DOCSLIB.ORG

Veganism As a Food Ethic (9370 Words)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Veganism As a Food Ethic (9370 Words) Veganism as a Food Ethic (9370 words) Corey Katz and Tristram McPherson Penultimate version To appear in The Handbook of Eating and Drinking Introduction Millions of people around the world are vegan. But what precisely is veganism? What can be said in favor of a vegan food ethic? And what are the implications of adopting such an ethic? This chapter takes up these questions. Section §1 introduces the idea of veganism as a food ethic. It distinguishes veganism from neighboring views and explains different ways of understanding a vegan ethic. Few people just find themselves with a vegan ethic, in the way that you might find yourself angry, or having just binge-watched an entire season of a trashy TV show. Often, at least, people become vegan for what they take to be good reasons. In this chapter, we suggest a simple framework for reasoning about veganism. On this framework, we first identify (some of) what is valuable (§2). Then, we consider ways of using our conclusions about value to assess animal agriculture, individuals’ food choices, and social and political institutions (§3). Although we will occasionally argue for conclusions in this chapter, our main aim is not to argue for or against veganism. (For an argument in favor of veganism, see McPherson 2016). Rather, it is to put the reader in a position to understand and critically evaluate the most important reasons that have been offered for embracing or rejecting a vegan ethic. 1. Veganism and food ethics introduced In this section, we aim to orient the reader to different ways of understanding what a vegan ethic might be. We begin by distinguishing the vegan pattern of eating from others. We then introduce the idea of an ethic and discuss different ways of understanding veganism as an ethic. Finally, we introduce the use of reasoning as a basis for adopting or retaining a vegan ethic. This section will prepare the reader for the following sections, which explore important kinds of reasoning that one might use to argue for or against veganism. We can begin by provisionally understanding veganism as a pattern of eating which does not involve the consumption of products made from animals (such as meat), or by animals (such as milk, cheese, or eggs). It is useful to distinguish this vegan pattern from several other salient patterns. These include: ● The omnivore, who eats both plant and animal products ● The lessmeatarian, who limits but does not eliminate their eating of animal products (Discussed in Bittman 2007) Katz and McPherson Veganism as a Food Ethic 2 ● The pescatarian, who eats seafood, but otherwise refrains from eating meat ● The ostrovegan, who eats plant products as well as some shellfish (Go Vegan Box, n.d.) ● The vegetarian, who eats food made from plants, and food made by animals (such as milk), but not food made from animals ● The fruitarian, who only eats products made by plants, such as fruits, nuts or seeds, but not foods made from plants, or foods made from or by animals ● The freegan, who seeks to eat in a way that is less wasteful and “consumerist,” and more environmentally friendly than alternative diets, for example by focusing on recovering edible food that has been discarded by corporate restaurants or supermarkets (Freegan Info 2018) ● The locavore, who aims to eat locally produced food (Barnhill 2016) ● The person who refrains from eating gluten ● The person who seeks to eat only organically grown food As should be clear from this list, the vegan pattern is more restrictive than some of these alternatives (such as the omnivore, vegetarian, and ostrovegan), less restrictive than others (the fruitarian), and distinct but compatible with others (the freegan, the locavore, etc.). While the preceding provides a provisional understanding of veganism, it is not adequate as a characterization. For example, suppose that Abbas scrupulously avoids animal products, but that his rival sometimes sneaks some beef broth into his soup. It is plausible that Abbas counts as vegan despite sometimes eating animal products. By contrast, suppose that Bita would eat meat if she could, but finds herself on a desert island with only fruits and vegetables to eat. Even if Bita has a vegan diet, it is plausible that she is not vegan. Finally suppose that Caz believes that it is wrong to eat animal products, but occasionally succumbs to cravings for cheese. We might call Caz a weak-willed vegan. These examples show that veganism is best understood as a feature of a person’s psychology, not merely his or her behavior. Specifically, veganism appears to be a kind of practical stance or commitment. Perhaps, to be a vegan is to embrace vegan eating as in some way better than less restrictive alternatives. We will call veganism understood in this way a vegan ethic. So understood, there will be many variants of the vegan ethic. For example, one could think that consuming animal products is wrong. Or that vegan eating is an ideal to aspire to (Gruen and Jones 2016). Or, less intellectually, one could simply be against consuming animal products. Vegan ethics can also vary in whether they disfavor consuming animal products given certain facts about how things are, or more strongly, disfavor it however things are. An analogy may help to illustrate this contrast. There are two kinds of death-penalty abolitionists. Katz and McPherson Veganism as a Food Ethic 3 Some think that in principle, killing could never be a just punishment. Others think that the death penalty could in principle be just, but that given facts about our actual institutions, it should be abolished. Once we think of veganism as an ethic, it is easy to see that the scope of vegan concern can vary as well. Some vegan ethics focus narrowly on eating, but others do not. For example, many vegan ethics oppose wearing animal products, or using them for furniture, as much as eating such products. Some also take their vegan concerns to extend to questions of which policies and institutions to support, and what stance they should take towards non-vegan persons. For example, should they attempt to convince others to become vegan? Should they hold omnivores responsible for their wrongdoing? We return to the scope of vegan concern in §3.3. In what follows, we will largely be concerned to explore careful reasoning that can be used in order to evaluate vegan ethics. It is worth emphasizing that not everyone who accepts a vegan ethic does so on the basis of reasoned arguments. For example, someone might watch a video of factory farming and be motivated to adopt a vegan ethic as a direct response to their horror at the treatment of animals. Some might even be suspicious of, or opposed to, the use of reasoned arguments to evaluate veganism. A vivid literary exemplar of this is provided by the character of Elizabeth Costello, portrayed in J. M. Coetzee’s novel The Lives of Animals. In her first lecture, Costello implores her audience to exercise their capacity for sympathy, not for reason (2001, 34). She refuses to offer ethical principles for her audience to consider, instead asking them to open their hearts to animals (2001, 37). Her lecture suggests that she distrusts the ability of reasoning – exemplified by the philosophers she discusses – to properly orient one to the ethical question at hand. Costello’s view deserves serious attention. Reasoning can and does sometimes lead us astray, and there is no guarantee that it is the most reliable means to orient our attitudes regarding non-human animals and veganism. For example, watching vivid videos may be more effective than reasoned argument as a way to move many people towards veganism. Despite this, we think that much can be learned from examining reasoning about vegan ethics. Consider three points. First, reasoned arguments in favor of veganism can complement the exercise of sympathy. For example, it may make it more difficult to rationalize away one’s sympathetic reactions. Second, reasoning can potentially be illuminating in ways that exercises of sympathy (for example) are not. When successful, reasoning can help us to understand why we ought to treat non-human animals in certain ways, whether we have sympathetic reactions to them or not. Third, reasoning can Katz and McPherson Veganism as a Food Ethic 4 potentially be informative in ways that the bare exercise of sympathy is not. For example, suppose that one were extremely sympathetic to the plight of non- human animals. Should such sympathy lead one towards veganism, or instead to ostroveganism, ethical omnivorism, or another of the patterns of eating mentioned above? Plausibly, reasoning is needed at least to see what precisely a certain sympathetic reaction calls for. In this chapter, we will focus on reasoned arguments concerning veganism. This is in part because of the significance of such reasoning, just mentioned. But it is also because our professional expertise is in reasoning about ethical questions, not in aptly eliciting emotional reactions in our audience. We now want to say a little about the sorts of evidence that we will appeal to in reasoning about veganism. This evidence contrasts with the characteristic sorts of evidence deployed in other academic disciplines. For example, in many such disciplines, one paradigm of excellent evidence is the sort that can be summarized by a statistically significant result in a well-designed study. Where such evidence bears on ethical questions, it is of course important. But many philosophers working in ethics doubt that such evidence can settle many ethical questions. For example, suppose that one established beyond controversy a set of facts about how animals in a given factory farm are treated: the shortness of their lives, the mutilations and illnesses they suffer, their inability to exercise those capacities characteristic of life for their species, etc.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • NEW TITLES in BIOETHICS Annual Cumulation Volume 20, 1994
    NATIONAL REFERENCE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS LITERATURE THE JOSEPH AND ROSE KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 20057 NEW TITLES IN BIOETHICS Annual Cumulation Volume 20, 1994 (Includes Syllabus Exchange Catalog) Lucinda Fitch Huttlinger, Editor Gregory P. Cammett, Managing Editor ISSN 0361-6347 A NOTE TO OUR READERS . Funding for the purchase of the materials cited in NEW TITLES IN BIOETHICS was severely reduced in September 1994. We are grateful for your donations, as well as your recom­ mendations to your publishers to forward review copies to the Editor. In addition to being listed here, all English-language titles accepted for the collection will be considered for inclusion in the BIOETHICSLINE database, produced at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics under contract with the National Library of Medicine. Your efforts to support this publication and the dissemination of bioethics information in general are sincerely appreciated. NEW TITLES IN BIOETHICS is published four times Inquiries regarding NEW TITLES IN BIOETHICS per year (quarterly) by the National Reference Center should be addressed to: for Bioethics Literature, Kennedy Institute of Ethics. Gregory Cammett, Managing Editor Annual Cumulations are published in the following year (regarding subscriptions and claims) as separate publications. NEW TITLES IN BIOETHICS is a listing by subject of recent additions OR to the National Reference Center's collection. (The subject classification scheme is reproduced in full with Lucinda Fitch Huttlinger, Editor each issue; it can also be found at the end of the (regarding review copies, gifts, and exchanges) cumulated edition.) With the exception of syllabi listed NEW TITLES IN BIOETHICS as part of our Syllabus Exchange program, and docu­ National Reference Center for Bioethics ments in the section New Publications from the Ken­ Literature nedy Institute of Ethics, materials listed herein are not Kennedy Institute of Ethics available from the National Reference Center.
    [Show full text]
  • 4​Th​ MINDING ANIMALS CONFERENCE CIUDAD DE
    th 4 ​ MINDING ANIMALS CONFERENCE ​ CIUDAD DE MÉXICO, 17 TO 24 JANUARY, 2018 SOCIAL PROGRAMME: ROYAL PEDREGAL HOTEL ACADEMIC PROGRAMME: NATIONAL AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO Auditorio Alfonso Caso and Anexos de la Facultad de Derecho FINAL PROGRAMME (Online version linked to abstracts. Download PDF here) 1/47 All delegates please note: ​ 1. Presentation slots may have needed to be moved by the organisers, and may appear in a different place from that of the final printed programme. Please consult the schedule located in the Conference Programme upon arrival at the Conference for your presentation time. 2. Please note that presenters have to ensure the following times for presentation to allow for adequate time for questions from the floor and smooth transition of sessions. Delegates must not stray from their allocated 20 minutes. Further, delegates are welcome to move within sessions, therefore presenters MUST limit their talk to the allocated time. Therefore, Q&A will be AFTER each talk, and NOT at the end of the three presentations. Plenary and Invited Talks – 45 min. presentation and 15 min. discussion (Q&A). 3. For panels, each panellist must stick strictly to a 10 minute time frame, before discussion with the floor commences. 4. Note that co-authors may be presenting at the conference in place of, or with the main author. For all co-authors, delegates are advised to consult the Conference Abstracts link on the Minding Animals website. Use of the term et al is provided where there is more than two authors ​ ​ of an abstract. 5. Moderator notes will be available at all front desks in tutorial rooms, along with Time Sheets (5, 3 and 1 minute Left).
    [Show full text]
  • George Sher Curriculum Vitae
    George Sher Professional Experience Fairleigh Dickinson University Instructor, Philosophy 1966-72 (full-time after 1968) Assistant Professor, Philosophy 1972-74 (tenured 1974) University of Vermont Associate Professor, Philosophy 1974-80 (tenured 1978) Professor, Philosophy, 1980-91 Acting Chair, Department of Philosophy, 1985-86 Rice University Herbert S. Autrey Professor of Philosophy, 1991- Chair, Department of Philosophy, 1993-2000 Publications BOOKS Desert, Princeton University Press, 1987; paperback, 1989. Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Chinese edition (Hebei People's Publishing House) forthcoming. Approximate Justice: Studies in Non-Ideal Theory, Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. In Praise of Blame, Oxford University Press, 2006. Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2009. Equality for Inegalitarians, Cambridge University Press, 2014 BOOKS EDITED Moral Philosophy: Selected Readings, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987; 2nd ed. 1995. Reason at Work: Introductory Readings in Philosophy, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984; 2nd ed. 1989; 3d ed. 1995. Co-editors Steven M. Cahn and Patricia Kitcher (all editions) and Peter Markie (3d edition). Social and Political Philosophy: Contemporary Readings, Harcourt Brace, 1999. Co-editor Baruch Brody Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory, Routledge, 2012 ARTICLES "Reasons and Intensionality," The Journal of Philosophy, March 27, 1969. "Causal Explanation and the Vocabulary of Action," Mind, January, 1973. "Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Winter, 1975. Reprinted in [ PDF ] Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., Equality and Preferential Treatment, Princeton University Press,1977. Thomas M. Mappes and Jane Zembaty, eds., Social Ethics, McGraw-Hill, 1987. James Rachels, ed, Moral Problems, Harper & Row, 3rd edition, 1979. John Arthur, ed., Morality and Moral Controversy, Prientice-Hall, 1981.
    [Show full text]
  • An Inquiry Into Animal Rights Vegan Activists' Perception and Practice of Persuasion
    An Inquiry into Animal Rights Vegan Activists’ Perception and Practice of Persuasion by Angela Gunther B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2006 Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the School of Communication ! Angela Gunther 2012 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Summer 2012 All rights reserved. However, in accordance with the Copyright Act of Canada, this work may be reproduced, without authorization, under the conditions for “Fair Dealing.” Therefore, limited reproduction of this work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review and news reporting is likely to be in accordance with the law, particularly if cited appropriately. Approval Name: Angela Gunther Degree: Master of Arts Title of Thesis: An Inquiry into Animal Rights Vegan Activists’ Perception and Practice of Persuasion Examining Committee: Chair: Kathi Cross Gary McCarron Senior Supervisor Associate Professor Robert Anderson Supervisor Professor Michael Kenny External Examiner Professor, Anthropology SFU Date Defended/Approved: June 28, 2012 ii Partial Copyright Licence iii Abstract This thesis interrogates the persuasive practices of Animal Rights Vegan Activists (ARVAs) in order to determine why and how ARVAs fail to convince people to become and stay veg*n, and what they might do to succeed. While ARVAs and ARVAism are the focus of this inquiry, the approaches, concepts and theories used are broadly applicable and therefore this investigation is potentially useful for any activist or group of activists wishing to interrogate and improve their persuasive practices. Keywords: Persuasion; Communication for Social Change; Animal Rights; Veg*nism; Activism iv Table of Contents Approval ............................................................................................................................. ii! Partial Copyright Licence .................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Discomfort and Moral Impediment
    Discomfort and Moral Impediment Discomfort and Moral Impediment: The Human Situation, Radical Bioethics and Procreation By Julio Cabrera Discomfort and Moral Impediment: The Human Situation, Radical Bioethics and Procreation By Julio Cabrera This book first published 2019 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2019 by Julio Cabrera Copyright © 2016 Editora Universidade de Brasília. All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-1803-5 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-1803-2 CONTENTS Preface ..................................................................................................... viii Part I: Ethics and the Human Situation Chapter One ................................................................................................ 2 The Minimal Ethical Articulation (MEA) The Role of Feelings and Sympathy in Ethics ...................................... 6 Chapter Two ............................................................................................. 10 Human Life and Discomfort (The Non-Structural Arguments) Chapter Three ........................................................................................... 23 The
    [Show full text]
  • Principles and Particularity: the Roles of Cases in Bioethics
    Principles and Particularity: The Roles of Cases in Bioethics JOHN D. ARRAS* INTRODUCTION Twenty-five years ago, when I was a graduate student in philosophy, the study of ethics had fallen on hard times. Some of the leading exponents of ethical theory had succeeded, for the time being, in showing either that all ethical judgments were reducible to emotive reactions-and hence irrational and indefensible'-or that the study of ethics, properly understood, had more to do with probing the nuances of the "language of morals"2 than with reflecting on the normative moral experience of real people in their mundane or professional capacities. The study of ethics had become a rarefied, specialized, technical, and, above all, dry discipline. Given the sad state of the field, many had begun to wonder whether political philosophy was dead. To be sure, books and articles continued to be written, and courses continued to be taught, but for many of us at the time such behaviors might have resembled the residual motions of patients in a persistent vegetative state more than genuine signs of life. The real "action" in philosophy lay elsewhere, around the "linguistic turn"3 or in continental theory, but certainly not in ethics. Not coincidentally, during my undergraduate and graduate years I was never exposed to anything remotely resembling a "case study" in ethics. If ethics was ever to establish itself as an intellectual enterprise worthy of respect, students were told, it would "have to ignore the grubby world of everyday moral concerns and concentrate instead on theory, abstraction, and the meaning of various moral terms.4 In my work today, however, I am mired in cases, both at the hospital, where the exigencies of clinical problems preclude leisurely invocations of philosophical theory, and even in my university classes on bioethics and the philosophy of law.
    [Show full text]
  • Recommended Further Readings
    Recommended Further Readings Bioethics Beauchamp, Tom, and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, ). O’Neill, Onora, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ). Steinbock, Bonnie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, ). Sugarman, Jeremy, and Daniel Sulmasy (eds.), Methods in Medical Ethics, nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, ). Veatch, Robert, A Theory of Medical Ethics (New York: Basic Books, ). Moral Philosophy Griffin, James, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon, ). Hooker, Brad, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Clarendon, ). Kamm, Frances, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (New York: Oxford University Press, ). Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, ). Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ). Political and Legal Philosophy Appiah, K. Anthony, and Amy Guttman, Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ). Brock, Gillian, Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). Feinberg, Joel, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, ). Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy, nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, ). Nussbaum, Martha, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, ). Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.33.42, on 02 Oct 2021 at 21:04:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009026710.012 Recommended Further Readings Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ). Sandel, Michael, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, ).
    [Show full text]
  • Ethics and Animals Fall 2020
    Ethics and Animals Fall 2020 Description This course examines the morality of our treatment of nonhuman animals. We start with a survey of moral theory. Do animals have moral status? Do we have a right to harm or kill some animals in order to benefit or save others? We consider these questions from a variety of moral perspectives, including consequentialism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and feminist ethics. We then apply these ideas to different kinds of animal use. For example, what is the morality of our treatment of animals in food, research, captivity, and the wild? Finally, we will explore ethical questions that arise for animal activists, including about what ends they should pursue, what means they should take towards those ends, and how they should relate to other social movements. General Information Time: T 5:00{7:30 ET Place: online Instructor: Name: Jeff Sebo Email: jeff[email protected] Office: online Office Hours: M 3-5pm ET 1 Readings The required books for this class are: Julia Driver, Ethics: The Fundamentals; Lori Gruen, Ethics and Animals; and Gary Francione & Robert Garner, The Animal Rights Debate. These books are available online, and the Gruen and Francione & Garner books are also available for free at the NYU library website. All readings not from the required books will be posted on the course website. Grading Your grades will be determined as follows: • Papers (75%): You will write three papers explaining and evaluating the ideas and arguments discussed in class. You will email this paper to [email protected]. For each paper, you can either create your own prompt (provided that you clear it with us in advance) or select from prompts that we create.
    [Show full text]
  • Scarlet Letters: Meat, Normality and the Power of Shaming
    Scarlet Letters: Meat, Normality and the Power of Shaming By Nicolas Delon In 2018 and 2019, a series of attacks by vegan activists struck meat- related businesses in France. Deemed “extreme” and “violent” by butchers, these actions invite us to reflect on the ethics of activism. Is it ever morally permissible to engage in illegal activism? Are tactics such as shaming even effective? As of this writing, a butcher shop in Paris was just vandalized, allegedly by vegan activists. From November 2018 to February 2019, a series of attacks struck meat-related businesses in the north of France. The damage included broken windows, fires at butchers’ shops, fishmongers, and restaurants, inflicted on nocturnal raids where activists also scrawled slogans such as “Stop Speciesism” and “Assassins”. Last June, butchers wrote to the interior ministry a letter to request increased protection, worrying about the consequences of “excessive media hype around vegan lifestyles”, and that vegans wanted to “impose their lifestyle on the immense majority of people”. Two animal rights activists were recently convicted of criminal damage by a court in Lille. “We needed an example to be made of them so that these actions by small groups with extremist and profoundly violent ideas come to an end,” said the head of the local butchers’ federation, Laurent Rigaud. France is no stranger to protests but the attacks shocked many in a country where gastronomy takes pride of place in culture. The attacks took place against the background of growing discussions around meat, animal abuse, veganism and speciesism, fueled in part by a string of undercover investigations led by the animal rights organization L-214 in slaughterhouses.
    [Show full text]
  • Chimpanzee Rights: the Philosophers' Brief
    Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief By Kristin Andrews Gary Comstock G.K.D. Crozier Sue Donaldson Andrew Fenton Tyler M. John L. Syd M Johnson Robert C. Jones Will Kymlicka Letitia Meynell Nathan Nobis David M. Peña-Guzmán Jeff Sebo 1 For Kiko and Tommy 2 Contents Acknowledgments…4 Preface Chapter 1 Introduction: Chimpanzees, Rights, and Conceptions of Personhood….5 Chapter 2 The Species Membership Conception………17 Chapter 3 The Social Contract Conception……….48 Chapter 4 The Community Membership Conception……….69 Chapter 5 The Capacities Conception……….85 Chapter 6 Conclusions……….115 Index 3 Acknowledgements The authors thank the many people who have helped us throughout the development of this book. James Rocha, Bernard Rollin, Adam Shriver, and Rebecca Walker were fellow travelers with us on the amicus brief, but were unable to follow us to the book. Research assistants Andrew Lopez and Caroline Vardigans provided invaluable support and assistance at crucial moments. We have also benefited from discussion with audiences at the Stanford Law School and Dalhousie Philosophy Department Colloquium, where the amicus brief was presented, and from the advice of wise colleagues, including Charlotte Blattner, Matthew Herder, Syl Ko, Tim Krahn, and Gordon McOuat. Lauren Choplin, Kevin Schneider, and Steven Wise patiently helped us navigate the legal landscape as we worked on the brief, related media articles, and the book, and they continue to fight for freedom for Kiko and Tommy, and many other nonhuman animals. 4 1 Introduction: Chimpanzees, Rights, and Conceptions of Personhood In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017).
    [Show full text]
  • Trends in Marketing for Books on Animal Rights
    Portland State University PDXScholar Book Publishing Final Research Paper English 5-2017 Trends in Marketing for Books on Animal Rights Gloria H. Mulvihill Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/eng_bookpubpaper Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, and the Publishing Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Mulvihill, Gloria H., "Trends in Marketing for Books on Animal Rights" (2017). Book Publishing Final Research Paper. 26. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/eng_bookpubpaper/26 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Publishing Final Research Paper by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: [email protected]. Mulvihill 1 Trends in Marketing for Books on Animal Rights Gloria H. Mulvihill MA in Book Publishing Thesis Spring 2017 Mulvihill 2 Abstract Though many of us have heard the mantra that we shouldn’t judge a book by its cover, marketers in book publishing bank on the fact that people do and will continue to buy and read books based not only on content, but its aesthetic appeal. This essay will examine the top four marketing trends that can be observed on the Amazon listings for books published on animal rights within the last ten years, specifically relating to titles, cover design, and the intended audience. From graphic adaptations of animals to traditional textbook approaches and animal photography, publishers are striving to evoke interest and investment in literature concerning a politically charged and inherently personal topic.
    [Show full text]
  • CRITICAL TERMS for ANIMAL STUDIES
    CRITICAL TERMS for ANIMAL STUDIES Edited by LORI GRUEN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS Chicago and London Contents Introduction • Lori Gruen 1 1 Abolition • Claire Jean Kim 15 2 Activism • Jeff Sebo and Peter Singer 33 3 Anthropocentrism • Fiona Probyn- Rapsey 47 4 Behavior • Alexandra Horowitz 64 5 Biopolitics • Dinesh Joseph Wadiwel 79 6 Captivity • Lori Marino 99 7 Difference • Kari Weil 112 8 Emotion • Barbara J. King 125 9 Empathy • Lori Gruen 141 10 Ethics • Alice Crary 154 11 Extinction • Thom van Dooren 169 12 Kinship • Agustín Fuentes and Natalie Porter 182 13 Law • Kristen Stilt 197 14 Life • Eduardo Kohn 210 15 Matter • James K. Stanescu 222 16 Mind • Kristin Andrews 234 17 Pain • Victoria A. Braithwaite 251 18 Personhood • Colin Dayan 267 19 Postcolonial • Maneesha Deckha 280 20 Rationality • Christine M. Korsgaard 294 21 Representation • Robert R. McKay 307 22 Rights • Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson 320 23 Sanctuary • Timothy Pachirat 337 24 Sentience • Gary Varner 356 25 Sociality • Cynthia Willett and Malini Suchak 370 26 Species • Harriet Ritvo 383 27 Vegan • Annie Potts and Philip Armstrong 395 28 Vulnerability • Anat Pick 410 29 Welfare • Clare Palmer and Peter Sandøe 424 Acknowledgments 439 List of Contributors 441 Index 451 INTRODUCTION Lori Gruen Animal Studies is almost always described as a new, emerging, and growing field. A short while ago some Animal Studies scholars suggested that it “has a way to go before it can clearly see itself as an academic field” (Gorman 2012). Other scholars suggest that the “discipline” is a couple of decades old (DeMello 2012).
    [Show full text]