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BOOK REVIEW COMPTE RENDU the Making of a Deal: Trudeau, Patriation and the Charter

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BOOK REVIEW COMPTE RENDU the Making of a Deal: Trudeau, Patriation and the Charter BOOK REVIEW COMPTE RENDU The making of a deal: Trudeau, patriation and the Charter Ron Graham. The Last Act: Pierre Trudeau, the Gang of Eight, and the Fight for Canada. Toronto: Allan Lane Canada, 2011. Review by Michael Behiels on Graham has written a Canada full control over its foreign graphed play in five acts. The Prologue remarkable account of how and and defence policy and trade, and the sets the troubled background for the R why Canadians finally became ending of appeals to the Judicial momentous roll-of-the dice, high- on November 5, 1981, a truly sovereign Committee of the Privy Council in stakes federal-provincial constitutional people. This occurred after Canadians 1949, Canadians remained a legal conference that would take place in had lived under and were governed by colony of Great Britain. Why? Our fed- November 1981. The national unity an Imperial Statute, the British North eral and provincial political leaders, crisis had grown topsy-turvy: the rise America Act, 1867, for over a century. who believed unanimity was essential, and consolidation of the Québécois On this day Prime Minister Pierre had failed on several occasions to agree secessionist movement; the failure of Trudeau and nine premiers put their upon an amending formula. The Last the Victoria Charter in 1971; the elec- signatures on an agreement that would Act, the story of how Canada became a tion of a Parti Québécois secessionist become the Constitution Act, 1982. fully independent nation-state, is government in 1976; Trudeau’s failed Canadians’ renewed Constitution recounted with great clarity, nuance, attempts to restart constitutional defined Canada as a constitutional candor and balance by one of Canada’s negotiations followed by his defeat in democracy and assigned the legislators, great non-fiction storytellers, Ron 1979 and return in 1980; the highly the executives and the courts as the Graham. He understands and explains divisive 1980 referendum on the seces- guarantors of the Constitution. The the competing conceptions of the sion of Quebec that the federalist No Constitution Act, 1982, patriated and source Canadian sovereignty, the elites forces won by 60 to 40 percent; and Canadianized the colonial BNA Act, versus the people. Those familiar with finally, the abject failure of the provided a range of amending formu- the several rounds of mega-constitu- Constitutional Conference of lae, enhanced dramatically provincial tional negotiations from 1967 to 1982 September 1980 when the premiers to control over nonrenewable resources, will discover that Graham’s succinct a man balked at Trudeau’s threat to and guaranteed equalization grants. Its and vivid account adds some new unilaterally patriate the BNA Act with centrepiece was the groundbreaking insights, thanks largely to his exten- the Victoria Charter’s region-based Canadian Charter of Rights and sive interviews and his access to some amending formula and a minimalist Freedoms, one that guaranteed funda- new documentation. His story, which charter of rights and freedoms that mental freedoms; expansive equality has some of the most piercing portraits entrenched official language rights. rights; language rights, including long of the main actors, pays well-deserved In Act 2, Graham takes the reader overdue education rights for Official homage to our late 20th century into the morning of November 4, 1981, language minorities; the recognition of Fathers of Re-Confederation — they of the highly charged constitutional Canada’s multicultural makeup; and were still all white men in suits. conference dealing with the future of the recognition of the Aboriginal peo- Graham’s welcome account comes on Canada. Fed up with the premiers’ rejec- ples, including status and nonstatus the 30th anniversary of this event, one tion in September 1980 of a resolution Indians, the Métis and the Inuit. that is, and will be, central to our con- to patriate the BNA, Act, 1867, with a stitutional history. region-based amending formula and a espite the hard-earned 1931 The Last Act is modelled on a charter, Trudeau decided to move uni- D Statute of Westminster, which gave superbly scripted and well-choreo- laterally. Nevertheless, he was 82 OPTIONS POLITIQUES DÉCEMBRE 2011-JANVIER 2012 The making of a deal: Trudeau, patriation and the Charter BOOK REVIEW compelled by an ambiguous 1981 n Act 3, the centrepiece in this how and why during the late day and Supreme Court Patriation Reference case I drama, Graham reveals how and throughout the late night of ruling to convene one last constitution- why the western premiers — led by a Wednesday November 4, Chrétien, al conference to garner the support of a very astute Blakeney and his wily side- Romanow, Meekison, McMurtry and substantial number of premiers so the kick Roy Romanow and fully backed other players hammered out a deal that process would be politically legitimate. by the more aloof but determined their respective bosses could live with. Ottawa’s Conference Centre was Peter Lougheed and his perceptive Based on their knowledge that buzzing with tension as Trudeau and his minister Peter Meekison — brilliantly Lévesque and Morin would veto every compromise required for a Graham’s portraits of the central players are quite superb. deal, they decided not to Trudeau and Lévesque, two scorpions, one cerebral the other inform Lévesque until the morning. Throughout the emotional, in a bottle, held starkly contrasting visions of negotiating process Premier nationalism, the role of the state and Quebec’s place in, or Davis, who was determined out of, the Canadian federation. to derail a referendum, remained in constant com- allies, Bill Davis of Ontario and Richard outmanoeuvred Lévesque. They got munication with the group. Davis then Hatfield of New Brunswick, confronted the constitutional deal, and the power played his ace. He called Trudeau to let face to face the recently created Gang of that would eventually flow from it, him know that he thought the deal was Eight — Bill Bennett of BC, Peter that the West so desperately wanted. a good compromise and that Trudeau Lougheed of Alberta, Allan Blakeney of What is clear from Graham’s brilliant should support it. Ottawa would accept Saskatchewan, Sterling Lyon of Manito- account of the players and their Alberta’s equality of the provinces in ba, René Lévesque of Quebec, John manoeuvres is that the possibility of a the 7/50 general amending formula Buchanan of Nova Scotia, Angus “kitchen accord” between Jean while the provinces would accept the MacLean of Prince Edward Island and Chrétien, Romanow and Roy comprehensive Charter with a Brian Peckford of Newfoundland. McMurtry resided in the months of notwithstanding clause. If the deal was intense and secretive bilateral negotia- rejected, Davis informed Trudeau that raham’s portraits of the central tions that were conducted by these he would not support him in London. G players are quite superb. Trudeau three behind-the-scenes players, espe- The jig was up! A shaken Trudeau told and Lévesque, two scorpions, one cere- cially between the “Uke and Tuque” — his ministers and advisers of the turn of bral, the other emotional, in a bottle, Romanow and Chrétien. Lévesque’s events. He authorized Chrétien to get held starkly contrasting visions of constitutional team, led by Claude the best deal he could. Trudeau reluc- nationalism, the role of the state and Morin, was never really in the loop. tantly accepted the 7/50 amending for- Quebec’s place in, or out of, the Lévesque was nominally part of the mula and the dreaded notwithstanding Canadian federation. The conference Gang of Eight as he served the purpose clause on fundamental rights on condi- was a coup de force during which of the western premiers who wanted a tion that it be renewed by legislators Trudeau had to break the Gang of deal but on their terms. Neither every five years. Chrétien and Trudeau Eight. If he failed, Trudeau would be Lévesque nor his advisers were ever hoped Lyon would not agree so that compelled to take unilateral action in really taken into the full confidence of Lévesque could not claim that Quebec the United Kingdom to patriate the Blakeney or Lougheed and their had been deliberately excluded. Alas. BNA Act with an amending process respective advisers. In short, they Lyon, in the midst of an election, did and a far more comprehensive charter rightly distrusted Lévesque’s motives. not want to be seen to be in bed with imposed on the government by the My own research and writing on the separatists so he agreed very reluc- people of Canada during parliamen- Lougheed concurs with Graham’s tantly to sign on to the deal. tary committee discussions over the interpretation. winter of 1980-81. Trudeau set the Once the Gang of Eight was bro- f course Lévesque, his ministers stage for the ultimate breakup of the ken, the Uke and the Tuque, with the O and advisers, once they learned Gang of Eight by getting Lévesque to support of Ontario’s McMurtry, got to of the deal at breakfast, were outraged. accept his proposal for referenda on work feverishly on a compromise deal Lévesque felt betrayed and humiliated the amending formula and the based on their discussions over the by his nemesis Trudeau who, he pro- Charter. Lévesque accepted because he summer and early fall. The making of claimed, had given up Quebec’s veto feared that Blakeney was going to bolt the deal played out in Act 4 is often by abandoning the regional amending and he believed that he could win a called erroneously “The Night of the formula. An embittered Lévesque, in referendum in Quebec. In Trudeau’s Long Knives.” Graham uses the term no frame of mind to push hard for words: “The cat is among the pigeons.” critically in his trenchant portrayal of concessions for Quebec that Trudeau POLICY OPTIONS 83 DECEMBER 2011-JANUARY 2012 Michael Behiels COMPTE RENDU was willing to offer, simply opted out rights of the Aboriginal peoples of The Mulroney and Robert Bourassa of the negotiations.
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