Military Review VOLUME XLII JANUARY 1962 NUMBER 1 CONTENTS

Editor in Chief The ROAD Ahead 2 Col Kennetl! E. Lay Lt Col Carl P. Keiser, USA : Assistant Editor Night Counterattack 7 Maj Gen H. Essame. B"itish Lt CAJI Jerry G. Wallace Army, Ret Features Editor The Common Denominator 17 Lt Col Cleo S. Freed De Malaville , Layout Editor The Western Soldier and 2d Lt Russell W. Munson, Jr. Communism . . 19 Capt E. M. McCormick. Spanish·American Editor A ustmlian A 1'/11 if Lt Hetalltl!S-Ramir~z Col C. The Strength of India _ ~S Ma] Edna)' O'Ralia»rr, Ten';lm';al . Associate Editor Army. Great Britain Lt Col Daniel E. Halpin Army IVar College Soviet Colonialism in the Baltic 36 l'aclovas Sidzilcauskas Executive Officer Soviet Power in the Baltic 41 , Mai Lorenzo D. Laughlin Siegfried Breye,' ~ Production Officer Japanese Operations in Hukawng ,i,. Lt Col Louis Ruiz Valley . . . 48 Hiroshi Fulf'u 11 Staff Artist ­ I) Charles A. Moore Defense of the British Common­ I· wealth in Asia and the Pacific 64 ~ The lIIilitary Review, a Harald Husemallu ,publication of the UNITED Realism in Military Thinking . 75 ; STATES ARMY, provides a Capt Robert B. Hen,-y. USA \ forum for the expression of i mIlitary thought and a me­ Nuclear Stalemate and -~ dlUm for the dissemination Simulated War . . . 78 lof Army doctrine of the di­ Charles T. Slewa,·t, Jr. I vision and higher levels. Realism Through Planning 90 The VIEWS expressed in U Col Stephen A. Day,~ USA ,this magazine ARE THE AUTHORW and not neces­ Military Notes 97 sarily those of the Army or Military Books 107 the Command and General Staff· College. ' Military Review Annual Awards 112' An Introduction to the Reorganization of the Army Division THE ROAD AHEAD

Lieutenant Colonel Car] P. Keiser, United States Army

ROAD, the U. S. Army's newest idea on division organization, is a real. istic approach to the facts of today's and tomorrow's military life-one Ihat will better prepare us to fight under the most diverse circumstances. Like the fighter who would take on all comers, the Army must be ready to quickly. alter its weapons and tactics to defeat any opponent in any arena. I As the Army prepares itself to meet the challenge .it is most important, that its officer corps understand the basic philosophies that underlie the! ROAD organization and its employment doctrine. It is also important that we look beyond the immediate task of reorganization, for ROAD will profoundly influence the future of the Army. ROAD i's rapidly moving from an begun to incorporate ROAD into thelT idea to a reality. Since 25 May 1961. curricula. when President Kennedy announced In its 1960-61 academic year. th, the decision to reshape the AI'my's U. S. Army Command and General divisions. much of the foundation for Staff College was able to orient a the reorganization has been laid. Ta­ number of its classes on the ROAD bles of organization and equipment concept of organization. The 1961·6~ (TOE's) have bee n drafted. The classes will receive instruction on both United States Continental Army Com­ the ROAD and the pentomic divi· mand has set the service schools to sions. and by the fall of 1962 all Com· work writing training literature for mand and General Staff College in· the new divisions and the schools have struction will be based on ROAD.

2 Military Reyill The division level training litera­ with a working knowledge of RI'>AD ture on ROAD organization and doc­ doctrine. trine will be published soon in two Tailor Unit to Meet Need field mahuals. Field Manual 61-100, The basic philosophy of ROAD is The Division, will contain the fun­ to fit the unit to meet the need. damentals ()f organization and em­ The ROAD formula does not pro­ ployment of all ROAD divisions. Field vide a universal division capable of Manual 54-2, Division Logistics and doing all things. Rather, it is a stand­ the Support Command also will be ard division structure uJlon which 'the common to all divisions. capabilities for doing specific tasks Other manuals covering the divi­ can be built. To the common division sion's subordinate units and many base, combat battalions-airborne in­ special subjects, such as airborne op­ fantry, mechanized infantry, jus-t DIVISION BASE XX

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

erations, are being written by the plain infantry, and armor-can be service schools. Much, of this litera­ added in whatever numbers and types ture will be ready for publication in the division needs to perform its an­ time to support the actual reorgani­ ticipated missions. The division then zation. assumes the character, capabilities, In early 1962 the first ROAD divi­ and limitations of its particular com­ : 'sions are to be formed. Sometime in bination of combat battalions. In other 1963, all active Army divisions and words, it becomes exactly what its some of the Reserve component divi­ combat battalions make it. 'sions should be fully organized under When a division is to operate in the new structure. TOE's and train­ a known environment-for example, ing literature will be available to sup­ jungles, mountains, deserts, plains­ port their new organizations and their it will be given the battalions that personnel should include a substantial best suit it for its operational setting number 9f service sclibol graduates and probable opposition. For some

I mary 1962 3 ROAD very practical reasons, such as the ments of the job carries down to the requirements in personnel and funds, battalion and company levels. The bri­ type divisions-mechanized, airborne, gade commander may employ his at­ armored, and infantry-will be estab­ tached combat battalions without at­ lished. tachments, or he may form battalion To simplify the "tailoring" process, task forces with combinations of the combat battalions themselves are arms and services that he believes are similar in structure. Each is composed best able to do the jobs he has as­ of a headquarters company and three signed to them. Cross attachment of identical companies of its particular companies between battalions is the arm. Infantry, air b 0 r n e infantry, method used to build these battalion mechanized infantry, and tank bat­ task forces. Cross attachment of pla­ talions are generally the same except toons to form company task forces is for variations in 'quantity and type a further extension of the concept. of equipment. ROAD gives us a doctrine of build­ Since early in World War II, United ing the organization to meet the needs States armored division commanders of the task-from Department of the have tailored their subordinate com­ Army level all the way down to the fighting company. mands to per for m specific tasks. Fighting forces were formed by at­ Functionalized Support taching combat battalions to the three ROAD also represents a new look small combat command headquarters. at some old ideas on administrative ROAD adopts this scheme of tailor­ support-and adapts some of these ing within the division, replacing the ideas to the division and lower levels. title "combat command" with "bri­ It breaks away from the tradition of gade." Without combat battalions, the support by separate technical service brigade is nothing more than a small units, each directly responsible to the headquarters having essentially no dIvision commander. and in its place combat capability. With combat bat­ prescribes a division level logistical talions attached to It, the brigade, commander and func!ionalized logis· like the division, assumes the char­ tical support. acter of its battalions. The division's administrative sup· This versatility does not stop at the port unitg are grouped into a !"uppnrt brigade. The concept of matching the command. This is not new. Division command's capabilities to the require- trains and support commands have been used before. \Vhat is new is that Lieutcnant Colonel Carl P. Keiser all divisions will have a support com­ is a member of the faculty of the mand and all division support com· U. S. Army rnmmand and Gellrml mands will be similar in structure. Staff Col/cr.<'. He .'<'n'cd with the 14th Logistical units within the support ..1,/ morcd Dil'ision during Wm:ld WO?' command are grouped functionally II. Subsequent assignments inciud{' Repair parts supply. and essentially all duty with Headquarters, 6th Army; Depa/'fmen! of th'e Arm y General field maintenance, reg a r dIe s s of Staff; and United Nations Command whether it is perf~med on engines, in Korea. He is a gr,aduate of the radios. canvas. or rifles, are carried USA CGSC and the US Army War out by a maintenance battalion. Sup· College. ply, from rations to barbed wire, e"

4 Military Review cept medical, is handled by a supply means that commanders, both logisti­ and transportation battalion. The sup­ cal and combat arms, and at levels port units are designed to be frag­ down to the company, must now direct mented. Each part is capable of join­ their thinking toward combined-arms ing and supporting a combat unit employment-and away from tradi­ when that combat unit cannot be sup­ tional branch orientation. This is es­ ported from a central location. sential if we are to derive the great­ est benefit from the ROAD concept. Reorganization Effects How will ROAD affect the Army of This is not a prophecy of doom for the branches of service, because we tomorrow? Some of its effects such as changes in strengths of divisions, will continue to need the specialists different blocks on the organization they produce. But it is a forecast for charts, and new numbers on the TOE, a closer integration of the branches at the division unit level, and a defi­ are apparent. That the new division nite need for leaders who are well­ will require more men and equipment g;rounded in combined-arms opera­ is also obvious. However, there are tions. some 0 the r implications that may prove to be ROAD's most important Granting that ROAD dictates a effects and these, too, should be obvi­ combined-arms attitude on the part ous in the light of ROAD's funda­ of brigade, battalion, and company mental concepts of combined-arms em­ commanders, how should this '1ttitude ployment and logistical functionaliza­ be developed? Obviously, training com­ tion. manders in combined-arms employ­ For many years we have been a ment must start at an appropriate branch oriented Army. Infantry has level in our service schools. Admit­ been the "Queen of Battles," artillery tedly, our schools at Knox, Sill, and Benning now teach combined-arms the "King"; armor has called itself they are pri­ "a way of life." Until they reached employment. However, marily branch oriented schools. Leav­ Command and General Staff College enworth, teaching at the division level · level, officers have attended branch and higher, is the lowest echelon in oriented schools, Quartermaster, Ar­ the school system which is formally mor, Ordnance, and the like. We con­ recognized as a combined-arms insti­ · tinue to have branch associations and branch journals and e a c h branch, tution. · justly proud of its heritage, seeks to New Teaching Requirements further branch esprit. It is readily apparent that, some­ In the new division, some units that how, the school system must meet the were formerly identified by branch requirement for teaching employment lose t hat identification. Ordnance, of the new combinations of arms and Quartermaster, and Transportation services at levels below the Command Corps units no longer appear as such and General Staff College. There are on the organiiation chart. Their mem­ a number of ways in which this could bers are absorbed in functional logis­ be done. While it is not the purpose tical units. Others, particularly infan­ of this article to de'ielop the final try and armored units, now are more answer to this and other problems, it likely to be organized for combat into would appear that either the branch combined-llrms t ask forces. This school curricula may have to be al­

IInuary 1962 5 ROAD tered to the point that these schools fantry. He should be able to transfer are no longer branch oriented, or easily from one type division to an· there may have to be combined-arms other without ha,.ng to learn new or· schools established below the Leaven­ ganizations. worth level for combat arms and the Tomorrow's mechanized infantry technical service officers. The Army's battalion commander should be equally 'School System may take on quite a at home commanding a force heavy different appearance as a result of with tanks, or one predominanJy in· ROAD. fantry. ¥I should be quite able to How far will functionalization of build his subordinate units in what· logistical support have to be extended ever fashion he feels wiII best accom· as a result of ROAD? Will mainte­ plish the tasks he has assigned-and nance and supply by technical service he should be able to match the mis· continue to be feasible at corps, field sions and forces he intends to give army, theater, or even departmental his subordinate commanders with thel! level? Or will functionalization at di­ personalities and experience. vision prove unworkable without sim­ ROAD is a sizable step toward in· ilar functionalization of support at tegration of the arms and service; higher levels? Perhaps only experi­ into more effective com bat teams ence will provide the real answers to While it does not eliminate the need these questions. However, it is appar­ for branch specialists, it is a mo" ent that ROAD wiII have its impact away from branch orientation and a on the logistical system above the di­ move toward a combined-arms attj. vision echelon. tude. In the long run, ROAD may hare The idea of a common base for significant effects upon our service all divisions, together with common school system and our concepts of l~ training manuals at the division level, gistical and technical service organi.! and the possibility of lower level com­ zations and operations. It should pr~' bined-arms training present some in­ duce commanders who can capitaJiZl, teresting thoughts on tomorrow's of­ on the capabilities of all arms ani, ficer. This feIlow should be pretty services and whp are at horne in an}; much at home in any division, be it type division. These may prove to b, mechanized, armor, airborne, or in­ ROAD's most far-reaching results. '

.. '. I am directing the Secretary of Defense to undertake a complete reo organization and modernization of the Army's divisional structure, to ina crease its nonnuclear firepower. to improve its tactical mobility in any en­ vironment. to insure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat, to facilitate its coordination with our major allies, and to provide modern mecha~ nized divisions in Europe and new airborne brigades in both the Pacific and Europe. President John F. Kennedy I

8 Military Revi,.l NIGHT COUNTER­ ATTACK Major Gen<;ral H. Essame, British Armll, Retired

WORLD War I was the nadir of had 80 percent of his command wiped generalship; this on the whole has out, counterattacked by night, rees­ been the the m e of many military tablished his positions, and stopped writers ever since. Now there is a Ludendorff's t h r u s t on Amiens in spate of books, mostly by diligent early April 1918. In detail his tactical historical students deviling up the methods are outdated but the spirit gloomy records of the period and gen­ in which he and his Australian and erally painting a picture of stupid British soldiers fought is immortal. butchers driving men to death in In March and April 1918, British droves. All of them, whether the lit­ for tun e s in the war undoubtedly erary minded survivors of the First reached their lowest ebb. Ludendorff's World War or their successors of the offensive of 21 March had almost re­ •1960's, overlook one vital fact. There sulted in overwhelming disaster for •was one thing the British generals of ourselves and the French. The Ger­ :World War I could do. They could get man advance had been stopped only at . their men to fight, to take mass cas­ the price of a 35-mile retreat and the ; ualties and keep on fighting. That, it practical destruction of the British ;seems to me, looking back on my own 5th Army. By 4 April, however, the Iexperience at the sharp end in both arrival of reinforcements and the i World Wars, has always been the basic breakdown of German communica­ jproblem in battle. It is likely to con­ tions had brought the attack in the Itinue to be in nuclear war. Somme area to a standstill. Five days i This is the story of a divisional com­ later the Germans broke through on gmander, long since dead, who, having the Lys, but were contained.

IJmuary 1962 7 NIGHT COUNTERATTACK

Losses Are Great only five officers and 200 men. In spite For the first time, so far as the of their depleted numbers, the morale fighting troops were concerned, the of these survivors·was high_ For five idea began to spread that there was days the 8th Division had practically a possibility that we might lose the stood alone between the Germans and war. Morale in some of the units Amiens. It had beaten off all attacks, which had been involved in the re­ had frequently counterattacked, and treat had deteriorated. Our losses had never retired without orders. been very great. There were rumors that many units had not fought to Replacements Received At Crouy we received replacemenll a finish. that all was not well at home, 500 strong, part of the army retained and that the hearts of the French in England for home defense. This were no longer in the struggle. group consisted almost entirely of On top of everything cam e Sir "A4 Boys." They were nearly all un· Douglas Raig's "Backs to the Wall" del' 19 years of age; practically none order of the day. Possibly this order had started to shave. Their physique, may have been necessary, but to many however, was good and their training who had fought in the March retreat, superior to that of the usual replace· its tone was insulting. It infuriated ments who at that time were being my own commanding officer who re­ sent to the front with 14 weeks' servo fused to publish it to the troops and ice. At the same time, 18 new officers said that if the morale of the higher joined us from various units; moo: command was low, his at least was of them had not previously served a, not. He deprecated anything savoring officers in the field. of the dramatic. The situation did not permit us to Early April found my battalion remain long in a rest area and carry resting at Crouy in the CaviIlon area out the training we badly needed, On about 15 miles west of Amiens. We 13 April the division joined the Au, had been thrown into the March re­ tralian corps and was promptly or· treat at Nesle on the 2!ld with the dered to move back to the line easl rest of the 8th D i vis ion and had of Amiens. We \vent by train to a sid fought our way back to Moreuil south ing west of Amiens and from there of Amiens. Our losses had been con­ marched to Pont Noyelles, which lie; siderable and we reached Crouy with about six miles northeast of the city Major General II. Essamc, British Our route lay through Amiens, which Army, Retired, is a 1I1embC)' of the at the moment was being shelled. A: Institute of Strategic Studies and a the shops had their shutters up ane lecture,' in military studies undC)' the the walls were placarded with poster' auspices of the Universities of. Ox­ stating that looters would be shot ,I ford, Exeter, and Southampton. He sight. Save for a few Military Police was commissioned in 1915, sertted in the streets were empty. an infantry battalion in World War We passed through the Place Gam I, and commanded an infantry brigade from Normandy to the Baltic during betta and noted a number of dead' World War II. lIe is the author of bodies here and there. Railway traflk "The Suvorov Legend" IV hie h ap­ had ceased. I had known Amiens '" peared in the January 1961 issue of 1916 as a gay town with busy shop' the M'ILITARY REVIEW. and restaurants. Its changed aspec:

8 Military Revier LOCATION OF THE 8TH DIVISION ACTION 10·15 APRil 1918

n· Id fir in pi ~t

~ January 1962 9 • NIGHT COUNTERATIACK brought home to me the seriousness air, but not so dense as to restrict of the situation. movement of arms other than tanks. German Air Superiority The trees were already in full leaf. We arrived at len g that Pont The 58th Division, however, reported Noyelles where we billetted in aban­ that these woods had been so per­ doned houses for two nights. Owing sistently shelled with mustard gag as to air bombardment we did not get to be useless both as covered ap­ much sleep. The Germans had a meas­ proaches and for the concealment of ure of air superiority at this time. reserves. We soon found this infoI" The bombs used were contemptible mation to be only too true. The cas­ by present-day standards. Nonethe­ ualties among runners and others less, their effect on the morale of the forced to pass through them were new men was not good. considerable during the next few days On 17 April the 8th Division was as the enemy continued to pour gas transferred to 3d Corps and ordered shell into them. I remember seeing to take over the hne about Villers the horses of a complete field artil­ Bretonneux from the 58th Division. lery brigade lying dead in rows in the The sector to be t a ken over lay Bois d'Aquenne. In fact, the troops astride the Amiens-Foucaucourt road. in the rear area suffered more severel), Generally, the country around is typ­ than those in the forward posts. ical of the Somme Valley-sweeping Villers Bretonneux itself, a fairl), downs with practically no cover. It large village with ample cellar accom· had been little damaged by artillery modation, was in a fair state of pres· fire; the crops were just coming up, ervation. The estaminets were full of and owing to the abnormally dry wines and spirits and the furniture spring there were no obstacles to in the houses was intact. On the east­ movement. ern edge stood the hangars of an The fighting earlier in the month abandoned airfield. The place. how­ had finished with the v ita I high ever, stank of mustard gas, and so ground Gentelles-Cachy-Villers Bret­ unhealthy had it become that to con· onneux in our possession. So long as ceal reserves within its houndaries it remained in our hands, the enemy proved impossible. ' was denied observation of the country Defensive Positions which falls gradually westward to­ Forward of Villers Bretonneux the ward Amiens. If he wished to con­ defenses consisted of hastily dug and tinue his offensive, it would be of isolated defended localities between primary importance to him to secure which movement by day was prevented this high ground as a preliminary by enemy fire. Nothing in the nature step. I need hardly remind re"ders of an elaborate trench system existed, of the lengths to which the Germans although the high ground Gentelles· would go to get artillery observation Cachy east of the Bois d' Aquenne had in either World War. been strongly wired and entrench,,:. Enemy Use of Mustard Gas A further reserve position was rap· Within the sector lay two carefully idly being constructed from Gentelles maintained woods-the Bois I'Abbe northward through the Bois I' Abbe. and the Bois d'Aquenne-sufficiently The 8th Division took over the sec· thick to deny observation from the tor astride the main road on the

10 Military ReVII. nights of 19-20 and 20-21 April, the By the standards of those days the 24th Brigade (to which my battalion division was holding a position in belonged) on the right, the 25th Bri­ considerable depth with three of its gade on the left, and the 23d Brigade battalions forward on a fro11t of 4,000 in reserve with one battalion in the yards. There was, however, little pro­ Villers Bretonneux defenses and the vision for local counterattack. Possi­ other two in the Bois I'Abbe. The 50th bly the lack of training of the troops Division Artillery and an army bri­ explains this to some extent. One sol­ gade were in support, our own gun­ itary section of tanks, however, was ners being elsewhere. This meant that concealed in the Bois d' Aquenne with we had an immediate call on 112 guns. this end in view. The field batteries

us Army A 37-millimeter gun being set up againt the Germans in World War I The fire plan envisaged defensive fire were all sit e d west of the Cachy m front of the forward posts. Switch in considerable depth. I cannot recollect any provision for antitank defense. The machinegun Uneasy Situation fire plan catered largely for indirect My own battalion took over the sec­ fire. I cannot remember seeing a ma­ tor immediately east of the village chinegun east of the line Domart­ with three companies forward and one Villers Bretonneux. All machineguns in reserve. Battalion headquarters was were concentrated as a separate bat­ in a brick kiln near the. railway sta­ talion. The normal infantryman un­ tion. Life for the next few days can fortunately was divorced from control only be described 'as uneasy. All was of them. still in the forward area by day. We

JlJluary 1962 11 NIGHT COUNTERATTACK were seldom shelled. In fact, the con­ major of the 4th German Guard Di­ ditions in no way resembled the trench vision. He stated that his division had warfare of the previous three years. relieved the 9th Bavarian Division On 20 April the shelling of Villers expressly to take part in an attack on Bretonneux. practically ceased. It was Villers Bretonneux, which was timed far different in the woods in rear. to take place at 0300 the following Day and night they were continually morning. That night all ,vere warned drenched with gas and the troops in to be on the alert and elaborate coun· reserve suffered severely. At night we terpreparation was carried out by our endeavored to patrol with little suc­ artillery. The attack, however, failed cess. In every case, our patrols re­ to materialize, although the intense ported that they had been driven back gas shelling of the woods and our by parties of the enemy never less batteries continued. than 30 strong. We completely failed The next day indications of attack to locate any definite positions held accumulated. Other prisoners and a by the Germans although the number deserter confirmed the statement of of his machineguns was evidently the Guard's sergeant major. Accord· very large. ing to them, the attack would take place early on the morning of 24 April Enemy Attack Imminent The air reports also indicated that As adjutant, I was able to get a the enemy was moving troops forward somewhat wider view of the situation and that his forward defenses "'ere than would have been the case had now strongly held. I been with a company. The divisional intelligence summaries emphasized Counterpreparation Plan that an enemy attack on a large scale Our artillery, therefore, on the was imminent. Our air reports indi­ night of 23-24 April carried out coun· cated considerable movement behind terpreparation of exceptional inten· enemy lines and a great increase in sity, every gun in the corps taking his artillery. part. The field batteries alone fired Every evening we received the air 100 rounds per gun. The din was ter· photographs of our immediate front rific and the losses of the German which had been taken that morning. troops forming up must have been We received at least a dozen nightly; considerable. they were remarkably good and clear. On the same night we were relieved They revealed the fact that the enemy by the 23d Brigade. It was bright was not constructing a trench system. moonlight; the ground was firm under It was, in fact, only too evident that foot and the relief went without a he had no intention of remaining hitch. By midnight, one battalion had where he was. The photographs tal

12 Military ReYill Despite the intense counterbom­ Shelling Resumed bardment being carried out by our At 0630 the bombardment began guns all around us, I fen asleep to be again. This time it appeared to have awakened at 0330 by a shell bursting lifted from the forward area and to a few yaros away. A fantastic bom­ be confined to the reserve and battery bardment had begun. The ground lit­ positions. The noise of machinegun erally shook. My commanding officer fire ahead became pronounced. The and I could not hear each other speak. attack had begun. Most of the shells falling around us It is impossible to give more than were going off not with the usual ex­ a brief account of what followed. The plosion but I ike suddenly deflated enemy in the 8th Division sector at­ tires. The air stank of gas. We hastily tacked on a front of three divisions, put on our respirators. under cover of five tanks and a cloud It is difficult t9 convey the feeling of smoke, the infantry operating in of utter helplessness produced by sit­ groups with machineguns, mortars, ting with a gas mask on in the dark. and flame throwers. The brunt of the The model in use in this period made attack fell on the right brigade. Two your mouth burn, and your saliva battalions were overwhelmed and the bubble in the tube. After the first third driven out of their position on hour, one had to fight against the the outskirts of Villers Bretonneux. temptation to throw it away and get On the left, one reserve company alone a breath of air. held its ground. It was evident that a bombardment It was not until 0930 that the sit­ of exceptional intensity had descended uation became more or less clear. The on the forward and rear areas of the remnants of the 23d Brigade had been divisional front. It lasted for two and driven on to the falling ground west a quarter hours. Mixed gas and high­ of the village. About 100 of the enemy explosive shells, supplemented by mor­ with machineguns and mortars had tar bombs, were poured continuously got into the Bois d' Aquenne. Further on all our positions. and approaches. south, he had rea c h e d the Cachy We subsequently learned that there Switch where he was definitely held was a mass of German artillery drawn up by two battalions. Between their up axle to axle just west of Marcel­ right and the 58th Division a gap cave, the gunners stripped to the waist existed of about half a mile. and reliefs standing by. The battalion from Blangy Tron­ About 0545 a lull came in the bom­ ville was brought up and given the bardment. It was now quite light. I task of clearing the enemy from the removed my respirator. The wood Bois d'Aquenne. Moving along the reeked of mustard gas. Two of the southern edge of the woods, they cookers had been hit. About 70 of the t urn e d northward into the Bois battalion, all suffering from gas, were d'Aquenne and eventually drove the streaming down to the regimental aid enemy to its eastern edge. Here, how­ post. A number of dead were lying ever, the battalion's commanding of­ about. From the front came the sound ficer was wounded and, deprived of of machinegun fire. It was impossible his leadership at a critical moment. to see far, however, owing to the mist. they became disorganized and finally

January 1962 13 'NIGHT COUNTERATIACK dug in on the track which runs north­ his advance in front of the Cach~ northeast through the wood. Switch. There were about 100 enemJ . A little earlier the section of tanks in the Bois d'Aquenne. The remnant! which had been hidden in the Bois of the 23d and 25th Brigades still held d'Aquenne and whose crews were suf­ the reserve line west of Villers Bret· fering from gas, had attempted to onneux, linking up with the 5th Aus· counterattack the enemy tanks but, tralian Division which had not been being armed with machineguns only, attacked. Our field batteries had stood had been speedily put out of action. their ground bravely and, in spite oj the fact that many of their positions Armor Action were under machiriegun fire, continued Headquarters, 3d Corps, alarmed at to interdict the western exits from the gap on the right flank of the 8th the village. Division, now intervened and at 1030 The reserves at the disposal of the ,dispatched s eve n. whippet tanks to commander of the 8th Division, Major clear up the situation east of the vil­ General Heneker, were my own bat· lage of Cachy. Ground more suitable talion-reduced by about 10 percent for them could not have been found. and very tired-and his pioneer bat­ While moving around the northeast talion. During the morning, however, side of this village, they suddenly the 13th Australian Infantry Brigade came upon two battalions of German was placed under his orders. The sit­ infantry forming up to attack. With­ uation was ripe for the counterstroke. out a moment's hesitation, they formed line and charged down the slope right Plan the Counterattack on the closely formed infantry. Experience indicates that to initiate Indescribable confusion reigned as a counterattack on a large scale with· they tore through the German ranks; out due time for preparation is to some men threw themselves on their court disaster. Reviewing the situa· knees before the tan k s only to be tion, General Heneker reached the crushed to death. The rest scattered. conclusion that, in view of the enemy's The whippets having completed their great strength in. machineguns, a task, returned to our lines, their sides counterattack by day over the open splashed with blood. They had lost slopes would break down. He took the only one tank-put out of action by view that he could maintain his pres· artillery fire on the way back-ancl ent position for the rest of the day only five men. and suggested that he be allowed to The helplessness of some 1,200 in­ carry out a night attack aided by the fantrymen against seven primitive full moon and the clear weather. The tanks manned by seven officers and 14 corps commander approved and placed men at this stage of the war had bMn the entire attack on the corps front demonstrated. In fact, their isolated under his command, giving him the action at a critical moment had a de­ 54th Infantry Brigade and the 13th cisive effect: it definitely stopped the and 15th Australian Infantry Bri· exploitation of the German attack for gades for the pu rpose. the rest of the day. Briefly, his plan, issued in the form Until nightfall the enemy held the of an order at 1730, was that the at­ high ground about Cachy, The 1st tack was to be carried out on a three­ Worcesters and 2d Devons had stopped brigade front. On the right, the 54th

14 Military Review Brfgade was to recapture the original their defense. Above all, the fir.e of line east of Cachy. In the center, the the large number of machineguns they 13th Australian Brigade with the ad­ were known to have brought forward, dition of my battalion was to form up almost unsurmountable by day owing on the high-ground south of the Bois to the open nature of the ground', I'Abbe and, attacking south of Villers would be neutralized to some extent. BretonneuXc, reestablish the line south Finally, the troops carrying out the of the village. On the left, the 15th attack were for the most part fresh Australian Brigade was to form up and of proved reputation. The plan on the plateau north of Villers Breton­ itself was so simple that even the in­ neux, attack in a southeasterly direc­ dividual private soldier could under­ tion, and join up with the 13th Aus­ stand it. tralian Brigade east of the village. My own commanding officer, Lieu­ "Zero" hour was to be at 2200. The tenant Colonel Latham, left for Gen­ artillery plan was simple in the ex­ eral Heneker's command post late in treme. Nothing in the nature of a the afternoon. The 13th Australian creeping barrage was possible. The Brigade arrived in the Bois l'Abbe. guns were to concentrate on the west­ Night came on. About 2000 Colonel ern edge of Monument Wood. the rail­ Latham returned, accompanied by the ways to the south of Villers Breton­ commanding officers of the 51st and neux, and Villers Bretonneux itself. 52d Australian Infantry Battalions. An available aircraft on the 4th Army Lieutenant Colon e I s Christie and front was to bomb the village during Whitham. The company commanders this period. At zero plus one hour the of' all three battalions assembled un­ guns were to lift to their original de­ der the tarpaulin which served as our fensive fire areas east of the final ob headquarters. Each of the three com­ jectives. manding officers gave out his orders Risks Considered by candlelight. It was the third an­ The plan can be described only as niversary of the Australian landing very bold. An attack was to be car­ in Gallipoli. ried out by night by three brigades The gist of the orders was this: the over ground which most of the attack­ 13th Brigade was to attack on a two­ ing troops had not had time to recon­ battalion front, the 52d Battalion on noiter. All experience then and now the right. and the 51st on the left. emphasizes the importance of thor­ My own battalion was to follow the ough previous reconnaissance in the 51st south of the Bois d'Aquenne and, case of night operations. It also dep­ while the other two pushed on south recates night attacks with forces ex­ of the village, to enter Villers Breton­ ceeding one brigade. neux and clear it of the enemy. The General Heneker was taking a great 50th Battalion was to remain in re­ risk. He considered that by attacking serve. . at 2200 he would secure surprise-the Time was short. About 2115 we Germans would never expect British moved off to forming-up tapes put troops to attack at that hour. Neither down by the Royal Engineers south would they, by that time, have .ad­ of the Bois l'Abbe._Colonel Latham justed the disorganization caused by decided to advance on a two-company the day's fighting and consolidated front in depth. There was sufficient

January 1962 15· NIGHT· COUNTERATTACK moonlight to see for several hundred nature of a barrage. The Australians yards. rushed forward from machinegun po­ Scarcely was the battalion formed sition to machinegun position, aided up than our bombardment started. We by the light of the burning buildings moved forward, my commanding offi­ in the village. Soon after midnight cer at the head of his battalion, mid­ they had gained all their objectives. way between the two leading com­ On the right, the 54th Brigade prac­ panies with myself and eight runners. tically regained the positions lost_ Ahead Villers Bretonneux burst into At daybreak, what remained of the flames. Our advance developed into a 8th Division was pushed into the vil­ run. Just as we cleared the wire of lage to mop it up. By nightfall, Villers the Gachy Switch, the enemy barrage Bretonneux was once again in our came down among us. hands and the line practically reestab­ The wire of the Cachy Switch ran lished in its old position. Only Monu­ diagonally across "the line of advance. ment Wood remained in the enemy's This and the general slope of the possession. ground caused the two Australian bat­ Lessons for Today talions, with whom we were now par­ Although tactics and weapons have tially intermingled, to veer to the changed, four lessons from this battle right and ourselves to move up on appear to be permanently valid. their left. Soon most of the enemy • The climax of every defensive shells were falling behind us. Machine­ battle is the counterstroke. guns were firing a few yards ahead • Time was the essence of the prob­ and also from the Bois d'Aquenne. lem. Here it was saved by using the I cannot personally give an eyewit­ division headquarters in line and thus ness description of the battle beyond in touch with the situation to mount this point. Colonel Latham was killed the operation. and I was wounded on the low ground • General Heneker, in spite of most before Villers Bretonneux. The Aus­ unfavorable conditions, achieved sur­ tralians got as far as Monument Wood prise. To this end he was willin!!, to but were driven back to a position take the risk of a night operation on between the Domart-ViIlers Breton­ a large scale with troops most of whom neux and Hangard-ViIlers Breton­ had no time for reconnaissance. neux roads. My own battalion was • In his plan for the counterattack eventually hung up by machinegun there' was an element of inspiration. fire from the railway embankment It was daring and yet so simple that southwest of the village until dawn every man taking part could under­ when the remnants succeeded in pen­ stand it. Its general design and espe­ etrating the southern outskirts. cially its fire plan allowed for the ex­ On the right, the 15th Australian ercise of the fullest initiative on the Brigade had better fortune. They did part of subordinate commanders in not cross their line of departure until the inevitable confusion of a night 2300-an hour late. Once started, how­ attack. It suited the Australian sol­ ever, their attack went smoothly and dier who in World War I showed him· successfully. Uncertain of the posi­ self quicker to exploit a situation than tion of his own troops, the enemy any other. It bore the hallmark of all failed to put down anything in the great operations of war-simplicity.

16 Military Review THE (OMMON

DENOMINATOR De Malaville

To DEFEAT their disunited opponents one after another has always been . one of the principles of conquerors. Communist imperialism is attempting to do this by exploiting the internal disagreements of the "Capitalist world." It has succeeded rather well; the history of the past 20 years is a recital of the continued progress of the Hegelian-Marxist ideology. The great American idea of World War II found its ultimate expression in the Marshall Plan, only to be lost later in technical discussions intent on purely military alliances. Confronting this political and 'spiritual void, Marxism outmaneuvers its adversaries by taking advantage of the minor disagreements that divide them, making them forget the stakes of the real struggle into which they are to be drawn one at a time and conquered. It would be pointless to deny the reality of the disagreements which en­ feeble the fighting spirit of the non-Marxist world. These disagreements occur In all spheres--economic, financial, monetary, scientific, social, military, ethnic, and spiritual: in short, they extend throughout the entire political order. Indifference, :nistrust, and rivalry all work together to weaken the poten­ tial of the Fre.. World by inactivating the means of production, causing dupli­ cate research, disorganizing distriblItion, permitting the undernourishment of indigent peoples, and scattering military efforts. These, in turn, are responsible for our loss of influence in Europe, Japan, South America, and Central Africa, and our retreat in China, Indonesia, Korea, Indochina, the Middle East, and North Africa. The closing of the Suez and the abandonment of .the Hungarian patriots had no other cause than the absence of a common political philosophy among the anti-Communist nations. Is the disunited Free World the most effective ally of Marxism in destroy­ ing freedom? The Communist world, stretching from central Europe eastward to China, has its own internal disagreements. But these discrepancies do not prevent communism from making new conquests---eonquests which exceed those justi­ fied by its material force.

llllaary 1962 17 COMMON DENOMINATOR

The Communist world depends "less on geographic than on ideologica1 alli· ances. Its alliances are forged and used in accord with one political philoso~hy. clearly defined, which tends to efface any secondary divergences. This brings us to the question, then: Is the Free World incapable of fiM· ing, above and beyond its petty discord, a directing concept and political ideal which can lead it to victory over Marxism? Can we discover the common de· nominator of our profound aspirations? Let us return now to basic matters. What is the source of our difficulties? Why are we fighting among ourselves? Each of us will reply by different arguments, depending on his situation, his history, his education. The arguments evoked wil) stress particular points depending on whljther our thoughts have turned more or'less recently to world affairs, and on whether our education has been chiefly technical or chiefly cuI· tural. Each of us, however, recognizes (either rationally or instinctively) a certain transcendent conception of man and of the world. The common measure of our alliance is less the economic and social struc· ture of our nations-actually this is its most fragile element, although the only one ever mentioned by the Marxists-than it is a belief in human dignity and in certain transcendent values, be they called God, Right, or the Ideal. Marxist dialectic synthesizes its fugitive and contradictory "truths" at the level of human physiology: Marxist philosophy is materialistic and determinis· tic. The ascending spiral of our thought, however, can exist only through God, It seeks an ideal truth which we reach for every day but which can never be attained. Our philosophy is transcendental or spiritual. Transcendent world or strictly material world? That is the crucial question, Such is the fundamental question to which the acts of simple citizens and whole nations alike should bear reference. Everything then becomes simple. unified, effective, and complete. Thus guided by a common political idea at last rediscovered, the nations of the Free World would be able to satisfy the imperatives which are proper to them, without continuing to abandon their partners to the blows of the adversary. They would not have to fight singlehanded in Cuba, in Suez, or in the Congo, ignored by their Atlantic allies. The French citizen could no longer be indifferent to the action of his. army in Algeria, if he knew that the combat concerned his own liberty and his right to possess a conscience. An enduring philosophy which sees God as the measure of men and Man as the measure of things-that is the ideal of individuals and nations in that anarchy of exuberant life which constitutes the Free World.

Digested from the original article which appeared in the REVUE MILI;rAIJ!E GENERAL! (France) June 1961. Translation by Mrs. Margaret Shu/enberger, Lawrence, Kans ...

18 MilHary Rerier This article presents the author's views of the threat posed by cmnmunism to the integrity of the armed forces. Although related specifically to the Aus­ tralian Army, it provokes thoughtful consideration of a problem faced by the military forces of aU free nations. The role of the military establishment in the ide­ ological struggle against Communist subversion is placed in perspective.-Editor.

THE WESTERN SOLDIER AND COMMUNISM Captain E. M. McCormick, AustraUan Arm/1

TODAY, the problems of nuclear war are always before us, and the major part of the time and energy spent in the study of military affairs is taken up in attempts to solve the many problems associated with such a war and its weapons. The immensity of the problem and its attendant horrors tend to overshadow the serious threat of the assault on men's minds by the Communist dogma. Yet if the march of Commu­ nist ideas: is not contained and actively countered, it may not be necessary to worry too much about the problems of nuclear warfare, as we may one day wake up and find that the war is over before it has really started-that a Communist government is in power and the country is a Communist satellite. It has happened before and it could happen again.

The Communist dogma is 11 weapon of war and of equal use in both hot and cold wars. It is aimed at the mind of man. As with any other enemy weapon its characteristics and capabilities must be clearly un­ derstood by the soldier if he is to counter or nullify its effects. The soldier must understand what he is fighting.

I JIIII.ry 19&2 19 THE SOLDIER AND COMMUNISM

We are also told that in a nuclear munist cause is to suborn the alle­ war it is most important that the sol­ giance and if possible convert the op­ dier have a sound belief in the right­ position's armed forces, or, if this is eousness of his cause if he is to with­ not possible, destroy their morale and stand the stresses and s t r a ins of thus render them ineffective. Is this nuclear attack. He must know why being attempted here? The answer is and for what he is fighting and be­ "Yes"; only the degree of activity is­ lieve in his reasons. The ordinary sol­ doubtful. dier must, therefore, understand the It is obvious that the Communist aims and methods of the Communists. line does not differ materially from To do this he must be educated in that of Lenin in 1928 when he said: communism; in other words, he must The Communist Parties (abroad) receive a type of political instruction must carryon persistent propaganda or indoctrination. urging the worker to refuse to traIlS­ Political instruction for soldiers! port war materials for the enemies of Immediately one can hear the objec­ the Soviet Republics. tions. The military critic says: How then can we com bat this The soldier must be nonpolitical to threat? carry out his job. Any Communist subversion can be countered by the Countering Communism activities of intelligence. We must on Already in the Armies of the United no account have political instruction States and Australia some effort is in the army. The next step would be being made to counter the threat of commissars. Communist teachings. The alarm felt He is ably bac)

20 Military Rnitl sion of any instruction on how to Understanding as a Weapon counter the insidious Communist at­ If he is aware and convinced that tacks on the minds of the majority communism is not native in its ideas who, indeed, may never be taken pris­ and aims, that it works to overthrow oner? It is a step in the right direc­ the legal government, and is subordi­ tion, but it is working back to front. nate to a foreign power, wi1\ he sup­ Invesifg-ation has revealed that Com­ port or tolerate it? I think not. We munist ideas are most effective against can get proof of this from state~ents the less-educated type of person, the of Communist leaders such as Andrei person who knows little about his own Vyshinsky who in 1948 stated: system of living and, therefore, has A real internationalist is pne who nothing with which to fight the state­ brings his sympathy and recognition ments of communism. Obviously, the up to the point of practical and max­ way to counter this situation in the imum help to the USSR, who supports army is to educate each and every the defense of the USSR by every soldier in citizenship and communism. means and in every possible form, and Compare the advantages and disad­ who act u a II y cooperates with the vantages of the two systems and let USSR and its agencies. The readiness him make up his own mind. ·of the workers of any country to sub­ The average citizen is a very fair­ ject all their aims to the basic prob­ minded fellow: He is not interested, lems of strengthening the USSR in to any great degree, in politics, nor its struggle is the manifestation of has he any great knowledge of the revolutionary proletarian internation­ various political parties. He generally alism on the part of the workers in . accepts the views of the group he has foreign countries. The defense of the been brought up with, or with whom USSR as the socialist motherland of he allies himself. He is convinced the world proletariat is the holy duty everyone has a right to say what he of every honest man anywhere. thinks. In many cases changes of gov­ Could the aims of the Communist ernment occur solely because he thinks Party be put more clearly than this? it's about time the other side had a After he has completed a course of go, rather than a belief in the plat­ instruction comparing our s y s tern form of the opposition. He does not, with the Communist system and show­ however, tolerate outside interference ing the foreign control and aims of .from anyone in the domestic affairs of the Communist Party as stated by his country, and this is perhaps one its leaders, the soldier will be in a of the keys to countering the machina­ strong position to resist the blandish­ tions of communism. ments and false promises of the Reds.

In recognition of the problem of internal Communist influence, the United States Army's troop information objectives speciti"ally provide for the further de­ velopment in each soldier of his belief in the principles of American democracy and freedom, his sense of responsibility as a citizen of the United States.,snd his aware­ ness of the threat of communism to Anierica and the Free World. This program emphasizes what is right with our system as weU as what is wrong with "ommu­ nism.-Editor.

, Jllaary 1962 21 THE SOLDIER AND COMMUNISM

He will be able to recognize the Com­ immense. Such an educational pro­ . munist methods whether he encounters gram could not be initiated by the mil· them at home, at war, or in a prison itary alone. The army, together with camp. He 'would understand and have the country's political experts, must ,a firm belief in what he was fighting produce a plan and supervise its exe­ , for. cution. The plan must ensure that The material to destroy the effects every soldier receives regular interest· of Communist methods and appeals ing instruction, in everyday language, is contained in the writings of the by people who know what they are system, and to defeat it we must edu­ talking about. cate the soldier in both the democratic Such instruction must be part of i

Pamphlets such as the .eries shown here are typical of the items used in the US Department of Def~nse troop information program and Communist way of life. There is the normal training program as are no fear that our system and way of weapon training and minor tactics. In life will suffer in comparison with that the same way as fieldcraft is taught of the Communist. to minimize the enemy fire, so must The Solution political education be given to mini· The solution to the menace of com­ mize the ideological bullets. The pro­ munism is simple, but the task of duction of a complete plan is beyond putting the solution into practice is the s~ope of this article. It is sufficient

22 Military ReYilt to understand the immensity of the will ensure that just as the statesman task, the fact that it can be done, and will be a check on the megalomaniac some general suggestions as to the ambitions of the odd general, so will method. the army be a check on anyone polit­ Will political education affect the ical party using the system to spread attitude of the army toward its duty? its own doctrines. The system can best I think not. If the political indoctri­ be described as nondenominational po­ nation of Communist armies, with its litical instruction. distortions, lies, and half-truths, binds In conclusion, it can be said that the armies closer to the state, how can there is a major threat to the armed education in the truth but do likewise? forces posed by the Communist dogma. It will strengthen the soldier's belief This threat c 0 u I d actually destroy in his cause and thus his will to fight. their effectiveness without a hot war. Fears that such education would It must be countered, and the way to encourage the ,army to take over the do this is by educating the soldier in rountry from the legal government citizenship and communism, by com­ are groundless. Except in the case of paring the two systems, and by mak­ a Communist government being in power, there is no fear or possibility ing it clear that the Communist dogma of any takeover or even desire for is an alien idea aimed at the subjec­ such a takeover. The system is not tion of his country. ' designed to produce politician soldiers, The problem is a large one, but the but purely to 'educate the soldier in difficulties are not insurmountable and the dangers of 'an alien ideology con­ should be tackled at once. The idea is ceived outside his country and aimed new in a democracy, but not in the at the eventual overthrow of his way world. It has a bad name when being of life. used for bad ends. but it can be No domestic political party could adapted to do good. In the words of quibble at this. In fact, such a system Lenin: ' strengthens their own position by cut­ Everyone will agree that an army ting to a minimum the chance of be­ which does not train itself to wield ing taken over by the Communists. all arms, all means and methods of The fact that the system is based on warfare that the enemy possesses or a plan conceived by cooperation be­ may possess behaves in an unusual and tween the military and the statesmen even criminal manner.

There is no true historical parallel to the drive of Soviet Communist imperialism to colonize the world. This is not the first time that ambitious dictators have sought to dominate the globe. But none has ever been so well organized; pOssessed so many instruments of destrudion; or been so adept at disguising ignoble motives and objectives with noble words and phrases. Furthermore, there is a totality in Soviet aggression whicn can be matched only by turning to ancient history when warring tribes sought not merely conquest but total obliteration of the enemy. Soviet communism does not seek the physical obliteration of a conquered people-although it would not hesitate to do so if this would serve its ends. But it does seek the total

iIIury 1962 23 THE SOLDIER AND COMMUNISM

obliteration of their customs, their 'social structure, their political struc­ ture, their religiou, and their freedoms. Everything and everybody must be remolded according to a blueprint laid down by Lenin and altered only for the purposes of ruthless efficiency by Stalin and the present-day.leaders. There is nothing so sacred-friendship, integrity, church, or family-that it escapes the attention of the Soviet commissar or the Communist bureaucrat. Soviet communism seeks to wipe out the cherished traditions and insti· tutions of the Free World with the same fanaticism that once impelled win­ ning armies to burn villages and sow the fields with salt so they would not again become productive. To this primitive concept of total obliteration, the Communists have brought the resources of modern technology and science. The combination is formidable. Twentieth century knowledge, when robbed of any moral re­ straints, is the- most dangerous force ev·er let loose in the world. And the entire literature of Soviet communism can be searched without turning up the faintest trace of moral restraint. If the Free World should lose to communism, th" loss would be total, final, and irrevocable. The citadel of freedom must be preserved because there is no road back to freedom for anyone if the citadel is lost. These are not new convictions with me. I have held them for many years. I was deeply impressed and horrified by the human misery and de­ struction that Hitler was able to create. Hitler's philosophy was based on the concept of total obliteration and Hitler lost. But the years sinc~ the end of World War II have demonstrated that Soviet communism is operating from a far stronger position than Hitler ever held. In 1949 I read an article in Foreign Affairs-which analyzed the writings of Stalin and quoted him at length. It was clear from these quotes that the Communist world had no intention of living forever in peace with the world of freedom. One of Stalin's favorite quotations from Lenin illustrates the point: 'We live ... not only in a state but in a system of states, and the exist... ence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisionR between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.' It is obvious that the aggressive goals of Soviet communism have not changed. Stalin's successor-Nikita Khrushchev-has said that our grand­ children will live under tommunism. I cite this material because I want you to know the spirit in which I be­ lieve the education program of our Defense Establishment should be con­ ducted. The threat is clear and immediate. Our fighting men should know the positive values of the freedoms which the nation is calling them to de­ fend and the nature of Soviet communism which seeks to take them away.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara

24 Military Revill Major Edgar O'Ballance. Territorial Army, Great Britain

T~o gigantic land powers, India have replied, in answer to a question and Red China, are growing up in concerning the defense of his country, ASIa adjacent to each other.' They "Defense against what?" have much in common-huge popula­ How strong is India? Can she ef­ tions, low standards of hving, fast­ fectively dam th.. flood to the north? rising b i r t h rates-and both are Th.. subcontinent of India, a penin­ struggling to industrialize. sula jutting out into the Indian Ocean Each is deeply immersed in its own from the Asian landmass, for c..ntn­ domestic and economic problems, and ries has been shielded from invaders one might think that both have far from the north by the massive ranges too much to do to contemplate inter­ of the Himalayas. It contains a va­ national aggression. As for India, she ri..ty of terrain, ranging from moun­ has enjoyed her role as a major neu· tain and jungle to desert and swamp. tral power between EaRt and West; To the northwest is Pakistan. To Red China, on the other hand, is fully the north is Tibet, now a province of committed to communism and all it Red China, with only a few small bor­ implies. Red China's policy is one of 'der states such as Nepal, Bhutan, and corrosive expansion. Already the Red Sikkim sandwiched between. To the tide laps relentlessly against the wall east lie East Paki~tan and Burma. of the Himalayas. India's land frontier i~ over 8,200 Not so long ago the Indian Prime miles long, more than 2,600 miles of Minist~r, Mr. Nehru, is reputed to 'which she shares with Red China.

January 1962 25 iNDIA.

The pop u I a t ion of 438 million sources of the country have by no (1961) is rapidly increasing; it has means been fully explored, let alone been estimated that it will exceed 492 developed. High hopes are placed in million by 1966, and 625 million 10 that direction. years later. These are formidable fig­ ures, indeed. India can be regarded as Improving .Output In World War II India became a more than a country in that she has base for the Burma and Far East seven major racial divisions, and a fighting, but no attempt was made to host of languages and dialects--one establish any "war industries." A authority ·estimates 700, which may number of scattered, small industries be roughly correct. Literacy is barely which had sprung up naturally were 23 percent but rising. The standard left to potter on in their own way of living of the people is low, the without encouragement from indus­ government being haunted by the ever­ trial Britain. Before 1947 there was present problem of feeding numbers hardly any heavy industry to speak that increase so rapidly. of in India. Since achieving independ­ Agriculture is the basis of the In­ ence, intense efforts have been made dian economy, but methods tend to to build up a sound industrial base to be primitive and yields low. For exam­ balance and complement the agricul· ple, there were only 34,000 tractors tural economy. Progress in this direc­ on more than 315 million cultivated tion has been made. Two five-year acres in early 1960. Traditions also plans have been completed, and an­ affect agriculture. The cow is sacred other one is just beginning. The plan and must not be killed. There are aims at increasing the national in­ about 200 million head of cattle in come, food production, steel output I n d i a

26 Military Review in first-class order. There also are fragmentation. Within India there more than 240,000 miles of second­ were a host of practically independent ary, improved roads in reasonable con­ princely states which formerly had dition. These roads stretch out to link private treaties with Britain. They the main cities, ports, and centers, but had to be persuaded to forego their until the aggressive intentions of Red rights and privileges and merge their China became so apparent, few roads territories into the new India. Hy­ led to the Himalayas. Since then a derabad, one of the largest, resisted network of strategic roads leading to such pressure, and was not integrated the northern frontier is being con­ until it was invaded and occupied by structed. Trucks and motor vehicles, Indian troops in September- 1948. both foreign and Indian, are ample, Almost at once a dispute arose over if not abundant, for the present econ­ the northerly state of mountainous omy of the country. Vehicle produc­ Kashmir. Although Kashmir has a tion is rising; more than 52,000 were predominantly Moslem population, its turned out from Indian factories in ruler was a Hindu, who opted to join 1960. India. Pakistan at once protested, and The people generally rely upon an­ the t roo p s of India and Pakistan imal transport. Rivercraft are used, clashed in Kashmir itself, where they where possible, as many of the rivers still face each other across an uneasy are navigable. cease-fire line. A good railway system links the To the northeast difficulties were ports and the main centers within the encountered in the Wild, tribal coun­ country. try of the Nagas, the famed "head­ Recent History hunters" who also demanded complete Consolidated and ruled by Great autonomy. Again, Indian troops had Britain for n e a I' I y two centuries, to intervene. This problem still is not power was handed over in 1947, when satisfactorily solved. India and Pakistan became independ­ On the whole, in spite of a few in­ ent. Generally, par t s with Moslem ternal spasms, matters have gone as roots went to Pakistan and the others well since independence as Mr. Nehru to India, but thIS left large communi­ reasonably could have hoped, although ties on both sides stranded in an alien one state, Kerala, has voted Commu­ country. The birth was painful, as nist in its local elections, much to his the sudden removal of British control" discomfort. resulted in mass migration and com­ In May 1951 the Red Chinese in­ munal slaughter. Actual fi'gures of vasion of Tibet, the power vacuum to those killed are unknown, but may the north, brought communism to the have been a million, or some say even borders of India. Then followed some more, The displaced and homeless years of uncertainty. Nehru, despite were many times that number. darkening skies, preached the gospel The prominent Indian leader, Mr. of pea c e f u I :coexistence with Red Nehru, became the Prime Minister of China, refusing to believe that the India, the chief political post. His im­ worst c 0 u I d happen, until he was mediate concern, once the birth pangs shaken by another upheaval in Tibet had subsided, was to ensure that it in March 1959., This time the Dalai remained a united country. He dreaded Lama, the spiritual and temporal

January 1962 27' o INDIA

leader of Tibet, fled southward into son for expansion was warfare with India. neighboring Pakistan. The I n d ian Six months later the first sizable state forces were incorporated, and clash between Indian and Red Chi­ an extensive recruiting campaign was nese troops occurred on the frontier. carried out. From 1948 until 1953 The Army were years of expansion, at the end Britain had always maintained a of which the Indian Army was about large standing army of Indian troops 500,000 strong. The dispute with Pak­ in India, as well as a British garrison. istan meanwhile ensured that the army The Indian Army in 1939, recruited received a certain priority and an ap­ on a voluntary basis, amounted to preciable share of the national budget. slightly more than 177,000. Another The fighting in Kashmir' died down 55,000, the private armies of the semi­ and, together with Nehru's declared , independent states, could be added to policy of peaceful coexistence and this number. Durfng World War II neutralism, led to a reduction in force. the army expanded rapidly until it In 1959, Red Chinese aggression re­ reached a total of more than 2.5 mil­ versed this trend, with the army re­ lion, and was reputed to be the largest turning to its for mer maximum "volunteer army" in history. When the strength of some 500,000. It is now war ended its strength melted away reported to have exceeded that figure. quickly, almost to its prewar level. Army Organization When India gained her independ­ The Chief of Staff, with general ence, the army was divided between headquarters at New Delhi, is di­ India and Pakistan, largely on the basis of religious persuasion. The 23 rectly responsible to the civilian Min­ infantry regiments, each varying from ister of Defense. who controls and two to five battalions. were disposed directs defense policy through the of in the following manner: 15 went professional service chiefs. Army gen­ to India, as did six of the 1'0 Ghurka eral headquarters has the u sua I regiments (the other four were re­ branches on the British pattern. For tained in the British service and de­ military purposes the country is di­ ployed mainly in Malaya); 12 of the vided into three territorial commands, 18 armored regiments (each of bat­ the Southern, the Eastern. and the talion size only); 19 of the 27 artil. Western. lery regiments; and ahout two-thirds Field formations closely follow Brit­ of the engineer and other logistical ish organization. There are three bri­ units. This gave a base of about 120,­ gade groups to a division, and three 000 trained, experienced troops upon divisions to an army corps, while an which to build and· meet the requi,:e­ "army group" may consist of any num­ ments of rapid expansion. ber of army corps with supporting Troops were required to replace the troops. Although in theory the field evacuated British garrison for inter­ lmits are neatly earmarked into divi­ nal security duties, to staff headquar­ sions, for practical purposes the bri­ ters and centers of instruction, and to gade group can be regarded as the Pl'ovide the specialist services, the basic field formation. majority of whom had been British The army still remains predomi­ personnel. Not the least urgent rea­ nantly Infantry. The men are trained

.28 Military Review at 21 Indian and Ghurka regimental heavy artillery stilI has to be prQ­ centers, each looking after and feed­ cured from Britain. ing a varying number of battalions Motor transport has increased in with reinforcements. The battalions proportion to the size of the army, themselves are formed into brigade and now India produces her own three­ groups. The infantry battalion con­ ton truck. Also a number of packmule sists of four infantry companies and companies have been formed to oper­ a headquarters and a support com­ ate in the mountains. A paratroop pany and is about 850 strong. It has training center was taken over from the usual conventional infantry weap­ the British, and a paratroop brigade ons, such as rifles, light and heavy built up. machineguns, mortars, and antitank India is said to have the only land­ weapons of the British type, most of air warfare training school in Asia. which have been manufactured in A part of the army is earmarked India. for internal security duties and is dis­ The fighting in Kashmir in the win· tributed about the .countryside, with ter of 1947-48 brought home the fact many units set up in old British can­ that the Indian infantry lacked win· tonments. A large part, perhaps 12 to ter and mountain training. The ma­ 14 brigade groups, is concentrated Jority of the troops employed by the either in Kashmir or in the northwest British in their a I m 0 s t perennial facing Pakistan. Since partition, the northwest frontier wars, had been Indian Army has faced that direction. Moslems, skilled in this kind of war­ More recently, however, Indian lead­ fare. A mountain brigade and a moun­ ers have been forced to recognize that tam and winter war training center the greater danger lies not there, but were formed, and special training was to the north. Recently, a few brigade given to other units until there were groups have moved northward to con­ at least three brigade groups expert centrate just south of the Himalayas at this type of warfare. Since 1960 at strategic points, covering the main this form of training has been ex­ mountain passes. tended. The plan prOVIdes that most The Officers of the Indian infantry units will be The cadre of Indian officers devel­ as capable of fighting in the moun­ oped during World War II. Although tains as on the plaing 'or elsewhere. the seed was sown before that, there The armored elements were fuserl were few Indian officers prior to 1939, together into an armorerl corps of since the Indian Army was officered about 12 battalions mounted in eIther principally by the British. Viceroy's tanks or other types of armored fight­ Commissioned Officers, a class of na­ mg vehicles, practically all British tive officers, acted as junior leaders made. and made up to some extent for the India has been pre dUCIng her own lack of Indian officers. Huge influxes small artillery pieces for some years, of Indians from the educated classes and so has been able to increase were accepted during the war, regard­ slightly her batteries of mountain, less of caste or creed. The majority field, antiaircraft, and antitank artil­ proved to be very effident and adapta­ lery, There are more than 20 ord­ ble. At the end of the war most of nance, gun, and carriage factories, but them returned to civilian life. Before

January 1962 29 INDIA

1947 the highest rank held by an In­ lection board c h 0 0 S e s candidates. dian was that of brigadier, since it About 750 cadets are commissioned was not British policy to promote In­ into the army each year. The School dians to high rank in view of possible of Infantry and other specialist cen­ political implications. ters train officers in technical subjects However, the small body of regular and the Defense Services Staff College Indian officers had been thoroughly prepares them for staff duty. In 1959 trained. In addition, they had ample the National Defense College was set battle experience and up to medium­ up to train Indian officers for senior level staff experience, so they were appointments and commands. able to step into the shoes of the de­ On the whole, the officers corps is parting British officers. a happy, loyal, hard-working, capable. The cadre of regular officers had and intelligent body. The bravery and to be increased and attention was leadership in the field of the Indian given to recruiting suitable material. officer were amply proved on a score Fortunately, the prestige of the army of fronts in World War II. There can was, and remains, high. It has been be no doubt whatever that in any hos­ able to attract good types in sufficient tilities he will fight well. numbers to meet the present require­ The Indiap Army lacks an adequate ments without difficulty. There are officers' reserve, which would handi· about 12,500 officers, but generally cap any expansion. A reserve was es· they tend to be rather mature for tablished formally in 1959, and all ex· their rank or appointment. There are, officers, within certain age groups, for instance, platoon commanders of were encouraged to register. No fig. 30 years of age, and company com­ ures have been published, but it is manders of over 40. The officer, un­ thought that this has been only par· less he reaches general rank, retires tially successful. It is do u b t f u I at 48. Those who retire, either on whether 20,000 have come forward to reaching the age limit or before, find register, and of the actual number, that prospects of obtaining civilian a large proportion are more than 40 employment are reasonably fair. years of age, A new a p pro a chIS needed. The officers generally reflect their British training, having adopted Brit­ Enlisted Men ish military customs, mode of life, British military thought always organization, and uniform almost com­ subscribed to the theory that the van· pletely. English is the official lan­ ous peoples of India exhibited distinct guage, they keep in close touch with martial or nonmartial aptitudes. Ac· British military developments, and cordingly, they enlisted into the In· show a keen interest in them. The)! do dian native arm y only the Hindu not intend to sink into insular back­ "fighting races," such as the Dogras, wardness and stagnation, but follow Rajputs, Jats, Gharwalis, Sikhs, and modern military thought and develop­ Ghurkas, and would not recruit from ment. In this sphere they are well­ southern India or Bengal. (The Mos· informed and as progressive as their lem element which went toPakiRtan budget will allow. is not discussed here, of course.) The r e are two officer-producing During World War II the recruit· schools, for which an interservice se­ ing base had to be broadened. The sa-

30 Military Revie. called "nonmartial" peoples who en-' system and institute a "Territorial rolled were under British direction, .Army" on a voluntaryl part-time basis. mostly in logistical formations. But There had been volunteer units be­ the few who served in combatant units fore 1947, but not many. This plan and saw action put up a good show, was put into effect in 1949 when a which indicated that the British the­ tentative target of 200,000 volunteers ory probably was extreme. was set, but results were disappoint­ On partition the new Indian Army ing. Having been long divorced from consisted almost entirely of Hindu military matters, the majority of the "martial races," and the government population was of the view that "war was faced with the problem of giving was for the soldier, not the civilian." the army a national character by en­ There was a slight spurt in voluntary listing a proportion of the so-called recruitment in 1954. But generally it "nonmartial" peoples. Response was dragged badly until 1959, when the poor, probably for two reasons. First, tempo quickened, and it was reported over a long period the British had that the Territorial Army had reached created a division between the edu­ "90 percent" of its goal, which by this cated classes and the military. Second, time may have been revised. . the nonviolence creed of Mahatma The volunteer may enlist between Ghandi had sunk deep into the con­ the ages of 18 and 45 years. He en­ science of the masses. This problem gages to serve for seven years with still remains, but is slowly being over­ the Territorial Army, followed by come. eight years in the Territorial Army The Hindu soldier himself is brave Reserve. All are expected to attend an' and efficient. Those from the "fight­ annual camp of between four to 14 ing races" have a long tradition of days, and certain periods of instruc­ military service. They enter the army tIOn at their Territorial Army unit with zest and enthusiasm. Moreover, center in the evenings or on weekends. the warrior is the second highest of The Territorial Army units are mainly the five castes in the Hindu religious situated in the cities. More units are and social structure, and so has pres­ to be formed and it is expected that tige seldom accorded to a soldier in the establishment will be increased, other countries. if that has not already been done. The army remains a voluntary one, In an effort to overcome the gen­ m which the majority of the men are eral military lethargy and the indif­ on long service tours of duty. The ference of the educated classes, a standard of training is high and the National Cadet Corps has been insti­ state of discipline admirable. Morale tuted. Both boys and girls between also is at a 'high level. The Indian sol­ the ages of 15 and 19 are encouraged dier has proved in war that he is a to join. It is a form of youth training fighting man to be feared and re­ with a military flavor. This National spected. Cadet Corps seems to fluctuate in the region of about 200,000 strong, but The Territorial Army over the years a large number of Faced with the necessity of provid­ young people have been brought in ing some form of second line defense, touch with the military needs of the India decided to emulate the British nation.

January 1962 31 INDIA

Air Force Navy India has a flourishing and expand­ The Indian Navy is much smaller ing air force. than the air force. When Britain with· drew, India was faced with the prob­ Out of the old Royal Indian Air lem of providing defense for her 3,500 Force, she gained eight squadrons of miles of coastline. From the breakup British aircraft. This n u c 1 e u s has of the old Royal Indian Navy, India gradually increased as more modern gained four sloops, 12 minesweepers, aircraft have been acquired. In 1955 and a corvette-small enough indeed a Soviet offer to provide MiG's and for such a task. The navy has since Ilyushins was refused. Instead, India been slowly built up, and at present c h 0 s e British Canberras, Hawker consists of one aircraft carrier, three Hunters, and French Mysteres. How­ destroyers, eight frigates, 12 mine­ ever, in 1961 she changed her policy sweepers, and other small cra~. Her and a dozen Antonov-12's were ac­ two shipyards are now producing cepted. A few Mi-4 (Hounds) heli­ small ships. copters previously had been acquired. The navy has had to take a lower Indian industry has produced a few priority than either of the other two light aircraft, but the air force has services. It seems that India does not had to rely upon foreign ones, and expect invasion from the sea as much will have to for some time to come. as from the land, and has cut her India is developing her own fighter cloth accordingly. jets. The main types of aircraft in A naval· aviation wing has been de­ service are Canberras, Hawker Hunt­ veloped, but it is still small in size ers, Libemtors, Vampires, Mysferes, and potential. In addition, a naval and Gnats. cadet corps exists for young people The strength of the air force in­ on a part-time voluntary basis. 1960 was given as 26,4QO men and Foreign Relations about 450 operational aircraft. Since Indian relations with certain for· then plans to expand it to 25 squad­ eign countries may seem a little un· rons, ,equipped with the best modern usual, but she has special problems jet aircraft, have been put into opera­ and other stresses and strains that tion. When these are completed the are not a I way s fully appreciated Indian Air Force will be able to con­ abroad. India's primary concern is tribute to .the defense of the Hima­ with three countries, which are in or· layas. Indian pilots are trained and der, Pakistan, Red China, and the So· exercised in India and ample good viet Union. material is available. Indian pilots.per­ Pakistan formed well during the closing stages There have been interracial massa· of World War II. cres at intervals throughout Indian As a form of reserve, in 1955 the history, and traces of fear and hatred Auxiliary Indian Air Force was in­ live on to color her relations. with Pak· stituted on a voluntary part-time istan. On partition, race warfare flared basis. It has five squadrons located in up, and traditional hatreds between the main cities, four of which are Hindu and Moslem were violently re­ equipped with jet aircraft. vive~. Since her inception, Pakistan

·32 Military Revier bas been the main "enemy," and Kash­ her admittance into the United Na­ mir the main bone of contention. Al­ tions. Although the two ideologies though the cease-fire line in Kashmir were vastly different, N e h r u con­ has remained "static," there have been stantly advocated peaceful coexist­ numerous incidents over the years be­ ence. So emphatic and single-purposed tween the two countries at places was he on this theme that in 1957, where their frontiers are together. As when the Red Chinese flagrantly con­ late as Apr i I 1959, an Indian jet structed a road through Ladakh, In­ bomber was shot down over Pakistani dian territory, to link up Tibet with territory. Sinkiang, Nehru neither protested to The creeping erosion by Red China China nor informed the Indian people in 1959 alarmed not only India, but of the facts. Pallistan as well, and brought about It was not until August 1959 when a somewhat forced agreement on cer­ Red troops openly attacked Indian tain disputed parts of their frontiers. frontier posts that he was thoroughly It seemed at first that the Red Chi­ disillusioned. During September and nese menace had brought India and October there were further patrol Pakistan together. For some months clashes and incursions, and Red Chi­ . all boded well for improved friend­ nese troops occupied some 9,000 square 'ship, but this condition did not last miles of Indian territory. This was . and underlying prejudices again rose later increased to about 12.000 square to the su rface. miles. Red Chinese maps show about Pakistan accused India of building 40,000 square miles of Indian terri­ up a modern force with which to at­ tory as their own. tack her, while India, upset when the Chou En-lai proposed a demilitar­ US sent modern jets to Pakistan, made ized frontier, but Nehru would not counteraccusations. At the time of agree, refusing to meet him for talks. writing, the two leaders, Prime Min­ In April 1960 Chou En-lai visited In­ Ister Nehru of India, and 'President dia. but the meeting was cool and no Ayub of Pakistan. are openly scolding agreement was forthcoming. Relations each other in public. The rift between between the two countries are now the two countries is not healed, and very cold. and the frontier has be­ is deeper than man y ~n the West come hot. causing India to focus her realize. . I defense effort on it instead of on Pakistan. Red China Although commonsense decrees that The other country that India has the Indian defense forces should point been forced to consider closely, some­ northward, this premise has been re­ what reluctantly it would appear, is luctantly accepted. Red China. For years Nehru tried to steer a course of neutralism between USSR West and East. He hoped to be a friend For years the USSR angled for in­ and confidant of both, but involved fluence in India. Although Nehru was with neither side in defensive pacts. friendly, he also was noncommittal. Red China's conquest of Tibet in 1951 In 1955 Bulganin and Khrushchev seemingly made no difference. Nehru visited India in an attempt to estab­ !. still asp ire d to gain Red China's lish more cordial relations. They faile'll n friendship. For years he sponsored on that occasion. Russian arms and il January 1962 33 INDIA aircraft were refused. A similar offer United States she also is friendly, made in 1957 also was turned down. more reserved in manner, but has ac­ The Soviet Union persevered and cepted loans and other aid. Canada gradually gained a foothold in the has helped her to establish atomic re­ technical anti industrial fields. By 1960 actors. She is generally friendly with it was thought that almost 49 percent other foreign countries, but not close. of the foreign technicians in India For some obscure reason, India has were Russians. Russian assistance­ not recognized Israel. technicians, loans, and equipment­ India is a prominent member of the has been funneled into steelworks and United Nations. She speaks her mind other enterprises to include Russian on world affairs, and shares fully in prospecting for oil in India. UN projects. She sent an ambulance In February 1960 Khrushchev again unit to Korea and later an Indian visited India. When Nehru tried to brigade assisted in the repatriation persuade him to 'use his influence to of prisoners of war. In Indochina she modify Red Chinese policy, I,hru­ provided military and civilian inspec· shchev refused to discuss the m.ltter. tion teams. She contributed an infan­ Later that year, India accepted Rus­ try battalion to the United Nations sian aircraft and more may be on the Emergency Forces for guard duty in way. It is thought that other military the Middle East between Egypt and arms and equipment were refused. In Israel. More recently, she has sent March 1961 it was announced that military observers to Lebanon, and quantities of petroleum would be im­ now has a brigade of troops in the ported from the Soviet Union, a move Congo. that probably has not pleased Red In the purely military sphere abroad China. her activities also have been fairly It appears that Soviet influence is wide. Indian instructors set up the increasing. Khrushchev is willing to Military Academy in Ethiopia and supply arms which is somewhat para­ combined services delegations have doxical in view of the fact that they visited both Red China and the Soviet would be used primarily for defense Union. The Indian Air Force has pro· against Russia's Communist sister, vided training facilities to Burma. Red China. Perhaps Khrushchev would Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malaya, and like to see a stronger I nd ia to act as Ghana. The navy has made several a counterweight against Red China. worldwide goodwill tours and visits. He knows ·that if India fell to Red China, a huge slice of the world's Comparison With Red China India's democratic neutral outlook land surface would be under Mao's may ultimately bring her into hostile form of communism. The influence of contact with Communist China aim· Moscow's brand would diminish cor­ ing at world conquest. respondingly. India and Red China have several Other Countries characteristics in common, such as India's relations with other coun­ hug e expanding populations, low tries can be summed up more briefly. standards of living, and difficulty in She is friendly and close with Britain, feeding the masses. They are both ag­ h a v i n g received arms, money, and ricultural countries which are only in other assistance from her. With the the .first stages of industrialization,

34 MIlHary Revier and both are technically underdevel­ expeditionary force, with all its nec­ oped. essary supporting services, and main­ The advantages seem, on the face tain a conventional line of commnni- .J of it, to be with Red China because cation over the massive obstacle of her population is mobilized and indoc­ the Himalayan ranges. It is doubtful trinated. She has a large army (per­ whether China could do this because haps 4.5 million, with a 250-million her army is static and guerrilla­ militia as a reserve) and a large air minded. force (perhaps 3,000 operational air­ Conclusion craft), with plenty of conventional B r 0 ugh t face to face with Red weapons. Her commanders have had China, how would India fare in war? war experience in handling large bod­ The Indian Army, small, but de­ ies of troops. On the other hand, In­ termined and efficient, supported by dia has only a small army and air its air force, should be able to hold force. lacks conventional weapons, and the Reds along the line of the Hima­ her high command never has experi­ layas for a time. Foreign aid would enced large-scale warfare. be needed, as she could not continue India's main advantages seem to be the struggle alone indefinitely. Her the natural Himalayan defensive line. main weakness lies in her lack of Red China's dependence upon Soviet reserves. Hostilities would almost cer­ generosity for aviation fuel, and over­ tainly unite the nation, and bring in extended Chinese communications sys­ Pakistan as an ally. It is also unlikely tems. Also, India can rely upon sev­ that India would find herself alone in eral countries to come to her aid, a fight against Red China. either materially, morally, or both, S h 0 u I d the Himalayan wall be while Red China stands alone and has breached at any point, the Red Chi­ no friends of any consequence. She nese soldier would find himself alone cannot rely completely even upon her in !< hostile country with every hand Communist sister, Soviet Russia, who against him, a vastly differ"nt propo­ cheerfully helps India to arm herself sition than conducting guerrilla tac­ to repel Chinese aggression. tics against a background of well­ To make any impact Red China disposed peasantry, as eve n t s in would have to assemble a gigantic Korea showed to a small degree.

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enworthy Kansas.

January 1962 35 SOVIET COLONIALISM

Vaclovas Sidzikauskas

LIE wave of self-determination in the history of world development. now sweeping Africa and Asia brings With all its evils, it has raised up the issue of colonialism to the fore­ and educated backward peoples to the front of international politics. The point at which they feel able to turn four characteristics of colonial rule successfully against their conquerors are conquest by force, domination by the very weapons-from newspapers the conqueror, colonization, and eco­ to guns-which tho s e conquerors nomic exploitation. taught them to use. This cannot be Whether lands are conquered over­ said about the great Russian Empire seas, as were the Western colonies, or where, sealed off from the outside overland. as were the Russian and world, subjugated nat ion s cannot Soviet colonies, is immaterial. The speak, crushed as they are under the history of modern colonialism since weight of Moscow's central power. World War I is the history of the Nikita Khrushchev distorted the gradual extinction of overseas colo­ truth when, as expected in the Gen­ nialism of the Western type, and. of eral Assembly of the United Nations the monstrous expansion of overland in 1960, he represented the Soviet colonialism of the Soviet type. Union as the champion of anticolo­ As every student of history knows, nialism and asserted that the Soviet the British, French, Spanish, Dutch, Union has no colonies. The Russia of and Portuguese built up their colonial the czars and the pre sen t Soviet empires along the great sea routes of the world, in the course ·of voyages Digested from the original ar­ of exploration and conquest. Western ticle which appeared in THE BAL­ TIC REVIEW, May" 1981. colonia:lism has clearly had its place

36 Military Review Union are the greatest of colonial munist subversion of six more inde­ powers. The Russians, a land people, pendent and s 0 v ere i g n states of did not have to go to sea in order to Central Europe: Poland, Hungary, expand. Placed strategically to domi­ Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, nate a vast Eurasian land mass, all and Albania. The latter became an they had to do was to push out their Adriatic outpost of the Moscow colo­ frontiers, moving step by step to in­ nial empire. In the occupied zone of corporate their new conquests within East Germany, Moscow established a the boundaries of their homeland. Communist puppet regime. It is true that in their early days the Bolsheviks regularly denounced Baltic Colonialism The captive Baltic States-Lithua­ the evils of Czarist imperialism and nia, Latvia, and Estonia-present the proclaimed their devotion to the prin­ most drastic and most conspicuous ex­ ciples of self-determination of nations ample of Soviet-Russian colonialism -large and small. But very soon after in eastern Europe. Sovereign and in­ their seizure of power in Russia, they dependent states at the outbreak of reversed their position and became World War II and respected members the most vigorous and ruthless suc­ of the League of Nations, they have cessors of the imperialistic and colo­ been eradicated from the political map nial policy of the czars. The only dif­ of Europe by the Soviets and sub­ ference is that now this policy is be­ mitted to a ruthless alien rule which ing carried out under the guise of attempts to destroy their national Communist ideology. The bloody wars identity. Their voice is not heard in of independence of the Baltic States the United Nations. And yet, they are and Poland against Soviet encroach­ European nations, possessing age-old ment in 1919-20 are too recent to be traditions of liberty and Western civ­ forgotten. ilization. Renewed Soviet Imperialism Lithuania, for instance, a militarily After an interval of 19 years, So­ and politically powerful state at the viet imperialist tendencies started to end of the Middle Ages and beginning gather momentum; at the outbreak of of the Renaissance, contributed largely World War II. On 23 August 1939, to the defense of Europe and played Stalin signed a pact with Hitler which an important role in the councils of carved up a large part of Central Eu­ Europe. Toward the end of the 18th rope. In rapid succession, the Red century, she temporarily succumbed Army attacked Poland in September to political and military pressure from 1939, and waged an imperialistic war the East. Professor Clarence Manning against Finland for which the Soviet of Columbia University has this to Union was branded aggressor by the say about Lithuania: League of Nations. Valuable areas of The Lithuanians had established a Finland were annexed by the USSR. powerful and independent state in In June 1940, Lithuania, Latvia, Europe during the Middle Ages. For and Estonia were overrun by armed centuries, they were able to check the forces and forcibly incorporated into German drive to the East. They pro­ the Soviet Union. The ensuing eight tected Europe against the Mongols years witnessed the subjection by So­ and the Tartars. They furnished a viet forces and Moscow-directed Com­ power and a government behind which

laaary 1982 37 COLONIALISM IN THE BALTIC the Eastern Slavs could live in peace affairs, defense, state security, the and safety with a freedom that was police, means of transportation and unknown in Muscovite Russia. They communication, currency. and foreign blessed their subjects with mare hu­ trade-or indirectly, through the lo­ man freedom than in the neighboring cal Communist Parties, w hie hare countries. They encouraged education branches of the Soviet-Russian Com· and toleration, and they' played their munist Party. The competence of pa~t in the genera1 development of these governments is very limited. European civilization. Russian political commissars, who The history of the Latvian and Es­ make all important decisions, are as­ tonian nationn has taken a different signed to most of the local "minis· but an equally dramatic course. tries." Do the essential characteristics of Thus Lithuania, Latvia, and Es· colonialism--conquest by force, alien tonia are entirely subordinated to the domination, colon'ialism, and economic conquering power which usurps all expklitation-apply to the three Bal­ the authority and ·imposes its politica! tic States? Let the facts speak. will. The Moscow-nominated Commu­ nist stooges in the Baltic States are Conquest Force by merely docile executors of the polit· Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were ical decisions of the colonial overlords invaded in June 1940 by the over­ in the Kremlin. whelming armed forces of Soviet Rus­ sia at the time when these states had CoJonization proclaimed their neutrality after Hit­ The Soviet Union has deported more ler's attack on Poland. They were al­ than half a million Lithuanians, Lat­ lied by peace, nonaggression, and mu­ vians, and Estonians to the remote tual assistance treaties with the Soviet Arctic areas of Soviet Russia where Union. The Select Committee of the many of them have perished from tor­ United States House of Representa­ ture, starvation, cold, and exhaustion. tives, after a thorough illvestigation At the same time, Russians continue of Soviet aggression against the Bal­ to be imported to Lithuania, Latvia. tic States, corroborated in its Third and Estonia. The Russian element con· Interim Report the fact of military stitutes, at present, nearly one-third aggression against the Baltic States of the entire population of Estonia in the following terms: and Latvia and nearly 10 percent of The evidence is overwhelming and that of Lithuania. (In prewar Lith· conclusive that Estonia, Latvia and uania the Russian element was almost Lithuania were forcibly occupied and nonexistent. ) illegally annexed by the USSR. Any All larger cities in the Baltic States claims by the USSR that the elections -Vilnyus and Memel in Lithuania, conducted by them in July, 1940, were Riga in Latvia, and Tallin in Estonia free and voluntary, or that the resolu­ -are the main targets of Russian tions adopted by the resulting parlia­ colonization. Even their streets and ments petitioning for recognition as squares have signs in the Russian Soviet Republics were legal, are false language. The local administrative or­ and without foundation in fact. gans of .Lithuania, Latvia, and Es­ Moscow rules its Baltic colonies tonia are' permeated with Russians. either iiirectly-by control of foreign Thus today in Lithuania three of the

38 Military Rev!ew 25 government ministers are Russian; tic population and the hampering of seven of the 30 members of the Eco­ all economic and cultural progress. nomic Council are Russian; 24 of the Conquered Colonies 209 members of the local "Soviet" or Contrary to the hypocritical asser­ Parliament are Russians; more than tions of the Kremlih, Lithuania, Lat­ 20 percent of all members of the Cen­ via, and Estonia are neither sovereign tral Committe~ of the Lithuanian independent states, nor self-govern­ Communist Party are Russian. ing entities. They are simply Soviet­ In the Soviet of Nationalities, Lith­ conquered colonies in eastern Europe, uania is represented by 10 delegates, possessing no independence or free­ two of whom are Russian; in the Su­ dom, and less internal self-government preme Soviet in the Kremlin-by 25 and incomparably fewer human rights delegates, eight of whom are Russian. than, for instance, Ruanda-Urundi, The corresponding figures for Latvia Rhodesia, Kenya, or Tanganyika. and Estonia are even higher. The pic­ There is nothing unnatural about ture would become even worse if those the desire of the Baltic nations to Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians choose their own political system, to educated < in and imported from Rus­ dispose of their own destinies, or to sia would be counted as Russians. enjoy the fruits of their labor as Economic Exploitation equal members of the community of The first step the Soviets took in nations. They are entitled by God­ the Baltic States was to confiscate aJl given and man-proclaimed laws to at the assets of the state and private least the sime solicitide of the world banks, including private savings ac­ body as the tribes of the Congo. counts, for the benefit of the State The problem of captive eastern Eu­ Bank of Soviet Russia, and forcibly rope, of which the Baltic problem is introduce Soviet ell rrency at an ar­ a part, is not only a moral and legal . bitrary and highly disadvantageous one. It is above all an important po­ exchange rate. litical issue which, hy its function as Other repressive measures foJlowed, a deterrent, conditions the survival such as the complete integration of of liberty in the rest of Europe. the economy of the Baltic States into Threat to Africa and Asia that of Soviet Russia; the compul­ The newly emerged states of Africa sory purchase of state bonds; the col­ and Asia have a great stake in the lectivization of agriculture, coupled liberty of eastern Europe. As The New with huge, compulsory deliveries to York Times pointed out in its 11 Oc­ Russia; the parasitic exploitation of tober 1960 issue: forests; and the diversion of national ... the fact is that the dying co­ manpower and skills to industries de­ lonialism of the Western World pre­ pendent on Soviet raw material. sents far less danger to the newly Annual state budgets, indeed aJl independent nations of Africa ana economic planning, including wages Asia than the rising imperialism of of industrial workers and remunera­ the Eastern; and it is one of the most tion for state employees, are drawn baffling phenomena of international up in Moscow. AJI these measures of politics that 80 many ~f them still fail colonial economic exploitation have re­ to realize it . ... European colonial­ sulted in the pauperization of the Bal- ism's record is rapidly coming to its

January 1962 39 COLONIALISM IN THE BALTIC end; it is only the colonialist record among these are life, liberty and the of the Communist world that, unfor­ pursuit of happiness. That to secure tunately, shows no immediate indica­ these rights, governments are insti· tion of decline. tuted among men, deriving their just The faith of the Baltic nations in powers from the consent of the gov­ the West and their hope for liberty erned.' These words reflect, we believe, have been considerably strengthened the basic principles which all Govern· and their morale sustained by the dec­ ments would do well to observe and laration of the United States Ambas­ to implement with all the energy at sador, Adlai E. Stevenson, before the their command.

Security Council on 15 March 1961, o The Baltic peoples, as well as the while dealing with the question of other captive peoples of eastern Eu· Angola: rope, firmly believe that these lofty The views of tM United States have principles are of !'niversal signifi. not changed since Jefferson wrote: cance and that they must be applied 'We hold these truths to be self-evi­ with the same vigor to the expanding dent, that all men are created equal. Soviet colonialism, as they are now that they are endowed by the Creator being applied to the receding Western with certain inalienable rights, that variety.

To invite constant attention to the fact that vast areas of the world have lost their freedom as the result of the exercise of Soviet force and power is entirely proper, it seems to me, especially when they are talking about freedom and accusing the Western Powers of colonialism. ActuaIly, this is the.twilight, the sunset of colonialism as we have known it, and there are few areas of the world left that are still colonial in the old sense of that word. Meanwhile, the Soviet imperialism has been E'JC:tended to cover atl of Eastern Europe to the Black Sea, so that the modern colonialist is not Brit· ain or France but the Soviet Union. I think this is something we should invite attentiop. to whenever we have an opportunity, because it is sometimes overlooked, especially by the African powers who think of colonialists as merely those who have been former masters. They overlook entirely the position of the Soviet Union and what it has done, largely because they have had no contact with it. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson

40 Military Revl,. SOVIET POWiER f: in the BALTIC Siegfried Breyer

THE Soviets have spared no cost in securing domination of the Baltic Sea area. Their methods of attaining this objective have ranged from the jovial smile, to brutal blackmail, ~o dulcet­ toned descriptions of a Baltic "Sea of Peace." The Soviet Baltic coastline. has grown from 200 kilometers in 1939 to over 1,500 kilometers today, and the Soviet Fleet with its power­ ful land and air support is now the greatest threat in the region.• The USSR is not, however, the ab­ solute ruler of the Baltic. Neutral but ". West-oriented Sweden also has a voice in the matter. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers, more­ over, control the western gateways to the Baltic. To make the Baltic a Sea of Peace, according to the Soviet .version, means nothing more than to create a state of "neutrality" for that area. Neu­ trality does not mean that the Baltic Sea will not be kept out of a future war, but merely that the West will be denied its use. A neutral Baltic will be closed to the war vessels of NATO countries (called by the Soviets "Non- This article is translated and digested from the two-part orig­ inal which appeared in SOLDAT UND TECHNIK (Federal Republic of Germany) Aprifand May 1961. All Rights Reserved by SOLDAT UND TECHNIK.

January 1962 41 POWER IN THE BAlTIC

42 Military Reylew Baltic-Sea-Countries") even in peace­ be transferred to other waters only time, while remaining open to the through the Danish straits. Ocean­ commercial vessels of all countries ranging submarines and missile car­ "in the interest of stabilizing inter­ riers of above average size are too national cooperation and international large for canal passage. They become trade relations." What precisely is useless if the straits are blocked. meant by this policy wiII depend ex­ clusively on Moscow's interpretation. Difficulties of Aggression To open these straits would require West-oriented Baltic nations, how­ more than destroying the NATO bases ever, whether the~ belong to NATO a Ion g the coastline. The aggressor or not, are unwilling to aid the So­ wou Id have to seize the Danish isles, viets in attaining such political hege­ and take· foothold on the bordering mony. Neutralization of the Baltic mainland. This would be feasible only Sea runs counter to their natural need with amphibious, or better still, tri­ for defense aga.inst the threat exem­ phibious operations, requiring the at­ plified by the "Baltic Red Banner tacker to transport troops over the Fleet." Baltic Sea and to land them on the How strong is the Soviet Baltic heavily defended coast. Fleet? How is it organized, what These ground forces would neces­ bases does it have, and what are its sarily consist of infantry and heavy military objectives? These questions weapons, especially tanks and guns. are most important to the independent To land such forces against heavy op­ Baltic nations, for reasons not only position is more difficult than to land political and military but also eco­ a few battalions or regiments of air­ nomic; the Baltic Sea is a great trade transportable infantry. Air transport route. of tanks and guns is limited, unless Finland and Sweden ship enormous paratroopers cap seize an airfield or quantities of lumber via the Baltic. hold an area for supply airdrops. The Swedish ore trade is almost as A successful waterborne ship-to­ important. The number of ships pass­ shore operation requ i res a consider­ ing through the Kiel Canal exceeds able number of small, shallow draft, the number passing through the Suez maneuverable craft of large cargo ca­ and Panama Canals combined. pacity, equipped for unloading. At In estimating the Red Baltic FleQt, least one undamaged port is required; one must consider the probable objec­ materiel can be transferred faster tives of any future war. There is only from a port than from small craft one goal for the Soviets which is operating between car g 0 ship and worth striving for: opening the gate­ beach. Securing an undamaged port, ways of the Baltic to enable their sea however, hardly seems possible in view forces to break out into the North of the particular geographical condi­ Sea. These forces-primarily subma­ tions of the Baltic Sea straits, which rines-eould affect shipping opera­ permit the defender to barricade en­ tions to all of northern Europe from dangered p I ace s extensively with the open ocean. Baltic shipbuilding mines. On the other hand, the com­ yards, moreover, still produce the plete destruction of s;ch strong points, greater part of Soviet Fleet arma­ harbors, and defense positions would ment and new war vessels, which can hardly be in the interest of the assail­

January 1962 43 POWER IN THE BALTIC

ant if he wished to convert them to army units engaged in a coastal area. his own use. In fact, they constitute a fast and maneuverable "floating artillery." The Baltic Gateways Defense of the Baltic Sea gateways Other Vessel Types is a cornerstone to the defense of all This applies similarly to the large Western Europe. number of destroyers and escort ves­ The strategic goal of opening the sels. even though their field of tasks Baltic gateways is probably a decisive is wider. not being limited to mere. factor in Soviet planning. The com­ support. The large number of mine­ position of the Soviet forces seems to sweepers and minelayers is to be ex­ confirm this. Besides cruisers, de­ pected; the Baltic is an ideal sea for stroyers, submarines, and escort ves­ mine warfare. defensive or aggres­ sels, there is a large number of small sive. The Soviet Union obviously in­ . craft, all more or less suited for land­ tends to wage an aggressive mine war. ing operations-landing craft. motor She is compelled. on the other hand. torpedo boats. and motor gunboats. In to mai1tain a large number of mine­ addition, there is a considerable num­ sweepers as well. I ber of small civilian craft. Construc­ The Soviet Navy in the Baltic has tion of the laUer has been accelerated its own air force for tactical employ­ in almost all the Soviet Baltic ship­ ment above the sea and coastal terri­ yards. In case of emergency, these tories. Its striking power appears to can be used for war purposes. be great. but its range of operation There is also a concentration of is limited. The s t ron gland-bound Soviet submarines in the Baltic; by naval forces-consisting of Marines the end of 1959 their number was es­ and coast artillery-represent. with timated at about 100. Actually, they the sea and air forces, the third arm are misplaced; in a war they could of the Soviet Navy. hardly find enough worthwhile tar­ gets to justify their deployment in Rumors of Missile Cruisers such numbers. Their natural field of Cruisers are the 1argest war vessels operation is the high seas. Obviously. of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. There are the Soviets hope to transfer their sub­ no aircraft carriers and no battleships. marines out of the Baltic Sea before The Soviet Navy has never possessed the outbreak of any future war. either or built aircraft carriers. Most of the through the Danish straits or by canal Baltic cruisers belong to the Sverdlov to the Arctic seas. class. construction of which began in There is also a concentration of sur­ about 1948. They are large and rela­ face vessels-cruisers, destroyers, es­ tively fast. but armed only with con· cort vessels. minesweepers. and mine­ ventional artillery and mines. layers. Apparently the cruisers and Reports that cruisers of this class destroyers are not designated for em­ will be modified to fire missiles have ployment on the high seas. These craft not as yet been confirmed. The Sverd­ must be considered the protective lov class cruisers have 150-millimeter force for the small craft during am­ guns as major armament, and belong, phibious operations. On occasion they according to former terminology. to could provide protective fire for land­ the light cruiser class. Today, in the ing troops. or safeguard the flanks of Baltic,Sea there are still two heavy

44 Military Review \'

cruisers with 1S0-millimeter guns; shchev announced in October 1960 that both were badly damaged duping the the Soviet Union also has nuclear sub­ war, and only one seems still to be in marines with rocket weapons. There commission. The for mer German is no real evidence to substantiate this. Nurnberg rounds out the line of There are many small craft: mine­ cruisers; it is apparently employed as sweepers (fitted also for minelaying), a training ship. fast coastal-escort boats, motorboats ,Most of the destroyers stationed in with artillery and torpedo armament, the Baltic are of the conventional type and submarine chasers. There are with strong artillery and torpedo arm­ motor cannon boats equipped with the ament. A modified late type is sup­ turrets of TS4 tanks-a special type

Soldat und T~f!h7l1k Units of the Soviet Baltic Fleet anchored in Leningrad Harbor during the annual "Day of the Red Navy." In the foreground are two destroyers of the Skorgi

January 1962 45 POWER IN THE BALTIC

-./­

- . ," ,.'."

..... " II

US Navallnatitutc proUl'd,nDI An Mi-I heliropter transferring personnel from a Soviet W class submarine At the present time the Soviet Bal­ Leningrad, with its extensive ship­ tic Fleet probably has five to six cruis­ bUilding facilities, is stilI the center ers, with three or four under construc­ of Soviet naval ship construction. tion. In addition, there are about 60 Most of the Soviet shipyards are en­ destroyers, 30 escorts, 130 subma­ gaged in construction of warships; rines, 150 landing craft, 200 mine­ contracts for construction of merchant sweepers, 250 motor torpedo boats, ships are frequently awarded to ship­ and numerous other small craft. yards of the West. If the need arises,

46 Military Review the shipyards in Eastern Germany 1,000 aircraft and approximatel~ 250 can also be used for the construction helicopters at its disposal. of war vessels. Leningrad, as ever, is the nerve Land and Air Forces center of the Soviet Navy. The output The "Baltic Military District" com­ prises geographically the Estonian, there of submarines alone is allegedly 30 per year. As submarines of almost Latvian, and Lithuanian Soviet So­ all available sizes can pass through cialist Republics, and Soviet East Prussia. The land forces presently the W hit e Sea-Baltic Sea Canal comprise 15 army divisions, and six (opened in 1933), reinforcements can be dispatched at discretion into the ail" divisions under the command of Atlantic Ocean and beyond. the army. The armored divisions are all equipped with modern tanks.. Along Military Canals the coast, especially in East Prussia, Canals are a major factor in Soviet are numerous rocket bases. military planning~. The White Sea­ Soviet forces in the whole Baltic Baltic Sea Canal connects Onega Lake area include the following: army with the White Sea, and is navigable (200,000), navy (160,000), elite secu­ for ships of up to 3,000 tons. It is 222 rity troops (80,000) , police troops kilometers long, and shortens the (15,000), and many auxiliary organi­ route from the Soviet Baltic ports to zations. the White Sea by 4,000 kilometers. The Sqviet Baltic forces, in sum­ The canal is frozen in winter. mary, are the strongest military and In cas e of war, of course, any political power in that area. Backing enemy will try to render the canal the Soviet Baltic Fleet are tremen­ unnavigable, as the German Air Force dous military power elements on the did in World War II. Therefore, it land and in the air. may be assumed that there are ex­ The Soviet Union hopes one day to tensive defense installations. gain ab~ute control of the Baltic Today, the most important bases area..Thisgoal could be reached easily of the Soviet Fleet are Kronshtadt, if the Soviets did not have to reckon Tallin, Riga, Kaliningrad, Baltiisk, with a powerful opponent: the nations and Lepaya. Adjoining are the German of the Free World joined in NATO. ports of Danzig, Gdynia, Slupsk, Kol­ The Western Powers of defense, even berg, and Swinemiinde under Polish though modest in relation to Soviet administration. Wismar and Rostock power, have one important advantage: in East Germany are at the disposal Their numerical inferiority can be of the Soviets. offset by geographical advantages at The Baltic Red Banner Fleet is the the gateways to the Baltic. In any at­ strongest of the foUl' Soviet lIeets, tack against the West, if the Soviets with headquarters at the naval base could not neutralize NATO and es­ Baltiisk. Under this command are all pecially its Baltic allies, they could sea forces, the naval air arm, the land not gain access to the open seas. In forces, coastal fortifications, all ports, the cold war, the NATO forces have bases, beacons, and a hydrographical a dual role: deterring the opponent department. The total number of per­ from an armed aggression, and deny­ sonnel is estimated at around 200,000. ing his claim to autocratic rule in the The naval air force has more than Baltic area.

January 1962 47 Japanese Operations in Hukawng Valley

Hiroshi Fuwa

DURING the dark days between December 1943 and July 1944, the Japanese 18th Division wrote a new page in the annals of military his· tory. Greatly outnumbered, short of supplies, and beset with hunger and sickness, the division successfully de· layed for seven months the advance of a United States-Chinese force in the Hukawng Vall e y of northern Bu rma. The operations extended along the 170-kilometer route from the Ta· rung River in the'north to Mogaung Station of the Myitkyina Railway in the south. This was the country through which the Ledo Road wound treacherously from Ledo, a city of northeastern In· dia, to Kunming in China. It also was the area through which the Chinese. suffering enormous casualties in dead and wounded, retreated before the ad· vance of the Japanese in 1942. During these seven months the Jap­ anese for c e was cut off and sur­ rounded by the enemy four times. But each time the 18th Division broke through, regrouped, and fought once more.

48 Military Review "J

The purpose of the 18th Division's fensive operations as seen from the defensive operations was to blunt the Japanese viewpoint. offensive of Lieutenant General Stil­ well's forces advancing south from Operations in General Ledo. The original Japanese plan was By the end of May 1942 the entir~ to delay the United States-Chinese territory of Burma had come under forces neaz: Kamaing (about 30 kilo­ the control of the Japanese forces. The road running from Kunming to Ran­ meters north of Mogaung) until the end of the Imphal offensive by the goon, used to supply Generalissimo Japanese 15th Army against the Brit­ Chiang Kai-shek, was cut off com­ pletely. ish 14th Army. If the Imphal offen­ sive had succeeded before the rainy Due to strong pressure exerted by season, Lieutenant General Masakazu the Generalissimo, the Allied forc2s Kawabe, the Supreme Commander of tried to reopen the supply route lead­ ing to China. From a number of pos­ the .Japanese Army in Burma, was supposed to have sent powerful rein­ sibilities, the Allied forces selected forcements to the aid of the 18th Di­ the Ledo-Mogaung-MyitkYina-Bhamo­ vision operating in Hukawng Valley. Lungling-Paoshan-Kunming r 0 a d as being the most feasible to establisb a If the plan had been realized, the supply line to China and to defeat the defensive mission of the 18th Divi­ Japanese forces in Burma. sion would have been over before the At the end of 1943 the US-Chinese rainy season of 1944. The Imphal of­ forces led by General Stilwell started fensive, however, failed and tbe be­ the' trek from Ledo t h r 0 ugh Hu­ leaguered 18th Division had to fight kawng Valley to Myitkyina. This force on without reinforcements, suffering was composed of the newly organized great losses in both personnel and 1st Chinese Army (22d and 38th Di­ supplies. visions)' one US regiment (5307th Due to the failure of the Imphal mixed regiment called the Galahad , Operation the 18th Division was not Regiment), and one Chinese tank unit able to achieve final success, despite equipped with US light tanks. Later, the efforts of the Commanding Gen­ this force was reinforced by the 30th, eral, 18th Division, Lieutenant Gen­ 50th, and 14th Chinese Divisions. This eral Shinichi Tanaka. and his men. combined US-Chinese force was called Notwithstanding the many difficul­ the Northern Com bat Area Com­ ties they faced, the 18th Division dis­ mand (NCAC). The air force which played courage, tenacity, and devotion supported the NCAC was the Amer­ to duty. Its operations became a model ican Northern Air Section Force. to the Japanese Army of the effective­ General StilweJl first planned to oc­ ness of defensive operations involving cupy Shingbwiyang located at the en­ trance of Tan a i Valley, estsblish trading space for time. bridgeheads over the Tanai River and Following is the outline of the de- then by the middle of February '1944 Hiroshi Fuwa is a member of the to advance to Shaduzup located in the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force middle part of Hukawng Valley. War History Division and a former Leaving Ledo, the 22d and 38th Chi­ colonel in the Imp e ria I Japanese nese Divisions passed through the Army. rugged mountains along the Burmes2­

January 1962 49 JAPANESE OPERATIONS

Figure I. Chinese border and reached Shingb­ At the end of November 1943, Gen­ wiyang, where a landing strip was eral Tanaka, while disclIssing opera­ constructed. The US Army Air Corps tions with his regimental command­ provided air defense and began to re­ ers at Myitkyina, for the first time supply the troops by air. became aware of the US operations During this time the 18th Division when he received this message: which was charged with the defense At Ningbyen 'It ear the Tarung of northern Burma knew little of the River, a skirmish broke out at the activities of the US-Chinese forces. extreme no~th end -of Hukawng Val-

50 Military Reylew ley between one of" our detachments high because they believed that it and the advance guard of General would be easy for them to defeat the Stilwell's forces. Chinese troops. General Tanaka had cautioned his subordinates that the Tanaka's Mission Chinese troops from Ledo would be This was the first of many battles different from the Chinese forces they during the seven months' operations had fought in the hinterland because in Hukawng Valley. Before this ac­ they had been American trained and tion, Lieutenant General Renya Muta­ equipped. The officers and men, rely­ guchi, Commanding G e n era I. 15th ing on their past experience of fight­ Army, had given General Tanaka the mission of annihilating the enemy in­ ing with the Chinese, did not fully vading northern Burma, or, at the very accept General Tanaka's estimate. least, to hold Myitkyina and Kamaing Their opinions changed abruptly, how­ at all costs. Consequently. General ever, after the first skirmish at the Tanaka, as he had to station a strong Tanai River..The numerically supe­ force at Myitkyina, did not have his rior Chinese forces fought hard, dis­ entire force at his disposal during the played excellent battle tactics, and Hukawng operation. In addition, he were ably led. was short of trucks. Resupply, there­ When General Tan a k a received fore, p I a g u e d the 18th Division word at Myitkyina that General Stil­ throughout the entire operation. well had invaded Hukawng Valley, his Despite the fact that the 18th Divi­ unit headquarters were located at sion was composed of two infantry these places:

55th Infantry Regiment Katha 56th Infantry Regiment Hukawng Valley 114th Infantry Regiment Myitkyina Division artillery Mohnyin Division headquarters Myitkyina regiments (six battalions), t h r e e While the 56th Infantry Regiment mountain-artillery battalions, and one Headquarters was at IHukawng, its heavy artillery (150-miIlimeter gun) main strength was at Kamaing. One battalion, General Tanaka had only battalion had been sent to Maing­ about 4,000 combat troops at the be­ kwan, and one company of this bat­ ginning stages of the Hukawng op­ talion had been detached to Ningbyen eration. There were only 150 rounds near the Tarung River. This com­ of ammunition for each rifle and ar­ pany engaged the advance guard of tillery piece. In the face of a com­ the 38th Chinese Division in the first plete lack of Japanese air support, the skirmish. US-Chinese forces had complete air Because the strength of the 18th supremacy. Division was disperses! over a wide Although the actual combat strength area, General Tanaka acted to con­ of the 18th was small, the fighting centrate his force. He first ordered spirit of the officers and men was the main force of the 56th Regiment lanuary 1962 51 JAPANESE OPERATIONS to the Tanai River, followed by the difficult. Consequently, some combat 55th Infantry Regiment and division personnel had to be used for resupply. artillery. The 114th Regiment was Action Around Taihpa Sa kept at Myitkyina. The advance battalion of the 56th It was planned to locate the supply Regiment attempted to reinforce the base for the Hukawng operation at company that had been fighting at

Figure 2.

Mogaung Station. General TanaKa Tarung, but was forced to retreat also had sent some ammunition to with heavy casllalties. Kamaing. Since the distance between G e n era I Tanaka, gathering !jis Kamaing and the Tanai River was ap­ troops as they arrived piecemeal at proximately 140 kilometers, and there Taihpa Ga near the Tanai River, con· were only two truck companies and fronted the newly organized Chinese one horse transport company, supply 1st Army after it had crossed the Ta· to the frontline units was extremely rung River. Considering the mission

52 Military Review and the time factor, he planned to tighter. The 18th Division faced a: hold the enemy and spend the rainy most delicate' situation. season aroljnd Jambu Hkintang. Due to the pressure of the US-Chi­ In order to achieve this, he planned nese forces, General Tanaka decided to fight a five months' delaying action to fall back to Maingkwan in the lat­ at Taihpa Ga and at Maingkwan. ter part of December 1944, contrary While aware of all inherent difficul­ to his original plan that envisaged ties, General Tanaka, after a complete holding Taihpa Ga until the end of analysis, concluded that this could be March. ­ accomplished. General Stilwell's losses in this first The first battle of this phase of ac­ encounter were not small, particularly tion began near Taihpa Ga and Taro in the 38th Division which had car­ Basin. ried out the frontal attacks on the General Stilwell's plan of action Japanese positions. Hardest hit in the called for the 38th Division to attack 38th Division was the 112th Regi­ the Japanese at Taihpa Ga from the ment, which had to receive extensive east; the main body of the 22d Divi­ personnel replacements by the end of sion to attack from the north; and a January. The 114th Regiment also ,ubstantial portion of the 22d Divi­ -sustained heavy casualties as it lost sion to march to Taro Basin, pass 60 percent of its company grade offi­ through the Wantuk Bum, and attack cers and many of its enlisted men. the Japanese from the rear. With heavy pressure on three Qf its fronts, the 18th Division still was In effect, General Stilwell planned able to conduct a successful with­ to encircle the 18th Division and an­ drawal to Maingkwan. Although the nihilate it in the western part of fa c tor s that permitted this with­ Taihpa Ga. drawal are not clear, it seems to have General Tanaka, at first attempt­ been due to: ing to hold the entire Taro Basin, 1. The heavy losses in the Chinese sent the 55th Regiment Headquarters ranks. and two battalions there to repulse the 2. The heavy rains that washed out Chinese attacks. Later, when the sit­ many roads, and made others barely uation deteriorated, he was compelled passable, thereby making resupply to to recall all but one battalion to Taihpa the Chinese extremely difficult. Ga. 3. Failure of the US-Chinese forces Believing that the only way the to cut off all exits to the south. Japanese could counterbalance the dif­ ference in strength and arms was to Operations Around take the offensive, he ordered attacks Maingkwan and Walawbum against the Chinese who were exert­ General Tan a k a selected Maing­ ing pressure from the east and north. kwan as the next battle site. Its loca­ These operations denied the advance tion between the Wantuk Bum and of the Chinese for awhile, 'but when the Tanai River ensured relatively se­ the Chinese t roo p s advanced to cure flanks, but the front was wide Yawngbang (south of Taihpa Gal and and the jungle was light, thus making began their attacks against the Jap­ it favorable country for the Chinese anese rear, the encirclement of the tanks. Notwithstanding these adverse Japanese positions became tighter and conditions the 18th, determined to de­

January 1962 53 JAPANESE OPERATIONS stroy General Stilwell's force, organ­ sion had to cross the Nambyu River. ized a defense position. The one main bridge along the road Because General Stilwell had missed was already in the hands of the en­ the opportunity to annihilate the 18th emy. Reconnaissance units could find Division around Taihpa Ga, he now no other crossing except at the bridge. was determined to ensnare it in the . During this time the Japanese were northern area around Shaduzup. Ac­ harassed by tank units attacking from cording to 'his bold scheme of opera­ the north. tions, the 22d Chinese Division and Net Tightens the main body of the 38th Chinese The 56th Regiment, advance guard Division would attack frontally. The for the Japanese main body, vigor­ US 5307th (Galahad) Regiment and ously attacked the enemy which held the 113th Regiment of the 38th Di­ the bridge, retook it, and on the morn­ vision would move,through the moun­ ing of 4 March attacked Walawbum. tains on the east and penetrate to Despite the vigor of'their attack, they Shaduzup to cut off the Japanese from were unable to dislodge the enemy. In the rear. the meantime, the 55th Regiment took The Galahad Regiment moved out up positions on the north side of the on 24 February. They marched far N ambyu River to protect the cross­ east of the Japanese positions and ap­ ing of the main body of the 18th Di­ proached Shaduzup. On 28 February, vision. General Tanaka crossed the however. General Stilwell changed his river after the 56th Regiment. plan and ordered the Galahad Regi­ On the morning of 5 March the ment to hurry to Walawbum located Japanese were attacked by tanks sup­ south of Maingkwan and closer than ported by air. Division headquarters Shaduzup to the Japanese positions, located to the south of the Nambyu On 2 March the Galahad Regiment River also was hit in the course of advanced to the northeast edge of the attacks. Heavy fighting continued Walawbum, occupied it, and severed around Walawbum. The ring around the north-south road passing through the 18th Division was being drawn Walawbum. ever tighter. ' Meanwhile, on 3 March the battle It was only through the efforts of at Maingkwan began when the Chi­ the 18th Division Engineering Reg­ nese 22d Division supported by tanks iment that the division was able to attacked the Japanese positions. escape. This regiment had hewn a On 3 March, General Tanaka, know­ path through the jungle starting from ing that the critical town of Walaw­ the western edge of Walawbum to a bum to his rear had been occupied by point on the main road nine to 11 the enemy, decided to defend agaiJJst kilometers south of Walawbum. the Chinese troops to his front with General Tanaka had not known of a smaller portion of his force. and to this trail. but after learning of its attack the US-Chinese forces occupy­ existence, and with the enemy encir­ ing Walawbum. That evening the main clement being drawn ever smaller. he force of the 18th Division withdrew withdrew along it. The movement be­ under cover of darkness and forced gan on 7 March with the 56th Regi­ marched toward Walawbum. ment acting as rear guard. With­ To r,each Walawbum, the 18th Divi­ drawal was complet!!d without loss.

54 Military Review Figure 3. luuary 1982 55 ; JAPANESE OPERATIONS

The Galahad Reg i men t which the jungle terrain with less difficulty reached Walawbum was replaced by than thought possible. Because of this the 113th Chinese Regiment and did flexibility they were able to maneu­ not participate in the attack against ver boldly and could select the scene the Japanese at Walawbum. The ad­ of battle. The natives cooperated with vance of the 22d Chinese Division the Allied forces, attacked small Jap­ from north of the Nambyu River was anese forces, and guided US-Chinese slow. These were factors contributing units through the Japanese positions, to the successful escape of t1 18th Conversely, the 18th Division, due to Division. lack of air support and dwindling sup­ While the battle of Walawb m was plies, lost its maneuverability and its in progress, the units of the 55th Reg­ ability to reconnoiter the enemy po­ iment retreating from Taro Basin sitions. were engaged by the pursuing Chi­ General Tanaka's defensive plans nese at Tashbum', a town about 40 called for the positioning of a small kilometers. southwest of Walawbum. holding force at Jambu Hkintang and the main force at Shaduzup, south of Operations Around Jambu Hkintang. This latter area was Jambu Hkintang and Shaduzup The 18th Division-escaping with selected because it afforded a good de­ fensive terrain with a number of small difficulty from Walawbum-retreated rivers converging at Shaduzup. to Jambu Hkintang about 30 kilome­ ters south of Walawbum. Morale Is Low Due to the forced marches. battles. When the battle was joined in mid­ and sickness, the combat strength of March, the spirit of the officers and the 18th Division dropped to an aver­ men of the 18th Division was low due age of 50 men per company. Despite to the continued reverses and the lack this. the mission of the 18th remained of food and supplies. General Tanaka. unchanged, that is, to delay the ad­ correctly evaluating the situation. vance of the Allied forces until the tried to raise the morale of his troops completion of the Imphai offensive and keep the Allied force off balance which was to begin on 15 March. by ordering numerous counterattacks, The Jambu Hkintang area selected General Stilwell, on the other hand, by General Tanaka as the next delay­ realizing that he failed to destroy the ing position was situated in the center Japanese at Walawbum, redoubled his of Hukawng Valley, between the Ta­ efforts and was determined to finish nai and Mogaung Rivers-the Tanai the Hukawng operation by annihilat­ flowing north and the Mogaung flow­ ing the Japanese once and for all. ing south. According to his strategy, two According to General Tanaka's orig­ places were selected to cut off the inal plan, he expected the 18th Divi­ possible retreat of the 18th Division, sion to spend the rainy season around The first area on the south side of Jambu Hkintang. Due to the contin­ Shaduzup was to be secured by one ued reverses, however, the division battalion of the Galahad Regiment reached this area two months earlier and one regiment of the 38th Chinese than he had anticipated. Division. The second area selected was The US-Chinese force, supplied pri­ at Inkangahtawng several miles far­ marily by air, was able to pass through ther south. This was to be taken by

56 Military Review the remainder of the Galahad Regi­ fear of firing into their own positions. ment and another regiment of the 38th The 18th Division Headquarters also Chinese Division. was attacked, resulting in communica­ While these forces were enveloping tions between division headquarters the Japanese rear, the 22d Chinese and the su bordinate units being' sev­ Division with the axis of advance ered. along the main road was to conduct This was the third time during the frontal attacks against the Japanese campaign that the 18th Division had positions. been encircled. General Tanaka had On the afternoon of n March, the no other course than to order his main force of the Galahad Regiment troops to break contact and fall back and one regiment of the 22d Chinese under command of individual unit Division began their march. They ar­ commanders. Since the units could not rived at Inkangahtawng on the 24th force a passage through the Allied and attacked a small Japanese out­ force south of Shaduzup, they took post. At that time, the task force com­ to the jun.gles to the west and escaped mander received this message from to the south. Brigadier General Merrill, the com­ At this time the spirit and morale manding officer of the Galahad Regi­ of the Japanese forces had reached ment: "Two Japanese battalions are a very low ebb. Tbeir uniforms were now marching north through Mo­ so tattered and worn that many were gaung and they will appear behind nearly naked, a great number had no you r troops." shoes, all were suffering from malaria On receipt of this message, the at­ and beriberi, and most were affected tacking Galahad troops broke contact with various skin diseases. Their daily and withdrew from Inkangahtawng. ration consisted of a handful of rice. Retreat Route Severed Most of the sick and injured could not The US-Chinese troops ordered to be treated because of the scarcity of Shaduzup began their march on 13 medical supplies, and there were no March but as they had to break trail trucks available to t ran s p 0 r t the as they went, they advanced very wounded. The average strength of the slowly. They reached the main road infantry companies dwindled to fewer with great difficulty at a point south than 30 men. One company consisted of Shaduzup. On the morning of the of 10 men commanded by a sergeant. 27th, they drove a small Japanese unit In the meantime Genera! Mutagu­ back and occupied the area, thus sev­ chi, commander of the 15th Japanese ering the Japanese retreat route. Army, started the long-awaited Im­ The main body of the 18th, Divi­ pha! offensive on 15 March with the , sion concentrated on the 22d Chinese crossing of the Chindwin River by , Division frontal attacks. This series the 15th and 31st Divisions. The Im­ of battles lasted from 15 to 31 March. pha! offensive had begun, but how Simultaneously, e I erne n t s of the much longer could the 18th Division Chinese Division enveloped the right fight? fiank of the 18th Division. This re­ If it were not for the rugged de­ sulted in extremely c los e and con­ termination, leadership, and strong fused fighting. Chinese tanks could will of General Tanaka, the 18th would not su~port the attack effectively for have ceased to ex i s t as a fighting

JllIuary 1962 57 JAPANESE OPERATIONS i force. They could move only under the Aftlr the lmphal offensive has suc­ cover of darkness. The US-Chinese ceeded we shall send two or three reg­ force could move at any time they iments to reinforce your division at wished. Normally, they advanced dur­ Hukawng. You will stop the enemy'. ing daylight hours and took up defen­ advance pending arrival of the rein­ sive positions at night. The Japanese forcements. When received, you will had to pay a high price if they were initiate a counteroffensive. to drive the enemy from their posi­ General Tanaka thought that the tions at night. Due to the deteriorat- next best delaying position was along the line Wala to Marakawh. However, to secure additional time, he planned to refuse the enemy farther north and then fall back to the east-west line at Wala. The US-Chinese troops marching through the mountains east of the Mogaung River toward the right rear of the 18th Division caused General Tanaka much concern. Since he could not spare any troops from the units already engaged to counter this threat, he reluctantly pulled one battalion out of the 114th Regiment from the Myit­ kyina garrison. Led by the regi­ mental commander, t his hattalion passed through the mountains west of Wala and counterattacked. The unit was comparatively small, how­ ever, and since no resupply was avail­ able, its combat elficiency fell rapidly. At the same time, the Japanese US Army force withdrawing from Shaduzup to Labor crews at work on the Ledo Road the Warazup-Tingring line was under in the vicinity of Myitkyina constant pressure from the US-Chi­ ing combat effectiveness of the troops, nese forces. the Japanese night attacks dwindled The Japanese elements were pushed as time went on. to the Wala-Marakawh line, which the 18th wanted to hold until the May of­ Operations Between fensive. To accomplish this under the Shaduzup and Kamaing circumstances was highly improbable. During the retreat from Shaduzup, General Tanaka pressed all troops into General Tanaka, faced with the prob­ the fight. Troops of transportation, lem of holding Stilwell's force, was medicine, signal, and other service still operating under the instructions units were now being used as infan­ he had received from General Kawabe, trymen. Even so, they were unable to commander of the Japanese Burma hold out until May. Distyct Army: The 22d Chinese· Division attacked

58 MilitarY Revle. from the north, the 38th Division at­ Division, joined the 18th Division. tacked from the east, and other strong General Tanaka immediately employed forces attacked Marakawh from the these troops to counterattack the Chi­ western mountains. nese advancing in the eastern moun­ The Japanese took up their posi­ tains and to the west of Marakawh. tions on 13 April. A three-pronged Even this action did not materially US·Chinese offensive against this line help the deteriorating situation. On started on 16 April. The Allied attack­ 17 May Myitkyina received heavy at­ ing units were closely and continu­ tacks from large Allied paratroop and ously supported by tanks and air. It ground units. By then it was evident was remarkable that the Japanese that the Imphal offensive would not . •" )j ~J~ ' ...... "t:fj" . ';1" . 1 ,J'r;~ >¥~~.~

US Army Survey party on elephants meets engineer troops working on Ledo Road forces, with more than half of their succeed. Consequently, the 18th Di­ combat personnel casualties and the vision could not expect to receive the remaining in extremely poor physical hoped for reinforcements from the and mental condition, had been able 15th Army. to hold up the Allies' advance for 40 days. The 18th Division Doomed The Japanese received some help Under these circumstances the 18th with the arrival on 25 April of two Division now faced complete annihi­ battalions of the 1 4 6 t h Regiment lation. (56th Division), w hie h had been During the last of: the battles in fighting in Yunnan Province, China, this area, the 55th and 56th Regi­ and in the middle of May when two ments, pressed on three sides, were battalions of the 4th Regiment, 2d scattered and retreated into the moun­

IIlV1ry 1962 59 \ >.

JAPANESE OPERATIONS

tains and jungles with heavy losses. As time went on small Japanese Two regimental commanders at the units which were isolated from the head of small units broke contact and main Japanese force at Nanyaseik escaped into the marshes along the area succeeded in passing through the Mogaung River. General Tanaka and enemy lines and arrived at Kamaing. the remainder of his headquarters re­ General Tanaka sent these units to treated to Kamaing on 31 May. Com­ attack the Chinese at Seton; however, munications with the two regimental all attempts to open the road leading coinmanders were out. Eight artillery to Mogaung failed. pieces and a number of trucks which Conditions of the 18th Division at were unable to pass through the en­ this time reached a new low. Every emy lines were destroyed on order. artillery. piece had been lost and each As many casualties as possible were soldier "ias rationed to two bullets per evacuated to Kamaing but many had day. The troops were exhausted from to be left behind:Of this number, the fighting and sickness. General Tanaka, majority committed suicide. after writing his will, formed the rem­ Up until 10 June only two battal­ nants of his division in a perimeter ions reached Kamaing. These units defense at Kamaing, with his head­ were commanded directly by General quarters in the center. Preparations Tanaka. Meanwhile, the two missing were made to make the final stand units with their regimental command­ when on 22 June this order was re­ ers crossed the Mogaung River in im­ ceived from the 15th Army Com· provised rafts, infiltrated the enemy mander: "The 18th Division will break lines, and finally reached Kamaing on contact with the enemy as soon as 18 June. Most of the casualties they possible and withdraw to Sahmaw." were attempting to evacuate lost their At first glance it seemed impossible lives in the river crossing. The 18th even to carry out this order because Division held out at Kamaing until 2 the· Chinese forces occupied Seton. July. However, using the same tactics as On 28 May, prior to the arrival of they had at Walawbum, the Japanese the 18th Division Headquarters at forces bypassed the Chinese and es­ Kamaing, certain elements of the Chi­ caped. Those who were left of the nese forces passed through the east­ engineer reg i men t hewed a path ern mountains and occupied Seton through the jungle, along which the which is eight kilometers south of 18th Division traveled arriving at Kamaing. This action not only pre­ Mogaung on 5 July. Further with­ vented any further withdrawal from drawal to the Sahmaw area was cov­ Kamaing, but also cut off any possi­ ered by the Japanese 53d Division at bility of receiving supplies from Mo­ Mogaung. gaung. The battle of Hukawng Valley which However, as the mission of the 18th lasted almost seven months was now Division was to refuse the US-Chinese over. Of the 18th Division's original advance north of Kamaing, and there strength of approximately 10,000 men, was no space left to conduct a fur­ 3,200 were killed and 1,800 injured; ther withdrawal, General 'tanaka de­ almost all of the remaining men were ~ided to fight to the finish with his sick and physically exhausted. The small fljrce. remnants of the j division moved to

60 Military Review Yunnan Province where it was re­ first was at Taihpa Ga, followed by built. Walawbum, Nanyaseik, and Kamaing. General Stilwell concentrated his In each case the Japanese forces es­ attacks on Myitkyina, which he took caped annihilation and were able to on 3 August with heavy losses. give a good account of themselves at the next battle. Summation and Observations General Stilwell's operations plans The Hukawng Valley defense op­ were always imaginative and daring. erations lasted nearly seven months. On these occasions his units almost The Japanese-US-Chinese strength ra­ succeeded in destroying the Japanese tio was approximately three to one in force; however, at the last moment favor of the Allied forces. The J ap­ his troops failed in this mission. anese fought without air support and We must conclude that "even though

US Army Mules normally played a major role in supplying United States-Chinese forces lIere much weaker in all aspects of the operation plan itself is excellent, log i s tic support. Notwithstanding it will not be carried to a successful these odds, they were able to delay conclusion if there is any lack of dar­ the US-Chinese advance for a sub­ ing or appropriate action on the part stantial period. of the subordinate units, combat com­ In trying to assess the reasons manders, or individuals." which allowed this we must look at General Stilwell's command was the situation as it existed on both strict, and he encoura~ed and pushed sides. The 18th Division was either the Chinese who, perhaps, initially at encircled or almost encircled by the least, were inclined to be overly cau­ enemy on four differen~ occasions. The tious toward the Japanese. The con­

IInary 1962 61 JAPANESE OPERATIONS fidence of the Chinese, however, rose Unfortunately, when the Impbal after several victories. operation failed, the underlying pur­ Although good strategy may in­ pose for the time-earning defense dis­ clude some tactical errors, a complete appeared. After that time the main victory will not be obtained without motivation of the 18th Division was a preponderance of sound tactics. to avoid annihilation. When the main On the other hand, the 18th Divi­ purpose for a holding or delaying ac­ sion, which had an initial abundance tion no longer exists, the higher com­ of self-confidence due to its experi­ mander should issue new directives. ence gained in China, Singapore, and In the Hukawng Valley operations, at the beginning of the Burma opera­ this principle was followed' for the tions, was willing to fight to the death 15th Army Commander assigned a if need be in keeping with the "Japa­ new mission to the 18th Division on nese spirit." 22 June. Regardless of the operations, in the The US-Chinese forces' tactics of last analysis, battles are fought be­ enveloping and attacking the Japa­ tween individuals. The man who is nese forces from the rear made orderly not fearful of his death will become withdrawal almost impossible. Despite the final victor. the low chances for success the 18th Delaying Actions' Division was able to escape on four In delaying operations, higher com­ successive occasions. manders must issue clear orders. They One of the factors that contributed must spell out the length of time to the ability of the 18th Division to needed, the purpose of the action, and, conduct its delaying action is the to· in addition, the importance and sig­ pography in Hukawng Valley. The nificance to the over-all mission. valley was about 10 kilometers wide The length of time for this type and the Tanai and Mogaung Rivers of defense must be compatible with flO\yed from north to south. Roads the regimental organization, equip­ paralleled each river. The mountains ment, supply. and particular ability that enclosed the valley restricted of the unit assigned the delaying mis­ passage. Therefore, the 18th Divi­ sion. sion's direction of withdrawal lay in Delaying operations are always dif­ only one possible direction-south. ficult and hard on the morale of com­ The terrain facilitated the decen­ bat troops. The problems inherent in tralized withdrawals of the Japanese. this type of operation can be lessened It acted just like a water pipe through considerably if its value and impor­ which they were able to pass. tance to the general good is made Furthermore, the 18th Division was known to all. In the caSe of the 18th lightly arm e d and had few heavy Division, there was a belief that its pieces of equ ipment. This also con­ action would contribute to the success tributed to the speed of the with­ of the Imphal offensive. There was drawals. also hope that they would only be on To annihilate the 18th Division in the defensive until the coming of the jungle terrain G e n era I Stilwell'. rainy season, at which time reinforce­ forces would have had to cut not only ments would be received and the of­ the main routes to the rear, but the fensive would be initiated. entire area. With the forces at his

62 Military Review' disposal this was a nearly impossible the attack. This'is a time-consuming task. If this operation had been con­ process. ducted in more open terrain, even the If more delaying time is needed, spirit and bravery of the 18th Divi­ the defender must engage the enemy sion might not have been enough to more closely. This, however, compli­ avoid annihilation. cates breaking contact and active with­ drawal. Sustained delaying action of Importance of Competency this kind can be successful only if a The importance of competent com­ commander is determined and the manders in time-earning defense can­ troops are confident. This can be lik­ not be overestimated. General Ta­ ened to the tactics used by a pheasant naka, an officer of unusual personal in fighting a snake. A pheasant will co u rag e and decisiveness, demon­ allow itself to be encircled by the strated his skill time after time. Du r­ snake's coils and at the last moment, mg tbe Hukawng Valley operation, he e:Xtricate itself with a powerful blow exhibited singleness of purpose and with its wings. strict command to keep the enemy off Due tot h e disproportionate balance. To gain time, he employed strength of the two forces, General the offensive, eVen under adverse con­ Tanaka adopted the pheasant's method. ditions. Even when the situation ap­ The power available to General Ta­ peared hopeless he never wavered in naka was insufficient to strike a crip­ his determination. Along with his pling blow, so he had to conserve his rugged physique, he certainly had strength, while the enemy was ex­ most of the attributes needed in a pending his, and at the last possible commander to engage in time-earn­ moment escape. ing defense. On the Allied side, the The Hukawng Valley operation will same could be said for General Stil­ long be remembered as an outstand­ well. 'ing example of "time-earning defense" Depending on the mission and sit­ conducted by two capable commanders uation, many different kinds of tac­ on opposing sides, General Stilwell· tics can be employed in delaying op­ and General Tanaka. erations. When time is not of the Perhaps the greatest tribute to the greatest importance, normal tactics Japanese forces who participated in can be employed; that is, merely with­ this operation came from General drawal to the next pr~viously selected Merrill, the commander of the Galahad defensive position after engaging in Regiment. In a meeting with General an inconclusive fight. Even these sim­ Tanaka following the war, General ple tactics result in much time be­ Merrill stated: ing expended by the attackers. The If my tI·oops. were as seasoned as attacking for c e normally will ap­ those of the 18th Division we could proach, make the necessary reconnais­ have annihilated you r division at sance, formulate and issue attack or­ Hukall'ng Valley and captured .fiOU as ders, deploy troops, and then launch a war prisoner.

laliaary 1962 63 This is a continuation 0/ the two­ part BerieB begun last month with the article, "De/enae of the British Commonwealth in North America and Europe."-Editor.

M ILITARILY, Australi~ and New DEFENSE OF Zealand developed together. Fro m 1926 to 1937 their attention was'fo­ cused on the defense of sea routes, THE BRITISH local defense against an invasion, and . the special significance of Singapore. In 1939 they were automatically at COMMON­ war against the Axis when England entered the conflict. Australia, with WEALTH a population of seven million, made military contributions totaling one IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC mill ion men. Her war casualties amounted to 31,000. Harald Husemann The Japanese attack on ~earl Har-

64 Military R.vie. bor brought the Pacific dominions into rings of Asiatic nationalism had been closer cooperation with the United awakened. Compared with overpopu­ States. G e n era 1 MacArthur estab­ lated Asia, Australia and New Zea- lished his headquarters in Australia, I land are a I m 0 s t vacant..They are, and that country became a supplier moreover, products of an era of white for one milliqn American soldiers. colonialism which always will remind In the decisive Battle of the Coral the new Asiatic nationalists of a pe­ Sea in May 1942, Australian and riod of oppression. The internal and American combat forces defeated the external struggles of the new Asiatic Japanese Fleet and tbus secured com­ states to stabilize the area make it munications between Australia and a breeding ground of political unrest. the United States. Thereafter Aus­ During recent years, Australia and tralia, who considered herself trustee New Zealand have tried to secure this of E u r 0 pea n civilization in Asia, region by pact systems and a balance found that the United States provided of strength. her with support which the other Com­ monwealth countries furnished only Regional Defense Pact hesitantly or not at all. In January 1944 the two powers The war itself ruled out the threat s i g ned the Australia-New Zealand of Japanese domination, but the stir- . Agreement, also referred to as the Canberra Agreement or ANZAC Pact. The agreement provides for unre­ stricted exchange of information be­ tween the two countries, collaboration and cooperation in the Southwest and South Pacific, and coordination of mil­ itary efforts. According to articles 13 through 16, a regional defense zone was to be established wit h i n the framework of a world security system. The defense zone was to cover the is­ lands north and northeast of Australia to the Samoa and Cook Islands. After the liberation of tne terri­ tories occupied by Japan, the princi­ ples of trusteeship and the principles of the Atlantic Charter were to be ap­ plied in these areas. Both countries proposed establishing a commission to care for the welfare, economic and 80­ Transwted and digested from the original article w h i chap­ peared in WEHRWISSENSCHAFT­ LICHE RUNDSCHAU (Federal Re­ public of Germany) May 1961. All Rights Reserved by WEHR­ WISSENSCHAFTLICHE RUNDSCHAU.

luury 1982 85 ·. DEFENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTH

cial, of the native population. The ommended a Pacific defense pact. In­ ,commission was to include England, dia rejected the idea of such an alli­ the United States, the French Com­ ance on principle; England and the mittee of National Liberation, and United States at first declined but Portugal. The proposal resulted in the later changed their minds. In 1949 establishment of a South Pacific Com­ the American Secretary of State de­ mission during the South Seas Con­ clared that the United States would ference in 1 9 4 7 at Canberra. The not consider participation in a collec­ agreement instituting the commission tive agreement. and stated with refer­ was signed by Australia, New Zea­ ence to India's attitude that the con­ land, France, the Netherlands, Eng­ flicts existing in Asia would first have land, and the United States. to be solved. During the 1 9 4 7 Commonwealth The United States also rejected a Conference in Canberra, the Austra­ proposal for a Pacific defense alliance lian representative pointed out that made by President Quirino of the England could no longer shoulder the Philippines and Chiang Kai-shek. responsibility for Commonwealth de­ fense alone, and that Australia and New Zealand sl)ould assume that re­ sponsibility in the Pacific. This position corresponds with the Australian desire for a more closely knit Commonwealth, within the frame­ work of which Australia would take over responsibility for the control of the Pacific. When this objective was not accomplished, Australia and New Zealand turned to the United States for support. Pact System Proposals After the conclusion of the NATO Treaty in 1949, Australia repeatedly proposed a collective regional secur­ Sir Carl Berendsen of New Zealand sign. ity pact. The proposals were supported the ANZUS Pact agreement by the Philippines but no agreement was reached during the 1949 discus­ However, an Australia-New Zealand­ United States Pact was signed in 1951. sions between England. Australia, and The preamble stated that: New Zealand. The Australian Prime Minister declared that a common de­ Australia and New Zealand as mem­ fense plan for the Pacific must be pre­ bers of the British Commonwealth 01 pared by an agreement between Eng­ Nations have military obligations out­ land. Australia, and New Zealand side as well as within the Pacific area. before other states could join such a Article 4 assured cooperation: pact. Each party recognizes that an armed One year before the Korean War. attack in the Pacific area on any of Korean President Syngman Rhee rec­ the parties would be dangerous to its

66 Military Review own peaee and safety and declares that zation without being a member of that it W 0 U I d act to meet the common 1J organization. , danger. .•. ·In 1953 United States policy in Asia Article 7 provided for a Council of underwent a bas i c change. When foreign Ministers of the signatory Churchill visited the United States states, and art i c I e 8 mentioned a and proposed that the d e fen s e bf planned comprehensive system of re­ 'southeast Asia be organized on the gional security in the Pacific area. model of NATO, he no longer en­ countered opposition. Churchill sug­ First ANZUS Meeting gested the United States, England, The treaty became effective in 1952, France, Australia, New Zealand, and and in the same yea r the ANZUS Thailand as members. He expressly Council, holding its first meeting in mentioned southeast Asia, thus indi­ Honolulu, was hailed as a success by cating that he did not want Japan as a member of the pact and that Eng­ land could not include Taiwan as it had recognized the People's Republic of China. In April 1954 Secretary of State Dulles proposed joi~t defense arrange­ ments in southeast Asia. The proposal was welcomed by Thailand, England, Australia, and the Philippines. Soon aft e r war d India, Indonesia, and Burma rejected the plan. While the United States was primarily concerned with a unified military command, English and French emphasis was on economic and political fields. Founding of StATO In Sept...mber 1954, England, the United StaLJS, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines held a conference in Ma­ Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, nila which culminated in the estab­ signs the pact for this country lishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty all representatives. Inquiries by the Organization (SEATO). The area British Foreign Office revealed that covered was defined as: England felt left out. It was argued ... the general area of southeast in England that she would assist Aus­ Asia including also the entire terri­ tralia in the event of war and, there­ tories of the Asian parties and the fore, was entitled to a place in the general area of the Southwest Pacific, ANZUS Pact. Australia countered this excluding the Pacific areas north of argument by stating that Australia latitude 21°80". ' would also render aid to England in SEATO nations were obliged: rase of conflicts within the framework . . . to cooperate with one another of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- in the further development of eco­

JuJUY 1962 61 DEfENSE Of THE COMMONWEALTH nomic 1I!easures including technical clined participation-one of her rep­ assistance designed both to promote resentatives describing SEATO as a economic progress and social well­ southeast Asia alliance without south· being. east Asia. Nehru declared that meas· Mutual support against aggressors ures against aggression often, in ef­ was promised: fect, led to aggression, and that a Each party recognizes that aggres­ complex of treaties such as NATO, sion by means of armed attack in the ANZUS, and SEATO is like a large treaty area against any of the parties business company in which nobody or against any state or territory which knows his position or what he·himself the parties by unanimous agreement is obligated to do. may hereafter designate would en­ The SEATO Treaty is unique in danger its own peace and safety and that the Asiatic powers not only have agrees that it will in that event act guarantees from the Western states, to meet the common danger in ac­ but also have obligations. At the first cordance with its constitutional proc­ meeting of SEATO members in Bang­ esse8 . .•• kok (1955) the establishment of a Provision was made for consulta­ SEATO Council was resolved. The tion of the parties in the event of council was to meet at least once a threat other than by armed attack. The year at Bangkok It was further de­ treaty also provided that action in cided that the military advisors of all "designated states and territories" countries were to meet regularly. should be taken only at the invitation The most effective military factor of the government concerned. Any in SEATO is, of course, the US 7th other state mi!!,ht by unanimous agree­ Fleet equipped with nuclear weapons, ment of the parties be invited to ac­ guided missiles, and aircraft. When cede to the treaty. Australia in February 1955 requested US Limitations definite information as to what the The United States Iimite"d her own United States was willing to do in commitment by adding the following the event of war, Dulles refused to passage to the text of the treaty: make a detailed statement. However, he made reference to the mod ern The delegation of the United States equ ipment of the American troops in of America in signing the present the Pacific. At the same time he pro­ treaty does so with the understanding posed that the SEATO Council should that its recognition of fhe effect of consider providing economic assist­ aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto . .. ance in the area. apply only to Communist aggression, SEATO Projects but affirms that in the event of other A committee was formed in 1955 for aggression or armed attack it will con­ studying Communist infiltration in the sult under the provisions of article *. area. Infiltration presents a special The weakness of SEATO stems problem because of the Chinese liv­ from the fact that only three Asiatic ing primarily in. Thailand and Malaya. states, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Thailand has a total population of 18 Philippines, are members and that the million, of whom three million are United States will act only in the event Chinese. Half of Malaya's total popu­ of a Communist aggression. India de- lation of five million are Chinese. The I 68 Military ReYlew economic interests of the wealthy Chi­ establish a common economic and ideo­ nese are, of course, with the West, Ifgical basis for the pact, the common but their traditional ties to the home­ hiistorical and cultural background of land often prompt them to let their N'ATO is missing. To consider SEATO children study in China. in the framework of the Common­ The 1956 conference of the SEATO wealth seems justified inasmuch as Council took pla,ce in Karachi. It was the defense planning of Australia and agreed to replace the Committee for New Zealand is primarily determined Research on Communist Infiltration by their membership in this aIliance. by a permanent research institute in SEATO is vitally important to both , Bangkok. The conference supported countries. SEATO has emerged from ~1 Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute by the idea of "regional responsibility" ,A reminding India that the United N a­ advocated by Australia and New Zea­ Il tions resolution on the Kashmir plebis­ land after World War II. ~j cite was still in force and that a set­ Military Summary ~: lIement should be sought by direct ;! negotiations. The comments on Kash­ The actual military armament of Austfalia and New Zealand can be i j mir were prompted by Bulganin's and Khrushchev's visit to India and briefly described. Officially, each Aus­ Kashmir, during which they had ad­ tralian male of 18 years of age is li­ " vocated Kashmir's accession to India. able for national service, but only i The most significant SEATO con­ 12,000 are called up each year. Train­ ing consists of 11 weeks of basic train­ ~ ference was held in March 1958, when i the Foreign Ministers of the member ing in the first year and three years' '1 states were in attendance. The French service in the Citizen Military Forces I (reserve forces). 'I'~' Foreign Minister emphasized the eco­ nomic aid program, while the English The strength of the regular army is and Australian Ministers were more about 21,500, of which about 1,500 , reserved on that subject. The confer­ are serving abroad. The strength of ence resolved to establish an engineer­ the Citizen Military Forces is about ing school in Bangkok and a military 22,000. academy at Baguio near Manila as The Royal Australian Navy has two SEATO projects. . aircraft carriers purchased from Eng­ During the conference, England's land, one cruiser, seven destroyers, Defense Minister announced that Eng­ four antisubmarine frigates, 14 frig­ land was not going to reduce her forces ates, several ocean minesweepers, and east of Suez during the next five years. numerous smaller craft. The strength He also stated that England was go­ is about 10,500 men. ing to establish a base in Singapore In 1958 the Royal Australian Air which, however, would not be designed Force comprised t h r e e squadrons for launching nuclear rockets. equipped with Canberra bombers, four SEATO is an attempt to organize with Sabre fighters, three with Her­ military aIliances of Western and Asi­ cules, Dakota, and Convair transports, atic states in an area in which the and two with Lincoln and Neptune political fronts-in contrast to Eu­ maritime patrol bombers. Two of the rope-are not yet clearly defined. Even fighter .I~ladronsand one bomber though an attempt is being made to squadron are based in Malaya as a con­

January 1962 69 DEFENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTH tribution to SEATO. The strength of the permanent air force is about 15,­ 500 men. In New Zealand, compulsory mili­ tary training began in May 1950. A~ proximately 33,000 men had bee trained by 1957 and transferred 0 the reserve. After the requirements of the nonregular forces had been met, compulsory military training ended as of 1959. The Royal New Zealand Navy has two cruisers on loan from England, eight frigates, fOllr ocean minesweep­ ers, and a number of small vessels. The

Australia's air, ground, and naval forces constitute sig. nificant military power in the South Padfic.-A u s t r a I i a News and Information Bureau Photos.

army comprises about 4.200 regular troops and a considerable number of reserve and territorial troops. Organi­ zation and the equipment of the air force are similar to those of the Royal Air Force; the strength in 1959 was 4.5u5 men. Within the Commonwealth, New Zealand is also responsible for the de­ fense of the strategic Fiji Islands. In 1948 the Fiji Islands obligated them­ selves to maintain troops to an extent desired by New Zealand, and to ap­ propriate 100,000 pounds annually for this force.

70 Military Review India and Pakistan ' of the Indian states, covering 84,471 India and Pakistan were established square miles. as separate states in 1947. Both coun­ tries retained English military ad­ Vacillation by Kashmir When India was partitioned, the visors. Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu was In India, a Defense Committee of undecided as to which of the two the Cabinet and a Defense Science states to join. An accession to Pakis­ Research Organization modeled after tan might cost the Hindu Prin~e his those in England were formed. Mili­ throne, and he rejected the idea of tary training was introduced into a surrendering extensive political rights number of universities in 1948 to by acceding to India. Contrary to Lord provide a source of reserve officers. A Mountbatten's advice to join one of territorial army was proposed, which the states, he hesitated, toying with would provide a reserve for the regu­ the idea of becoming an independent lar army and would be responsible for state; finally, he requested the con­ internal defense, air and coastal de­ tinued existence of the state of transi­ fense, and military training. In 1955 tion. ::.', voluntel!rs were introduced into the Communal rioting broke out. The 1," army under a plan which was to pro­ insurgents (Moslems) organized an f vide basic military training to 500,000 I men within five years. armed movement for the liberation of ~ Kashmir. According to the Pakistan ~ The Indian Navy employs, almost version, India instigated mQrders of 1 exclusively, ships purchased from Eng­ Moslems in an attempt to suppress the , land, including an English aircraft 1 revolution. Moslem tribesmen under j carrier, two cruisers, three destroyers, the com man d of Pakistan officers 14 frigates, and small vessels. poured into Kashmir. The Maharaja The Indian Air Force is equipped fled to Jammu and appealed to the In­ J with French Mystere and Ouragan dian Government for help. The Maha­ I' and English Gnat and Hunter fighters, raja signed the instrument of acces· and English bombers and transports. sion to India (1947) and resolved to The Indian Air Force has approxi­ install an interim government. Pak­ mately 450 operational aircraft. istan objected. It was agreed that final Pakistan's Arm y consists exclu­ accession would be deferred until a sively of volunteers. The Pakistan plebiscite could decide the question. Navy comprises one cruiser, six de­ stroyers, and five frigates which were Dominions in Conflict purchased in England in 1956 and After further conflict, India loqged modernized there with American funds a complaint before the United Nations from the Mutual Aid Program. Security Council. Pakistan filed a The paramount military problem of countercomplaint. The Security Coun­ the two countries, which led to arma­ cil recommended the appointment of tnent spending of approximately 50 a commission, withdrawal of part of percent of the Indian and up to 85 the Indian troops, the formation of an percent of the Pakistan national in­ interim government, and a plebiscite. come between 1948.55, has been the Neither state agreed: conflict over the p r inc ely state of The two dominions, u n d e r one Jammu and Kashmir. It is the largest crown, fought e a c h other through.

JaDulry 1962 71 DEFENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTH

1948. A resolution making concessions Prime Ministers' Conference of the to both states was implemented, and Commonwealth countries in London. fire ceased on 1 January 1949. Sub­ Proposals for settlement were accepted sequently, insurmountable difficulties by Pakistan and rejected by India. arose with regard to demilitarization A period of direct negotiations and and the plebiscite. Kashmir was at visits of the two Prime Ministers fol. last divided by a demarcation line: lowed. The situation worsened when Pakistan's sec t ion comprises west President Eisenhower announced in Kashmir and the mountain land in the 1954 the American decision to give north, and India administers the val­ military assistance to Pakistan. ley of Kashmir and Jammu. The diametrically opposed Indian The Security Council appointed a and American for e i g n policies-in

Umtt'd Natl(m' An Australian officer of the United Nations observer team in Kashmir presents an Indian complaint to a Pakistani officer on the cease-fire line mediator between the two countries their attitude toward the Korean War, but all efforts at mediation failed. A recognition of China, and India's aim UN mediator decided, however, that for a neutral bloc in Asia-are reo Pakistan, in first crossing Kashmir's vealed by Nehru's rejection of the border, had violated international law. West's moral claim as representative Thus a representative of the UN Se­ of the cause of liberty. India claimed curity Council for the first time took that the American military assistance sides against Pakistan. carried the cold war into the Near Another attempt to settle the dis­ and Middle East, that Pakistan's mil· pute was made i~ 1951 during the itary outweighed India's, and that

12 MilitJrJ ~lYi" this assistance might introduce a new will cooperate with the Government of form of colonialism. the United States in regard to meas­ Pakistan·US Agreement ures for the control of the actions of In' 1954 Pakistan and the United those nations which endanger the pres­ States signed an agreement providing ervation of world peace. for aid in military equipment, mate­ The situation grew worse when Pak­ rial, and services. The agreement istan joined SEATO in 1954 and ac­ stated that the aid would be used for ceded to the Turkish-Iraqi agreement defense purposes: on mutual cooperation (now the Cen­ The Government will utilize this aid tral Treaty Organization) in 1955. Di­ exclusively for the maintenance of in­ rect negotiations between the Prime [! ternal security and her legitimate self- Ministers of the two countries were

EmbfUlfll 01 PakMtan Pakistani cadets of the military academy at Kakul on parade defense or to enable Pakistan to take deadlocked. In 1955 Pakistan spent 67 part in the defense of the region or million pounds on defense, more than in collective security agreements and 50 percent of her total budget. How­ measures within the framework of the ever, a large portion of this amount United Nations. Pakistan will not com­ was procured through foreign aid mit acts of aggression against any funds. other nation. The Government of Pak­ USSR Favors India istan will not without obtaining the Bulganin and Khr~hchev, visiting consent of the Government of the India in 1955, decided that Kashmir United States use this aid for any legally belonged to lPdia. The USSR other purpose than provided for • ..• thus sided with India in the UN, while In the interest of their mutual se­ SEATO supported Pakistan. curity the Government of Pakistan The Kashmir dispute remained un­

IIRuary 1962 13 DEFENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTH solved but ceased to be a hot issue. Kashmir was irrevocable. In Pakis­ The Governor General of Pakistan tan, the Soviet Union's abstention was stated in 1956: cited as indicating that Pakistan's No one of any consequence or with claim was justified. any sense of responsibility thinks of In subsequent times, part of the war with India . ... It would be idiotic Indian press claimed that the United . for two countries in the Common­ States was building military bases in wealth to fight. the Pakistan area of Kashmir near India was not unfriendly toward Gilgit and Chitral. Part of the Pak. the Soviet Union-a fact which, in istan press asserted that the USSR turn, caused the West to woo India. was building a military base at La­ Even though the West did not di­ dakh. United Nations observers de­ rectly turn its back to Pakistan, it termined that neither was true. appeared to Pakistan as if neutralism Oecline of Controversy was more profitable than military al­ In the course of the year, tension liances. around the Kashmir dispute gradually After the Moslem League, dominant relaxed, and in 1958 nine of the 11 in Pakistan until 1956, lost much of border problems were settled by ne­ its importance,' a new government re­ gotiation. A joint communique stated solved to bring the matter of parti­ that neither party contemplated hos­ tion again before the Security Coun­ tilities to change the status quo. cil. At the same time, the opening of Fresh controversies broke out late the Bin a h a I Tunnel, the first all­ in 1958 when General Ayub Khan weather communication between the took over control of the Pakistan Gov­ Kashmir Valley and India, was a sign ernment. Subsequently, relations be­ that India did not intend to give up tween India and Pakistan have notably Kashmir. imp,oved. General Ayub Khan even The Security Council in .1957 made proposed a common military treaty. a new effort to settle the Kashmir in view of the fact that not only In­ dispute. Pakistan requested the with­ dian but also Pakistani areas had been drawal of the troops of both parties, reported marked as Chinese territories the dispatch of UN troops to the area, on new Chinese maps. Reassu red by and a plebiscite. The Security Council treaty, India could transfer her troops voted by 10 votes in favor and one from the Pakistani to the Chinese abstention (USSR) for a plebiscite, border. and ann a u nee d that a unilateral Developments during the past two change of status would not be recog­ years seem to indicate that Pakistan nized by the UN. The Indian delegate, and India, in view of the world polit­ Krishna Menon, announced during the ical and military situation, will quietly same session that India's accession of agree to maintain the status quo. I SUBSCRIBERS

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74 Military Review REALISM IN MILITARY THINKING

Captain Robert B. Henry. United States Arml/

" THERE are two prevalent dangers "This will be in the field by ____." in our military thinking today which "This will be in the hands of the have long ago deceived the civilian troops by ____ ." population and which are slowly and "This will be operational by insidiously influencing many military officers, The first of these dangers is The result is that the number of looking forward to the exclusion of people who ask what we will do to­ looking at the present. morrow morning at 0600 is growing Time, like all other things, must smaller. It generally consists of offi­ have an order of precedence. The most cers who have just returned from a important time is the present; and line unit with one of our field armies the future, however important, how­ in Germany or Korea. These return­ ever impressive, however demanding, ing officers are too familiar with the must be second. weapons and equipment actually on We must naturally admire the in­ hand, actually ready to be used. They dividual who looks forward to provide have been concerned with daily train­ future security, but our public inter­ ing utilizing present equipment with est and constant concern over "gaps" all the problems of present equip­ have led to a series of statements ment. The overzealous publicizing and which resound in our ears at every propagandizing of future weapons service school as well as in most pub­ and equipment has led to a wide ig­ licatiolls, military or civilii1n. norance of just what Is the equipment "This missile will be in produc­ on hand in our field armies. tion in ____ .H Now, all of these future facts are

IIIIBlry 1962 75 MILITARY THINKING

interesting and important to an ah­ to maintain equilibrium in our em­ tive minded officer, but what must be phasis. Because of or in spite of these more interesting and more important conflicting interests, some of which is what the units will take to the field are perhaps essential, it should be our tomorrow morning. constant concern to be realistic about Perhaps some will feel that this the present, or the future is most cer. situation is overexpressed, and the tainly lost. problem, if one exists, is a small one. This is the danger of "overfuturi~ However, there are many officers, jun­ tic" thinking. It is not sufficient to ior and senior, who have many years leave the battalion S3 'in overseas, separating their service in our field areas to cope with the "0600 tomor· i armies in Germany or Korea. These row morning" problem. This problem I officers then are surprised at equip­ must continue to occupy the minds of ment and maneuvers when troop duty all military officers. I overseas comes. Instead of having con­ Service schools must take a realis.! sidered the practical problems of to­ tic approach concerning the use of I day, they have squandered time pre­ new weapons in overseas units. Not I paring for a hattie in 1966, in which only s h 0 u I d the capabilities of a I they may be unable to take part be­ weapon be explained; how our field I cause they are not prepared for the armies are using these weapons is I battles of the present. important. Without such corollary in· terpretations individuals can imagine: Tomorrow's Battle Equipment an entirely different situation than: This problem extends to more than that actually existing. The important new missiles. It encompasses every­ thing is not "envisaged" use, but the thing, from weapons to vehicles to use enforced by conditions facing our radios. It is essential that every offi­ field armies. We must gear our think· cer be concerned with the equipment ing and teaching to the field army of with which tomorrow's battle will be today. fought. It is as if we were living in If, then, we come to the point of two worlds, allowing the real world thinking about our immediate equip­ of real problems to be ignored, and ment, we delude ourselves if we do hoping it will catch up with our "re­ not honestly evaluate the capabilities search and development minds," but of this equipment. This is the second until then pretending that it already danger--overestimating capabilities, has "caught up." In the present-day competition of Inaccurate Reporting deterrent forces, of service rivalries. Surely. most readers have had an of branch rivalries, of the glorifica­ experience on field maneuvers some· tion of the technician, it is difficult thing like this. Fire is not delivered at a proper time, yet, when reports Captain Robert B. Henry is a grad­ reach the controlling headquarters. uate student at Pennsylvania State somehow everything has been quite University. A 1955 graduate of the United States Military Academy, he proper. Perhaps this is the result of served in Germany for three and one­ rationalizing which runs-"Well, we half years and was then assigned as would have fired if•..•n or "They an instructor at the US Army Missile would have fired except for...." Then School ,at Fort Bliss, Texas. when the afteraction report is read

76 Military Re"" I the "if" and "except for" are lost not being able to come up to the pseu­ Be altogether. dostandard. :h There are many higher ranking of­ Oiten the process works in reverse. n fleers who sincerely believe that many The fire direction center or fire sup­ UI units possess capabilities which they port coordination center calls down r· actually do not. Likewise, there are to say that your unit "just had" a many junior officers who know the simulated firing. Often the excuse is ,. units do not have these capabilities, that communications were out for a to but lack the influence to convince short time, so you didn't get the fire 's ; others of the mistake, or 1ack the for­ mission, but normally the unit would r· titude to attempt to convince them. have received the information on time. m A case in point is the assignment Such rationalizing accounts for most )/ of a fire mission to an artillery bat- of this misreporting. Normally, the f!i talion on field maneuvers. The mission vehicle's front steering mechanism ,. r:; arrives late, but by the above de­ would not have broken, normally, the )! ~ scribed machinations the firing is re­ men needed for the perimeter would )! ~: ported as on time. The commander have been present, normally ... and a ~ who receives the report takes it, of so on ad infinitum. Who are we kid­ Id .~ course, at face value. As a result, re­ ding? All of these adversities nor­ , quirements and standards may be pub­ . mally are normal; the troubles, the in­ i Hshed after the maneuver which are abilities of the maneuver are normal. Ie ; actually inaccurate. The unit is as­ Now, the issue is not that units, .: tonished at the requirements, but, be­ large and small, tend to boast of their e lieving in their validity and little sus­ abilities. It is the subsequent publica­ , pecting its contribution to an error, tion of new standards which leaves continues on future maneuvers to in­ a situation in which no one knows crease its Hrnistakes" in reporting to exactly what is correct or where to avoid criticism. Pointing to such con­ find out. In addition, it breeds the ditions is neither trite or naive, be­ inexcusable and disappointing habit cause their everyday occurrence is of "fudging" results-often by staffs alarming. at higher headquarters as well as the These false concepts about our ca­ units. For those who disregard the pabilities are not intentionally per­ concept of "except for" and "if" the petrated. They result from an intense distinctions of honesty and exactness desire to excel-a fine thing, except can become symbols of failure in the when it obscures the facts. assigned mission. Such are the dan­ A primary force in the generation gers. of these "overestimates" of capabili­ The problem has only one solution ties is the unavoidable simulations of -the realistic and unalterably honest field maneuvers. The loading of mis­ observation of the facts on luLm!. ,i1es and moving to new firing posi­ Each officer must make a conscious tions are often the areas where op­ effort to keep two things in mind: timistic estimates are used rather than This is the equipment we have on actual average times. Once this mis­ hand, this is exactly what we are able take has been made, it is the depress­ to do with it. Only ·in this way can ing but honest fact that many reports we hope to have any peace of mind are "fudged" to prevent criticism, for about "tomorrow morning at 0600."

January 1962 77' Charles T. Stewart, Jr.

NUCLEAR STALEMA AND SIMULATED WA THE society of nations lives in mock wars or war games mainlY as a unstable equilibrium. At other times means ~f training men, of testing in history, nations have had clashing equipmdnt, tactics, and organization, interests and irreconciliable objectives, of learning cheaply from warlike ex· but stopped short of war for essen· perience the lessons which would have tially the same reasons that exist to· cost more dearly under rea! combat. day: the hi g h costs of victory, the Nations also h a v e participated in genuine chance of defeat. and its in· "token" wars, real wars of reduced conceivable consequences. Under such scope, subject to numerous constraints. conditions, nations have found other in which genuine antagonists h a v e means of resolving their differences. vied with each other. The token war or of partly or wholly attaining their has a purpose distinct from that of a objectives-means w h i c h were not war game: the test of nerve, of the peaceful, yet not warlike. Since nu­ willingness of a nation to go to war, clear stalemate could in time rule out of the strength and stamina of its the rational possibility of total war. political system and vigor of political it is proper to consider some of the leadership. alternative strategies. There is another possible objective Nations engaged in war games long in fighting. a token war: to obtain a before the development of computing decision which might also be sought machines and the invention of game by full·scale war, but to obtain it at the 0 ry. They have participated in lower cost and with less risk. The

18 Militlry Review article mej\ns any procedure used as a substitute for full-scale war as a met hod ;of seeking a decision. The term "simulation" has been applied so widely to the use of war models-and I ate I y specifically to mathematical mod e I s, often programed for com­ puters-that it is n.ecessary to em­ phasize the distinction between this common usage and the specific defini­ tion employed here. The distinguish­ ing feature is intent, not method. The intent of simulated war is to obtain the decisions of full-scale war without its attendant costs and losses (includ­ ing risks other than the risk of de­ feat) . War games, mathematical models, and the like are mainly means of ob­ taining information, not of reaching decisions. It is conceivable that a con­ ventional war game could be played between hostile nations as a decision­ making process. Nor can the possi­ bility be ruled out that the same ob­ jective could be pursued via mathe­ distinction between a token war and a matical models and computers. But war game disappears in this case. The the possibility is remote. bloodshed is incidental; the essence is A simulated war waged only in the that a substitute has been found for minds of a general staff is more than full·scale war. The outcome of con­ a war game in that it works out the flict between nat ion s theoretically implications of a concrete alternative may be settled as decisively by the toss g i ve n serious consideration rather of a coin as by the clash .of arms. than a set of hypothetical situations. The term "simulated war" in this A simulated war, even if played only as a mental game of solitaire, has im­ Dr. Charles T. Stewart, Jr., is a re­ mediate and practical consequences in search economist at the Chamber of international relations; a war game Commerce of the Un it e d States in rloes not. The first bears on action; Washington, D. C. During World Wal' II he served with the Army in Hall'aii, the second on planning for possible New Guinea, and Luzon. He lcas sell­ action. ior rescarch analyst with the George­ Simulated War in History town University Graduate School Re­ Battles have been decided by the search Project, working un d e r con­ tract for the Army. He is the author outcome of fights between the cham­ of "Who Is Mine Enemy?" which ap­ pions of opposing armies. These often peared in the October 1961 issue of were duels, although on occasion they the MILITARY REVIEW. were pitched battles between small lanuary 1962 79 SIMULATED WAR groups of picked men. In the day s these bloodless con t est s, but can when mercenaries played a major role readily imagine the ideal-type the y in European military affairs, battle­ might approximate. If the simulated fields bore a close resemblance to battle were sufficiently critical. the parade grounds and the decision was political settlement following the sim­ reached more in the manner of a col­ ulated military decision might amount lective bargaining session than of a 'to a peace conference terminating in trial at arms. The most sophisticated ii peace treaty_ In this case it \\a, development of simulated warfare, likely that political representath'e, of however. must be attributed to the the opposing arm i e s might suppl.­ Chinese. ment. or even supersede. the military During the Chou dynasty. eighth antagonists, Depending on the com­ to third centuries R. C. it was cus­ pleteness of the simulated mllitar)' tomary to prepare for battle with op­ victory and the criticality of the bal­ posing armies. rested and fed. drawn tie, the political decision might range up in formation on a suitable battle­ anywhere from withdrawal of the "de­ field. Instead of signaling for a charge feated" army fro m the immedIate or other opening move, however. the area to political. as well as militan', surrender of one side to the other, opposing generals and the i I' staffs would m e e t in a tent prepared for Conditions for Simulated War them in a no man's land between the The motive fol' simulation of \\"1 armies, Here they would engage in a is always present whene\'el' motl\es complex and curious game. similar to for war exist. It is simply the dem'e chess. but In fact a simulated battle, to avoid most of the costs of war, and Each general would indicate the moves to reduce its rll..k~. without abandon­ he would make with the military re­ ing the aims of war (although seahng sources at his command; the other them down to a level compatible \\lth general. in turn. would innicute hIS :·mrces5ful .simulation of war). The~e countermoves, ' contrary motIves-the gains of \'I('~ Their staffs fulfilled t\\() functIOn, tory. and the amidance of the c<>'(, -advisory and evaluath-e, In the ad­ and risks of war-ne\er ha\t:' hl!l'll visory function each general might strong-ai' than they are tOllay, rely. or not. as he chose, on the wisdom Code of Conduct of his subordinates. In the e""luati\'e The conditions under which "m­ function. the two sides would arrive ulated war in the past could be fOllght at n consensus, 01' compromise. on the were quite string-ent. First, both ,ides outcome of each move and rounter­ must be expected to abide by a com­ move in the simnlated battle, In this mon code of conduct. If neither army manner it was often possible to arrive or political entity could be expected to at a consensus on which side would abide faithfully by the termg of the have won an actual battle had it been political settlement at least for a time, fought. and possibly on how one-sided then simulated war became impOSSI­ the victory would have been, If such ble, If the "victory" proved quite con­ agreement were reached. the simulated clusive. then the defeated side might battle then became a political con­ be prepared to respect the terms even ference_ without acceptance of the code of con­ We lack details on the structure of duct, because the loser realizes that

80 Military Review the victor can readily enforce these t e r m s of the outcome, it cannot be terms, or worse, if necessary. But if fully ascertained beforehand. Modera­ victory is not lopsided, a common ac­ tion is a condition for acceptance of cepted code of conduct is ·required. the outcome of a simulated war. Professional Experience These three conditions apply to all Second, for consensus or compro­ forms of simulated war: information mise on the military outcome of the on the probable outcome of conflicts, simulated battle, it is necessary that confidence that each side will honor the opposing generals and their staffs the t e r m s of resulting agreements, be professionals, capable of evaluating and moderation in the terms exacted objectively and accurately the proba­ by the victor and acceptable by the ble outcome of the various moves. It loser. Specifically, they apply to the is also quite necessary that they have use of champions by armies living and confidence in the other side's estimates fighting under a feudal code of con­ of its resources-manpower, equip­ duct. and to the bargaining processes ment, supplies, and performance char­ by mercenary armies operating essen­ acteristics--or that e a c h side have tially as business enterprises. nearly complete and accurate intelli­ The initial conditions for simulated gence estimates of its own and its op­ war, which are adequate information ponent's capabilities. These conditions and good f a i t h. or confidence, are can not be met in warfare between presently met only in part. Each side barbarian tribesmen. am 0 n g whom knows enough about the other's of­ stylized single combats may occur pri­ fensive power to realize that all-out marily as a form of sport. war could be disastrous for both. This Restraint information may be adequate for sim­ Finally, the winning side must show ulated war. Evidence of good faith, restraint in its demands. If it presses confidence in the willingness of the for harsh settlements, it tempts the potential enemy to abide by express other side to try for a more favorable or tacit agreements, is patently lack­ outcome in actual battle than it was ing. Our search for peace is aimed a b I e to obtain in a simulated war. largely at obtaining evidence of good , Each side has its "fighting point" at faith, or measures to d e f eat any which it would rather)ncur the losses breach of faith, or means of enforcing and risks of battle than a c c e p t the good faith. Hence neither side is will­ terms proposed by its opponent. If the ing to accept a settlement which de­ simulated victor makes excessive de­ prives it of its retaliatory power. mands. tbe simulated loser may change What is unusual about the current the scene of battle to a trial at arms. and future strategic balance is that If. on the other hand, the loser is even the loser in a simulated war re­ unwilling to make sufficient conces­ tains the ability to destroy the winner sions, it may be the simulated winner by resort to all-out pucIear attack. Who takes the initiative in c los i n g and that both sides know this. The forces. Moderation in peace t e r m s, potential ability to reverse unfavora­ however, is not a condition for the ble decisions in simylated wars--or initial undertaking of simulated war, at least the ability to appeal the deci­ on I y for its successful conclusion. sion by resorting to nuclear war-and Since moderation must be defim;:d in the knowledge that this ability exists,

Jlluary 1962 81 SIMULATED WAR

may be a sufficient condition for sim­ into all-out war, or that conventional ulated war eve n in the absence of war may develop into limited war good faith. The battlefield is not the with nuclear, chemical, or biological only place where veto power has ef­ weapons. These risks have risen. To 'fectively substituted for good faith. balance the ledger, limited war offers Simulation versus Limitation the prospect of limited gains at best In principle, simulated war must be By contrast, World War II offered clearly distinguished from lim i ted the prospect of total victory and un· war. In practice, of course, phenomena conditional surrender. The costs have can rarely be neatly compartmental­ risen disproportionately to the spoils. ized, with one type of war shading by As a result, the spectrum of militan­ degrees into another. Limited war is situations that can be rationally e~­ complementary to all-out war; it is visaged is considerably narrowed, and part of the spect.rum of military chal­ the odds are weighted toward sim­ lenges and responses available to na­ ulated war, and toward wars quitE limited in scale, theater, and weapon tions. Simulated war, on the 0 the r hand, is a substitute for all-out war, systems, as well as in objectives. as considered above, but also may be Trial and Error Obsolete a substitute for limited war. We can no longer afford trial and The distinction between simulated error in war operations. It is not pos­ war and limited war vis-a-vis all-out sible to initiate a major military move war is that a simulated war, as a Rub­ tentatively, withdrawing if it miscal· stitute for all-out war, has the same intent as the war for which it sub­ culates or otherwise falls short of ex­ stitutes; limited war has an intent pectations. The attendant I' i s k s are different fro m that of all-out war. too great; decisions must be made too i Simulated war as a substitute for quickly; consequences follow imme­ limited war has the same intent as diately. Laos and Lebanon-type situa· limited war. It would be a mistake to tions are far more likely than new distinguish bet wee n limited war. Koreas. When Anglo-American forces which can range very widely in its mil­ occupied Lebanon and J 0 I'd a n. un­ itary commitments, and simulated war doubtedly a simulated war over Iraq on the basis of bloodshed or weapon was waged in Washington and Lon­ systems used. Simulated war mayor don, and probably in M 0 s cow. The may not involve bloodshed; military probable developments and risks from war, limited or not, always does. invasion of Iraq were considered too The costs of lim i ted war in the grave to justify the deed. f u t u I' e may become exorbitant in A simulated war undoubtedly has terms of the gains to be expected, at been fought out on the Berlin ques­ least by the scale of past costs and tion in the Kremlin and in the Pen­ past gains. A limited war can approxi­ tagon. Its possible or expected out­ mate in scale the costs of World War comes have influenced bargaining pos­ II. If the 1 i mit e d war is nuclear, tures of the United States and the the costs, including long-term conse­ USSR. Simulated wars can be can­ quences, can be even greater. Also to celed retroactively, whereas military be considered among the costs are the war, limited or not, represents an ir­ risks that limited war may develop rev 0 cab 1 e commitment. Simulated

82 Military Revin wars can restore the status quo as it incur heavier losses and risks than was before war only if it is apparent other nations. As its power grows it to both sides that they would be bet­ may become a source of great insta­ ter off as before. Only under these bility. Eve n now, it may have the conditions do they perform the role power to commit the USSR to courses of painless trial and error. In one re­ of action the I at t e r nation would spect the r e is no reverting to the choose to avert. Disparity in t e r m s .. status quo, and that is in terms of in­ means no common bargaining area. ,. formation, which always increases as Costs and risks cannot be considered :1 a result. apart from expected or required re­ i A strategic situation under which turns. The willingness to incur costs .~ it is quite possible that both major and assume risks can be specified only il antagonists would lose from military in terms of what the costs and risks & gambits exists today and often has are for: what is the anticipated re­ ;1 occurred in history. It might be as­ turn. The side willing to pay more for 1 sured by the pre sen c e of a large a given return is in a position to win ;{ "third force" of neutrals and nonbel­ limited wars and, once this advantage ligerents. War between two arm e d is realized by both sides, in a position coalitions could result in a "neutral to obtain limited objectives by sim­ coalition" inheriting the earth. Such ulated war. a prospect might be sufficiently un­ A particularly unstable situation palatable to aggressors to increase the exists if both sides have vulnerable likelihood of peace. retaliatory for c e s, but one side is rapidly eliminating the vulnerability Stability Conditions The strategic situation is in equi­ of its nuclear striking force. The other librium when the antagonists do not side is then sorely tempted to strike differ greatly in their willingness to first w h i I e it can still hope to win, incur war costs and risks of all-out before it is reduced to a hopelessly war, or in the returns they demand inferior strategic position. Even with invulnerable striking forces on both from limited wars and simulated wars. The equilibrium would be quite unsta­ sides. instability may exist while one side is developing an effective system. ble if both sides have a willingness to of active homeland defense, while the incur heavy losses and run high risks, homeland of the other side remains and also have high expectations from vulnerable. Periods of change in the military gambits. This total siliuation strategic balance are always hazard­ apparently does not prevail. The bal­ ous. The power in decline is tempted ance tends to be unstable if retaliatory to s t r ike. The power on the rise, power is quite vulnerable on both goaded by its anticipation of the de­ sides, and stable if it is invulnerable. clining power's temptation, may strike The strategic situation is in dan­ preemptively. Thus each power po­ gerous disequilibrium if one side is tentially enhances the other's inclina­ willing to incur much higher costs tion to strike. and much higher risks than the other, or if there is great disparity in the Hostage Cities _ terms on which the two sides are will­ The need for simulation is based ing to settle either a simulated or a ultimately not on the vulnerability of limited war. China seems willing to our mil ita r y position but on the

Jlliuy 1982 83 SIMULATED WAR

existence of a s y s t e m of hostages, Civil defense is just as essential a such as well served many an ancient part of our power to deter as Strate­ people for a time. The exchange of gic Air Command bombers and inter. hostages places a premium on non­ continental ballistic missiles. military settlements, contributes to In terms of psychology, the pros· stability and a feeling of security, and pect of nuclear holocaust involving de­ vastly reduces the significance of even struction of our cities and death to a m a jar differenf!es in first-strike or large part of our population is too re­ retaliatory strength. mote from past experience to catalyze Considering the tremendous advan· the American people into the precau· tage to the aggressor in a surprise tionary action of passive defense. The nuclear strike--an advantage which threat has an aura of unreality, and has existed for some years and will the subconscious reaction is one of I last some years yet-continued mutual incredulity. Passive defense measures I restraint would be improbable with­ wou ld be more acceptable as a means out exchange of hostages. These hos­ of preventing war, of creating a sta.! tages are our cities and those of the ble peace. Americans are also victim, I enemy. They are helpless. Like hos­ of their traditional belief that the best tages of the blood royal in ancient defense is a good offense; this is a times, their"loss would not affect our dubious philosophy at best, and dan· military forces in being. They are ir­ gerous in nuclear war. A good offense relevant for military decision in a is a necessary but by no means suf· short nuclear war. But a desire for ficient condition for survival or stable the continued existence of his na­ tion's cities, always at the sufferance deterrence. of the enemy, is enough to deter an If either side ever achieves a de· attacker even if e qui p p e d with a fense effective enough to preserve preponderance of force. most of its major cities, that is, if it retrieves its hustages from en em), Purpose of Civil Defense hands, then the inherent instability of The public emphasis placed on civil a nuclear potential giving prepon" defense

84 Military Revin bilities are so far from parity as to ning-like limited war is also unlikely invite attack by either side. . because it is pointless in obtaining The functions of intelligence must reliable information, assessing fight­ be expanded to include the disclosure ing points, or j u d gin g intents. It of information to the potential enemy places maximum emphasis on condi­ that will prevent an overestilI)ate of tioned reflex reaction and minimizes his own or an underestimate of his careful deliberation. opponent's resources. W her e great Cost of Reliability disparity in capabilities exists, the Although a costly war may proviile objective should be the dissemination abe t t e r test of the strength of a of equilibrating misinformation. The policy or posture than a tentative and assumption here is that the objective indirect thrust, it may not increase is to avoid wars. The opposite intelli­ the reliability of information, or the gence policies would be pursued if the· confidence with which it is received. purpose were to encourage a miscal­ Korea-type challenges do more than culated atta~k by the enemy, or to test intent; they create issues of pres­ ;, cause him to reduce his vigilance or tige and domestic politics seriously t I defense effort to the point where he distorting the information sought, re­ i I!1would be vulnerable to attack withont ducing its predictive value. A Korea­ ~prospect of adequate retaliation. type war is a high price to pay for '; The main purpose of limited wars information which, even if worth the ::Ill the future may be the determina­ cost, CDn be 0 b t a i ned much more ::tion of each side's willingness to incur cheaply. Korea could be interpreted .losses and run risks, and each side's not as motivated by realized ignorance \bargaining range on war outcomes. and directed at clarification, but as Once this knowledge is obtained. fur­ the result of misinformation, as a •ther gains may be sou g h t by sim­ miscalculation on the part of the Com­ .ulated war until one side or the other munists. A repetition seems improba­ ;changes the price it is willing to pay ble. 'for a given strategic return, neces­ War models and limited wars are ;sitating a new limited war to settle on two distinct methods of obtaining in­ nell' terms. formation, respectively the a priori or A limited war thus conceived is the deductive and the empirical or in­ result of ignorance, and its main ac­ ductive met hod. Conventional war icomplishment is improved informa­ games represent an attempt to repro­ !tion. When ignorance is the motiva­ duce as closely as possible realistic tion, and improved information the experimental conditions rather than 'objective of a limited war, as weIl as rigorous laboratory standards. They s Its result, then large-scale lim i ted cannot completely escape the limita­ wars, high in cos t s and risks and tions of the a priori method nor can heavy in losses, become irrational. For they obtain its conceptual rigor. information theory teaches us that H we had total -mtelligence, there the amount of information does not might be no occasion for war; all the depend on the strength of the signal. implications of the data C 0 u I d be Apr 0 b e into Laos, or a landing in w 0 r ked out via sim;;lated warfare. Lebanon, may provide as much infor­ Starting from a stable position, the mation as a Korea-type war. A light- chances that any nation or coalition

I January 1962 85 SIMULATED WAR w 0 u I d obtain a decisive advantage that she will not be so weakened as to would be greatly reduced. We will fall prey to invasion from surrounding never have complete, relevant infor­ enemy countries, or dismemberment mation, for relevant information en­ within by secession of major nation· compasses both capabilities and inten­ ality groups, or internal revolt that tions. On capabilities, full knowledge will destroy the present leadership is at least theoretically possible; on and change the ideological complexion intentions it is not. of the nation. The last meaning of I The facile assumption that, if we survival really implies the self-pres· know all the objective data, we can ervation of S 0 vie t leadership, and infer each other's behavior (unless, to could be discarded' without implying I avoid being f 0 u n d out, one or the national dismemberment or defeat. other adopts a randomized strategy) To survive a counterattack, Soviet is a dangerous fallacy of game theory. defenses must be able to lim i t the In its original form game theory em­ number of US nuclear warheads which I ployed a far too narrow concept of find their targets. Let us assume that I rationality, embodied in the minimax Soviet leaders are willing to accept 20 : principle.' Either we must ad mit detonations on targets in their home- ! other types of rational behavior, or land as the maximum price they can! recognize that' irrational behavior is a f for d for the destruction of the I relevant and important. For the psy­ United States. If their defense against! chology of the "reluctant duelist" does missiles is 90 percent effective, the, i not describe the behavior of a Khru­ can permit 200 US nuclear missiles to I shchev or his motivation. In the arena survive the initial Soviet attack, but, of intentions, ignorance and the op­ no more. portunity for bluffing will persist. If It is taken for granted that a US the balance of weapons is precarious, counterattack would not be a random it can be upset by an imbalance of one,· with choice of targets determmed wills; if it is stable, then world peace by standing assignments of the mis­ might be assured. . siles that happened to escape the inl' In an N-country situation, stability tial Soviet attack. On the contrary. may be impossible because the dish·i· a US counterattack might have to as· bution of known capabilities between sume inability (or belatedness I of potential aggressors cannot be known knocking out Soviet offensive bases. without adequate information on the and concentrate on doing maximum intentions of third countries. Knowl· dam age to USSR urban-industrial edge of implicit coalitions entails fuJI centers and their populations. T\\enty intelligence on intentions. detonations on such selected targets might be the limit of Soviet tolerance, The Fallout Deterrent The Soviet Union will not attack whereas a much larger number would the United States unless she feels be acceptable if aimed at dispersed fairly certain that she will survive the Soviet launching sites. counterattack. Soviet survival means The scale of the USSR's initial at· tack, and the effectiveness With which • Dani{'l Ensberg, "Theory of the Reluctant Duelist," Amencan Economic Revicu'. December it must be mounted to assure Soviet 1966, pp 909~923. For a genE'l'st discussion of game theory, sec "Theory of Games." Encllclopaedla survival, as well as US defeat, depends Britantltc4. Encyclopaedia Britanmca. Inc., Chl~ eago, 1960. Volume 10. p 6. on the number of US missiles and

86 Military Renew I "

II missile sites located in different im­ Union v'ictory becomes exceedingly pact areas, and on the effectiveness of large. US defenses. If the United States has miss i I e sites capable of launching Factor of Mobility 1,000 missiles, a purely hypothetical Dispersion is far more important figure, and Soviet defense is 90 per­ than the mer e ability to withstand cent effective, the USSR must knock direct hits. If the number of different out 800 before she can be sure of sur­ missile launching sites is sufficiently I a r g e, intentional nuclear war ap­ vival. She must, therefore, launch 800 proaches impossibility, even if all sites missiles if there is no US defense, and are vulnerable to air attack, the US a larger number if there is. has no missile defense capability, and I If US defenses are 90 percent ef­ all missile sit e s are destroyed. The !fective, the Soviet Union must launch number of bases required to rule out 'I 8,000 nuclear missiles to knock out an attack becomes smaller (because , 800 US launching sites to reduce US their survival rate will be higher from l launchings to 200, and successful im­ an attack of any given size), if the I pacts to 20. If there is more than one locations of some of the bases are un­ ! nuclear missile per launching site (a known, if a large number of dummy ; site being an area small enough to be missiles and sites are in existence and knocked out by a single missile), then the Soviets do not know which are the number of US launching sit e s dummy, if some sites are located far which the Soviets can permit to escape enough underground to ensure rela­ destruction is reduced. With two mis­ tive invulnerability, and if some bases siles per site, the number spared must are mobile. be halved. If defense on each side is The more reliable US defensive sys­ 10 percent rather than 90 percent ef­ tems are, and the less reliable Soviet fective, the US S R in this example defensive systems are, the greater the must launch about 1,086 to knock out size of attack required to assure So­ 978 out of 1,000 US launching sites. viet survival. Thus the greater the cutting the number of US missiles probability that the attack must be on launched to 22, and impacts to 20. so large a scale as to be ruled ont because of its fallout effects on the If the US has 1,000 missile sites, Soviet Union and the Northern Hemi­ ': a Soviet attack would require a mini­ sphere. , mum of 800 nuclear explosions. In fact, the number of explosions would Unstable Stalemate t, be m u c h larger; some US miSSIles A nuclear race is inherently U\lstu­ ;.',', would explode on Soviet targets, some, ble. Almost any improvement in one • possibly very many, of the US and side's position leads to magnified reac­ r Soviet antimissile missiles would be tion by the other side. Any increase nuclear-tipped, and some of the inter­ in the number of Soviet missile sites cepted m iss i I e s might explode 011 will cause us to increase the number interception. It is apparent that if the of our missiles by a multiple of the United States increases the number of Soviet increase, depending upon the her missile launching sites into the . effectiveness of their interception, the thousands, the number of n u c I ear estimated accuracy of our missiles, detonations nee e s s a r y for Soviet and the prospect that some of ours

January 1962 87 SIMULATED WAR will be destroyed before launching. guess estimates of each. Probably the Significant improvements i nth e most serious area of doubt, however, USSR's active defense, or in her civil concerns missile launching sites; each defense, may also require substantial side may be uncertain whether it has increases in the number of our mis­ knowledge of all the other side's site. siles. The Soviet Union will likewise and what percentage of actual sites it overreact to improvements in the num­ does know. ber or accuracy of our missiles, in Chemical and biological warfare our antimissile defense, and in our pose another kind of problem. Bac· civil defense measures. terial attacks in tim e theoretically While both sides retain some ex­ could generate worldwide epidemics, pectation of developing a missile in­ depending on the agent used. Privi· terception capability, or of signifi­ leged popUlations, however, may be cantly reducing damage and casualties fully protected through inoculation. through civil defense measures, there Intercepted missiles carrying bacterial is no such thing as too much nuclear warheads may spread their cargo un· capability. Thus nuclear arsenals may predictably; interceptions are not nec· continue growing until their simulta­ essary to engender epidemics beyond neous dischar}!"e would be capable of the confines of the country a-ttacked destroying much of the Nor the r n Because of the reproductive capacity Hemisphere. This capability already of some biological agents, the ultimate exists, if one of the nuclear powers effects don't necessarily depend upon makes its bombs as dirty as possible. the number of missiles used, or the Thus there exists a distinct if still number intercepted, or the number remote possibility that the size of an misdirected by erroneous calculation. attack required to rule out unaccepta­ For chemical warfare the threshold ble retaliatory damage will become so of effects is significant; neither winds large that its fallout effects on the at­ from target areas nor "fallout" from tacker become unacceptaille. Only at high altitude interceptions are likely this point would the nuclear stalemate to create effective concentrations in become stable. unintended areas rem 0 t e from the All the previously mentioned deter­ targets. minants of the necessary size of a So­ Chemical and biological warfare, viet nuclear attack h a v e been dis­ for all their potential destructivenes" cussed as though the i r values were may be only another kind of limited known. The truth IS there a I way s war under conditions of nuclear stale­ will be a considerable element of un­ mate. Neither side could press its at· certainty about them which m a k e s tack too vigorously, nor exploit its ad­ their effect on decisions difficult to vantage too far, lest the other feel its estimate. Defense effectiveness, both cause is lost, and deliver a mortal nu· ours and the USSR's, is not precisely clear blow. Radar screens, launching known. To a degree we overcome the sites, and computing equipment are hazard induced by t his incomplete relatively invulnerable to chemical and knowledge by assuming our defense biological attack, and control and com­ is less effective than it is and assum­ mand center personnel can protect ing a corresponding increase in Rus­ themselves. sian d'efense effectiveness, over best- In the future military forces could I

88 Military Revier ! well be positi6ned in outer spa c e. tion of which would contaminate the When that time comes wars might be world to an unacceptably high degree. fought with fewer casualties and less These prospective developments are fallout menace to the earthbound pop­ sufficient to impose moderation on the ulation. Their occurrence would, there­ victor and to ass u I' e good faith on fore. become more likely. But no ma­ both sides. Moderation and good faith, jor country would be foolish enough together with adequate information, to commit all its offensive strength to are the conditions necessary for sim­ a satellite war in outer space. It would ulated wars. hold back a reserve sufficient to re­ Because of nuclear stalemate, war tain its veto power and thus to impose as a means of altering the balance of moderation on the enemy, should the power is no Ion gel' valid; only its latter win in outer space. Space war incidental information gathering ob­ then would remain limited. We cannot jectives temain. The most vital infor­ say what form this veto power would mation of all, not obtainable through take in the future. A large and widely the war model or war gam e s ap­ . dispersed nuclear arsenal whose de­ proach, concerns the psychological l struction would excessively contami­ factors such as: intentions, fighting nate the atmosphere could deter an points, willingness to take and inflict all-out war for many years to come. losses, and to incur risks. Acquisition of this information requires limited Bases for Simulated War wars, but not necessarily at the cost Technology has increased the costs or on the casualty scale of Korea. For of war relative to prospective gains, decision-making, wars are unneces­ and in risks relative to rewards. Each sary. Decision-making, which works antagonist is capable of preserving its out the policy and power implications veto on all-out war by maintaining a of new information, will be assisted large number of widely dispersed nu· by simulated wars. These gam e s of clear missiles, not enough of which solitaire may terminate in summit could be destroyed to reduce retalia­ meetings, or in less spectacular and tion to acceptable levels, or destruc­ less formal mutual understandings.

Fitting Words: "All that has gone on before is mere skirmishing. The war now begins." These were the words of General W. T. Sherman, uttered shortly after his conference with Grant, who was appointed by Lincoln as SU~ preme commander, 12 March 1864. In outlining the strategy for ending the war, Grant directed Sherman to attack Confederate General Johnston, conquer Georg:a and move north to join Union forces in the capture of Richmond. Grant, directing the Army of the Potomac, decided to tangle with Lee in Virginia. The strength of the Union forces on 1 January 1864 totaled 860,000, opposed to 480,000 in the Confederate ranks. ­

January 1962 89 THE FIELD ARMY CPX CAN ACHIEVE tional procedu res and staff techniques at a desired rate of play. Unlike the field training exercise, REALISM the CPX is not tied to actual troop actions. but is responsive to simulated actions and situations. It Can be one· THROUGH sided or two-sided. and can be con· ducted from station or field locations. PLANNING If it is carefully planned and con· Lieutenant Colonel Stephen A. Day, ducted, it can simulate actual war­ United State. Armll time. operating conditions to a high degree. REALISM largely determines the Planning to achieve realism in a success of a field training command CPX falls into two distinct areas of post exercise (CPX). As with other consideration-the planning ph a s e desirable objectives, the achievement and the conduct phase--based on the of realism may be more nearly as­ logical sequence of events in the over­ sured through early and continuous all operation. The planning phase for planning. a CPX officially begins when the army At higher levels the CPX is univer­ commander announces his decision to sally established in training programs conduct such an exercise. However, as a normal training vehicle. It can for the exercise planner. normally a exercise the various headquarters and member of the G3 section of the army staff elements of a command at the headquarters. planning for future ex· same time the troop elements are con­ ercises is a continuous process. ducting vital unit training. Costwise. in comparison with a field army field The first planning task is to deter· training exercise (FTX), the large­ mine the exercise scope, objectives. scale field training CPX is relatively levels of player participation, and in­ inexpensive. It is a flexible training clusive dates. It is important to avoid tool whi'ch can test or develop opera­ objectives that seek conclusions as to

90 Military Review the tactical play of the exercise. The ble, of adjacent allied or US forces CPX is a valid medium for headquar­ or both, and elements of the communi­ ters and staff play only, and the re­ cations zone, tactical air force, army Bults of simulated' tactical play are group, and naval forces. Appropriate necessarily inconclusive. "invitations" to these forces are in­ Directives from higher headquar­ cluded. After the commander acts on ters as well as previous comments, this paper, the planner has a firm desires, and directives expressed by basis for detailed planning. the army commander are complied Naming the Exercise with. An open file of these should be The next planning task is to name maintained by the exercise planner. the exercise. This may seem to be a The planner analyzes the critique of trivial problem, but an exercise name the field army's last exercise, if ap­ can "flavor" the entire preparation plicable, and critiques from recent and conduct of an exercise. A carefully similar exercises throughout the world, selected name may contribute materi­ if available. The corps commanders ally to the realism for which we are are asked to set forth their desires, striving. The planner submits a paper if they have not already done so, and that recommends in order of prefer­ the army general staff is thoroughly ence three or more exercise names. canvassed. Sufficient time should be Naming an exercise is a knotty given to the general staff to allow it problem-it often conveys overtones to incorporate the ideas of the special of a classified significance. In Europe stsff. an exercise name coupled with the The planner then submits a paper, dates of the contemplated exercise through normal staff channels, spe­ generally is classified. One exercise cifically recommending the exercise comes to mind that I think had a scope, objectives, levels of player par­ particularly appropriate titIe--CPX ticipation, and inclusive dates. This Summer Stock. It was held in June paper includes a discussion of the re­ 1956-and tested for the first time quests and requirements referred to 7th Army's capability of going on an earlier. In addition, it includes specific alert. In this sense, it was a summer recommendations for participation or stock-type production, and most par­ degree of representation, as applica- ticipants got the "feel" of it through Lieutenant Colonel Stephen A. Day the name. is with< the Military Assistance Ad­ The recent Exercise Winter Shield visory Group in Formosa. A 1945 was apt I y named-it was a cold graduate of the United States Military weather situation and exercised the Academy, he was graduated from thr NATO Shield. Names like counter­ U. S. Army Command and General thrust and strike back connote the tac­ Staff College in 1961. Other assign­ tical theme of the exercise. Cordon ments include duty in Japan, Korea, . Bleu had meaning for the 1st French and Germany. During his tour of duty Army participants-for US partici­ in Germany he was maneuver staff pants maybe it emphasized infantry officer, GS, 7th Army. This article i~ based on a treatise written while he as symbolized by t1!.e infantryman's was a student in the Regular Course blue shoulder cord. at the Command and General Staff The foregoing are the major plan­ College.. ning tasks that the G3 exercise plan­

January 1962 91 REALISM THROUGH PLANNING ner accomplishes as an individual. ministrative play. and formulation of Others not discussed here-s,ince they detailed control procedures for exer. do not. in themselves. directly contrib­ cise play. When combined. these can. ute to realism-are budgetary consid­ trol plans are the scenario for the con­ erations. maneuver damage control duct of the exercise. They are pre­ plans. transportation restrictions. lo­ sented to the army commander for cal political considerations. classifica­ his approval. The army commander, tion of parts of the exercise and the as director of the exercise, is the onl. over-all exercise. visitors' bureaus. the officer at field army level. with the e;. public information plan. critique re­ ception of the army controUers. who quirements, location. and attendance knows both player and controller plans. limitations. This information normaUy is extended From this point on the G3 exercise to the corps commanders insofar as planner is the army G3 controller. He the play of the exercise for< their corps requests. through staff channels. that is concerned. a senior officer be designated as the The army control group then pre· army chief controller. This officer also pares the player instructions. These serves as the deputy director of the instructions "paint the picture" of the exercise. Through the army chief of political, economic. psychological, and staff. the exercise planner requests strategic background of the exercise. the designation of control oillcers from They contain the army group (simu· Gl. G2, G4, G5, and from the special lated) operation plan or order. which staff sections. Collectively. these offi­ requ ires the preparation of plans and cers and the G3 controller make up the orders by the headquarters of the field army control group for the exercise. army and its various subordinate, as· This group operates directly under the signed. or attached unit headquarters. army commander until the end of the The simulated plan or order is com· exercise. plete and conforms with the head· Control Procedures quarters' actual SOP's. A simulated Through the coordinated efforts of intelligence input, from the lower non­ the army control group, planning for playing headquarters and from the control organizations at the various non playing adjacent and higher head· levels, methods of operation, commu­ quarters. is prepared and disseminated nications require'lnents, and necessary at the appropriate player levels. control reference materials begin to The composition of this player rna· take shape. If the control group has terial offers one of the first opportuni­ available a standing operating proce­ ties for realism. If it conforms in dure (SOP) for control organizations time and substance with what might and procedures, such as the "Stand­ be expected in a combat situation un­ ard Control Reference Data for Com­ der the conditions of the given exer­ mand Post Exercises," Headquarters, cise setting. the planner has taken a 7th United States Army, dated 25 May long step toward realism. On the other 1956. and subsequent revisions. the hand. a well-planned exercise can fall planning proceeds very quickly. flat if the buildup to actual exercise The first major planning task of the play is not logical and realistic. Player army control group is the production instructions are submitted to the army of control plans for tactical and ad­ commander for his approval.

92 Military RevieW Army Control Plans afford efficient control communications The last control planning step is the systems. preparation of the army control in­ Enemy Force Allocation structions. The heart of these instruc­ In conjunction with the control out­ tions is the control outline of tactical line of tactical play, an allocation of play. Around this outline the army e"emy forces is made to corps control control planners plan a detailed con­ groups. Corps control groups, in turn, trol organization, a communications allocate enemy forces to the division system to support the organization, an control groups of divisions initially enemy force (Aggressor) necessary committed. Subordinate controtgroups ~ to support the tactical requirements of committed player units have sec­ ~ of the outline, and the control' guid­ tors of control responsibility outlined . ance necessary to effect realistic con­ through extension of the boundaries trol actions for all aspects of the ex­ of the committed player units. The fI,~ ercise. army control group retains control of " A basic control concept is that ef­ all overt enemy airborne operations, fective con t r 0 I of a CPX can be chemical and biological attacks, and t: achieved only when the exercise player nuclear weapon strikes. r elements are "wrapped" as in a blanket When the army control instructions II by control from all sides. Control must are issued, the army control group or­ represent all friendly units-lower, ganizes and conducts a briefing for adjacent, and higher-which are not major controllers of division, corps, playing. Gaps within the player eche­ and separate army units. The purpose lons are filled by control elements to of this briefing is to ensure that a com­ avoid incomplete play. For example, mon understanding of control plans , a nondivisional separate battalion, is reached throughout the various con­ which normally goes directly to an trol echelons. Control schools or fur­ army supply point or technical serv­ ther briefings may be found to be ice for administrative support, is con­ necessary. Separate briefing~ for al­ , Irol represented, if not played, to main­ lied, lateral, and higher headquarters , lain realistic personnel and logistical control elements are held as required. t play. After receipt of the army control t Player reaction to the tactical plan, instructions, but prior to the begin­ ning of the exercise, each corps and "'I such as commitment of a major re­ serve at a certain time and place, is division control group-jointly or sep­ , predictable. The control structure for arately-is required to war game the " the exercise is designed to provide for exercise, in sector. The purpose is to t expeditious shifts of control authority determine weaknesses in the over-all I~ as actions like these take place. A concept and to note specific needs for carefully tailored control communica­ additional enemy forces, major strike tions system is drawn up, capable of forces, and nuclear weapons in conso­ full operation throughout all phases of nance with the control outline of tac­ the exercise playas envisioned in the tical play. tactical outline. An army CPX which The army chief controller, with his goes down to include battle group level major staff controllers, is briefed by normally r e qui res communications the corps control groups on the re­ support from outside the field army to sults of these war games and makes

laRulry 1962 93 REALISM THROUGH PLANNING such adjustments and tentative allo­ The purpose of an exercise message cations of strike forces and nuclear from the controller's side is to create weapons as are necessary. All such play, or to guide existing play back allocations remain tentative to pre­ into the desired direction. Ideally, at serve flexibility of control during the higher headquarters' levels, a message play of the exercise. The army com­ should impose extensive coordinated mander is briefed in detail on the action by players to achieve the prac.

US .41'1!1, Careful war gaming of the exercise before actual play helps the planning stalT t. detect weaknesses and achieve realism coordinated results of the corps con­ tice that we are after and to give th, trol war games. communications a workout. This play The Exercise Begins is essential in any large-scale CPX to The conduct phase of an exercise is test the communication and the staff initiated by the delivery of appropri­ operational procedures. ate written and oral operational. intel­ In one exercise I recall, as soon as ligence, and administrative messages the "war" broke out, a IOO.OOO-rnan to appropriate player headquarters civilian force. roughly organized. vol­ from controllers representing nonplay­ unteered to assist the effort and fight ing friendly units and agencies. The on the NATO side. This device brought bulk of such messages are inserted into play all the ramifications of na­ in the play by controllers at the lowest tional agreements. the Geneva Con­ playing or controlling echelon. vention. security check. logistical sup-

94 Military Revi.. port, and many others. A carefully main CP was allowed back into opera­ worked out series of data and messages tion so that play could continue. kept many staff sections, such as the An enemy airborne strike can be staff judge advocate's, quite busy. depicted realistically and put into play with little prior effort. Messages are Realistic Devices first fed into G2 channels of possible Real items were injected into play enemy assembly deep in enemy terri­ , at the lowest playing echelon-to test tory. As the aircraft take off and ren­ "technical intelligence channels-even dezvous, sightings from agents and US Ithough in a CPX framework. Air Force are reported. The radars . In another exercise the play called next pick up the aircraft. Appropriate , for a satellite regiment to defect to messages are injected into the Anti­ a playing regimental headquarters. An aircraft Artillery Intelligence Service officer in foreign uniform actually re­ net. As the aircraft cross the forward ported in to the player regimental edge of the battle area (FEBA), some headquarters. This action created play low echelon sightings are reported. throughout the entire army. The de­ Such a series of messages-received fecting forces had to be moved, fed, at various echelons of the army over and checked, and tactically they left a period of two or more days--creates a hole in the enemy line potentially a realistic situation in the headquar­ capable of exploitation by our forces. ters of playing units. One of the most successful gambits In preparing a message, the planner our planning group devised involved asks himself "how would this informa­ a photograph of a Rhine River instal­ tion get to the CP T' After he has de­ lation. We sent a copy of the photo to cided, he establishes the timing and Washington and had it "doctored" to content of the message. Little action reflect the aftereffects of a nuclear of consequence is covered by one mes­ weapon of specified yield. The two sage, but becomes pieced together in photos-before and after-with an ex­ a CP through a series of partial-infor­ . planatory message from a nearby com­ mation messages from various places mander were inserted into the play at and at varying times. , the right place and time. Projecting this a little further, in In another exercise we hit the 7th the case of the main CP nuclear strike Army main command post (CP) with mentioned previously, it would be il­ , a nuclear weapon. By prearrangement logical to inject a message from the with the Army s i g n a I officer, the main CP to the alternate CP that "we switchboard went dead, lights went have just been hit by a nuc." ComJ.llu­ out, and no one was allowed in or out nications surely would be out. of the CPo A control liaison officer This is the type of action in which told the army chief of staff that a a control liaison officer comes in handy. nuclear weapon of unknown strength A liaison officer at the alternate CP had just struck the command post. Re­ -equipped with a telephone line to ports giving details on effects were the G3 controller--can keep the G3 fed into the alternate CP from nearby controller informed ab6tit the reaction headquarters. After the alternate CP of messages as they arrive in the al­ took over the army and implemented ternate CPo He then adds or subtracts damage assessment procedures, the from the planned sequence of messages

1iDuary 1962 95 REALISM THR01lGH PLANNING

"by ear" and achieves the desired re­ in friendly rear areas, or a heavy for. action. ward area flow of refugees require the The quantity, format, and contents utmost in imagination and coordinated of these messages must be realistic preplanning to be realistic. If major and similar to those which would be actions of this type are not portrayed sent in normal operations. realistically, an otherwise carefully Controllers keep abreast of both planned exercise is ine~ective. friendly and enemy plans and opera­ The "Standard Control Reference tions to ensure that actions when in­ Data for Command Post Exercises," troduced conform to the over-all situ­ referred to earlier outlines many de­ ation and com ply with the actual tails for realistic presentations of ac· capabilities of enemy forces. The con­ tions of this type. A corollary work in sequence of all friendly combat actions the field of logistics is "Logistical is evaluated care.fully and its impact Play Within 7th Army During Com­ reflected in enemy reactions. mand Post Exercises," dated 15 Sep­ In the conduct of enemy ground op­ tember-1957. Reference works of this erations, controllers adhere to realistic type will materially assist the CPX rates of movements and employ units planner. only within on-the-ground offensive In preparing the conduct phase of and defensive-area limitations. Delays an exercise, due consideration should in movement caused by defiles and be given by the army control group to other player actions such as barrier the expected tempo of play. A rela­ systems, demolitions, and massed or tively even tempo of required player major fires are carefully assessed. actions is generally desirable, with, Time and Space Factors probably not more than two peak load Similarly, controllers e val u ate periods throughout the exercise. The player actions to ensure that they ob­ tempo of play also should be uniform serve realistic time and space factors. wi~hin each player headquarters, witb Disregard of factors such as abnormal all staff elements working. speed of movement or excessively wide If the information can be withheld, defense frontages are countered by the the exact hour of exercise termination insertion of additional problem ele­ should not be known beforehand, even ments, such as excessive straggling, by the controllers. Undoubtedly, many lost columns, obstruction by refugees, good exercises have soured on a "clock I and en e m y countertactical actions. watching" note. Experience shows that Army and corps control groups nor­ an optimum exercise ending is reached! mally post control liaison officers to in a tactical background of friendly' their respective player command posts exploitation or pursuit with "all hands to keep abreast of player reactions in busy," the exact time of termination the tactical operations centers and being determined and announced by other installations. the army commander. Major player problem situations re­ The field training CPX at field army qu ire intensive control coordination to level has as a prime objective the sim· be effective_ Actions such as an enemy ulation of actual wartime operating airborne strike, enemy or friendly nu­ conditions. To accomplish this objec· clear fires, a defection of an enemy tive, the field training CPX must be unit, the coordinated use of guerrillas -and can be-realistic.

96 Military HeYi.. UNITED STATES .'T114' ArmQred Reconnaissance Carriers thorizes the expenditure of nearly six The United States Army has issued million doUars on production facilities. orders for quantity production of the The new full-tracked vehicle carries new T1l4 lightweight armored vehi­ a crew of three, but space is provided cle. Designed for use as a command for a fourth man if desired. T est vehicle or for armored reconnaissance models were powered by a 175-horse­ power gasoline engine and carried a turret-mounted .7.62-millimeter ma­ chinegun.-News item. United States Strike Command The new long-range air and ground strike force recently announced by the Secretary of Defense (MR, Dec 1961, p 97) has been designated the United States Strike Command. It has been activated at MacDilI Air Force Base, near Tampa, Florida. This is a tem­ porary location for the new headquar­ ters.-News item. Amphibious Assault Ships liS Army The United States Navy has TlJl reconnaissance vehicle launched two ships of an entirely new class. They are the f/Co Jima and the roles, the T114 weighs but 13,500 Okinall'u amphibious assault s hip s. pounds combat loaded; is air trans­ Each is designed to carry 2,000 troops, portable, air droppable, and amphibi­ a crew of 900, 20 large amphibious ous. Light weight is achieved by ex­ transport helicopters, and 30 I i g h t tensive use of aluminum. helicopters. Four s u c h vessels are The initial order for 1,215 vehicle" scheduled to join the four amphibious carries a price tag of over nine mil· assault ships now in the fleet.-News lion dollars. A separate contract au­ item.

The MILITARY REVIEW and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the lIfILITARY NOTES section of this pUblication. Items are printed as a service'to the readers. No official endorsement of the views, opinions, or factual statements is to be im­ plied.-The Editor.

January 1962 97 ", MILITARY NOTES

'Midas' Satellite Surveillance The system is expected to increase In a recent test Midas IV, tlie first the warning and reaction time availa­ of the Midas series reported to be ble for the United States air defense functioning fully after launch, success­ system from 15 minutes, which can be fully detected the firing of a Titan obtained from present radar systems, missile less than two minutes after to 30 minutes. Great B ri t a i n has recently an­ nounced that she is participating in the Midas project and that a ground read-out station for the system will be b u i I t at Kirkbride in northern England. The Kirkbride station will be operated by the Royal Air Force. The announcement of British par­ ticipation indicated that the Midas system will eventually consist of "a number" of satellites and that the in­ formation gleaned from ,the read-out stations will be simultaneously avail· able to operations c e n tel' s in the United States and Great Britain, and to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Midas II was launched in A p I' i I 1960 and, although still in orbit, is no longer transmitting. Midas III was launched in July 1961. Its operational stat'!s has not been disclosed.-Ne\\S item. Plastic Surgical Instruments Plastic surgical instruments ,dllch could be used during a national erneI" gency when metal iR in short supply are currently being perfected at the Army Medical Service's Me die a I u.\ Air 1'01'('(, Equipment Development Laboratory, . A Midas satellite just prior to launeh Fort Totten, New York. the Titan left its launching pad at The devices ranging from retractors Cape Canaveral, Florida. to surgical cutting instruments are The objective of the Midas project mol d e d from polycarbonate resins. is to develop an early warning system The instruments are light and dura· for defense against intercontinental ble, and can be produced faster than ballistic missiles. It uses an infrared metal instruments. Metal surgical in­ sensing device to detect missiles by struments are produced by a compar­ registering the infrared emissions atively small number of skilled and from their motors. highly paid artisans.-News release.

98 Military Review Mobile Assault Bridge Individual units will be driven di­ A new mobile assault vehicle which rectly from land into the water. Each can travel on land or water, serve in­ has a two-man crew. Eight men can dividually as a fer r y, or be joined have a four-unit fer r y, capable of together to form a bridge in a matter carrying 55 tons, ready for loading in ~ of minutes will soon be tested by the 15 minutes. Or, 32 men with 16 units ! Army. ! The new equipment has bee n 'de­ t signed by the Arm y Engineer Re­ i search and Development Laboratories, ~ Fort Belvoir, Virginia. ,; Called a Mobile Assault Bridge, it , wiII be able to keep pace with modern. I mechanized armies and speed river crossings of large forces with reduced The ramp approach unit (a b 0 v e) and . concentration of troops. Bridges of bridge deck section (below) of the new . virtually any length can be speedily Mobile Assault Bridge, developed by the Army Engineers

can put a 400-foot bridge in place in one hour. Each unit, made principally of aluminum, will wei g h less than 50,000 pounds and be powered by a Units of the new Mobile Assault Bridge 335-horsepower diesel engine. are shown, in this sketch. being linked The contract calls for fabrication together to span a river. Other units can of 12 units. Delivery of the test units be linked together as a ferry. is scheduled to start 1 January 1963.­ News release. assembled by joining together the required number of individual unit~, AntifJash Device each of which can travel independ­ Researchers have developed a device ently. to protect users of optical instruments Resembling the DUKW (wheeled from flash blindness as a result of a boat) of World War II, each unit is nuclear burst on the battlefield. The capable of traveling overland or being battery-powered protection unit may used as a ferry. Each unit's individual be fitted to the objective end of field­ 'pan section can be rotated hydrau­ glasses or telescopes. It provides auto­ lically to a position right angle from matic closure of a shutfer in one ten­ the boat-truck bod y for joining to­ thousandth of a second upon sensing gether as a bridge. a nuclear flash.-News item.

Jaaury 1962 99 MILITARY NOTES

ATtllleTY Trl'lI.:U XMIOI self-propelled I05-millimeter howitzer

ArtilleTIl Tun" XM102 towed lOS-millimeter howitzer

100 Military Review New Howitzer Development inches in length and six inches in The United States Army is develop­ diameter. It is normally operated by a ing two new lO5-millimeter howitzers three-man crew but can be effectively suitable for the highly mobile opera­ employed by two men. The normal tions visualized in future warfare. crew consists of a gunner, a loader, One is a 6,OOO-pound, self-propelled and an illuminator. The illuminator weapon designated the XMI04 SP. It operates the ultraviolet light source is essentially an una r m 0 red full­ which is a tripod-mounted unit also tracked gun platform 0 n I y' slightly called an illuminator. The gunner aims over five feet in height, 5.25 feet wide, the launcher, which also serves as a , and 12.75 feet in length. The vehicle carrying case, in the general direction will be powered by a currently pro­ of the target and fires the weapon. duced %-ton engine. It is reported The loader provides the crew the capa­ capable of 35-mile-an-hour speeds and bility of carrying additional missiles. to have a 300-mile cruising ran g e The weapon, when fired, initially without refueling. The XMI04 will operates as a free rocket until it re­ 1 carry a crew of four men. This weap­ ceives the reflected ultraviolet signal. on will be readily air transportable in It then locks on the light beam and currently available assault landing homes on its target.-News item. aircraft and can be air dropped. Defense Supply Agency A second still lighter weapon is be­ ing developed for use in helicopter The Secretary of Defense has es­ tablished a Defense Supply Agency borne assaults or similar operations. (DSA) which will consolidate general It also is air droppable. This is the supply responsibility for the t h r e e XM102 towed version of the 105-milli­ military services in a single organiza­ meter howitzer. Over-all weight is tion. The new agency will take over 3,000 pounds, and the weapon has a the purchase of 956,000 items which silhouette of only 30 inches. An alu­ are common to the services. ·minum box trail in a wishbone shape contributes to the light weight of the The DSA will be headed by a United XMI02.-News item. States Army lieutenant general and staffed jointly. It has assumed the 'Tomahawk' Antitank Missile personnel and functions of the former A major United States manufac­ Armed Forces Supply Support Center turer has disclosed details on a new and has set up operations in the Muni­ man-transportable antitank missile tions Building, Washington, D. C., which is unencumbered by wire guid­ pending availability of a permanent ance. Called the Tomahawk. it uses a location. Eventually, it will incorpo­ light source which throws an invisible rate the single-manager agencies of spot of ultraviolet light on the target. the Army and Navy in the fields of The missile homes on the light re­ subsistence, clothing and textiles, con­ flected from the target during the struction supplies, petroleum products, terminal portion of its flight. The new general and industrial supplies, medi­ missile has been commercially devel­ cal supplies, and traffic management. oped and is not a US Army-sponsored Plans are underway lor the establish­ project'i, ment of an electrical and electronics Toma:10k is reported to be 40 division.-News release.

January 1962 101 MILITARY NOTES

'Mauler' Tests Underway to seven minutes of preheating are The United States Army's highly required to start the engine. mobile battlefield air defense system, The unit is operated by a self-eon· the Mauler, has advanced to the test tained gas 0 lin e engine. Its total firing stage. A recent announcement weight, complete with metal housing, by the Army discloses that the new' is 300 pounds.-News release. surface-to-air missile met all of its Self·Powered Radio test objectives in its first firing at the A small radio transmitter-receiver White Sands Missile Ran g e, New weighing only six pounds, which is Mexico. not dependent upon an external power A contract for 13 million dollars in source, has been developed. As pres· additional development funds has been ently designed the device can be used awarded the prime contractor to con­ as a beacon in airdrop or rescue op­ tinue work on the. Mauler s y s t e m. erations; however, its principles of When it becomes operational it will provide ground units with a self-con­ tained, h i g h I y mobile, air defense weapon capable of delivering accurate fire even while" on the move. It will use solid fuel, radar-guided missiles to destroy short-range enemy tactical missiles and high-performance air­ craft in the forward battle area. The missiles will be packed in lightweight shipping containers which will a Iso serve as launching tubes. The system will be transported on a modified vel's ion of the Army's M 113 vehicle and will be ail; droppable and capable of s w i m min g inland waterways.-News item. compact Heating Unit A lightweight self-contained heat­ ing unit has been developed by the

US Army Engmeer Research and De­ GPL DlIllIlon velopment Laboratories for use in General Prl'C"It""'" }IIt', Hattery-less radio set missile systems. The unit, which is 0.6 meters high, 0.6 meters wide, and 0.9 operation are readily adaptable to use meters long, has a rated capacity of as a small portable voice radio. As a 150,000 B.t.u. per hour and in-ambient beacon the unit will respond only temperatures of minus 65 degrees after being interrogated by a coded Fahrenheit can produce 225,000 B.t.u. pulsed radar signal. As a voice radio per hour. A blowtorch tYPe preheat­ it would operate without interroga· ing device is used at temperatures be­ tion. In either application it w 0 u I d low minus 25 degrees Fahrenheit. At use a self-contained electromechanical minus 65 degrees Fahrenheit only five power source.-News item.

102 Military Review CZECHOSLOVAKIA into a "rn 0 d ern armed force." He Soviet Air Defense Missiles stated that Poland has a modern air Czechoslovakia now has the stand­ force that corresponds to the general ard Soviet air defense missile accord­ level of world technology, He added: ing to a West German source: A recent We also have modern arm 0 red photo shows these weapons, w h i c h equipment, artillery, a strong antiair­ craft defense ready to repuh;e any ag­ gressor from the air and other equip­ ment that meets every requirement of mod ern battlefields. We also have weapons of ultimate modernity-de­ fensive rocket weapons, Photographs displayed at the time of this statement showed w hat ap­ peared to be Soviet-made antiaircraft rockets similar to the United States Nike Ajax.-News item. Soltfut und Tec1ullIt. WEST GERMANY Czech troops with Soviet surface-to-air Bundeswehr To Operate Radars missiles A West German source reports that correspond roughly to the Nike Aja.l' the Bundeswehr will assume control produced in the U nit e d States, on of a large number of radar stations display with the Czech Army.-News now operated by United States forces item, in West Germany. Most of the instal­ lations involved are approach-control Civilian Army Czechoslovakia now has ahout one million members in her "Union for Cooperation With the Army," The union is pledged to fu rther the "com­ bat preparedness of the working peo­ ple and help form . . . traits and knowledge necessary .to build a ma­ ture socialist society." The union is starting paramilitary training for youths under 14 years of age and will promote interest in para­ chute jumping, motor vehicular sports, marksmanship, and amateur radio.­ News item, US Air Forre 'Vest German officers undergoing train .. POLAND ing on US radar equipment Modern Arms For Poland radars at,. airbases use d by NATO The chief of the Political Board of forces and early warning radars pro­ the Pol ish People's Army has an­ tecting the Federal Republic's borders, nounced that the army has developed -News item,

January 1962 103 . . MILITARY NOTES . USSR Multiple Rocket launchers The information from which the during a 1959 mil ita r y parade in following notes have been compiled Moscow. This launcher is mounted on was taken from Dutch and German a GAZ63 truck. Both versions use a sources. They do not represent the solid fuel, spin-stabilized, 140-milli. official United States Army estimate of Soviet artillery rocket capabili­ ties or It'eapons.-Edit01·. The Soviet Army makes extensive use of small tactical rocket weapons to provide artillery support of ground troops. A number of multiple rocket

The 17-tube 140-millimeter launcher meter rocket, 0.91 meters in length and weighing about 120 po u n d s. Thi~ weapon is reported to have an effec· tive range of about nine kilometers. The GAZ6S vehicle has a 70-horse·

The 16-tube B~f-U launcher l launchers were used for this purpose during World War II and several neW or improved weapons systems in thjs category have become available in re­ cent years. Simple artillery rockets are cheaper to build and easier to use than conventional guns or howitzers. However, they are usually less ac­ curate and deliver a less effective charge. BM-20 quadruple launcher The M-IS: This is a World War II system that was standard equipment power gasoline engine which proddes in the Soviet Army until 1954. The a road speed of 65 kilometers per hour rail-type launcher mounts 16 rockets, and an operating range of 420 kIlo· each 132 millimeters in diameter. meters. The BM-14: This weapon is re­ The BM-20: This is a 200-milli· placing the M-IS. It is a 16-tube meter rocket system using a quadruple launcher mounted on a ZlLl51 truck launcher mounted on a ZlLl51 truck chassis. A 17-tube launcher, nine over chassis. This w e a p 0 n was first dis· and eight under, which appears very played in 1954. The roc k e t has a similar> to the BM-H, was observed length of 3.11 meters and a span of

104 Military Review 0.40 meters. It is said to use a TNT 2S0-millimeter rocket: A still larger warhead. The vehicle is credited with system, using a 280-millimeter rocket, a speed of 64 kilometers per hour and has also been observed. This weapon a range of 550 to 600 kilometers. Ef­ can fire six rockets from a launcher fective range is estimated at IS.5 kilo­ mounted on a YaAZ t r u c k. It has meters. relatively long fins and some observers The BM-24: This is a 240-millimeter believe it can be fitted with a nuclear rocket system incorporating a 12-tube' or a chemical warhead.-News item. launcher on a ZlL151 truck chassis. Rail Line Modernization Details of the Soviet Union's pro­ gram to modernize and expand her internal rail system as reported by lzvestiya indicate that considerable progress has been made in recent years. This report states that there are now 14,000 kilometers of electri­ f)ed rail lines in the USSR with an additional 2,000 kilometers to be added 8M-21 on a truck mount this year. The Trans-Siberian line from Mos­ A more recent version first observed cow to Lake Baikal is almost com­ in 1957 is mounted on an A T-S full­ pletely electrified. When this project tracked vehicle. The projectile used in is completed there will be 5,000 kilo­ this weapon is a spin-stabilized rocket meters of electrified line between Mos­ cow and Lake Baikal. Despite these improvements, the rail lines through the Urals are still overburdened and alternate lines are being constructed and electrified. Major electrification projects are also going forward on the Moscow­ Donets Basin line, the Moscow-Lenin­ grad line, and on a number of shorter Th. 240-millimeter launcher on a full­ but strategically important rail net­ tracked vehicle works.-News item. Photos courtesy of Herkenning, New Camera Capability Netherlands The Soviet Union claims to be able 1.20 met e r s long. The tracklaying to produce a camera capable of dis­ chassis weighs 15 tons and has a 210­ tinguishing an object 16 inches in di­ horsepower diesel engine. It has a ameter from a distance of 1,000 miles. speed of 40 kilometers per hour and A camera of this nature would be par­ an operating range of 320 kilometers. ticularly effective employed in an or­ Effective range of the weapon is re­ biting reconnaissance satellite.-News ported as seven kilometers. item.

January 1962 105 MIlITARY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN 'Chieftain' Tank

This is one of the first photographs released on Great Britain's new main battle tank. the Chieftain. This vehicle is lighter. faster. has more power. and affords better crew protection than its predecessor. the Centurion Mark 9. The Chieftain mounts a 120-millimeter cannon. is extremely fast across countr)'. and is equipped to swim water obstacles. Prototypes will be furnished the West German Government for user tests in the near future (MR. Feb 1961. p 106 and Dec 1961. p 100) .-News release. CANADA New Gun·Locating Radar A radar set that can locate enemy enemy's firing position at the pu"h of weapons before their rounds reach the a button. This information is passed ground has been developed for the on to the guns which can fire in reo Canadian Army by the National Re­ taliation within the minute. search Council I NRC) in Ottawa. Completely Canadian in design and Ten production models WIll be ready development. it was demonstrated at for delivery to the Royal Canadian Sennelager. West Germany. to rep· artillery late in 1962 and early 1963. resentatives of NATO countries duro The highly mobile compact u nit. ing the summer of 1960. The equip· called Radar Set AN;MPQ-501. can be ment is said to be superior to any mounted on all current versions of ar­ other radar set of its type. mored carriers used by NATO forces. The AN/MPQ-501 is the result of as well as the Canadian Army's new over 16 years of research and develop· Bobcat. In addition to its ability to ment by the army and NRC scientists. locate enemy mortar. artillery. and The new r a dar set can be put into rocket sites quickly and automatically, action in Jess than five minutes. It is it may be used for surveillance and completely self-contained and com· surveying. bines operating efficiency with a high On picking up a projectile in flight. de g r e e of mobility. reliability. and automatic computer~ pro v ide the protection.-News item.

106 Military Review ARMS REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND ISSUES. RIDE TO WAR. The History of the First New Edited by David H. Frisch. 162 Pages. The Jersey Cavalry. By Henry C, Pyne. 373 Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961. Pages. Rutgers University Press, New Bruns­ $1.25 paperbound. wick, N. J., 1961. $6.00. By LT COL FRANCIS J. KELLY, Armor By LT COL WILLIAM D. BEARD, In! "The fundamental problem of arms The history of the First New Jersey control today," according to this col­ Cavalry, written by its regimental lective report, "is the achievement chaplain, was first published in 1871. and stabilization of a strategic bal­ This edition has been brought up to ance between the Soviet Union and date and corrected by Earl Schenck the United States." Fourteen papers Miers. by social and physical scientists make Many books on Civil War history up this collection. which is the second tell of major battles and leaders. It of three to be published. and which is, however, from books such as this succeeds Strategy and Arms Control that the student of military history by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton learns about the life of the officers H. Halperin. I and men in the regiments. The writers' 'd i ve r sit y of ap­ The author presents in lively de­ proaches, although detracting from tail the many actions in which the cohesiveness, permits the examination "First Jersey" was engaged, and re­ of several technical considerations not lates the heroic deeds of its members. widely discussed elsewhere. Camp life, the fatigue of long rides, The reports deal with the complex and the thrill and terror of the cav­ areas of stabilized deterrence, arms alry charge are vividly rendered. limitations, both conventional and nu­ The First New Jersey Cavalry, or­ clear, control and contingency opera­ ganized in the fall of 1861, partici­ tions, missile production inspection, pated in all major campaigns and cav­ and phased proportional disarmament. alry engagements in Virginia until The authors recognize a factor, often General Lee's surrender at Appomat­ neglected in discussions of arms con­ tox in the spring of 1865. It was de­ trol: that "arms control will not elimi­ feated many times in the early years nate national conflicts; indeed, in some of the war when the Union Cavalry instances, it may lead to their intensi­ was no match for the more experi­ fication." enced and better led Confederate Cav­ The proposal made here calls for alry. As the officers and men gained reduction in nuclear stockpiles and experience, they were able to engage delivery means, limitation on conven­ the Confederate Cavalry on more even tional forces, and strengthening of terms, Finally, in the"latter stages of institutions for preventing or limit­ the war, it was the Union Cavalry ing minor conflicts. which controlled the field.

January 1962 107 • MIlITARY BOOKS

A FORWARD STRATEGY FOR AMERICA. By A realistic and hardheaded approach Robert Stra\Sz.Hupe: William R. Kintner and is taken to the objectives of long tenn Stefan T. Pllssony. With Alvin J. Cottrell, aid programs. The U nit e d States James E. Dougherty, Richard B. Foster, Wal· should help those who help themselves ter F. Hahn, Robert C. Herber, Francis P. and are willing to resist communism. Hoeber, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Dono· The effect upon our policies of senti. van Yeuell, Jr. 451 Pages. Harper & Bros., mental idealism concerning interna. New York, 1961. $5.95. tional politics, the national desire to By MAJ DEBow FREED, Inf be liked more than respected, and "un. due sensitivity to the vagaries' of pub· In Protracted Conflict, written by lic opinion" is lamented. the same authors and published in The authors have written exten· 1959, Communist plans for world dom­ sively on national affairs in recent ination were identified as a conflict to years and are recognized authorities be waged with the West for however in the field. They have included, as an long was necessary to win the strug­ appendix, a selected bibliography on gle. This definitive study of the true material covered in the book. Students nature of the Communist effort also of the Communist challenge, or other detailed many of the techniques used aspects of national affairs, shOUld find by the Communists to achieve their this most helpful. goals. A Forward Strategy for Amer­ ica is a follow-on study to develop a THE COMING TESTS WITH RUSSIA. By Wal· strategy for waging and winning the ter Lippmann. 37 Pages. Little, Brown & Co., protracted conflict. Boston, Mass., 1961. $2.50. The authors define a forward strat­ After the author left the Soviet egy as one which exerts active pres­ Union in April 1961, following a sure against communism. They de­ lengthy interview with Khrushchev, velop a conceptual framework within he 'Yas asked many times whether he which an effective strategy' can func­ was encouraged or depressed by what tion rather than state their ideas as he had heard from the Soviet Premier. to the specifics of this strategy. The His answer was that he was "sobered" nearest approach to a detailed policy by Khrushchev's unrelenting position is in the military field. Their propos­ on the areas of disagreement with the als for all t y pes of forces, without West because, "I do no think there is discriminating between them as to any bluff in it." their relative worth, can be summa­ During the unique eight-hour inter· rized simply as morc. view session, Mr~ Lippmann was able This stUdy presents the challenge to draw out Khrushchev to get his we face as one which calls for greater personal opinions on the great igsues effort in all aspects of our national of the day, This book, with direct and life. It cites this as justification for hard-hitting candor, sets forth the pol· a substantially higher level of mili­ icies of the Soviet Government as seen tary expenditures and then attempts through the eyes of its leader. AI· to prove such a course of action feasi­ though the author offers little in the ble by espousing the theory which way of solutions, his clear statement states that the larger gross national of the problems facing the West is product predicted for the future will well worth the few minutes it will take support a much larger military budget. to read this report.

108 Military Revie. WAR·PATH AND BIVOUAC. By John F. Finerty. always seemed to keep him company." 358 Pages. University of Oklahoma Press, The account is highly readable and Norman, Okla., 1961. $2.00. informative. By W. W. ANDERSON THE DIVIDED UNION. By 1. G. Randall and This reprint of an 1890 volume is David Donald. 572 Pages. little, Brown & a warm, folksy view by a bold, hard­ Co., Boston, Mass., 1961. $6.50. riding newspaperman of the Army's By LT COL WILLIAM N. MARTASIN. campaign against the Sioux Indians in AGe 1876. This is an excellent one-volume his­ John Finerty covered two other In­ tory of the Civil War. Based on J. G. dian campaigns but saw no action in RanaaU's The Civil War and Recon­ either. He was a Congressman, an ed­ struction. published in 1937, it ad­ itor, seven times president of the dresses itself specifically to the Civil United Irish Societies of Chicago, and War years. An annotated bibliography thrice president of the United Irish of Civil War literature is a valuable League of America. part of this book. He has been described as "always thirsty-for liquids and news and he David Donald, a Professor of His­ can hold any quantity of either." His tory at Princeton University, and the letters to the Chicago Times were late J. G. Randall, a former History sharp and clear, naturally somewhat Professor at thEli University of Illinois, tinged by the phraseology of the pe­ are well-known for their numerous riod. publications on Lincoln and the Civil Finerty wrote of the soldier, not War era. Dr. Donald was awarded the himself. He was highly literate and 1961 Pulitzer Prize for his Charles made friends easily--especially among Sumne,. and the Coming of the Civil the cavalry with whom he charged IVa,'. mto battle, in the front ranks, in shirt All facets of the Civil War are ex­ sleeves and calmly smoking his pipe. amined in this comprehensive volume, He had several close calls in des· yet the military campaigns are out­ perate fighting, but he tells of the lined in sufficient detail to give the action of other men-not himself. On reader an understanding of the di­ one occasion his outfit escaped and verse political and economic forces at returned to' camp, ragged, bleeding, work and their effect on military and starving, and in a state of almost total naval operations. Also thoroughly por­ collapse. Summing up his experience trayed are the problems of raising an Finerty said, "I lost my saddle and army and the difficulties of army ad­ bridle. I lost my pipe and blankets, ministration faced by the Union. and I lost my horse. But worst of all An attempt is made to present the i. I lost my toothbrush." viewpoints of the North and South as This is the style and humor he uses well as the historical controversies in recounting his placid and hair-rais­ which have raged about the conflict ing experiences with the Indians. It and its generals. was not his duty to ride into action, The book is well-i.llustrated 'with but a contemporary said he was al­ maps and photographs and should be ways in the midst of it, that "Finerty a welcome addition to the library of was a man of action, and adventure any Civil War scholar.

JaDUlry 1962 109 MILITARY BOOKS I" DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. Toward a Theory This is not an easy book. The com· i of National Security. By Glenn H. Snyder. plexity of the subject, not the author's " 294 Pag~ P r inc e ton University Press, style, is responsible. In fact, Dr. Sny· Princeton, N. J., 19&1. $&.50. del' writes more clearly than most of By COL ANTHONY L. WERMUTH, Inf his colleagues. Now an Associate Professor of In­ In view of the international mind· - ternational Relations at the Univer­ reading that necessarily accompanies: sity of Denver. Dr. Snyder is one of national moves over current crises. " a series of brilliant scholars who have Deterrence and Defense could not be investigated problems of security, more timely. while serving"as a Research Associate THE MILITARY STAFF. Its History and D~ at Princeton's Center of International velopment. A Revised Edition. By Brigadier Studies. It is a deadly serious SUbject, General James D. Hittle, United States M. infinitely complex, requiring diligent rine Corps, Retired. 326 Pages. MililaFJ application to unravel and understand. Service Division. The Stackpole Co., Har· I n advancing a theory of national risburg, Pa., 1961. $5.50. security in this book, he has under­ By MAJ ROBERT C. BURGESS, Arty taken to support his contention that "the central theoretical problem in the This new third edition of a classic field {)f national security policy is to in its field, first published in 1944, has clarify and distinguish between the been revised extensively to include re­ two central concepts of deterrence and cent developments in military staff defense." His support is sound, rea­ organization and procedures as prac· sonable, and persuasive. ticed in many nations throughout the In the process, he makes many sound world. The updating of its context and useful distinctions between the serves to make more valuable a basic confusing concepts, such as between reference used by many universities den i a I and punishment, strategic an.d service schools in appropriate value and deterrent value, intrinsic courses. value and power value, balance of ter­ Those wishing a detailed discussion ror and balance of power, the requ ire­ of current staff operation in Germany. ments approach and the limited-econ­ France, Great Britain, the United omy approach, and (certainly not States, and the Soviet Union will not least) balance of intentions and bal­ find it in this book. For an excellent ance of capabilities. comparative analysis of the history Readily acknowledging the earlier and development of the staffs of these work in analysis of strategic equations nations in one package, however, the performed by William Kaufmann, Ber­ work stands without peer. nard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Robert General Hittle traces the origins of Osgood, and many others, Dr. Snyder military staffs from the days of the has provided a highly sophisticated ancients to the present, and constantly analysis which largely supports the stresses the mutual contributions of "flexible response" program advocated the leaders in staff development. The by General Maxwell D. Taylor and significance of major innovations by others who have seriously questioned such great captains as Gustavus Adol· overweening dependence upon a policy phus. Washington, Moltke, and Na· of mas~ive retaliation. poleon is stressed throughout.

110 Military RevieW THE ROAD PAST MANDALAY. By John Mas­ On the affirmative side, the proper ters. 341 Pages. Harper & Bros., New York. recognition of the responsibilities of $5.00. command, the importance of morale, By COL ERVAN F. KUSHNER, USAR the value of tradition, and the un­ wavering will to win were all essential There have been several good books elements contributing to the ultimate written in recent years of the frus­ victory. They are delineated clearly trations and formidable difficulties and objectively. In this respect, the which faced the Allies in Burma. The book is superb. campaigns there against the Japanese were war at its worst. John Masters THE SAND CREEK MASSACRE. By Stan Hoig. tells in a dramatic manner of his per­ 217 Pages. University of Oklahoma Press, sonal participation in the largest land Norman, Okla., 1961. $4.00. action undertaken against the Nip­ By LT COL ROBERT G. MATTE, Inl . ponese in World War II. Formerly a career officer in the The u n hap p y treatment of the British Indian Army, Brigadier Mas­ American Indian during the westward ~ ters now resides in the United States. expansion of our Nation is seldom " This is the second volume of his treated objectively. The merit of au­ - autobiography, and as he t r a vel s thor Hoig's interesting account of one along ancient routes of approach to of the less attractive periods in our Burma by way of Syria, Iraq, Iran, history lies in his analytical approach and India on the wearisome and vio­ to a difficult subject. His book is foot­ ; lent road to Mandalay, there are pas­ noted and documented to an extent sages of descriptive writing· faintly that should satisfy the most critical reminiscent of Colonel T. E. Law­ scholar of the era. and is obviously rence's The Seven Pillars 01 Wisdom. the product of considerable research. The terrible aspects of the jungle The author depicts the Colorado warfare wag e d in Burma are mi­ Territory during the Civil War as far nutely and vividly described; yet one enough removed from major areas of cannot help but feel that this is now conflict to warrant scant attention a more than twice-told story. from Washington. The Rebellion was To the active military man who the problem, and in many cases the reads at his leisure in order to broaden governing of a vast area of the coun­ his tactical and strategical horizons, try was left to incompetent political The Road Past Mandalay will not appointees and frustrated. ambitious have too much to offer. The author Volunteer officers. Trouble with the candidly admits that the book was not normally peaceful Cheyenne. Arap­ designed for professional use. aho. Comanche. Kiowa. and 0 the r Recollections of a short cram-course tribes was deliberately generated, ap­ at the Staff College at Quetta in Ba­ parently motivated by political ambi­ luchistan are of interest and there are tions and a desire for recognition in many entertaining anecdotes of army a period of national tragedy. garrison life related with typically Author Hoig's boo k does not fit British humor. readily into any of tile usual catego­ The author attempts a brief word ries of military reference material. It picture of General Stilwell and arrives is more than a history of a critical at very unfortunate conclusions. period and less than a tactical treatise.

Il!Ulry 1962 111 MILITARY REVIEW ANNUAL AWARDS

The purpose of the annual award is to stimulate effective expression of military thought among members of the military profession. Articles published in the MILITARY.REVIEW which are written by members of the United Ststes military services on active duty are eligible for the awards. Annual awards have been given each year since 1953. The award year runs from November through the following October. Two annual awards, $250 for first place and $100 for second place, are being given for the first time this year.

Award winners are determined by a judging committee of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College staff and faculty. Selection is based upon ac· curacy, authoritativeness, completeness, originality, readability and reader ap· peal, soundness, substance, and over-all merit of the articles.

HONORABLE MENTION Articles receiving honorable mention in the 1961 competition are:

"If You Don't Like the Mess," November 1960 Col Lynn D. Smith, Int

"Alaska-Gibraltar of the North," February 1961 Col Willard Pearsoll, Illf

"A Soviet View of America," April 1961 Maj Jane G. Brig/a, WAC

"Weather and the Normandy Invasion," June 1961 Capt Philip M. Flammer, USAF

"What to Expect From a Communist Prisoner," July 1961 Maj Carl M. Cuelzo, TC

"Viva Villa!" August 1961 Maj Robert K. Sawyer, Arty

112 Military Reylew US Army 1961 AWARD WINNERS Ma Hlr Carl M. Guelzo. center, received first place award ($250) for his ar­ ticle, "The Communist Long War," published in December 1960. Lieutenant Cnlond David M. Ramsey, Jr.• left, received second place award ($100) for his ":\!anagement or Command?" in the September 1961 issue. Major Gen­ K. Johnson,. Commandant, U. S. Army Command and General Staff presented the awards. •Ua;nl· Carl M. Guelzo, Trausportation Corps, is a graduate of the Univer­ of Pennsylvania and the U. S. Army Language School, where he studied KOi can language. He received his Master's degree in transportation from Ull\ycrsity of Tennessee. He served with the 3d Infantry Division during Korean War and later with the Armistice Affairs Division, United Nations Korea. He is now a member of the 1961-62 Regular Course at the . S. Arm~- Command and General Staff College. Li, "tenant Colonel Dadd M. Ralllsey, Jr., Artillery, a 1938 graduate of ,'ania State University, received his Master's degree in industrial man­ from Georgia Institute of Technology in 1953. He served in Europe World War II with the 76th Infantry Division, and in .Korea in 1951 the 9th Corps Artillery. He has held a military government assignment is " graduate of the Army Management School. He is a member of the fac­ at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. I .. I···~·~...