Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality: Its Direction and Some Aftermath*

HERVAEUS NATALIS ON INTENTIONALITY: ITS DIRECTION AND SOME AFTERMATH*

John P. Doyle (St. Louis, MO)*

In a much quoted passage from 1874, Franz Brentano (1828–1917) wrote: Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional (and also mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expres- sions, would call relation to a content, direction upon an object (which is not here to be understood as a reality) or immanent objectivity.1 Since 1874, for observers of Brentano and of intentionality doctrine, whatever else may be at issue the general consensus has been that “intentionality” indicates a direction from knower to known. Th us, Brentano’s most recognized disciple, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), who is credited with introducing the term itself into modern philosophy,2 has described it as “the property of being conscious of something”.3 Th is direction from consciousness to the object (which Brentano himself infl uenced by the problem of non-existent objects later rejected)4 appears in others

* A longer version of this article appeared in Th e Modern Schoolman 83 (2006), pp. 85–124, under the title: “Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) on Intentionality. Its Direc- tion, Context, and Some Aft ermath”. 1 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A.C. Rancurello – D.B. Terrell – L.L. McAlister, London 1973, p. 88; as quoted by T. Crane, “Intention- ality”, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, London – New York 1998, pp. 816–821, esp. p. 817. 2 Cf. G. Bealer, “Intentionality”, in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, ed. H. Burkhardt – B. Smith et al., München – Philadelphia – Wien 1991, vol. 1, p. 400. 3 E. Husserl, Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, tr. W.R. Boyce Gibson, London 1969, p. 109. 4 For this see, J. Haldane, “Intentionality and One-sided Relations”, Ratio 9 (1996), pp. 95–114, esp. pp. 96–97. 262 john p. doyle dependent upon Brentano5 and a glance at secondary sources will con- fi rm its almost universal acceptance as the common view.6

In the Middle Ages: from the Latin Avicenna on, the term “intentio” can be found throughout the thirteenth century.7 But, to my knowledge the actual word, “intentionalitas”, surprisingly appears fi rst only in the fourteenth-century writing of Hervaeus Natalis.8 A bigger surprise for me was to fi nd that Brentano in one place actually mentioned Hervaeus and listed three of his works.9 But the biggest surprise of all was to discover that for Hervaeus the direction of intentionality as such was not from knower to known but rather oppositewise—from known to knower! My purpose now is to sharpen that discovery as well as to touch on some of its wider Wirkungsgeschichte.

5 Cf. e.g., Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), Über Annahmen, Leipzig 1902, p. 103, as cited by R. Grossmann, Meinong, London – Boston 1974, p. 87. On the relation of Meinong to Brentano here, cf. T. Parsons, Nonexistent Objects, New Haven – London 1980, p. 48. 6 For examples, cf.: Grossmann, Meinong, p. 117; id., “Intentional Relation”, in Th e Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. T. Honderich, Oxford – New York 1995, p. 413. Also see: T. Crane, “Intentionality”, ibid., p. 818; J. Searle, “Intentionality (1)”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford 1994, p. 380; J. Perry, “Intentionality (2)”, ibid., pp. 386 and 388 sqq.; R. Chisholm, “Intentionality”, in Th e Encyclopedia of Phi- losophy, ed. P. Edwards, vol. 4, New York 1967, p. 202; and J.-L. Petit, “Intentionalité”, in Encyclopédie philosophique universelle, dir. A. Jacob, t. II: Les notions philosophiques. Dictionnaire, vol. 1, Paris 1989, p. 1346. An exception, perhaps, to the general rule is John Haldane, who stresses the immanence of thinking to the point of excluding any necessary relation to an object; cf. “Intentionality and One-sided Relations”, p. 114. For a denial of such a directional character among the Scholastics coupled with its attribu- tion to Husserl, see H. Spiegelberg, “Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl”, Philosophische Heft e 1/2 (1936), pp. 88–89. 7 For some of this, see P. Engelhardt, “Intentio”, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 4, Basel 1976, cols. 466–474. 8 For this, cf. Th e Oxford English Dictionary, a corrected re-issue . . ., vol. 5, Oxford 1933, p. 379. 9 For this, see the chapter, “Geschichte der kirchlichen Wissenschaft en”, in Johann Adam Möhler, Kirchengeschichte, ed. P.B. Gams, Regensburg 1867, vol. 2, pp. 526–584, esp. p. 570; for Brentano’s authorship of this chapter, cf. ibid., p. 526.