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Mjsiebert) (Final Submission to SGS Aug26'14 Platonic Recollection and Illumination in Augustine’s Early Writings by Michael Jay Siebert A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Michael Jay Siebert (2014) Platonic Recollection and Illumination in Augustine’s Early Writings Michael Jay Siebert Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2014 Abstract Will any longest possible straight line inside of a circle have to pass through the center? Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430 CE) certainly thought so and he thought that others would too. The experience of learning such “intelligible things” (intellegibilia), as he called them, fascinated him, and unlike most contemporary philosophers, thought the experience was loaded with epistemological and metaphysical implications. The implication for which he is particularly famous is his contention that the experience requires “illumination” from the divine. There are disputes about what this contention means precisely, but it begins from the claim that there is an analogy between seeing visible things and knowing intelligible things. Just as seeing visible things happens by means of the illumination of the sun, so also “seeing” intelligible things happens by means of an illumination from God. Without this divine illumination, intelligible things would not truly be “intelligible,” i.e. knowable. This illumination theory of learning is typically interpreted as an alternative to a Platonic recollection theory, since it seems not to require innate knowledge and the soul’s preexistence. The Augustine scholar Gerard O’Daly, for example, says that from start to finish, Augustine’s theory of illumination was an “explicit and unequivocal” alternative to Platonic recollection. My ii contention in this dissertation is that this was not always the case. I argue that at least in his pre- baptismal (and post-conversion) writings (386-7), Augustine not only entertained but also accepted Platonic recollection as a complement to illumination. In making my case, I provide original insight into interpreting Augustine’s Soliloquies and his obscure On the Immortality of the Soul. This insight reveals his attempted reconciliation of these theories and his underlying philosophical motivations. I also argue that Augustine’s preferred way of reconciling the theories in these works was highly unorthodox, entailing, among other things, that the soul was uncreated and consubstantial with God. These rarely defended claims indicate that the nature of Augustine’s conversion to Christianity is commonly misunderstand and suggest avenues for re- examining Augustine’s later writings and legacy. iii Acknowledgments My completion of this dissertation owes so much to many people. First, I would like to thank my university professors, especially James Muir, my undergraduate professor (and Cicero) who “converted” me to philosophy, the late Sabine MacCormack, my MA project supervisor, Peter King, my dissertation supervisor, and Lloyd Gerson and John Magee, my other dissertation committee members. I owe the latter three particular thanks for their unique insights and patience in reading and correcting obscure drafts much less interesting than Augustine’s. I am also grateful to Martin Pickavé for suggesting this topic to me, to Phillip Cary for kindly agreeing to be my external examiner, and to Brian Dobell, Matthew Siebert, and Ryan Topping for helping me to deal with the topic with much greater skill and depth than otherwise would have been possible. Very special thanks goes to my sister, Keri, and to my parents, Dan and Carol, who have always loved and supported me, and, in so doing, helped me to overcome the difficult personal issues that threatened to prevent this project’s completion. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Rad, whose contribution to completing this work of recollection cannot be calculated. It is dedicated to him. iv Table of Contents Abstract ..........................................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgments.........................................................................................................................iv Table of Contents...........................................................................................................................v Abbreviations...............................................................................................................................vii Note on Translations and References ..........................................................................................x Timeline of Augustine’s Relevant Writings and Life Events ...................................................xi Introduction ...................................................................................................................................1 1. The Intention of this Study.................................................................................................................1 2. The Scope and Method of this Study.................................................................................................5 3. Implications of this Study.................................................................................................................13 4. Platonic Recollection and its Conceptual Framework...................................................................17 5. Possible Arguments and Principles behind the Doctrine of Platonic Recollection in Augustine .................................................................................................................................................................32 Chapter 1 – The Issues of Interpretation ..................................................................................43 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................43 1. Putative Evidence for Platonic Recollection ...................................................................................43 2. Putative Evidence Against the Preexistence Requirement............................................................54 3. Putative Evidence Against Innate Knowledge................................................................................68 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................................78 Chapter 2 – The Soliloquies and Platonic Recollection............................................................80 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................80 1. The Soliloquies Project......................................................................................................................81 2. The Soliloquies’ Immortality Argument .........................................................................................84 3. The Immortality Argument and Platonic Recollection in General ..............................................89 4. Objections ........................................................................................................................................102 5. “Eternal, Constitutive Forms” Platonic Recollection ..................................................................107 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................117 Chapter 3 – On the Immortality of the Soul and Its Argumentative Strategy......................119 Introduction .........................................................................................................................................119 1. The Subject Matter of On the Immortality of the Soul .................................................................123 2. Augustine’s Strategy for Proving the Continual Existence of the SOUL: On the Immortality of the Soul 6.10-11....................................................................................................................................127 3. Augustine’s Strategy for Proving the Continual Existence of the SOUL: Further Observations about the Nature of the Conjunction.................................................................................................138 3.1. The Four Ways in which the SOUL Can be Conjoined to Ratio ................................................138 3.2. The Conjunction as a Prior Connection to Ratio as Opposed to a Posterior Connection..........143 4. Augustine’s Strategy for Proving the Continual Existence of the SOUL: Further Observations about the Identity of Ratio..................................................................................................................147 4.1. The Convertibility of Disciplina, Ratio, and Art in 1.1-5.9.......................................................148 4.2 The Convertibility of Ratio, Eternal Intelligible Things, and Truth in 7.12-16.25.....................158 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................167 Chapter 4 – How the Argumentative Strategy of On the Immortality of the Soul Entails Platonic Recollection .................................................................................................................169
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