DOCSLIB.ORG

And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy Abstract

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy Abstract And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy Abstract This PhD dissertation is on infinite regress arguments in philosophy. Its main goals are to explain what such arguments from many distinct philosophical debates have in common, and to provide guidelines for using and evaluating them. Two theories are reviewed: the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory . According to the Paradox Theory, infinite regress arguments can be used to refute an existentially or universally quantified statement (e.g. to refute the statement that at least one discussion is settled, or the statement that discussions are settled only if there is an agreed-upon criterion to settle them). According to the Failure Theory, infinite regress arguments can be used to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to solve an existentially or universally quantified problem (e.g. to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to settle all discussions, or that it fails to settle even one discussion). In the literature, the Paradox Theory is fairly well developed, and this dissertation provides the Failure Theory with the same tools. Cover painting: ‘Going around in circles’ by Sanne Rous (2010) Contact [email protected] http://sites.google.com/site/janwillemwieland/ Submission 12/12 Defense and minor changes 2/13 Supervisor Prof. Dr. Erik Weber, Ghent University Co-Supervisor Prof. Dr. Maarten Van Dyck, Ghent University Doctoral Guidance Committee Prof. Dr. Arianna Betti, VU University Amsterdam Reading Committee Prof. Dr. Arianna Betti, VU University Amsterdam Dr. Tim De Mey, Erasmus University Rotterdam Dr. Bert Leuridan, Ghent University Prof. Dr. Joke Meheus, Ghent University Prof. Dr. Benjamin Schnieder, University of Hamburg Chair Examination Committee Prof. Dr. Freddy Mortier, Ghent University Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte Jan Willem Wieland And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy Proefschrift voorgedragen tot het behalen van de graad van Doctor in de Wijsbegeerte 2012 Contents Foreword vii 1. Introduction 1 1.1. Key terms and hypotheses 1.1.1. Argument schema, instance 1.1.2. Reconstruction, evaluation 1.1.3. Regress, regress argument 1.2. Everyday regresses 1.3. The use of schemas 1.3.1. Metaphilosophical arguments 1.3.2. Methodological arguments 1.3.3. Obstacles 1.4. Overview 2. Regress Argument Schemas 27 2.1. Desiderata 2.2. The Paradox Schema 2.2.1. Schema 2.2.2. Validity 2.2.3. Boundaries 2.2.4. Literature 2.3. The Failure Schemas 2.3.1. Schemas 2.3.2. Validity 2.3.3. Boundaries 2.3.4. Literature 3. Instances 67 3.1. Argument reconstruction 3.2. Paradox filling instructions 3.3. Failure filling instructions 3.4. Selected full instances 3.4.1. Sextus Empiricus 3.4.2. Lewis Carroll 3.4.3. Russell 3.4.4. Wittgenstein 3.4.5. Ryle 4. Analysis 91 4.1. Comparison schemas I: Structure 4.1.1. Similarities 4.1.2. Generating the regress v And So On 4.1.3. From regress to conclusion 4.1.4. Scepticism 4.1.5. Dialectics 4.2. Regress 4.2.1. Series vs. regresses 4.2.2. Viciousness 4.2.3. Infinity 4.2.4. Circularity 5. Applications 129 5.1. Fallacies 5.2. Regressive Pragmatism 5.3. Carroll’s Tortoise 5.4. Epistemic Infinitism 5.5. Access principle 5.6. Russell’s relations 5.7. Quine/Davidson controversy 6. Meta-Debate 157 6.1. The literature 6.1.1. Three camps 6.1.2. Passmore’s Failure-hypotheses 6.1.3. Gratton’s Failure-hypotheses 6.2. Comparison schemas II: Soundness 6.2.1. Schema choice 6.2.2. In favour of the Failure Schema 6.2.3. Revisionism 7. Epilogue: Two Theories 191 7.1. Taking stock 7.2. The Paradox Theory 7.3. The Failure Theory 7.4. Epilogue Summary in Dutch 199 References 209 vi Foreword The Tortoise was saying, “Have you got that last step written down? Unless I’ve lost count, that makes a thousand and one. There are several millions more to come.” (Carroll 1895) […] and so on ad infinitum, so that, since we have no place from which to begin to establish anything, suspension of judgement follows. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism ) If you say ‘and so on’, you yourself do not know more than ‘and so on’. (Wittgenstein 1956) 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on to infinity. If there is an infinite regress, people usually write this phrase, or some variant of it, because they do not want to go to infinity themselves. For myself, I prefer simply ‘and so on’, accompanied by a bit of handwaving. The phrase suggests that the idea is clear, that from that point onward the regress is obvious. The reader knows how to go on. But do we really know how to go on in each and every case? No doubt most of us, except perhaps Wittgenstein’s pupil (see his 1953: §185), do know how to go on in cases involving natural numbers. For many regresses, though, I am not so sure. In this dissertation on regress arguments, I collect and spell out a variety of cases deriving from all corners of philosophy: from concerns about morality to problems about rationality, from Sextus to Russell to contemporary philosophers. Still, even if one does know how to go on, it is not clear what follows. If there is an infinite regress, then what ? What is to be concluded from it? As one philosopher put it after having described such a regress: How does “the story go on from here”? (Johnson 1978: 68) As another philosopher ‘solved’ this issue: Here the narrator, having pressing business at the Bank, was obliged to leave the happy pair. (Carroll 1895: 280) In other words, we want to know not only what regresses are, but also what kinds of conclusions can be drawn from them. This is the most important query in this dissertation, and I explore two different answers to it. vii And So On Specifically, I develop two theories of regress arguments, which will be called the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory . I readily admit that this dissertation is no especially academic production embedded in cutting-edge, quickly evolving discussions in our field. Also, it is not my own deepest production; not a resolute attempt to open up our way of looking at the world and ourselves. I have tried to do such things elsewhere, modestly, in my side project on Pyrrhonian scepticism, i.e. the view that propagates global suspension of belief. This dissertation is of a different nature. First, it is intended as a real, scientific project with a clear and, in some sense, timeless objective: to find out how regress arguments are supposed to work. This just had to be sorted out. I am of course not the first to address this topic, but my predecessors are few in number and have left unresolved some rather delicate issues (especially regarding the Failure Theory, which is my original contribution to the debate). Second, the results of this study ought to be of interest to anyone who employs regresses in one’s reasoning; virtually, then, to all philosophers. Third, it aims to contribute to the progress of philosophy as a discipline. Like any other inquirer into philosophical methodology (i.e. the branch of philosophy which studies how philosophers can and should proceed), I hope that my investigation will make a difference to the philosopher’s practice. Particularly, I hope that from now on disputes about any particular regress argument (concerning what it establishes, or concerning whether it can be resisted) will be more clearly motivated, and indeed more clearly framed, in terms of the Paradox or Failure Theories outlined in what follows. viii FOREWORD Several acknowledgements are in order. I am grateful to: Tim De Mey for sending me to Ghent. To Erik Weber and Maarten Van Dyck for taking me on board, providing a nice niche for the kind of project that I wanted to pursue, and advice during the past years. Special thanks to Erik for showing how to do things hypothetically and for urging me to find more applications, and to Maarten for stimulating my interests in epistemology through our first-year course. To Arianna Betti and Anna-Sofia Maurin for advice from a distance and attracting my attention to the debate on regress arguments in the first place. To the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) for funding my research project. To Jon Sozek for the language edit. To Sanne Rous for the cover painting. To Gitte Callaert for help with the design. To Mathieu Beirlaen, Frederik Van De Putte and Christian Straßer for checking parts of the formalisations. To Philipp Blum for reminding me of the Sisyphus case which closes this dissertation. To audiences and colleagues at many conferences and seminars for discussion and suggestions. To the referees of my articles. To Eline, Annemart, Frijk and my parents for plenty of unrelated things. And finally to Prof. Dr. Freddy Mortier, the chair of the examination committee, and to Prof. Dr. Arianna Betti, Dr. Tim De Mey, Prof. Dr. Joke Meheus, Dr. Bert Leuridan, and Prof. Dr. Benjamin Schnieder for taking part in my reading committee, and to Bert and Benjamin for helpful feedback in the final stage (Benjamin’s insistence on the formal details of my story led to substantial improvements of §2). ix §1 Introduction And So On 1.1. Key Terms and Hypotheses In the following I identify six key terms of this dissertation: argument schema, instance, reconstruction, evaluation, regress, and regress argument. I do not pretend to say anything new or controversial in this part. My aim is only to explicate what will be meant by the terms.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Thomas Aquinas' Argument from Motion & the Kalām Cosmological
    University of Central Florida STARS Honors Undergraduate Theses UCF Theses and Dissertations 2020 Rethinking Causality: Thomas Aquinas' Argument From Motion & the Kalām Cosmological Argument Derwin Sánchez Jr. University of Central Florida Part of the Philosophy Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the UCF Theses and Dissertations at STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Sánchez, Derwin Jr., "Rethinking Causality: Thomas Aquinas' Argument From Motion & the Kalām Cosmological Argument" (2020). Honors Undergraduate Theses. 858. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses/858 RETHINKING CAUSALITY: THOMAS AQUINAS’ ARGUMENT FROM MOTION & THE KALĀM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT by DERWIN SANCHEZ, JR. A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Philosophy in the College of Arts and Humanities and in the Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Fall Term 2020 Thesis Chair: Dr. Cyrus Zargar i ABSTRACT Ever since they were formulated in the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas’ famous Five Ways to demonstrate the existence of God have been frequently debated. During this process there have been several misconceptions of what Aquinas actually meant, especially when discussing his cosmological arguments. While previous researchers have managed to tease out why Aquinas accepts some infinite regresses and rejects others, I attempt to add on to this by demonstrating the centrality of his metaphysics in his argument from motion.
    [Show full text]
  • Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument
    This is a draft of an article published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Citations should be to published version: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1501400 ​ Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument Abstract: Many take the claim that you can’t ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non-moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs– a view I call moral inferentialism – ​ presents an attractive non-skeptical moral epistemology. “Why should I believe this set of propositions?” is quite different from the logical question: “What is the smallest and logically simplest group of propositions from which this set of propositions can be deduced?” –Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism p. 129 §1 Is to Ought Of the many theses that have been held about the relationship between thoughts about what is and ​ thoughts about what is good or what ought to be, one of the most straightforward often gets overlooked. ​ ​ ​ The following is, I imagine, a common experience: a thought crosses your mind about how things are, were, or might be. Next, you have an evaluative or a deontic thought – a thought about goodness, badness or about what ought to be done. Not only does the one thought follow the other, but it seems the first thought – the thought about what ‘is’ – justifies the second thought about value or obligation. For ​ ​ instance, you think: ‘The old man collapsed and is in pain,’ and that seems to support the thought that something bad has happened and you ought to help.
    [Show full text]
  • THE MORAL CLOSURE ARGUMENT Matt Lutz
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v19i1.243 Vol. 19, No. 1 · January 2021 © 2021 Author THE MORAL CLOSURE ARGUMENT Matt Lutz skeptical hypothesis argument introduces a scenario—a skeptical hypothesis—where our beliefs about some subject matter are systemat- A ically false, but our experiences do not discriminate between the case where our beliefs are true and the skeptical scenario where they are not. Because we are unable to rule out this scenario, we do not know that any of our beliefs about the subject matter are true. As one famous skeptical hypothesis argument goes: I cannot rule out the hypothesis that I am being deceived by a demon. Therefore, I cannot know anything about the external world. By similar token, a moral skeptical hypothesis argument is an argument that moral knowledge is impossible for agents like us in situations like ours, because we are unable to rule out some skeptical hypothesis. In this paper, I will defend a moral skeptical hypothesis argument—the Mor- al Closure Argument—against a number of objections. This argument is not novel, but it has rarely been taken seriously because it is widely held that the argument has serious flaws. My task in this paper is to argue that these supposed flaws are merely apparent; the Moral Closure Argument is much more potent than it might seem. 1. The Moral Closure Argument Let us introduce a few of the concepts that will feature prominently in the dis- cussion to come. Closure: If S knows that P, and P entails Q, and S believes that Q on the basis of competently deducing Q from P, while retaining knowledge of P throughout his reasoning, then S knows that Q.1 A closure argument is a kind of skeptical hypothesis argument that relies on Clo- 1 There are other ways to formulate Closure, but this is the most widely accepted version of the principle.
    [Show full text]
  • These Disks Contain My Version of Paul Spade's Expository Text and His Translated Texts
    These disks contain my version of Paul Spade's expository text and his translated texts. They were converted from WordStar disk format to WordPerfect 5.1 disk format, and then I used a bunch of macros and some hands-on work to change most of the FancyFont formatting codes into WordPerfect codes. Many transferred nicely. Some of them are still in the text (anything beginning with a backslash is a FancyFont code). Some I just erased without knowing what they were for. All of the files were cleaned up with one macro, and some of them have been further doctored with additional macros I wrote later and additional hand editing. This explains why some are quite neat, and others somewhat cluttered. In some cases I changed Spade's formatting to make the printout look better (to me); often this is because I lost some of his original formatting. I have occasionally corrected obvious typos, and in at least one case I changed an `although' to a `but' so that the line would fit on the same page. With these exceptions, I haven't intentionally changed any of the text. All of the charts made by graphics are missing entirely (though in a few cases I perserved fragments so you can sort of tell what it was like). Some of the translations had numbers down the side of the page to indicate location in the original text; these are all lost. Translation 1.5 (Aristotle) was not on the disk I got, so it is listed in the table of contents, but you won't find it.
    [Show full text]
  • The Likeness Regress: Plato's Parmenides 132Cl2-133A7
    THE LIKENESS REGRESS THE LIKENESS REGRESS PLATO'S PARMENIDES 132C12-133A 7 By KARL DARCY OTTO, B.A., M.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy McMaster University © Copyright by Karl Darcy Otto, July 2003 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (2003) Mc Master University (Philosophy) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: The Likeness Regress: Plato's Parmenides 132cl2-133a7 AUTHOR: Karl Darcy Otto, B.A. (Toronto), M.A. (McMaster) SUPERVISOR: Professor David L. Hitchcock NUMBER OF PAGES: x, 147 11 Abstract Since Forms and particulars are separate, Plato is left with the task of describing the way in which they are related. One possible way of con­ struing this relation is to suppose that particulars resemble Forms. Socrates proposes this and is refuted by Parmenides in the so-called Likeness Regress (Parmenzdes 132c12-133a7). This work comprises both an exposition and an analysis of the Likeness Regress. In the exposition, I work out the argument-form of the Like­ ness Regress in second-order logic (and later, show that first-order logic is sufficient). This symbolisation provides a baseline for the balance of the exposition, which has two focusses: first, I define what it means for par­ ticulars to resemble Forms, with the help of D. M. Armstrong's account of resemblance in A Theory of Unwersals; second, I demonstrate that the infinite regress argument of the Likeness Regress is indeed vicious, with the help of T. Roy's theory of regress arguments. In the analysis, I proceed with the premiss that an asymmetrical account of the resemblance relation would allow Socrates to escape Parmenides' refu­ tation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Regress Argument I. Doxastic Vs. Propositional Justification There
    Phil. 159: Epistemology October 18, 2018 Lecture 14: The Regress Argument I. Doxastic vs. Propositional Justification There are two importantly different ways in which we talk about justification in the realm of belief: “S is justified in believing P.” “S’s belief in P is justified.” “Believing P is justified for S.” “S’s belief in P is well founded.” “S has a justification for believing P.” “S justifiably believes P.” The sentences in the left-hand column are compatible with S not believing P, and they are compatible with S believing P but for terrible reasons. The sentences in the right-hand column, on the other hand, imply both that S believes P and that S does so for the right reasons. The sort of justification picked out by the sentences in the left-hand column is called propositional justification. The object of assessment here is a proposition, which may or may not be believed by the subject in question. The sort of justification picked out by the sentences in the right-hand column is called doxastic justification. (‘Doxastic’ means ‘pertaining to belief’.) The object of assessment here is a belief. Some authors think beliefs can be morally justified, prudentially justified, aesthetically justified, and so on in addition to being epistemically justified (i.e. justified in that distinctive way which is relevant to knowledge). I will usually drop the ‘epistemically’-qualifier unless it matters. II. Mediate vs. Immediate Justification Some of our beliefs are (doxastically) justified because they are supported by other beliefs that we have. However, in order for these further beliefs to provide the right sort of support, it seems that they themselves must be justified.
    [Show full text]
  • The Regress Argument for Moral Skepticism
    Sara Ash Writing Sample The Regress Argument for Moral Skepticism Introduction An important epistemological question about morality is whether we can be justified in believing any moral claim. Justification of moral beliefs is an important aspect of morality, because without reasons for believing moral claims, morality becomes unacceptably arbitrary. In this paper, I will present and explain the regress argument for moral justification skepticism. Afterward, I will present objections to some of the premises in the argument and accompanying responses to those objections. I conclude at the end of this paper that the regress argument, while valid, is probably not sound and therefore does not successfully undermine moral justification. The Infinite Regress Argument The infinite regress argument is an argument for general skepticism, but Walter Sinnott- Armstrong has adapted the argument to morality and suggests that “If the problems raised by these arguments cannot be solved at least in morality, then we cannot be justified in believing any moral claims” (9). This argument contains a series of conditionals whose consequents comprise disjunctions. By applying the rules of disjunctive syllogism and modus tollens, the argument is intended to show that none of the ways in which a person can be justified in believing a moral claim works. Sinnott-Armstrong’s clear and concise formulation of the infinite regress argument taken from his paper “Moral Skepticism and Justification” in the anthology Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology
    [Show full text]
  • The Interplay Between Relations, Substances, and Existence By
    The Interplay Between Relations, Substances, and Existence By Andrew Janes A Thesis Submitted to Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts - Honours in Philosophy. April, 2019, Halifax, Nova Scotia Copyright Andrew Janes, 2019 Approved: Scott Edgar Doctor Date: 12/04/19 ​ 2 The Interplay Between Relations, Substances, and Existence by Andrew Janes Abstract This thesis explores the ontology of relations and the implications of it. I make the case that relations between multiple substances are impossible. Furthermore, I argue that existence is a predicate, and can therefore be the predicate of a relation. I do this to push the argument that substances cannot exist in relation to each other. The conclusion I make from this is that only one substance can exist, since otherwise a substance could exist in relation to another substance. This conclusion, I point out, is the doctrine of substance monism. Furthermore, I argue that the self exists, because it is given in experience. Because the self is a substance, and I have argued for substance monism, the self is the only substance there is. This conclusion is idealism, and, in conjunction with substance monism, necessitates solipsism. 12/04/19 3 1. Introduction In this paper, I investigate the commitments one must make when they uphold the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR),1 which asserts that for every fact, truth, and state of affairs, there is a sufficient reason that explains why it holds. More specifically, I aim to investigate commitments regarding relations. Furthermore, I aim to show why these commitments ultimately lead to an abandonment of substance pluralism2 and realism.3 That is, one must abandon the PSR if they are to believe that substance pluralism or realism holds true, or abandon substance pluralism and realism if they believe the PSR to be true.
    [Show full text]
  • The Medieval Social Epistemologies of Augustine and Aquinas
    Knowing and Trusting: The Medieval Social Epistemologies of Augustine and Aquinas by Matthew Kent Siebert A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2014 © Copyright by Matthew Kent Siebert, 2014 Knowing and Trusting The Medieval Social Epistemologies of Augustine and Aquinas Matthew Kent Siebert Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2014 Abstract This dissertation is an introductory exploration of two influential medieval thinkers, Augustine and Aquinas, on the topic of testimony. I explain how Augustine’s view that testimony is a source of knowledge (notitia) developed through four stages, and argue that on Augustine’s view testimonial belief is justified inferentially. I argue that Aquinas thinks some testimonial belief is justified inferentially, and some is justified by adhering to the speaker as the formal object of one’s belief, on the grounds that the speaker is truthful. I argue that these provide knowledge when they provide cognitio. And I argue that Aquinas’s view can be developed into a plausible account of testimonial trust and trustworthiness. ii Acknowledgments I am extremely grateful for the guidance and support of Peter King, Martin Pickavé, and Jennifer Nagel in the writing of this dissertation. I am also grateful to Deborah Black, Michael Siebert, Simona Vucu, and Ian Drummond, for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of some of these chapters. And I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Government of Ontario, and the University of Toronto for financial support.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Causal Series
    There Must Be A First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Causal Series Abstract Several of Thomas Aquinas’s proofs for the existence of God rely on the claim that causal series cannot proceed in infinitum. I argue that Aquinas has good reason to hold this claim given his conception of causation. Because he holds that effects are ontologically dependent on their causes he holds that the relevant causal series are wholly derivative: the later members of such series serve as causes only insofar as they have been caused by and are effects of earlier members. Because the intermediate causes in such series possess causal powers only by deriving them from all the preceding causes, they need a first and non-derivative cause to serve as the source of their causal powers. Keywords Thomas Aquinas; Five Ways; Causal Series; Infinite; Causal Regress; Causation; Ontological Dependence; God; Proofs This is an Author's Original/Accepted Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the Version of Record, has been published in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy, September 5, 2013, copyright Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2013.816934 A. Introduction Thomas Aquinas claims that certain sorts of causal series cannot proceed in infinitum. This claim is central to the first three of the famous five ways for demonstrating the existence of God that he presents in his Summa Theologiae (ST). Many interpreters have attacked both the claim and the considerations which Aquinas offers in support of it. Some interpreters, such as Bertrand Russell and John Hick, read Aquinas either as negligently dismissing the possibility of infinite series without a first member or as assuming a rejection of the infinite, based on certain (supposedly dubious) arguments that Aquinas puts forward elsewhere.1 Other interpreters, including distinguished scholars 1 Bertrand Russell writes that the Five Ways “depend on the supposed impossibility of a series having no first term.
    [Show full text]
  • Routledge Chapter
    Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem? Declan Smithies Forthcoming in Current Controversies in Epistemology. Edited by Ram Neta. Routledge, 2014. 1. Introduction Foundationalism is a thesis about the structure of epistemic justification – that is, the distinctive kind of justification that we have for our beliefs. To a first approximation, foundationalism is the thesis that some of our beliefs are foundationally justified, while all other justified beliefs are justified in a derivative way by their relations to foundationally justified beliefs. In metaphorical terms, our belief system has the structure of a building in which the whole edifice is supported by its foundations. To make the thesis more precise, we can draw a distinction between inferentially and non-inferentially justified beliefs.1 A belief is inferentially justified if and only if it is justified in a way that depends upon the justification of other beliefs, whereas a belief is non-inferentially justified if and only if it is justified in a way that does not depend upon the justification of any other beliefs. Foundationalism can now be defined more precisely as the thesis that some beliefs are non-inferentially justified, while all other justified beliefs are inferentially justified in a way that depends on their relations to non-inferentially justified beliefs.2 Foundationalism can be understood as a thesis about the structure of justified belief in either propositional or doxastic senses of the term. A belief is 1 justified in the propositional sense if and only if the believer has justification to hold the belief, whereas a belief is justified in the doxastic sense if and only if the believer holds the belief in a way that is justified.
    [Show full text]
  • The Regress Problem
    Chapter 1 The Regress Problem Abstract The attempt to justify our beliefs leads to the regress problem. We briefly recount the problem’s history and recall the two traditional solutions, foun- dationalism and coherentism, before turning to infinitism. According to in- finitists, the regress problem is not a genuine difficulty, since infinite chains of reasons are not as troublesome as they may seem. A comparison with causal chains suggests that a proper assessment of infinitistic ideas requires that the concept of justification be made clear. 1.1 Reasons for Reasons: Agrippa’s Trilemma We believe many things: that the earth is a spheroid, that Queen Victoria reigned for more that sixty years, that Stockholm is the capital of Finland, that the Russians were the first to land on the moon. Some of these beliefs are true, others are false. A belief might be true by accident. Suppose I have a phobia which makes me believe that there is a poisonous snake under my bed. After many visits to a psychiatrist and intensive therapy I gradually try to convince myself that this belief stems from traumatic and suppressed childhood experiences. One fine day I finally reach the point where I, nerv- ous and trembling, force myself to get into bed before first looking under it. Unbeknownst to me or the psychiatrist, however, a venomous snake has escaped from the zoo and has ensconced itself under my bed. My belief in the proposition ‘There is a poisonous snake under my bed’ is true, but it is accidentally true. I do not have a good reason for this belief, since I am © The Author(s) 2017 1 D.
    [Show full text]