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Strategic Communications As a Key Factor in Countering Hybrid Threats

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Strategic communications as a key factor in countering hybrid threats STUDY Panel for the Future of Science and Technology EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA) PE 656.323 – March 2021 EN Strategic communications as a key factor in countering hybrid threats This report describes the key features, technologies and processes used in strategic communications to counter hybrid threats and their components. A theoretical description of hybrid threats is complemented by an analysis of diverse case studies, describing the geopolitical context in which the hybrid threat took place, its main features, the mechanisms related to strategic communications used by the victim to counter the hybrid threat and its impact and consequences. A comprehensive set of policy options aimed at improving the EU response to hybrid threats is also provided. STOA | Panel for the Future of Science and Technology AUTHORS This study has been written by Juan Pablo Villar García, Carlota Tarín Quirós and Julio Blázquez Soria of Iclaves S.L., Carlos Galán Pascual of the University Carlos III of Madrid, and Carlos Galán Cordero of the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya at the request of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) and managed by the Scientific Foresight Unit, within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of the European Parliament. ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE Zsolt Pataki, Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA) To contact the publisher, please e-mail [email protected] LINGUISTIC VERSION Original: EN Manuscript completed in March 2021. DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. Brussels © European Union, 2021. PE 656.323 ISBN: 978-92-846-7812-9 doi: 10.2861/14410 QA-02-21-202-EN-N http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa (STOA website) http://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet) http://epthinktank.eu (blog) Strategic communications as a key factor in countering hybrid threats Executive summary The hybrid threat concept and its components The hybrid threat concept attempts to synthesise a complex and evolving phenomenon, where state and non-state actors use diverse means and tools to influence different forms of decision-making, undermine citizens' trust in democratic processes and institutions, exacerbate political polarisation and spread confusion about geopolitical events with the ultimate goal of destabilising the victim while reinforcing the political vision and values of the offender. The use of digital technologies constitutes a differential and key component of modern hybrid threats, as it exacerbates their potential. Hybrid threats can be characterised as follows: • They are coordinated and synchronised; • deliberately target democratic states' and institutions' systemic vulnerabilities; • use a wide range of means; • exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution as well as different interfaces (war-peace, internal-external, local-state, national-international, friend-enemy); • aim to influence different forms of decision-making at the local, state, or institutional level; • favour and/or achieve the agent's strategic goals; • while undermining and/or hurting the target. Promoters of hybrid threats can use a wide range of actions to achieve their goals. This study analyses these components related to strategic communications and digital technologies: (1) funding organisations and political parties for propaganda, (2) strategic leaks and cybertools, (3) social media and domestic media outlets, (4) paramilitary organisations, (5) religious influence, (6) economic pressure and (7) concerns about migration. Disinformation campaigns play a crucial role in hybrid threats Disinformation is a key component of hybrid threats. It can be defined as 'verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public'. Disinformation campaigns take advantage of the possibilities opened up by digital platforms. Responses to hybrid threats: the role of strategic communications Responses have been categorised according to two dimensions: action areas and the time frame in which the action should be taken. Action areas encompass (1) political or diplomatic actions, (2) informative actions, (3) economic of financial actions, (4) intelligence actions, (5) legal actions and (6) military actions. Regarding the time frame, actions are categorised as (1) preventive measures, (2) detection measures and (3) response measures. Some of these measures are considered within the scope of strategic communications. Strategic communications may, for the purposes of this study, be defined as the 'systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences, identifies effective conduits, and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through those conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour' (Tatham, S., 2008, p. 3). The essential characteristics of strategic communications can be summarised as follows: • They are executed according to a predefined and systematic plan; I STOA | Panel for the Future of Science and Technology • involve actions at strategic, operational and tactical levels; • are developed in a competitive, and even conflictive, environment, where audiences are subject to a constant buzz that can hamper their goals being met; • demand a high level of coordination and synchronisation between stakeholders; • require targeted audiences to be exactly defined; • require selection of the most adequate communication channels; • are aimed at informing, influencing or promoting behavioural changes in the target audiences; • must be aligned with the overall goals of the promoter country or organisation; • must be focused on both the short and long term. Digital technologies have a relevant impact on strategic communications Digital technologies open up great opportunities to spread messages amongst broad audiences in a rapid and inexpensive way, and to create customised narratives for specific audiences. Digital technologies can be used by both promoter of hybrid threats to fabricate and spread disinformation, and the institutions that fight them to develop counter-narratives. The 5G standard represents a quantum leap in the field of communication infrastructure, which is bound to revolutionise strategic sectors. Telecommunication network security is critical to countering hybrid threats. Other relevant technological innovations that can act as a driver for the development of hybrid threats are (1) artificial intelligence (AI), (2) the Internet of Things (IoT) and (3) blockchain technologies. From theoretical analysis to practical implementations of hybrid threats and the use of strategic communications to counter them Seven practical implementations of hybrid threats across the world are analysed: • the most paradigmatic case of hybrid threat: the Russian attacks against Ukraine that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea; • four cases that include new or enhanced hybrid attack mechanisms and/or innovative strategic communications measures in the response: support for the Salafi movement in the Netherlands by the Gulf monarchies; Saudi Arabian pressure on Pakistan regarding the civil war in Yemen; foreign influence of Russia and China through academic institutions and think tanks; and Russian electronic warfare during the Zapad 2017 exercises; • two recent cases that have drawn the attention of policy-makers and analysts: disinformation campaigns against NATO operations in Lithuania, and disinformation attacks in the Catalan issue. Altogether, these cases, reflect all the components and essential characteristics of hybrid threats, and the responses include interesting insights into the field of strategic communications. Successful responses that use communication strategies share common characteristics: proactivity by implementing preventive measures, such as awareness campaigns, intense cooperation amongst stakeholders and an elaborate, coherent and solid narrative. Case studies show that strategic communications have a great potential to counter hybrid threats. However, more proactive approaches, better cooperation and more intensive use of digital technologies are needed to provide more efficient and effective responses to hybrid threats. II Strategic communications as a key factor in countering hybrid threats Policy options to tackle hybrid threats Although the EU has already implemented different measures to counter hybrid threats, vulnerabilities persist. The policy options proposed in this study are aimed at facing hybrid threats by addressing such vulnerabilities. They have been grouped into eight categories: • Policies related to regulation against hybrid threats. • Polices related to attribution of hybrid threats. • Policies related to the role of social media platforms in the fight against hybrid threats. • Policies aimed
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