UNCLASSIFIED When Separated from Attachments

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REC1JAPPROVEl1-9 -2 018lsigned by Acting Director General (M) BTodd 201801135 United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART SECRET January 4, 20 I 8 B5 (UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachments)

ACTION MEMO FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL (M)

FROM: H - Charles S. Faulkner r SUBJECT: Congressional Request for Department of State Documents Relating to CFIUS review of the Uranium One Transaction (CDP-2017-00024)

Recommendation .That you approve the transmittal of documents responsive to three committees: the Senate Judiciary Committee, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regardirig Department of State review of a Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) transaction. (Approve/Disapprove by O1/10/20, 17)

Backgroun~ On October 12, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee sent a letter to the Secretary of State requesting information related to the D.epartment's actions to support approval of the acquisition of Uranium-One, an owner of U.S.-based uranium mining claim assets, by Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ), which was at the time a subsidiary of Russia's state energy corporation, Rosatom. On November 14, 2017, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (HOGR) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) jointly sent a similar letter to the Secretary ·of State.

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Attachments: Tab I - Incoming Senate Judiciary Committee letter Tab 2 - Incoming HPSCI/HOGR letter Tab 3 - Transmittal letter to Chairman Grassley Tab 4 - Transmittal letter to Chairman Nunes Tab 5 - Tr~nsmittal letter to Chainnan Gowdy

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Approved: H: Mary K. Waters (MKW)

Drafted: H: PMcNemey

Cleared: M: CCappiello (ok) A: MScholl (ok) LIM: KThomas (ok)

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CHARLESE. GRASSLE',,IOWA, CHAIRMAN ORRING HATCH.VTAH DIANNE~NSTrlN, CAIJFORNIA UNOITTO GRAHAM,SO\Jnt CAAOUNA PATfllCXJ,LEA.MY, VERMQNT JOHNCORNYN. rr'AAs RICHARDJ OUffBIN,o.LINOIS 0 MICMA£L·~.LEE,,UTAH SHELOONWHrtUtOUSE, RHOOE $UNO T!OCRIJ?.T(l(AS AMYIC1.08UCHAlt MINNESOTA BENSASSE,.NE8JIASI½ AL FRANKEN.M INNESOTA ~nitrd~mtrs· ~matt JEFFRJJ(E, ARIZONA !RELEAS E IN FULLI MIil!CRAPO. IDAHO ~~~~i:;.e,:',.;~;~;t\~~:~ COMMITTEEON THE :JUDICIARY MAZI! k. HIAOl"IO:HAWAU :: :'e~iseii~vtr:1J!:"A \Y,!\SHINGTON.OC 20510,0275

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October 12, 2017

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson Secretary U.S. Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secret~ry Tillerson:

In June 2015, I wrote to several member agencies on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) regarding the acquisition of Uranium One, an owner of U.S. based uranium assets, by Atornredmetzoloto (ARMZ), which is a subsidiary of Russia's state energy corporation, Rosatom. 1 The transaction raised a number of national security concerns because it effectively ceded twenty percent of U.S. uranium production capacity to tlie Russian government. 2

In that letter, I raised additional concerns related to potential conflicts of interest between the State Department and the transacting parties . These concerns stemmed frqm the fact that during critical stages of the acquisition approval, interested parties, such as the Chairman of Uranium One, Ian Telfer, made large donations-some in the millions of dollars-to the Clinton Foundation while Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State .3

In response to my inquiry, the Obama administration wrote that in October 20 I 0, CFIUS certified to Congress that "there [were] no unresolved national security concerns with the

1 Letter from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chainnan, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary to the Dep't of Justice, State, and Treasury (June 30, 2015 ). 2 Wilson Andrews, "Donations to the Clinton Foundation, and a Russian Uranium Takeover," THENEW YORK TIMES (April 22, 2015); Jo Becker and Mike McIntire, "Cash Flowed to Clinton Foundation-AmidRussian Uranium Deal," THENEW YORK TIMES · (April 23, 2015). See also, Uranium One to Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 29, 2013. Accessible at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML 1304/MLI 3043A505.pdf 3 In my June 30, 2015 letter, I noted the following: "Reports further indicate that between 2008 and 20 I 0, Uranium One and Fonner UrAsia investors donated $8.65 million to the Clinton Foundation. During this period of time, Uranium One's legal hold on the Kazakhstan-based uranium deposits was in doubt. Allegedly, Uranium One executives contacted U.S. Embassy officials in Kazakhstan to help ensure the validity of their mining licenses. According to The New York Times, the State Department cable explaining the circumstances was copied to Secre1aryC linton, among other individuals. In 2009, when the validity of the mining licenses was at issue, the Cha1nnan of Uranium One, Mr. Jan Telfer, donated $1 million to the Clinton Foundation via his family charity called the Femwood Foundation. In the same year, AllMZ acquired a 17% state in Uranium One and the parties sought an initial CFfUS review. In June 2010, Rosatom, via ARMZ, sought majority ownership in Uranium One. According to news reports, Mr. Telfer donated $250,000 to the Clinton Foundation during this crucial time. In total, Mr. Telfer donated over $2 million through 2013." Wilson Andrews, Dona/Ions to the Clinton Foundation. and a Russian Uranium Takeover, The New · York Times (April 22,2015); Jo Becker and Mike McIntire, Cash Flowed ta Clinton Foundation Amid'Russian Uranium Deal, The New York Times (April 23, 2015). ·

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Secretary Tillerson October 12, 2017 Page 2 of5

transaction" and that the transaction had been approved. 4 Further, the U.S. Treasury's response noted that "[n]o CFIUS agency proposed mitigation or prohibition of the transaction." 5

I am not convinced by these assurances. The sale of Uranium One resulted in a Russian government takeover of a significant portion of U.S. uranium mining capacity. In light of that fact, very serious questions remain about the basis for the finding that this transaction did not threaten to impair U.S. national security.

In addition, it has recently come to the Committee's attention that employees ofRosatom were involved in a criminal enterprise involving a conspiracy to commit extortion and money laundering during the time of the CFIUS transaction. According to court filings in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in 2009, the FBI began an investigation into corruption and extortion by senior managers of JSC Techsnabexport (Tenex), a subsidiary of Rosatom. 6 Tenex operated as the sole supplier and exporter of Russian Federation uranium and uranium enrichment services to nuclear power companies worldwide. 7 Tenex established a wholly-owned subsidiary company located in the Unit~d States called Tenam, which became Tenex's official representative in the United States. Tenex was run by Vadim Mikerin, a Russian national and Director of the Pan American Department of Tenex from 2004 to 2010. In . 2010, Mikerin became the executive director ofTenam until 2014. 8 As director ofTenam, he oversaw the shipment of uranium from Russia for use in American power plants under the "Megatons to Megawatts" program. 9 It has been reported that at one point the program fueled ten percent of U.S. electricity. 10

• CFTUSCertification to Congress, Case 10-40: Rosatom (Russian Federation)/UraniumOne, Inc, (October 22, 2010). In November of 2015, the Department of Justice (DOJ), replied to my letter and said "The Department of Justice's National Security Division (NSD) reviewed this transaction in consultation with the Federal Bureau of!nvestigation (FBI) and CFTUSagencies. In accordance with standard procedure, NSD evaluated the factors listed in section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and ultimately communicated to CFTUSthe Department's clearance of this transaction." s Letter from Anne Wall, Assistant Secretary for Legislalive Affairs, to Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 3, 2015). The CFTUSrev iew process begins with an informal review that consists of an unofficial CFIUS determination prior to a formal filing. From there, CFIUS engages in a 30-day review period where the Director of National lntelltgence is required to carry out an analysis of any threat to the national security. If security risks or concerns are identified and cannot be resolved during the 30-day review, CFIUS proceeds to a 45-day national security investigation stage. At that point, CFTUSnegotiates mitigation with the parties. At the end of the 45-day investigation, CFIUS will·eilher determine that the transactton does not pose national security risks or refer the matter to the President for a determination. In addition, under 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (b)( I )(B), CFIUS is required to proceed to the 45-day investigation period if the transaction is considered a foreign government controlled transaction. According to Treasury's September 3, 2015, response the transaction at issue was considered as such. See also James Jackson, The CommitlelJon Foreign lnvestmenl in 1he UnitedSlates (CF/US). CRS (June 13, 2017). 6 Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Pre-IndictmentDelay, United States v. Vadim M1kerin,Criminal No. TDC-14-0529 (D. MD) at I. 7 , Superseding Indictment, United States v. Vadim Mikerin, Criminal No. TDC-14-0529 (D. MD) at I. 'a Id. . 9 Joel Schectman, U.S. sentences Russian nuclear official to four years for bribe scheme, Reuters (Dec. 15, 20 IS). The "Megatons to Megawatts" program converted uranium from thousands of Russian nuclear warheads for civilian use in U.S. nuclear power plants. io Id. - 11Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Vadiin Mikerin, Criminal No. TDC-14-0529 (D. MD) at I 0-11.

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Secretary Tillerson October-I 2, 2017 Page 3 ofS

than $2 million in bribe payments through a web of secret accounts in Cyprus, Latvia, and Switzerland." 12 His actions, according to the government, occurred "with the consent of higher level officials at Tenex and Ros·atom ... " 13 Indeed, based on news reports, the investigation began as an intelligence probe into Russian nuclear officials. 14 During the investigation, federal agents attempted to convince Mr. Mikerin to turn on his Russian colleagues by showing him evidence of relationships between "shell companies and other Russian energy officials, including President Vladimir Putin." 15 He refused to expose them and was subsequently arrested and charged. It is unclear whether these criminal actors and actions factored into CFIUS' review of the Rosatom transaction and, if so, whether it brought additional scrutiny.

The Committee has also learned additional details regarding a June 2010 speech in Moscow where former President Bill Clinton, and thereby Secretary Clinton, 16 received $500,000 from Renaissance Capital, ·a Russian investment bank whose senior officers include former FSB (Russian intelligence) personnel. Most of the banks in Russia are controlled in some manner by the Kremlin, and sources have described Renaissance Capital as an extension of the Russian government. 17 At the Committee's recent oversight hearing on the Foreign Agents , Registration Act, a witness described Renaissance Bank in the following way:

The Chairman was - ·or I should say another senior official was a British citizen of Russian origin named Igor Sagiryan. On their staff at Renaissance Capital, they trumpeted the fact that they had a · number of former FSB officers on their staff. I should point out that there is no such thing as a former FSB officer. It is a lifetime commitment. And in the Department of Justice investigation into Prevezon Holdings, they determined that $13 million from the crime that Sergei Magnitsky uncovered, exposed, and was killed over went to the bank accounts of Renaissance Capital in the United Kingdom. 18

• I

12 Joel Schectman, U.S. semences Russian nuclear official tofour yearsfor bribe scheme, Reuters (Dec. 15, 2015). 13 Affidavit in support of an application under rule 41 for a Warrant to Search, U.S. v. Vadim Mikerin, Criminal No. TDC-14· 0529 (D. MD). 14 Joel Schectman, U.S. sentences Russian nuclear official tofour years for bribe scheme, Reuters (Dec. 15, 2015). IS Ed. . 16 As I have previously written with respect to the applicability of the foreign Emolument Clause to Secretary Clinton, she and former President Bill Clmton filed joint taxes, were a joint economic unit, and therefore any monies received by her husband are also hers. See U.S. Office of Government Ethics, 04xl6 Disclosureof Assets of a Spouse and Dependents, Nov. 16, 2004 where the Office of Government Ethics held that employees who prepare joint tax returns with their spouses would be considered to have derived financial or economic benefit from their spouses' assets and would also be charged with knowledge of their spouses' assets. 17 According to the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel, one of the factors used to determine whether an entity is an instrumentality of a foreign government is whether it is susceptible to becoming one. See Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non Government Members of ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C. 121 (1993). Having multiple-former FSB officers involved in running the bank weighs in fav.orof finding the entity to be an instrumentality. Of course, it's also common knowledge that there is no such thing as a "former" FSB officer. IK Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Oversight of the Foreign Agents RegistrationAct and Al/empts to Influence U.S. Elections: Lessons Learnedfrom Current and Prior Administrations, Testimony from Mr. Bill Browder at 20-21 (July 27, 2017).

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Secretary Tillerson October 12, 2017 Page 4 ofS

Notably, in the same month as the Clinton speech, Uranium One and Rosatom notified CFIUS of the Russian government's intent to acquire twenty percent of the United States' uranium assets. The next month, in July 2010, Renaissance Bank reportedly assigned Uranium One a "buy" rating, a move that would principally benefit its Russian investors. 19 ·

The donations raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest for Secretary Clinton and the Obama administration . · The fact that Rosatom subsidiaries in the Uni-ted States were J under criminal investigation as a result of a U.S. intelligence operation apparently around the time CFIUS approved the Uranium One/Rosatom transaction raises questions about whether that information factored into CFIUS' decision to approve the tran~action.

In order to assess the decisions concerning the sale of Uranium One, please answer the following questions: '• I. According to the Treasury Department, CFIUS gathers on a weekly basis to discuss pending transactions. Please list the date of each meeting that involved a discussion of the Uranium One/Rosatom transaction, the list of attendees by agency, and provide all records related to each meeting to include all transcripts, memoranda, and other . I communications regarding the transaction.

2. Were your agency's personnel assigned to the CFIUS transaction made aware of the ongoing 9riminal and intelligence investigation into senior managers of Tenex, Tenam, and Rosa tom prior to CFIUS approval of the Uranium One transaction _in October 20 IO? If so, please detail when they were made aware and what exactly they were made aware of. In addition, please provide all records relating to those communications. If not, why not?

3. Please provide a copy of all records related to the presentation provided by Uranium One/Rosatom to CFIUS staffers prior to filing a formal notice on August 4, 2010.

4. Please provide a copy of your agency's official confirmation to Treasury that the transaction did not raise any unresolved national security concerns.

5. Please provide all records relating to your agency's determination that the Uranium One/Rosatom transaction did not raise any unresolv.ed national secJrity concerns.

6. Please provide all records relating 10 communications with respect to Secretary Clinton and donations to the Clin_tonFoundation by parties interested in the Uranium One/Rosatom transaction. ·

I anticipate that your written response and most.responsive documents will be unclassified. Please send all unclassified material directly to the Committee. In keeping with the requirements of Executive O~der 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified

19 Jo Beckerand Mike McIntire, "Cash Flowed to Clinton Foundation Amid Russian Uranium Deal," THE NEWYORK TIMES (April 23, 2015). .

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Secretary Tillerson October I 2, 2017 Page 5 of5

information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified documents, provide all unclassified information directly to the Committee, and provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. The Committee complies with all laws and regulations · governing the handling of classified information. The Committee is not bound, absent its prior agreement, by any handling restrictions or instructions on unclassified information unilaterally asserted by the Executive Branch. ·

Thank you in advance for your cooperation with this request. Please respond no later than October 26, 2017. If you have questions, contact Josh Flynn-Brown ofmy Committee staff at (202) 224-5225.

~- Sincerely,

Charles E. Grassley Chairman Committee on the Judiciary

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O,:tober 12, 2017

VIA ELECTRONICTRANSMISSION

The Honorable Rex W.Tillerson Secretary U.S. Department of State Washington,D.C . 20520

Dear Secretary Tillerson:

In June 2015, I wrote to several mtimberagencies on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFnJS) regarding the acqulsition of Uranium One, an owner of U.S. based uranium assets, by Atomredmetzoloto(ARMZ), which is a subsidiary of Russia's state energy corporation, Rosatom.1 The transactionraised a number of national security concerns because it effectively ceded twenty percent of U.S. uranium production capacity to the Russian government.2

In that letter, I raised additional concerns related to potential conflicts of interest between the State Department and the transacting parties. These concerns stemmed from the fact that during critical stages of the acquisition approval, interested parties, such as the Chainnan of Uranium One, Ian Telfer, made large donations-some in the millions of dollars-to the Clinton 3 Foundationwhile Hillary Clinton was Secretary ofState. ·

In response to my inquiry, the Obama administrationwrote that in October 2010, CFIUS certified to Congress that "there [were] no unresolvednational security concerns with the.

1 Letter from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chainnan, Seoate co.:am.on the Judiciaryto the Dep't of Justice, State, and Treasmy (June 30, 2015). z WilsonAndn:ws , "Donations

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SecretaryTiller-son October12, 2017 Page2 ofS

transaction"and that the transaction had b•:enapproved. 4 Further, the U.S. Treasury's response noted that "[n]o CFIUS agency proposedmitigation or prohibitionof the transaction."5

I am not convinced by these assurances. The sale of Uranium One resulted in a Russian governmenttakeover of a significantportion of U.S. uraniummining capacity. In light of that fact, very serious questions remain about the basis for the finding that this transaction did not threatento impair U.S. national security.

In addition, it has recently come to the Committee's attention that employees ofRosiltom were involved in a criminal enterprise involvinga conspiracyto commit extortion and money launderingduring the time of the CFJUStransaction. Accordingto court filings in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,in 2009, the FBI began an investigationinto I corruptionand extortion by senior manag(:rsof JSC Techsnabexport(Tenex), a subsidiary of Rosatom.6 Tenex operated as the sole supplierand exporter of Russian Federation uranium and uranium enrichmentservices to nuclear power companiesworldwide. 7 Tenex established.a wholly-ownedsubsidiary company located in the United States called Tenam, which became Tenex's official representative in the United States. Tenex was run by Vadim Mikerin, a . Russian national and Director of the Pan AmericanDepartment of Tenex from 2004 to 2010. In 2010, Mikerinbecame the executivedirector ofTenam until 2014.8 As director ofTenam, he oversaw the shipment of uranium from Russia for use in Americanpower plants under the . "Megatons to Megawatts" program.9 It has been reportedthat at one point the program fueled ten percent of U.S. electricity. 10

Accordingto the facts set forth by the federal government,between 2004 and 2014, Mr. Mikerinwas involved in a multimilliondollar conspiracyinvolving an extortion and money launderingscheme that awarded contractsto Americancompanies to transport uranium in exchange for kick-backs.11 In 2014, Mr. Mikerinpleaded guilty "to helping orchestrate more l 4 CFIUS Certificationto Congress, Case 10-40:Rosato:n (Russian federation)/Uranium One, Inc, (October 22, 2010). In Novemberof201.5, the Departmentof Justice (DOJ),replied to my letter and said "The Departmentof Justice's National Security Division(NSD) reviewed this tn111sactionin consultationwith the FedtlralBureau of Investigation(FBI) and CFIUS agencies.In accordancewith standard procedure, NSDevalualed the factorslisted in section721 of the Deftnse Production Act of 1950,as amended,and ultimatelycommunicated to CFIUS the l)epartmeot'scltiarance of this transaction." 5 Letter from Anoe Wall, Assistant Secretaryfor LegislativeAffairs, to SenatorChuck Gras:sh:y,Chairman, Senate Committtleon the Judiciary(Sep t 3, 2015). The CFJUS review process begins with an infoimalreview that consists ofan unofficial CFIUS determinationprior to a fonnal filing. from there, CFIUS engagesin a 30-day review period where the Director of National Intelligenceis required to cany out an analysisof any threat to the oalionalsecurity. If security risks or concerns are identified and cannot be resolved during the 30-day review, CFIUS proceedsto a 45-day nationalsecurity investigation stage. At that point, CflUS negotiatesmitigation with the parties. At the cod ofthc:45-day investigation,CFIUS will either detennine that the transactiondoes not pose national security risks or refer the t!l8tterto the President for a determination. In addition, under 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (b)(l)(B), CFIUS is required to proceed to the 45-day investigationperiod if the transaction is considereda foreign governmentcontrolled transaction. Accordingto Treasury's September3, 2015, responsethe transactionat issue was considered as such. See also James Jackson, 77,eCommillee on foreign fnvestme11tin the United States (CF/US), CRS (June 13, 2017). 6 Government'sResponse to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Pre-lndicbllentDelay , United States v. Vadim Mikerin,Criminal No. IDC-14-0529(D. MD) at I. . 7 , Supmeding Indictment, United States v. Vadim Mikerin,Criminal No. TDC-14-0529(D. MD) at I. 1 Id. 9 Joel Schcctman,U.S . sentences Russian nuclear offici'ulro four yearsfor bribe scheme, Reuters (Dec. IS, 20 IS). The "Megatonsto Megawatts"program converteduranium from thousandsof Russiannu clear warheads for civilian use in U.S. nuclear power plants. ,oId . 11 Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Vadim Mikerin, CriminalNo. IDC-14-0529 (D. MD) at 10-11.

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Secreta,yTillerson October12, 2017 · Page 3 ofS

than $2 million in bribe payments th.rougha web of secret accounts in Cyprus, Latvia, and Switzerland."12 His actions, ~ccordingto the govemment,occurred ''with the consent of higher level officialsat Tenex and Rosatom... " 13 Indeed,based on news reports, the investigation began as an intelligenceprobe into Russiannuclear officials. 14 During the investigation,federal agents attemptedto convince Mr. Mikerinto tum on his Russian colleaguesby showinghim evidenceof relationshipsbetween "shell c:ompaniesand other Russian energy officials, including PresidentVladimir Putin."15 He refused to expose them and was subsequentlyarrested and charged. It is unclear whether these criminalactors and actions factored into CFIUS' review of the Rosatomtransaction and, if so, whether it broughtadd.itional scrutiny. . .. . The Committeehas also learnedadditional details regardinga June 20 IO speech in Moscowwhere former President Bill Clinton,and thereby SecretaryClinton, 16 received $500,000from RenaissanceCapital, a Russianinvestment bank whose senior officers include fonner FSB (Russian intelligence)personnel. Most of the banks in Russia are.controlledin some mannerby the Kremlin;and sources have describedRenaissance Capital as an extension of the Russiangovemment. 17 At the Committee's.recent oversightbearing on the Foreign Agents Registra_tion Act, a witness describedRenaissance Bank in the followingway:

The Chairman was - or I should say another senior official was a British citizen of Russianorigin namedIgor Sagiryan. On their staff at Renaissance Capital, they trumpeted the fact that they had a numberof former FSB officerson their staff. I should point out that there is no such thing as a former· FSB officer. It is a lifetime commitment. And in the Departmentof Justice investigationinto PrevezonHoldings. they d(:terminedthat $13 million from the crime that Sergei Magnitskyuncovered, exposed, and was killed over went to the b~k accounts of Renaissance Capital in the United Kingdom.18

12 Joel Scheetman, U.S. sentences Russian nuclear official tofour yearsfor bribe scheme, Reuters (0cc. IS 201S). · rs Affidavit in support ofan application under rule 41 for a Wamint to Search. U.S. v. Vadim Mikerin, Cri~al No. TOC-14- 0S29 (D. t-U)) . .lf Joel'Schectman, U.S.sentences Russian nuclear ojfici'alto four yearsfor bribe scheme, Reuters (Dec. Is. 20 IS). IS Id. · 16 As I have previously written with respect to lhe applic~bilityof the foreign Emolument Clause to Secretary Clinton, she and fonner President Bill Clinlon filed joint taxes, were a joinl economic unit, and therefore any monies received by her husband are also hers. See U.S. Office·ofGovemment Ethics, 04x/6 Disclosureof Assets of a Spouse and Dependents, Nov. 16, 2004 where the Office of Government Ethics held that employees who preparejoint tax returns with their spouses would be consideredto . have derived financial or economic benefit from their spouses•assets and would also be charged with kllowledge of their spouses' assets. 17 According to the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel. one of the factors used to detennine whether an entity is an instrumentalityof a foreign government is whether it i~ susceptible to becomingone. See Applicabilityof the Emoluments Clause to Non Government Members of ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C.· 121 ( 1993). Having multiple fonner FSB officers involved in running the bank weighs in favor of finding the entity lo be an instrumentality. Of course. it's also common kllowledge that there is no such thing as a "former" FSB officer. . · . 11 Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Oversightof the Foreign AgentsRegistration Act and Allempts to Influence U.S. Elections: Lessons Learnedfrom Current and Prior Administrations,Testimony from Mr. Bill Browder at 20-21 (July ~7. 2017).

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'\ ' SecretaryTillerson October 12,2017 Page4ofS

Notably, in the same month as the Clinton speech, Uranium One and Rosatom notified CFIUS of the Russian government's intent to acquire twenty percent of the United States' uranium assets. The next month, in July 20 I0, RenaissanceBank reportedly assigned Uranium One a "buy" rating, a move that would principally benefit its Russian investors.19

The donations raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest for Secretary Clinton and the Obama administration. The fact that Rosatom subsidiaries in the United States were under criminai investigation as a result of a U.S. intelligenceoperation apparently around the time CFIUS approved the Uranium One/Rosatomtransaction raises questions about whether that infonnation factored into CFIUS' decision to approve the transaction. ·

In order to assess the decisions concerning the sale of Uranium One, please answer the following questions:

I. According to the Treasury Department, CFIUS gathers on a weekly basis to discuss pending transactions. Please list the date of each meeting that involved a discussion of the Uranium One/Rosatom transaction, the list of attendees by agency, and provide all records related to each meeting to include all transcripts, memoranda, and other communications regarding the transaction.

2. Were your agency's personnel assigned to the CFIUS transaction made aware of the ongoing criminal and intelligence investigationinto senior managers of Tenex, Tenarn, and Rosatom prior to CFIUS approval of the Uranjum One transaction in·October 201O? If so, please detail when they were made.aware and what exactly they were made aware of. In addition, please provide all records relating to those communications. lfnot, why . not?

3. Please provide a copy of all records related to the presentation provided by Uranium One/Rosatom to CFIUS staffers prior to filing a formal notice on August 4, 2010.

4. ~lease provide a copy of your agency's official confirmation to Treasury that the transaction did not raise any unresolved national security concerns.

5. Please provide all records relating to your agency's determination that the Uranium One/Rosatom transaction did not raise any unresolved ~ational security concerns.

6. Please provide all records relating to communicationswith respect to Secretary Clinton and donations to the Clinton Foundationby parties interested in the Uranium One/Rosatom transaction. · ·

I anticipate that your written response and most responsive documents will be unclassified. Please send all unclassified material directly to the Committee. In keeping with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified

19Jo Becker and Mike McIntire, "Cash Flowed to Clinton FoundationAmid Russian Uranium Deal," TuE NEW YORXTIMES · (April 23, 2015).

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06573504 Date: 06/08/2018 ·' UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06573504 Date: 06/08/2018

Sec~etaryTillerson October 12, 2017 · Page5 ofS

information, please segregate all unclassifiedmaterial within the classified documents,provide all unclassifiedinformation directly to the Committee,and provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. The Committeeco mplieswith all laws and regulations governingthe handling of classified information. The Committeeis not bound, absent its prior agreement,by any handling restrictionsor instructionson unclassi~edinformation unilaterally ass .erted by the ExecutiveBranch. ·

Thank you in advance for your cooperation~ith this request. Please respond no later than Oc~ober26, 2017. If you have questions,contact Josh Flynn-Brownof my Committee staff at (202) 224-5225, . .

· Sincerely,

CharlesE. Grassley Chainnan Committeeon the Judiciary \

(

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C065 73504 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFI ED U.S. Department of ~tate Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06573508 Date: 06/08/2018

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) October24, 2017 VIA ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

The HonorableRex W. Tillerson Elaine Duke Secretary Acting Secretary U.S. Departmentof State t.).S. Department of Homeland Security Washington,D.C. 20520 Washington,D.C. 20528

Dear SecretaryTillerson and Acting SecretaryDuk e,

On October 12, 2017, I wrote to you both as part of an inquiry into the acquisitionof UraniumOne, an owner of U.S. based uraniumass ets, by Atomredmetzoloto(ARMZ), a subsidiaryof Russia's state energy corporation,Ros atom.1 As you know, in June 2015, !'wrote several member agencieson· the .Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) regardingthe acquisition of Uranium One.2 The transaction raised a number of national security concernsbecause it effectively ceded twenty percentof U.S. uraniumproduction capacity to the Russiangovernment. 3

In the oc,ober 12, 2017 letter, I explainedth at employeesofRosatom were involved in a criminalenterprise involving a conspiracyto commit extortion and money launderingduring the time of the CFIUS transaction. Accordingto court filings in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in 2009, the FBI began an investigation into corruption and extortion by senior managers of JSC Techsnabexport(Tenex), a subsidiaryof Rosatoi:n.4 Tenex operated as the sole supplier and exporter of Russian Federationuranium and uranium enrichment services to nuclearpower companies worldwide.s Tenex established a wholly-owned subsidiary companylocated in the United States called Tenarn,which became Tenex's official representativein the United States. Tenex was run by Vadirn Mikerin•,a Russian national and

1 Letter from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chainnan, Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryto the Dep' t of Justice, State, and Treasury (Oct. 12, 2017). 2 Letter from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm.on the Judiciary to the Dep't of Justice, State, and· Treasury (June 30, 2015). · ' Wilson Andrews,"Donations to the Clinton Foundation, and a Russian Uranium Takeover," THENEW YORK TIMES(April 22, 20 I 5); Jo Becker and Mike McIntire,. "Cash Flowed to Oi nton FoundationAmid Russian Uranium Deal," THENEW You TIMES (April 23, 2015), See also, Uranium One to Nuclear RegulatoryCommission, January 29, 2013. Accessible at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1304/MLI 3043A505.pdf 4 Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Pre-IndictmentDelay , United States v. Vadim Mikcrin, Criminal No. TDC.J4-0529 (D. MD) at I. 5 Superseding lndictmen,t, United States v. Vadim Mikc:rin,Criminal No. TDC-14-0529(D. MD) at I.

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06573508 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06573508 Date: 06/08/2018

Director of the Pan American Department of Tenex from 2004 to 2010. In 2010, Mikerin became the executive director ofTenam until 2014.6 As director ofTenam, be oversaw the shipment of uranium from·Russia for use in American power plants un.derthe "Megatons to Megawatts" program.7 It has been reported that at one point the program fueled ten percent of U.S. electricity. 8 · ·

According to press accounts and court filings, the FBI was investigating Vadim Mikerin in 2009, yet Mikerin was approved for a work visa,by the Obama Administration in 201Oto run Rosatom's new American arm, Tenam. 9 Court documents show that Mikerin renewed that same visa in August 2014, and initiated th·e process to become a lawful pennanent resident soon after. 10 He was apparently arrested the following month for alleged money laundering and extortion in October 2014.11 It is concerning that a suspected criminal was able to apply for and renew a work visa while being under FBI investigation.Therefore, to better understand the circumstancessurrounding his visa application and renewal, please provide the following information no later than November 7, 2017.

U.S. Department of State 1. Please provide all visa records and associated documentation for Vadim Mikerin.

a. At which embassy or consulate did he submit .the application?

b. · 1Please provide the visa category and validity period for all previous visas issued to Mikerin.

c. Please provide the dates of submission for all past visa applications submitted by Mikerin, along with all associated documentation,case notes, or other related information.

d. Was Mikerin subjected to any additional administrative processing associated with any visa application'?Please explain and provide all documentation uncovered, or created, as a result of such additional processing.

U.S. Departmentof Homeland Security

I' I. Please provide the a-file, all records of entry into or exit from any port of entry in the ""l United States for Mikerin, a timi!lineof his known travel into the United States, and all relevant receipt files.

6 Id. ' Joel Scbectman, -U.S.sentences Russian nuclear official tofour yearsfor bribe scheme, Reuters (Dec. IS, 20 I 5). The "Megatons to Megawatts"program converted uranium from thousandsof Russian nuclear warheads for civilian use in U.S. nuclear power plants. 1 Id. 9 ht1p://lhehill.com/policy/national-security/355749-fbi-11ncovered-russian-bribery-plot-before-obama-administration 10 Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, United States v. Vadim Mikerin,Criminal No. TOC-14-0529(D. MD) at 8. 11 Id. at 4.

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06573508 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06573508 Date: 06/08/2018

I anticipate that your written.reply and any responsivedocuments will be unclassified. Please send all unclassified material directly to the Committee.In keeping with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsivedocuments do contain classified information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified documents, provide all unclassified infonnation ·directly to the Committee,and provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. Although the Committeecomplies with all laws and regulations governing the handling of classified information,it is not bound, absent its prior agreement, by · any handling restrictions or instructionson unclassifiedinformation unilaterally asserted by the ExecutiveBranch .

. . . Thank you in advance for your cooperationwith this request. If you have questions, please contact Katherine Nikas ·or Josh Flynn-Brownof my Committee staff at (202) 224-5225.

Sincerely,

CharlesE . Grassley Chairman· Committeeon the Judiciary

Cc;:

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein Ranking Member Senate Committee on the Judiciary

,·

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06573508 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574065 Date: 06/08/2018

§ ELEASE IN FUL~ ~ongreS'gof tfJe~niteb ~tateg 1!,ousecrf 3Rq,resentatibes Dastington, 119QC20515

November 14, 2017

The HonorableRex W. Ti..llerson Secretary . U.S. Departmentof State 220 l C Street NW Washington,DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The House Pennanent Select Committeeon Intelligenceand Committee on Oversightand Government Refonn (Committees)are investigatingthe Department of State's role in the Committeeon Foreign Investment in the United States' (CFIUS) approval of the acquisition of UraniumOne by Rosatom,Russia's nuclear energy agency (the Uranium One Transaction). ··

The Committeeshave questionsf ibout CFIUS•sreview and approval of the UraniumOne Transaction, including.whc=therth e FBI had evidence that Russian nuclear industry officials were engaged in bribery,kickbacks, extortion and mo_ney laundering. As you know, the Department of Justice prosecuted'Vadim Mikerinfor conduct related·to Russianattempts to participate in the U.S. uraniummarket. The FBI's investigationof this conductoccurred around the time CFJUSwas reviewingthe Uranium One transaction. The Departmentof State sits as a.permanentmember of CFIUS.'

CFIUS has "one purpose," which is ''to review the potential national security effects of transactionsin which a foreign companyobtains control of a U.S. company." 2 To effectuatethat "one purpose," CFIUS "considersthe particularfacts and circumstances of each transactionto identify and address the potentialnational security effects of the transactioo."3 ·

1 50 U.S.C.App.§ 2170(k)(2)(listing "[t]he Secretaryof State"or his designeeas a memberofCFIUS). 1 HollyShuhnan. U .S. Dep't ofTreaswy, CF/USat a Glance,Feb. 19,2013, https://www.treasury.gov/coMect/blog/Pages/CFIUS-at-s-Glance.sspx. , Id. UNCLASSIFIED

• I I UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574065 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574065 Date: 06/08/2018

UNCLASSIFIED The HonorableRex W. Tillerson November 14, 2017 Page2

It is unclear to the Committeeswhether the FBI alerted the other members of CFIUS about the investigationinto Russia's effons to obtain control of the U.S. uraniwn market. As a result, it is unclear whether CFJUSposs essed and considered all of the infonnation relevant to detennining whe1hera Russian company should have gained control of allegedly more than 20 percentof America's uranium supply.

In fact, two current membersof the IntelligenceCommittee sent a letter to then Secretaryof the Treasury Timothy Geithnerto "urge the Committeeto recommend the President block this transactionor postponeany action until the CFIUS has carefully evaluated-the concerns outlined below.',.. The letter made plain that "Russian entities are of particular concern with regard to foreign control of U.S. nuclear-relatedassets:•s Other concerns outlined in the letter includeRosatom's status as (i} "a state-ownedentity, · overseenby a government that has shown little if any inclinationto effectively address the widespreadand continuing corruptionwithin Russia, particularlyits energy sector," (ii) Rosatom'straining of Iranian nuclear scit~ntists,and (iii) the Departmentof State's · warning "that the expansion of Russia in the area of nuclear energy could involve the appearanceof new danger zones in the world," among others.6

Then-SecretaryGeithner respond<:dto ~e representatives' letter a few weeks later, pledging that CFIUS "takes very seriously its obligation to protect national security while maintainingan open investment cnviroM1cnt"and promising that CFIUS will "act in 7 accordancewith its statutory responsibilities" to review the transaction. .

It is also unclear whether, as SecretaryG eithner promised, CFIUS, and the U.S. Governmentas a whole, properly scrutinizedthe UraniumOne Transactionand its post.: closing effects. Toe Committeesare interestedin whetherany of Uranium One's uraniwn was exported abroad, despite assurancesit would not, and what role, if any, the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission would have played.

To enable the Committeesto bett<:runderstand CFIUS's review and approval of the Uranium One Transaction;please provide the followingdocuments and information as soon as possible but no later than 5 :00 p.m. on November28, 2017. The Department should produce infonnation from January 1, 2009 to December31, 2016: ·

1. All Department procedures,regulations, and guidance regarding CFIUS.

• Letter &omReps. Peter King & Ileana Ros-Leh1inen,ct al., to Hon. TimothyGcithner, Sec'y of the Treasury,Oct S, 20 I0, avaflableat http://nrchives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ncws/storynt6I8. 'Id · . •u . 7 Letter from the Hon. Timothy Oeithner,Sec'y of the Treasury,to Reps. Pei.er King & Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, etal., Oct 25, 2010. ·

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574065 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASS IFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574065 Date: 06/08/2018

UNCLASSIFIED The HonorableRex W. Tillerson November 14, 2017· Page3

2. All CFIUS meeting minutes or similardocuments referring or relating to the Uranium One Transaction. ·

3. All documents and correspondencebetween the Departmentor CFnJS and any of the parties or the parties' representativesrelated to the Uranium One Transaction.

4. All documentsreferring or relating to any IntelligenceCommunity inputs into CFIUS's considerationof the UraniumOne Transaction.

5. Documentssufficient to show the securityarrangements and conditions imposed on the parties or others relatedto the Uranium One Transaction.

6. All documents referringor relating to the potential national·security effects of · the Uranium One Transaction.

7. All documentsreferring or relatingto the followingentities:

a. Uranium One; b. ARMZ; c. Rosatom; d. Kazatomprom; e. Ian Telfer; f. APCO Worldwide; g. Femwood Foundation;anr;i h. Salida Capital.

Please also brief the Committees' staff no later than 5:_00 p.m. on November 30, 2017. If a portion of the briefing is required to be i:lassified,please arrange an unclassified session to be followedby the classified portion.

When producingdocuments to the PennanentSelect Committeeon Intelligence, please deliver production sets to the majoritystaff iii I·IVC-304. When producing docwnents to the Committeeon Oversightand GovernmentRefonn, please deliver productionsets to the majority staff in Room 2157 of the RayburnHouse Office Building. The Committeesprefer, if possible, to receiveall documentsin electronic format. An attachmentto this letter provides additionalinstructions for respondingto the Committees' request.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574065 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574065 Date: 06/08/2018

UNCLASSIFIED The HonorableRex W. Tillerson November 14, 2017 Page4

If you have questions about this request,please contact Cordell Hull of the PermanentSelect Committeeon Intellig1enc~at (202) 225-4121, and Jessica Donion of the Committeeon Oversight and GovernmentReform at (202) 225-5074. Thank for you for your attention.

Sincerely,

DevinNunes Trey Gowdy Chainnan,Permanent Select Committee Chairman,Committee on Oversight on Intelligence and GovernmentReform

Peter/k~~· T. King &a9 Chairman,SubcfilMU~ging Chainnan. Subcommitteeon National Threats of the Permanent Select Securityof the Committee on Committeeon Intelligence Oversightand Government ~cform

Enclosure r

cc: The Honorable Adam B. Schiff, RankingMember PermanentSelect Co~ittcc on Intelligence

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings,Ranking Member Committeeon Oversight and GovernmentReform

The HonorableAndre Carson.Ranking Member . Subcommitteeon Emerging Threats

The Honorable StephenF . Lynch, RankingMember Subcommitteeon National Security

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574065 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574078 Date: 06/08/2018

!RELEASE IN FULL !

~ongressof tbeWniteb $tates 1-!,ou.seof .31\epre.sentatibe.s UafSf_Jin1!ton,110QC 20515

November 14, 2017

The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson Secretary U.S. Department of State 2201 C.Street NW Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary;

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligc;:nc·e and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Committees) are investigating the Department of State's role'in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the. United States' (CFIUS) approval of the acquisition of Uranium One by Rosaiom,, Russia's .nuclear ei,.ergy agency (the Uranium One Transaction).

The Committees have questions about CFIUS's review and approval of the Uranium One Transaction, including whether the FBI had evidence that Russian nuclear industry officials were engaged in bribery, kickbacks, extortion and money l~undering. As you know, the Department of Justice prosecuted Vadirn Mi.kerin for conduct related to Russian attempts to participate in the U.S. uranium market. The FBI's investigation of this conduct occurred around the time CFIUS was reviewing the Uranium One transaction. The Department of State sits as a permanent. member ·of CFIUS. 1

CFIUS has "011epurpose," which is "to review the potential national security effects of transactions in which a foreign company obtains control of a U.S. company." 2 To ~ffectuate that "one purpose," CFIUS "considers the particular facts and circumstances of each transaction to identify and address the potential national security effects of the transaction. "3

1 50 U.S.C. App.§ 2170(k)(2) (listing "[t]h'~ Secretary of State" or his designee as a member ofCFIDS)'. 2 Holly Shulm~, U.S. Oep't of Treasury, CF/US at a Glance, Feb·. 19, 2013, · https://www,treasury .gov/conhect/blog/Page ·stCFfUS-at-a-Glance.aspx. 3 id UNCLASSIFIED

P.R:INT'EOON AECV(:LEI)PAPER

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574078 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574078 Date: 06/08/2018

1 UNCLAS SI FI ED The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson November 14, 2017 ·Page 2

It is unclear to the Committees whether the FBI alerted the other members of CFIUS about the investigation into Russia's efforts to obtain control of the U .S. uranium market. As a result, it is unclear whether CFIUS possessed and considered all of the infomiation relevant to determining whether a Russian company should have gained control of allegedly more than 20 percent of America's uranium supply.

In fact, two current members of ~heIntelligence Committee sent a letter to then Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner to "urge the Committee to recommend the President block this transaction or postpone any action until the CFIUS has carefully evaluated th~ concerns outlined below." 4 The letter made plain that "Russian entities are of particular concern with regard to foreign control of U.S. nuclear-related assets." 5 Other concerns outlined in the letter include Rosatom's status as (i) "a state-owned entity, overseen by a government that has shown little if any inclination to effectively address the widespread and continuing corruption within Russia, particularly its energy sector," (ii) Rosatom ' s training ofiranian nuclear scientists, and (iii) the Department of State's warning "that the expansion of Russia in the area of nuclear energy could involve the appearance of new danger zones in the world,'! among others. 6 ·

Then-Secretary Geithner responded to the representatives' letter a few weeks later, pledging that CFIUS "takes very seriously its obligation to protect national security while maintaining an open investment environment" and promising that CFIUS will "act in accordance with its statutory responsibilities" to review the transaction. 7

It is also unclear whether, as Secretary Geithner promised, CFIUS, and the U.S. Government as a whole, properly scrutinized the Uranium One Transaction and its post closing effects. The Committees are interested in whether any of Uranium One's uranium was exported abroad, despite assurances it would not, and what role, if any, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would have played.

To enable the Committees to better understand CFIUS's review and approval of the Uranium One Transaction·; please provide the following documents and information as soon as ·possible but no later than 5:00-p.m. on Nov ember 28, 2017. The Department should produce information from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2016: ·

1. All Department procedures, regulations, and guidance regarding CFIUS.

4 Letter from Reps. Peter King & Ileana Ros-Lehtjnen,et al., to Hon. Timothy Geithner, Sec'y of the Treasury, Oct. 5, 20 I 0, available at http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/story/?1618. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Letter from the Hon. Timothy Geithner, Sec'y of the Treasury, to Reps. Peter King & neana Ros-Lehtinen, et al., Oct. 25, 2010. .

ONCLASSIF"IED

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UNCLASSIFIED The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson November 14, 2017 Page 3

2. All CFIUS meeting minutes or similar documents referring or relating to the Uranium One, Transaction.

3. Ali documents and ~orrespondcmce between the Department or CFIUS and -any of the parties or the p~es' reptesentatiyes related to the Uranium One Transaction.

4. All documents referring or 'relating to any Intelligence Community inputs into CFIUS's consideration bf tht; Uranium Orie Transaction.

5. Documents sufficient to show the security arrangements and conditions imposed on the parties or others .related to the.Uranium One Transaction.

6. All documents referring or relath~g ~o the potential national security effects of the Uranium One Transaction.

7. All docwnents referring or relating to the following entities:

a. Uranium One; b. ARMZ; c. Rosatom; d. Kazatomprom; e. Ian Telfer; f. .APCO Worldwide; g. Femwood Foundation; and h. Szjida Capital.

Please.also brief the Committees' staff no.later thai:i 5:00 p.m. on November 30, 2017. If a portion of the briefing is required to ,be classified, please arrange an unclassified. session to be followed by the classified portion; ·

When producing documents to the Permanent Select Committee on intelligence, please deliver production sets to the majority staff in HVC-304. When producing documents to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, please deliver production sets to the-majority staffin Ri>om 2157 of the Rayburn House Office Building. The Committees prefer, if possible, to recei:ve all documents in electronic format. An · attachment to this letter provides additional instructions for responding to the Committees' request:

UNCLASSIFI°ED

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574078 Date: 06/08/2018 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574078 Date: 06/08/2018

UNCLASSIFIED The Honorable Rex W. . Tillerson . November 14, 2017 Page 4

If you have questions about this request, please contact Cordell Hull of the Permanent Sefoct Committee :on Intelligence at (202) 225-4f21,and Jessica Dorilon of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform at (202) 225-5074. TI:iankfor yo~ for your attention.

Sincerely,

Devin Nunes Trey Gowdy Chairman, Permanent Select Committee . Chairman, Committee on Oversight on Intelligence ~d Government Reform &l?zg~ PeterNY~~ T. King onDeSanfis Chairman, Subc~~ging · Chainnan, Subcommittee on National Threats of the Permanent Select Security. of the Committee on Co.mmittee on Intelligence Oversight and Government Reform

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Adam ij . Sc;hiff, Ranking Member Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

The Honorable Elijah E. Cumrnin,g$,Ranking Member Committee on Oversight a,nd Government Re'fonn

The Honorable Andre -Carson, Ranking Member Subcommittee on Emerging Thr.eats

The Honorable Stephen F. Lynch, Ranking Mei;nber Subcommittee on National Security

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-16650 Doc No. C06574078 Date: 06/08/2018