'EVER DIFFERENTIATED UNION': PARTICIPATION of THIRD STATES in the COMMON SECURITY and DEFENCE POLICY ERENCAN TEZCAN Msc FREE

‘EVER DIFFERENTIATED UNION’: PARTICIPATION OF THIRD STATES IN THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

ERENCAN TEZCAN

MSc FREE UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM 2019

Bursiyer ve Programa Ait Bilgi Formu

Adı-Soyadı Erencan Tezcan

Sözleşme No. TR2016/DG/04/A1-01/0273

Başvuru Yaptığı Sektör Kamu (Kamu-Üniversite-Özel Sektör)

Başvuru Esnasında Bağlı Bulunulan Kurum AB Başkanlığı

Başvuru Esnasında Bağlı Bulunulan AB İşleri Uzmanı Kurumdaki Unvan

Çalışma Alanı (AB Müktesebat Başlığı) Fasıl 31: Dış, Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası

Öğrenim Görülen Ülke Hollanda

Öğrenim Görülen Şehir Amsterdam

Programın Öğretim Dili İngilizce

Üniversite Özgür Amsterdam Üniversitesi

Fakülte Sosyal Bilimler

Bölüm Siyaset Bilimi

Program Adı Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Ulusaşırı Yönetişim

Programın Başlangıç/Bitiş Tarihleri (PDS 01/09/2018 – 01/09/2019 belgesindeki tarihler)

Öğrenim Süresi (ay) 12 ay

“Daha Farklılaşmış Birlik”: Üçüncü Devletlerin Ortak Tez/Araştırma Çalışmasının Başlığı Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasına Katılımı

Danışmanının Adı/Soyadı Dr. Özlem Terzi

Danışmanının E-posta Adres/leri [email protected]

Scholar and Program Information Form

Name/Surname Erencan Tezcan

Contract No. TR2016/DG/04/A1-01/0273

Sector as of the Application Date Public (Public Sector-University-Private Sector)

Institution as of the Application Date Directorate for EU Affairs

Title as of the Application Date EU Expert

Field of Study (i.e. EU Acquis Chapter) Chapter 31: Foreign, Security and Defence Policy

Country of Host Institution The Netherlands

City of Host Institution Amsterdam

Language of the Programme English

Host Institution Vrije University

Faculty Social Science

Department Political Science

International Relations and Transnational Name of the Programme Governance Start/End Dates of the Programme (as in the 01/09/2018 – 01/09/2019 PDS)

Duration of the Programme (months) 12 months

‘Ever Differentiated Union’: Participation of Title of the Dissertation/ Research Study Third States in the Common Security and Defence Policy

Name of the Advisor Dr. Özlem Terzi

E-mail/s of the Advisor [email protected]

iii

THESIS/RESEARCH REPORT APPROVAL PAGE

I have examined the dissertation/research report entitled

[‘Ever Differentiated Union’: Participation of Third States in

the Common Security and Defence Policy]

presented by

[Erencan TEZCAN]

and hereby certify that it is worthy of acceptance.

../../20..

[Dr. Özlem TERZİ]

[Signature]

[VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT]

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ...... 1

Abbreviations ...... 2

Özet ...... 3

Introduction ...... 5

1. A Part of European Security, But not a Part of CSDP? ...... 9

1.1. A Brief History of Third States’ in European Security and Legal Possibilities .....9

1.2. Same Question, Different Answers ...... 11

2. Tools in the Box: Differentiation, Externalization and the CSDP ...... 16

2.1. Historical Evolution and Recent Discussions about Differentiated Integration ... 17

2.2. Differentiated Integration as a Theoretical Frame ...... 18

3. Concepts, Method and Sources ...... 22

3.1. Key Concepts and Operationalizations into Variables...... 22

3.2. Process Tracing ...... 24

3.3. Data Sources and Case Selection ...... 26

4. Participation of Non-EU European States in the CSDP ...... 28

4.1. Norway and the CSDP ...... 28

4.2. Iceland and the CSDP ...... 35

4.3. Turkey and the CSDP...... 40

4.4. Comparative Analysis of the Cases ...... 47

Conclusion ...... 49

Reference List ...... 53

Abbreviations

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

EDA European Defence Agency

EDF European Defence Fund

EEA European Economic Area

EEC European Economic Community

EFTA European Free Trade Area

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

EU European Union

FPA Framework Participation Agreement

ICRU Icelandic Crisis Response Unit

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PADR Preparatory Action on Defence Research

PfP Partnership for Peace

PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation

PSC Political and Security Committee

UK United Kingdom

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA United States of America

WEU Western European Union

Özet

Avrupa Birliği, iç ve dış boyutlarıyla birçok alan ve sektörde “farklılaşmış” bir siyasal varlık olarak kurumsallaşmıştır. Avrupa Birliği’nde yakın dönemde yaşanan siyasal gelişmeler, farklılaşmanın hızını da arttırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası, iç ve dış farklılaşmanın iyi bir örneğidir. Zira bir üye devlet olan Danimarka politikaya dahil olmamayı tercih ederken, üye olmayan bazı ülkeler güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki bütünleşmenin bazı veçhelerine katılım sağlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada, temel amaç, üçüncü ülkelerin güvenlik ve savunma alanlarındaki bütünleşme sürecine katılımlarını kolaylaştıran ya da engelleyen faktör ve koşulları anlamak ve açıklamaktır. Bu amaçla, farklılaştırılmış bütünleşme kuramının temel varsayımları araştırma sorunsalını çözebilmek için kullanılacaktır. Ayrıca, Norveç, İzlanda ve Türkiye analizi gerçekleştirmek için örnek olarak seçilmiştir. Genel olarak, bu tezde karşılıklı bağımlılık ve siyasallaşmanın, üçüncü ülkelerin güvenlik ve savunma bütünleşmesine katılım düzeylerinin belirlenmesindeki önemlerinin altını çizmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Farklılaştırılmış Bütünleşme, Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası, Üçüncü Ülkeler, Norveç, İzlanda, Türkiye

Abstract

Contemporary European integration has been institutionalized as a differentiated political entity with internal and external dimensions. Recent political developments in the European Union have accelerated the pace of differentiation. In this context, the Common Security and Defence Policy is a solid example of external and internal differentiation. For instance, while Denmark as a member opted out from the policy, there are some non- member states which aim to participate in the different aspects of the security and defence integration. In this study, the main aim is to understand and explain the factors and conditions facilitating or impeding third states’ participation in integration in the security and defence field. To this end, the main assumptions of the differentiated integration theory is used to solve the research puzzle. Moreover, Norway, Iceland and Turkey are selected as case studies to conduct the analysis. Overall, this thesis aims to underline the importance of the interplay between interdependence and politicization on defining the level of third states’ participation in the security and defence integration.

Keywords: European Union, Differentiated Integration, Common Security and Defence Policy, Third States, Norway, Iceland, Turkey

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has successfully institutionalized in plenty of fields and sectors, however it is not free from differentiation. On the contrary, today, it is possible to mention multiple varieties of integration. For instance, there are 19 member states which share the common currency, while 9 member states are not in the eurozone. Similarly, most of the member states have agreed for integration in the security and defence field, yet, Denmark decided to remain outside of the integration in this field.

Moreover, along with the internal differentiation of integration, there is also an external dimension. Some non-EU states like Norway tend to be part of the integration while not becoming member state. More concretely, Norway implements the 75% of the acquis communautaire without being a member of the Union (Leruth & Lord, 2015, p. 756). Thus, it is fair to admit that contemporary European integration is institutionalized as a highly differentiated political entity with internal and external dimensions.

Recent developments in the European integration further increase the degree of differentiation both internally and externally. The most important factor accelerating the trend of differentiation is the Eurozone crisis and the measures taken in order to confront it (Leruth & Lord, 2015, p. 756). The member states sharing the same currency further integrated their fiscal, economic and monetary policies (Leruth & Lord, 2015, p. 756). Moreover, another notable development in this context is the inception of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) which allows like-minded member states to move further in security and defence integration (Aydın Düzgit & Marrone, 2018, p. 5).

In this thesis, the main aim is to shed light on the external dimension of the differentiation in the security and defence integration. To this end, the main research question is that what factors and conditions do facilitate or impede third-country’s involvement in integration in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Indeed, scrutinizing the

5 factors and conditions which allows or impedes the third states’ participation in the CSDP is significant for both political and academic reasons.

To begin with political aspects, at the time of the writing this study, the future of the United Kingdom (UK) in the EU is not clear, and the withdrawal has been postponed. Though the debate on the future of relations between the UK and the EU mainly revolve around the issues related to economic and trade matters, the future of the cooperation in the security and defence field is an important aspect of it (Bakker, Drent & Zandee, 2017, p. 10). The UK is one of the strongest military force in the EU and is also at the central position in the context of the transatlantic security and defence relations. Moreover, the UK is the key member state within the scope of security and defence integration. Thus, the modality of the UK’s involvement as a third state to the CSDP is highly important.

Secondly, the European political leaders define the security and defence integration as a key priority especially after the Juncker Commission. As a result, series of reforms and integrations have been initiated including the PESCO and the European Defence Fund (EDF). These reforms mainly aim to strengthen the EU as a security and defence actor. Yet, further integration in these fields comes with a question on the role of third states in this context. Since St. Malo Declaration in 1998 which marks the initiation of the CSDP, the EU has cooperated with the third states in security and defence issues. As noted, this question has regained its popularity especially after the Brexit referendum in 2016. Yet apart from the UK, countries such as Norway, Turkey and Iceland, which are not members of the EU but are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), will continue to be a part of the Europe`s security. It will not be wise to admit that the EU will operationalize its integration without considering the involvement of these countries. Moreover, these countries have actively provided necessary cooperation with the EU in these areas in the last two decades. Hence modalities of their involvement need to be re- considered within the evolving European security structure.

Academically, the question is also relevant. The involvement of the UK to the CSDP is also popular among scholars, representatives of think-tanks and strategists. But, beyond the case of the UK, the unresolved problems on the relations between the NATO and the EU attracts the interest of the scholars especially in the case of Turkey. Besides, the rising tension in the transatlantic security and defence relations is an accelerating factor of the intensification in the academic works. Thus, security and defence cooperation with third countries attracts attention of scholars too. Yet, as will be shown in the section dedicated to the literature on the issue, focus of scholars is mainly towards the involvement of the UK after the Brexit process. However, in this study, main aim is to draw a common theoretical frame, which establishes generalizable causal mechanisms for third states’ participation in the CSDP.

This study, with its theoretical underpinnings, is also highly relevant in a wider context of the EU studies. Throughout this thesis, the main assumptions and the concepts of the differentiated integration theory will be used. As noted by Dyson and Sepos (2010, p. 20) existing grand theories of integration such as neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and constructivism, cannot explain the disintegrative tendencies and thus, any attempt to understand and explain differentiation in the European integration is also an attempt to further develop new theoretical approaches in the EU studies. Besides, external dimension of differentiated integration theory provides an integrationist framework for the non-EU states participation.

To resolve the puzzle, this thesis is structured as follows. The next section is dedicated to the comprehensive literature review on the third states’ involvement in the CSDP. The main aim of this section is to define the key themes in the discussion among scholars and to detect the gaps which will be filled by this study. Very briefly, it will be noted that most of the literature focuses on the individual cases of non-EU states and that there is a lack of a holistic frame on the puzzle of the thesis. Besides, it will also be underlined that the magnitude of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is the main reason why most of the academic works focuses on the question of the UK’s participation in the CSDP.

In the following section, theoretical framework of the thesis will be drawn up. In a nutshell, this study will be conducted through the lens of differentiated integration theory with an emphasis on external dimension. There will be three hypotheses in this thesis to detect the factors that result in the promotion or the impediment of third parties to participate in the CSDP integration.

The theoretical framework will be followed by the research design in which the methodological aspects of this study will be revealed. To answer the question of thesis, three non-EU states are selected as case studies. These are Turkey, Norway and Iceland. There are various reasons for selecting these countries as case studies. Firstly, all of them are members of the NATO and the question of their involvement in the European security and defence policies is older than the CSDP. Moreover, their degree of participation in the CSDP is divergent. While Norway participates in nearly all aspects of the CSDP, the involvements of Iceland and Turkey are rather limited. Hence, scrutinizing and comparing their individual cases will help to understand the factors and conditions affecting the involvement of third states. Methodologically, in this thesis, theory testing variant of process tracing method will be used. This method allows researchers to trace the operation of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation (Checkel, 2014, p. 116).

After the research design, the empirical analysis of the study will be conducted. In this section, three selected cases will be under scope. Each case will help to test a hypothesis developed in the theoretical framework section. Moreover, in the end of this section, the cases will be compared.

In the end of the study, there will be a concluding section in which the primary argument of the thesis on the research question will be underlined. In addition, the merits and limits of differentiated integration will be exposed and lastly future avenues for further research will be noted.

1. A Part of European Security, But not a Part of CSDP?

The issue of third states’ participation in the European security and defence integration is not a new phenomenon. Interestingly, it is older than the inception of the CSDP (Webber et al., 2002, p. 77). In this section, the main aim is to provide a comprehensive list of literature on the issue. Yet before doing so, in order to frame the issue concretely, firstly, there will be a brief sub-section dedicated to the historical evolution of the issue and existing different options and modalities in the EU for the participation of the third states in the CSDP. After this historical and legal perspective, a comprehensive list of the literature will be followed.

1.1. A Brief History of Third States’ in European Security and Legal Possibilities

Following the enactment of Petersberg Declaration in 1992, three special categories of membership in the Western European Union (WEU) were created, namely the observer category for the member states of the EU not preferring joining the WEU such as Ireland and Denmark, the associate member for non-EU countries like Turkey, Iceland and Norway and lastly a forum of consultation for former communist states of eastern Europe (Webber et.al, 2002, p. 77). Hence, the non-EU countries were able to participate in the institutional framework of the European defence in early 1990s. However, following the monumental call for a genuine European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the St. Malo Declaration, nonEU countries lost their ground to participate in the security and defence integration in the EU as an associate member.

For the time being, there is not a comprehensive and systematic framework which ensure the participation of third countries in the CSDP (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 19). Actual possibilities for third parties are not inter-coordinated and mostly are eclectic in their nature (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 19). To map the legal structure roughly, it is possible to group the involvement of third parties to the CSDP under three headings: participation in the CSDP missions and operations including Battlegroups, engagement

9 to capability development and lastly contributing to defence research (Bakker et al., 2017, pp. 11-12).

Regarding the CSDP missions and operations, it is possible to ensure participation of any third countries through a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA). According to the report published by the European Parliament, so far, 18 FPAs have been signed by the EU and the third countries (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 19). However, many third countries which have singed the FPA do have dissatisfaction with the conditions of participation because all the FPAs prevent meaningful involvement in the decision- making and strategic management (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 19). On the other hand, any third country, without signing an FPA with the EU, may participate military and civilian operations of CSDP in ad hoc basis too (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 19). Switzerland, in this context, is the best example for ad hoc cooperation between a third country and the EU (Koenig, 2016).

Along with the civilian and military CSDP missions, Battlegroups constitute another important aspect for the participation of non-EU states. So far, Turkey, Norway, Ukraine, Macedonia and Serbia have participated in the various Battlegroups of the EU (Koenig, 2019, p. 3).

Apart from cooperation in the field, capability development is an important aspect of the CSDP. The European Defence Agency (EDA) is an important institution in this context. Third countries may contribute by signing an administrative arrangement with the EDA and so far, Norway, Switzerland, Serbia and Ukraine have preferred to do so (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 20). Yet, the scope of the cooperation, unsurprisingly, does not reach to the decision-making mechanism, and consists of only specific projects and programmes (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 20).

The last channel allowing participation of third countries in the CSDP is the realm of defence research. Recent developments like the EDF, and the PESCO are significant components of industrial initiatives in defence research field (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 20). In the context of the EDF, the members of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA) may participate in the EDF as associated members and the other third country companies can exceptionally be eligible to funding (European Commission, 2019a). With regard to the PESCO, third states may involve in the projects upon the invitation of member states and do not have any decision-making rights (Aydın Düzgit & Marrone, 2018, p. 5).

After having categorized the possible avenues for third states’ participation in the CSDP, it must be underlined that the issue is also at the agenda of the EU institutions. According to Thierry Tardy (2014), in 2013, in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is a permanent committee of the Council of the EU dealing with foreign, security and defence issues, a series of recommendations on the CSDP cooperation with possible third countries have been listed. More recently, in the Foreign Affairs Council dated 6 March 2018, the issue was brought to the agenda yet there were no proposals agreed for third states’ participation, rather the member states preferred to continue to implement existing modalities based on FPAs (Santopinto & Villafranca, 2018, p. 19).

1.2. Same Question, Different Answers

After having illustrated the existing legal structure through which third states may participate in the CSDP, this thesis may continue to expose a comprehensive list of literature on the issue in order to build a sound theoretical framework in the following section. Before examining divergent perspectives on the issue, it must be underlined that the volume of the academic works is directly related with the pace of integration in the security and defence fields.

The academic literature on the CSDP has intensified after the Brexit referendum. There are two important reasons for this. Firstly, the European integration has just gained tremendous pace after the referendum (Martill & Sus, 2018, p. 851). The PESCO and the EDF are most notable integrative steps in the field. Secondly, though at the time of writing, the process of withdrawal has not been completed yet, the Brexit referendum symbolizes the withdrawal of one of the most important member state from the European integration in the security and defence field. As noted by Martill and Sus (2018, p. 848), apart from France, the UK is the only member state that has the ability to deploy full- spectrum military capabilities, and that has a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Moreover, the diplomatic networks including the special relationship with the United States of America (USA) is also an important key factor for the CSDP. Thus, Brexit accelerated the pace of academic volumes in the CSDP related fields.

Roughly, the recent literature on the CSDP can be divided into three groups. The first group deals with the recent reforms and integrative steps (e.g. Tardy, 2018a: Biscop, 2018a). The second group consists of academic pieces scrutinizing the transatlantic security and defence relations in the context of the NATO-EU relations (e.g. Howorth, 2018: Smith & Gebhard, 2017). The last bunch of the academic works focuses on the future of the EU-UK security and defence relations (e.g. Whitman, 2016: Duke, 2018: Biscop, 2018b).

Indeed, when examined closely, all of this evolving literature grasps the different components of the main puzzle of this study. For instance, new integrative steps in the CSDP like inception of the PESCO and the EDF come with the question of third states’ participation in these initiatives. Secondly, non-EU countries like Turkey, Norway and Iceland are members of the NATO and their participation in the CSDP was always an important matter for the transatlantic relations. Lastly, the future of UK-EU relations is directly related to modalities of third states’ participation in the CSDP.

As noted in the previous subsection, in the Clingendael Report, three different options for third states participation are listed (Bakker et al., 2017, p. 11). After having listed these options, in the report it has been noted that the main impediment which hinders participation is the legal structure which does not allow third states to join the decision- making process of the EU in the CSDP (Bakker et al., 2017, pp. 12-13).

Similarly, in an article dealing with the question of possible roles for the UK after the completion of Brexit process, Howorth (2017, p. 197) argues that existing political- institutional framework needs to be revised to “maximize the involvement of the UK in the CSDP - if necessary through some form of associate membership of the PSC”. Further, he underlines (2017, p. 197) that the new political-institutional framework is to be widened to involve countries like Turkey and Norway.

Apart from legal constraints, political conflicts between a member state and non-EU state have the potential to hinder the cooperation between the EU and non-EU state in question. In their study dealing with the relations between the NATO, the EU and Turkey, Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou (2012, p. 556) underline that enduring unresolved “Cyprus problem” is the major impediment for Turkey’s integration to the CSDP framework.

Pernille Rieker (2012, p. 5), through a liberal peace theory and complex interdependence perspective, conceptualizes the European integration as a peace project. Then she argues (2012, p. 7) that three factors determines the level of external differentiation between the EU and non-EU state, namely the scope of the association agreements, the level of participation in EU policies and the level of adaptation to EU rules, norms and values (Rieker, 2012, p. 6). Indeed, Rieker has not specifically focused on the CSDP in her study, rather investigates broader realm of European integration.

In a study which aims to scrutinize the role of Norway in the changing CSDP, Hillion (2019, p. 26), with an institutionalist stance, notes that to shed light on the possible

13 avenues for Norway’s participation in new CSDP initiatives, there is a need for taking into “consideration precedent of enhanced cooperation in other areas too, e.g. EEA and Schengen”. Hence, this can be interpreted that existing institutional ties and relations with third states is an important factor determining the degree and the modality of their participation in the CSDP.

Taking the participation of the UK in the CSDP as a focus, Turpin (2019) investigates the issue through neoclassical realist perspective. In a nutshell, unlike mainstream realist understanding, “the neoclassical realists suggest that systemic pressures must be processed through the domestic policy apparatuses in which the business of foreign policy making is conducted” (Turpin, 2019, p. 5). In this line, Turpin (2019) argues that there is an interplay between the systemic pressure for further cooperation with third countries in the CSDP and divergent domestic preferences of parties.

In an article dealing with the future role of the UK in the CSDP, with the assumptions of disintegration and differentiated integration theory, Martill and Sus (2018, p. 853) point to three elements determining the future of the relationship between the Union and the Kingdom. These elements are the overlap of interests between the continental capitals and London, the effects of the new reforms in the CSDP and lastly the divergence of opinions among the member states and the politics of granting the UK a substantial role after Brexit (Martill & Sus, 2018, p. 853).

Apart from academics, there is an increasing pace of the studies conducted by the think tanks on the CSDP. Before investigating some of prominent studies, it must be underlined that these works often lacks theoretical frame and rather, are prone to policy briefs. In this context, Thierry Tardy is one of the leading figures who studies the CSDP in general and the third states involvement, in particular. According to Tardy, the partnership between third states and the EU is limited in scope and produces not much visibility (Tardy, 2014, p. 1). In his perspective, the involvement of third states to CSDP operations and missions has pros and cons at the same time (Tardy, 2014, p. 1). Yet, partnership in

14 security and defence has not been never a high priority for the EU and the existing mechanism is ill-suited to the existing pace in the security and defence integration (Tardy, 2018b, p. 2). By investigating the possible involvement of the UK to CSDP, Tardy argues that the future of their participation is problematic because of general political strategy of the UK regarding the CSDP in the last decade, the immature state of play in the EU’s security and defence reforms and lastly domestic pressures in the UK (Tardy, 2018b, p. 3).

Similarly, Aydın Düzgit and Marrone (2018) scrutinize the participation of third states in the PESCO. In the case of the PESCO, they claim that any future development of the mechanism is depending “whether and how it will be related to bilateral and mini-lateral cooperation between European countries” (Aydın Düzgit & Marrone, 2018, p. 3). Düzgit and Marrone (2018, p. 5) argue that cooperation between EU and third states is overlooked in the present PESCO arrangements. Besides, by taking Turkey as a case, Aydin Düzgit and Marrone (2018, pp. 5-6) list the main constraints for third party involvement in the PESCO as the existence of unresolved political and military problems between an EU member and participating third state (Aydın Düzgit and Marrone, 2018, p. 6).

Lastly, in a policy brief on the relations between the EU and Norway, Svendsen (2018) emphasizes that third states suffer from their position as “decision taker”. Besides, the recent European initiatives are not mature enough for third states participation and thus, it would be wise for Norway to stay cautious before actively participating in the new initiatives (Svendsen, 2018).

To sum up, when examined closely, it is fair to underline that third states’ participation in the CSDP is a popular subject among scholars and strategist. However, there are gaps to be filled. First of all, the literature reviewed shows that the individual cases of countries attract more attentions of researchers. Besides, owing to the magnitude of the UK in the security and defence fields, the recent literature mainly deals with the effects of the Brexit

15 referendum. Thirdly, the evolving structure of the CSDP goes beyond the existing legal structure which was firstly institutionalized in early 2000s based on the FPAs. However, to my judgment, theoretical causal mechanisms which can be generalized for the participation of any third states to all aspects of the CSDP including missions/operations, capability building and defence research will enhance the existing literature. Lastly, the issue of participation in the CSDP needs to be evaluated in wider universe of the European integration. Existing literature lack the necessary connection with the integrationist perspective. In the following section, the main aim is to develop such mechanisms which has the roots in the integration theories and aims to explain the issue in generalizable terms.

2. Tools in the Box: Differentiation, Externalization and the CSDP

In this thesis, as noted in the introduction, differentiated integration theory will be used to solve the puzzle. Yet, unsurprisingly, differentiated integration is a contested term (Leruth & Lord, 2015, p. 758). It can be used as a concept, theory, process and as a system at the same time (Leruth & Lord, 2015). All these different dimensions are closely linked to each other. For instance, Dyson and Sepos (2010, p. 3) define the differentiated integration as an instrument for addressing long-lasting political problem of inaction.

In this thesis, differentiated integration theory with its external dimension will be used to reveal casual mechanisms which determine the participation of non-EU European states in the CSDP. To do so, firstly historical evolution and contemporary discussions of differentiated integration will be narrated. Secondly, there will be a subsection dedicated to the differentiated integration as a theoretical perspective in which three hypotheses will be developed in order to reveal the causal mechanisms for the participation of third states in the CSDP.

2.1. Historical Evolution and Recent Discussions about Differentiated Integration

Differentiated integration, in its systemic meaning, was not always constant in the European integration. The concept of the differentiated integration, according to Leruth and Lord (2015, p. 755), firstly appeared in a report on the future of Europe prepared by Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans. In the context of the EU law, on the other hand, the notion was brought to the agenda for the first time right after the Single European Act (Leruth & Lord, 2015, p. 755). The integration before the Maastricht Treaty “approximated a single institutional order more closely than the post-1992 EU” (Leruth & Lord, 2015, p. 755). Today, existing sectors of integration provide necessary justification for differentiated integration. Economic and monetary union, Schengen agreement, social aspect of the Union and the CSDP represents clear examples of differentiated modalities of integration (Dyson & Sepos, 2010, p. 3). Moreover, there are multiple verbal variations to refer differentiated integration in the literature, like enhanced cooperation, flexibility, core Europe and à la carte Europe (Dyson & Sepos, 2010, p. 4).

Differentiated integration increases in line with the deepening stages of the integration. The grand theories of European integration mainly focus on these deepening stages and try to understand them. At the same time, the political decisions of some member states like opting out from a policy field or non-EU states’ decision to implement EU acquis in a certain field were neglected by these grand theories and conceived as temporal sideeffects of deepening (Schimmelfenning, Leuffen & Ritterberger, 2015, p. 765). Hence, theory of differentiated integration has the potential to fill this long-neglected gap in the EU studies.

At the time of writing this thesis, the Union is experiencing a reflection process. There are several suggestions and proposals coming from the EU institutions, politicians and scholars for the future of the integration. Central key theme of new future projections and scenarios is their reference to differentiated integration (Fabbrini & Schmidt, 2019, p. 173). For instance, President Emmanuel Macron (2017) on his historical speech in the

University of Sorbonne underlines that a core Europe would be the center of the integration. Similarly, the European Commission (2017a) has published the White Paper on the Future of the Europe. In this monumental document, five scenarios have been projected for the future of the integration and differentiated integration is one of the main themes. In the academic and philosophical side of the coin, for example, one of the most influential European philosophers of contemporary times, Jürgen Habermas (2016) emphasizes that in the existing cacophony of 28 member states, it is not possible to move further, and a core Europe must be saved first.

2.2. Differentiated Integration as a Theoretical Frame

After having summarized historical evolution of differentiated integration and contemporary discussions, it is time to move on to the theoretical aspects. Leuffen, Ritterberger and Schimmelfenning (2013, p. 1) underlines that “the EU as a system of differentiated integration is an indispensable key to understanding its nature” and also define “three dimensions to understand the EU adequately: the level of centralization, the functional scope, and the territorial extension”. On the other hand, differentiation does not mean the plurality of polities, vice versa the system of differentiated integration in the EU context can be defined as “organizational and member state core but with a level of centralization and territorial extension that vary by function” (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 11). Leuffen et al. (2013, p. 12) make a categoric distinction of integration, namely vertical and horizontal integration. While the former “refers to the centralization of EU decision- making in different policy areas”, the latter addresses “the territorial extension of the EU’s jurisdiction in each policy area” (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 12). The concept of horizontal integration is a suitable tool for the puzzle of the thesis since “it is also open to the possibility that non-EU member state adopt EU rules” (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 15).

At this point, another important distinction comes to fore, which is internal horizontal differentiation and external horizontal differentiation. The external differentiation can be defined as a case where “EU rules apply uniformly to all member states but outsiders also

18 adopt these rules”, such as enactment and implementation of the acquis communautaire in the free movement of goods and services by the EEA countries like Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 17). The internal differentiation is a case where some member states of the EU opt-out from certain policies. The Eurozone, a political project from its start, consists of only 19 out of 28 member states and is an example of internal differentiation (Schimmelfenning, 2019, p. 177).

Apart from this distinction between internal and external differentiation, there is also a grey zone where some member states opt-out from certain policies, but some non-EU states opt-in, just like in the Schengen regime (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 17). In the context of the thesis, this last option is a perfect match, since Denmark as a member state opts out from the CSDP while some non-EU states try to be part of it.

Though the externalization of the acquis is a widely accepted phenomenon, yet third states’ involvement to the Union’s political and institutional environment is a hardly studied issue (Lavanex, 2015, p. 836). In legal terms, it is not possible to involve them in the decisionmaking process of the Union. Yet, Lavenex (2015, p. 837) argues that “trans- governmental committees and regulatory agencies offers hitherto understudied opportunities for the flexible integration of non-member states”.

The CSDP in this context is an interesting case. In the absence of institutional deepening, in contrast to the economic and monetary union, the future of the CSDP may present a new kind of differentiated integration in the EU both politically and academically (Fabbrini & Schmidt, 2019, p. 174). Moreover, in the context of the security and defence policies, as noted by Howorth (2019, p. 263), differentiation is a norm. Main reason for intensified differentiation in the CSDP is ontological dyads like large states/small states, extrovert/introvert states, allies/neutrals, nuclear/non-nuclear states, big/small defense spenders and naval states/land army states (Howorth, 2019, p. 264).

Defining different types of integration and/or differentiation is not enough to establish sound theoretical ground for the thesis to solve the research question. Key factors and determinants are needed to be framed. In this context two main factors of integration, interdependence and politicization, have an explanatory power (Schimmelfenning et al., 2015, p. 765). While former act as a driver of integration, the latter has the potential to impede it (Schimmelfenning et al., 2015, p. 765). More concretely, these factors are key determinants in the theoretical causal mechanisms of both internal and external differentiated integration.

By expanding his earlier works, Schimmelfenning (2019) makes a distinction of key drivers for internal differentiated integration, as demanding and supplying factors. For the first one, heterogeneity of preferences, dependence and capacity are listed as key drivers, while for the latter, size of group, externalities created by the group and bargaining power of the group are named (Schimmelfenning, 2019, p. 185).

To develop sound causal mechanisms and hypotheses, further clarification is needed especially on the concepts and their evolution through time. As noted, interdependence is a key driver force for the differentiated integration theory (Schimmelfenning et al., 2015, p. 772). On the other hand, any increase in interdependence is conceptualized as “demand for more integration” and the result of this driving force will be determined by politicization (Schimmelfenning et al. 2015, p. 772). Hence, while interdependence composes of demanding factors of differentiation integration, politicization refers, naturally, to the supply side. Thus, Schimmelfenning’s recent study (2019) is mostly expansion and fine-tuning of the existing differentiated integration theory regarding internal differentiation. More concretely, interdependence as a concept may contain the preference, dependence and capacity and accordingly politicization may refer to determining factors like bargaining power, size of the group and lastly externalities. All the central concepts and sub-concepts will be defined in the following section in the context of external differentiated integration.

The causal mechanisms developed in this study mainly rest on intergovernmentalist approach to differentiated integration (Schimmelfenning, et al., 2015: Schimmelfenning, 2019). Interestingly, Schimmelfenning argues (2019, p. 183) that variants of intergovernmentalism, i.e. liberal and realist, do not necessarily contrast each other in the context of differentiated integration. In practice, more concretely, it is to say that the main assumptions of realist intergovernmentalism have explanatory power for the Eurosceptic rich countries of the Union regarding the core state functions like fiscal union or defence policies, while differentiation in the internal market through transition periods or derogations for the newly acceded members can be explained by liberal variant (Schimmelfenning, 2019, p. 184).

While developing a casual mechanism for external differentiation, Schimmelfenning et al. (2015, p. 774) emphasize that “external horizontal differentiation results from a combination of high politicization of European integration in the non-member state but high interdependence and low politicization at the policy level”. This causality may be explanatory. Yet membership of a country to the EU can be highly politicized issue in the domestic politics of the non-member state and in the EU itself at the same time. Hence, while developing theoretical hypotheses for this thesis, the possibility of politicization in the non-EU state and/or in the member states of the EU will be taken into account.

Overall, in this study, in order to detect functioning simple causal mechanisms, two key factors of integration, which are interdependence and politicization, will be use as key concepts to develop hypotheses. The causal mechanism is quite simple. To determine the level of external differentiated integration between the EU and the non-EU countries, there must be highly politicized relations regarding the full membership. The second step of the mechanism merely focuses on the integration in policy level. Firstly, the interdependence must be high which creates a demand for integration. Lastly, politicization needs to be framed to determine the level of integration.

In line with the differentiated integration perspective and these theoretical explanations, this study will be operationalized by three different hypotheses. For all hypotheses, the precondition is politicization of full membership. More concretely, it is to underline that politicization of membership issue is the first phase of the causal mechanism which aims to explain the external differentiation. In this context, the first hypothesis to be tested is that a nonEU state may participate in the integration in the field of the CSDP if interdependence between this state and the EU is high and politicization between them is low in policy level. Secondly, a non-EU state may not be able to participate in the integration in the CSDP if interdependence and politicization is low in policy level at the same time. Lastly, a non-EU state may not be able to participate in the integration in the field of the CSDP if interdependence and politicization between them are both high in policy level, since member states have absolute veto rights against non-EU states in the fields related to the CSDP and in the case of high degree of politicization, external differentiated integration is not possible to occur.

3. Concepts, Method and Sources

After having framed the theoretical underpinnings of this study, it is possible to move on the methodological aspects. In this section, first and foremost, the concepts, i.e. politicization and interdependence, will be defined and their operationalization into variables will be structured. Secondly, the main method of this study, which is process tracing, will be introduced. Lastly, data sources for gathering empirical evidences and case selection will be narrated.

3.1. Key Concepts and Operationalizations into Variables

To begin with, the main concepts to be defined in this section are interdependence and politicization. As noted in the previous section, these concepts refer to multiple sub- variables. To be more concrete, while interdependence covers preference, dependence and capacity, the latter refers to concepts like bargaining power, size of the group and

22 externalities. Holistically, interdependence and politicization are important concepts in the wider EU studies realm (Schimmelfenning, et al., 2015, p. 767). To begin with, interdependence can be defined as endogenous and exogenous factors that create demand for integration (Schimmelfenning, et al., 2015, p. 772). These factors can be heterogeneity of preference, dependence regarding the policy in subject, and lastly capacity to integrate. These sub-variables need to be evaluated in the context of the external dimension of differentiated integration. Very briefly, preference can be described as a political will of non-EU states to participate in the integration process in a given policy. Dependence can be portrayed as a need for more integration with the EU where non-EU countries share the same goals and perspectives with those of the EU regarding a policy in subject. Lastly, capacity is to have the necessary sources to involve in an integration process in a given field. On the other hand, politicization can be defined as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU” (Schimmelfenning et al., 2015, p. 771). Polarization of opinions, interests or values may refer to externalities, size of the integrating group and bargaining power. These sub-variables need to be defined in the context of the external differentiated integration. In a nutshell, externalities may be defined as results and sideeffects of the integration between the EU and non-EU countries in a given policy to the member states. These side effects might be negative or positive. Secondly, bargaining power is the most important sub-variable in the context of external differentiation, since the member states have the absolute veto power regarding further cooperation with the non-EU countries. Bargaining power can be defined as having a veto power regarding the further cooperation with the nonEU state which is willing to participate in a given policy field. Lastly, the size of group as a concept refers to group of member states in internal differentiated integration (Schimmelfenning, 2019, p. 185). In the case of external differentiation, size of the integrating non-EU country might play an important role and can be framed as a factor that has potential to create positive or negative externalities to the existing member states.

As of this point, with the advent of these concepts, their operationalization into variables can be defined. In the main research question and three hypotheses developed, participation of non-EU states in the CSDP is the dependent variable. The level of

23 participation is defined by the interplay between interdependence and politicization. Thus, interdependence and politicization, as key concepts, are independent variables in this study. But, how is the level of participation measured? Indeed, the level of participation by third states to the CSDP can be detected by investigating the different legal avenues for participation which has been narrated in the beginning of the state-of- the-art section. Very briefly, non-EU states may take part in the civilian and military CSDP missions including Battlegroups, may contribute to the European defence capacity building process and lastly may join efforts in defence research. Hence these categories can act as indicators of participation in this thesis.

3.2. Process Tracing

After having defined the fundamental concepts and their operationalization into variables, it is possible to move on the methodological aspect of the thesis. Yet, before framing the methodological details, in order to ensure consistency between theoretical perspective and the methodology, there is a need for explanation regarding metatheoretical principles of the study. Metatheoretical underpinnings of the study is important since it also defines the methodological boundaries of the thesis. In other words, there is a direct correlation between metatheoretical, theoretical and methodological positions. As explicitly noted in the previous section, this thesis will scrutinize the third states’ involvement to the CSDP through differentiated integration perspective. It is possible to position this theoretical perspective into wider rational-choice tradition. In this wider metatheoretical tradition, it is assumed that governments are rational, and integration is an outcome of constellations of state preferences, international interdependence and bargaining power (Schimmelfenning, 2019, p. 177). In methodological perspective, the proponents of empirical rational choice tradition may apply qualitative process tracing method in their studies (Checkel, 2014, p. 116). Thus, in this study, main method will be process tracing which allows researchers to trace the operation of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation (Checkel, 2014, p. 116).

However, there is no uniform application of process tracing. In contrast, it can be underlined that there are three variants of process tracing: theory testing, theory-building and explaining-outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 11). While the last one is case oriented approach, the others are theory oriented. More concretely, theory-driven variants of process tracing are bounded to the theoretical causal mechanisms, while outcome- oriented process tracing lacks theoretical perspective and only focuses on the causal mechanism leading to a given outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 18-19).

In the specific context of the thesis, the main aim is to define the causal mechanisms determining the external differentiation in the security and defence field. The fundamental objective in the thesis is to test these hypotheses in specific cases of Norway, Turkey and Iceland. The hypotheses developed in the previous section present clear causal mechanisms as a result of interplay between interdependence and politicization. Besides, these hypotheses have the potential to be generalized in other policy fields and to other non-EU countries. Thus, this thesis aims to establish causal mechanism for the integration of third countries to the CSDP. Overall, theory-testing process tracing approach is suitable tool for this study.

Before delving into the required steps for theory-testing variant of process tracing, it is necessary to explain very briefly what causality means. In this thesis, firstly, causality refers to a mechanismic understanding, which can be briefly defined as interactive influence of how causal mechanisms contribute to producing an outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 25). In the specific case of the thesis, the main aim is to understand and explain how the interaction between interdependence and politicization play a definitive role for the participation of nonEU states in the integration in the CSDP.

Secondly, there is also another debate on the probabilistic versus deterministic causation in social science. In a nutshell, in this thesis deterministic causation perspective is used which examines factors necessary and/or enough cause of an outcome in an individual case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 27). Thus, in the context of the thesis, the main aim is

25 not to narrate historical political relations in a sequenced manner. The aim is to find factors leading to a particular outcome. More concretely, complying with theoretical hypotheses developed in the previous section, the investigation of each case will seek to find “the predicted empirical manifestations of the mechanism are present or absent” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 33). Hence, during the empirical analysis of each case, firstly the politicization of membership issue will be tested and then secondly the interplay between interdependence and politicization in policy level will be tested.

Theory-testing approach in process tracing requires three steps (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 15). It starts with the conceptualization of causal mechanism between variables based on existing theorization (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 15). In the case of this thesis, this step has already been accomplished in the previous section by developing three hypotheses based on the existing differentiated integration theory. The second step is to operationalization of the variables. This step has already been accomplished in the beginning of this section by underlying the relations between dependent and independent variables. The last step is the collection of empirical data to test the presented hypotheses (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 15). This step will be conducted in the next section.

3.3. Data Sources and Case Selection

As noted by Checkel (2014, p. 116), in the application of process tracing, the necessary data is overwhelmingly qualitative in nature and is deduced from historical memoirs, expert surveys, interviews, press accounts and official documents. Hence, in this thesis, these are the possible sources of data. Yet, it must be admitted that in a context of highly politicized issue, these data sources may be mis-leading. Especially, memoirs, interviews and to a certain extent press documents may reflect individual perspectives. However, within the boundaries of this study, complying with the intergovernmentalist theoretical perspective, official documents and expert reports prepared by experts are more valuable. Hence, in this thesis, official documents on the CSDP prepared by the relevant institutions of Norway, Iceland, Turkey and the EU will be the main sources of empirical evidence.

In addition, key academic articles on the issue will also be investigated. As illustrated clearly in the previous section, regarding external differentiation in the CSDP, three hypotheses have been developed. For each of three hypotheses, three cases will be used, namely Norway, Iceland and Turkey. The main rational behind selecting these countries as case studies has two reasons. Firstly, the question of the participation of these countries in the European security and defence integration is older than the CSDP itself and this question is still relevant today. More importantly, these countries participate in the CSDP in divergent levels. Thus, explaining their level of involvement is crucial.

During the application of research, the main aim is to apply within-case inference which means to use empirical evidences collected for testing the hypothesized causal mechanism (Beach & Pedersen, p. 69). For the first hypothesis, it will be the relations between Norway and the EU. In this case, the membership of Norway is highly politicized. Yet interdependence is high and politicization in the CSDP related fields is low, which enables Norway’s participation in the nearly all aspects of the CSDP. For the second hypothesis, the relations between the EU and Iceland will be under scope. In this context, the membership of Iceland to the EU is a highly politicized issue in Iceland. On the policy level, the level of interdependence and politicization between Iceland and the EU are both low. Thus, participation of Iceland in the CSDP integration has remained limited. For the last hypothesis, the selected case country is Turkey. Though the accession negotiations are officially ongoing, the membership of Turkey to the EU is a politicized issue. On the policy level, both interdependence and politicization are high which impedes Turkey’s participation in the all aspects of the CSDP.

Overall, in line with the theoretical and methodological perspective of the thesis, the following section will focus on three independent cases, namely Norway, Iceland and Turkey. The main aim will be to respond the main research question of the thesis by asking how the interplay between interdependence and politicization play a definitive role for the participation of Norway, Iceland and Turkey in the integration in the CSDP-related fields?

4. Participation of Non-EU European States in the CSDP

In this thesis, to answer the research question, three distinct non-EU countries are selected as cases to scrutinize. In each sub-section, the main aim is to evaluate the individual cases through perspective of external differentiated integration. The last sub-section will be dedicated to the comparison of cases.

4.1. Norway and the CSDP

Norway is an outstanding example of how much a non-EU state may participate in the European integration in certain selected fields. Interestingly, Norway participates in two of the most important brandmark policy fields of the EU, namely internal market and the Schengen Area, while preferring not to become a member state (Rieker, 2006, p. 281). In this sub-section, firstly, the relations between Norway and the EU will be narrated very briefly. This is important to illustrate the first phase of causal mechanism which is high politicization of the membership to the EU. Secondly, the participation of Norway in the CSDP is explained in line with the interaction between interdependence and politicization. The relations between the EU and Norway can be traced back to the early days of the integration. At the beginning, Norway did not show any interest in joining the European integration, because, the country out-rated all the founding members of the integration in economic and social terms (Ongur, 2007, p. 6). The perspective of Norway on international trade came along with the UK and they decided to establish the EFTA (Ongur, 2007, p. 6). Yet, in time, Norway wanted to join the European Economic Community (EEC). The accession negotiations were started in 1970 and completed in 1972 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 2). In 1972, the issue of the membership to the Community was put to a national referendum in which the majority of Norwegians voted against the membership. In 1992, the EEA Agreement was signed between the members of the EFTA and the European Community and entered into force in 1994. Following year, together with Finland, Sweden and Austria, Norway was expected to become members of the EU. However, once again, Norwegians voted against the membership in 1994.

Though Norway did not join the EU, this does not mean that their relations with the EU is limited. The close ties with the EU are “result of political cooperation, primarily through the EEA and Schengen Agreement” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 2).

The institutional and legal framework which the EEA and the Schengen Agreement offer, do not provide wide opportunities for the cooperation in foreign and security policy. The EEA Agreement only provides grounds for foreign policy consultation twice in a year in the margins of the EEA Council meetings (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 15). Yet, Norway has not refrained showing interests in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP. As of 2019, according to a report written by Nicole Koenig (2019), Norway is one of the most integrated non-EU states to the CSDP. As noted in the table no 1 (Tardy, 2014, p. 3), Norway participates in all three aspects of the CSDP. The country signed the FPA with the EU to participate in military and civilian operations and joined the Nordic Battlegroup. Moreover, it also signed an administrative agreement with the EDA. Lastly, Norway participates in the EDF through Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018, p. 7). Hence, it is fair to admit that Norway is highly integrated to the CSDP. The key theoretical concepts of the thesis may provide insightful explanation for their level of participation.

Table 1: Participation of Norway in the CSDP

Field of Cooperation Date Scope of Cooperation CSDP Missions/Operations Signature of FPA: 3 Participated in 11 CSDP including Battlegroups December 2004 missions and operations (Tardy, 2014, p. 3) Joined the Nordic Battlegroup in 2008 Capability Building Administrative Contributed projects and Arrangement with EDA: 7 programmes such as March 2006 helicopter exercises and other flying events, the air-to-air refuelling programme and the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (EDA, 2016) Defence Research Through the membership Participated to the EEA in the research component of the EDF (PADR)

Contributed projects and programmes such as helicopter exercises and other flying events, the air-to-air refuelling programme and the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (EDA, 2016) Defence Research Through the membership to the EEA Participated in the research component of the EDF (PADR)

As noted, the primary stage for the external differentiation is politicization of the membership to the EU. In the case of Norway, it is fair to admit that the accession to the EU is highly politicized issue in its domestic politics. The results of two referenda in the country in 1972 and 1994 on joining the European integration provides necessary and clear evidences in this context. In both referenda, Norwegians refused to be part of the European integration. More recently, in the Norwegian Government’s Strategy for

Cooperation with the EU covering the period between 2018 and 2021, no vision has been shared for the accession to the EU (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Thus, with these historical and contemporary evidences, it is fair to admit that the issue of membership to the EU is highly politicized in domestic politics of Norway.

Though the accession to the EU is traditionally a highly politicized issue in Norway, in policy level, there are close ties not only in the internal market and Schengen zone, but also in the CSDP. During the Cold War years, there was a broad consensus in Norwegian politics on the centrality of Atlantic security orientation and the role of armed force which was territorial defence against the Soviet Union (Græger, 2005a, p. 413). Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the status quo started to change.

In 1992, Norway as a member of the NATO became an associated member to the WEU. This status provided Norway a flexible room for influencing the decision of the full members in various institutional constellations (Rieker, 2006, p. 287). Yet, in late 1998, when Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Chirac declared their intention to have a genuine security and defence policy, it was a signal for the end of Norway’s privileged status in the WEU. In the beginning, Norway posed important conditions to continue to be part of the European security and defence architecture, yet the leaders of the EU rejected their demands (Rieker, 2006, p. 282). Norway’s influence on the policy has decreased in parallel with the new developments in the CSDP. Yet, Norway, after having been excluded from the institutional constellations of the new policy realm, continued to demand for more participation (Rieker, 2006, p. 282).

Interdependence may provide valuable insight for their insistence and demand for the participation in the new evolving security and defence policy. As noted, interdependence may refer to three sub-concepts, namely dependence, preference and capacity. Firstly, following the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, Norway was suspicious about an independent ESDP, since it would mean undermining the NATO’s role in the continent which Norway heavily counted on (Rieker, 2006, p. 285). In the various national security

31 and defence documents, Russia was perceived as a main threat, even after the end of the Cold War (Rieker, 2006, p. 285). Yet, with the change of the defence concept from territorial warfare to international crisis management, along with the initiation of the ESDP, Norway started to align its position with the EU (Rieker, 2006, p. 286). Besides, the civil wars on the periphery of the EU, especially those in the Balkan region, was an alert for the need of a genuine policy. Upon this background, it was the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York which initiated the age of the war on terror. Though Norway was a participant in the operation in Afghanistan, their policy orientation was overlapping with the EU’s more civilian security understanding (Græger, 2005a, p. 412). Thus, geographical conflicts and the change of the USA security and defence policy towards unilateralism increased the dependence of Norway to the EU.

Secondly, preferences of Norwegian politics, which constitutes the other component of interdependence, towards the ESDP was also clear. Participating in the ESDP was a general policy attitude of the politics in Norway irrespective from the divergent constellations of governments in the country (Rieker, 2006, p. 282). For instance, in 1999, before the Helsinki European Council, the Foreign Affairs Ministers Knut Vollebæk sent a Pro Memoria to the member states of the EU and the NATO and emphasized the need for establishing arrangements that would ensure a satisfactory inclusion of the non-EU allies (Græger, 2005b, p. 93). Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the newly founded government in 2000, Thorbjørn Jagland (2000) claimed in his address in the Parliament that pursuing a proactive European policy was a must and passive adaptation was not an option. Moreover, Jagland (2000) also underlined that there was a broad consensus among the political parties of Norway on “Norwegian support for strengthening the European capability for crisis management, the need to develop the ESDP in close cooperation between the EU and the NATO and lastly Norway should be linked as closely as possible to the new EU cooperation” (Jagland, 2000).

Last but not least, capacity to integrate was also important dimension creating demand for participation. Regarding the capacity, it must be underlined that though the country is not among the most powerful military country in the world, especially because of the

Soviet threat during the Cold War, territorial defence was an important concept in the country (Græger & Leira, 2005, p. 49). However, as with the change in the concept of defence in 1990s from territorial defence to international crisis management and peacekeeping, Norway started to adapt itself to the new realities. For instance, in 2000, the Parliament of Norway agreed to establish an armed forces task force of 3500 personnel for international operations including the EU-led operations (Jagland, 2000).

Overall, in the initial years of the CSDP, the second step of the theoretical causal mechanism of the thesis, which is the demand for participation, was present for the case of Norway. As noted in theoretical section, the demand needs to be responded by the supply side of the external differentiated integration, which is politicization which may refer to externalities, size of integrating country and bargaining power. In the late 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium, the relations between Norway and the EU was not problematic and there was no politicized nature in the context of foreign, security and defence policy. This enabled Norway for participation in the integration in these field. The official conclusion of the EEA Council on 20 December 1994, few weeks after the referendum on the EU accession in Norway, provides a valuable evidence on this issue. In this conclusion, partners reaffirmed their wish to strengthen the political dialogue on foreign policy with a view to developing closer relations (EEA Council, 1994).

Thus, it is fair to admit that in the first decade of the new millennium, as a result of interdependent and de-politicized relations on policy level, Norway were able to participate in all aspects of the CSDP. More recently, especially with the Juncker Commission, the EU has intensified its efforts in the security and defence policy. As in the first decade of the CSDP, Norway has not refrained showing interest in participation in the new fields.

Recent developments in international politics have helped to increase the dependence of Norway to the EU which results with further demand for joining integration in the CSDP related fields. As noted by Hillion (2019, p. 6), the evolving and changing perspective of

33 the USA on the transatlantic security relations, rising fragility of the European neighborhood including the Russian aggressive politics in Ukraine and Syria and the Brexit process are main key driver forces in this sense. In a report prepared by a group of experts upon the request of the Norwegian Defence Ministry in 2015, it is noted that “Norway is once again facing traditional security challenges, combined with a variety of less conventional threats” (Tammens et al., 2015, p. 14). The shift towards multi-polarity in international politics affects the willingness and ability of the U.S. to maintain a visible and credible engagement in Europe (Tammens et al., 2015, p. 13).

Moreover, in the Norwegian Government’s Strategy for Cooperation with the EU covering the period between 2018 and 2021, it is noted that the government of Norway has three key tasks: “to further develop political dialogue and coordination with the EU, to strengthen Norway’s practical cooperation with the EU and to promote favorable conditions for the Norwegian defence industry” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Indeed, this document provides very illustrative evidence on how the preference of Norway to the evolving CSDP.

On the other hand, in the conclusion of the Council of the EU meeting on 20 December 2012, it was noted that “the Council highly appreciates the participation of Norway in numerous CSDP operations and missions, in the Nordic Battle Group, as well as in the activities of the EDA” and “the Council is committed to further deepening this partnership, in particular through the continuous participation of Norway in CSDP operations” (Council of the EU, 2013). Hence, this official document provides necessary evidence to claim that the relations between the EU and Norway is not politicized in the context of the security of defence policy.

In this highly interdependent and low politicized nature of relations, Norway “participates in the research part PADR of the new EDF, - as the only non-member state” (Skogen, 2018). In parallel, Norwegian government also demands for participation to the individual projects of PESCO as well (Skogen, 2018).

4.2. Iceland and the CSDP

The attitude of Iceland towards the European integration is an interesting case, since the political sphere in the country is mainly Eurosceptic while Iceland is one of the participants in the most important brandmark policies of the European integration, namely internal market and the Schengen-zone. In this section, the main aim is to explain Icelandic involvement in the CSDP. Yet, before doing so, to reveal how the issue of the membership to the EU is a highly politicized matter, firstly, the relations between the EU and Iceland will be narrated. This is important, since the first phase of the casual mechanism of the thesis is high politicization of the membership. The second phase of the analysis will aim to explain the level of Icelandic participation in the CSDP, through the central concepts of external differentiated integration. Following the World War II, unlike most of the western states, Iceland pursued a more restrictive trade policy (Thorhallsson & Vignisson, 2004, p. 22). In this context, the government did not show any interest towards the EEC. Moreover, as a result of the dispute with the UK on the fishery, Iceland did not join to the EFTA too (Thorhallsson & Vignisson, 2004, p. 23). Thus, the country was remote to all integration efforts in Europe at the beginning of the Cold War. However, in time, Iceland started to seek the possible engagement. After having solved the political conflict with the UK on the exclusive economic zone, and as a result of fisheries pressure groups’ demand, Iceland joined to the EFTA in 1970 (Thorhallsson, 2105, p 33). While the relations between Iceland and the evolving European international architecture was limited, the relations with the USA was very dense. Indeed, the special relationship between Iceland and the USA was an important factor defining the attitudes of Iceland towards the European integration. Iceland signed a direct defence agreement with the USA in 1951 (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2006, p. 328). Besides, the USA was an important actor contributing the Icelandic economy. The other Nordic countries, too, were dependent on the transatlantic security relations, yet Iceland was an extreme case in this context (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2006, p. 329).

The membership to the EFTA created a harsh political dispute in the domestic politics of Iceland (Thorhallsson, 2015, p. 33). Similarly, the ratification of the EEA and Schengen

35 agreement were divisive issues for the political elites and parties in Iceland (Thorhallsson, 2015, p. 35). Eventually, Iceland became part of the EEA in 1992 and the Schengen area in 2001.

During the1990s, the governments of Iceland did not prefer to make an application for the accession to the EU, unlike the most of European states. The attitude of Iceland towards the EU started to change in the second half of the first decade of the new millennium. There are two main reasons for this change. Firstly, in 2006, the USA unilaterally withdrew its military forces from the country and secondly the USA did not help Iceland during the economic and financial crush in 2008 (Thorhallson, 2013, p. 4).

Following the financial crisis in 2008, Iceland submitted the application for the membership. The primary reason of Iceland’s application for the membership to the EU was economic. Because the country was harshly affected by the global financial crisis and the plan for the economic recovery was based on EU membership (Thorhallsson, 2015, p. 41). On the other hand, in the Parliament of Iceland, the question of applying for the EU membership was not warmly welcomed in 2009 too. Indeed, the motion for the application was narrowly approved by the members of the Parliament (Thorhallson, 2013, p. 13).

The accession negotiations started on the June of 2010. In time, 27 chapters were opened to negotiations and 11 of them were provisionally closed (European Commission, 2017b). However, following the government change in the May of 2013, the newly elected government firstly suspended the negotiations and decided to terminate the whole process in 2015 (Thorhallsson, 2015, p. 32).

The most recent government in Iceland has been formed in the October of 2017. The coalition consists of three political parties, the Left Green Movement, the Independence Party and the Progressive Party. In the government agreement that these political parties

36 collaboratively have written, there is no reference for the re-initiation of the accession negotiations. On the contrary, it is noted that “Iceland’s interests are best served by remaining outside the EU. The government considers that one the most vital interests for Iceland is to give its fullest attention to the implementation of the EEA Agreement” (Government of Iceland, 2017, p. 36). This is a robust illustration of the government’s perspective to the European integration and provides necessary evidence to strongly claim that the membership to the EU is a highly politicized issue in Iceland’s domestic politics.

After having illustrated the highly politicized nature of the issue of the membership, this thesis may move on the further phases of the casual mechanism, which is the interaction between interdependence and politicization in the policy level. Iceland participates in some aspects of the CSDP integration as noted in table 2. In 2005, the FPA between Iceland and the EU has been signed which allows Iceland to participate in the civilian and military operations under the CSDP. Apart from the FPA, Iceland did not join to the EDA or any battlegroups. Moreover, there seems no interest in participation in the PESCO or the EDF. Interestingly, the EDF regulation allows participation of the EEA countries. Thus, it is fair to admit that the level of Iceland’s involvement in the CSDP integration is low. The key concepts of the external differentiated integration may provide explanation for their participation.

Table 2 Participation of Iceland in the CSDP

Field of Cooperation Date Scope of Cooperation CSDP Missions/Operations Signature of FPA: 21 Participated in 2 CSDP including Battlegroups February 2005 civilian missions and operations (Tardy, 2014). Capability Building No participation - Defence Research No participation -

Iceland was a conventionally natural country and remote to any warfare. However, aftermath the end of the World War II, as a result of growing Soviet threat, Iceland

37 became one of the founder nations of the NATO (Bailes & Ólafsson, 2014, p. 2). Besides, Iceland, as a country which did not have any military force, signed a long-term Defence Agreement with the USA in 1951, as noted before. The USA assumed responsibility of the defence of Iceland on behalf of the NATO. Both membership and the defence agreement with USA were divisive issues for the Icelandic domestic politics (Bailes & Ólafsson, 2014, p. 2).

Iceland’s first attempt to be part of the European security architecture, apart from the NATO, was its membership to the WEU. Like Norway and Turkey, Iceland became an associate member of the WEU in 1992. With this status, Iceland enjoyed a privileged position by having participated in the early phases of decision-making process. However, creation of a genuine security and defence policy in the EU ended the privileged position of Iceland. According to Bailes and Thorhallsson (2006, p. 333), the government of Iceland primarily had concerns about losing their seat at the security architecture and the possible division between the NATO and the EU which would diminish the transatlantic security consensus that Iceland heavily depended on (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2006, p. 333). Yet, in time, the government of Iceland decided to be part of the evolving structure although there was no concrete channel for influencing the decision-making process. Due to the lack of military capacity, their contribution to the missions and operations in the CSDP remained mainly on the civilian aspects (Bailes & Rafnsson, 2012, p. 110). In 2000, in this context, the government of Iceland decided to establish the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit (ICRU) which consisted of civilian aspects of peacekeeping such as police, doctors, lawyers, air traffic controllers, administrators (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2006, p. 335).

In 2006, the USA informed the Icelandic authorities to withdraw all the forces from the island. As of 2006, Iceland has a new understanding of security based on bilateral memorandums with some Nordic states, the UK and Canada and strengthening its relations with the NATO by arrangements for periodic deployment of the Alliance’s aircraft to Keflavik and by involving to the NATO’s multilateral activities (Bailes & Ólafsson, 2014, p. 2).

The withdrawal of the USA from the island resulted with important activism within the Icelandic governments on the security and defence policy matters. For the first time in Iceland’s history, a national risk assessment was prepared and published in 2009 (Bailes & Ólafsson, 2014, p. 2). In this document, no reference was made for the CSDP. Similarly, the Parliament of Iceland endorsed the resolution no 26/145 indicating that NATO is the primary pillar for security and defence of Iceland (Resolution of Parliament, No 26/15, 2016). Indeed, both documents provide necessary evidences to claim that Iceland’s preference and dependence in security and defence policy is towards the NATO, not the EU.

Iceland’s lack of army, naturally, creates a lack of capacity for the country’s involvement in international or supranational efforts. For instance, Iceland could not participate in the European pillar of the NATO in 1968 and in 1976 (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2006, p. 331). Similarly, before the 1990s, humanitarian missions and developments aids were not primary concerns of the Icelandic governments (Thorhallsson, 2013, p. 9).

For the other important element of the CSDP, which is the EDA, Iceland showed reluctance to participate. Since, Iceland does not have a defence capacity (Bailes & Rafnsson, 2012, p. 110). The government’s position paper at the opening ceremony of the accession negotiations in 2010 clearly reveals how Iceland perceives the EDA. In this document, it was noted that “Iceland is proud of its non-military tradition and will not establish a military in the future. Thus, we will have to look at the relations with the EDA in that context” (Government of Iceland, 2010, p. 10). In parallel, at the beginning of the negotiations of the Chapter 31 Foreign, Security and Defence Policy in which the CSDP- related acquis is negotiated too, it was underlined that Iceland did not wish to participate in the EDA and wish that its status as a country without a military would be taken into account (European Commission, 2011, p. 5). To my judgment, these documents provides the empirical evidence to claim that the lack of military or, theoretically speaking, deficiency in the capacity, prevents Iceland not to join one of the important components of the CSDP.

On policy level, regarding the CSDP, there is no politicization between the EU and Iceland. The clear evidence for this argument can be deduced from the accession negotiations. The negotiations for Chapter 31 Foreign, Security and Defence Policy was started on 30 March 2012 and provisionally closed on the same day (Council of the EU, 2012). This decision shows that integration with Iceland as a small country on security and defence policies did not pose any risk to create any negative externalities and thus member states did not use their bargaining power by not vetoing the closure of the chapter on the same day.

Overall, despite the low level of the politicization, due to low level of interdependence, especially lack of capacity and preference and dependence to the NATO, Icelandic participation in the CSDP remained low.

4.3. Turkey and the CSDP

The last case to be scrutinized in this thesis is Turkey’s participation in the CSDP. Yet, it must be underlined that there are clear differences between Turkey and the Nordic cases. First and foremost, the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU are officially ongoing. Secondly, Turkey has a strong military and defence capacity. Before delving into an in-depth analysis on Turkey’s participation in the CSDP, the relations between the EU and Turkey will be narrated. This is important since the first phase of the causal mechanism of the thesis is high politicization of the membership. After this analysis, the level of Turkish participation in the security and defence integration will be assessed through the interaction between interdependence and politicization, which constitutes the successive phase of the casual mechanism of the external differentiation.

Turkey’s interests towards the European integration was present at the beginning of the European integration. Just two years after the foundation of the EEC, Turkey made an application for partnership in 1959 and the Ankara Agreement was signed by the parties in 1963 which foresaw foundation of customs union between parties. The issue of the

40 membership would be evaluated following the establishment of customs union. As a result of political upheavals in the country, especially subsequent military coup d’états in 1971 and 1980, the membership of Turkey to the EEC was not considered at that times (Açıkmeşe & Triantaphyllou, 2012, p. 557). In 1987, the government of Turkey made an application for the membership, and this application was rejected in 1989 (Açıkçmeşe & Triantaphyllou, 2012, p. 557). Indeed, this rejection may be evaluated as the first empirical evidence of the politicization of Turkey’s membership.

During the first half of the 1990s, the relations between the EU and Turkey merely focused on customs union, which would be established in 1995. Four years later, at the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit, Turkey was listed as a candidate country on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidates (European Council, 1999). The accession negotiations have been started on 3 October 2005. At the time of writing, 16 chapters have been opened to negotiations and one of them has been closed provisionally (European Commission, 2019, p. 105).

When recalling the exact theoretical definition of the politicization, normally, for a country conducting accession negotiations to the EU, there should not be high politicization of the membership. Yet, the issue of Turkey’s membership to the EU is not free from politicization. There are various evidences supporting this argument. As noted, the rejection of Turkey in 1989 may be evaluated as the first evidence. More recently, the most important and explicit evidence is the enduring conflict of the “Cyprus issue”. Following the enlargement in 2004, Turkey had to extend the customs union to the new member states. On 29 July 2005, the customs union was extended to the new members via change of letters. At the same time, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005) made a declaration underlining that “ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey’s rights and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960.” In response to Turkey’s official declaration, the Council decided on 11 December 2006 that the negotiations on 8 chapters cannot be opened and no chapters can be provisionally closed

41 on the grounds that Turkey does not undertake its obligations stemming from the Ankara Agreement (Council of the EU, 2006). In the political side, following the Council meeting of December 2009, Cyprus unilaterally stated that it would block the opening of 6 chapters including Chapter 31 Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. In total, at the time of writing, 14 chapters out of 35 cannot be opened to negotiations. Besides, since 2004, in nearly all the official EU documents related to Turkey, the EU emphasized the importance of the “Cyprus issue” as conditions for the accession (Açıkmeşe & Triantaphyllou, 2012, p. 556). Thus, it is fair to claim that membership of Turkey to the EU is a politicized issue.

After having illustrated the highly politicized nature of the membership, this thesis may move on the policy level analysis. As noted, there are roughly three components of the CSDP, participation in missions and operations including battlegroups, engagement to capability development and lastly contributing to defence research. As noted in table 3, in the context of the first component, the FPA has been signed by Turkey and the EU, which allows the country to participate in the civilian and military operations. Besides, Turkey also participated in Italyled Battlegroup in 2010. Yet apart from involving the CSDP operations including the Battlegroups, Turkey could not integrate to the other aspects of the CSDP. The interaction between interdependence and politicization may explain Turkey’s low level of participation.

Table 3 Participation of Turkey in the CSDP

Field of Cooperation Date Scope of Cooperation CSDP Missions/Operations Signature of FPA: 29 June Participated in 7 CSDP including Battlegroups 2006 missions and operations (Tardy, 2014) Participated in the Italy- led Battle group in 2010 Capability Building No participation - Defence Research No participation -

In the case of Turkey, the factors creating demand for participation in the CSDP is clear. As noted in theoretical section, there are three sub-variables in this context, namely preference, dependence and capacity. To start with, Turkey’s attitude towards the CSDP is clear at the beginning. In a note of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is noted that Turkey’s unwavering commitment and support derives not only from the accession process, but also the general attitude of the country in supporting initiatives that would contribute to regional and international peace and security (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Besides, as noted by the Ambassador Ömür Orhun, General Director of International Security Affairs in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 2000s, following the end of the Cold War, traditional security challenges in bipolar world eroded, while new threats to the security have risen in the periphery of the EU, such as the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the military and nonmilitary challenges stemming from the Mediterranean basin (Orhun, 2000). Thus, it can be noted that newly emerged threats following the end of the Cold War increase Turkey’s dependence to the EU in security and defence policy. Regarding, the capacity which enabled Turkey’s participation to the CSDP, Turkey has no deficiency. Since, Turkey is an important military power and has a defence industry. Hence, it is fair to claim that the demanding factors of the external differentiation were present in the case of Turkey during the early years of the CSDP. However, as noted before, the demand side of the external differentiation must be responded by the supply side, which is politicization.

In the early years of the CSDP, the participation of non-EU countries to the missions and operations was one of the most problematic issues, especially for Turkey. In 1992, Turkey became an associate member of the WEU. This status, as in the cases of Norway and Iceland, provided a privileged position for Turkey as a non-EU country. Aftermath the St. Malo Declaration in 1998, the leaders of the EU decided to improve a genuine security and defence policy which was welcomed by the USA and the NATO. In the Washington Summit of the NATO, two guiding principles were defined, the participation of non-EU European states in the evolving ESDP and the use of the NATO’s assets for the ESDP operations (Açıkmeşe & Triantaphyllou, 2012, p. 562).

For Turkey, “exclusion from a military capable EU would mean military exclusion from post-Cold War Europe” (Terzi, 2002, p. 44). More concretely, Turkey had three main concerns in this context, the loss of the privileged rights of participation in the decision- making and operational activities of the WEU as an associate partner and the danger that the ESDP could be used in Turkey’s immediate vicinity without Turkey’s involvement or consent and the possibility of Cypriot involvement to EU operations as an EU member (Açıkmeşe & Triantaphyllou, 2012, p. 562). In line with these concerns, in the official press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the European Council in Helsinki in 1999, it was noted that “our wish is that the EU will show the necessary foresight for establishing a satisfactory arrangement for the participation of all European Allies, so that there will be no difficulty in defining the modalities for the foreseen NATO-EU relations” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Indeed, this press release indicates the conditional relation between the participation of non-EU European countries in the ESDP and the modality of relations between the EU and the NATO. In the same vein, Ambassador Ömür Orhun, Director General for International Security Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, underlined the importance of the associate membership status of the WEU and claimed that this modality could be applied in the ESDP (Orhun, 2000). Turkey’s concerns were partly addressed in late 2001 by the assurance that the “the EU would not take a military operation against a non-EU NATO member and arrangements whereby the EU would consult Turkey in any crisis” in its proximity (Keohane, 2009, p. 129). Yet, it was Greece, opposing this consensus by claiming that too great concessions were given to Turkey (Keohane, 2009, p. 129). The negotiations were continued till the end of 2002. Eventually, the Berlin Plus arrangements, which ensured the involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led operations and recourse of the NATO’s assets by the EU, were finally adopted (Açıkmeşe & Triantaphyllou, 2012, p. 563).

When examined the issue, the importance of the bargaining power and externalities as components of politicization illustrates themselves. Since Turkey is one of the NATO members which has the veto power to block the use of the Alliance’s assets by the EU, the leaders of the EU had to accept objections of Turkey a certain extent. This is an interesting issues, since through this analysis, it is fair to claim that although polarization

44 of opinion was clear about the modality for the non-EU states in the ESDP and the recourse of NATO assets, as a result of the strong bargaining power of Turkey by being member of the NATO, a consensus could have been reached by the parties. On the other side, the consensus reached created negative externalities for Greece. Very briefly, there were enduring political disputes between Turkey and Greece, and allowing Turkey to participate in the ESDP in a certain extend would be against the national interests of Greece. Yet, as noted, the bargaining power of Turkey was more definitive factor.

Following the Berlin Plus arrangements which ensured the recourse of the NATO’s assets by the EU and non-EU states participation in the CSDP in a certain extent, the EU was able to initiate the first police operation in Bosnia in 2003, namely the operation of Concordia (Cebeci, 2011, p. 99). Moreover, the NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia was replaced by the Operation Althea which was launched in 2004 (Cebeci, 2011, 100).

Though the consensus on the Berlin Plus and few successful operations, it did not take long to have a new political dispute on the issue when Cyprus became member of the EU in 2004. The EU demanded the inclusion of Cyprus to the Berlin Plus arrangements (Cebeci, 2011, p. 100). In response, Turkey blocked the participation of Cyprus in the Berlin Plus arrangements and its conclusion of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement with the NATO (Cebeci, 2011, p. 100).

Cyprus responded to Turkey’s rejection by blocking Turkey’s participation in the EDA. In the original plan, Turkey was expected to sign an administrative arrangement with the EDA, like Norway. Since, both countries were institutionally participant of the predecessor of the EDA, Western European Armament Union and Western European Armament Group within WEU. However, on 14 April 2005, Cyprus have stalled the approval of the Administrative Arrangement between Turkey and the EU because of political considerations (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Since then, Turkey declared its insistence to be member of the EDA. For instance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan (2008), in his address at the European Parliament Committee on

Foreign Affairs, repeated the dissatisfaction of Turkey about the Cypriot impediment for the membership to the EDA. On the other side of the coin, the EU continued to demand for the extension of the Berlin Plus arrangement to the all member states. For example, in the latest Turkey Report published by the European Commission on 29 May 2019, it is stated that “the issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, involving all EU Member States, continues to be unresolved” (European Commission, 2019b, p. 101). When examined closely through the central concepts of the thesis, politicization may have an explanatory power. As a result of strong bargaining power of Cyprus by being a member state of the EU, participation of Turkey in the EDA was hindered.

As a result of double veto by Turkey and Cyprus, there has been a severe impasse in the relations between EU–NATO cooperation after 2004. More recently, the relations between have been revitalized between two institutions. Turkey did not make any objection in this time (Aydın Duzgit & Marrone, 2018, p. 5).

In meantime, as noted before, the EU has accelerated the pace of integration by initiating the PESCO and the EDF. However, Turkey has not found any chance to participate in these new initiatives so far. Firstly, there is a frozen conflict between Turkey and the EU on the extension of the Berlin Plus arrangements to all member state (Aydın Duzgit & Marrone, 2018, p. 5). Apart from this enduring problem, there is a rising tension between Turkey and Cyprus regarding dispute on gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. Lastly, in the latest Turkey Report, it is noted that “Turkey's accession negotiations have come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing” (European Commission, 2019b, p. 105). In this highly politicized atmosphere, it can be argued that the participation of Turkey to the new initiatives in the CSDP is unlikely, even if Turkey would possibly be a significant contributor.

Overall, the factors creating demand for participation in the CSDP by Turkey are present. However, as a result of high politicization of the relations with some member states in

46 policy level, Turkey’s participation in the CSDP remained low. Absolute veto power of the member states plays a certain definitive role in this case.

4.4. Comparative Analysis of the Cases

After having concluded in-depth analysis of the cases individually, this last sub-section may focus on the comparison of the cases. This analysis will be structured in line with the causal mechanism of external differentiated integration. To start with first phase of the mechanism, it is fair to admit that in all three cases, the membership to the EU is highly politicized issue. Norway, as a highly integrated outsider, held two referenda on the membership to the EU in 1972 and 1994. The results of these referenda were both negative and Norwegians preferred to stay out of the EU. More recently, as noted in the Norwegian Government’s Strategy for Cooperation with the EU covering the period between 2018 and 2021, the government of Norway prefers to enhance the existing ties with the EU and there is no reference for the full accession to the Union. In the case of Iceland, the membership to the EU is also highly politicized issue. Historically, Iceland did not prefer to make the application for the full membership till 2008. Though, Iceland conducted accession negotiations with the EU following the financial crisis in 2008, as a result of a change in government, the accession negotiations were terminated in 2015. In the last government coalition agreement, it is explicitly noted that Iceland prefers not to be member and conducts its relations with the EU in the context of the EEA. Lastly, Turkey case presents an interesting example of politicization. The accession negotiations are on-going at the time of writing. Yet, as noted in the latest Turkey Report prepared by the European Commission, “Turkey's accession negotiations have come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing” (European Commission, 2019b, p. 105). The most important reason for this situation is the ‘Cyprus problem’. As noted in the relevant sub-section, 14 of 35 negotiation chapters cannot be opened for the negotiations and no chapter cannot be closed provisionally as a result of this political dispute. Thus, overall, it is fair to claim that in all three cases, the membership of the EU is politicized issue.

When it comes to the second phase of the causal mechanism, the first independent variable is interdependence. As noted occasionally, interdependence may refer to three subvariables, namely preference, dependence and capacity. When examined closely in the case of Norway, it can be argued that these factors creating demand for participation in the CSDP are all present. Norwegian governments have shown their interest to the evolving security and defence policy. Besides, especially with the geographical challenges stemming from the periphery of Europe and the change of the USA’s attitudes during the age of war on terror increased the dependence of Norway to the EU. Moreover, Norway adapted itself to the new security understanding by creating new forces to increase its capacity to integrate with the EU and the other international actors providing security. In the case of Iceland, it is not possible to claim that all three factors creating demand for participation are present. Iceland preferred to align its security understanding with the USA. Even after the USA’s withdrawal of military forces from the country, Iceland preferred to strengthen its bilateral relations with some member states of the EU and with the NATO. Most importantly, Iceland, as a country which does not have any military power, lacks capacity to integrate with the evolving European security and defence structures. Lastly, it is possible to admit that the three components of factors creating demand for participation in the CSDP are all present in the case of Turkey. To start with, Turkey as a country which conducts accession negotiations traditionally preferred to be part of the European security structure. Besides, challenges in the Balkan region during 1990s was an accelerating factor for Turkey’s preference and dependence on the EU regarding security and defence policy. Lastly, Turkey, with its strong military power and defence industry, had the necessary capacity to integrate with the EU in the CSDP matters. Overall, while Turkey and Norway show their demand for involvement in the evolving security and defence policy and on the other hand as a result of its structural deficiencies and policy preferences, Iceland does not strongly demand for participation.

The second independent variable of the causal mechanism is politicization which may refer to three sub-variables, namely externalities, bargaining power and size of the participating country. The relations between Norway and the EU regarding the security and defence policy is not politicized. Various official documents of the EU affirm this argument and thus member states of the EU have not preferred to use their absolute veto

48 power. As a result of low politicization, Norway participates in nearly all aspects of the CSDP. On the side of Iceland, it is also possible to claim that the relations with the EU are not politicized regarding the security and defence issues. The negotiations in the Chapter 31 Foreign, Security and Defence Policy presents necessary evidence in this context. However, Iceland does not participate in all aspects owing to low interdependence. Lastly, as a result of political dispute with Cyprus, the relations between Turkey and the EU concerning security and defence policy is highly politicized. Turkey only participates in the civilian and military operations of the CSDP including the Battlegroups. Regarding the other aspects of the CSDP, for instance the cooperation with the EDA, the bargaining power of Cyprus plays a definitive role.

Conclusion

In this thesis, the main research question is that what factors and conditions do facilitate or impede third-country’s involvement in integration in the CSDP. To answer the research question, the assumptions and the concepts of the external dimension of differentiated integration theory are used. In line with this tradition, three hypotheses are developed, and each hypothesis formulate distinct causal mechanisms. To test these hypotheses, three non-EU states, which are Norway, Iceland and Turkey, are selected as cases and process tracing method is applied by using the qualitative data stemming from the official documents published by the EU, and relevant authorities of these countries. For all hypotheses, the precondition is politicization of full membership. In all three cases, the issue of membership to the EU is a highly politicized as a result of divergent reasons. The first hypothesis is that a non-EU state may participate in the integration in the field of the CSDP if interdependence between this state and the EU is high and politicization between them is low. The selected case for this hypothesis is Norway and the empirical evidences gathered affirm that the interdependence between Norway and the EU is high and while politicization is low in the policy level. This combination enabled Norway to participate in all aspects of the CSDP. The second hypothesis is that a non-EU state may not be able to participate in the integration in the CSDP if interdependence and politicization is low at the same time. Iceland is selected as a case for this hypothesis. In practice, in line with

49 the data collected from the official documents and secondary sources, it is fair to admit that interdependence and politicization between Iceland and the EU in the context of the CSDP are both low. As a result of this combination, Iceland’s involvement in the CSDP remains low. The last hypothesis is that a non-EU state may not be able to participate in the integration in the field of the CSDP if interdependence and politicization between them are both high. To test this hypothesis, Turkey is selected as a case. During the research, with the advent of the data derived from the official documents of the EU and Turkey and secondary sources, it reveals that interdependence and politicization are both high in the context of the relations between the EU and Turkey in the CSDP. This combination resulted with the low participation of Turkey in the integration. By taking into account all these tested and verified hypotheses, this thesis argues that the interplay between interdependence and politicization play a definitive role in the level of third states’ participation in the CSDP related integration.

It is possible to locate this thesis in a wider universe of the EU studies. The contemporary European integration is a differentiated political entity with internal and external dimensions. Besides, conducting a research on the participation of third states in various policies of the EU is hardly exploited realm. Moreover, recently, the pace of integration in the CSDP has accelerated profoundly and the academic works have also been intensified on the issue. However, the participation of third states in the CSDP has been discussed in a fragmented manner by only focusing on either solely to the UK or individual case of non-EU states. This thesis aims to fill these gaps by establishing generalizable causal mechanisms based on the interplay between interdependence and politicization.

This thesis reveals how the interplay between interdependence and politicization is definitive for third states’ participation in the CSDP. Indeed, the argument and findings of the thesis are relevant both academically and politically. To my judgement, recent developments in the Union increase the relevance of the findings. Though, at the time of writing, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has been postponed, their participation in the CSDP is an important aspect of the discussions. For instance, the government of the

UK repeats their demand of “a new, deep and special partnership with the EU” in the CSDP related areas (Government of the UK, 2017, p. 3). In line with the findings of the thesis, it is possible to claim that interdependence and politicization will be important factors for the UK’s future participation. Especially divergent preferences and dependence of London and the EU member states and the relations between the UK and Ireland may have the potential to be a definitive factor in this context. This study is also relevant in academical terms. When examined the recent literature on the CSDP, it is possible to detect three main research fields: recent initiatives of the CSDP, the transatlantic security and defence relations and the future relations between the EU and the UK. The findings of the thesis are relevant for all the aspects in a certain extent. Any researcher may touch upon the recent CSDP initiatives and third states, transatlantic security and defence relations and lastly the UK as a non-EU state by using differentiated integration and the hypotheses of this study.

After having concluded the analysis through differentiated integration theory and process tracing method, it is fair to claim that both theoretical perspective and methodological aspects provided necessary tools to solve the research question. To start with, differentiated integration theory enables to establish causal mechanism for third states participation in the CSDP. Secondly, differentiated integration theory manage to cover both liberal and realist variant of the intergovernmentalism. This is important in terms of conducting the research in other sectors of integration in the EU. In the methodological aspects, theory testing variant of process research enables to test the hypothesized causal mechanism during the analysis. This method is also compatible with the rational choice tradition which differentiated integration theory belongs.

Beyond any doubt, the preferred theoretical perspective and methodology have the limitations too. To start with, this research counts on primarily the official documents of the EU, Norway, Iceland and Turkey. The data for the analysis derives from these documents and are overwhelmingly qualitative in their nature. The qualitative nature of the empirical evidences has the limitation of objectivity. Each official document analyzed

51 reflects the perspective of the EU or the state in question. Moreover, unlike quantitative studies, replication of any qualitative study is difficult in this context.

Lastly, this thesis opens avenues for further research in few veins. Firstly, external differentiation of other sectors may be scrutinized through the hypotheses and argument of the thesis. For instance, conducting a research on how interdependence and politicization define the level of participation of third countries in the Schengen zone would be an interesting study. Similarly, it is also possible to widen this thesis to the other non-EU countries like Serbia, Ukraine and possibly the UK by asking how interdependence and politicization between the EU and these countries define their level of involvement in the CSDP. Overall, recent political developments in the EU and evolving academic literature on differentiation show that the contemporary European integration is moving towards an “ever differentiated union” with external and internal dimensions. Thus, understanding the factors creating differentiation will be a crucial task for academia.

Reference List

Aydın Düzgit, S. & Marrone, A. (2018). PESCO and security cooperation between the EU and Turkey (Global Turkey in Europe Working Paper No. 19). Retrieved from https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_19.pdf

Açıkmeşe, S. A., & Triantaphyllou, D. (2012). The NATO–EU–Turkey trilogy: the impact of the Cyprus conundrum. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 12(4), 555-573.

Babacan, A. (2008, 28 May). Speech Presented at the Foreign Minister of Turkey at the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs. Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-ali-babacan_- foreign-minister-of-turkey-at-the-european-parliament-committee-on-foreign- affairs_-28-may.en.mfa

Bailes, A. J. K., & Thorhallsson, B. (2006). Iceland and the European Security and Defence Policy. In A. J. K. Bailes, G. Herolf & B. Sundelius (eds.), The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy (pp. 328-348). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Bailes, A. J., & Ólafsson, K. Þ. (2014). Developments in Icelandic security policy. Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla, 10(2), 1-15.

Bailes, A. J., & Rafnsson, Ö. Þ. (2012). Iceland and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Challenge or Opportunity?. Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla, 8(1), 109- 131.

Bakker, A., Drent, M., & Zandee, D. (2017). European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit? (Clingendael Report July 2017). Retrieved from https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017- 07/Report_European_defence_after_Brexit.pdf

Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Biscop, S. (2018a). European defence: give PESCO a chance. Survival, 60(3), 161-180.

Biscop, S. (2018b). Brexit, strategy, and the EU: Britain takes leave (Egmont Paper No 100). Retrieved from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2018/01/ep100.pdf?type=pdf

Cebeci, M. (2011). NATO-EU cooperation and Turkey. Turkish Policy Quarterly, 10(3), 93- 103.

Checkel, J. (2008). Process tracing. In A. Klotz & D., Prakash (eds.), Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (pp. 114-130). London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Council of the EU. (2006). Council conclusions on Enlargement (16635/06). Brussels, Belgium: Council of the EU. Retrieved from https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16635-2006-INIT/en/pdf

Council of the EU. (2012). Second meeting of the Accession Conference with Iceland at Deputy level (8378/12, Press 147). Brussels, Belgium: Council of the EU. Retrieved from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8378-2012- INIT/en/pdf

Council of the EU. (2013). Council conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries (5101/13). Brussels, Belgium: Council of the EU. Retrieved from https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5101-2013-INIT/en/pdf

Duke, S. (2018). Will Brexit Damage Our Security and Defence?: The Impact on the UK and EU. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Dyson, K., & Sepos, A. (2010). Differentiation as design principle and as tool in the political management of European integration. In K. Dyson & A. Sepos, Which Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration (pp. 3-23). London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

EEA Council, (1994). Conclusion of the second meeting of the EEA Council meeting on 20 December 1994 (94/280). Brussels, Belgium: EEA Council. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-94-280_en.htm

European Commission (2011). Screening report Iceland Chapter 31 – Foreign, security and defence policy. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission. Retrieved from

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/iceland/key- documents/screening_report_31_is_internet_en.pdf

European Commission. (2017a). White Paper on the Future of Europe (COM2017/2025). Brussels, Belgium: European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta- political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf

European Commission. (2017b). Iceland. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country- information/iceland_en

European Commission. (2019a). EU budget for 2021-2027: Commission welcomes provisional agreement on the future European Defence Fund. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1269_en.htm

European Commission. (2019b). Turkey 2019 Report (SWD(2019) 220). Brussels, Belgium: European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529- turkey-report.pdf

European Council. (1999). Presidency Conclusion Helsinki European Council. Helsinki, Finland: European Council. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21046/helsinki-european-council- presidency-conclusions.pdf

European Defence Agency. (2016). Latest Press Releases EDA Chief Executive and Norwegian Minister of Defence discuss defence cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-press- releases/2016/01/15/eda-chief-executive-and-norwegian-minister-of-defence- discuss-defence-cooperation

Fabbrini, S. & Schmidt, V.A. (2019). Introduction: differentiation and beyond. Comparative European Politics, 17(2), 173-175.

Government of Iceland. (2010). General Position of the Government of Iceland. Reykjavik, Iceland: Government of Iceland. Retrieved from

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deea/dv/0427_0 8/0427_08en.pdf

Government of Iceland (2017). Coalition Agreement. Reykjavik, Iceland: Government of Iceland. Retrieved from https://www.stjornarradid.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=c0c3c70a-051d-11e8- 9423-005056bc4d74

Government of the UK. (2017). Foreign policy, defence and development: a future partnership paper. London, England: Government of UK. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-policy-defence-and- development-a-future-partnership-paper

Græger, N. (2005a). Norway in a transatlantic tight spot between US and European security strategies?. Security Dialogue, 36(3), 412-416.

Græger, N. (2005b). Norway between NATO, the EU, and the US: a case study of post- Cold War security and defence discourse. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18(1), 85-103.

Græger, N., & Leira, H. (2005). Norwegian strategic culture after World War II: From a local to a global perspective. Cooperation and Conflict, 40(1), 45-66.

Habermas, J. (2016). The Core Europe to Rescue. Retrieved from https://www.zeit.de/kultur/2016-07/juergen-habermas-brexit-eu-crises- english/komplettansicht

Hillion, C. A. P. (2019). Norway and the changing common foreign and security policy of the European Union (NUPI Report No 1/2019). Retrieved from https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi- xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2582455/NUPI_Report_1_2019_Hillion.pdf?sequ ence=2&isAllowed=y

Howorth, J. (2017). EU defence cooperation after Brexit: what role for the UK in the future EU defence arrangements?. European View, 16(2), 191-200.

Howorth, J. (2018). Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence relations?. Journal of European Integration, 40(5), 523-537.

Howorth, J. (2019). Differentiation in security and defence policy. Comparative European Politics, 17(2), 261-277.

Jagland, T. (2000, 17 June). On Norway and the European Security and Defence Policy. Speech presented at the Parliament of Norway, Oslo, Norway. Retrieved from https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Stoltenbergs-1st- Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert- individuelt/2000/on_norway_and_the_european_security/id263970/

Keohane, D. (2009). ESDP and NATO. European Security and Defence Policy. In G. Grevi, D. Helly & D. Keohane (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy the first 10 years (pp. 127-138). Condé-sur-Noireau, France: Corlet Imprimeur.

Koenig, N. (2016). EU external action and Brexit: relaunch and reconnect (Policy Paper No 187). Retrieved from https://www.delorsinstitut.de/2015/wp- content/uploads/2016/11/20161122_BrexitExternalAction-Koenig-JDIB- Nov16.pdf

Koenig, N. (2019). Revamping CSDP Partnerships in the Shadow of Brexit (EU Global Strategy Watch Report No 9). Retrieved from https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eugs_watch_9.pdf

Lavenex, S. (2015). The external face of differentiated integration: third country participation in EU sectoral bodies. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(6), 836-853.

Leruth, B. & Lord, C. (2015). Differentiated integration in the European Union: a concept, a process, a system or a theory?. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(6), 754- 763.

Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2013). Differentiated integration: Explaining variation in the European Union. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Macron, E. (2017, September 26). Initiative for Europe. Speech presented at the opening ceremony of the University of Sorbonne, Paris, France. Retrieved from http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne- verbatim-europe-18583.html

Martill, B., & Sus, M. (2018). Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or ‘French connection’?. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(4), 846-863.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). Norway and the EU - Partners for Europe. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/europapol itikk/norway_eu.pdf

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). Norway in Europe The Norwegian Government’s strategy for Cooperation with the EU 2018–2021. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/dokumenter/eu/eu _strategy.pdf

Ongur, H. Ö. (2007). Reluctant Norway and European Union. Anadolu University Journal of Social Science, 7(2), 1-18.

Orhun, Ö. (2000). European Security and Defence Identity-Common European Security and Defence Policy: a Turkish perspective. Perceptions, September/November.

Resolution of Parliament no 26/145 on a national security policy for Iceland (2016). Retrieved from https://www.government.is/publications/legislation/lex/2018/01/19/Parliament ary-resolution-No.-26-145/

Rieker, P. (2006). Norway and the ESDP: explaining Norwegian participation in the EU's Security policy. European Security, 15(3), 281-298.

Rieker, P. (2012). Integration, Security and Associated Non-members-The EU as a Regional Security Provider. (NUPI Working Paper No 802). Retrieved from

https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi- xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/277238/NUPI%2bWorking%2bPaper-802- Rieker.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Santopinto, F. &Villafranca, L. (2018). CSDP after Brexit: the way forward. Commissioned by the European Parliament's Sub-Committee on Security and Defence. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603852/EXPO_ST U(2018)603852_EN.pdf

Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., & Rittberger, B. (2015). The European Union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(6), 764-782.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2019). The choice for differentiated Europe: an intergovernmentalist theoretical framework. Comparative European Politics, 17(2), 176-191.

Skogen, T. (2018, 27 February). Norwegian Security Policy – including participation in the CSDP. Speech Presented at the EU Parliamentary Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved from https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norwegian-security-policy--including- participation-in-the-csdp/id2592184/

Smith, S. J., & Gebhard, C. (2017). EU–NATO relations: running on the fumes of informed deconfliction. European Security, 26(3), 303-314.

Svendsen, Ø. (2018). European Defence and Third Countries after Brexit. (NUPI Policy Brief 3/2018). Retrieved from https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi- xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2489486/NUPI_Policy_Brief_3_18_Svendsen.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Tammens, R., Bund, K. H., Grytting, T., Hoel, A. H., Matlary, J. H., Toje, A. & Wilhelmsen, J. (2015). Expert Commission on Norwegian security and defence policy. Commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Retrieved from https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/fd/dokumenter/unifie d-effort.pdf

Tardy, T. (2014). CSDP: getting third states on board (European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief No 6/2014). Retrieved from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_6_CSDP_and_t hird_states.pdf

Tardy, T. (2018a). Does European defence really matter? Fortunes and misfortunes of the Common Security and Defence Policy. European security, 27(2), 119-137.

Tardy, T. (2018b). What third-country role is open to the UK in defence (CEPS Commentary). Retrieved from https://www.ceps.eu/wp- content/uploads/2018/04/Tardy_Brexit.pdf

Terzi, Ö. (2002). New capabilities, old relationships: emergent ESDP and EU-Turkish relations. Southeast European Politics, 3(1), 43-61.

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1999). Press Release Regarding Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) Addressed at The EU’s Helsinki Summit. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-regarding-common- european-security-and-defence-policy-_cesdp_-addressed-at-the-eu_s-helsinki- summit_br_no_239--_december-13_-1999.en.mfa

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2005). Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus. Retrieved fromhttp://www.mfa.gov.tr/declaration-by-turkey-on-cyprus_-29-july- 2005.en.mfa

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). The European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO-EU Strategic Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iii_-turkey_s-views-on-current-nato-issues.en.mfa

Thorhallsson, B. (2013). Iceland's Contested European Policy: The Footprint of the Past: A Small and Insular Society (University of Malta Institute for European Studies Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No 02/2013). Retrieved from https://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/198529/JMBaldurPaper022 013webv6.pdf

Thorhallsson, B. (2015). The Outsiders: Norway and Iceland. In C. H. Grøn, P. Nedergaard & A. Wivel (eds.), The Nordic Countries and the European Union, (pp. 32-50). New York, NY: Routledge.

Thorhallsson, B. & Vignisson, H. T. (2004). The ﬁrst steps: Iceland’s policy on European integration from the foundation of the republic to 1972. In B. Thorhallsson (ed.), Iceland and European Integration (pp. 37-53). New York, NY: Routledge.

Turpin, L. D. (2019). UK-EU Military Cooperation and Brexit from a Neoclassical Realist Perspective: No Big Deal?. In C. A. Baciu & J. Doyle (eds.), Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe (pp. 3-27). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Webber, M., Terriff, T., Howorth, J., & Croft, S. (2002). The common European security and defence policy and the ‘third‐ country’issue. European Security, 11(2), 75-100.

Whitman, R. G. (2016). The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?. National Institute Economic Review, 238(1), 43-50.