NOTES Two The First Eighteen Months of PNDC Rule 1. For a detailed discussion of these organizations see Ray (1986; Zeebo, 1991). The June Four Movement (JFM) and the National Democratic Movement (NDM), in particular, became very influential in 1982–1983. 2. Stool or customary lands are lands held in trust by chiefs (sometimes a head of family) of traditional states for their communities. Stools symbolize the authority of chiefs in southern Ghana. The deposition of a chief is called “destoolment.” In northern Ghana, the symbol of chiefly authority is the skin of an animal. According to Abdulai and Ndekugri (2007), over 90 percent of the total land area of Ghana is under the control of customary landholding institutions. Three The Achievements and Limitations of Economic Reform 1. This replaced the old cash or chit system. Until now, produce-buying clerks had held back payments, sometimes for many months, abused funds, and paid farmers with phony checks. Under the new system, farmers promptly received checks that could be cashed at any bank. 2. I discuss additional factors that limited GEPC support of exporters and other thematic issues in chapter eight. Four Strains in Government-Business Relations, 1983–1991 1. In 2001, the Asantehene gave expression to this view by publicly scolding some chiefs for doing a disservice to the institution of chieftaincy for their role in the P/NDC. The Akimhene followed suit. 2. Symbolically, Soviet and Chinese technical assistance personnel, some of their diplomatic staff and the entire official East German community were expelled within the first week of the coup (Esseks, 1975). 3. I am grateful to Richard Jeffries for this information. 234 Notes 4. Of the six private sector members of the PSAG, only one, A. Appiah-Menkah, could be identified with this group. Of the remaining five, two (I. E. Yamson and J. K. Richardson) were the Chair of the multinationals Unilever Ghana and Pioneer Tobacco Ghana, respec- tively. Alan Kyeremateng and P. K. Kludjeson were respectively managing directors of EMPRETEC and Kludjeson International. Both belonged to the younger generation of entrepreneurs. The sixth member, W. E. Inkumsah, though belonging to the older genera- tion of capitalists, had an unusually clean image. 5. The date of this issue of the Daily Graphic was accidentally cut off during photocopying. Five Government-Business Relations in the Democratic Era 1. Chabal and Daloz have asserted that corruption is not really a domestic political issue in Africa “so long as its fruits are deemed to have been suitably and vigorously redistributed according to the logic of patronage” (1999, pp. 99–100). It is impossible to understand Ghanaian or, for that matter, Tanzanian politics on this basis. 2. The PNDC appointed one-third of assembly members. The remaining two-thirds were elected. 3. Reports of missing persons had persisted, much to the worry of Botchwey and other key regime members. 4. Marino Chiavelli, an Italian businessman, reportedly loaned $1 million to the People’s National Party during the Third Republic in return for the award of contracts (New African, December 1982, pp. 28–29). 5. GHACEM has plants in Takoradi and Tema. Both had contracted to purchase paper sacks from MWPS since the 1960s. It is not clear why only the contract with Tema (the bigger plant) was canceled (interview). 6. The Tyson chicken empire was very well connected to the Clinton administration, having done business in Arkansas while Clinton was governor there. I am grateful to Professor John Sidel for this information. 7. Having expanded into papaya and coconut cultivation and pineapple processing, he was upbeat about the future. 8. The Court ordered (i) the state-owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation to accord equal access to both the ruling and opposition parties, (ii) the government to cease requiring prior police permission for public demonstrations, (iii) the regime not to celebrate December 31 (a highly partisan event) with public funds, and (iv) the government to change its practices in the election of district chief executives. 9. The opposition parties seeking avenues to gain publicity and to embarrass the leadership, seized on the latter’s sloppy handling of the tax. Rawlings personally distanced himself from the VAT debacle, saying that Finance Minister Kwesi Botchwey had created troubles for him (Afrani, 1995, p. 27). 10. The original members were the AGI, GNCC, the Ghana Employers Association, Ghana Association of Bankers, and the Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters. New members include the Ghana Association of Consultants and Ghana Real Estate Developers Association. 11. The GNCC classified members into five groups: 1A, 1B, 1C, 2, and 3 based on turnover. As of 2000, annual subscription was C2.5 million; C1.875 million; C950,000; C450,000; C180,000, respectively (interview, GNCC officer). In early 2000, $1 was worth about C3,500. Later that year, the rate rose to $1 to C7,000. 12. A prime example was J. A. Addison’s donation of a large office complex to the AGI (inter- view, AGI officers). Notes 235 13. This section has benefited from the work of Elizabeth Hart and E. Gyimah-Boadi (2000). 14. This affected four categories of imports: luxury products not made in Ghana; agricultural- based products available in Ghana; industrial products made from imported raw materials; and other garments not cotton or used clothing. Six The Changing Face of Ghanaian Business: The Rise of P/NDC Stalwarts 1. For alleged scandals involving NDC functionaries, see Ghanaian Chronicle, August 14, 2000; August 18, 2000; August 21, 2000. 2. Kwamena was minister of local government and rural development for years before serving as minister of regional cooperation in 2000. Kwesi was in charge of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre. Ato headed the National Investigation Committee and the Internal Revenue Service during the PNDC era. 3. This allegedly included foreign interests. The NPP government ended Telekom Malaysia’s management of Ghana Telecom in 2001, citing nonperformance. The real reason was sus- picion that Telecom Malaysia fronted for some NDC leaders. Seven NDC-Business Relations: The Case of Brong-Ahafo 1. This was a political and military union consisting of all the chiefdoms in the then Ashanti under the leadership of the Ashanti king who was based in Kumasi. The British colonial practice of indirect rule employed indigenous chiefs as part of the administrative system, leaving chiefly power largely intact. This, however, caused many chiefs, especially those in the far-flung lands, to resent the control and authority of the Ashanti king. 2. The NDC’s success in BA was due to many factors. These do not, however, concern us here. 3. An example was the failed attempt by the Kumasi metropolitan assembly to sack its chief executive, Akwasi Agyemang, who purged the assembly of his perceived enemies (Ghanaian Chronicle, May 8, 2000). 4. Soon after his appointment, this former teacher, had acquired, among other assets, three houses, several cars and a construction firm, which was awarded the bulk of contracts in the district. He was also allegedly arrogant and abusive. In an act reminiscent of the Nkrumah era (see Jones, 1976), the DCE had a private dance band to entertain him (interviews con- ducted at Goaso, the district capital). 5. The rules governing timber operations underwent major and rapid changes in a few years as part of an effort, partly due to donor pressure, to save the industry. The practice of granting timber concessions that last for decades was ended and replaced by the grant of timber rights. The new timber regime allows timber rights to be revoked if a breach of the terms and conditions is deemed to have occurred. It also makes district officials, including the District Forestry Officer a vital part in the decision to grant or revoke timber rights. The rapid changes caused confusion, giving officials considerable leeway and discretion in applying the law. For changes, see the L. I. 1649, for details see Timber Resources Management Regulations, 1998. 6. In my interview with an officer with the DIC, he denied that political connections were relevant in deciding who SOEs were sold to, arguing: “how could we sitting here in Accra, 236 Notes know who J. Adom is and which political party he supports? The man simply submits better business plans than others, hence his success.” 7. In 1998, the government leased a jet for the President’s use without seeking parliamentary approval as mandated by law. Critics saw this as irresponsible because there was already a presidential jet (see Ghanaian Chronicle, February 18, 2000; Ghanaian Chronicle, editorial, February 21, 2000. 8. This was also true of the central government, which owed billions to contractors (see Ghanaian Chronicle, May 10, 2000). 9. Before the 1996 elections, 6.7 billion cedis was “paid” to contractors for the much-criticized Keta Sea Defense Project. The work was not done. Critics believed that the amount involved went into NDC campaign fund. A minister of state was later sacked in connection with this case (Oelbaum, 2002), but critics charged that this was because he had become politically expendable. Moreover, the contractors were not prosecuted. Nor was the money recovered. 10. Political tension pervaded Berekum in the run-up to the 2000 elections. Supporters of the MP and minister of state, J. H. Owusu-Acheampong, and those of his rival, Retired Captain N. Effa-Dartey, violently clashed in November. The MP accused a local radio station of “incitement” and it was shut down for two weeks. When Rawlings publicly criticized Effa- Dartey, whom he had reportedly sacked from the military, he revived the acrimony between himself and Effa-Dartey and gave what was essentially a local issue a national flavor.