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The New Dutch Elections: Bellwether for Europe?

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The New Dutch Elections: Bellwether for Europe? The Eurasia Center – European Program The New Dutch Elections: Bellwether for Europe? April 2021 Dutch Candidates for the Election, Photo Credit: Remko de Waal Read more at DutchNews.nl: Chann Austine Cortes The Eurasia Center European Program www.EurasiaCenter.org The New Dutch Elections: Bellwether for Europe? From March 15-17, 2021, the Netherlands held general elections to determine the legislative makeup of its government, as well as who would become the Prime Minister.1 As always, the Dutch election was watched closely by European experts, as the Dutch have long been seen as a bellwether for Europe. It was one of the first to embrace egalitarianism, the first to accept the LGBTQA+ community, and saw the first advocates for both multiculturalism and the recent rise of right-wing nationalists.2 This means that tracking the Dutch election often gives one a good sense of the political climate surrounding the rest of Europe. Although the newly elected is still creating a ruling coalition, as the Dutch utilize a Party List Proportional Representation parliamentary system, the relative power of each political party can be seen in how many seats they have lost or gained.3 This election occurred because the previous Government resigned in January due to a child welfare scandal that left many families of multi-ethnic backgrounds in financial ruin in the middle of a Pandemic.4 Because of this, one would be forgiven if they thought that this would massively hurt the success of the ruling party, the center-right People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Instead, the VVD overperformed expectations, remaining the largest party in the 1 Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, “Vervroegd Stemmen Wordt MOGELIJK Bij Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2021,” November 3, 2020, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/10/30/vervroegd-stemmen-wordt-mogelijk-bij- tweede-kamerverkiezingen-2021. 2 Keith Knutson, “Keith Knutson: The Netherlands Are a Bellwether for Europe,” La Crosse Tribune, June 13, 2010, https://lacrossetribune.com/news/opinion/keith-knutson-the-netherlands-are-a-bellwether-for-europe/article_818080a4- 76d6-11df-a6d9-001cc4c03286.html. 3 Michela Palese, “The Netherlands Is Going to the Polls, but How Do Dutch Elections Work?,” Electoral Reform Society, March 17, 2021, https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/the-netherlands-is-going-to-the-polls-but-how-do-dutch- elections-work/. 4 Anna Holligan, “Dutch Rutte Government Resigns over Child Welfare Fraud Scandal,” BBC News (BBC, January 15, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55674146. Netherlands and even gaining two seats.5 This success is in large part due to their leader, Prime Minister Mark Rutte. He is an experienced politician and is expected to become the Netherlands’ longest serving Prime Minister following this election. He is positioned to be one of the most senior EU officials in the upcoming years, as Germany’s Angela Merkel nears retirement.6 Despite several scandals throughout his long career, Rutte has cultivated a public appearance as an everyman. He is known for often wearing casual clothing, adapting his personal ideology to match the general mood of the public and being remarkably frugal when discussing economic policy, an incredibly popular personality trait amongst the Dutch public.7 It would be difficult to imagine VVD experiencing success without Rutte’s unique ability to avoid suffering from the ramifications of scandals. This election also saw remarkable success for pro-European political parties. The centrist party Democrats 66 (D66) saw one of their greatest successes in recent history, overtaking Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) to become the second largest party in the country.8 This party was also reliant on the debating prowess and general popularity of their leader, Sigrid Kaag, a former United Nations special envoy for Syria and the outgoing foreign minister of trade and development.9 Despite being a coalition partner to Rutte, Kaag painted the D66 as a more left- leaning government leader who would be willing to take a more active role in the EU. This election 5 Jon Henley, “Netherlands Election: Mark Rutte Claims Fourth Term with 'Overwhelming' Victory,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, March 18, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/17/netherlands-election- mark-rutte-on-course-to-win-fourth-term. 6 David M. Herszenhorn and Eline Schaart, “Mark Rutte: The Netherlands' Mr. Normal,” POLITICO (POLITICO, March 16, 2021), https://www.politico.eu/article/netherlands-general-election-2021-mark-rutte-polls/. 7 David M. Herszenhorn and Eline Schaart, “Mark Rutte: The Netherlands' Mr. Normal,” POLITICO (POLITICO, March 16, 2021), https://www.politico.eu/article/netherlands-general-election-2021-mark-rutte-polls/. 8 Anna Holligan, “Dutch Election: PM Mark Rutte Claims Victory and Fourth Term,” BBC News (BBC, March 18, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56436297. 9 Thomas Erdbrink, “A Pro-Europe, Anti-Populist Youth Party Scored Surprising Gains in the Dutch Elections,” The New York Times (The New York Times, March 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/world/europe/netherlands-elections-volt.html. also saw a newcomer party, Volt, secure first-ever parliamentary seats.10 Volt is an anti-populist, pro-Europe party overwhelmingly consisting of young people.11 While not the only newcomer party to see success this election, Volt is notable for being part of a pan-European movement dedicated to rejecting the rise of populism and embracing further EU integration, ideas seen as no longer viable for political success in the eyes of many traditional parties. This, combined with the notably young age of most of its members, suggests that the younger generation may be more interested in multiculturalism than older ones, possibly indicating a shift in politics for the near future. Meanwhile, the aforementioned populist nationalists that Volt has positioned itself against saw very mixed results. The largest group, Geert Wilders’ PVV, lost three seats, becoming tied for the third largest party rather than being the second.12 However, while they lost seats, the far-right Forum for Democracy (FvD), led by the controversial Thierry Baudet, gained six seats.13A new offshoot of the FvD, the Juiste Antwoord 2021 (JA21), also won as many seats as Volt did this year.14 Things were much more disappointing for the Dutch left. While the Dutch Labour party 10 Jon Henley, “Netherlands Election: Mark Rutte Claims Fourth Term with 'Overwhelming' Victory,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, March 18, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/17/netherlands-election- mark-rutte-on-course-to-win-fourth-term. 11 Thomas Erdbrink, “A Pro-Europe, Anti-Populist Youth Party Scored Surprising Gains in the Dutch Elections,” The New York Times (The New York Times, March 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/world/europe/netherlands-elections-volt.html. 12 Jon Henley, “Netherlands Election: Mark Rutte Claims Fourth Term with 'Overwhelming' Victory,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, March 18, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/17/netherlands-election- mark-rutte-on-course-to-win-fourth-term. 13 Jon Henley, “Netherlands Election: Mark Rutte Claims Fourth Term with 'Overwhelming' Victory,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, March 18, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/17/netherlands-election- mark-rutte-on-course-to-win-fourth-term. 14 Thomas Erdbrink, “A Pro-Europe, Anti-Populist Youth Party Scored Surprising Gains in the Dutch Elections,” The New York Times (The New York Times, March 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/world/europe/netherlands-elections-volt.html. (PvdA) managed to keep all nine of its seats, two other left-leaning parties, GroenLinks (GL) and the Socialist party (SP), both lost almost half their seats, finishing with eight each.15 What was particularly impressive about this election was the high turnout. Unlike previous elections, voting took place over three days. Individuals were allowed to vote on March 15 and 16, rather than just that Wednesday to minimize exposure to COVID-19.16 Likewise, a drive-through polling station was set up for the first time in Amsterdam and individuals were allowed to vote by mail or by proxy. As a result, turnout hit about 82.6%.17 This is a remarkably high turnout rate, 15 Jon Henley, “Netherlands Election: Mark Rutte Claims Fourth Term with 'Overwhelming' Victory,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, March 18, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/17/netherlands-election- mark-rutte-on-course-to-win-fourth-term. 16 Michela Palese, “The Netherlands Is Going to the Polls, but How Do Dutch Elections Work?,” Electoral Reform Society, March 17, 2021, https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/the-netherlands-is-going-to-the-polls-but-how-do-dutch- elections-work/. 17 Anna Holligan, “Dutch Election: PM Mark Rutte Claims Victory and Fourth Term,” BBC News (BBC, March 18, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56436297. especially compared to 53% that voted in Catalonia in another election held earlier this year.18 More information about that election can be found on another article here at the Eurasia Center. It is expected that Rutte’s new government will be a coalition between the VVD, the D66, and the Christian Democrats (CDA), who often form a coalition with Rutte’s party.19 However, this coalition would not have enough seats to govern effectively, meaning that Rutte will likely have to find allies within smaller political parties to secure his coalition.20 Time will determine what the new Dutch government will look like. For now, it seems that pro-EU advocates may have reason to be optimistic about their future. 18 Sam Jones and Stephen Burgen, “Catalonia Election: Pro-Independence Parties Increase Majority,” February 14, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/14/catalonia-regional-election-covid-voting.
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