Rhode Island College Digital Commons @ RIC Honors Projects Overview Honors Projects 4-2017 Mind-Body Dualism: A Neo-Leibnizian Argument David Kendall Casey Rhode Island College,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/honors_projects Part of the Philosophy of Mind Commons Recommended Citation Casey, David Kendall, "Mind-Body Dualism: A Neo-Leibnizian Argument" (2017). Honors Projects Overview. 133. https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/honors_projects/133 This Honors is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Projects at Digital Commons @ RIC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Projects Overview by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ RIC. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. MIND-BODY DUALISM: A NEO-LEIBNIZIAN ARGUMENT By David Kendall Casey An Honors Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Honors in The Department of Philosophy Rhode Island College April, 2017 Abstract This paper attempts to construct a novel argument against the theory of materialism in Philosophy of Mind. Specifically, I argue that materialism cannot be a sufficient answer to the mind-body problem. That is, in the attempt to provide a satisfactory answer as to how the mind is related to the body, the claim that the mind is identical to the brain, I contend, is untenable. First, I explicate the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, then I use it to demonstrate the falsity of the claim: the mind = the brain. In doing so, I argue that the mind and the brain do not have the same properties in virtue of what I’ve deemed a “neo-Leibnizian” argument.