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P14 P13 Analysis WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 2013 ANALYSIS THE LEADING INDEPENDENT DAILY IN THE ARABIAN GULF ESTABLISHED 1961 Founder and Publisher YOUSUF S. AL-ALYAN Editor-in-Chief ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-ALYAN EDITORIAL : 24833199-24833358-24833432 ADVERTISING : 24835616/7 FAX : 24835620/1 CIRCULATION : 24833199 Extn. 163 ACCOUNTS : 24835619 COMMERCIAL : 24835618 P.O.Box 1301 Safat,13014 Kuwait. E MAIL :[email protected] Website: www.kuwaittimes.net Issues A year later, Abe has big ‘to do’ list By Shingo Ito year after a landslide national election, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is riding high as his Aplan to rescue the economy earns praise at home and abroad, but chinks in his armour are beginning to show. The unprecedented policy blitz, dubbed Abenomics, ushered in growth that led G7 nations in the first half of the year, stoked a sizzling stock market rally and offered a tantalising end to years of deflation. When Abe formed his cabinet on Dec 26 he had the backing of a large proportion of the population to fol- China’s army its pride and challenge low through with a pledge to reverse two decades of lacklustre growth and debilitating deflation. Then at the beginning of 2013 he declared that By David Lague and Charlie Zhu PLA hierarchy. Within days of taking over from Hu Jintao as head divided between rival political benefactors and regional com- “Japan is back” in a speech to the New York Stock of the Central Military Commission in November last year, Xi pro- mands. While Xi was working his way up, Deng’s successor, Jiang Exchange, saying his prescription of big government t’s part of the lore of modern China. When paramount leader moted Wei Fenghe, commander of the Second Artillery Corps and Zemin, was promoting dozens of senior officers who remain in spending and monetary easing would reinvigorate the Deng Xiaoping was handing over power a generation ago, a member of the CMC, to full general. In late July and early August, positions of power today. Jiang was the man Deng advised to world’s number-three economy. He embarked on a Iwidely recounted tale goes, he had some advice for his succes- he promoted six officers to the rank of four-star general, and 18 to tend to the generals. In retirement, Jiang remains one of China’s roadshow abroad to sell Brand Japan, including signing sor. For every five working days, spend four with the top brass of lieutenant-general. leading power brokers. His military appointments made sure his a nuclear reactor deal in Turkey and focussing on fast- the People’s Liberation Army. The latest leader of China, Xi Jinping, Eleven of those 24 officers are political generals, said Bijoy Das, influence would outlast his term. Hu Jintao, who replaced Jiang, growing economies in Southeast Asia. “This has been a shows every sign of applying that lesson. A month after assuming a Chinese expert at India’s Institute of Defence Analysis. “In likewise sought to anchor his position through military promo- very hectic year, travelling a lot overseas,” Abe said in power in November last year, Xi visited the province of essence it indicates that the Party is co-opting a section of the PLA tions and patronage before handing over to Xi. Both Jiang and Hu speech last week, adding he visited over two dozen Guangdong on his first major political tour. Of the five days he echelon to ensure that the ‘Party holds the gun,’” he said. Xi is kept the funding tap wide open for new military hardware and countries since election night. spent there, three were at a military base, according to official cov- shown mixing with the lower ranks, too. Dressed in plain military- substantially improved pay and conditions for the troops. His globetrotting burnished an image of a strong erage of his trip. style khaki slacks and shirt, the solidly built 60-year-old stands in Xi appears set to maintain heavy military spending despite leader committed to getting things done in a country The son of a Communist revolutionary commander, Xi built his mess lines, selects a plate and chopsticks from a stack and is competing needs. A hundred million Chinese still live in poverty, where the pace of policy is often glacial. And Tokyo’s career as a friend of the army, and at times an official in it. But he filmed eating and chatting with soldiers and sailors. according to official measures, and there is growing pressure to winning bid to host the 2020 Olympics gave national still feels compelled to ask his generals for something in return: spend more on health, education and pollution control. Official pride another shot in the arm, as well as promises of loyalty. “First, we must keep in mind that the military must Military Princeling defense spending is set to climb 10.7 per cent this year to $119 bil- further economic benefits. “Abenomics definitely unswervingly adhere to the party’s absolute leadership and obey Xi, like all of China’s Communist leaders, insists the PLA is lion. Much spending takes place outside the budget, however, deserves praise,” said Ivan Tselichtchev, economics pro- the party’s orders,” he said on one of his many military inspection bound with the party’s fortunes. The army delivered political pow- and many analysts estimate real outlays are closer to $200 billion, fessor at Niigata University of Management. “It has tours. er with its civil war victory in 1949 over the Nationalists. It fought second only to the United States. The US Defense Department’s greatly improved sentiment among investors and con- Xi’s injunction that the party comes first is a sign of the insecu- the US to a prestige-enhancing stalemate in Korea. It buffered 2012 budget totaled $566 billion. sumers which is a positive for economy.” Applause for rity modern Chinese leaders feel at the top of their nation’s huge tumult at home in the early decades of the People’s Republic and the two-time premier is a far cry from 2006 when his and increasingly powerful armed forces, military experts say. As it ended the 1989 Tiananmen protests in a bloody crackdown. In his Friendly Generals term ended in ignominy and illness after just a year in grows mightier, the People’s Liberation Army is growing trickier to task of cementing ties with the generals, Xi had a head start. His As Xi came to power at the 18th Party Congress in November office. govern. The PLA’s rising global profile is integral to Xi’s stated father, Xi Zhongxun, was a Communist guerrilla fighter who last year, there was substantial turnover in the Central Military This time around, Abe’s efforts are bearing fruit. His vision for the nation: the “China Dream,” a rejuvenated country policies and those of his new central bank governor that’s both peace-loving and militarily powerful. But Xi is less a Haruhiko Kuroda helped sharply weaken the yen the true military man than Deng and the founder of the People’s unit has lost a fifth of its value against the dollar this Republic, Mao Zedong. He is fundamentally a career bureaucrat, year, giving a boost to exporters - while the stock mar- like his immediate predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. ket has surged more than 50 percent to a six-year high. Like them, Xi has to win over the force that keeps the Economic growth slowed in the third quarter, but busi- Communist Party in power. But he must do so at a time when the ness confidence remains at a six-year high, while a key PLA is more self-confident than ever, mounting the first serious inflation indicator in October rose at the fastest pace challenge to the naval dominance of the United States since the since the late ‘90s. But observers say firms must now end of the Cold War. “It will take time for Xi to take control of the raise wages so employees have more to spend, driving military,” says Huang Jing, an authority on the PLA at the National the economy and giving the corporate sector confi- University of Singapore. “Most of the senior generals were not dence to expand. appointed by Xi. Instead they were all appointed by his predeces- An increase in pay packets is even more crucial sors.” ahead of a sales tax rise next year to 8.0 percent from The rise of a nationalistic leader with military leanings comes 5.0 percent, a move aimed at shrinking Japan’s huge as the People’s Liberation Army, with 2.3 million men and women national debt, proportionately the worst among under arms, is the hard edge of a rising China. China’s annual mili- wealthy nations. The International Monetary Fund, tary spending is now second only to that of the US armed forces. among others, has welcomed Tokyo’s efforts to get its The PLA navy is projecting power further into the Pacific. Years of fiscal house in order, but the tax rise has stoked fears it buying, copying and sometimes stealing technology have helped will derail a recovery. The last sales tax rise, in 1997, the PLA narrow its capability gap with the United States and other foreshadowed the fall into deflation. rivals in Asia. ‘I’m worried about our future’ Beyond Borders And while the economy is moving to move in the Xi, as chairman of the Central Military Commission, is com- right direction, there is a growing disillusionment with mander-in-chief alongside his roles as party general secretary and the leadership.
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