Veganism as a Food Ethic (9370 words) Corey Katz and Tristram McPherson Penultimate version To appear in The Handbook of Eating and Drinking Introduction Millions of people around the world are vegan. But what precisely is veganism? What can be said in favor of a vegan food ethic? And what are the implications of adopting such an ethic? This chapter takes up these questions. Section §1 introduces the idea of veganism as a food ethic. It distinguishes veganism from neighboring views and explains different ways of understanding a vegan ethic. Few people just find themselves with a vegan ethic, in the way that you might find yourself angry, or having just binge-watched an entire season of a trashy TV show. Often, at least, people become vegan for what they take to be good reasons. In this chapter, we suggest a simple framework for reasoning about veganism. On this framework, we first identify (some of) what is valuable (§2). Then, we consider ways of using our conclusions about value to assess animal agriculture, individuals’ food choices, and social and political institutions (§3). Although we will occasionally argue for conclusions in this chapter, our main aim is not to argue for or against veganism. (For an argument in favor of veganism, see McPherson 2016). Rather, it is to put the reader in a position to understand and critically evaluate the most important reasons that have been offered for embracing or rejecting a vegan ethic. 1. Veganism and food ethics introduced In this section, we aim to orient the reader to different ways of understanding what a vegan ethic might be. We begin by distinguishing the vegan pattern of eating from others. We then introduce the idea of an ethic and discuss different ways of understanding veganism as an ethic. Finally, we introduce the use of reasoning as a basis for adopting or retaining a vegan ethic. This section will prepare the reader for the following sections, which explore important kinds of reasoning that one might use to argue for or against veganism. We can begin by provisionally understanding veganism as a pattern of eating which does not involve the consumption of products made from animals (such as meat), or by animals (such as milk, cheese, or eggs). It is useful to distinguish this vegan pattern from several other salient patterns. These include: ● The omnivore, who eats both plant and animal products ● The lessmeatarian, who limits but does not eliminate their eating of animal products (Discussed in Bittman 2007) Katz and McPherson Veganism as a Food Ethic 2 ● The pescatarian, who eats seafood, but otherwise refrains from eating meat ● The ostrovegan, who eats plant products as well as some shellfish (Go Vegan Box, n.d.) ● The vegetarian, who eats food made from plants, and food made by animals (such as milk), but not food made from animals ● The fruitarian, who only eats products made by plants, such as fruits, nuts or seeds, but not foods made from plants, or foods made from or by animals ● The freegan, who seeks to eat in a way that is less wasteful and “consumerist,” and more environmentally friendly than alternative diets, for example by focusing on recovering edible food that has been discarded by corporate restaurants or supermarkets (Freegan Info 2018) ● The locavore, who aims to eat locally produced food (Barnhill 2016) ● The person who refrains from eating gluten ● The person who seeks to eat only organically grown food As should be clear from this list, the vegan pattern is more restrictive than some of these alternatives (such as the omnivore, vegetarian, and ostrovegan), less restrictive than others (the fruitarian), and distinct but compatible with others (the freegan, the locavore, etc.). While the preceding provides a provisional understanding of veganism, it is not adequate as a characterization. For example, suppose that Abbas scrupulously avoids animal products, but that his rival sometimes sneaks some beef broth into his soup. It is plausible that Abbas counts as vegan despite sometimes eating animal products. By contrast, suppose that Bita would eat meat if she could, but finds herself on a desert island with only fruits and vegetables to eat. Even if Bita has a vegan diet, it is plausible that she is not vegan. Finally suppose that Caz believes that it is wrong to eat animal products, but occasionally succumbs to cravings for cheese. We might call Caz a weak-willed vegan. These examples show that veganism is best understood as a feature of a person’s psychology, not merely his or her behavior. Specifically, veganism appears to be a kind of practical stance or commitment. Perhaps, to be a vegan is to embrace vegan eating as in some way better than less restrictive alternatives. We will call veganism understood in this way a vegan ethic. So understood, there will be many variants of the vegan ethic. For example, one could think that consuming animal products is wrong. Or that vegan eating is an ideal to aspire to (Gruen and Jones 2016). Or, less intellectually, one could simply be against consuming animal products. Vegan ethics can also vary in whether they disfavor consuming animal products given certain facts about how things are, or more strongly, disfavor it however things are. An analogy may help to illustrate this contrast. There are two kinds of death-penalty abolitionists. Katz and McPherson Veganism as a Food Ethic 3 Some think that in principle, killing could never be a just punishment. Others think that the death penalty could in principle be just, but that given facts about our actual institutions, it should be abolished. Once we think of veganism as an ethic, it is easy to see that the scope of vegan concern can vary as well. Some vegan ethics focus narrowly on eating, but others do not. For example, many vegan ethics oppose wearing animal products, or using them for furniture, as much as eating such products. Some also take their vegan concerns to extend to questions of which policies and institutions to support, and what stance they should take towards non-vegan persons. For example, should they attempt to convince others to become vegan? Should they hold omnivores responsible for their wrongdoing? We return to the scope of vegan concern in §3.3. In what follows, we will largely be concerned to explore careful reasoning that can be used in order to evaluate vegan ethics. It is worth emphasizing that not everyone who accepts a vegan ethic does so on the basis of reasoned arguments. For example, someone might watch a video of factory farming and be motivated to adopt a vegan ethic as a direct response to their horror at the treatment of animals. Some might even be suspicious of, or opposed to, the use of reasoned arguments to evaluate veganism. A vivid literary exemplar of this is provided by the character of Elizabeth Costello, portrayed in J. M. Coetzee’s novel The Lives of Animals. In her first lecture, Costello implores her audience to exercise their capacity for sympathy, not for reason (2001, 34). She refuses to offer ethical principles for her audience to consider, instead asking them to open their hearts to animals (2001, 37). Her lecture suggests that she distrusts the ability of reasoning – exemplified by the philosophers she discusses – to properly orient one to the ethical question at hand. Costello’s view deserves serious attention. Reasoning can and does sometimes lead us astray, and there is no guarantee that it is the most reliable means to orient our attitudes regarding non-human animals and veganism. For example, watching vivid videos may be more effective than reasoned argument as a way to move many people towards veganism. Despite this, we think that much can be learned from examining reasoning about vegan ethics. Consider three points. First, reasoned arguments in favor of veganism can complement the exercise of sympathy. For example, it may make it more difficult to rationalize away one’s sympathetic reactions. Second, reasoning can potentially be illuminating in ways that exercises of sympathy (for example) are not. When successful, reasoning can help us to understand why we ought to treat non-human animals in certain ways, whether we have sympathetic reactions to them or not. Third, reasoning can Katz and McPherson Veganism as a Food Ethic 4 potentially be informative in ways that the bare exercise of sympathy is not. For example, suppose that one were extremely sympathetic to the plight of non- human animals. Should such sympathy lead one towards veganism, or instead to ostroveganism, ethical omnivorism, or another of the patterns of eating mentioned above? Plausibly, reasoning is needed at least to see what precisely a certain sympathetic reaction calls for. In this chapter, we will focus on reasoned arguments concerning veganism. This is in part because of the significance of such reasoning, just mentioned. But it is also because our professional expertise is in reasoning about ethical questions, not in aptly eliciting emotional reactions in our audience. We now want to say a little about the sorts of evidence that we will appeal to in reasoning about veganism. This evidence contrasts with the characteristic sorts of evidence deployed in other academic disciplines. For example, in many such disciplines, one paradigm of excellent evidence is the sort that can be summarized by a statistically significant result in a well-designed study. Where such evidence bears on ethical questions, it is of course important. But many philosophers working in ethics doubt that such evidence can settle many ethical questions. For example, suppose that one established beyond controversy a set of facts about how animals in a given factory farm are treated: the shortness of their lives, the mutilations and illnesses they suffer, their inability to exercise those capacities characteristic of life for their species, etc.