Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (2013), 285–287.

Biagio G. TASSONE, From Psychology to Phe- tury German research on Aristotle. He gives a nomenology: Franz Brentano’s PSYCHOLOGY survey of Brentano’s early books on Aristotle, FROM AN EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT and Con- Von der Mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden temporary Philosophy of Mind. Hounds- nach Aristoteles ( e Several Senses of being in mill: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. 352 pp. Aristotle, 1862) and Die Psychologie des Aris- ISBN: 978-1137029218. toteles: Insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poi- etikos ( e Psychology of Aristotle, 1867). In the last ten years there has been renewed  e  rst part of the book would have interest in Franz Brentano’s philosophy. His pro ted from a comparison between Bren- views on consciousness have been mined by tano’s position in  e Psychology of Aristotle philosophers for new ideas and his views on and Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. value have influenced response-dependent In the former work Brentano holds an inner accounts. Tassone’s book that focuses on Bren- sense theory of consciousness and identi es tano’s main work Psychologie vom empirisch- the inner sense with the Aristotelian common en Standpunkt (1874) is therefore timely and sense.  e characteristic objects of the inner well-motivated.  e book aims to make Bren- sense are perceptions. In Psychologie, Brenta- tano’s work more accessible to contemporary no rejects the inner sense theory as an unsat- readers by providing necessary philosophical isfactory reading of De Anima 3.2. (Brentano background.  e book also wants to give a crit- 1874, 184-5. [102].)1 However, Brentano’s ical commentary on Psychologie vom Empirisch- inner sense theory is not just implausible as en Standpunkt. In addition, Tassone wants to an interpretation of Aristotle.  ere are sever- show that Brentano’s philosophy contains al philosophical objections that count against insights that can be brought to bear on issues it. For example, the inner sense theory takes in contemporary philosophy of mind. (9 .). our knowledge of properties like colour to  e book has three parts.  e  rst part depend on knowledge of our own mental acts: is devoted to the philosophical and histor- ical background of Brentano’s work. In the We could not think anything but rela- second part Tassone surveys and comments tions to ourselves and our thoughts.  is on the main topics of Brentano’s Psychology: is undoubtedly false. (1874, 185 [101]) the methodology of (descriptive) psychology, the marks of the mental (intentionality, con-  e second part of the book is, in e ect, a sciousness, unity of consciousness), Brentano’s commentary to Brentano’s Psychologie vom revision of the theory of judgement and,  nal- Empirischen Standpunkt. It provides again ly, his view of emotions.  e  nal third part helpful philosophical background for the is supposed to locate Brentano’s views with- understanding of Brentano’s philosophy. Parts in contemporary philosophy of mind and to of Chapter 3 outline the in uence of, among assess their relevance to current thinking. others, Comte on Brentano and discuss Bren-  e  rst part is valuable for readers inter- tano’s relation to phenomenalism. In chapter ested in Brentano.  e  rst chapter is mainly 4 ancient and scholastic in uences on Bren- an intellectual biography of Brentano. Draw- tano are described. ing on Stumpf as a witness Tassone gives a However, the exegesis and analysis of helpful account of Brentano’s philosophical Brentano’s arguments is less helpful. Let me beginnings and provides, among other things, give three examples from chapter 3. an overview over Brentano’s lectures in Würz- First, ‘Mental or psychic phenomena are burg. Brentano takes Aristotle’s philosophy as said by Brentano to be immediately grasped his starting point and develops his philosophy by clear insight.’ (83, see also 105.)  is is not in response to questions posed by Aristotle. In right. Brentano argues that inner perception chapter 2 Tassone locates therefore Brentano’s is confused, yet evident. For example, he writes work on Aristotle in the context of 19th cen- in the Appendix of the 1911 of Psychologie:

285 Inner perception is confused […] and ry ‘observation’. (See Brentano 1874, 49 [26]; although this imperfection does not a ect 61 [32])  is activity is, as Tassone (85) notes, its evidence, it has caused many mistakes. in some respects like observation. Brentano  ese mistakes, in turn, have led certain therefore says that one can ‘in a manner of psychologists to doubt the general fact speaking’ [sozusagen] observe a mental phe- that inner perception is evident, even to nomenon in memory. But observation in a dispute its correctness. (Brentano 1911, manner of speaking is not observation. Unfor- 129. My translation.) tunately the English translation is less careful. For instance, a passage on p. 181 of Psychol- Brentano’s heterodox view on this topic will ogie is translated as: merit further discussion. Second, Brentano distinguishes between [W]hen we recall a previous act of hear- inner perception and observation. Tassone ing, we turn toward it as a primary object, takes Brentano to equate inner observation and thus we sometimes turn toward it as with ‘introspection’ (83): observers. (99)

According to Brentano[,] inner percep- How could Brentano say this if he takes obser- tion takes place only with respect to [a] vation of mental phenomena to be impos- psychical or mental phenomenon. Intro- sible? In fact Brentano does not say it. His spection, on the other hand, is described translators have simply left out some crucial as a second order mental act having always words: what Brentano calls a physical phenomenon as its object. (83) [W]hen we recall a previous act of hear- ing, we turn toward it as a primary object, Does Brentano really hold the surprising view and thus we sometimes turn toward it in a that one can introspect physical phenome- way that is similar to someone who makes na? How can introspection be a second order an observation. [in ähnlicher Weise wie ein mental act, that is, one will assume, a men- Beobachtender]. (1874, 181) tal act that is directed upon another mental act, but have a physical phenomenon as its Whether Brentano is right to take paying object? attention to a mental phenomenon in mem- Brentano argues that there is no obser- ory only to be similar to observation proper vation of mental phenomena. Observation is a question that deserves further discussion. requires attention and one cannot direct one’s  ird, Brentano argues that we cannot attention to one’s current mental acts. ( is observe a mental phenomenon like a  t of assumption needs obviously to be justi ed anger. If we are consumed by anger, we can- further.) Hence, one can’t observe mental not form the intention to observe it. Tassone phenomena. A fortiori inner observation or comments: introspection can’t be a second order mental act whose topic is a physical phenomenon.  is insight should be generalized to hold  e only acts of observation we can  nd are for all mental phenomena. As inherently not second order mental acts; but attentive conscious structures beyond the realm of perceptions of physical objects. direct observation, these intangible men- Tassone seems to agree with this point. tal acts can never be objects for themselves. Brentano, he writes, dismisses the notion of  erefore, the immediately lived experi- ‘introspection’. (83). However, he takes Bren- ence of a ective disposition towards the tano also to hold that we observe our earlier world, that is, being directed to objects or mental states in memory. (85) But if inner contents—precisely because it is intimate- observation is impossible, one cannot observe ly constitutive of my immediate mental mental phenomena in memory either. Bren- state and awareness—cannot be prescind- tano himself carefully avoids calling paying ed from or fully objecti ed. (84f.) attention to a mental phenomenon in memo-

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