FORCES IN MIND TRUST How Counter-Insurgency Warfare Experiences Impact upon the Post- Deployment Reintegration of Land-Based British Army Personnel John D Brewer and Stephen Herron Photo copyright: Forces in Mind Trust 1 FORCES IN MIND TRUST How Counter-insurgency Warfare Experiences Impact upon the Post- Deployment Reintegration of Land-Based British Army Personnel Grant number FiMT14/1017QUB End-of-Award Report Professor John D Brewer HDSocSci, MRIA, FRSE, FAcSS, FRSA Principal Investigator and Dr Stephen Herron Post-Doctoral Research Fellow The Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice Queen’s University of Belfast Belfast BT7 1NN Northern Ireland 2 Table of Contents 1. Foreword by Air Vice Marshall Ray Lock CBE P 4 2. Executive Summary of Report Pp 5-12 3. Executive Summary of Policy Recommendations Pp 13-15 4. Introduction Pp 16-20 5. Research Design Pp 21-28 6. Literature Review Pp 29-51 7. Research Findings and Analysis Pp 52-111 8. Policy recommendations Pp 112-122 9. Conclusion Pp 123-138 10. Bibliography Pp 139-144 11. Appendices Pp 145-155 1. List of Gatekeepers 2. International Advisory Board Members 3. Biographies of the Authors 4. Participant Information Sheet 5. Informed Consent Form 3 FOREWORD “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it”, wrote philosopher George Santyana in the first half of the 20th Century. The two World Wars that defined that Century have though proven to be the exception rather than the rule. The UK’s Armed Forces, and in particular the British Army, have been consistently engaged over many decades in counter- insurgency warfare, which places unique demands on the very souls of those who fight. One hundred years after Santyana’s words, and with British soldiers still serving in Afghanistan, albeit mainly in training roles, and perhaps in more discrete roles elsewhere, this report draws upon the lived experiences of those who fought the counter-insurgency fight. Over the years, doctrine has evolved and terminology has been sanitized, but the essence of fighting war ‘amongst the people’, a term first captured by the distinguished and thoughtful General Sir Rupert Smith, has remained. And the differing impact on its participants compared to that suffered by those from more conventional or symmetric conflicts, is presented here in rich and credible detail. By highlighting the more ethereal issues of trust, identity and cultural awareness, this report does not shy away from asking many and difficult questions. In its policy recommendations, the report likewise presents a lengthy and varied menu, a word I use advisedly as it implies selection, whereas every recommendation deserves at the very least proper consideration. The pragmatist in me recognizes that not all of these policy recommendations will be implemented, and perhaps ownership of some is so diffuse as to require fundamental societal change. Forces in Mind Trust is ambitious, but I doubt even we would claim to be able to influence to that extent. For now. But then, the idealist gains the upper hand, and as I re-read this report, it is apparent that we can avoid repeating the lessons of history, and we can improve the chances of successful transition for those returning from counter-insurgency warfare. We just need to take the time to read and absorb the report, and to consider how individually we might change our approach so as to collectively and at every level support those in transition. These are serious challenges that can only be solved by serious hauling on the policy levers. Counter-insurgency warfare seems unlikely to go away, and nor do the needs of those affected by it. Let us work together and provide the direct support, create the environment and develop the society that will allow serving personnel to transition with dignity and success. Air Vice-Marshal Ray Lock CBE Chief Executive, Forces in Mind Trust 4 1. Executive Summary of Report 1. This Report isolates one specific set of land-based soldiers, those who were deployed in counter-insurgency (COIN) warfare in Afghanistan, to explore their specific transition experiences. 2. COIN operations contrast with conventional warfare in terms of the nature of the enemy, the army’s operational objectives and role, and the higher levels of unpredictability and risk in the deployment. This form of warfare intensifies the emotional labour involved, particularly in terms of trust, identity and stress. 3. The research was not intended to contrast the transition experiences of troops from conventional warfare, for which a control group of equal numbers would be needed, but to undertake a small, two-year qualitative study capturing the experiences of Afghanistan veterans in their own words. 4. The research design introduced a longitudinal dimension by comparing the transition experiences of Afghan veterans with earlier COIN operations, in Britain’s wars of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Ulster Defence Regiment in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s. This allowed us to explore the impact of cultural changes on transition, particularly changed attitudes towards trauma, and changed public attitudes towards COIN warfare generally. 5. The data set on which this Report is based involves 90 hours of taped interviews with 129 respondents, representing 20 from earlier COIN operations in the 1950s and 1960s, 30 from the Ulster Defence Regiment in Northern Ireland, 70 Afghanistan veterans, and 9 from other conflicts. We interviewed veterans of all ranks, both regular and reserve; we included a sub-sample of current serving soldiers. 6. Reintegration back into civilian life should be seen as a continuum, with one pole represented by successful management of the transition, the other unsuccessful. Most COIN personnel can be placed somewhere along this continuum, which is why we refer to it as the continuum of normal transition. 7. Locations along the continuum are not fixed and unchanging because life events, planned or unplanned, can increase or inhibit an individual’s success in managing the transition. These life events are normal; they occur for us all. They are not just faced by ex-military returning to civilian life. The key issue therefore is the resilience of soldiers towards them. 8. Veterans’ sense of identity is crucially important in managing the transition. Over- identification with the army and with the combatant soldier role predisposes veterans to an inability to cope in civilian life. This is usual in all soldiering; there are, however, 5 special features in COIN warfare that intensifies over-identification, worsening management of the transition back to civilian life. 9. These special effects are: i) the public controversy surrounding the combatant role in COIN warfare can increase ‘the quest to belong’ with former comrades as an escape from public criticism at worst or public indifference at best; ii) the combatant role in COIN, where there is uncertainty about whom to trust and who the enemy is, increases reliance on comrades, intensifies the sense of camaraderie, narrows the boundaries of the trusted in-group, and enhances the tight-knitted nature of friendships with one’s immediate peers, whose very lives in a combat situation are in the group’s hands, dependent on each looking after the other. 10. COIN warfare creates a ‘bubble’ environment for soldiers. The term ‘bubble’ was used regularly by respondents, which suggests it is part of the vocabulary in the occupational culture of ordinary veterans. 11. The ‘bubble’ effect of COIN is both strength and a weakness. On operations, survival depends on close knitted camaraderie, where looking after the squad is the same as protecting oneself, but in civilian life it can be problematic by keeping veterans in the bubble. 12. The bubble is closely tied to the issue of trust. COIN warfare narrows the boundaries of trust, restricts the number of those who can be trusted, and increases the emotional emphasis soldiers place on another’s trustworthiness. Reliance on others’ trustworthiness is very important in COIN, and can create a mutually reinforcing community of people who ‘understand what it is like’: they understand why they are fighting where they are, doing what they’re doing, needing no justification or explanation that requires them to be made accountable. 13. Narrow boundaries of trust and anxiety about another’s trustworthiness in civilian life are problematic, making normal social relations and human social interaction difficult, which can increase feelings of isolation and withdrawal outside the army. The mutually reinforcing trusted community suddenly disappears, and unless the boundaries of trust are broadened and the emotional priority placed on people’s trustworthiness is rebalanced, veterans can have difficulties in adjusting. 14. Alternative sources of camaraderie are important in managing the transition. Some found this in formal regimental associations and ex-servicemen groups, some in self- constructed communities, through Facebook, shared leisure activities, and the like. These alternative sources of community helped in transforming their former violent or hyper forms of masculinity into more normal forms. Some Afghan veterans resisted the idea of engaging with the British Legion, seeing it as ‘an old man’s club’, whereas non-Afghan veterans saw Help for Heroes, for example, as too Afghanistan focused. 15. Some veterans were able to compartmentalise their former life in the bubble, hermetically sealing it in the past, transferring identity in civilian life on to their family, work, religious life, and the like. These veterans rarely questioned their former role, 6 nor reflected on it. They cut themselves off from the public ambivalence to the COIN war and its purpose, and did not tend to participate in army-based alternative communities. 16. Those not doing so well in managing the transition tended, now they are outside the bubble, to be much more reflexive, questioning their role in an unpopular COIN war, being more sensitive toward the public’s ambivalence toward the war, and to reflect more upon their experiences and the harrowing scenes that remain vivid in their memory.