The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

Department of Psychology

THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS IN THE ENCODING AND RETRIEVAL OF FACES

A Thesis in

Psychology

by

Troy Garrett Steiner

© 2017 Troy Garrett Steiner

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science

December 2017 ii

The thesis of Troy Garrett Steiner was reviewed and approved* by the following:

Reginald B. Adams, Jr. Associate Professor of Psychology Thesis Advisor

Theresa K. Vescio Associate Professor of Psychology

Nancy A. Dennis Associate Professor of Psychology

Melvin Mark Professor of Psychology Head of the Department of Psychology

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School iii

ABSTRACT

The ability to remember people— a skill detectable in newborn infants (Field,

Woodson, & Greenberg, 1983) — is remarkable and critical to a functional social life

(Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). However, memory is often imperfect (e.g., eyewitnesses identify the wrong individual as often as 78% of the time; Malpass & Devine, 1981), as well as biased (e.g., the ability to remember faces dramatically decreases if the person belongs to a different group or race; Hugenberg &

Corneille, 2009). Several contemporary models attempt to address how preconceived expectations might influence the ability to accurately remember faces (i.e., sensitivity) as well as the tendency to falsely remember a face (i.e., bias). However, these models differ on whether people will be more adept at remembering faces that satisfy (i.e., are congruent with) or violate (i.e., are incongruent to) preconceived expectations and whether the contribution of these expectancies will have the greatest influence at the initial formation of the memory (encoding) or at the recall stage of the memory

(retrieval). Across three experiments, I present evidence addressing how individual differences in expectation strength operationalized as stereotype endorsement influences memory sensitivity and memory bias and the contributory effects of the encoding and retrieval stages of memory to this phenomenon. These results are later interpreted and discussed in light of the models reviewed, with a focus on societal implications, and potential future directions seeking to further examine potential moderators and additional cognitive underpinnings of this phenomenon. iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ...... v

List of Tables ...... vi

Acknowledgements ...... vii

Chapter 1 The Relationship between Social Expectations and Memory ...... 1

Encoding and Retrieval ...... 5 Models that Address how Expectations Influence Memory ...... 7 Schematic Information-Processing Model ...... 8 Schema-Pointer Plus Tag Model ...... 9 Attractor Field Model ...... 10 Associative Network Model ...... 12 Model Comparisons ...... 13 Current Research ...... 15

Chapter 2 Method ...... 17

Experiment 1 ...... 18 Participants ...... 18 Stimuli ...... 19 Design and Procedure...... 20 Results ...... 23 Discussion ...... 26 Experiment 2 ...... 29 Participants ...... 30 Stimuli ...... 30 Design and Procedure...... 30 Results ...... 31 Discussion ...... 34 Experiment 3 ...... 37 Participants ...... 38 Stimuli ...... 38 Design and Procedure...... 39 Results ...... 39 Discussion ...... 42

Chapter 3 General Discussion ...... 46

Experimental Review ...... 47 Implication for the Models of Expectations and Memory ...... 50 Social Implications ...... 54 Conclusions and Future Directions ...... 55 Appendix: List of Math Questions Used in the Distractor Task ...... 58 v

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1. Example stimuli for Experiments 1, 2, and 3 ...... 20

Figure 2-2. Experiment 1 Results: Sensitivity ...... 25

Figure 2-3. Experiment 1 Results: Bias ...... 26

Figure 2-4. Experiment 2 Results: Sensitivity ...... 33

Figure 2-5. Experiment 2 Results: Bias ...... 34

Figure 2-6. Experiment 3 Results: Sensitivity ...... 41

Figure 2-7. Experiment 3 Results: Bias ...... 42 vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1. Model Comparisons ...... 15 vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“Nanos gigantum humeris insidentes”, I am but a dwarf standing on the shoulders of giants; Bernard of Chartres and later Isaac Newton were describing the great bodies of work that provided the foundation for their own accomplishments. Indeed, this thesis would not have been possible without the contributions of the scientific community, but I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to the people whose gracious generosity and insurmountable kindness made this accomplishment possible; you too are the giants upon which I stand. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Reginald B. Adams, Jr, for his support, guidance, and for providing me this all- too-rare opportunity. I would also like to thank my parents and grandparents for leading by example with respect to their admirations for kindness, humor, family, and science. I am also grateful to my friend and lab-mate, Anthony J. Nelson, of whom I have always thought of as a role model and mentor. I would also like to thank my brother-in-arms, Daniel N. Albohn, for both his continuing support and constant challenge in nearly all aspects of my life. Furthermore, this work would not have been possible without my dedicated team of research assistants: Brandon F.

McCormick, Brittney O. Jessick, Natalie A. Augustine, Kierstin Barbieri, Andrea K. Frank,

Malini Suresh Nair, and Rachel L. Waite. Finally, I would like to express my tremendous gratitude and boundless love to my fiancée, Irena Gorski, for all the things that would take another thesis to put into words. 1

Chapter 1

The Relationship between Social Expectations and Memory

The ability to remember people— a skill detectable in newborn infants (Field,

Woodson, & Greenberg, 1983) — is remarkable. As Hood and colleagues (2003) noted,

faces are more alike than dissimilar, and yet people are capable of recognizing thousands

of individual faces. People are even able to discriminate between minute differences in

facial structure among thousands of other people and capable of recognizing people seen

from a different angle, with glasses, hats, different hairstyles, or after years of aging

(Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006; Tanaka, Giles, Kremen, & Simon, 1998; Tank &

Hopfield, 1987). However, memory is often imperfect (e.g., eyewitnesses identify the wrong individual as often as 78% of the time; Malpass & Devine, 1981), as well as biased (e.g., the ability to remember faces dramatically decreases if the person belongs to a different group or race; Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009).

The ability to remember people is crucial to functional social interactions and

memory errors substantially hinder people’s lives (Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski,

Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). For example, face memory errors may lead to the

avoidance of social interactions (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005; Duchaine & Nakayama,

2006), difficulty maintaining interpersonal relationships (Duchaine, 2000; Duchaine &

Nakayama, 2005), damages to a person’s career (Duchaine, 2000), and even depression

(Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005). Face memory’s daily, prominent, and versatile influence

on people’s lives has made it one of the most intensively studied aspects of human 2

cognition for the past 40 years and continues to attract scientists from a wide range of

disciplines (Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000).

The study of face memory has been heavily influenced by cognitive and social psychology research (Calder et al., 2000). The integration of these subfields has transformed our understanding of face memory and why certain faces are more easily remembered than others. For instance, the cognitive miser theory, born from social cognition, suggests processing resources are limited (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) and accurately remembering faces is costly (Hugenberg et al., 2010; for review see Miyake &

Shah, 1999). However, some faces require fewer resources to process and/or garner more attention and processing resources and are thus easier to remember (Hugenberg et al.,

2010; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; for review see Reber, Schwarz, Winkielman, 2004).

Visual cognition research has demonstrated that the basic visual components of

faces (e.g., symmetry, clarity, complexity, and contrast) influence processing costs (for

review see Reber, Schwarz, Winkielman, 2004). Social cognition research has likewise

demonstrated that social factors influence processing costs and determine which faces are

the primary recipients of resource expenditure (DeWall & Maner, 2008; Fiske, 1993;

Guinote & Vescio, 2010; Hugenberg et al., 2010; Maner et al., 2008; Neuberg & Fiske,

1987; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009). For example, people are better at remembering faces

belonging to members of one’s own race (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Chance &

Goldstein, 1981; Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969) and social group

(Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007; Hugenberg et al., 2010). People are also better at

remembering those of higher social status (Ratcliff et al., 2011) and those whose face

convey motivationally relevant cues (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009). 3

Social cognitive research has also revealed that certain facial cues and the

combination of these cues influence the processing of and ability to remember others

(Clore, 1992; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). The

manner in which various social cues combine to influence social attention, perception,

and memory has been recently underscored as evidence that our visual system is largely

organized according to the social relevance of these combined messages (for review see

Adams, Albohn, & Kveraga, 2017). Early on Adams and Kleck (2005) proposed that

faces displaying facial cues that share social meaning (i.e., share congruent signal value)

perceptually combine to reduce processing demands (e.g., wide, averted eyes with high

brows are more easily identified as fear in combination; for review see Adams et al.,

2010). A growing body of research has now demonstrated combinatorial influences

across a variety of social cues where processing demands are reduced including, but not

limited to: eye gaze and emotion (Adams & Kleck, 2003; Adams et al., 2003), race and

emotion (Ackerman et al. 2006; Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007; Hugenberg,

2005), race and eye gaze (Adams, Pauker, Weisbuch, 2010), gender and age (Quinn &

Macrae, 2005), body and face (de Gelder, 2006), and gender and emotion (Adams, Hess,

& Kleck, 2015; Becker et al., 2007). Compound social cue congruity (shared social

meaning) can also be defined with respect to preconceived expectations people hold (e.g.,

gender stereotypes; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Stereotypes themselves are considered to have developed in order to increase processing fluency (Macrae, Milne, &

Bodenhausen, 1994; Sherman, Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000). However, the research examining the influence of social cue congruity relative to the perceivers’ social expectations on memory performance remains limited and mixed. 4

Several contemporary models attempt to address how preconceived expectations

might influence memory, but they differ on whether people will be more prone to

processing facial cues that are congruent or incongruent with social expectations, and

whether the contribution of these expectancies will have the greatest influence at the

initial formation of the memory (encoding) or at the recall stage of the memory

(retrieval). Memory research has also differentiated between sensitivity and bias effects.

Sensitivity is defined as the difference between the rate at which people correctly identify

old stimuli as familiar and the misidentification of novel stimuli as old. Bias, on the other

hand, refers to the likelihood of identifying a face as familiar regardless of its novelty.

Some of these models suggest that faces displaying facial cues that satisfy (i.e., are

congruent with) preconceived expectations are processed more fluently and thus

remembered better (for reviews see Forster, Higgins, & Strack, 2000; McDaniel & Geraci

2006; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Tanaka, Giles, Kremen, & Simon, 1998; Tank &

Hopfield, 1987). On the other hand, other models suggest facial cues that violate (i.e., are

incongruent to) expectations would be better remembered because they go against the

proverbial grain and demand deeper level processing, while faces that satisfy

expectations will simply appear more familiar regardless of their novelty due to their low

processing cost (i.e., memory bias; for reviews see McDaniel & Geraci, 2006; Stangor &

McMillan, 1992; Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007).

In the current work, I explore the relationship between cue congruity— with

respect to social expectations— and memory performance. Herein, I present evidence

addressing how individual differences in expectation strength operationalized as

stereotype endorsement influences memory sensitivity and memory bias. Furthermore, I 5

address the contributions of encoding versus retrieval memory stages to this

phenomenon. Below, I first review the differences between the encoding and retrieval stages of memory. Then, I review of the most prominent models of expectations and memory from cognitive and social psychology. Finally, I review the critical differences between these models.

Encoding and Retrieval

Assuming stereotypic expectations influence memory implies individual differences, because people will vary in the social expectations they hold. Further, memory is a multistage process including the formation and storage of a perception (i.e., encoding), and the evoking of the stored perception (i.e., retrieval). However, memory is not a perfect process; errors can and often occur at any or multiple points in the process.

An error at the encoding stage simply means the memory was never fully created and thus cannot be later recalled, whereas an error at the retrieval stage may be the failure to remember an item (lack of sensitivity) or due to the false recollection of a new item (bias: e.g., the misidentification of an innocent person as a perpetrator in a police line-up).

Despite a number of similarities between the encoding and retrieval stages, there are notable cognitive and neurobiological differences between these two stages of memory.

The encoding and retrieval stages are fundamental to memory; however, they both

have distinct cognitive and neurological underpinnings. Efficient encoding, relative to

efficient retrieval is primarily determined by the cognitive mechanisms of: 1) attention

(Jenkins & Postman, 1948; Green, 1956; Green, 1958; Schmidt, 1991), 2) depth of

processing (i.e., the amount of stimulus analysis, Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Eysenck, 6

1979; Green 1956; Jenkins & Postman, 1948; Marschark & Hunt, 1989; Schmidt, 1991;

Waddill & McDaniel, 1998), 3) rehearsal (Rundus, 1971), 4) and the processing

requirements of the stimuli itself (Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979). On the other

hand, efficient retrieval, relative to efficient encoding, is primarily determined by the

cognitive mechanisms of: 1) generation (i.e., if the memory originated from one's own

mind rather than being perceived; Jacoby, 1978; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Peynircioglu &

Mungan, 1993), 2) discrimination (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Hunt & Mitchell, 1982), and

3) recency of encounter (Knoedler, Hellwig, & Neath, 1999; Waddill & McDaniel,

1998).

Furthermore, notable differences in the brain regions dedicated to encoding

relative to retrieval include the inferior frontal lobe and middle frontal gyrus (both

affiliated with increased attentional processing; Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti,

Duncan, & Owen, 2010), the left inferior prefrontal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus

(both affiliated with the depth of processing; Friederici, Opitz, & Von Cramon, 2000;

Kapur, Craik, Tulving, Wilson, Houle, & Brown, 1994), and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (affiliated with stimuli-specific increased processing demands; Linden et al.,

2003). The brain regions dedicated to retrieval relative to encoding include the left

prefrontal cortex and left premotor cortex (both affiliated with stimuli recency; Li, Wang,

Zhang, Meng, He, & Hu, 2003), the left prefrontal precuneus (affiliated with the

generation and memory; Lundstrom, Petersson, Andersson, Johansson, Fransson, &

Ingvar, 2003), and the right middle frontal gyrus and right inferior parietal cortex (both

affiliated with the use of mnemonic strategies; Olesen, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2004;

for meta-analysis see Spaniol, Davidson, Kim, Han, Moscovitch, & Grady, 2009). 7

By examining the individual and combined contributions of encoding and retrieval stages of memory, we can identify which cognitive processes are required for efficient memory performance and potentially identify the cause of memory error. Each of the contemporary models of expectations and memory make note of the contributions of at least one of these memory stages; however, in addition to each model’s overarching predictions as to whether people are more sensitive, sensitive and/or biased to facial cues congruent or incongruent with social expectations, the models differ as to the contributions of encoding and retrieval stages to this phenomenon and the theory behind it. Below, I review several current models that address the role of expectations in memory, and specific predictions they make regarding each of these factors (note that few models address all of these factors, and where they do not, I will note that too).

Models that Address how Expectations Influence Memory

The following models are based in schema theory, which proposes that people organize concepts (e.g., events, roles, behavior) into a framework (i.e., a schema) that specifies each concept’s characteristics and the relations between those characteristics

(for review see DiMaggio 1997). Schemata are implicitly used to facilitate the processing of new information (Nadkarni & Narayana, 2007) and Schemata have been demonstrated to influence memory; however, the results and the models developed from these results are mixed (for review see Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Each model proposes that at the center of each schema lies a prototype for how stimuli should appear. Stimuli similar to the prototype are categorized as congruent with expectations, whereas dissimilar stimuli are incongruent with expectations. As the strength of expectation increase, the definition 8 of the prototype increase; this increase in definition results in fewer resources required to process stimuli similar to the prototype. Depending on the model, the fewer processing resources may enhance or weaken the sensitivity and/or bias for stimuli either congruent or incongruent with this prototype and this enhancement or weakening will be primarily or entirely due to the encoding or retrieval stage of memory. Below is a review of the similarities and discrepancies of the four most prominent models that address how expectations influence memory.

Schematic Information-Processing Model

The Schematic Information-Processing (SIP) model is a theoretical approach to understanding social memory in the context of cognitive schemata (Alba & Hasher, 1983;

Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Hastie, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Schemata are structured representations of knowledge that are used to interpret the world and are constantly adapting to include or exclude new information (Bartlett, 1932). The SIP model suggests that existing knowledge influences the processing fluency of social stimuli because preexisting schemata provide structure for the processing and the storage of new stimuli

(Alba & Hasher, 1983; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1989). People are more capable of accessing the existing schema for schema-congruent stimuli (e.g., a man behaving aggressively rather than sociably, or a woman behaving sociably rather than aggressively, Maccoby & Wilson, 1957; Koblinsky, Cruse, & Sugawara, 1978). This is because this information is more frequently in use, resulting in heightened accessibility of schema-congruent stimuli. Ambiguous stimuli that cannot be interpreted easily as schema-congruent may reduce the ability to encode and retrieve the stimuli. According to 9 this model, by incorporating schema-congruent stimuli into an existing schema structure, the perceiver can more efficiently encode and later recall schema-congruent stimuli relative to schema-incongruent stimuli (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Schank & Abelson, 1977;

Srull & Wyer, 1989). The structure provided by preexisting schemata results in the preferential processing of social stimuli that are schema-congruent at both encoding and retrieval (no differentiation is made between the two), while schema-incongruent stimuli are incompatible with existing schema and thus remain filtered or ignored at both encoding and retrieval (Neisser, 1976; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1989). In sum, this model predicts that schema-congruent stimuli will be better remembered due to improved encoding and retrieval compared to schema-incongruent stimuli. This model also predicts that in addition to retrieval to heightened sensitivity to schema-congruent stimuli, retrieval contributes to a heightened bias toward schema-congruent cues relative to schema-incongruent stimuli. This bias is the result of the efficient processing of schema-congruent stimuli that produces a sensation of familiarity regardless of the stimuli’s actual novelty (Woll & Graesser, 1982).

Schema-Pointer Plus Tag Model

Similar to the SIP model described above, The Schema-Pointer Plus Tag (SP + T) model predicts existing schemata influence the memory of schema-congruent and schema-incongruent stimuli (Graesser, 1981; Woll & Graesser, 1982). Unlike the SIP model however, the SP + T Model predicts that schema-incongruent stimuli will be preferentially remembered. While both models agree that schema-congruent stimuli are able to be efficiently encoded by relying on existing schemata, the SP + T model 10

proposes schema-incongruent stimuli are ‘tagged’ at encoding as distinctive and stored

into a separate memory location. The SP + T model further develops that this separate

location for schema-incongruent stimuli aids recall, because while specific schema- congruent stimuli are competing for resources with a number of stored memories, schema-incongruent stimuli are competing with fewer memories, thereby aiding retrieval.

This model also predicts that there will be a bias to false alarm to schema-congruent stimuli.

In sum, the SP + T model predicts greater sensitivity (accurate performance) to schema-incongruent versus schema-congruent stimuli, thereby offering contradictory predictions to the SIP model described above. That said, both models predict people will be biased to recognizing schema-congruent stimuli at recall because schema-congruent stimuli appear familiar and are thus more likely to be perceived as previously seen even if they are indeed novel (Woll & Graesser, 1982).

Attractor Field Model

The Attractor Field (AF) model proposes that the features of faces or objects we encounter in our environment are normally distributed along a number of dimensions in our psychological space and thus form a schema (for reviews see Tanaka et al., 1998; see

Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007). At the center of these dimensions lays a prototype with cues congruent to the perceiver's experiences and expectations. Unlike the SIP and

SP + T models, the AF model suggests that people can have a prototype for schema- incongruent stimuli that exists tangentially along shared dimensions with the schema- congruent prototype. However, the schema-incongruent prototype is less defined relative 11

to the schema-congruent prototype because, inherent to its nature, a person encounters

stimuli incongruent with expectations less frequently.

Based on the above assumptions, the AF model states that a stimuli’s distance

from the schema-congruent prototype and other stimuli within this psychological space

determines the size of its attractor field or each stimuli’s range of influence that also

determines the resources needed to process the stimuli (Tank & Hopfield, 1987). Stimuli

clustered near each other and near the schema-congruent prototype have smaller attractor fields and require fewer resources to process, but people tend to mistake the higher perceptual fluency as a proxy for familiarity; thus, people have a bias to identifying schema-congruent stimuli as familiar regardless of its actual novelty (Bartlett, Hurry, &

Thorley, 1984; Corneille, Monin, & Pleyers, 2005; Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007;

Corneille, Potter, & Mwenge, 2007; Light, Kayra-Stuart, & Hollander, 1979; Monin,

2003; Valentine, 1991; Valentine, 2001; Vokey & Read, 1992). On the other hand, stimuli with larger attractor fields, schema-incongruent stimuli, are more easily encoded because they stand out as highly distinct to the observer despite the large amount of resources required to process them. The AF model, states that the influences of a stimuli’s attractor field on memory performance is the result of perceptual fluency at encoding and does not make any predictions as to any potential contributions of the retrieval stage on memory sensitivity nor bias (Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007;

Tanaka & Corneille, 2007). 12

Associative Network Model

The Associative Network (AN) model proposes that the number of associations

there exist between schemata and stimuli influence memory processes (Hastie, 1980;

Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989). For example, the prototype for

an angry expression may include a furrowed brow, clenched jaw, and thin lips; however,

an angry expression is not limited to only these characteristics, and these same

characteristics may be associated within a network of many different schemata. Similar to

the three previous models, the AN model suggests that existing associations provide an

efficient framework to interpret stimuli. Schema-congruent stimuli are efficiently

encoded into the existing framework, whereas schema-incongruent stimuli require

additional processing to be integrated into the existing network; a process referred to as

elaboration (Waddill & McDaniel, 1998). This is somewhat similar to the AF model,

such that the AF model proposes the possibility for schema-congruent and schema-

incongruent prototypes within a single schema and the AN model describes the process

of integrating schema-incongruent stimuli into the preexisting schema. Assuming copious

processing resources are available, schema-incongruent stimuli are retained in working

memory while new associations are made to integrate the schema-incongruent stimuli

into the existing schema network (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983).

During recall, stimuli activate their respective associations and those with a

greater number of associations are better remembered. If processing resources are

available during encoding, it is predicted that schema-incongruent stimuli will be recalled better than schema-congruent stimuli due to the greater number of associations needed to effectively encode the stimulus. On the other hand, if processing resources at encoding 13 are limited, the preexisting network of associations for schema-congruent stimuli will aid in their efficient retrieval. Thus, the AN model is similar to SP + T at encoding if copious resources are available, but more similar to the SIP model when resources are limited.

Furthermore, this model predicts that as expectation strength increases, schema- congruent stimuli will have stronger associations, requiring even fewer processing resources, whereas schema-incongruent stimuli will become more ambiguous, requiring even more processing resources, thereby augmenting the effects just described. Critically, the AN model does not make note of the possibility for enhanced memory sensitivity for both schema-congruent and schema-incongruent as expectations strength increases, but in accordance with this model, is a logical possibility. This model, however, makes no clear predictions as to how schema-congruent or schema-incongruent stimuli will influence memory bias effects.

Model Comparisons

Each of these models have been tested and applied to face memory (Corneille,

Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007; Light, Kayra-Stuart, Hollander, 1979; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff,

& Ruderman, 1978; Woll & Craesser, 1982; Wyer, R. S., & Srull, 2014; for review see

Stangor & McMillan, 1992; for review see Valentin, Abdi, O’Toole, & Cottrell, 1994).

These models of memory suggest the ability to remember faces is influenced by the schema congruity/incongruity of facial cue expectations. Some models suggest superior memory for faces that satisfy expectations, while others suggest that stimuli violating expectations are better remembered (see Table 1–1). The SP + T and AF models predict better overall memory for facial schema-incongruent cues, the SIP model predicts better 14 memory for schema-congruent cues, and the AN model predictions depend on mental resources for processing. Furthermore, the influence that congruity of cues to the schema has at encoding versus retrieval stages of memory varies by model, or is simply not discussed.

The SIP, SP + T, and AN models propose that schema-congruent cues will be encoded better, whereas the AF model proposes schema-incongruent cues will be encoded better. As for the influence of expectations during the retrieval stage of memory: the SIP model predicts better retrieval of schema-congruent cues, the SP + T model predicts better performance for schema-incongruent cues, the AN model proposes that the amount of processing resources during the encoding stage will determine if schema- incongruent or schema-congruent facial cues are better retrieved, and the AF model makes no clear predictions as to the influence of expectations at retrieval. The SIP, SP +

T, and AF models predict people will demonstrate a bias to incorrectly identifying novel faces with schema-congruent cues as familiar, whereas the AN models make no such predictions. The SIP and SP + T models predict this bias is primarily influenced by retrieval, whereas the AF model predicts this bias is influenced by encoding and does not make a specific prediction as to the contribution of retrieval. Critically, inherent within each model is the proposition that its own hypotheses for sensitivity and/or bias will increase as a function as function of expectancy strength.

Table 1–1 Model Comparisons. Each model’s respective main effect predictions to schema- congruent and schema-incongruent stimuli with respect to memory sensitivity and bias and the contributions of the encoding and retrieval stages of memory. Critically, the Schematic Information- 15

Processing, the Schema-Pointer Plus Tag, and the Associative Network models suggests their respective predictions will increase as expectation strength increases.

Sensitivity Bias Model Encoding Retrieval Overall Encoding Retrieval Overall Schematic Information-Processing Congruent Congruent Congruent No prediction Congruent Congruent Schema-Pointer Plus Tag Congruent Incongruent Incongruent No prediction Congruent Congruent Attractor Field Incongruent* No Prediction Incongruent* Congruent No prediction Congruent Associative Network Congruent Depends** Depends** - - - - - No prediction - - - - -

*The Attractor Field model posits that if an atypical prototype exists, that the sensitivity towards schema- incongruent will not increase, but decrease as a function of greater expectation strength. **The Associative Network model posits that the sensitivity during the retrieval stage and therefore overall is dependent upon the amount of resources available (i.e., more resources results in superior sensitivity to schema-incongruent stimuli, whereas fewer available resources results in superior sensitivity to schema-congruent stimuli.

Current Research

The four contemporary models addressing how expectations influence memory described here all predict that expectations will influence memory performance.

However, the model’s predictions rarely overlap with one another and some fail to even discuss key components of memory performance including: memory bias and the contributions of the encoding and retrieval stages of memory. Given that these models of expectations and memory are so disparate, this study strives to, in part, help reconcile them. I approached examining these hypotheses in two aims.

First, this thesis seeks to demonstrate how the encoding and retrieval stages coalesce to influence memory sensitivity and biases for faces displaying schema- congruent versus -incongruent cues with respect to prior expectations. This was accomplished by utilizing individual differences towards the endorsement of gender- expression stereotypes and presenting schema-congruent and schema-incongruent cues at 16

the learning and testing phases (Experiment 1). Second, this thesis then seeks to

separately elucidate the contributions of the encoding and retrieval stages on the

phenomena of memory sensitivity and bias for faces displaying schema-congruent versus

-incongruent cues with respect to prior expectations. This was accomplished by again

examining individual differences towards the endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes and limiting exposure to expressive cues to either the learning phase

(Experiment 2) or the testing phase (Experiment 3) to isolate their respective influences

on memory. These results are later interpreted and discussed in light of the models

reviewed, with a focus on societal implications, and potential future directions seeking to

further examine potential moderators and additional cognitive underpinnings of this

phenomenon. 17

Chapter 2

Method

Over the past 40 years, researchers from a wide range of disciplines have studied

the phenomena of social memory and developed multiple theories behind this

phenomenon (Calder et al., 2000). Contemporary models addressing the influence of

schemata on memory all concur that people's schemata influence the ability to remember

others, however they differ on, or fail to address, whether facial cues congruent or

incongruent with a schema are better remembered, how the strength of the schema

influences memory sensitivity and bias, and the contributions of the encoding and

retrieval stages of memory.

Because bias and sensitivity are independent measures of memory performance, I

examined them both using a signal detection approach. Within signal detection theory,

sensitivity is defined as a person’s ability to correctly identify stimuli (correcting for bias)

that they have seen before relative to incorrectly identifying novel stimuli as having been

previously seen. Bias on the other hand reflects a person’s tendency to offer a certain

response whether it is correct or not. In the following experiments, I seek to elucidate

memory sensitivity and bias for cues that are schema-congruent versus -incongruent with expectations and examine how the strength of these expectations, as an individual difference measure, influences memory performance. The definition of the schema is operationalized as the endorsement for gender-expression stereotypes in each of the

following experiments. In order to accomplish this, I examine the relation between

expectation strength and memory sensitivity and bias in Experiment 1, and then I 18

examine the contributions of the encoding stage in Experiment 2 and the retrieval stage in

Experiment 3 to this phenomenon.

Experiment 1

The contemporary models that address how expectations influence memory all concur that people's expectations influence memory in some way, but they differ on

people’s capabilities to remember schema-congruent versus -incongruent cues relative to,

and the contributions of, the encoding versus retrieval stages of memory to this

phenomenon. Experiment 1 aimed to examine how the encoding and retrieval stages of

memory together influence memory performance, and how the definition of people’s

schemata moderates their combined contributions to face memory. In order to accomplish

this, participants completed a memory paradigm that presented expressive cues at the

learning phase and expressive cues at the testing phase. I subsequently measured

individual’s endorsement for gender-expression stereotypes to examine whether strength

of gender stereotypical expectations moderated the memory effects.

Participants

Sixty undergraduate students (44 female, 12 male) completed the study for

course-credit. All participants identified as Caucasian. Race has been demonstrated to

influence memory performance (Michel et al., 2006); in order to reduce noise in the

current examination, Caucasian participants were selected for this and the following

experiments. Of those who completed the study, two participants (1 female, 1 male) were 19

removed from further analysis due to failure to follow instructions, and two females were removed due to responses outside 3 standard deviations below the mean. Thus, the final analysis included 52 participants (41 female, 11 male). All participants reported being naïve of the study hypotheses when debriefed after completing the study. Study and recruitment methods were approved by the Pennsylvania State University Institutional

Review Board.

Stimuli

Thirty-two female and 32 male gray-scale images of expressive Caucasian faces were used (see Figure 2-1). Faces were selected from the FACES database and each image was validated as expressing the desired emotion (Ebner et al., 2007). The facial

expressions of anger and joy were selected as people typically associate these expressions

with men and women, respectively (Birnbaum, Nosanchuk, & Croll, 1980; Briton & Hall,

1995; Fabes & Martin, 1991; Grossman & Wood 1993; Kelly & Hutson-Comeaux,

1999). Thus, men expressing anger and women expressing joy were operationalized as

schema-congruent; whereas, men expressing joy and women expressing anger were

operationalized as schema-incongruent. The images were cropped within an ovoid region

to exclude hair cues because hair cues have been demonstrated to be particularly

influential on face recognition (O'Donnell & Bruce, 2001). Images were grey-scaled and

displayed at a size of 5.6 x 8.3 cm. The faces were randomly divided into two groups of

target and lure images, each group of faces was balanced for gender and expression. Each

participant was equally likely to be assigned to either order of faces, thus each participant

had equal chance of a face appearing as a target or lure. 20

Figure 2-1. Example stimuli for Experiments 1, 2, and 3.

Design and Procedure

Participants completed an intentional memory-paradigm consisting of a learning phase, a distractor task, and a testing phase. Participants took part in a three phase memory paradigm including: 1) passively viewing expressive faces, 2) completing a distractor-math task, and 3) completing a memory test in which they had to indicate

whether faces had been previously seen or were novel. Prior to beginning the paradigm, participants were instructed to silence their cell phones and leave their belongings (e.g., food, drinks, cell phones, etc.) inside their pockets and/or backpacks. Participants were instructed to sit in front of a computer monitor and to rest their head in a chin-rest. The 21 distance between the participants and the monitor was approximately 56 cm. All stimuli were presented focally with a visual angle of 6.64˚ by 8.75˚ on Dell personal computer monitors (85 MHz; with a screen resolution of 1280 by 1024 pixels) using the computer software Opensesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). Once seated, participants were verbally instructed that they would be participating in a memory paradigm that would require their utmost attention. Participants then began the learning phase.

At the beginning of the learning phase, written instructions appeared on the screen reminding participants that this was a memory paradigm and would require their utmost attention. Instructions also indicated participants were not expected to respond during this phase and merely had to do their best to remember the faces for later testing. Once participant felt they understood the instructions, they could press the spacebar to begin the learning phase. The learning phase consisted of 32 unique face stimulus trials that then repeated five times for a total of 160 trials presented in random order. Each trial began with a fixation point for 1725 ms followed by a male or female expressive face for

150 ms; combinations of gender and the expressions of anger and joy were equally balanced, and were counterbalanced across individuals (i.e., the same face was always repeated with the same expression for each participant, but half participants saw each stimulus with one expression, and half with the other). Each face presented during the learning phase would appear later during the testing phase as a target stimulus against an equal number of lure images. The selection of faces as target or lure images was also counterbalanced across participants, such that each face was equally likely to appear during the learning and testing phases or solely as novel stimuli in the testing phase. 22

After the learning phase, participants completed the distractor task. For this participants were instructed to try their best to accurately complete 8 multiple-choice college algebra problems (see Appendix 1) within approximately 7 minutes. Participants were instructed that they were not required to use the chin-rest for this portion and were provided a pen and paper to work on the problems. Each problem, the answer, and four incorrect answers were displayed on the monitor. Participants indicated their answers via keystroke.

Following the distracter task, the instructions for the testing phase were presented.

In the testing phase, participants were to respond using a remember-know-new paradigm

(Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 2002). Participants indicated if they 1) definitely remember seeing the face before, 2) think they may have seen the face before, or 3) do not remember seeing the face before. Instructions also indicated participants were to use the chin-rest during this phase. Once participants felt they understood the instructions, they could press the spacebar to begin the testing phase. The testing phase consisted of the original 32 target face trials along with 32 novel lure face trials; trial order was randomized. Each trial began with a fixation point for 500 ms followed by an expressive face that remained on the screen until a response was indicated. Sixty-four faces were presented in a randomized order. Faces were equally balanced across gender—half of which had been seen during the learning phase.

After concluding the testing phase, participants completed a gender-expression expectancy questionnaire adapted from Fabes and Martin (1991). For each question, participants were asked to imagine either the “average male” or the “average female” and to rate, on a 7-point scale, the extent to which the average male/female expresses each of 23

the following basic emotions: anger, fear, joy, sadness, disgust, and surprise. The scale

was anchored by never (1), almost never (2), rarely (3), sometimes (4), frequently (5),

almost always (6), and always (7). Lastly, participants were verbally probed for suspicion

and debriefed.

Results

First, two emotional expressions by gender endorsement scores were computed from the

data for the frequency of expressing anger and joy. The endorsement score for joy was

computed by subtracting the rated frequency the average male was expected to express

joy from the rated frequency the average female was expected to express joy. Likewise,

the endorsement score for anger was computed by subtracting the rated frequency the

average female was expected to express anger from the rated frequency the average male

was expected to express anger. As predicted, these two scores were correlated, r (58)

= .41, p = .001, justifying combining them into a single measure indicating each

individual’s overall endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes by averaging these two values. Thus, greater values of this measure indicate more endorsement for gender- expression stereotypes. A one-sample t test was conducted to determine if participants displayed a significant expectation for expressions congruent with respect gender stereotypes. The sample mean of 0.46 (SD = .66) was significantly different than 0, t(59)

= 5.39, p < .001 suggesting that, overall, the participants did endorse gender-expression stereotypes. 24

In this and the following experiments, participant’s responses of “Remember” and

“Know” were combined into single item; this was done for the ease of clarity and doing so did not alter the interpretation of the results1. Outlier analysis revealed two participants with accuracy greater than 3 standard deviations less than the mean; these participants were removed from all subsequent analyses. To determine if participants scored significantly above chance on the memory test, a one-sample t test was conducted.

Participants scored moderately well on the memory task; the sample mean of 0.59 (SD

= .06) was significantly above chance, t(51) =11.30, p < .001.

Recognition sensitivity was then calculated using d’ (M = .52, SE = .05) using the formula, = ( ) ( ) which measures the distance −1 −1 between the𝑑𝑑′ signalϕ and𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 the𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 noise𝑟𝑟 − meansϕ 𝐹𝐹 in𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹standard𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 deviation𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 units (Macmillan, 1993; for review see Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Larger values of d’ indicate a greater ability to distinguish signals from noise, or in other words, the ratio of correctly remembering a face relative to falsely remembering a novel faces increases. Recognition bias was calculated using c (M = -.29, SE = .05) using the formula, =

( ) ( ) 𝑐𝑐 −1 −1 which measures the distance between the criterion and ϕ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + ϕ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 −2 the neutral point, where neither response is favored (Macmillan, 1993; for review see

Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Two ANCOVA models were conducted to examine: 1) the

influence of expectancy on memory sensitivity for faces displaying congruent and

incongruent cues and 2) the influence of expectancy on memory bias for faces displaying

congruent and incongruent cues.

1 We initially examined responses (know, familiar, or new) in relation to stimuli congruity and endorsement of gender- expression stereotypes. However, we combined the know and familiar responses into hits in order to calculate sensitivity and bias as these two metrics were more pertinent to the models of expectations and memory. Importantly, the pattern of effects for known and familiar judgments when analyzed separately were the same as when combined. 25

Sensitivity

The first analysis revealed no significant difference in recognition sensitivity between congruent (M = 0.52, SE = 0.08) and incongruent gender by emotion paired

faces (M = 0.55, SE = 0.07), F(1,50) < 0.01, p = ns. No significant interaction was found

between expectancy strength and the stereotypic congruity of expressive facial cues,

F(1,50) = 0.18, p = ns. There was a significant effect of stereotype endorsement,

however, on overall recognition sensitivity such that sensitivity increased as individual’s

expectancies increased, b = 0.53 [0.06, 1.00], F(1,50) = 5.64, p = .021, = .10. Figure 2 𝑝𝑝 2-2 shows the sensitivity for schema-congruent and –incongruent faces Ƞas a function of

individual’s expectancy strength.

Figure 2-2. Memory sensitivity for faces displaying schema-congruent and -incongruent expressions, with respect to gender-expression stereotypes (i.e., men express anger and women express joy), as a function of individual’s strength of expectations for these stereotypes. 26

Bias

The second analysis revealed a greater bias towards stereotypic congruent gender- emotion faces (M = -0.35, SE = 0.06) than incongruent gender-emotion faces (M = -0.25,

SE = 0.05), F(1,50) = 4.97, p = .030, = .09. No interaction was found between 2 𝑝𝑝 expectancy strength and the gender stereotypicȠ congruity of expressive facial cues,

F(1,50) = 0.49, p = ns, nor for expectancy strength on overall recognition bias, F(1,50) =

1.78, p = .189. Figure 2-3 shows the bias for schema-congruent and –incongruent faces.

Figure 2-3 Memory bias for faces displaying schema-congruent and -incongruent expressions, with respect to gender-expression stereotypes (i.e., men express anger and women express joy).

Discussion

Experiment 1 examined how the encoding and retrieval stages of memory together contribute to memory sensitivity and bias as a function of expectation 27

endorsement—operationalized as the endorsement for gender-expression stereotypes.

People were instructed to remember men and women's faces displaying expressions congruent and incongruent with common gender stereotypes (Birnbaum, Nosanchuk, &

Croll, 1980; Briton & Hall, 1995; Fabes & Martin, 1991; Grossman & Wood 1993; Kelly

& Hutson-Comeaux, 1999) and later completed a memory test with faces displaying the same gender-stereotypical cues. Individual’s endorsement for gender-expression stereotypes was subsequently measured. Memory sensitivity and bias were analyzed as distinct constructs and interpreted below.

Sensitivity

Recall that the four contemporary models of how expectations influence memory

all predict superior sensitivity to faces with either stereotypically congruent or

incongruent cues, none predict both. The SIP model predicts superior sensitivity to

congruent faces, the AN model predicts various moderators will predict whether

sensitivity to congruent or incongruent faces is superior, and the SP + T. Each model

proposes that their predictions will increase as the endorsement of expectations increases.

Experiment 1 sought to elucidate how these stages coalesce and their combined influence

on sensitivity; this was accomplished by examining individual differences in the

endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes and presenting expressive cues during the

learning and testing phases.

Experiment 1 demonstrated that when expressive cues are present at encoding and

retrieval stages, together, sensitivity to faces was qualified by an individual’s

endorsement for gender-expression stereotypes, for cues both congruent and incongruent 28

with the stereotype. In other words, individuals who more strongly endorsed gender-

expression stereotypes displayed greater sensitivity to all faces.

The majority of the contemporary models that address how expectations influence memory also make predictions as to how the encoding and retrieval stages of memory contribute to memory sensitivity and bias; however, these predictions rarely overlap. The unique contributions of the encoding and retrieval stages on memory sensitivity are examined in Experiments 2 and 3, respectively, and discussed in light of the different models’ predictions.

Bias

The SIP model, the SP + T model, and the AF model predict an increased bias to

categorize congruent faces as familiar—regardless of actual novelty— and this bias will

increase as endorsement of expectations increases. However these models conflict as to

whether this bias is the result of cognitive mechanisms at the encoding or the retrieval

stages of memory. The SIP and the SP + T models predict the bias towards congruent

stimuli is the result of cognitive mechanisms during the retrieval stage—not the encoding

stage; on the other hand, the AF model predicts the bias towards congruent stimuli is the

result of the encoding stage. Experiment 1 sought to elucidate how individual differences in gender-emotion stereotype endorsement influences memory bias, without differentiating the influences of encoding and retrieval stages. In this way, Experiment 1

demonstrated an overall bias to respond to faces displaying congruent relative to

incongruent cues. This bias was not qualified by individual’s endorsement of gender-

expression stereotypes. 29

Of the three contemporary models of expectations and memory that discuss

memory bias, one predicts bias is the result of contributions of the cognitive processes

during the encoding stage of memory and two predict bias is the result of contributions of

cognitive processes during the retrieval stage of memory. Thus, next I will report on the

unique contributions of the encoding and retrieval stages on memory bias in Experiments

2 and 3, respectively and discussed in light of the different models’ predictions.

Experiment 2

The contemporary models that address how expectations influence memory differ

predictions regarding schema-congruent versus -incongruent cues and the contributions

of encoding versus retrieval stages of memory. Experiment 2 aims to elucidate the contribution of the encoding stage, again as a function of individual differences in the influence of expectation strength— operationalized here as gender-emotion stereotype endorsement— on face memory performance. In order to focus specifically on the contribution of the encoding stage of memory to this phenomenon, participants completed a memory paradigm adapted from Hood, Macrae, Cole-Davies, & Dias (2005) that capitalizes on exposure gender-stereotypical expressive cues at the learning phase, but only unexpressive, identity cues at the testing phase. In this way, the influence of cue congruity and individual’s endorsement for expectations is limited to the encoding stage.

I subsequently measured individual’s endorsement for gender-expression stereotypes to examine whether strength of gender stereotypical expectations moderated the memory effects. 30

Participants

Fifty-six undergraduate students (33 female, 23 male) completed the study for

course-credit. All participants identified as Caucasian. Of those who completed the study, five participants (4 female, 1 male) were removed from further analysis due to failure to follow instructions and one male was removed due to responses outside 3 standard deviations from the mean. Thus, the final analysis included 50 participants (29 female, 21 male). All participants reported being naïve of the study hypotheses when asked after performing the study. Study and recruitment methods were approved by the Pennsylvania

State University Institutional Review Board.

Stimuli

The same 32 female and 32 male gray-scale images of expressive Caucasian faces utilized in Experiment 1 were also used in Experiment 2 (see Figure 2-1). Additionally, the inexpressive faces from the FACES database were included in this experiment (Ebner et al., 2007). The faces were randomly divided into two groups of target and lure images, each group of faces was balanced for gender and expression. For each participant, the target and lure group of faces was randomized such that each participant had equal chance of a face appearing as a target or lure.

Design and Procedure

Experiment 2’s design and procedure was nearly identical to Experiment 1, but now faces displaying expressive cues appeared during the learning phase and faces displaying 31 inexpressive cues (neutral) appeared as the testing phase. As in Experiment 1, each face was equally likely to appear during the encoding and testing phase or solely the testing phase.

Results

As previously performed in Experiment 1, gender-emotion endorsement scores were computed based on the expected frequency of males and females expressing anger and joy; these scores were again correlated, r(54) = .49, p < .001 and were averaged into a single value indicating the individuals’ endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes.

A one-sample t test was conducted to determine if participants displayed a significant expectation for expressions congruent with respect gender stereotypes. The sample mean of 0.46 (SD = .79) was significantly different than 0, t(55) = 4.29, p < .001 suggesting that, overall, the participants did endorse gender-expression stereotypes. Furthermore, independent-sample t tests were conducted in order to determine that expectancies were equivalent between Experiments 1 and 2, which they were, t(114) = 0.02, p = .982.

Outlier analysis revealed a single participant’s accuracy was greater than 3 standard deviations less than the mean; this participant was removed from all subsequent analyses. To determine if participants scored significantly above chance on the memory test, a one-sample t test was conducted. Participants scored well on the memory task; the sample mean of 0.53 (SD = .06) was significantly above chance, t(49) =3.81, p < .001.

Recognition sensitivity was then calculated using d’ (M = .18, SE = .05) and recognition bias was calculated using c (M = -.13, SE = .06). The expectancy score was submitted to two ANCOVA models to examine: 1) the influence of expectancy on memory sensitivity 32

for faces displaying schema-congruent and schema-incongruent cues at encoding and 2) the influence of expectancy on memory bias for faces displaying schema-congruent and schema-incongruent cues at encoding.

Sensitivity

The first analysis revealed no significant difference in recognition sensitivity

between congruent (M = 0.21, SE = 0.06) and incongruent faces (M = 0.15, SE = 0.05),

F(1,48) = 0.55, p = ns, however this was qualified with a significant interaction between stereotype endorsement and the congruity of expressive facial cues, F(1,48) = 5.09, p

= .029, = .10. People who reported greater expectancies displayed a marginally greater 2 𝑝𝑝 sensitivityȠ to congruent faces, b = .26 95% CI [-0.08, 0.95], t(47) = 1.71, p = .094, and

significantly less sensitivity to incongruent faces, b = -.35 [-1.23, -0.06], t(47) = -2.23, p

= .030. Figure 2-4 shows the sensitivity for schema-congruent and –incongruent faces as

a function of individual’s expectancy strength. 33

Figure 2-4. Memory sensitivity for faces displaying schema-congruent and -incongruent expressions, with respect to gender-expression stereotypes (i.e., men express anger and women express joy), during the learning phase and displaying neutral expression at the testing phase as a function of individual’s strength of expectations for these stereotypes.

Bias

More negative values of c indicate an increased bias toward identifying certain stimuli as having previously been seen—regardless of novelty. The second analysis revealed no significant difference in recognition bias between congruent (M = -0.15, SE =

0.06) and incongruent faces (M = -0.12, SE = 0.06), F(1,48) = 0.55, p = ns, however this was qualified with a significant interaction between stereotype endorsement and the congruity of expressive facial cues, F(1,48) = 5.09, p = .029, = .10. People who 2 𝑝𝑝 reported greater expectancies displayed significantly more biasȠ to congruent faces, b = -

0.71, [-2.22, -0.21], t(47) = -2.42, p = .019 and significantly less bias to incongruent 34

faces, b = 0.64, [0.08, 1.93], t(47) = 2.19, p = .034. Figure 2-5 shows the bias for schema- congruent and –incongruent faces as a function of individual’s expectancy strength.

Figure 2-5. Memory sensitivity for faces displaying schema-congruent and -incongruent expressions, with respect to gender-expression stereotypes (i.e., men express anger and women express joy), during the learning phase and displaying neutral expression at the testing phase as a function of individual’s strength of expectations for these stereotypes.

Discussion

Experiment 2 examined the unique contributions of the encoding stage to memory

sensitivity and bias as a function of individual differences in gender-emotion

stereotypical expectation endorsement. Put differently, people were instructed to

remember men and women’s faces that were displayed with emotion expressions that

were either congruent or incongruent with common gender-emotion stereotypes

(Birnbaum, Nosanchuk, & Croll, 1980; Briton & Hall, 1995; Fabes & Martin, 1991;

Grossman & Wood 1993; Kelly & Hutson-Comeaux, 1999) and then later completed a 35

memory test based on faces devoid of expression. Finally, participants’ explicit

endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes was measured. Memory sensitivity and

bias were analyzed as distinct constructs and below are interpreted.

Sensitivity

Recall that the four contemporary models reviewed earlier that address how

expectations influence memory all predicted superior sensitivity (i.e., performance

accuracy) during the encoding stage of memory. Some models to predicted stereotypically congruent versus or incongruent cues would increase memory, others vice versa. Specifically the Schematic-Stimuli Processing (SIP) model, the Schema-Pointer

Plus Tag (SP + T) model, and the Associative Network (AN) model predicts superior sensitivity to schema-congruent cues, whereas the Attractor Field (AF) models predict better sensitivity to schema-incongruent cues. Each model proposes that their unique predictions will increase as the endorsement of expectations increases.

This experiment demonstrated that the encoding stage contributes to greater sensitivity for faces displaying gender-stereotype congruent cues over and above gender- incongruent facial cues. Further, this finding was qualified by individual’s endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes. Individuals who more strongly endorsed gender- expression stereotypes displayed superior sensitivity to stereotypically gender-emotion congruent faces and worse sensitivity to stereotypically gender-emotion incongruent faces. This effect partially matches the predictions of the SIP, the SP + T , and the AN models; these three models suggest that the schemata for expected behavior becomes 36

more defined as endorsement increases, and thus novel stimuli congruent with this

schemata require fewer resources to efficiently encode.

The majority of the contemporary models that address how expectations influence

memory also make predictions as to how the retrieval stage of memory contributes to

memory sensitivity and bias; however, these predictions rarely overlap. The unique

contributions of the retrieval stage on memory sensitivity are examined in Experiment 3

and discussed in light of the different models’ predictions.

Bias

The SIP model, the SP + T model, and the AF model predict an increased bias to

categorize schema-congruent cues as familiar—regardless of actual novelty— and this bias will increase as endorsement of expectations increases. However these models conflict as to whether this bias is the result of cognitive mechanisms at encoding or the retrieval stages of memory. The SIP and the SP + T models predict the bias towards schema-congruent stimuli is the result of cognitive mechanisms during the retrieval stage—not the encoding stage; on the other hand, the AF model predicts the bias towards schema-congruent stimuli is the result of the encoding stage. Experiment 1 sought to elucidate the contributions of the encoding stage on memory bias.

This experiment demonstrated that the encoding stage contributes to people over- reporting remembering faces. Again, this bias was qualified by the degree to which a person endorses gender-expression stereotypes. Individuals who increasingly endorsed gender-expression stereotypes were more capable of encoding faces displaying stereotype congruent cues, but this increase, coupled with the increased behavior to falsely 37

remember novel faces, resulted in a calculated bias towards all stereotype congruent

faces. On the other hand, individuals who reported stronger endorsements of gender-

expression stereotypes were increasingly less likely to report remembering the

incongruent faces they had previously seen during the experimental learning phase. Their

inability to encode incongruent faces countered the general bias to falsely remember

novel faces, thus as people’s endorsements of gender-expression stereotypes increased

they had an increasingly poor sensitivity but no change to their bias of incongruent faces.

Of the three contemporary models of expectations and memory that discuss

memory bias, two predict bias is the result of contributions of cognitive processes during

the retrieval stage of memory. The unique contributions of the retrieval stage on bias are

examined in Experiment 3 and discussed in light of the different models’ predictions.

Experiment 3

As already noted, contemporary models that address how expectations influence

memory all agree that people's expectations have a powerful influence memory, but they

also tend to differ as to whether schema-congruent versus -incongruent cues contribute more to the retrieval stage to this phenomenon. Experiment 3 aims to elucidate the contribution of the retrieval stage of memory as a function of gender-emotion stereotype strength on memory performance. In order to accomplish this, participants completed a memory paradigm similar to the paradigm employed in Experiment 2, again adapted from Hood, Macrae, Cole-Davies, & Dias (2005), that capitalizes on using faces devoid of expression at the learning phase, and then coupling these faces, in addition to novel faces, with with gender-congruent and –incongruent emotion cues at the testing phase. I 38 again measured individual’s endorsement for gender-expression stereotypes after the memory task; thus, in this experiment the influence of gender-emotion stereotype congruity versus incongruity was constrained to the retrieval stage.

Participants

Fifty-three undergraduate students (39 female, 14 male) completed the study for course-credit. All participants identified as Caucasian. Of those who completed the study, two participants (1 female, 1 male) were removed from further analysis due to failure to follow instructions and one female was removed due to responses outside 3 standard deviations from the mean. Thus, the final analysis included fifty participants (37 female,

13 male). All participants reported being naïve of the study hypotheses when asked after performing the study. Study and recruitment methods were approved by the Pennsylvania

State University Institutional Review Board.

Stimuli

The same 32 female and 32 male gray-scale images of expressive and neutral

Caucasian faces utilized in Experiment 2 were also used in Experiment 3 (see Figure 2-

1). The faces were randomly divided into two groups of target and lure images, each group of faces was balanced for gender and expression. For each participant, the target and lure group of faces was randomized such that each participant had equal chance of a face appearing as a target or lure. 39

Design and Procedure

Experiment 3 was nearly identical to Experiment 2, but now faces displaying no expressive cues (neutral) appeared during the learning phase and expressive faces appeared during the testing phase. As in Experiments 1 and 2, each face was as equally likely to appear during the encoding and testing phase or solely the testing phase.

Results

As in Experiments 1 and 2, gender endorsement scores were computed based on participants’ explicit ratings of expected frequency for males and females to express anger and joy. These were again high correlated, r(51) = .46, p <.001 and were averaged into a single value indicating the individuals’ endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes. A one-sample t test was conducted to determine if participants displayed a significant expectation for expressions congruent with respect gender stereotypes. The sample mean of 0.53 (SD = .56) was significantly different from 0, t(52) = 6.89, p < .001.

An independent-sample t test determined the expectancies were equivalent between

Experiments 3 and 1, t(111) = -0.60, p = .547 and between Experiments 3 and 1, t(107) =

0.55, p = .582.

Outlier analysis revealed a single participant’s accuracy was greater than 3 standard deviations less than the mean; this participant was removed from all subsequent analyses. To determine if participants scored significantly above chance on the memory test, a one-sample t test was conducted. Participants scored moderately well on the 40

memory task; the sample mean of 0.56 (SD = .05) was significantly above chance, t(49)

=8.05, p < .001.

Recognition sensitivity was calculated using d’ (M = .33, SE = .04) and

recognition bias was calculated using c (M = -.23, SE = .07). The expectancy score was

submitted to two ANCOVA models to examine: 1) the influence of expectancy on

memory sensitivity for faces displaying gender-emotion congruent versus incongruent

cues at retrieval and 2) the influence expectancy on memory bias for faces displaying of

gender-emotion congruent and incongruent cues at retrieval.

Sensitivity

The first analysis revealed no significant difference in recognition sensitivity

between congruent (M = 0.32, SE = 0.06) and incongruent faces (M = 0.33, SE = 0.06),

F(1,48) < 0.01, p = ns. There was also no significant interaction found between stereotype endorsement and the stereotypic gender-emotion congruity of faces, F(1,48) =

0.01, p = ns. There was a significant effect of stereotype endorsement, however, on overall recognition sensitivity such that sensitivity increased as individual’s expectancies increased, b = 0.17 [0.03, 0.31], F(1,48) = 5.03, p = .030, = .10, a finding that mirrors 2 𝑝𝑝 that found in Study 1. Figure 2-6 shows the sensitivity for Ƞschema-congruent and –

incongruent faces as a function of individual’s expectancy strength. 41

Figure 2-6. Memory sensitivity for faces displaying neutral expressions at the learning phase and displaying schema-congruent and -incongruent expressions, with respect to gender-expression stereotypes (i.e., men express anger and women express joy), during the testing phase as a function of individual’s strength of expectations for these stereotypes.

Bias

The second analysis revealed a significant main effect of congruity, F(1,48) =

8.95, p = .004, = .16, indicating that there was less bias towards stereotypic gender- 2 𝑝𝑝 emotion pairingsȠ of faces (M = -0.20, SE = 0.07) than nonstereoptypic gender-emotion

pairings of faces (M = -0.27, SE = 0.07), however this effect was qualified by a

significant interaction between stereotype endorsement and the congruity of faces,

F(1,48) = 7.18, p = .010, = .13. People who reported greater expectancies displayed a 2 𝑝𝑝 marginally greater bias toȠ congruent faces, b = -0.23 [-0.50, 0.03], t(47) = -1.77, p = .084;

stereotype endorsement did not influence the bias to incongruent faces, b = -0.02 [-0.27, 42

0.24], t(47) = -0.14, p = .886. Figure 2-7 shows the bias for schema-congruent and –

incongruent faces as a function of individual’s expectancy strength.

Figure 2-7. Memory bias for faces displaying neutral expressions at the learning phase and displaying schema-congruent and -incongruent expressions, with respect to gender-expression stereotypes (i.e., men express anger and women express joy), during the testing phase as a function of individual’s strength of expectations for these stereotypes.

Discussion

Experiment 3 examines the unique contributions of the retrieval stage of face

memory to sensitivity and bias as a function of stereotypical gender-expression

endorsement. People were instructed to remember men and women's inexpressive faces

and then were later presented with faces displaying expressions that were congruent

versus incongruent with common gender stereotypes when completing a memory test

Memory sensitivity and bias were analyzed as distinct constructs and below are

interpreted. 43

Sensitivity

Recall that the five contemporary models of how expectations influence memory

all predict superior sensitivity due to the contributions of the retrieval stage to faces

combined with either stereotypical or counter-stereotypical gender-emotion expressive

cues. The SIP and the SP + T models predict superior sensitivity to congruent faces, the

AN model predicts various moderators will predict whether sensitivity to congruent or

incongruent faces is superior, and the AF model makes no clear predictions as to the

contributions of the retrieval stage. Each model, however, proposes that their predictions

will increase as the endorsement of expectations increases. Experiment 2 examined the

contributions of the encoding stage to memory sensitivity, Experiment 3 sought to

elucidate the influence of retrieval on memory sensitivity by examining individual

differences in the endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes when exposed to

expressive cues only in the testing phase.

By limiting expressive cues to either the learning or testing phase, Experiments 2 and 3 were able to isolate examination to the unique contributions of the encoding and retrieval stages on memory sensitivity, respectively. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the retrieval stage contributes to people’s ability to accurately remember previously seen faces and reject novel faces regardless of whether the face displayed cues congruent or incongruent with gender-expression stereotypes. Similar to Experiment 1, but unlike

Experiment 2, sensitivity was qualified by an individual’s endorsement for gender- expression stereotypes regardless of the stereotypical congruity of facial cues. Individuals who more strongly endorsed gender-expression stereotypes displayed greater sensitivity 44

to all faces. The interpretation of this finding with regard to the previous two experiments is discussed further in the General Discussion.

Bias

The SIP model, the SP + T model, and the AF model predict an increased bias to

categorize congruent faces as familiar—regardless of actual novelty— and this bias will

increase as endorsement of expectations increases. Each of these three models propose

this overactive sensation of familiarity is due to people’s overreliance of the expected

prototype/schematic face and this overreliance will increase as expectancy strength

increases. The SIP and the SP + T models predict the bias towards congruent stimuli is

the result of cognitive mechanisms during the retrieval stage—not the encoding stage; on

the other hand, the AF model predicts the bias towards congruent stimuli is the result of

the encoding stage. Experiment 2 examined the contributions of the encoding stage to

memory bias, Experiment 3 sought to complement by elucidating the contributions of the

retrieval stage on memory bias by examining individual differences in the endorsement of

gender-expression stereotypes and limiting expressive cues to the testing phase.

Experiment 3 demonstrated that the retrieval stage contributes to people reporting

remembering faces displaying incongruent relative to congruent cues, regardless of their

actual novelty. As predicted, this bias was qualified by individual’s endorsement of

gender-expression stereotypes. Similar to Experiment 2, individuals who increasingly

endorsed gender-expression stereotypes displayed an increasing bias towards congruent

cues that reached similar levels of bias found to incongruent faces. The interpretation of 45 this finding with regard to the previous two experiments is discussed further in the

General Discussion. 46

Chapter 3

General Discussion

All four contemporary memory models reviewed predict that prior expectations

will influence memory performance. However, the four models’ predictions rarely

overlap with one another, and some fail to address key components of memory performance including: 1) memory bias and 2) contributions of the encoding versus

retrieval stages to memory performance. This thesis sought to expand upon the four

previous models by examining how individual differences in degree of endorsement for

gender-emotion stereotypes influence memory sensitivity and bias as a function of both

the encoding and retrieval stages of memory. In order to accomplish this, I conducted

three experiments to examine two characteristics of individuals: 1) endorsement of

gender-emotion stereotypes and 2) memory performance. Experiment 1 examined how

the encoding and retrieval stages of memory coalesce and influence memory and

Experiments 2 and 3 examined the unique contributions of the encoding and retrieval

stages to this phenomenon, respectively. In this final chapter, I review the conducted

experiments and discuss the theoretical implications of the experimental findings with

regard to the contemporary models that address how expectations influence memory,

propose a new model that combined these models, and discuss the social implications of

this work. 47

Experimental Review

Experiment 1 sought to elucidate how the individual’s expectations influence memory sensitivity and bias. People were instructed to remember men’s and women's faces that displayed expressions congruent and incongruent with common stereotypes

(Anger & Joy; Birnbaum et al., 1980; Briton & Hall, 1995; Fabes & Martin, 1991;

Grossman & Wood 1993; Kelly & Hutson-Comeaux, 1999) and later completed a memory test using the same expressions. People demonstrated similar levels of sensitivity to both congruent and incongruent facial cues and this was influenced by an individual’s endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes. Individuals who more strongly endorsed these stereotypes displayed greater sensitivity to all faces, whether posing stereotype congruent or incongruent gender-emotion displays. Overall, people were more biased to congruent facial cues relative to incongruent facial cues and this effect was not qualified by stereotype endorsement.

Experiments 2 and 3 sought to elucidate the influence of the people’s expectation on memory sensitivity and bias at the encoding and retrieval stage of memory, respectively. In Experiment 2, people were instructed to remember men’s and women's faces that displayed expressions congruent and incongruent with common stereotypes and later completed a memory test using faces devoid of expression. People demonstrated similar levels of sensitivity to both stereotype congruent versus incongruent gender by emotion facial cues. This effect was further qualified by individual’s endorsement for gender-emotion stereotypes, such that individuals who more strongly endorsed gender- emotion stereotypes displayed superior sensitivity to faces displaying congruent facial cues and worse sensitivity to faces displaying incongruent cues. Furthermore, people 48

displayed equivalent levels of bias to faces regardless of the stereotype congruity of the

facial cues; however this was also qualified by individual’s endorsement for gender-

expression stereotypes. Only the bias to stereotype congruent, not incongruent, facial

cues increased as stereotype endorsement increased.

Next, experiment 3 sought to elucidate the contributions of the retrieval stage of

memory on performance. People were instructed to remember men’s and women's

unexpressive faces and again completed a memory test using expressions congruent and

incongruent with common stereotypes. Similar to Experiment 1, but not Experiment 2,

people demonstrated similar levels of memory sensitivity to both congruent and

incongruent facial cues, and this again was qualified by individual differences in endorsement of gender-expression stereotypes. Again, like Experiment 1, but not

Experiment 2, individuals who more strongly endorsed these stereotypes displayed greater sensitivity to all faces, both stereotype congruent and incongruent. Furthermore,

and again unlike Experiment 2, people were less biased to stereotype congruent facial

cues relative to incongruent facial cues, but this too was qualified by gender-emotion

stereotype endorsement. In this case, similar to Experiment 2, only the bias to congruent

facial cues increased as stereotype endorsement increased as the bias to incongruent

facial cues remained unaffected.

Together, these results suggest that both the encoding and retrieval stages of memory contribute to the superior memory sensitivity for congruent facial cues and incongruent facial cues as a function of expectation strength— operationalized here as gender-emotion stereotype endorsement. In Experiments 1 and 3, people displayed an equivalent sensitivity to both congruent facial cues and incongruent facial cues. However, 49

sensitivity was predicted by an individual’s endorsement of gender-expression

stereotypes and encoding and retrieval differentially influenced these effects. Notably, as

stereotype endorsement increased, people were more sensitive to stereotype congruent facial cues across all three experiments. This suggests the influence of expectancies on memory is not specific to only encoding or retrieval, but rather both. On the other hand, as stereotype endorsement increased, sensitivity to incongruent facial cues decreased at

encoding (Experiment 2) and increased at retrieval (Experiment 3). This suggests the

contribution of retrieval to the sensitivity of incongruent stimuli is likely able to

compensate for the deleterious influence of encoding as representative of the superior

sensitivity in Experiment 1.

The bias towards congruent facial cues relative to incongruent facial cues

demonstrated in Experiment 1 appears to be the result of the summation of the influence

of stereotype endorsement on congruent facial cues at encoding and retrieval. People

displayed equivalent bias to congruent and incongruent facial cues at encoding, but less

bias to congruent facial cues relative to incongruent facial cues at retrieval. However, at

both of these stages the bias towards congruent facial cues increased as stereotype

endorsement increased. The greater bias to congruent facial cues relative to incongruent

facial cues, demonstrated when facial cues were provided at encoding and retrieval, must

be the additive influence of stereotype endorsement on the bias to congruent facial cues.

This additive influence is even able to overcome the greater bias towards incongruent

facial cues displayed during only the retrieval stage. Unlike the relation between

stereotype endorsement and memory sensitivity, stereotype endorsement no longer

influenced bias if people were provided cue information at encoding and retrieval. This 50

suggests that the contributions of stereotype endorsement during the encoding and

retrieval stages on bias to congruent facial cues have potentially reached a ceiling when combined.

Implication for the Models of Expectations and Memory

The research presented in this thesis represents a novel examination of the influences of individual expectations on memory sensitivity, bias, and the independent influence of these factors during the encoding and retrieval stages of memory. Within the three experiments presented here, none of the current models of expectations and memory alone best predicted the overarching results. However, each model contributes to a different interpretation of the results. The existing models are each built on the same presumption that memory for new stimuli are processed with respect to existing schemata, and thus I will attempt to integrate the presuppositions, where applicable, of each model in an effort to address the outcome of the current studies.

Recall that each model proposes that at the center of each schema lays a prototype for how stimuli should appear. Stimuli similar to this prototype are categorized as congruent with expectations, whereas dissimilar stimuli are incongruent with expectations. As the strength of expectation increases, the definition of the prototype increases; this increase in definition results in fewer resources required to process stimuli

more similar to the prototype (i.e., congruent). Depending on the model, the fewer

processing resources may enhance or weaken the sensitivity and/or bias for stimuli either

congruent or incongruent with this prototype. 51

The Schematic Stimuli-Processing (SSP) model suggests that the increased

processing fluency for congruent stimuli results in enhanced sensitivity at encoding and

retrieving, whereas incongruent stimuli are simply filtered out and ignored. While both

the SSP and Schema-Pointer Plus Tag (SP + T) models predict the increased prototype’s

definition enhances processing fluency, the SP + T suggests that at encoding and at the

cost of some cognitive effort, the incongruent stimuli are essentially “tagged” as

incongruent with expectations and stored as individual units in memory. The storage of

each stimulus as its own individual unit aids in recognition at the retrieval stage of

memory. Thus, counter to the SSP model, the SP + T model predicts that this tagging will

result in the superior sensitivity for incongruent stimuli. Despite having antagonistic

predictions as to sensitivity to congruent and incongruent stimuli, the SSP and SP + T

models both predict that congruent stimuli ‘over-activate’ a schema and produces a sense of familiarity, regardless of novelty, at retrieval and this produces a bias to congruent stimuli.

The Attractor Field (AF) model extends on the SP + T model and proposes that incongruent stimuli can be encoded as individual units (i.e., tagged) or processed into the existing schema in relation to an unexpected prototype. The key difference between the

AF model and the other models is that the AF model proposes that a schema can contain a prototype for expected behavior and a prototype for unexpected behavior. Incongruent stimuli can be processed in relation to the unexpected prototype instead of integrated into other schema. However, the unexpected schema is less defined relative to the expected schema because, inherent to its nature, a person encounters stimuli incongruent with expectations less frequently. Unlike the previous models, the AF model only specifies the 52

influence of expectations on the encoding stage. The AF model states that as the

prototypes for expected and unexpected cues increase in definition, people will become more efficient at processing congruent and incongruent stimuli. However, people will mistake the higher perceptual fluency of congruent faces as a proxy for its familiarity and thus have a bias to identify stimuli congruent with expectations as familiar— regardless of actual novelty. The increased processing fluency of incongruent faces reduces sensitivity to them because of their increase in perceived similarity.

The Associative Network (AN) model does not mention an effect of expectations on memory bias, but helps mitigate the discrepancy between the SSP, SP + Tag, and AF models with respect to sensitivity. Building off the SP + T model and similar to the AF model, the AN model proposes that, at encoding, incongruent stimuli are not stored as individual units of memory, but instead integrated into an existing schema’s network. The integration of incongruent stimuli is the process of forming new associations within a network of schemata in response to the unexpected. The associations within a network are stronger for more expected behaviors and the strength and number of associations predicts processing fluency and thus superior sensitivity. However, integration is costly; if enough resources are available at encoding, incongruent stimuli will form numerous new associations and thus result in superior sensitivity for incongruent stimuli at recall and memory overall. Critically, the AN model does not make note of the possibility for enhanced memory sensitivity for both schema-congruent and schema-incongruent as

expectations strength increases, but in accordance with this model, should be possible.

The superior associations for congruent stimuli would lead to superior processing fluency

at encoding and at retrieval, whereas the integration of incongruent stimuli —if copious 53 processing resources were available— would lead to superior processing fluency at retrieval; there is no reason these two effects cannot occur simultaneously and both would increase as expectation endorsement increases.

The evidence demonstrated here supports a combination of these models. I propose that, as do all the models, there exists a prototype for expected behavior and, as the AF model uniquely states, a prototype for unexpected behaviors may also exist. As expectations increase, the two distinct prototypes increase in definition. The increased definition of the expected prototype results in increased processing fluency of schema- congruent stimuli and therefore superior sensitivity at encoding and retrieval. However, this increased processing fluency results in the bias to recognize schema-congruent stimuli as familiar, regardless of novelty, at encoding and retrieval. The increased definition of the unexpected prototype results in increased perceived similarity between schema-incongruent stimuli and therefore worse sensitivity at encoding. However, the increased definition of the unexpected prototype also reduces the processing resources needed to tag schema-incongruent stimuli as similarly unexpected. The collected schema- incongruent stimuli are later integrated into the existing schema network. The integration of this group leads to superior sensitivity at recall. The SP + T and the AN models predict better encoding for schema-congruent stimuli, potentially better retrieval of schema- incongruent stimuli, but overall memory sensitivity is predicted by retrieval. Here, I demonstrate the same pattern of results for sensitivity: the contributions of the recall stage can compensate for the deleterious effects of the encoding stage with respect to schema-incongruent stimuli. Thus, through a combination of the reviewed models of expectations and memory, I can interpret the contributions of the encoding and retrieval 54

stages to the influence of expectations on memory sensitivity and bias and as well as

discuss the social implications of this phenomenon.

Social Implications

People need to be able to remember people in order to have functional social lives

(Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008); the inability to

accurately remember people strains relationships in many expected and unexpected ways.

For example, the inability to remember people can lead to the avoidance of social

interactions (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006), difficulty

maintaining interpersonal relationships (Duchaine, 2000; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005),

damage to a person’s career (Duchaine, 2000), and depression (Duchaine & Nakayama,

2005). Even worse, mistakes are not equal: people are better at remembering faces belonging to members of the same race (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Chance &

Goldstein, 1981; Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969), the same social group (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007), and individuals with higher social status

(Ratcliff et al., 2011). This study demonstrated that people who more strongly endorsed gender-emotion stereotypes displayed superior memory for stereotype congruent and incongruent face-emotion expression combinations. The superior memory performance related to the endorsement of stereotypes demonstrated here and the downstream effects of superior memory may act as a positive feedback for the stereotype and thus, in part, contribute to the self-perpetuating nature of stereotypes (Stangor & Lange, 1994).

This study also demonstrated that people who more strongly endorsed stereotypes

were more likely to mistake a stranger as familiar, but only if that stranger matched their 55 expectations. For example, this increased likelihood can, in part, explain the distressing rate of eyewitnesses identifying the wrong individual as often as 78% of the time

(Malpass & Devine, 1981). Perhaps, the incorrectly identified people looked similar to how the perceiver expected a perpetrator would look. Indeed, people who more strongly endorse stereotypes are more likely to label strangers as belonging to the stereotyped group (Elliott & Wittenberg, 1955; for review see Meissner & Brigham, 2001).

Conclusions and Future Directions

This study revealed that expectations improve memory performance for faces displaying cues congruent or incongruent to expectations, but expectations also increase the bias towards congruent faces. This relation was demonstrated using individual differences to elucidate the contributions of the encoding and retrieval stages of memory separately and together. Specifically, as expectations increased, the memory performance for congruent stimuli presented at only encoding or retrieval increased, whereas memory performance for incongruent stimuli presented only at encoding or retrieval decreased or increased, respectively. In addition, as expectations increased, people displayed an increase in bias towards congruent stimuli at encoding and retrieval that potentially hit a ceiling effect in the general memory paradigm. The results of this study were interpreted in light of four prominent and divergent models of expectations and memory leading to new conclusions as to the impact of schemata and expectation endorsement on memory.

By forming a schema, people create an expectation for how people should behave and/or look and possibly how they should not. Schemata support memory by providing prototypes that enable people to interpret the world relative to their expectations. People 56 that match our prototypes are easily interpreted and added to the existing schema, but stimuli that closely match our expectations will appear familiar regardless of actual novelty. Conversely, if something does not match our expectations it is integrated as incongruent and stored separately from stimuli that match our expectations. Therefore the increase in expectations can lead to superior memory sensitivity for people that conform or contradict expectations and greater memory bias to people that conform to expectations.

The contributions of encoding and retrieval not only help quell debates between existing models, but also elucidate potential cognitive processes. The encoding and retrieval stages of memory have been demonstrated to depend on a number of cognitive processes. Specifically, encoding is linked to enhanced attention (Jenkins & Postman,

1948; Green 1956; Schmidt, 1991), processing fluency (Jenkins & Postman, 1948; Green

1956; Schmidt, 1991), and elaboration (Waddill & McDaniel, 1998); whereas retrieval is linked to enhanced diagnostic power, (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Peynircioglu & Mungan,

1993), discrimination (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Hunt & Mitchell, 1982), increased cognitive access (Knoedler, Hellwig, & Neath, 1999; Waddill & McDaniel, 1998), and increased application of mnemonic categories (Bruce & Gaines, 1976; Watkins &

Watkins, 1975; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). The encoding and retrieval effects demonstrated here could be interpreted as a superordinate level to all of these processes and thus future testing could elucidate the contributions of each process.

Future research extending this study can investigate these cognitive effects and even behavioral interventions to moderate the effect. For example, memory requires both sides of the brain, but the Hemispheric Encoding and Retrieval Asymmetry (HERA) 57 model proposes the left side of the brain is predominantly utilized at encoding and the right side of the brain is predominantly utilized at retrieval (Habib et al., 2003; Tulving et al., 1994). By squeezing a stress ball in the right or left hand, people can purposefully prime the encoding and retrieval stages, respectively, thus increasing their memory performance (Propper et al., 2013). Therefore, this study not only elucidates the impact of expectations and memory in general, but also acts as the first step in actively enhancing or inhibiting memory. Future research can build off the encoding and retrieval effects found within this study and study the manipulation of general memory performance/bias, or performance/bias specific to congruent or incongruent stimuli. 58

Appendix

List of Math Questions Used in the Distractor Task

1. ( + ) ( + )( ) = 5. ( ) = 𝟏𝟏 a. a.−𝟐𝟐 −𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 𝒙𝒙 𝟑𝟑 − 𝒙𝒙 𝟏𝟏 𝒙𝒙 − 𝟐𝟐 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟔 𝟐𝟐 b. + + b. −𝒙𝒙 − 𝟕𝟕𝟕𝟕 − 𝟐𝟐 𝟖𝟖 c. 𝟐𝟐 + −𝒙𝒙 𝟓𝟓𝟓𝟓 𝟐𝟐 c. −𝟒𝟒 d. 𝟐𝟐 + 𝟏𝟏 −𝟑𝟑𝒙𝒙 − 𝟕𝟕𝟕𝟕 𝟐𝟐 d. − 𝟖𝟖 𝟐𝟐 + e. −𝟑𝟑𝒙𝒙 − 𝟓𝟓𝟓𝟓 𝟐𝟐 𝟏𝟏 𝟐𝟐 e. 𝟖𝟖 2. = −𝟑𝟑𝒙𝒙 𝟓𝟓𝟓𝟓 − 𝟐𝟐 𝟏𝟏 𝒙𝒙 𝟕𝟕 6. + 𝟒𝟒= , = 𝒙𝒙+𝟐𝟐 −a. 𝒙𝒙−𝟐𝟐 𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙−𝟕𝟕 𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈 √𝒙𝒙a. 𝒂𝒂( 𝒃𝒃 𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭) 𝒙𝒙 b. 𝒙𝒙+𝟐𝟐 b. ( )𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙+𝟕𝟕 𝒃𝒃 −𝒂𝒂 𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙+𝟐𝟐 c. c. 𝟐𝟐 𝒂𝒂 −𝒃𝒃 −𝒙𝒙 −𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟗−𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝟑𝟑 𝟑𝟑 𝟐𝟐 d. 𝒙𝒙 −𝟒𝟒 𝒃𝒃 − 𝒂𝒂 d. 𝟐𝟐 𝟑𝟑 𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙 −𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟗+𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 e. 𝒂𝒂 − 𝒃𝒃 𝟐𝟐 𝟑𝟑 e. 𝒙𝒙 −𝟒𝟒 𝒃𝒃 −𝒂𝒂 𝒙𝒙−𝟕𝟕 7. 𝟏𝟏 𝟏𝟏 = √ 3. = 𝟒𝟒 𝒙𝒙 − 𝒚𝒚 𝟑𝟑 𝟐𝟐 𝟐𝟐 𝟐𝟐 𝒚𝒚 −𝒙𝒙a. ( + ) √𝒙𝒙 a. 𝟐𝟐 b. 𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙( 𝒙𝒙 ) 𝒚𝒚 b. 𝒙𝒙 𝟏𝟏 −𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 𝒙𝒙+𝒚𝒚 c. ( ) c. 𝒙𝒙𝟑𝟑 𝟏𝟏 𝟑𝟑 𝟑𝟑 𝟐𝟐 d. − 𝒙𝒙 +𝒚𝒚 d. 𝒙𝒙 −𝟔𝟔 e. e. 𝒙𝒙 𝒚𝒚 − 𝒙𝒙 𝟔𝟔 𝟏𝟏 = 8. | + 𝒙𝒙| +𝒚𝒚< 4. −𝟐𝟐 −𝟏𝟏 𝒙𝒙 𝟓𝟓 𝒙𝒙 𝟒𝟒 𝟐𝟐 ? 𝒙𝒙 𝒚𝒚a. 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 𝟕𝟕 𝟏𝟏 < 𝟏𝟏 𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞a.𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞 𝐭𝐭𝐨𝐨 𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰 𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨 𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭 𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟 𝟑𝟑 𝟐𝟐 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙 𝒚𝒚 < b. b. 𝒙𝒙 − 𝟑𝟑 𝟏𝟏 𝟓𝟓 𝟐𝟐 < < 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝒙𝒙 𝒚𝒚 c. 𝒙𝒙 𝟑𝟑 c. 𝟓𝟓 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙 d. < < 𝟐𝟐 𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙 𝟒𝟒 𝒚𝒚 d. e. < < 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 −𝟒𝟒 𝒙𝒙 − 𝟑𝟑 𝟑𝟑 𝟐𝟐 e. 𝒙𝒙 𝒚𝒚 𝟎𝟎 𝒙𝒙 𝟑𝟑 𝟏𝟏 𝟓𝟓 𝟐𝟐 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙 𝒚𝒚 59

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