Portugal and Europe David Castaño | Alice Cunha Jorge M

Portugal and Europe David Castaño | Alice Cunha Jorge M. Fernandes José Santana-Pereira José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes Teresa de Sousa | Carlos Gaspar

SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018

2018

: Contents

PORTUGAL AND EUROPE

Editorial Note 007

Socialism, Democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: SPECIAL ISSUE the Portuguese case 009 DIRECTOR David Castaño Nuno Severiano Teixeira | IPRI -NOVA EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Portugal, Spain and Europe: Carmen Fonseca | IPRI- NOVA from the parallelism of the accession negotiations to the capitalisation of the third enlargement EDITORIAL BOARD Carlos Gaspar | IPRI-NOVA of the European Economic Community 025 Filipa Raimundo | ICS-UL Alice Cunha Madalena Meyer Resende | IPRI-NOVA Marco Lisi | IPRI-NOVA The 2014 European elections manifestos: Maria Raquel Freire | FE-UC a preliminary analysis Raquel Vaz-Pinto | IPRI-NOVA of the main competition dimensions 043 Teresa Ferreira Rodrigues | IPRI-NOVA Jorge M. Fernandes and José Santana-Pereira ADVISORY BOARD António Costa Pinto | ICS-UL, Portugal Federalism: is it the solution Charles Kupchan | Georgetown University, to the European Union crisis? United States A Portuguese view 09 Eusebio Mujal-León | Georgetown University, José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes United States Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses | University Portugal, the European Union of Maynooth, Ireland and the crisis 077 Gian Luca Gardini | Friedrich Alexander Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar Universität, Germany José Manuel Pureza | FE-UC, Portugal Kenneth Maxwell | Harvard University, United States Luís Lobo-Fernandes | University of Minho, Portugal Maurizio Cotta | University of Siena, Italy BOOK REVIEWS

Miguel Poiares Maduro | EUI, Italy Miguel Requena | UNED, Spain In defence of a benign dual hegemony 095 Miriam Gomes Saraiva | UERJ, Brazil Bernardo Pires de Lima Mirjam Kuenkler | Columbia University, United States Tiago Moreira de Sá, Nancy Bermeo | University of Oxford, Política Externa Portuguesa, Lisbon, Great Britain Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, Octavio Amorim Neto | FGV, Brazil 2015, 100 pp. Pedro Aires Oliveira | IHC-NOVA, Portugal The splendour of political history 099 Rafael García Pérez | Univeristy David Castaño of Santiago de Compostela, Spain Rui Lopes. Stefano Guzzini | Danish Institute West Germany and the Portuguese for International Studies, Denmark Dictatorship, 1968-1974. Thomas Diez | University of Tübingen, Between Cold War and Colonialism, Germany London, Palgrave Macmillan, Yves Meny | LUISS Guido Carli, Italy 2014, 269 pp. OWNER IPRI- NOVA The importance of historical memory. Rua de D. Estefânia, 195 -5.º, D.to A ﬁrst person account of the negotiations 1000 -155 Lisboa for Portugal’s accession Tel.: +351 21 314 1176 Fax: +351 21 314 1228 to the European Community 103 E -mail: [email protected] Isabel Camisão Website: www.ipri.pt João Rosa Lã and Alice Cunha (orgs.), NIF: 506346064 Memórias da Adesão à Mesa das Negocições, DESIGN Silveira, Book Builders, 2016, 358 pp. José Brandão [Atelier B2]

TRANSLATION AND PROOF READING Rachel Evans The double drama of Ernesto Melo Antunes 107 António Reis DIGITAL EDITION Maria Inácia Rezola, Ernesto Melo Antunes, ERC APPLICATION 124442 Uma Biograﬁa Política, Lisbon, Âncora,

ISSN 1645- 9199 2012, 792 pp.

DOI https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.si

LEGAL DEPOSIT 207 795/04 R:I Abstracts are indexed by CSA PAIS, IBSS, IPSA, LATINDEX, SciELO Citation Index of Thomson Reuters and EBSCO The editorial status is available online COVER at www.ipri.pt Double portrait of Gerardus Mercator and Jodocus Hondius Mercatur-Hondius atlas of 1612

PORTUGAL AND EUROPE

PORTUGAL AND EUROPE Editorial Note

he journal Relações Internacionais (R:I) has been published by the Instituto Português T de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Nova de Lisboa (IPRI-NOVA) since it was founded in 2004. It is a quarterly academic journal with reflections and debate on international politics that takes a plural and open line to all academic fields, all political sciences and international relations schools. In the last fourteen years, 59 editions of Relações Internacionais (R:I) have been published. These are available on the IPRI-NOVA website. IPRI-NOVA has a committed internationalisation strategy. Its aims include making Portuguese studies on political science and international relations more accessible. It was therefore decided to start publishing an annual edition of its Relações Internacionais journal (R:I) in English and online. Simultaneously, Relações Internacionais (R:I) continues its regular publication of four paper editions in Portuguese every year, and to present the work of Portuguese and foreign researchers in the field of international relations and comparative politics. This first special edition in English addresses a central topic in Portugal’s foreign policy, namely Europe, and it includes articles published in Relações Internacionais (R:I) by a number of Portuguese researchers in the fields of history, European studies, international politics and comparative politics. The edition opens with an article by David Castaño focusing on the period of Portugal’s democratisation. The article takes a historical perspective to analyse, on one hand, the role played by Europe in Portugal’s democratisation and, on the other, the socialist governments’ position on Portugal’s integration in the EEC which was in 1986. The article by Alice Cunha adopts a comparative approach to Portugal and Spain’s respective application processes for EEC membership which led to the creation of convergence on the European project. Focusing on the negotiation period for each country, the article strives to demonstrate how the interests of the Member States influenced the pace of the negotiation processes. Following the historical contextualisation provided by the two first articles, the article by Jorge M. Fernandes and José Santana Pereira analyses the European elections of 2014.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 007-008 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sia01 In the context of an international and European crisis, and above all an economic crisis, the authors examine the European election programmes of Portugal’s ﬁve largest parties. This analysis reveals a pattern of relative consensus on Portugal’s continuity in both the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union. Continuing against the backcloth of the economic crisis, José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes discusses how pro-federalist proposals can be seen as a solution to this crisis in the Eurozone and also addresses the repercussions of these options for Portugal. In the same vein, Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar assess how the European and Portuguese economic crisis has impacted the strategic debate on Portugal’s foreign policy. The authors consider that, in light of this new context, the debate in Portugal has started to question the terms of Portugal’s options in relation to Europe for the ﬁrst time since Maastricht.

ELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 008 PORTUGAL AND EUROPE Socialism, democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: the Portuguese case* David Castaño

urope’s role in the Portuguese democratisation pro- E cess has been analysed primarily by political science, ABSTRACT following the line of research developed by «transitology», he role played by Europe in the which highlighted the importance of the international TPortuguese democratisation pro- context1 and gained added momentum after the fall of the cess has been analysed primarily by political science, following the line of Socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. This lit- research developed by «transitology» erature divides democratisation processes into two phases: that drew attention to the importance of the international context. Among transition and consolidation. A key aspect that stands out the key aspects that stand out in this is the idea that the EEC played a particularly relevant role literature is the idea that the EEC played a particularly relevant role in in the democratic consolidation phase following Portu- the democratic consolidation phase. gal’s entry into the Community. However, Geoffrey Prid- However, Geoffrey Pridham argued that we should not overlook the influ- ham argued that we should not overlook «the influences ence of European integration on dem- of European integration prior to membership» on «democ- ocratic transition processes. The present article will follow this line ratisation or even transition», and he drew attention to taking a historical approach by analys- the various kinds of influence that integration can exert ing the evolution of the Portuguese Socialists in relation to the process of 2 over democratisation processes . European integration and the EEC’s The present article will follow this line, taking a historical role during Portugal’s democratic transition. approach in the analysis of the evolution of the Portuguese Socialists in relation to the European integration project Keywords: Democratic transition; European integration; Portugal; Socialist and Europe’s role in the democratic transition phase. It Party. spans the period from the fall of the authoritarian regime to the summer of 1976, following the adoption of the Constitution; during this time legislative elections took place, the President of the Republic was elected by direct ballot and the I Constitutional Government took office. RESUMO Combining a set of internal and external factors, our aim Socialismo, Europa e Democracia. Transição is to analyse how the revolutionary process ultimately e integração europeia: favoured a rapprochement. At first, this had seemed to O caso portugûes.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 009-023 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sia02 papel da Europa no processo de have little chance of success and even its greatest advo- O democratização português tem cates claimed it would be a long slow process that would vindo a ser essencialmente analisado pela ciência política seguindo a linha be brought to fruition only in the long term. de investigação desenvolvida pela transitology que chamou a atenção para a importância do contexto inter- THE 1972 TRADE AGREEMENT nacional. Entre os aspectos sublinha- From the 1960s, and notably under Marcelo Caetano’s dos por esta literatura destaca-se a ideia de que o papel da CEE é rele- leadership, the non-Communist opposition and in par- vante na fase da consolidação demo- ticular the Socialists from ASP, (that would later form the crática. Geoffrey Pridham defendeu, no entanto, que não devemos negli- PS), drew attention to the dilemma the country would genciar a influência da integração ultimately have to face: Africa or Europe. However, this europeia nos processos de transição. Adoptando uma abordagem histórica, dilemma did not separate just the opponents and sup- este artigo pretende seguir essa linha, porters of the regime. It very quickly became clear that analisando a evolução dos socialistas portugueses em relação ao projecto there were also conflicting positions within the Estado de integração europeia e o papel da Novo, and even among its most powerful support base Europa na fase da transição democrática. (Church, armed forces, large economic groups). While Palavras-chave: Transição democrá- some sectors of the opposition believed that Africa meant tica; Integração Europeia; Portugal; perpetuating the dictatorship and that Europe was syn- Partido Socialista. onymous with democracy, there were some in the regime who thought there was scope to play both sides simultaneously, and others who saw rapprochement to Europe as the first step towards the future political liberalisation of the dictatorship. Indeed, the latter position was shared by members of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany who advocated that involving Portugal more in the integration process would strengthen the liberal elements of the Lisbon regime3. But for the Portuguese head of government, the Europe-Africa binomial was a false dilemma because Portugal was simultaneously African and European and it could never renounce this twofold trait4. Nevertheless, the signature of a free trade agreement between Portugal and the European Economic Community in July 1972 was not seen by the opposition as a purely diplomatic manoeuvre in response to the need to protect itself from any negative impact on the national economy resulting from the United Kingdom’s entry in the EEC, or as a mere response to the evolution in the EFTA/EEC relations. It was an understandable fear that the first steps were being taken towards a rapprochement that was not just economic, but with clear political repercussions. In fact, the agreement contained an evolutionary clause that opened the path to the development and deepening of the relations between the two parties. Fifteen months before this agreement was signed, Mário Soares, one of the most important members of the opposition and leader of the Portuguese Socialists, did not believe Marcelo Caetano would be able to bring about this rapprochement without previously promoting internal reforms in exchange; for example, making the national production structures more competitive, putting an end to corporativism, and permitting freedom

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 010 of association once again. When there was no longer any doubt that the agreement would be reached, Soares began to play down its importance and minimise its political significance5. However, the agreement did have some political significance and there were other signs that worried the opposition. At the XII International Socialist Congress at the end of June 1972, the representative of the Portuguese Socialists appealed to their international partners to oppose the Portuguese government’s participation in the European Security Conference6; and later, when it was revealed that Lisbon had managed to buy a range of military equipment from the French government, the Portuguese Socialists were afraid that Marcelo Caetano’s government was managing to consolidate itself7. Another sector of the opposition shared these fears. In December 1973, Francisco Sá Carneiro, the Liberal wing dissident, wrote an article for the «Expresso» that was censored: «It seems the Common Market is designing a parallel evolution through a strange extension of the concept of democracy and freedom, which will lead to its opening the doors to Mediterranean authoritarianism»8. Any development of the kind would clearly imply finding a political solution to the colonial problem. Marcelo Caetano tried this path, but the President of the Council was aware that any change in the empire would impact the life of the regime, just as any change in the regime would have repercussions for the survival of the empire. The ties keeping the regime and the empire united and in tact could not be undone without harming the two parties that gave it shape. It was this overlap that led to the impasse and to the end of the Liberal wing’s hopes. The 1972 agreement did not strengthen the position of the pro-Europeans vis-à-vis the intergrationsists, as the Portuguese negotiators defended, nor did it contribute to the political liberalisation of the regime, essentially because it did not give rise to a political solution to the war. Mário Soares was the member of the opposition with the clearest understanding of this impasse and he tried to make the most of its political dividends. The Socialist leader drew attention both at home and abroad to the divisions at the heart of the regime and highlighted Marcelo’s inability to overcome them9. Meanwhile, the Social- ist’s were competing in a political arena increasingly threatened by the far-left, so its official discourse defended the need to deepen Portugal’s ties with a Europe that did not exist: a «United Socialist Europe (...) at the service of the workers» and not «a creation of international employers», based on «neo-capitalist and imperialist foundations», facilitating «the penetration of American, European, and multinational capital in various Western European countries»10. Meanwhile, the Socialist leader took a more moderate stand when he was addressing international public opinion, defending that the future of Portugal involved European integration. However, this was not described as risk- or problem-free: «there is no other path without causing great sacrifices for the Portuguese people!»; and it should not be applied in the short term: «I consider integration as a target to be reached after a certain period of time»11. On the eve of the fall of the Estado Novo, Europe was not merely a pipe dream for the

Socialism, democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: the Portuguese case David Castaño 011 opposition, it was also a threat symbolised by a fashionable expression of the day: «Europe of the trusts»12. The rapprochement between Portugal and Europe under Marcelo left its marks.

MILITARY COUP AND FALL OF THE REGIME The Socialists were not the only ones to see the rapprochement and stronger ties with the Common Market, the then expression for the EEC, as a gradual process that should be implemented over time. Already after the fall of the regime, in the aftermath of a trip to Brussels in September 1974, the Secretary General of PPD, Francisco Sá Carneiro, defended that the priority was to ensure full advantage was taken of the existing agreement and strengthening the evolutionary clause in the ﬁelds of economic and technical cooperation; he said that «Portugal’s admission as a full member was still a long way off»13. However, Sá Carneiro strived to set himself apart from Mário Soares, stating at the end of October that year that his party gave a «clear yes to Europe and to the Europe of the Common Market»; he added that he did not consider this to be «a simple construction of monopolies in an advanced phase of capitalism». But, in fact, the PPD leader was unable to avoid the platitudes of the day in this same press conference. Like the Socialists, he defended «a Portuguese path to Socialism as an original contribution to the development and consolidation of social democracy in Europe and the world» and committed to establishing «a bridge between the construction of democratic socialism in Europe and the socialist experiences in the Third World»; this bridge would be «Portugal’s contribution to an internationally responsible and anti-imperialist European socialism with under-developed countries»14. Given this manifest inability to mark out differences, it was not difﬁcult for Soares to assert himself as Europe’s main interlocutor as the revolutionary process gathered pace. Since the 1960s, the Socialist leader had been establishing a network with the European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. As a result of these contacts, the President of the Junta of National Salvation, General António de Spínola, invited him to travel to the main European cities so that Portugal’s new political situation would gain international recognition. These contacts also opened the doors for him to the Palácio das Necessidades. From May 1974, in the dual role of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary General of PS, Soares hosted heads of Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, leaders of parties and trade unions in Lisbon and visited them in Europe. Initially, Soares and his interlocutors were concerned primarily with resolving the colonial problem. The question of deepening relations with the EEC was relegated to a secondary posi- tion15. It was the logical development of a strategy that been defended since the opposition to Marcelism. In addition, some political leaders, notably in the North of Europe, had expressed a wish to make economic aid programmes and closer relations with Portugal conditional upon its prior recognition of the colonies’ right to self-determination and independence16.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 012 On the other hand, neither the MFA Programme nor that of the first two provisional governments defended closer ties with the Common Market. The MFA Programme simply advocated broadening and diversifying «international relations based on friendship and cooperation» and the Programme of the I Provisional Government advocated IT WAS NECESSARY TO WAIT UNTIL 20 JANUARY the «intensification of trading and political 1976 FOR THE EEC’S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS relations with the countries of the Euro- TO AUTHORISE THE COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE pean Economic Community»17 and not WITH PORTUGAL, AND UNTIL THE FOLLOWING with the European Economic Community. 9 JUNE TO SIGN AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL It was only seven months after the military TO THE AGREEMENT AND ALSO A FINANCIAL coup that Lisbon presented proposals for PROTOCOL. the modification of some of the clauses in the 1972 free trade agreement and sought to improve the social rights of the Portuguese emigrants in the EEC countries18. Meanwhile, it was necessary to wait until 20 January 1976 for the EEC’s Council of Ministers to authorise the Commission to negotiate with Portugal, and until the following 9 June to sign an additional protocol to the agreement and also a financial protocol. This impasse is explained by Portugal’s turbulent internal situation.

THE INTERNAL CONTEXT Over these two years, Portugal went through a process of political, economic and social upheavals. The fall of the I Provisional Government in July 1974; the tension between the President of the Republic and the Coordinating Commission of the MFA due to divergences on the future of the African territories; the events of 28 September and the resignation of Spínola; the deepening of the rift between Socialists and Communists; the rapid deterioration in the country’s economic and financial situation; and the explosion in the world of work in the countryside and cities; this all intensified revolutionary dynamics that had little interest in deepening ties with the EEC. This is the context in which the evolution of the Portuguese Socialists should be analysed, a party that criticised European social democracy while systematically claiming to be the main defender of Portugal’s integration in the European construction process which had been enjoying new momentum since late 196919. It was not an easy path however. Internally, there were profound divergences on the subject in PS, and, in a party spectrum in formation, PPD sought to affirm itself as the main pro-Europe party. The PS Congress in Lisbon in December 1974 is very revealing of the internal contradictions within the party. Until then, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Socialist leader had only defended deepening the existing agreement, rejecting the possibility of advancing to member status, not to mention an integration agreement; this was due to the country’s level of development and the negative effects the process would have on the Portuguese economy20. It was not a rejection of integration in the European project as

Socialism, democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: the Portuguese case David Castaño 013 such, but more a question of preparing for the struggle that the Portuguese economy would have to endure. This was however quite distinct from the position expressed in the party’s Programme. Although revised at this meeting, it remained highly critical of the European construction process, described as a structure that guaranteed the world- wide domination of capitalism21. At the Congress, the group formed to fight the left wing headed by Manuel Serra defended prioritising the foreign policy of developing closer ties with Europe22. It was the appearance of this group, which was the butt of criticisms from the radical wing of the party, that allowed Soares to emerge as a leader able to act as a bridge between the various THE DEFEAT OF THE RADICAL WING, sensibilities of a divided party and made it THE WEAK IMPACT OF THE SUBSEQUENT SPLIT, possible to consolidate the line proposed AND STOPPING THE DESERTION OF A SIGNIFICANT by the leadership after Manuel Serra’s split. GROUP OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC SUPPORTERS Shortly after, Serra formed the Frente WHO THREATENED TO MOVE OVER TO PPD ARE Socialista Popular (FSP - Popular Socialist IMPORTANT ASPECTS NOT ONLY IN THE HISTORY Front), a party that ultimately came within OF PS, BUT ALSO IN THE DEMOCRATIC the orbit of the PCP. TRANSITION AND THE EUROPEAN OPTION The defeat of the radical wing, the weak WHICH WAS THEREAFTER ENVISAGED impact of the subsequent split, and stop- AS A FUTURE POSSIBILITY. ping the desertion of a significant group of social democratic supporters who threatened to move over to PPD23 are important aspects not only in the history of PS, but also in the democratic transition and the European option which was thereafter envisaged as a future possibility. A PS dominated by supporters of non alignment and Third Worldism or deprived of Social Democratic sensibilities could never affirm itself as Europe’s main interlocutor. In such a scenario, Sá Carneiro’s PPD would find the door open first for its much-wanted membership of the International Socialists and then to become the main pro-Europe party. In this context, the European option would only have been considered by the parties in the centre and to the right of the political spectrum. Could this option have been successful under these circumstances? It is important to analyse how PS became the major Pro-European left wing party, despite the clear positioning defined in its programme and the constraints experienced during the PREC.

PS – PIVOTAL PARTY The acceleration of the revolutionary dynamics that took place in the late summer of 1974 had a marked impact on PS. An important group advocated maintaining stronger ties with the PCP and left wing parties continuing to work as a unit as they had under the Estado Novo, that is, a hybrid model in which different parties coexisted but grouped under the MDP/CDE umbrella. However, the party’s leaders and more central wing sought to clearly mark out the differences between PS and PC in light of the latter’s well known hegemonic pretensions. This was essentially the struggle waging at the

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 014 Congress in December 1974. Over the following months, the breach with MDP, the trade union question, the controversy around the lack of pluralism in the media and the debates on the participation of the armed forces in the Constituent Assembly contributed to accentuating the deep rift separating communists and socialists on all these matters. Meanwhile, the Socialist leaders continued to claim that their ultimate objective was to destroy capitalism and they attempted to keep an equal distance between Nordic social democracy and the model of the people’s democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. It was only in an interview in the pro Social Democratic newspaper Le Novel Observateur at the end of February 1975 that Mário Soares confirmed that if he had to choose between «State capitalism with a Socialist façade», like that of the Soviet Union and the «so called people’s democracy», and the Swedish Socialism, his choice went unreservedly to «Socialism the Swedish way», because although it was not «true Socialism», it had produced a more human and freer society than many others. None- theless, for Portugal he continued to defend the application of «a true Socialism and not just a capitalism with its most odious features corrected»24. In light of this stance, PPD tried to assert itself as the main interlocutor of Social Democracy in Portugal and, thus, the European preference. When Willy Brandt and Olof Palme visited Portugal in October 1974, PPD stressed the PS’s ambiguity: on one hand, critical of the Social Democratic model but on the other seeking closer ties with the European Social Democratic parties. The description of Olof Palme’s arrival at Lisbon airport is a good illustration of the situation at the time: members of PPD shouted slogans alluding to social democratic membership, while members of the young socialists handed out leaflets criticising social democracy25. Parallel to this, senior members of PPD were visiting European countries to muster support for their party’s membership of the Socialist International26. In fact, the Socialists managed to remain the only Por- tuguese members of the Socialist International and, although PPD established contacts and obtained backing, notably financial support, they were unable to forge a special relationship with any of Europe’s political families. CDS, on the other hand, rapidly became a part of the Christian democrat network. This weakness in conjunction with Sá Carneiro removal from the provisional governments, after the crisis that led to the fall of the Palma Carlos government, and with Mário Soares’ success in the internal struggle waging in his party influenced the evolution of the political process in Portu- gal and the subsequent actions of external actors. As the revolutionary process gathered pace, PS and Mário Soares became the main advocates of the pluralist path and sought backing in Europe and the United States for the struggle waging internally. The revolutionary threat is thus the main cause for the transformation that took place in the Socialist Party, which abandoned the Third World- ist discourse and adopted a pro-European stance27. Despite the PS victory in the election for the Constituent Assembly, in May 1975 the revolutionary path gained new impetus and it became clear that only the moderate

Socialism, democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: the Portuguese case David Castaño 015 members of the armed forces on the Revolutionary Council could invert what seemed an overwhelming trend. The PS leader addressed the main political and military power and used economic arguments to justify the need for deepening ties with Europe. Soares explained to the members of the Revolutionary Council that the catastrophic economic situation required expansionist policies if they were to stem the country’s growing unemployment. This entailed making investments and, given the deficit in the balance of payments, it was vital that there were no reductions in either revenues from the key tourism sector or emigrants’ remittances. In fact, these two sources of foreign currency originated mainly from Europe. As a result, Soares argued that even though an approximation to Third World countries might be correct at a strictly political level, this would be of «little» value at the economic level and, therefore, Portugal should bet in Europe. On the other hand, the Socialist leader recalled that the country only had enough currency to guarantee its responsibilities until September that year and that part of the Bank of Portugal’s gold was pledged as security in Switzerland, which raised the question: «when the reserves run out, who will give us a loan?» In his opinion, only Europe would do so but that meant the country had to guarantee political democracy was assured; only then would «Europe help». He predicted that «the fundamental aid must come from Europe. The strength of things will force us to review things». According to the Secretary General of PS, if the strikes continued, the occupations and the purges, the country would soon be facing economic and financial collapse and the counter revolution would be the main beneficiary of such a context28. Three days after this meeting, the Assembly of MFA discussed the future of «Portuguese Socialism» and reached the conclusion that the PS leadership should be stopped because it did not want Portugal to go beyond the stages of Socialism reached in Western Europe. The Assembly therefore recommended that CR adopted a «a firm and critical position towards the parties, namely the PS», which were creating obstacles that were prevent- ing the unfolding of the revolutionary process29. Following this meeting of the MFA, a large demonstration was organised in Lisbon in defence of the people’s power with the support of PCP, MDP and FSP. Addressing the crowds who were calling for the armed forces to have a stronger role in the political process, the head of the armed forces, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, referred to the National Anthem as the future National Anthem of the Socialist Republic of Portugal30.

THE EXTERNAL FACTOR This was when the Socialist Secretary General warned some of the Western governors and senior EEC ofﬁcials of the need to take measures, suggesting that the Soviet Union should be told of possible repercussions in the détente should the situation in Portugal deteriorate31. In the weeks that followed, the Portuguese Socialists pressured Western countries to spell it out to Moscow that advances along the revolutionary path would damage the détente process32.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 016 The countries of Europe as well as the United States exerted this pressure in Helsinki and also on the President of the Republic, General Costa Gomes. In the latter case, the aim was to make Portugal’s military and political leader aware that the country’s economic situation was at breaking point, it could not rely on the USSR for any aid of that kind, and that bilateral or multilateral support was dependent upon the adoption of a democratic and multiparty solution that respected individual freedom33. Following the Helsinki meeting, the European countries had to take the initiative. This division should not be interpreted as a consequence of the previous divergences on the West’s strategy on Portugal34. These had already been overcome. In mid-July, after the PS had left government, the United States ambassador in Lisbon met with his British and German colleagues: they all agreed with the strong position adopted by the Portu- guese Socialists who they argued would have to turn their electoral strength into political strength and that it was important to build bridges with the MFA’s moderate members of the armed forces. The representatives of West Germany and the United Kingdom also agreed with the North American ambassador who defended that it was time to act but that it was the Europeans who should take the lead35. Meeting in the outskirts of Stockholm, the main leaders of the Socialist and Social Democratic parties, including heads of state, ministers and party leaders of 12 European countries and of Israel, listened to Mário Soares as he painted a bleak picture of the situation in Portugal and they agreed on positions. Following the meeting, a small work group was formed, made up of Palme, Brandt, Mitterrand and Callaghan, the aim of which was to channel financial aid to the Portuguese Socialists. The Committee of Friendship and Solidarity for Democracy and Socialism in Portugal was set up in THE APPROVED STRATEGY WAS BASED ON FOUR London. The approved strategy was based POINTS: TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT on four points: technical and financial sup- FOR PS; AWARENESS RAISING ACTIVITIES IN port for PS; awareness raising activities in PORTUGAL AND WEST EUROPE; EXCHANGE Portugal and West Europe; exchange pro- PROGRAMMES WITH THE PORTUGUESE ARMED grammes with the Portuguese Armed FORCES; PREPARATION OF THE EEC’S ECONOMIC Forces; preparation of the EEC’s economic AID PROGRAMME. aid programme36. Despite the apparent unanimity, there were some divergences among the European Socialists. For example, Harold Wilson and Mitterrand believed that the support plan for the Socialists should only be put into action once the political instability in Portugal had been overcome and a Communist dictatorship was no longer a possibility37. In this case, the position defended essentially by the Nordic countries prevailed, namely that it was necessary to act before the internal situation deteriorated seriously and a scheme was set in motion to allocate funds to the PS through a Swiss bank. A different position was adopted, however, on financial aid for Portugal. Here, the pro-active position defended by the Swedes was in the minority and it was decided at the London meeting that they should

Socialism, democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: the Portuguese case David Castaño 017 follow the EEC position, that is, that ﬁnancial aid would only be released once certain democratic requirements, such as the holding of free elections and the subsequent constitution of a government, had been met. The Socialist leader, who publicly defended that aid from Europe should be unconditional, agreed on this condition38. Nonetheless, the EEC was not a mere spectator to the internal developments.

EUROPEAN ANTICIPATION On 11 June 1975, the Commission defended in the Council that emergency economic and financial aid should be sent to Portugal, recommending that the aid should be provided «quickly and in a spectacular fashion» so as to have the maximum political effect. One week later, the Commissioner for External Relations, Christopher Soames, addressed the European Parliament, calling for immediate and substantial aid to be granted to Portugal as a demonstration of the Community’s engagement in supporting Portugal on the path towards pluralist democracy. The following month, the French President vetoed the sending of community aid to Portugal and Europe’s final com- muniqué of 16 and 17 July stated that the EEC was willing to cooperate more closely with Portugal on economic and financial matters but that this support would only be granted to a pluralist democratic State39. However, this proved to be a very broad concept. As a result of the internal and external pressure, President Costa Gomes decided to dismiss Vasco Gonçalves from his position as Prime Minister at the end of August. Forming the new executive was a long slow process however, indicative of the continued tensions in Portuguese political and military life. Over the next two weeks, the negotiations for the constitution of the VI provisional government were also subjected to external pressures. On one hand, the North American Secretary of State expressed his dissatisfaction with the continued presence of PCP militants in the government40; on the other, the Communist leader reported that the EEC had made the unblocking of financial aid for the country conditional upon the new Finance Minister not being a member of the Communist party41. On 19 September, the new government took office. Although Kissinger’s wishes were not satisfied, largely because the Socialist leader wanted to maintain communists in the government for fear of losing influence in certain parts of the country, it was neither a PCP militant nor a compagnon de route that became Minister of Finance. The position went to Salgado Zenha, a well-known senior member of the Socialist Party. The much sought-after loan arrived less than a month later. Vasco Gonçalves’ departure and the substitution of the V Government with one that reflected the results of the election for the Constituent Assembly were sufficient for the EEC’s Council of Ministers to approve the concession of a large amount of emergency financial aid for Portugal. This change of attitude has been described as a natural development due to the political shift witnessed in Portugal. However, merely substitut- ing one provisional government with another, also provisional, did not turn Portugal into a pluralist democratic regime, nor did it remove the possibility of armed action.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 018 In fact, what happened was that the European Council changed its attitude and started following the Commission’s directions. Thus, both the EEC and the United States, which publicised an aid package three days later, took an initiative even before the military clarification in November 1975, which benefited the moderates in the fight they were still waging against the supporters of the revolutionary path. The EEC did not expect the situation in Portugal to be clarified. On the contrary, it contributed to this clarification with the means at its disposal: the provision of financial resources at a reduced interest rate and manifesting its unequivocal commitment to the successful establishment of a pluralist democratic regime. Soon after, in January 1976, the EEC’s Council of Ministers authorised the Commission to negotiate the revision of the 1972 Free Trade Act with Portugal.

EUROPE WITH THE PS AND THE PS WITH EUROPE Portugal’s rapprochement with the EEC and that of the EEC with Portugal is thus the fruit of the revolutionary process and it emerged in response to the revolutionary drift. The PS also played a fundamental role as the pivotal party in this context. Despite fears and doubts about Portugal joining the Communities, the events that took place in Portugal in 1974 and 1975 led to the anticipation and shortening of a process that PORTUGAL’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE EEC was expected, but not so soon. The PS AND THAT OF THE EEC WITH PORTUGAL IS THUS stood out in this area due to its demarca- THE FRUIT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS tion in relation to the political parties to AND IT EMERGED IN RESPONSE TO THE the left, the need for a counterpoint to the REVOLUTIONARY DRIFT. THE PS ALSO PLAYED end of the imperial cycle and the competi- A FUNDAMENTAL ROLE AS THE PIVOTAL PARTY tion with the parties to its right that IN THIS CONTEXT. defended Portugal’s membership. The Third Worldist discourses and proposals were set aside, and Portugal’s integration in the European project took the spotlight in the campaign for the ﬁrst legislative elections that would take place on the second anniversary of the 25th April revolution. One month before the elections, the PS organised a meeting in Porto of the Committee for Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy and Socialism in Portugal. The aim of the Socialists was to «draw the country’s attention to the international projection and credibility» of the party42. Under the slogan «Europe With Us», the Portuguese Socialists welcomed the leaders of Europe’s Social Democratic parties. At the end of the meeting, Willy Brandt, the head of the Committee, expressed the leaders’ commitment not only to developing bilateral relations between Portugal and European countries, but also its greater involvement in European institutions, notably the EEC, and he called on Europe to acknowledge its responsibility towards Portugal. This came in response to the opening speech when Soares stated that he wanted the country to participate «actively in the construction of Europe»43.

Socialism, democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: the Portuguese case David Castaño 019 In the legislative elections of 1976, the PS was again the most voted party. Refusing alliances with the parties either to its left or to its right, the Socialists formed a minority government. Its programme defended the need to start a new phase in the relationship with the EEC and to open negotiations with a view to membership, which they estimated could be achieved in three years44. This was not a consensual choice. During the debate on the government programme in the Assembly of the Republic, only the CDS praised the initiative45. The leader of the PPD did not deny he wanted Portugal to be integrated in the EEC but argued that the negotiation process for membership would be so slow that it would be preferable to begin by negotiating associate status46; Álvaro Cunhal spoke for the PCP and expressed his opposition to an integration that would «accentuate the ties of dependence and reduce the prospects of economic development and social progress» in the country47. Once Portugal’s membership of the Council of Europe was guaranteed, Portuguese diplomacy, led by Medeiros Ferreira, established the ﬁrst contacts with a view to submitting the application for membership that would be formalised in March 1977. It was the start of a process that proved much longer than the Portuguese authorities had initially expected.

CONCLUSION The EEC played a relevant role during the democratic transition in Portugal. In the Portuguese case, we find examples of the five types of influence identified by Pridham (symbolic; the stimulating effects of the prospects of entry; conditionality instruments; the elites’ involvement in the EU’s institutional framework and in transnational networks with connections to the Community)48. PS took a central role in the dynamics established at the time. Due to the political situation at the time, the fact that the civil leadership of this process was a party known to have opposed the old regime and with strong international ties was of relevance to the defeat of the revolutionary path and to the success of the transition to democracy, just as the positioning of PS and the way the party evolved was not indifferent. The evolution of Europe’s positioning on Portugal was also important. While it is true that «the pro-European shift was essentially a consequence of decolonisation and the institutionalisation of democracy»49, we can state that the PS’s pro- European shift and, to a lesser extent, the EEC’s more interventionist position with regards Portugal even before the clarification of the military situation of 25th Novem- ber 1975 contributed to the institutionalisation of democracy. The shape and timing of the European option is therefore, above all, the result of the fight between revolutionary legitimacy and democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the pragmatic dimension of this option. Under the Estado Novo, the rapprochement with Europe was presented not as an ideal but as a necessity, and it started to be defended during the transition due to economic and geographic constraints. Later, when already a Member State, participation in the Economic and Monetary Union was also justified

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 020 as the best response to an inevitable external constraint rather than as a goal for the country50. Although almost four decades have already passed, these genetic features of Portugal’s adhesion to the European construction project are still clearly present.

TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

Date received: 1st September, 2015 | Date approved: 27th October, 2015

David Castaño Researcher at IPRI-NOVA where contemporary history and the history of he is working on a post doctoral project on the international relations, in particular in the period consolidation process of Portuguese democracy of the Estado Novo, transition and democratic (1976-1982). He holds a PhD in Contemporary consolidation. History. His studies focus on Portuguese > [email protected]

ENDNOTES

* 6 15 This paper was first published in Mário Soares speech at the XII Con- Mário Soares’ declarations after a Relações Internacionais no.48, December gress of the Socialist International, meeting at the European Commission in 2015. 28-6-1972, reproduced in Escritos do Exílio, May 1974, Diário de Notícias, 5-5-1974, p. 3. p. 156. 1 16 WHITEHEAD, Lawrence - «International «Dutch views on Portugal», telegram 7 aspects of democratization», in Guillermo Letter from Tito de Morais to Mário from the US Embassy to the Hague to the O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (eds.), Soares, in Mário Soares, Cartas e inter- Department of State, 20-5-1974, The Ha Transitions from authoritarian rule: Uncertain venções do exílio. Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 02504, State Department Cables. conclusions. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- 2014, p. 173. 17 versity Press, 1986, pp. 3-46; PRIDHAM, MFA Programme. Available at: www1. 8 Geoffrey - Encouraging democracy. The CARNEIRO, Francisco Sá - Textos. Seg- ci.uc.pt/ihti/proj/docs25a/MFA1-1.HTM, international context of regime transition in undo volume (1973-1974). Lisboa: Alêtheia consulted on 12 September 2015. Pro- Southern Europe. Leicester: Leicester Uni- Editores, 2010, p. 115. gramme of the I Provisional Government. versity Press, 1991. Available at: www.portugal.gov.pt/ 9 See Mário Soares’ articles and inter- media/464072/GP01.pdf, consulted on 15 2 PRIDHAM, Geoffrey - «A integração view in the book Escritos do Exílio. Lisboa: September 2015. europeia e a consolidação democrática na Editorial Bertrand, 1975. 18 Europa do Sul», in António Costa Pinto and CASTRO, Francisco - «A CEE e o 10 Nuno Severiano Teixeira (ed.), A Europa do «Programa do Partido Socialista». PREC», Penélope, nº 26, 2002, p. 129. Sul e a construção da União Europeia de 1945 Lisboa: Portugal Socialista, 1973. 19 aos anos 80. Lisboa: ICS, 2005, p. 157. VARSORI, Antonio - «Crisis and stabi- 11 Mário Soares’s interview to «Dag- lization in Southern Europe during the 3 On the relations between Portugal and bladet», February 1973, reproduced in 1970s: Western strategy, European instru- FRG during Marcelism, see LOPES, Rui - Escritos do Exílio, p. 223. ments», Journal of European Integration West Germany and the Portuguese Dictator- History, 15(1), 2009, p. 5. 12 ship, 1968-1974. Between Cold War and «Sou pela Europa dos trabalhadores 20 Colonialism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, e não pela Europa dos trusts». Mário See, for example, Mário Soares’ inter- 2014. Soares’s censored interview to the view to the FRG television, 9-10-74. FMS, newspaper República. Escritos do Exílio, Arquive MS, III GP, MNE, pt. 02335.001.001 4 CASTILHO, José M. Tavares - «O p. 143. and SOARES, Mário - Nova Política Externa marcelismo e a construção europeia», Portuguesa. Lisboa: MNE, 1974. 13 Penélope, 18, 1998, p. 85. «Declarações ao Povo Livre, 24-9- 21 1974», CARNEIRO, Francisco Sá - Textos. PS programme, approved at the Con- 5 SOARES, Mário, «Portugal e a Terceiro volume (1974-1975). Lisboa: gress in December 1974. FMS, PS Archive, Europa», article published in the newspa- Alêtheia Editores, 2010, pp. 59-60. National Agencies, pt. 4385-005. per «Le Monde», 3-3-1971, censored inter- 14 22 view conceded to the newspaper Press Coniference of Sá Carneiro, «Proposta Socialista», motion pre- «República» on 30-4-72. Texts reproduced 30-10-1974, CARNEIRO, Francisco Sá - sented at the PS Congress, reproduced in Escritos do Exílio. Lisboa: Editorial Ber- Textos. Terceiro volume (1974-1975). Lisboa: in the newspaper República, 12-12-1974, trand, 1975, pp. 68-70 e pp. 143-153. Alêtheia Editores, 2010, pp. 80-81. p. 9.

Socialism, democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: the Portuguese case David Castaño 021 23 «Democratic movement converts into State Department Cables; «Soares sug- Lisbon, 9-9-1975, State 214380 e «Mes- party», telegram from the US Embassy in gestions for US assistance», telegram sage to Callaghan on Portugal», tele- Lisbon to the State Department, 5-11-1974, from the US Embassy in Lisbon to the grama do Departamento de Estado para Lisbon 04776. State Department Cables; State Department, 12-7-1975, Lisbon. a embaixada dos EUA em Londres, 9-9- «Partido Popular Democrático holds con- State Department Cables. 1975, State 214379. State Department gress, affirms center-left stance», tele- Cables. 33 gram from the US Embassy in Lisbon to RODRIGUES, Luís Nuno - Marechal 41 the State Department, 26-11-1974, Lisbon Costa Gomes. No centro da tempestade. CASTRO, Francisco - «A CEE e o 05179. State Department Cables. Lisboa: Esfera dos Livros, 2008, pp. 266- PREC», Penélope, nº 26, 2002, p. 146. 268 and Bernardino Gomes and Tiago 24 42 Interview to Le Novel Observateur, 24-2- Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs Kissinger. Os «Comissão Técnica eleitoral. Oper- 1975, reproduced in the book Democrati- EUA e a revolução portuguesa. Lisboa: Dom ações especiais», 16-2-1976. FMS, PS zação e Descolonização. Dez meses no Quixote, 2008, p. 264. Archive, National Agencies, National Com- governo provisório. Lisbon: Publicações mission, pt. 244.003. 34 Dom Quixote, 1975, p. 288. On the different points of view in the 43 North American administration, see Diário de Lisboa, 15-3-1976, p. 10. 25 Diário de Notícias, 28-10-1974, p. 9; GOMES, Bernardino and SÁ, Tiago Moreira 44 Diário de Lisboa, 28-10-1974, p. 4. de - Carlucci vs Kissinger. Os EUA e a rev- Programme of the I Constitutional olução portuguesa. Lisboa: Dom Quixote, Government. Available at www.portugal. 26 «PPD and Balsemão visit to Scandina- 2008. gov.pt/media/464012/GCO1.pdf. via», telegram from the US Embassy in 35 45 Lisbon to the State Department, 30-10- «Views of British and German ambas- Speech by Freitas do Amaral in the 1974, Lisbon, 04688. State Department sadors on current crisis», telegram from debate on the programme of the I Consti- Cables. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, A Rev- the US Embassy in Lisbon to the State tutional Government, 5-8-1976. FMS, pt. olução e o Nascimento do PSD. Lisboa: Department, 12-7-1975, Lisbon 03938. 02087.027. Bertrand Editora, 2000, 1º vol, pp. 521-522. State Department Cables. 46 Speech by Sá Carneiro in the debate on 27 36 For example, in February 1975, the On the external aid granted to the Por- the government programme, 12-8-1976. CAR- Socialist leader defended «a policy of pro- tuguese Socialists, see CASTAÑO, David NEIRO, Francisco Sá - Textos, quarto volume gressive integration in Europe» and was - «’A practical test in the détente’: Inter- (1975-1977). Lisboa: Alêtheia, 2012, p. 254. favourable to closer ties with the EEC. national support for the Socialist Party in 47 Interview to the L’E xpr es s, 17-2-1975, the Portuguese Revolution», Cold War His- Discurso de Álvaro Cunhal no debate reproduced in the book Democratização e tory, 2015, vol. 15, nº 1, pp. 1-26. do programa de governo, 8-1976. FMS, pt. Descolonização. Dez meses no governo 02087.019. 37 provisório, Lisboa, p. 267. «Meeting of socialist leaders on Por- 48 tugal», telegram from the US Embassy in PRIDHAM, Geoffrey - «A integração 28 Minutes of the Revolutionary Council, Stockholm to the State Department, 12-8- europeia e a consolidação democrática na 23-5-1975. ANTT, Revolutionary Council 1975, Stockh 03962, State Department Europa do Sul», p. 157. Archive, Minutes, vol.1, box 1. Cables. 49 PINTO, António Costa and TEIXEIRA, 29 38 REZOLA. Maria Inácia - Os militares na «Socialist meeting on Portugal», tel- Nuno Severiano - «Portugal e a integração revolução de Abril. O Conselho da Revolução egram from the US Embassy in Stockholm europeia, 1945-1986», in António Costa e a transição para a democracia em Portu- to the State Department, 3-9-1975, Stockh Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (ed.), gal (1974-1976). Lisboa: Campo da Comu- 04348; «Socialist meeting on Portugal», A Europa do Sul e a construção da União nicação, 2006, pp. 234-238. telegram from the US embassy in London Europeia de 1945 aos anos 80. Lisboa: ICS, to the State Department, 8-9-1975, London 2005, p. 18. 30 Diário de Lisboa, 29-5-1975, p. 1 e 5. 13814, State Department Cables. 50 TORRES, Francisco, «A convergência 31 39 Record of Mário Soares’ telephone CUNHA, Alice - «Tempo de passagem: para a União Económica e Monetária: contact with a senior official of the Foreign Os governos provisórios no Contexto da objectivo nacional ou constrangimento Office, 27-5-1975, The National Archives, Adesão de Portugal à CEE (1974-1976)», externo», in Pedro Lains and Marina Costa FCO 9/2294. Revista de História da Sociedade e da Cultura, Lobo (org.), Em nome da Europa. Portugal 2012, 13, pp. 393-395. em mudança (1986-2006). Estoril: Principia, 32 «Norwegian visit to Portugal», tele- 2007, p. 100. 40 gram from the US Embassy in Oslo to the «Coalition Politics», telegram from the State Department, 3-7-1975, Oslo 02776. State Department to the US Embassy in

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CARNEIRO, Francisco Sá - Textos. Segundo tuguese Dictatorship, 1968-1974. Between SOARES, Mário - Nova Política Externa volume (1973-1974). Lisboa: Alêtheia Edi- Cold War and Colonialism. London: Pal- Portuguesa. Lisboa: MNE, 1974. tores, 2010. grave Macmillan, 2014. SOUSA, Marcelo Rebelo de, A Revolução e CARNEIRO, Francisco Sá - Textos. Terceiro PINTO, António Costa e TEIXEIRA, Nuno o Nascimento do PSD, 1º vol. Lisboa: Ber- volume (1974-1975). Lisboa: Alêtheia Editores, Severiano - «Portugal e a integração euro- trand Editora, 2000. 2010. peia, 1945-1986», in António Costa Pinto e Nuno Severiano Teixeira (ed.), A Europa do REZOLA, Maria Inácia, Os militares na rev- Francisco Sá Carneiro - Textos, Quarto Sul e a construção da União Europeia de 1945 olução de Abril. O Conselho da Revolução e volume (1975-1977). Lisboa: Alêtheia, 2012.. aos anos 80. Lisboa: ICS, 2005, p. 17-43. a transição para a democracia em Portugal (1974-1976). Lisboa: Campo da Comuni- CASTAÑO, David, «’A practical test in the PRIDHAM, Geoffrey - «A integração euro- cação, 2006. détente’: International support for the peia e a consolidação democrática na Socialist Party in the Portuguese Revolu- Europa do Sul», in António Costa Pinto e RODRIGUES, Luís Nuno, Marechal Costa tion», Cold War History, 2015, vol. 15, nº 1, Nuno Severiano Teixeira (ed.), A Europa do Gomes. No centro da tempestade. Lisboa: pp. 1-26. Sul e a construção da União Europeia de 1945 Esfera dos Livros, 2008. aos anos 80. Lisboa: ICS, 2005, p. 155-173. CASTILHO, José M. Tavares, «O PRIDHAM, Geoffrey - Encouraging democ- VARSORI, Antonio - «Crisis and stabiliza- marcelismo e a construção europeia», racy. The international context of regime tion in Southern Europe during the 1970s: Penélope, 18, 1998, pp. 77-122. transition in Southern Europe. Leicester: Western strategy, European instruments», Leicester University Press, 1991. Journal of European Integration History, CASTRO, Francisco - «A CEE e o PREC», 15(1), 2009, p. 5-14. Penélope, nº 26, 2002, pp. 123-157. SOARES, Mário - Cartas e intervenções do exílio. Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2014. WHITEHEAD, Lawrence - «International CUNHA, Alice, «Tempo de passagem: Os aspects of democratization», in Guillermo governos provisórios no Contexto da SOARES, Mário - Democratização e Descolo- O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (eds.), Adesão de Portugal à CEE (1974-1976)», nização. Dez meses no governo provisório. Transitions from authoritarian rule: Uncer- Revista de História da Sociedade e da Lisboa: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1975. tain conclusions. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Cultura, 2012, 13, pp. 381-398. University Press, 1986, pp. 3-46. SOARES, Mário - Escritos do Exílio. Lisboa: LOPES, Rui - West Germany and the Por- Editorial Bertrand, 1975.

Socialism, democracy and Europe. Transition and European integration: the Portuguese case David Castaño 023

PORTUGAL AND EUROPE Portugal, Spain, and Europe: from the parallelism of the accession negotiations to the capitalisation of the third enlargement of the European Economic Community* Alice Cunha

ortugal and Spain had had a very different relationship Pwith Europe from the start of the European integration ABSTRACT process in the 1950s, and it was only after both countries his article focuses on the Portu- joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 Tguese application for membership to the European Economic Commu- that the two converged. nity, seeking to demonstrate that Por- In light of the European Union’s current enlargement tuguese accession was delayed as a 1 result of the simultaneity of Portugal policy, the Iberian enlargement may be a source of nos- and Spain’s accession negotiations. talgia as it was an event of great importance at the time for It also analyses the fact that although Member States were theoretically in both States; in addition to their full integration in the EEC, favour of further enlargement, they bilateral relations between the two countries were improved. dealt with the process at their own pace, and in accordance with their own spe- As celebrations take place for the 30th anniversary of the cific requirements; we therefore show Act of Accession, we make a further contribution to the how the interests of the Member States study of Portugal’s accession to the EEC by returning to conditioned the accession process. the “Siamese negotiations”2 concept and the way in which Keywords: European Economic Com- Member States capitalised on this enlargement3. munity, Iberian enlargement, Portugal, Spain. In fact, Portugal’s accession to the EEC came up against two main obstacles. Spain was the first of these because Portugal was held back by the simultaneity of their accession processes. The economic challenge Spain posed for RESUMO the EEC and the Member States resulted in several pauses Portugal, Espanha in negotiations, which also affected the progress of Por- e Europa: entre o paralelismo das tuguese negotiations. On the other hand, Portugal became negociações de adesão a “prisoner” of this application. Not only could it have e a capitalização do terceiro alargamento joined sooner because it was the first to request member- da Comunidade ship, albeit a mere four months before Spain, but it was Económica Europeia always ahead in negotiations, even if only a little; and its entrando-se na candidatura portu- accession raised fewer and smaller problems. C guesa de adesão à Comunidade

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 025-041 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sia03 Económica Europeia, este artigo pro- The other obstacle concerns the way in which the Member cura demonstrar que a simultaneidade States capitalised on the third enlargement, orchestrating das negociações de adesão de Portugal e de Espanha atrasaram a adesão por- it to obtain beneﬁts for themselves. In fact, the Member tuguesa, assim como o facto de, States’ progressive takeover of the enlargement policy was embora os Estados-membros serem 4 favoráveis em princípio ao novo alar- such that people spoke of the “creeping nationalisation” gamento, terem lidado com o processo of the policy, immediately compromising both its credibil- ao seu ritmo e de acordo com as suas próprias e muito particulares exigên- ity and its efﬁciency. And although the enlargement pro- cias, pelo que procuraremos demons- cess can be considered a political process underpinned trar de que modo é que os interesses dos Estados-membros condicionaram by several economic, social and geopolitical factors, it todo o processo negocial. was ultimately the value of fruit, of vegetables, olive oil,

Palavras-chave: alargamento ibérico, and wine that mattered because these issues do in fact Comunidade Económica Europeia, sow discord among Member States. Espanha, Portugal. This article focuses on the Portuguese application, seeking to demonstrate that Portugal’s accession was delayed as a result of the simultaneity of Portugal and Spain’s accession negotiations, and that although the Member States were theoretically in favour of the new enlargement, they dealt with the process at their own pace and in line with their own and very speciﬁc requirements. We will therefore attempt to show how the Member States’ interests conditioned the entire negotiation process.

THE BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS After the Second World War, Portugal took the path of international cooperation with membership of the OECD, EFTA, and NATO, whereas Spain limited its participation to the OECD from 1958 and to technical-type international organisations. The first years of European integration were “indecisive years”5 for Spain, and it was only in 1962 that it gave any real consideration to participating in this project. Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares and Antonio Moreno Juste note that Spain’s rapprochement to Europe changed status between the Second World War and Franco’s death, going from a “minor” (1949-1955) to an “average” political matter (1957-1962) and then finally to a “priority” political matter (from 1962)6. Political decisions on the issue of European integration were only made after this and there were several attempts to establish relations with the EEC. Spain only succeeded in doing so in 1970 with the signing of a trade agreement established within the scope of the EEC’s trade relations with Mediterranean countries. Under Portugal’s Estado Novo, the European construction project was limited to its economic aspect, and Portugal simultaneously distanced itself from and was kept away from the political side due to the authoritarian regime in power. However, attempts were made to “establish means for both parties to collaborate” on two different occasions: first in 1962 and again in 19697, with the latter resulting in the signing of trade agreements in 1972.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 026 In both Portugal and Spain, the non-democratic regimes prevented any political arrange- ment with the EEC. This situation changed in the mid-1970s with the 25th April Revolu- tion in Portugal in 1974, and the death of General Franco in Spain in 1975, when the institutional mechanisms were set in motion in both countries that ultimately led to the application for membership to the EEC: the Portuguese on 28th March 1977, and the Spanish on 26th July of that same year. The underlying reasons for the request for membership were the same in both cases, notably the need to consolidate the democratic regime (democratisation), and to boost their respective economies (trade relations), which were heavily dependent on the markets of the EEC Member States; and also social reasons (a large number of emigrants in the Member States)8. In this respect, the EEC was considered a source of political security (against any dictatorial temptation) as well as economic security (through development aid). Once the application for membership was made, both countries were faced with the following question: now that a democratic regime was in place following free elections and there were political parties and democratic institutions, when and under what conditions would they be accepted as Member States. This came in the broader context of the Cold War, in which the Portuguese and Spanish transition processes could tip the balance of influences in Europe if the communist parties were to obtain too much power in the new democratic regimes. It was therefore important for the western block to guarantee stability on the Iberian Peninsula and for the EEC to support the two States in their democratisation processes. In both cases, some months elapsed (19 for Portugal, and 18 for Spain) between the application for membership and the official opening of negotiations. Over these months, bilateral meetings were held at various levels (with representatives of the respective governments and community institutions, including diplomats from the various Mem- ber States, Commission experts) in preparation for future negotiations and they were able to draw on the experience of the first enlargement process (1973) and that of Greece, which was ongoing at the time. Whereas the Greek negotiation process took just two years, Portuguese and Spanish negotiations lasted seven, thanks to the Spanish application more than that of Portugal. Thirty years after accession, António Martha recently confirmed that if negotiations had not taken place simultaneously, Portugal’s accession would have taken two years9. In fact, it is known that Spanish accession was not an “easy, swift, or smooth task”10, and it had repercussions on Portugal’s accession, as we will see below.

THE PARALLELISM PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATIONS In all seven rounds of enlargement to date, the accession process was always (and still is) unique for each candidate State. Despite running parallel to each other, the Spanish and Portuguese negotiations had both similarities and differences. The similarities are

Portugal, Spain, and Europe Alice Cunha 027 evident in the visits made to the capital cities of the Member States by Prime Ministers Mário Soares and Adolfo Suárez in 1977 to gather support for their application for membership. The successive governments of both countries repeated these visits to ensure that the Member States would not forget the “enlargement portfolio”. Negotiations were conducted by several governments (in Portugal, the accession portfolio saw nine constitutional governments; Spain saw four), formed by different political parties (Partido Social- ista, Partido Popular Democrático and Centro Democrático Social, in the case of Portugal; Unión de Centro Democrático and Partido Socialista Obrero Españhol - PSOE, in the case of Spain). In fact, in the Portuguese case, the two governments led by Mário Soares were responsible for both applying for membership and signing the accession treaty, while in Spain, Filipe González finished what Adolfo Suárez had started. Another similarity is that the negotiations for accession in both countries were conducted by a small team of diplomats and experts (about 20 in each team), and any changes to this team were to the political leader of the negotiations11 rather than at the technical level. The number of Conference meet- ings12 also converged, with a total of 32 ministerial meetings for Spain and 27 for Portu- gal, and 31-32 Deputy meetings; reaching an agreement on the chapters of agriculture, fisheries and social affairs was much more difficult for Portugal, while Spain had problems with agriculture, social affairs, industry and foreign affairs. In terms of differences, in Spain the application for accession became a national matter supported by all political parties represented in the Parliament13 – unprecedented in any of the Member States and used as a show of strength to the outside14. In contrast, the application did not have unanimous support in Portugal’s Assembly of the Repub- lic from the outset and was opposed by the Communist Party (a stance that would last throughout the whole negotiation process, ending with a vote against the ratification of the Act of Accession). On the other hand, whereas there was not much participation from business associations and unions in Portugal, those responsible for the negotiations in Spain had 175 work sessions with business and union organisations, 210 sectoral meetings and four seminars for journalists between February 1979 and October 198215. The accession negotiations for Portugal started on 17th October 1978 and 5th February 1979 for Spain. The political conclusion was reached on 29th March 1985, and the technical conclusion on 7th June and subsequently formalised with the signing of the Act of Accession on 12th June that same year. Over this long period, the parallelism and the globalisation of negotiations was a frequent topic and common to all those involved. The three applications (including that of Greece) for EEC membership were phased and the accession process therefore developed accordingly; hence, Roy Jenkins, then President of the European Commission, believed that although negotiations with candidates would not take place in parallel and it was agreed they would not be done jointly, the three applications would inevitably come up against similar problems16. The Coun- cil reaffirmed this when it stated that negotiations should also be based on the principle of the merits of each candidate, even though there were certain inter-relations

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 028 between the three applications17. Vanessa Núñez Peñas has a different understanding of the matter, defending that “the political, institutional and economic consequences of the accession to the south [of Europe] were analysed from a global perspective from the outset, even though the Commission’s opinions on the membership of each candidate were prepared in a bilateral manner”18. And even on the Portuguese side, it was known beforehand that “while some countries favour holding negotiations with new candidates individually, others prefer to globalise these negotiations”19. Moreover, during the phase of sounding out political-diplomatic opinions, Greece did not want its application to be linked in any way to that of Portugal (which would stall its accession process), and similarly Portugal did not want its application connected to that of Spain which was still being prepared. A link with the Greek application would allow Portugal to gain time and would be more advantageous in negotiations; the link with Spain would have the opposite effect, as was later verified. With regard to this matter, Portugal always rejected any globalised negotiations with either Greece or Spain; it advocated bilateral and individual negotiations, not only because of the specific economic problems of each candidate, but also because of the stage of democratic development; Mário Soares had stated this even before the PORTUGAL ALWAYS REJECTED ANY GLOBALISED application for membership had been NEGOTIATIONS WITH EITHER GREECE OR SPAIN; made20. In 1983, already more than halfway IT ADVOCATED BILATERAL AND INDIVIDUAL through negotiations, an intervention from NEGOTIATIONS, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE the Minister of Finance and Budget Plan- SPECIFIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF EACH ning, João Salgueiro, at an INTEREUROPA CANDIDATE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE STAGE conference (Portuguese Association for the OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT. Study of European Integration) referred to the parallelism of Portugal and Spain’s negotiations with the EEC; he explained that “the Portuguese government’s position has always been clear, it has been the same from the start and there is no reason to change it”21, namely, negotiations based on the country’s own merits. The “commitment to the principle of ‘non-globalised’ negotiations” was unremitting, with the Portuguese side fighting for each application to be assessed on the basis of its specificities, own merits, and with its own calendar22; it tried to distance itself from the Spanish negotiations, defending a vision of autonomy and national sovereignty, especially in relation to Spain23. And although negotiations were in effect conducted individually, they could hardly be independent of each other; so in the end, the theory of “our application was made first and we should be the first to access”24 did not hold true. Although Portugal had always stated its wish to join before Spain, it was generally understood from 1980 that this was beyond its reach as it was not what the Member States wanted; they were cautious about concessions made to Portugal throughout negotiations so as not to “contaminate” concessions to be made to Spain25. In contrast

Portugal, Spain, and Europe Alice Cunha 029 to Spain, Portugal had few, if any, agricultural or industrial sectors that seriously threatened the EEC. However, by “taking a relatively passive position in the negotiations, the Portuguese became vulnerable to the problems found in the Spanish negotiations”26. As a result, the Portuguese were quite constrained about openly criticising the EEC; the strategy of the Spanish government was quite different, and it manifested its disapproval on several occasions when negotiations stalled. In fact, Spain also wanted the two applications to be formally separated, even if only in principle. On the one hand, it defended that “each application should be analysed separately in line with its circumstances and own merits”, but on the other, it was clearly understood that “if we distance ourselves too much from the others, we risk them joining because their cases are relatively straightforward; and if we arrive months or even years later, at the wrong time and isolated, circumstances could have got worse and our accession could be vetoed for one reason or another”27. This fear of negotiations with Portugal evolving faster than Spain’s and of enlargement taking place in two phases lasted until almost the end of the negotiations and was even the reason for growing tensions in the bilateral relations between the two countries. While the candidates wanted their applications to be dissociated from each other and, thus, separate accessions, the Member States did not share this position. France was the ﬁrst Member State to speak of a “Europe of the Twelve”, which would include Spain. Portugal suffered because of this from the start as its application became involved in the problems the EEC faced mainly from Spain. On the other hand, the Federal Repub- lic of Germany had never accepted Portugal’s accession on its own. This is how Fran- cisco Pinto Balsemão summarised the problem: “You’d go to Bonn, they’d say: «You’re in tomorrow; but the Spanish have to be in too. It’s nothing to do with us. But it’s the French that don’t want the Spanish in. So go to Paris and tell the French to let the Spanish in.» We’d go to Paris (…) and the French would say: «We have no problem with you joining now, but try to convince the Germans that you can join on your own, that you don’t need to wait for the Spanish. You see, it’s more complicated with the Spanish»”28.

Any idea of playing Bonn against Paris was doomed to fail however, and it was equally dangerous to attempt to set an accession date (although the Portuguese government was particularly expeditious in this case); so the Portuguese and Spanish governments had to use their resources effectively to unblock and speed up negotiations. Diogo Freitas do Amaral and António Martha agreed with Pinto Balsemão, and Diogo Frei- tas do Amaral added that from a community standpoint, “the problem of Portugal’s integration is a problem for Portugal; Spain’s integration in Europe is a problem for the EEC”29. Even the Commission had decided, albeit informally, that accession would take place simultaneously30, which would result in the slow pace of negotiations. It did so not only

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 030 because joint accession was “administratively easier”31, but also because of its experience of the first enlargement and because it was unaware of the delicate bilateral relations between the two countries32. Indeed, with the exception of Greece and more recently Croatia, two or more States joined at the same time in all the enlargement rounds. Payno noted that although this enlargement round involved three States, it was seen as a single process, and that Brussels had a tendency to “globalise” enlargement and to generalise some candidates’ problems to others33. Furthermore, “timing and geography meant that, contrary to Greece, there was no realistic possibility of Portugal approaching the EC on its own”34. On the other hand, the argument that it would be politically and administratively impossible for the two States to join at different times due to logistic problems, such as integrating the countries’ staff in the European institutions, did not work. It was extremely frustrating for the Portuguese and Spanish delegations, in part due to difficulties in understanding the fact that the political aim of accession – the consolidation of the democratic regimes – was not enough to conclude negotiations35, which also entailed various economic consequences. Indeed, France had treated the two applications quite differently from the start, as it was aware of the many points of competition between the French and Spanish economies36, and therefore foresaw more negotiation problems with Spain than with Portugal. Hence, throughout negotiations various key French politicians such as François Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, Georges Marchais, and others less well known, expressed opinions of a clearly nationalist bent that were not aligned with the pro-European spirit. Raimundo Bassols even cites the colourful example of MP Pierre Guidoni when he was referring to the possible Iberian enlargement that “democracy is one thing; fruit, wine and vegetables is quite another”37, something that has also been confirmed by literature38. If Portugal had presented its application for membership alone, the matter might not have been resolved, but it would have been put well on track. However, the Spanish application made it difficult to separate the two. It was also known that the Spanish application involved economic problems that Portugal did not have: Spanish agriculture was very competitive with the agriculture in southern France; some industries, notably steelworks and the car industry, were also competitive with French counterparts; moreover, there were many American multinational companies in Spain that could represent a “threat” to the EEC’s customs protection. In contrast, the Portuguese GDP was only 1% of the total GDP of the EEC, and the Portuguese economy would therefore have minimal impact on the EEC, and even that of Spain would not be very significant. Nevertheless, the Portuguese application would remain “hostage” to that of Spain until the very end. This was not, however, the first time Spain came between Portugal and the EEC: in 1962, the unexpected Spanish application for membership raised a series of objections from European socialist parties, and the Portuguese government was advised to let “the dust

Portugal, Spain, and Europe Alice Cunha 031 [raised by the Spanish request] settle” and present its application as late as possible39. Years later, in 1976-1977, news that the Spanish application for membership was imminent accelerated Portugal’s application40. The parallel negotiations and inseparable nature of the two applications were therefore a constant and posed an obstacle that Portugal could not overcome. Ultimately, it was not within its reach to do so. In addition, there was another obstacle that was no less important to the progress of negotiations: the instrumentalisation of enlargement so that the Member States could capitalise on beneﬁts that were in their national interest.

CAPITALISING ON ENLARGEMENT Following the not so successful enlargement experiences in recent years, due to the candidate’s inadequate preparation or membership being unsustainable (in the case of Bulgaria, for example), some adjustments have been made that have strengthened the Member States’ control over this policy. Moreover, the Member States themselves have also “had fewer scruples in instrumentalising enlargement to obtain national political gains”41. This was already the case at the time of the Iberian enlargement and allowed it to become hostage to national political and economic agendas. Although each enlargement process entails gains for both old and new Member States, here the Iberian enlargement process was successful despite Member States having reservations due to the expected conflicts on the respective distribution of benefits. Christina Schneider, who analyses distribution conflicts in enlargement processes, argues that the successive enlargement rounds have materialised in spite of these conflicts because it is believed that access to the market and the geopolitical benefits resulting from integration outweigh the loss of political sovereignty, an opinion shared by economists and political scientists. And on the other hand, as defended by sociologists, European integration is an almost natural process motivated by common values and by socialisation42. In the early 1980s, the EEC was committed to implementing structural reforms as this was fundamental for its compliance with its internal and external obligations related to enlargement43. Therefore, the enlargement process and the strengthening of common policies had to be pursued in parallel and simultaneously, but the former could never be a condition for the latter44. In short, there was a common and enduring concern that strengthening had to come before enlarging (deepening vs. enlargement). This need for further development alongside the reform of institutions and common policies proved a clear obstacle in the context of negotiations. However, it was not the only one. A ‘cocktail’ of factors conditioned the negotiations: a politically weak Commission until the Jacques Delors presidency; French President François Mitterrand wanted a “race for growth” while looking out for French farmers’ interests; the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, insisted on a budget rebate; and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was out of control45.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 032 The new enlargement only added to this scenario, but it was the Member States’ least important concern by far even though it heightened the tension among them and took up time and effort. Moreover, we know that the enlargement policy has become increasingly politicised46 and the process continues to be predominantly political47. There was real concern that the enlargement process could endanger the EEC’s THERE WAS REAL CONCERN THAT THE economic accomplishments and the cohe- ENLARGEMENT PROCESS COULD ENDANGER sion of the single market, and also that the THE EEC’S ECONOMIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS EEC could be weakened by enlargement, AND THE COHESION OF THE SINGLE MARKET, putting its fundamental objectives at risk48. AND ALSO THAT THE EEC COULD BE WEAKENED On the other hand, while enlargement BY ENLARGEMENT, PUTTING ITS FUNDAMENTAL would not in fact pose a new major prob- OBJECTIVES AT RISK. lem for either the Community structure or its capacity to function, it would exacerbate the existing problems in agriculture, industry and the regions, and highlight the urgency and importance of making structural reforms. Nevertheless, apart from these more technical matters, there was no reason to refuse the candidates’ membership. Even so, the Member States’ ability to delay any accession process cannot be underestimated. This was clearly demonstrated by the Iberian enlargement. While Spain was to blame for the delay in the Portuguese negotiation process, France’s position delayed that of Spain; it is thought France conducted the Spanish accession process to suit the pace of its own domestic policy49, and its actions during the process were “considered from the start to be more in line with a campaign by the major parties to attract votes than a strategy in the scope of the French European policy”50. An interesting example of this delay – and its inherent complexity – was the fact that a little over half of all the negotiations (eight years) was taken up solely with the “vue d’ensemble” phase51, and so the assessment of Spain’s level of preparation for membership was only concluded in the ﬁrst half of 1982. At ﬁrst, electioneering was in fact an explanation for the position of the French party leaders (Jacques Chirac and Georges Marchais, for example), particularly during the legislative elections in March 1978. Protecting the interests of French farmers was what mattered at the time (especially those in the south of France, considered the most conservative) in light of the consequences of Spain’s accession. Later, in 1982, Raimundo Bassols – member of the Spanish negotiating team from 1977 to 1982 – was under the impression that “Mitterrand’s inventory” was a means of stalling the negotiations and triggering early elections so that the PSOE party (socialists) could win and continue with the accession. Nevertheless, the positions varied and France’s main political parties were divided between Giscard’s «opportunist yes» and the communists’ «categorical no», the «cautious yes» of Miterrand’s socialists and Chirac’s «not now»52. This refusal, however,

Portugal, Spain, and Europe Alice Cunha 033 was more a campaign issue for the parties from the political spectrum than for the French in general who were not opposed to enlargement. Moreover, it could lead to the emergence of anti-French feeling in Spain, which would be prejudicial for France after accession. Curiously, Vanessa Núñez Peñas defends that the consequences of France being seen as the main (and almost only) obstacle to Spanish accession actually affected Spanish-French bilateral relations more than the negotiations between Spain and the Community53; this of course, from our perspective, if we do not take into consideration the successive delays due to French requests, namely “Giscard’s European re-launch” – known as “Giscardazo” in Spain – and “Mitterrand’s inventory”. In fact, on a number of occasions one (or more) Member State only allowed the enlargement process to advance if certain conditions were satisfied, because everyone wanted something: the Nordic countries wanted the reform of the institutions; Italy and France wanted the reform of the CAP; the United Kingdom wanted the contribution to the community budget to be reviewed; Luxemburg and the Federal Republic of Germany wanted limits set on the free circulation of workers (Portuguese workers in the first case, and Spanish in the latter); Ireland wanted access to community funds; and, towards the end, Greece wanted an increase in the funds for Mediterranean agricultural products54. Let us look at some of these in more detail. In the early 1970s, the institutions created under the Rome Treaty were already showing some weaknesses, and the possibility of enlargement would therefore provide the necessary final impetus for institutional reform. However, the Member States’ reading of the matter varied: while the BENELUX coun- IN THE EARLY 1970S, THE INSTITUTIONS CREATED tries, Italy and Ireland questioned the UNDER THE ROME TREATY WERE ALREADY potential implications of enlargement at an SHOWING SOME WEAKNESSES, institutional level, France and the United AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ENLARGEMENT Kingdom, and, to a lesser degree, the Fed- WOULD THEREFORE PROVIDE THE NECESSARY eral Republic of Germany were content with FINAL IMPETUS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM. the status quo55. The smaller countries, particularly the BENELUX countries, were particularly concerned about the weakening of Community institutions, which would lead to an increase in the power of larger countries. This issue was raised specifically in the scope of enlargement on more than one occasion56 because there was a risk that institutions would deteriorate and might not be able to guarantee an efficient decision- making process in an enlarged community; this had already been the case with the enlargement from six to nine Member States. But it was still in its early stages and it dragged on until the end of the accession negotiations and beyond; it was only concluded with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986. Under the pretext of a “European re-launch”57 – which suggests the consolidation and development of common policies, and the improved functioning of the EEC and of

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 034 cooperation between institutions –, the French President, Giscard d’Estaing put the enlargement process “on hold” on 13th October 1981. This triggered distinct reactions. The Portuguese government understood that the French President had not expressed any opposition to Portuguese accession, but had simply defended the need for a pause in the enlargement process without setting deadlines58, and therefore negotiations would proceed with the agreed agenda. This was a cause for concern in Spain for months because, as Raimundo Bassols suggested, “if Greece were to join ﬁrst and without any problems, and Portugal managed to get round being put ‘on hold’ and were free of us, the Spanish application could be seriously compromised and even open to a future French veto if negotiations were not well managed or there was too much internal pressure”59. In mid-1982, with François Mitterrand already in the French Presidency, an inventory was requested of the problems related to the enlargement in terms of both community policies and for each Member State60. This61 was presented in the same year but it did not add anything essential and was considered “a way of France transferring the responsibility of its own problems with enlargement to the Com- munity as a whole, given that the different problems were already known and had been extensively analysed”62. In terms of problem solving (or at least working towards a solution), the outcomes of the Stuttgart European Council (17-19 June, 1983) are worthy of note. In addition to examining the major dossiers that had been pending for years (enlargement, funding, CAP reform, and new common policies)63, the “Stuttgart Mandate” was approved at the Council. This Mandate served to launch negotiations to resolve the ﬁnancial problems related to the third enlargement. Between June and December that year, seven special European Council meetings were convened to discuss a number of problems related to the CAP, the structural funds, competitiveness, and EEC funding. They resulted in the reform of the CAP, and the approval of the fruit and vegetable regime – France’s struggle supported by Italy and Greece –, which increased the subsidies for Mediterranean agriculture after the Nordic States agreed to increase resources for agriculture in the hope that enlargement would bring two new markets as outlets for their industrial products. The United Kingdom was already the second largest net contributor to the community budget in 1977, coming second after the Federal Republic of Germany, and it was expected to become the largest net contributor once the transition period ended in 1980. However, the problem was not the contribution it made but the amount it received in return. The Federal Republic of Germany was the only other Member State that received less than it contributed, but the difference was minimal. Meanwhile, a “correction mechanism” had been created and the amount of the United Kingdom rebate had been decided upon; but Margaret Thatcher, who had been elected Prime Minister in May 1979, did not accept the Commission’s proposal to reimburse 350 million pounds, proposing one billion. She maintained this position for the following four and a half

Portugal, Spain, and Europe Alice Cunha 035 years, during which time there was agreement on several temporary rebates but no final agreement was reached. Over this period, the United Kingdom also started to hamper progress in other areas because its demand had not been met. This is when the political rhetoric in favour of consolidating democracy in the south of Europe started to wane, even though Margaret Thatcher herself continued to manifest the “British Government’s strong support” for enlargement and the inclusion of Portugal and Spain64. This issue was only resolved at the European Council in Fontainebleau (25-26 June 1984), when an agreement was finally reached on the amount of the United Kingdom’s compensation vis-à-vis its contribution towards the Community budget. This agreement also opened the way for the implementation of two others: on the increase in own resources raising the ceiling on VAT to 1.4%, and budgetary and financial discipline65. In the final phase of the negotiations when technical and policy issues had been concluded, Greece’s intention to veto Portuguese and Spanish membership loomed large because, as a recent Member State, IN THE EARLY 1970S, THE INSTITUTIONS CREATED it feared a transfer of funds (structural sup- UNDER THE ROME TREATY WERE ALREADY port) to these two less developed States, SHOWING SOME WEAKNESSES, and wanted its rights to be guaranteed. AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ENLARGEMENT This threat of the veto was overcome with WOULD THEREFORE PROVIDE THE NECESSARY the creation of the Integrated Mediterra- FINAL IMPETUS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM. nean Programmes (IMP), from which Greece, Italy and France would benefit, and Ireland ensured that this programme would not affect the transfers to the less pros- perous regions of the EEC. Christina Schneider claims that candidates and Member States negotiate the distribution of the enlargement’s earnings and losses among themselves; and the European Union is enlarged despite major distributive conflicts when some members (those that can veto the membership of new members) are compensated for their anticipated losses66. She adds that it is the States with the most to lose that have an incentive to delay negotiations and can use their power to veto (enlargement requires unanimity) either explicitly or implicitly; even the Member States with the most to gain from enlargement encourage them, compensating them with other benefits so as to cover those losses. In the case of the Iberian enlargement, for example, France and Italy supported enlargement but wanted compensation within the scope of the CAP. Diogo Freitas do Amaral notes that during the negotiations “there was no notion of friend-enemy” but, in his opinion, they were conducted based on the “wrong overall conception, insofar as they want to help everyone a little and so everything is distributed”67. Agreement came from the Spanish on this when referring that the Member States not only got everything they wanted from the candidates, but also that what they granted depended on their good-will68.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 036 CONCLUSION The Portuguese and Spanish waited in desperation as negotiations slowly proceeded. The Iberian enlargement negotiations took place in an atmosphere of Euro-pessimism, a lack of political willingness, and a revival of intergovernmentalism, which contributed to negotiations dragging on and ultimately made technical and economic obstacles easier to overcome than the political ones69. It was the internal problems of the Community together with the national political scenario in each Member State that determined the pace of negotiations, irrespective of Portugal and Spain’s own domestic interests (which were mostly sidelined) and the difficulties raised by each application. Although negotiations never formally came to a standstill, their progress was aligned with the EEC’s internal developments; notably, there was no chance of concluding the agriculture chapter until the CAP reform had been completed. It is not easy to establish a direct correlation between the Spanish negotiations’ influence on Portuguese negotiations because meetings were bilateral (between the Member States and the candidate); however, it is easy to ascertain that Portugal did not conclude its accession chapters until Spain did so. The way the EEC as a whole and some individual Member States viewed Spain’s economic strength was the underlying reason for this; on the other hand, from a political perspective, the EEC was not prepared to go through two enlargement rounds, one for Portugal and another for Spain. Indeed, although the EEC publicly defended the theory of the “merit of the candidates”, the negotiations actually ran parallel to each other and accession was simultaneous; and the Federal Republic of Germany’s position on the simultaneous accession of the two Iberian States was intransigent. Ultimately, the completion of the enlargement process depended primarily on the resolution of two main issues, namely the contribution to the community budget and the CAP reform, and on two of the Member States giving their agreement on these issues (Germany to support the cost of the accession, and France to accept the CAP reform); if we put everything else aside, Portugal was indeed a “victim” of Spain’s difficulties, and its negotiations could only be concluded after the more complicated problems between the EEC and Spain were resolved. There can be no doubt that Portugal could easily have joined the EEC about three years earlier if its application had not been associated with that of Spain. In the end, no one was responsible for the delay in the negotiations70 but everyone gained from enlargement. Using “dragging” tactics, or even of “freezing” as a question of affirmation, the Member States obtained more favourable conditions without having to bear the weight of cancelling the enlargement. Ultimately, the interests of every Member State prevailed: the resolution of the contribution for the community budget to the liking of the United Kingdom; the setting up of the MIP, which pleased Greece, Italy and France, with France also achieving the CAP reform; the reform of the institutions,

Portugal, Spain, and Europe Alice Cunha 037 which pleased the BENELUX countries; and the simultaneous accession of Portugal and Spain, as had been West Germany’s wish. Thus, the Member States openly capitalised on the enlargement as their demands were met and Portugal and Spain were well aware of this.

TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

Date received: 27th July, 2015 | Date approved: 15th September, 2015

Alice Cunha holds a PhD in Contemporary History various publications, all related with Portugal and from the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences European Integration. Her main research interests of the Univesridade NOVA de Lisboa and is a are the history of European integration, studies researcher with the Institute of Contemporary on enlargement and European funds. History at this University. She is the author of > [email protected]

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 038 ENDNOTES

* This paper was first published in aged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Movimentos de Cooperação e Integração Relações Internacionais no.48, December The Ministry of European Integration, and Europeia no Pós-Guerra e a Participação de 2015. the Ministry of Finance and Budget Plan- Portugal nesses Movimentos. Lisbon: INA, ning; and in Spain by the Ministerio de 1981, p. p. 26. 1 CUNHA, Alice Monteiro Pita Brito da Asuntos Exteriores and the Ministerio para 23 - À Descoberta da Europa: A Adesão de Por- las Relaciones con las Comunidades Euro- HIBOU, Béatrice - «Greece and Portugal: tugal às Comunidades Europeias. Lisbon: peas, the latter converted to State Depart- Convergent or Divergent Europeanisa- Instituto Diplomático, 2007, p. 40; ROYO, ment in February 1981. Regarding the tion». In The Member States of the European Sebastián and MANUEL, Paul Christopher Portuguese and Spanish negotiation Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, - «Introdução». In Portugal, Espanha e a structure, see: CUNHA, Alice - O Alarga- 2005, p. 232. Integração Europeia. Lisbon: ICS, 2005, p. mento Ibérico…, op. cit., pp. 91-100; NÚÑEZ 24 49. Depending on the author, this enlarge- PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la reforma y la President António Ramalho Eanes, on ment is also called “Mediterranean ampliación (1976-1986): las negociaciones his visit to Strasbourg, when making a enlargement” or “enlargement to the hispano-comunitarias en tiempos de tran- speech to the Assembly of the Council of south”. sición y approfondissement. Madrid: Com- Europe, on 9th May 1984, demanded that plutense University of Madrid, 2013, the applications be separated as the more 2 CUNHA, Alice - À Descoberta da pp. 447-449, respectively. difﬁcult problems of the Portuguese appli- Europa…, op. cit., p. 126. cation had largely been solved. Historical 12 The Conference was the ofﬁcial name Archives of the European Union, CPPE- 3 CUNHA, Alice - O Alargamento Ibérico adopted for the number of intergovern- 001655, “Portugal Demands Priority”, da Comunidade Económica Europeia: A mental meetings that took place between Financial Times, 10 May 1984. Experiência Portuguesa. Lisbon: Universi- the Member States and the candidate 25 dade Nova de Lisboa, 2012 [PhD thesis; countries within the scope of the acces- FERREIRA, José Medeiros - «Portugal policopied]. sion negotiations. em Transe (1974-1985)». In História de Portugal. s.l.: Círculo de Leitores, vol. 8, 4 13 HILLION, Christophe - The Creeping CLOSA, Carlos and HEYWOOD, Paul 1994, p. 150. Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement M. - Spain and the European Union. Hound- 26 Policy. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for mills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 15; PRESTON, Christopher - Enlargement European Policy Studies, Report No. 6, BASSOLS, Raimundo - España en Europa…, and Integration in the European Union. Lon- 2010. op. cit., p. 191. don: UACES, 1997, p. 81.

5 14 27 ALONSO, Antonio - España en el Mer- Vanessa Núñez Peñas, quoting QUIN- BASSOLS, Raimundo - España en cado Común. Del Acuerdo del 70 a la Comu- TANILLA NAVARRO, Miguel Ángel - «Los Europa…, op. cit., p. 212. nidad de los Doce. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, partidos políticos españoles ante el proceso 28 1985, pp. 19-30. de integración europea». In Revista de Estu- BRITO, José Maria Brandão de, dios Políticos, no. 108, 2000, pp. 307-323. AMARAL, João Ferreira do e ROLLO, 6 CASTAÑARES, Juan Carlos Pereira Maria Fernanda - Portugal e a Europa – 15 and JUSTE, Antonio Moreno - «A Espanha: BASSOLS, Raimundo - España en Testemunhos dos Protagonistas. Lisbon: no centro ou noa periferia da Europa?». Europa…, op. cit., p. 237. Tinta da China, 2011, testimony by Fran- In A Europa do Sul e a Construção da União cisco Pinto Balsemão, pp. 138-139. 16 Europeia, 1945-2000. Lisbon: ICS, 2005, pp. Mr. Roy Jenkins addressed the Euro- 29 56-57. pean Parliament, on 14 February 1978, Interview with Diogo Freitas do presenting the Commission's programme Amaral, on 21st June, 2011; Interview with 7 Letter dated 18th May 1962, signed by for 1978. In COMMISSION -Bulletin of the António Martha, on 8th August, 2011. the Minister of State, José Corrêa de European Communities, No.2.Brussels: 30 Oliveira, in Fundo “Gabinete do Ministro Commission of the European Communities, See, for example, HIBOU, Béatrice - das Finanças”, Economic European Com- 1978, p. 12. «Greece and Portugal…», op. cit., p. 231. munity series of the Ministry of Finance 17 31 Contemporary Archive, Bundle 2; “Aide Archives Historiques de la Commis- MACEDO, Jorge Braga de - «Política memoire”, in Arquivo Histórico Diplomático sion Européenne (AHCE), BAC 250/1980 Externa Portuguesa: Uma Abordagem (AHD), EOI, M. 682, Folder 1 a). 18, “Note de Dossier – Réunion du Conseil Económica». In Portugal em Mudança – du 2 mai 1978Ð, 3 Mai 1978. Ensaios sobre a Atividade do XI Governo 8 Among others: CUNHA, Alice - O Alar- Constitucional. Imprensa Nacional–Casa 18 gamento Ibérico…, op. cit., p. 79; BASSOLS, NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la da Moeda: s.l., 1991, p. 178. Raimundo - España en Europa: Historia de reforma y la ampliación…, op. cit., p. 133. 32 la adhesión a la CE, 1957-85. Madrid: Polit- LOPES, Ernâni Rodrigues - «Depoi- 19 ica Exterior, 1995, p. 169; VAITSOS, Con- Fundação Mário Soares Archives, mento». In Portugal e a Integração Europeia stantine - «Conclusions: Economic Effects Folder 837, “Reações ao pedido de adesão 1945-1986 – A Perspetiva dos Atores. Lisbon: of the Second Enlargement». In The Sec- de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias”, Temas e Debates, 2007, p. 148. ond Enlargement of the EEC – The Integra- written by Fernando d’Oliveira Neves, 33 tion of Unequal Partners. New York: St. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EOI, dated 10th PAYNO, Juan Antonio - «Introduction: Martin’s Press, 1982, p. 243. February, 1977, p. 3. The Second Enlargement from the Per- spective of the New Members». In The 9 20 Testemony by António Martha, on 4th AHCE, BAC 250/1980 n.° 653, “Portu- Enlargement of the European Community June 2015, as part of the Series of Confer- gal plans early application for EC mem- – Case-Studies of Greece, Portugal and ences “Memórias da Adesão de Portugal bership”, 15 March ‘77. Spain. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., à CEE” [Memories of Portugal’s Accession 1983, p. 1. 21 to the EEC]. SALGUEIRO, João - «Intervenção». In 34 A Política Económica na Comunidade Euro- PRESTON, Christopher - Enlargement 10 BASSOLS, Raimundo - España en peia Alargada. Lisbon: INTEUROPA, 1985, and Integration…, op. cit., p. 81. Europa…, op. cit., p. 1. pp. 30-31. 35 Not even Spain’s attempted coup d’état 11 22 In Portugal, negotiations were man- FREIRE, António de Siqueira - Os on 23 February 1981 – the so-called “23-F”

Portugal, Spain, and Europe Alice Cunha 039 48 that confirmed the problems in the Span- COMMISSION - General Considerations sion des Communautés Européennes, ish democratisation process –, which the on the Problems of Enlargement (Commu- 1982, p. 17. Member States strongly condemned, nication sent by the Commission to the 61 resulted in an urgent policy to accelerate Council on 20 April 1978). In Bulletin of the «Inventory, on the problems posed by negotiations given the event and the unde- European Communities, Supplement 1/78. enlargement for Community policies and niable link between accession and democ- Luxembourg; European Communities, for each of the Member States». In Bul- ratisation. 1978 [COM (78) 120 final]. letin des Communautés Européennes, Sup- plement 8/82. Bruxelles: Commission des 36 49 DUCHÊNE, François - «Community CALVO-SOTELO, Leopoldo - Memoria Communautés Européennes, 1982. Attitudes». In The Second Enlargement of viva de la transición. B arcelona: 62 the EEC – The Integration of Unequal Part- Plaza&Janés,1990, p. 151. PRESTON, Christopher - Enlargement ners. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982, and Integration…, op. cit., p. 77. 50 p. 37. NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la 63 reforma y la ampliación…, op. cit., p. 175. COMMISSION - Bulletin des Commu- 37 BASSOLS, Raimundo, España en nautés Européennes, n.º 6. Bruxelles: Com- 51 Europa…, op. cit., p. 194. Joint view of the application aimed at mission des Communautés Européennes, understanding in detail the difficulties 1983, pp. 19-21. 38 RUANO, Lorena - «The Consolidation and the problems for all parties in each 64 of Democracy vs. the Price of Olive Oil: chapter. «Letter from Margaret Thatcher to The Story of why the CAP Delayed Spain’s Gaston Thorn (London, 5 August 1982)». 52 Entry to the EC». In Journal of European NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la Referred to on: 17/09/2015. Available at: Integration History. Luxembourg, Vol. 11, reforma y la ampliación…, op. cit., pp. 177-178. http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content No. 2, 2005, pp. 97-117. /09e48a79-d536-4368-a5cd-667e7c396d 53 NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la 40/f60f070d-2921-4842-8554-895ac 39 AHD, EOI M. 210, telegram received reforma y la ampliación…, op. cit., p. 234 65fbb6b/en. from the Brussels Embassy, dated 27 April (and 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. of chapter 4). 65 1962. COMMISSION – Bulletin of the European 54 See, in particular, CUNHA, Alice - O Communities, no. 6. Brussels: European 40 GAMA, Jaime - «A Adesão de Portugal Alargamento Ibérico … op.cit., p. 74. Communities Commission, 1984, p. 7. às Comunidades Europeias». In Política 55 66 Internacional. Lisbon, vol. 1, no. 10, 1993, DINAN, Desmond - Europe Recast: A SCHNEIDER, Christina J. - Conflict, pp. 11-12. History of European Union. Boulder: Lynne negotiation…, op.cit., p. 183. Rienner, 2004, p. 178. 41 67 HILLION, Christophe - The Creeping Interview with Diogo Freitas do 56 Nationalisation…, op. cit., p.6. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – COMIS- Amaral, on 21st June, 2011. SION - «Enlargement of the Community 42 68 SCHNEIDER, Christina J. - Conflict, - General considerations on the problems ALONSO, Antonio - España en el Mer- Negotiation and European Union Enlarge- of enlargement». In Bulletin of the Euro- cado Común…, op. cit., p. 197. ment. Cambridge: Cambridge University pean Communities, Supplement 1/78. Lux- 69 Press, 2009, p. 3. embourg: Office for Official Publications Proof of this was the fact that the last of the European Communities, 1978 [Com- Deputy meeting for Spain took place on 43 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - «Euro- munication sent by the Commission to the 28th May 1984, but negotiations were only pean Union – Reports for 1980». In Bul- Council on 20 April 1978, COM (78) 120 concluded at a political level at the end of letin of the European Communities, final], pp. 15-16; EUROPEAN COMMUNI- March 1985, showing that from a technical Supplement 4/80. Luxembourg: Office for TIES – COMISSION - «The Institutional point of view, there was nothing else that Official Publications of the European Com- System of the Community – Restoring the needed to be dealt with, and almost a year munities, 1981. Balance». In Bulletin of the European Com- elapsed before political decisions were munities, Supplement 3/82. Luxembourg: reached. 44 AHCE, BAC 250/1980 no. 64, “Briefing Office for Official Publications of the 70 Note for President Jenkins, Venice Summit European Communities, 1982 [COM (81) As Raimundo Bassols parodied, the Meeting: Enlargement – President Gis- 581, 7 October 1981]. Commission placed responsibility on the card’s remarks”, 10 June 80. Council, the Council on the European Par- 57 «Mémorandum sur la relance euro- liament, the European Parliament, in turn, 45 DINAN, Desmond - Ever Closer Union – An péenne». In Bulletin des Communautés on the Commission, Commissioner “x” on Introduction to European Integration. Hound- Européennes, n° 11. Luxembourg: Office Commissioner “y”, and Commissioner “y” mills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 70. des publications officielles des Commu- on Board of Directors “a” or “b”, Italy nautés Européennes, 1981. thought France was responsible, France 46 PEDERSEN, Thomas- European Union blamed the Netherlands, and the Nether- 58 and the EFTA Countries: Enlargement and AHCE, BAC 250/1980 n.° 22, “Telex no. lands the “decision-making system”. BAS- Integration. London: Pinter Publishers Ltd, 185/80Ð, 9 juin 1980. SOLS, Raimundo - España en Europa…, op. 1994, p. 138. cit., p. 236. 59 BASSOLS, Raimundo - España en 47 S CHIMMELFENNIG, Frank and Europa…, op. cit., p. 240. SEDELMEIER, Ulrich (eds.) - The Politics 60 of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical COMMISSION - Bulletin des Communau- Approaches. London: Routledge, 2009, p. 3. tés Européennes, n.º 6. Bruxelles: Commis-

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ALONSO, Antonio - España en el Mercado FERREIRA, José Medeiros - «Portugal em of the European Community – Case-Studies Común. Del Acuerdo del 70 a la Comunidad Transe (1974-1985)». In História de Portugal. of Greece, Portugal and Spain. London: The de los Doce. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1985. s.l.: Círculo de Leitores, vol. 8, 1994. Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983, pp. 1-37. BASSOLS, Raimundo - España en Europa: Historia de la adhesión a la CE, 1957-85. FREIRE, António de Siqueira - Os Movi- PEDERSEN, Thomas - European Union and Madrid: Politica Exterior, 1995. mentos de Cooperação e Integração Euro- the EFTA Countries: Enlargement and Inte- peia no Pós-Guerra e a Participação de gration. London: Pinter Publishers Ltd, BRITO, José Maria Brandão de, AMARAL, Portugal nesses Movimentos. Lisbon: INA, 1994. João Ferreira do e ROLLO, Maria Fernanda 1981, pp. 17-31. - Portugal e a Europa – Testemunhos dos PRESTON, Christopher - Enlargement and Protagonistas. Lisbon: Tinta da China, 2011, GAMA, Jaime - «A Adesão de Portugal às Integration in the European Union. London: testimony by Francisco Pinto Balsemão. Comunidades Europeias». In Política Inter- UACES, 1997. nacional. Lisbon, vol. 1, n.º 10, 1993, pp. 5-19. CALVO-SOTELO, Leopoldo - Memoria viva de ROYO, Sebastián e MANUEL, Paul Chris- la transición. Barcelona: Plaza&Janés,1990. HIBOU, Béatrice - «Greece and Portugal: topher - «Introdução». In Portugal, Convergent or Divergent Europeanisa- Espanha e a Integração Europeia. Lisbon: CASTAÑARES, Juan Carlos Pereira e tion». In The Member States of the European ICS, 2005, pp. 23-56. JUSTE, Antonio Moreno - «A Espanha: no Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, centro ou na periferia da Europa?». In A 2005, pp. 229-253. RUANO, Lorena - «The Consolidation of Europa do Sul e a Construção da União Euro- Democracy vs. the Price of Olive Oil: The peia, 1945-2000. Lisbon: ICS, 2005, pp. 45-74. HILLION, Christophe - The Creeping Story of why the CAP Delayed Spain’s Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Entry to the EC». In Journal of European CLOSA, Carlos and HEYWOOD, Paul M. - Policy. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Integration History. Luxembourg, Vol. 11, Spain and the European Union. Houndmills: European Policy Studies, Report No. 6, No. 2, 2005, pp. 97-117. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 2010. SALGUEIRO, João - «Intervenção». In A CUNHA, Alice - O Alargamento Ibérico da LOPES, Ernâni Rodrigues - «Depoimento». Política Económica na Comunidade Europeia Comunidade Económica Europeia: A Experiên- In Portugal e a Integração Europeia 1945- Alargada. Lisbon: INTEUROPA, 1985. cia Portuguesa. Lisbon: Universidade Nova 1986 – A Perspetiva dos Atores. Lisbon: de Lisboa, 2012 [PhD thesis; policopied]. Temas e Debates, 2007, pp. 139-165. SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank and SEDELMEIER, Ulrich (eds.) - The Politics CUNHA, Alice Monteiro Pita Brito da - À MACEDO, Jorge Braga de - «Política of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Descoberta da Europa: A Adesão de Portugal Externa Portuguesa: Uma Abordagem Approaches. London: Routledge, 2009. às Comunidades Europeias. Lisboa: Insti- Económica». In Portugal em Mudança – tuto Diplomático, 2007. Ensaios sobre a Atividade do XI Governo SCHNEIDER, Christina J. - Conﬂict, Nego- Constitucional. Imprensa Nacional–Casa tiation and European Union Enlargement. DINAN, Desmond - Ever Closer Union – An da Moeda: s.l., 1991, pp. 157-237. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Introduction to European Integration. 2009. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la reforma y la ampliación (1976-1986): las negocia- VAITSOS, Constantine - «Conclusions: DINAN, Desmond - Europe Recast: A His- ciones hispano-comunitarias en tiempos de Economic Effects of the Second Enlarge- tory of European Union. Boulder: Lynne transición y approfondissement. Madrid: ment». In The Second Enlargement of the Rienner, 2004. Complutense University of Madrid, 2013 EEC – The Integration of Unequal Part- [PhD thesis; policopied]. ners. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982, DUCHÊNE, François - «Community Atti- pp. 243-268. tudes». In The Second Enlargement of the EEC PAYNO, Juan Antonio - «Introduction: The – The Integration of Unequal Partners. New Second Enlargement from the Perspective York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982, pp. 25-42. of the New Members». In The Enlargement

Portugal, Spain, and Europe Alice Cunha 041

PORTUGAL AND EUROPE The 2014 European electoral manifestos a preliminary analysis of the main competition dimensions* Jorge M. Fernandes and José Santana-Pereira

INTRODUCTION The crisis triggered by the financial crash in Europe ABSTRACT exposed many of the weaknesses in the European construc- he European project has enjoyed tion process, notably with regard to the Economic and Tconsiderable support from both Monetary Union (EMU)1. The crisis, which began in 2008, elite and masses in Portugal. Since the country joined the EEC in 1986, the had enormous political repercussions including that of main political parties have been strong the foreseeable punishment of incumbents with successive supporters of the Europe project. In recent years, however, this has been election defeats of governments in Portugal, Spain, Greece, undermined by both political and eco- Iceland and Italy2. In the countries most affected by the nomic crises. In this paper, we produce a preliminary analysis of the competi- European crisis, such as Greece, there has even been a tion dimensions in the forthcoming reconfiguration of the party systems due to the abrupt fall 2014 European elections. We make an empirical analysis of the position held of traditional parties (PASOK) and the appearance of by the five most important Portuguese extremist parties like SYRIZA and Golden Dawn3. political parties in relation to European integration, the Euro, debt renegotia- th In Portugal, the European elections on 25 May 2014 will tion, Eurobonds, and changes in pen- take place in a context of great economic, political and sions in a context that fosters contestation of European integration social tension, largely as a result of the austerity measures and its outputs. implemented by the Socialist Party (PS) (led by José Sócrates), Keywords: European Election, Elec- and the Social Democratic Party (PSD/CDS-PP) (led by toral Manifestos, Euro, Economic Pedro Passos Coelho), notably after the signing of the Crisis. agreement with the troika (International Monetary Fund, European Commission and European Central Bank). The Portuguese – supporters of the European project since the RESUMO 4 country’s adhesion to the EEC – are extremely disap- Os programas eleitorais pointed with Europe. Eurobarometer data from autumn das europeias de 2014: 5 uma análise preliminar 2013 show that 79 per cent of the Portuguese feel that das principais dimensões the European Union (EU) does not listen to them. Only de competição a fifth of those surveyed believe that the EU has a positive m Portugal, a opinião pública e as image and that Europe is moving in the right direction. E elites têm dado um apoio cons-

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 043-058 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sia04 tante ao projeto europeu. Desde a Moreover, Portuguese citizens are divided with regard to entrada de Portugal na CEE, em 1986, the Monetary Union and the Euro, with only 20 percent os principais partidos políticos foram fortes apoiantes da Europa. Nos últi- believing that the economic and financial crisis can be mos anos, porém, a crise económica resolved at the European level. Thus, the Portuguese were e política tem vindo a erodir o apoio ao projeto europeu. Este trabalho faz unhappy with the European project, which seemed to have uma análise preliminar das principais failed to generate prosperity and economic security. They dimensões de competição das eleições europeias de 2014, analisando o posi- are also pessimistic about the way in which democracy cionamento dos cinco maiores parti- functions in Portugal (85 percent said they are dissatisfied) dos portugueses em relação à integração europeia, ao euro, à rene- and they unanimously describe the state of the economy gociação da dívida, aos eurobonds, e as disastrous, which, according to research on the eco- aos cortes nas pensões, num contexto favorável à contestação da integração nomic vote, tends to be reflected in bad election results europeia e dos seus resultados. for the governing parties6.

Palavras-Chave: Eleições Europeias, Which electoral strategy will Portugal’s main political par- Programas Eleitorais, Euro, Crise. ties choose, notably those that led the country’s accession and integration process into the EU, during the 2014 Euro- pean election in light of this apparently unfavourable context for a strong pro-European discourse where European matters are interwoven with the decisive subject of the economic situation more than in any other European elections in Portugal to date (largely due to the direct intervention of European institutions in managing the problem of the Portuguese sovereign debt)? The present article is a first systematic approach to this question as it analyses the electoral manifestos prepared by the parties/coalitions represented in the European Parliament (Portugal Alliance [Aliança Portugal], Left Bloc [Bloco de Esquerda], CDU and the Socialist Party [Partido Socialista]) during the first months of the year. The aim is to identify the positioning of Portugal’s main political forces on the five major topics linked to Europe and the economic crisis, and to shed light on the impact of factors such as political ideology, their government situation (incumbent/opposition) and party type (mainstream or more radical) in the positions expressed in their electoral manifestos. In the following pages, we will briefly describe the main patterns in the positioning of Portuguese political parties in relation to Europe, as indicated in the programmes prepared during the campaigns for these second-order elections7. After presenting the hypotheses, data and dimensions of the analysis, a content analysis of the electoral manifestos of the Portuguese parties is used to analyse their positioning. The main patterns observed will then be discussed in light of the current social and political context.

CONTENT OF THE PORTUGUESE PARTIES’ ELECTORAL MANIFESTOS FOR THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS European elections directly elect citizens’ representatives in the European Parliament. They were ﬁrst held in 1979 and have since taken place every ﬁve years. Reif and Schmitt refer to the European elections as second-order national elections; indeed, they can be

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 044 compared to local or regional elections given that they have no direct impact on the governance of the national public territory. According to these authors, the European elections are dominated by the national cleavages (insofar as the European ‘arena’ is abstract, distant and not very politicised); they are characterised by higher abstention rates than first-order elections (i.e. legislative elections, in the Portuguese case), as well as by better election perspectives for small and/or new parties and a tendency to penal- ise the governing party8. European elections in Portugal have undoubtedly been second- order elections, given the high abstention rates (higher than the European average irrespective of their timing in the national political calendar), and the fact that both the bigger and governing parties have less satisfactory results than the opposition and/or smaller parties9. The fact that European elections are seen as second-order national elections also has implications for the presence of European matters in campaigns. European elections are often an arena to discuss matters of national relevance at the expense of truly Euro- pean issues. This phenomenon is frequently seen in the media, thanks not only to editors and journalists but also the political actors involved in the campaigns10. The presence of European subjects in more visible political campaign materials, such as airtime or posters, is limited to the point that the expression «Europe-shaped hole» can be used to describe its content: in 2009, three quarters of the campaign materials prepared by the Portuguese political parties represented in the European Parliament addressed national matters11. In this case, there is a marked cleavage between governing and opposition parties, with the incumbent dedicating two thirds of their THE AMOUNT OF ATTENTION GIVEN political communication material to Euro- TO EUROPEAN MATTERS IN THE PARTIES’ pean issues while the opposition parties ELECTORAL MANIFESTOS IS DETERMINED tend to address Europe much less. BY FACTORS SUCH AS THE LEVEL OF The amount of attention given to European POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN SUBJECTS matters in the parties’ electoral manifestos AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, OR THE LEVEL OF is determined by factors such as the level INTRA-PARTY DISAGREEMENT ON EUROPE. of politicisation of European subjects at the national level, or the level of intra-party disagreement on Europe12. In the Portuguese case, the political parties’ positions and preferences on the European project can usually be clearly identified in their euromanifestos. The analysis of the documents prepared for the European campaigns in the first 23 years of Portugal’s membership of the EEC/ EU reveals three major phases in Portuguese political parties’ attitudes towards Europe13. The first phase, from 1986 to 1991, is one of widespread enthusiasm and specific pragmatism, insofar as the main parties (with the exception of the CDU) evaluated adhesion positively, albeit with a certain scepticism regarding the concession of some decision- making powers to the EEC. In the second phase, which ran from the Maastricht Treaty to the turning of the millennium, we see the governing parties’ increased enthusiasm

The 2014 European electoral manifestos Jorge M. Fernandes and José Santana-Pereira 045 about the European project but also the appearance of a real cleavage between large and small parties on Europe-related matters; this followed a change in the CDS leadership when it adopted a clearly Eurosceptic position on the grounds that it was defending the national identity and sovereignty14. The third phase, from 2000 to 2009, ran parallel with the growth in the Left Bloc’s electoral success, as well as the EU’s enlargement to the East. This phase is marked by some dispersed scepticism (with the increased presence of references to some negative or contradictory aspects of EEC/EU adhesion in electoral manifestos) in relation to the support for the European project specifically, notably in the attempt to give Europe a greater role and more power in decision-making processes and the management of areas like the environment, immigration, justice, and social policies15. Despite these broad trends, the positions of the Portuguese political parties have varied considerably. Sanches and Santana-Pereira tested the impact of three of the parties’ characteristics using the positions expressed in the European electoral manifestos published between 1987 and 200416. Following Hooghe, Marks and Wilson17, the first two variables address ideology and ideological extremism (distinguishing between right and left-wing parties, and between parties towards the centre with diffuse ideologies and extreme parties). The third variable was related to the party’s situation at the time of the European elections, and made the distinction between the parties with governing responsibilities and opposition parties. The analysis showed that the left-right cleavage was relatively unimportant: indeed, the PS has always been closer to the PSD than to the CDU on the European project. In general terms, political competition on the subject of European affairs seems to have been based on the cleavage between the so-called ‘centrist’ parties and small parties that are ideologically more defined. This was the case particularly in the 1990s, when the CDS took a much more Eurosceptic stand than it does today, thus joining forces with the ALTHOUGH PORTUGAL’S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION traditionally critical CDU. Although the PS WAS ESSENTIALLY LED BY THE ELITE, and the PSD have been clearly pro-Europe, WITH LITTLE PARTICIPATION OR INTERVENTION it should be noted that they tend to be less BY THE PEOPLE AND CIVIL SOCIETY, enthusiastic supporters when they are in THE ATTITUDES TO EUROPE IN THE PUBLIC the opposition18. OPINION HAVE NEVER BEEN IRRELEVANT. There are clearly electoral reasons for the oscillations in the declared positions of some Portuguese political parties on the EU. In an attempt to obtain the best election results possible, parties seek to control the tensions between the positions previously expressed, public opinion at the time of the elections, and the political measures implemented by the government in a multi-level governance system. Although Portugal’s European integration was essentially led by the elite, with little participation or intervention by the people and civil society19, the attitudes to Europe in the public opinion have never been irrelevant; in fact, the high level of support for the European project

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 046 enabled the governing parties to make electoral gains thanks to the advantageous consequences of Portugal’s adhesion to the EEC/EU20. This is the main reason why, from 1986 to 2009, the governing parties’ positions on Europe tended to be very positive and receptive to the further development of the Union21. Marina Costa Lobo reached a similar conclusion when analysing the salience given to the subject of Europe in the political programmes of Portuguese parties, noting that it «varies depending on each party’s circumstances at a given election. In other words, the subject of Europe and the positioning for or against are highlighted or downplayed according to whether or not the parties believe they contribute to their goals at a given electoral moment»22.

OBJECTIVES, HYPOTHESES, DIMENSIONS OF ANALYSIS, AND MATERIALS ANALYSED This paper analyses the positioning of the Portuguese political parties in the forthcoming 2014 European elections on important dimensions of the political competition during the campaign period, with the aim of identifying the main patterns and some of the factors that structure and shape the parties’ position. The positioning of each party is identified by analysing the content of the electoral manifestos produced for the European elections. This method of positioning parties as per ideology has a long tradition in political science; it is considered more reliable and is used more frequently than other methods (use of data collected by expert surveys or public opinion polls) due to its objectivity and impartiality and the great availability of data23. Given the objectives of this article, electoral programmes (or similar party documents) are undoubtedly the most suitable choice given that a truly systematic analysis of the political parties’ positions on the crisis, Europe and the interconnection of these two subject areas must be analysed based on official documentation, particularly if it has been prepared with electoral objectives in mind. The analysis of the electoral programmes covers only the four political parties and coalitions already represented in the European Parliament. We therefore chose to focus on the parties with a formalised and institutionalised relationship with Europe as a result of their recent presence in successive Parliaments: PS, PSD, CDS-PP, BE and CDU. The Socialist Party (PS) chose its leader and Member of the European Parliament (MEP) between 1999 and 2004 to head the party list. The governing parties (PSD and CDS-PP) announced the formation of the Portugal Alliance coalition in March 2014, with the Member of European Parliament, Paulo Rangel, heading its list. Two names connected to the CDS-PP (Nuno Melo, MEP, and Ana Clara Birrento, professor and member of the party) were among the coalition’s first ten candidates. To the left, the smaller parties with parliamentary representation chose two young figures who had already proved themselves in the European Parliament: Marisa Matias (Left Bloc) and João Ferreira (CDU). In terms of the people involved in the campaign, the focus seems to have been essentially on continuity.

The 2014 European electoral manifestos Jorge M. Fernandes and José Santana-Pereira 047 Based on the results of studies on the positions on the EU of Portugal’s political parties in electoral programmes published in the last few decades24, the parties are again expected to seek a balance in 2014 between their traditional position on Europe and the opportunities and constraints afforded by the current context, both from the point of view of the climate of public opinion (waning enthusiasm for the European project, apprehen- sion due to the intervention of European THE PARTIES ARE AGAIN EXPECTED TO SEEK institutions in the country’s economic and A BALANCE IN 2014 BETWEEN THEIR TRADITIONAL financial management), and in terms of POSITION ON EUROPE AND THE OPPORTUNITIES their current position vis-à-vis the govern- AND CONSTRAINTS AFFORDED BY THE CURRENT ment (incumbents vs. opposition parties). CONTEXT, BOTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW Thus, Portugal Alliance25 is expected to OF THE CLIMATE OF PUBLIC OPINION, express enthusiasm for the European pro- AND IN TERMS OF THEIR CURRENT POSITION ject and to defend the measures that result VIS-À-VIS THE GOVERNMENT. directly or indirectly from the agreement made with the troika (hypothesis 1), while the Socialist Party, which traditionally defends the European Union, will tend to align its Euro-enthusiasm with some scepticism about the measures implemented by the government to resolve the debt problem (hypothesis 2). CDU benefits from a fruitful terrain to express its traditional positions, and will therefore continue to stress its mistrust of the EU (hypothesis 3). Lastly, the BE, the Euro-enthusiasts with nuances26 and with a more recent representation in the European Parliament, can choose to ride the wave of discontent with the government and the EU and, like the Communists and the Green Party (Verdes), highlight its criticisms of the EU in its 2014 electoral programme (hypothesis 4). Accordingly, the government parties vs. parties with no governing experience dichotomy is expected to be associated with major differences in terms of the positions on Europe, and explicit support for the European project is therefore more likely to be found among the former than the latter (hypothesis 5). In light of the necessary brevity of this study, we have decided to focus our analysis on five fundamental dimensions. The choice was governed mainly by the centrality and salience acquired since the onset of the crisis in Portugal, particularly in relation to economic and financial policies – a subject that is now inextricably linked with European matters. We seek to understand where the Portuguese parties stand on the following topics: •General attitude on the European Union. •Need to renegotiate the Portuguese debt. •Remaining in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). •Mutualisation of European States' debts, with the creation of Eurobonds. •Permanent cuts to pensions and benefits. All the dimensions are directly or indirectly related to the EU in that they involve matters directly linked to the EU and its institutions, or in which the latter have played an important role. These dimensions capture each party’s overall position on European

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 048 integration (i), public debt (ii), a subject of great salience since the beginning of the assistance programme, and on the EMU (iii; iv). Dimension number v was included as it has become of increasing salience in recent years, and is absolutely central in the May 2014 European elections, and due to the fact that these measures have been presented and discussed as part of the adjustment process required under the agreement with the European institutions and the IMF. The party documents27 used in this article are as follows: the electoral manifest entitled «Portugal Alliance – Europeans 2014», published in March 201428, was mostly used for the PSD-CDS coalition. The electoral programme presented by the coalition stands out mostly because of its unique format: 101 ideas tweeted to facilitate the dissemination of the party’s positions and proposals through social networks29. We also used the programme of the 9th Constitutional Government30. Several sources31 were used for the Socialist Party, namely the October 2010 Declaration of Principles [Declaração de Princí- pios de outubro de 2010]32, the 2011 legislative elections programme33, the Portugal Has a Future [‘Portugal Tem Futuro’] motion34, and the New Direction for Portugal [‘Novo Rumo para Portugal’] declaration35. For the CDU, we used the 2014 European election manifesto entitled «Portugal with a Future in a Europe of the Workers and the People» [‘Um Portugal com Futuro numa Europa dos Trabalhadores e dos Povos’]36. Lastly, in the case of the BE, we used the manifesto Disobeying a Europe of Austerity [‘Desobedecer à Europa da Austeridade’]37, prepared by the party for the May 2014 European elections.

ANALYSING THE COMPETITION DIMENSIONS Let us start by analysing the Portuguese political parties’ positions on European integration. As we have seen, historically the main parties in the Portuguese party system (PS and PSD) have been strongly pro-European. The other parties are known for their marked scepticism (CDU) or, as in the case of the CDS, of shifting between Euro- scepticism and being pro-European38. In the 2014 European elections, the government’s coalition parties (PSD and CDS-PP) have stated that they are strongly in favour of the European project; their Portugal Alli- ance manifesto states that «we are part of the European future and today we are full citizens of Portugal and Europe»39. The PS, in its 2010 Declaration of Principles, reaf- firms that it is «totally in favour of the European construction process, and in favour of the development, strengthening and enlargement of the European Union»40. In line with the CDU’s traditional scepticism but without ever explicitly affirming its opposition to the European project, its manifesto for the 2014 European elections argues that «nothing can force Portugal to agree to the subordination of the State within the EU framework or to divest its national sovereignty and independence»41. The CDU also manifests its opposition to the Budget Treaty, a recently-created instrument to maintain the strict rules of budgetary control, namely holding the structural deficit at 0.5%. This coalition’s position is clear; it defends the «reversibility of agreements and treaties that

The 2014 European electoral manifestos Jorge M. Fernandes and José Santana-Pereira 049 rule the current integration, starting with the Lisbon Treaty, the Budget Treaty, and the legal documents on Economic Governance»42. There are some nuances in the Left Bloc’s position. On one hand, it presents itself as an integral part of the pro-Europe left as opposed to the Euro-sceptic left, but on the other it clearly rejects the current distribution of power, and proposes fighting for the refoundation of the EU’s institutions. According to the BE electoral manifesto, «the European left parties must have a project for the refoundation of Europe [...] that will overcome the institutional blockage created by unbending treaties»43. The document also states that the BE defends a «referendum on the Budget Treaty in which the voices of the victims of this policy will oppose this broad institutional consensus»44. An analysis of the parties’ position on renegotiating the public debt (dimension 2) reveals a cleavage between the government parties and the opposition. The government parties defend that «decreasing the Portuguese economy’s excessive debt must be achieved [by] steadily reducing public debt»45. More explicitly, they add that «Portugal must comply with its commitments. Although not easy, it is indispensable»46. In a dia- metrically opposed position, the motion ‘Portugal Has a Future’ from the PS, the largest opposition party, not only foresees «a renegotiation of the extension of the payment deadlines for part of the public debt» but also the «renegotiation of the interest to be paid on loans obtained»47. The CDU and the BE’s positions are quite similar, with both parties defending that Portugal should immediately renegotiate the amounts, deadlines, and interest on public debt. The third dimension analysed herein seeks to understand the political parties’ specific position on the single currency. Remaining in the EMU has been a topic of increasing salience in recent years. Generally speaking, the idea of leaving the single currency (still) seems to be considered undesirable in Portugal. However, some striking differences between the political parties are worthy of note. In its manifesto, the Portugal Alliance defends that «Portugal must consciously choose a single currency that will serve its interests and allow the economy to grow steadily»48. According to the governing parties, this entails «an institutional reform of the Economic and Monetary Union [...] so that integration is strengthened responsibly and with solidarity, shared powers and guarantee mechanisms»49. The PS, on the other hand, clearly states in its ‘New Direction for Portugal’ declaration that «the choice is not between staying in or leaving the Euro. For us, the urgency is in changing the Euro Zone and completing it with political, economic and social governance»50. Indeed, it should be noted that the three parties that have shared governing roles in Portugal since democratisation not only agree Portugal should remain in the euro, but also that institutional reforms are required to correct the EMU’s shortcomings. While the BE has never explicitly come out in favour of Portugal remaining in the euro area, it does, however, reject «more sacrifices in the name of the Euro»51. We can therefore assume that the BE defends Portugal’s continu- ation in the euro area must be compatible with the end of austerity and sacrifice. Marisa

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 050 Matias, who heads the party list, confirmed this when she said «if we reach a point where we have to choose between the euro area and the welfare state, I have no doubt that we will have to choose the welfare state»52. The CDU is the most openly eurosceptic party in this dimension of our analysis. In its electoral manifesto, the coalition states that Portugal must fight to «dissolve the Economic and Monetary Union and adopt measures that prepare the country for any changes to the euro area, namely those resulting from Portugal’s exit, whether of its own accord or due to future developments of the EU crisis»53. The analysis of this dimension reveals the stark differences between the PSD-CDS coalition and the PS on one hand, and the positions defended by the BE and the CDU, which differ in terms of intensity. Whilst the former are adamant that Portugal should remain in the EMU and must strive for the necessary institutional reforms that will ensure the Euro is in keeping with the end of austerity, the other parties believe that leaving the Euro is, or may become, a reality. If the economic and social costs of austerity continue to rise, Portugal must consider leaving the euro area. The fourth dimension analysed herein is the position of Portuguese political parties on Eurobonds, an instrument many see as being part of the above mentioned institutional reforms of the EMU. Yet again, the cleavage between the more pro-Europe parties and the much more Eurosceptic party in the Portuguese partisan system is evident. The PSD and the CDS-PP, as well as the PS and the BE, are in favour of the creation of debt mutualisation mechanisms. In its electoral manifesto, PSD and CDS-PP clearly state that «the future development of solidarity and debt mutualisation mechanisms is desirable [...]. To that end, the Union must optimise structural reforms in the Member States by means of a system of ‘contractual arrangements’ and ‘associated solidarity mechanisms’ mutually agreed upon by the Member States and the European Union»54. Simi- larly, the PS highlights the «need to focus on economic growth, as well as the introduction of Eurobonds at a European level so as to mutualise the debt of the euro area countries»55. In this dimension, the BE takes a similar position to that of the coalition parties and the PS. In their 2014 manifesto, the BE argue that the «EU must have its own debt management instruments that can serve as a resource for Member States, but benefiting from the funding costs that an area like the EU can provide»56. In keeping with its usual Euroscepticism, the CDU is the only Portuguese political player openly against any debt mutualisation mechanisms. In a recently approved thesis, the Com- munists call this type of mechanism a «decoy», characterising it as «a speculative fund built on the Member States’ contribution to increase sovereign debts and the dependence on large financial capital»57. Lastly, we turn to the question of pensions and the future of the public Social Security, a subject widely debated in Portuguese society. This dimension is particularly important in the context of European elections as the successive updates to the memorandum of understanding have included key measures in this area of governance. In the months immediately prior to the European elections, the topic of a permanent cut in pensions

The 2014 European electoral manifestos Jorge M. Fernandes and José Santana-Pereira 051 has been acquiring growing salience. In the government programme, the PSD and CDS-PP states that «it is necessary to study and assess the introduction of reforms that introduce a savings component in the old-age pensions whilst maintaining the State’s guarantee in the area of compulsory solidarity»58. The PSD and the CDS-PP justify this measure with the «fall in the economic dependence ratio» and the «progressive matura- tion of careers»59. On the other hand, the proposal from the PS is based on the reform implemented by the José Sócrates government in 2006. The Socialists therefore defend «promoting the sustainability, efficiency and equity of public Social Security without overlooking the conjunctural financial restrictions, but as an alternative to the project of the Portuguese right-wing to partially privatise and slim down Social Security». The CDU and BE have very similar positions on THE PS AND THE PORTUGAL ALLIANCE Social Security. They both defend that the CONTINUE TO PRESENT THEMSELVES public system should be maintained and AS POLITICAL PARTIES IN FAVOUR OF EUROPEAN plainly reject the «pension and benefits INTEGRATION, EXPRESSING GENERAL SUPPORT devaluation» policy. FOR THE EUROPEAN PROJECT, Table 1 systematises the positions of polit- REMAINING IN THE EURO ZONE, ical parties on the five dimensions under AND DEBT MUTUALISATION BY CREATING analysis, using a scale that ranges from EUROBONDS. THE MAIN SOURCES totally in favour, to partially in favour, par- OF DISAGREEMENT ARE THE NEED tially against, and totally against. The PS TO RENEGOTIATE THE DEBT. and the Portugal Alliance continue to present themselves as political parties in favour of European integration, expressing general support for the European project, remaining in the Euro zone, and debt mutualisation by creating Eurobonds. The main sources of disagreement between these two leading players in the 2014 European elections are the need to renegotiate the debt (defended by the Socialists but rejected by the governing parties) and making permanent cuts to pensions and benefits; this measure was proposed by the government with a few nuances and partially refuted by the main opposition party. Thus, these positions are in line with the past of the PSD and PS, in which they stand out as the main players in the European adhesion and integration processes, and with the position of the PS as the main opposition party. CDU’s strong nationalist and Eurosceptical position, identified in most of the programmes published for European elections in the last 30 years60, is still present in the 2014 documents. On the other hand, the BE position is somewhat undefined and with several undertones, which sets it apart from the strongly Eurosceptic CDU and the centrist parties. Thus, only the hypothesis on the BE position in the electoral programme for the 2014 European elections does not have empirical support in our analysis. Despite its short relationship with the EU, the BE seems to have given more importance to maintaining its traditional line of moderate enthusiasm about the EU rather than capitalising on the current lack of popularity for the Europe project among Portuguese voters.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 052 Tabela 1 > The positions taken by the main political parties and coalitions in the 2014 electoral programmes

Portugal Alliance PS CDU BE

General attitude regarding Totally Totally Totally Partially the European Union in favour in favour against in favour

Renegotiation of the Totally Totally Totally Totally Portuguese debt against in favour in favour in favour

Remaining in the Economic Totally Totally Totally Partially and Monetary Union (EMU) in favour in favour against against

Debt mutualisation of the European states Totally Totally Totally Totally with the creation in favour in favour against in favour of Eurobonds

Partially Partially Totally Totally Permanent pension cuts in favour against against against

We now turn to our analysis of the differences between the positions expressed by the political parties in terms of their size, ideology and situation vis-à-vis government (government vs. opposition). Curiously, in 2014, the left/right-wing and opposition/ government dichotomies overlap as both the right-wing parties are in government while the left-wing parties are in opposition. Table 2 shows that these factors have a weak to moderate impact on their positions on European integration, debt mutualisation through the creation of Eurobonds, and remaining in the EMU; there is no clear division between the two sides of each cleavage analysed. In these three questions, the two largest parties tend to take the same position, while the two smaller parties diverge, largely due to the differentiated statements and choices of the BE. The range of positions found among the main left-wing parties in opposition does not allow us to state there are striking differences in party positioning on these three subjects due to ideology or the parties’ situation vis-à-vis government. Quite the contrary, the opinions on renegotiating the Portuguese debt and the cut in pensions are marked by a strong left vs. right-wing divide, or a government vs. opposition divide, in which the left-wing/opposition parties are clearly more in favour of renegotiation and more against the cuts than the right- wing parties. The size of the parties has little impact; whereas the smaller parties express similar positions, the two larger parties express diverging attitudes in their official documents.

The 2014 European electoral manifestos Jorge M. Fernandes and José Santana-Pereira 053 Tabela 2 > Differences in parties’ attitudes expressed in the 2014 Electoral Programmes according to their ideology, size and situation vis-à-vis government

Left/Right-Wing Large/Small Parties (Opposition/Government)

General attitude Weak Moderate to the European integration

Renegotiation Strong Weak of the Portuguese debt

Remaining in the Economic Weak Moderate and Monetary Union (EMU)

Debt mutualisation of European states Weak Weak with the creation of Eurobonds.

Permanent cuts to pension Strong Weak and beneﬁts

CONCLUSIONS Ever since the «Europe with us» [‘A Europa connosco’] slogan, launched by the PS in the 1970s, public opinion and, above all, the political and economic elites in Portugal have had a positive perception of the European integration process. For many years, Europe was associated with prosperity, modernity and social progress. However, these well established facts have been questioned in recent years. Since the economic and financial crisis of 2008, and in particular the troika’s entry in Portugal in May 2011, this perception of European politics and its goodwill, and the purely positive vision of the EU has gone into decline. The 2014 European elections are taking place in this context and, as the first elections since the onset of the crisis, they are of great importance. In this article, we have analysed five competition dimensions in the May 2014 European elections. The fundamental conclusion is that, despite the recent deterioration in the public’s opinion of the EU, there is remarkable continuity in the positions on the Europe project held by the parties with parliamentary representation. For example, despite the cleavage on the renegotiation of the public debt, Portugal’s main political parties (PS and PSD, the latter in a coalition with the CDS-PP) still agree that Portugal should remain in the EU and the Economic and Monetary Union. The CDU, which is the most Eurosceptic in the Portuguese party system, maintains its usual position. As for the BE, even though it is one of Europe’s left-wing parties, in fact its position on Europe is somewhat ambiguous and half-hearted. Taking into account the moment when this article was written (a few weeks before the European elections), and the focus on five specific dimensions rather than a more wide-ranging approach, this is a preliminary and partial analysis. Indeed, anything can

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 054 still happen in terms of the political communication the parties’ positions on Europe and the economic crisis. Notwithstanding, in light of the constraints associated with the positions taken by the main players in the Portuguese party spectrum, it is extremely unlikely that major changes will take place in the panorama outlined herein. Whatever the case, our conclusions can only gain from subsequent validation and conﬁrmation after the end of the 2014 European election campaign.

TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

Date received: 24th March, 2014 | Date approved: 27th April, 2014

Jorge M. Fernandes Post doctoral researcher at Studies, European Journal of Political Research, the Instituto de Ciências Sociais of the Universidade Party Politics, among others. Co-editor of the book de Lisboa. PhD in Social and Political Science from Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective the European University Institute of Florence in (Routledge). In 2018-2018, Visiting Scholar at 2013. His research interests are institutions, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, parties, electoral systems,and parliaments. His Harvard University. work has been published in Comparative Political > [email protected]

José Santana-Pereira Assistant Professor at the perspective, the role of the media in developing Department of Political Science and Public Policy, and changing these attitudes, the differences ISCTE-IUL and Integrated Researcher at CIES- between European media systems and the the IUL. PhD in Social and Political Science from the attitudes of parties and public opinion towards European University Institute of Florence in 2012. the European Union. His research has focused on the attitudes and > [email protected] political behavior of citizens from a comparative

ENDNOTES

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[Consulted on: 1st April 2014). 21 pp. 116-130; DE VREESE, Claes H.; BAN- SANCHES, Edalina Rodrigues; SAN- Available at: http://www.ps.pt/images/ DUCCI, Susan; SEMETKO, Holly A.; BOOM- TANA-PEREIRA, José – «Which Europe do stories/pdfs/declaracao_de_prin-cip- GAARDEN, Hajo A. - «The news coverage of the Portuguese political parties want? ios_2010.pdf (accessed on 1st April 2014). the 2004 European Parliamentary election Identity, representation and scope of Gov- 33 campaign in 25 countries». In European Union ernance in the euromanifestos (1987- PS, Programa eleitoral das eleições Politics, Vol. 7, N.º 4, 2006, pp. 477-504. 2004)», pp. 183-200. legislativas, 2011 [Consulted on: 1st April 2014). Available at http://down-loads.sol. 11 22 JALALI, Carlos; SILVA, Tiago - «Eve- LOBO, Marina Costa – «A União Euro- pt/pdf/ps.pdf. ryone ignores Europe? 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Nicolò – Party Attitudes Towards the EU in peia e os partidos políticos portugueses: 36 the Member States: Parties for Europe, Par- da consolidação à qualidade democrática», CDU, Manifesto «Um Portugal com ties Against Europe. London: Routledge, pp. 78-96; SANCHES, Edalina Rodrigues; Futuro numa Europa dos Trabalhadores e 2014, pp. 115-132. SANTANA-PEREIRA, José – «Which dos Povos», 2014. [Consulted on: 1st April Europe do the Portuguese political parties 2014). Available at: http://www. pcp.pt/ 14 LOBO, Marina Costa - «A União Euro- want? Identity, representation and scope sites/default/files/documentos/declara- peia e os partidos políticos portugueses: of governance in the euromanifestos cao_programatica_pcp_eleicoes_parla- da consolidação à qualidade democrática». (1987-2004)», pp. 183-200; SANTANA- mento_europeu_2014.pdf. In LOBO, Marina Costa; LAINS, Pedro – Em PEREIRA, José; SANCHES, Edalina Rod- 37 Nome da Europa. Portugal em Mudança rigues – «Portugal», pp. 115-132. BE, Manifesto «Desobedecer à Europa (1986-2006). Estoril: Principia, 2007, da Austeridade», 2014. [Consulted on: 25 pp. 78-96. It is important to note that, for ana- 1st April 2014). Available at: http:// www. lytical purposes, we have considered Por- bloco.org/media/IIconf_recom_eur.pdf. 15 SANTANA-PEREIRA, José; SANCHES, tugal Alliance (PSD and CDS-PP) as a 38 Edalina Rodrigues – «Portugal», pp. 115-132. single actor. Although their positions on LOBO, Marina Costa – «A União Europeia European matters have followed different e os partidos políticos portugueses: da con- 16 SANCHES, Edalina Rodrigues; SAN- trajectories (see the works by Marina solidação à qualidade democrática», pp. TANA-PEREIRA, José – «Which Europe do Costa Lobo and José Santana-Pereira and 78-96; FREIRE, André – «As eleições euro- the Portuguese political parties want? Edalina Sanches, quoted throughout the peias em Portugal». In Relações Internacio- Identity, representation and scope of gov- article), and were even quite distinct on nais. Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 119-125; LOBO, Marina ernance in the euromanifestos core governance matters during the Costa – «Portuguese attitudes towards the (19872004)». In Perspetives on European Passos Coelho government, we are sure EU membership: Social and political perspe- Politics and Society. Vol. 11, N.º 2, 2010, both parties were basically in agreement tives». In South European Society and Politics. pp. 183-200. on the five dimensions analysed in the Vol. 8, N.º 1, 2003, pp. 97-118. spring of 2014. 17 39 HOOGHE, Liesbet; MARKS, Gary; WIL- Manifesto Aliança Portugal – Euro- 26 SON, Carole J. – «Does left/right structure SANTANA-PEREIRA, José; SANCHES, peias 2014, p. 2. party positions on European integration?». Edalina Rodrigues – «Portugal», pp. 115- 40 In Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 35, N.º -132. PS, Declaração de Princípios de 2010, 8, 2002, pp. 965-989. pp. 17-18. 27 We would like to thank our colleagues 18 41 SANCHES, Edalina Rodrigues; SAN- Ana Espírito Santo, Tiago Silva and Carlos CDU, Manifesto «Um Portugal com TANA-PEREIRA, José – «Which Europe do Nogueira for their valuable help in iden- Futuro numa Europa dos Trabalhadores e the Portuguese political parties want? tifying and collecting these documents. dos Povos», 2014, p.5.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 056 42 51 58 Ibidem, p. 14. BE, Manifesto «Desobedecer à Europa Programa do XIX Governo Constitu- da Austeridade», 2014, p. 1. cional, p. 86. [Consulted on: 1st April 2014). 43 BE, Manifesto «Desobedecer à Europa Available at: http://www.por-tugal.gov.pt/ 52 da Austeridade», 2014, p. 6. Interview with Marisa Matias, media/130538/programa_ gc19.pdf. Expresso, 29th March 2014, p. 15. 44 59 Ibidem. Programa do XIX Governo Constitu- 53 CDU, Manifesto «Um Portugal com cional, p. 85. [Consulted on: 1st April 2014). 45 Due to the lack of an official document Futuro numa Europa dos Trabalhadores e Available at: http://www.por-tugal.gov.pt/ on the coalition's common position on this dos Povos», 2014, p.5. media/130538/programa_ gc19.pdf. matter, we used the electoral programme 54 60 of PSD and CDS-PP, respectively on this Manifesto Aliança Portugal – Euro- LOBO, Marina Costa – «A União Euro- specific point. Cf. Programa Eleitoral PSD peias 2014, p. 7. peia e os partidos políticos portugueses: 2011, p. 33. da consolidação à qualidade democrática», 55 Position available on the party's offi- pp. 78-96; SANCHES, Edalina Rodrigues; 46 Cf. Programa Eleitoral CDS-PP 2011, cial site. (Consulted on: 1st April 2014). SANTANA-PEREIRA, José – «Which no page. Available at: http://www.ps.pt/ posicoes- Europe do the Portuguese political parties do-ps/europa/eurobonds.html. want? Identity, representation and scope 47 Programa Eleitoral PS, 2011, p. 13. of governance in the euromanifestos 56 BE, Manifesto «Desobedecer à Europa (1987-2004)», pp. 183-200; SANTANA- 48 Manifesto Aliança Portugal – Euro- da Austeridade», 2014, p. 8. PEREIRA, José; SANCHES, Edalina Rod- peias 2014, p. 3. rigues – «Portugal», pp. 115-132. 57 Projeto de Resolução Política, 2012. 49 Ibidem. [Consulted on: 1st April 2014). Available at: http://pcp.pt/sites/default/ files/documen- 50 Manifesto Aliança Portugal – Euro- tos/teses_projeto_de_reso-lucao_politica. peias 2014, p. 12. pdf.

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RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 058 PORTUGAL AND EUROPE Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view*1 José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes

«IF THERE IS NO POLITICAL EUROPE, THE EURO WILL DIE. THIS DEATH COULD TAKE MANY FORMS ABSTRACT AND THERE MAY BE MANY DETOURS ALONG THE WAY. IT COULD BE AN EXPLOSION, AN IMPLOSION, A SLOW DEATH, ederal aspirations have been sub- A DISSOLUTION, OR A DIVISION. Fjacent to the integration of the IT COULD TAKE TWO, THREE, FIVE, TEN YEARS, AND BE PRECEDED European Communities/European BY A LARGE NUMBER OF REMISSIONS, WHICH, ON EACH OCCASION, Union since its inception. With the GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WORST HAS BEEN AVOIDED»2. current crisis that started in 2007/2008, we have seen a new wave of ideas related with economic federalism. «THE PURPOSE OF THE UNION IS NOT TO BRING AN END TO THE However, it is unclear what the con- NATIONAL STATE, BUT RATHER TO STRENGTHEN THOSE STATES crete solution could be, particularly in AS VIABLE DEMOCRACIES, GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF LAW AND A HIGH terms of the division of competences LEVEL OF SOCIAL WELFARE. WE MUST EXTRICATE OURSELVES FROM THE and powers between the EU and the SIMPLE CHOICE THAT SOME WISH TO IMPOSE ON US WHEN IT COMES member states. The purpose of this TO THINKING ABOUT EUROPE: EITHER A FEDERAL STATE paper is to identify and analyse the 3 OR A FREE TRADE ZONE» . major proposals and/or federalist- oriented measures to resolve the Euro- zone crisis. It is also an aim to assess he underlying federalist ambitions of the Communi- the eventual design of a more eco- Tties/European Union integration process are well- nomically integrated European Union, based on any form of economic feder- known. The period from immediately after the 2nd World alism, and discuss its implications and War to the moment when the Communities were formed risks for Portugal. in the 1950s was particularly rich in terms of these uniﬁ- Keywords: European Union, Economic cation ideals. However, once achieved, they also fell short crisis, Federalism, Portugal. of their proponents’ most ambitious expectations. But this does not mean that they had no impact on the path of European integration at relevant moments. This was RESUMO visible not only at the moment of its foundation but also Federalismo: in the period immediately following the fall of the Berlin solução para a crise na União Europeia? Wall and the end of the Cold War. In these cases, federal Uma perspetiva ideals had a marked inﬂuence on several of the mecha- portuguesa nisms created by the Maastricht Treaty, notably the crea- s aspirações federais estão subja- tion of the Euro. With the current crisis, which started in A centes ao processo de integração

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 059-075 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sia05 das Comunidades/União Europeia 2007/2008, we have seen a new wave of ideas and propos- desde o seu início. Com a atual crise als of a more or less federalist bent at the national polit- iniciada em 2007/2008 temos assistido a uma nova vaga de ideias imbuídas ical level, from European institutions, as well as from sobretudo de um federalismo econó- think tanks and academic experts. Indeed, calls for the mico. Todavia, não é claro em que poderia consistir uma solução deste need for «more Europe» and a «European economic gov- tipo, nomeadamente em termos de ernance» to resolve the current financial and economic repartição de competências e poderes, entre a UE e os Estado-membros. O crisis have frequently come from various national and objetivo deste artigo é identificar e political circles. analisar algumas das principais pro- postas e/ou medidas de cariz federa- In the case of Portugal, there seems to be consensus lista que têm sido efetuadas para among the main political forces that increasing the Euro- resolver a crise da Zona Euro. Por outro lado, tentaremos também avaliar pean Union’s competences (namely through a «European em que poderia consistir uma União economic governance») is a suitable and necessary way Europeia mais integrada economica- mente, numa lógica próxima do fede- of solving the current crisis. However, it is not clear what ralismo económico, bem como this kind of solution would entail, notably in relation to discutir as suas implicações e riscos para o Estado português. the distribution of competences and powers at the national and European level, or what their long-term implications Palavras-chave: União Europeia, Crise would be for member states – and Portugal in particular económica, Federalismo, Portugal. - and the actual European Union. This reflection therefore aims to identify and analyse some of the main federalist- type proposals and/or measures that have been advanced: European economic governance, banking and fiscal union, European bonds/Eurobonds, etc. It is also our aim to try to assess what a more economically integrated European Union would consist of specifically, given that a federal-type economic solution, whatever it may be, would first have to be a political solution. To this end, the methodology used will be based on bibliographic and documental research, complemented by a comparative method. We start with a short analysis of classic political federalism models (the United States in 1787, Switzerland in 1848), as well as economic and monetary federalism, highlighting the case of German unification in the 19th century. We will then review the model used in current European integration, which can be qualified as integration by stealth4. This is followed by an analysis of some of the most relevant proposals on this subject in recent years from European institutions, think tanks and scholars, etc.. Lastly, a comparative method is adopted to discuss and assess the viability of the proposals of a «federal upgrade» in the European Union, both in relation to classic federal models and the already existing experience of European integration. The analysis will be completed with a short discussion on the foreseeable impact of such a solution from a Portuguese perspective.

THE CLASSIC FEDERALISM MODELS5 There is extensive literature on federalism. The works published by Dimitrios and Wayne6 and Burgess7, among others, provide a broad picture of the federalism problematic,

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 060 namely in terms of concepts, theories, case studies, and current trends. Rather than reviewing this literature here8 , we will make a brief and very selective look at some examples of classic federalism, from both the political and economical stance. Closely following Andreas Føllesdal9, federalism can be defined as the theory or defence of federal principles for the division of powers among political units and common UNLIKE A UNITARY STATE, institutions. Unlike a unitary State, sover- SOVEREIGNTY IN FEDERAL POLITICAL ORDERS eignty in federal political orders is not IS NOT CENTRALISED BUT IS BASED centralised but is based on at least two ON AT LEAST TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS. different levels. The units at each level have their own authority and, in certain areas, may be self-governed. The political obligations and rights of citizens are therefore guaranteed by two different authorities. The division of power between the political units and the centre may vary. The centre usually exercises power over defence, foreign policy and finance. The political units may also participate in the decision-making process of the central bodies. Typically, but not necessarily, a federal State is the result of a merger between several states or political units that were previously autonomous. In general, they are small or medium-sized states or political units that renounced or were forced to renounce their full sovereignty and form a new, larger, political unit. The federal solution may also result from the transformation of a central and unitary State (usually a large territory) to a model with a different internal organisation and division of powers that confers extensive autonomy to its regions and provinces. In this case, the process involves shared internal sovereignty, with regions or provinces being called federate states or another equivalent designation. This is usually referred to as a «false federation» or «imperfect federation»10, as it does not result from the joining of political units which had previously been sovereign. Federal Germany, founded in 1949 after the 2nd World War, is an example of this situation in Europe. It succeeded the centralised Germany of the 3rd Reich and the not so decentralised Weimar Republic. (However, there had been several sovereign political units at moments in history before the unification in 1871). Whatever the case, the federal State is the only one that exercises sovereignty externally (foreign policies, diplomacy, and armed forces are exclusive spheres of the federal State). It is not always easy to define the boundaries of a federation compared to other similar units, such as confederations. In theory, the political units that are part of a confederation – the sovereign States – essentially maintain their sovereignty and, as a matter of principle, may voluntarily abandon the confederation. Typically, a confederation is based on common interests that lead to their joint sovereignty in certain fields (for example, defence in foreign affairs, and trade in domestic matters). It should be noted, however, that there can be quite different forms of confederation, which can range from being similar to a federation with a mere intergovernmental cooperation agreement. Returning to the federation case, the most studied examples of classic federalism are

Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes 061 probably those of the United States of America, in 1787, and Switzerland, in 1848. It should be noted that these two historical examples of federations occurred in very different circumstances to those currently found in the European Union. Federation in the United States came in 1787, as mentioned above, and took place over a short eleven- year period after independence in 1776. Among other specific circumstances of the time, the population of the then thirteen British former colonies totalled less than three million inhabitants. A relevant aspect is that there was not much difference in the size and heterogeneity of the political units that formed the federation in 1787. The most populated State, Virginia, had 538,000 inhabitants vis-à-vis 45,000 in the least populated, Rhode Island, representing a difference of 1 to 12 in these two extremes. This, however, was exceptional, with the difference falling to 1 to 6 between the second largest State and the last but one, and 1 to 3 between the other States in general11. It is also important to note that none of the thirteen former colonies had any long-standing sovereign State-nation tradition when they decided to transform the confederation into a federation. When Switzerland evolved to a federation in 1848, replacing the medieval Helvetic confederation with the modern federal Switzerland, the size of the population was similar to that of the thirteen British colonies that founded the North American federation in 1787. Turning to political institutions, what are the typical features of a federal State’s institutions within these two models of classic federalism, particularly in the case of North America? One of the most characteristic political features is the existence of a bicameral parliament, based on a balance between the small and large federate units. The first parliamentary chamber prevents the large, less numerous, federate units from being dominated by a coalition formed by the smaller units. On the other hand, the second parliamentary chamber tries to protect small political units from hegemony by the larger units. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that, within this classic federalism, equality among representatives was facilitated by the fact that the differences were relatively small due to the small size of all the federate units. Another typical characteristic of the North American federal model is the institution of presidential government; this seeks to function as a strong link for the whole group with direct democratic legitimacy conferred at the ballot by the majority of the federation’s citizens. The Swiss case was also influenced by the North American bicameral model, which was incorporated into the Swiss Constitution. Its most original element is seen in the Federal Council, the federation’s executive body, for which consensus among the main parties is the basis of government. And so a tradition from the times of the Helvetic Confederation has remained in place; moreover, the federal State’s competences are reduced to the minimum. Legislative power is essentially in the hands of the cantons. This leads to a distinction from the Helvetic model that is common practice in direct democracy: the use of a referendum to ratify changes to the constitution or on other political matters considered of such importance that they require citizens’ direct approval12.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 062 We not turn to the economic dimension of federalism by examining the historic example of German unification in the 19th century, notably its monetary unification. Before analysing this aspect, it is important to stress that the German unification of the 19th century was not a voluntary and peaceful accession process like that of the Communi- ties/European Union, which was also only possible after the tragedy of the 2nd World War. Diplomatic manoeuvring and war played a crucial role in the creation of the FROM AN ECONOMIC-MONETARY PERSPECTIVE, German federal State in the 19th century. THE CHANGE IN CURRENCY AND MONETARY The word realpolitik, commonly used in this POLICIES IN THE DIFFERENT STATES period, captures the spirit of the time. The TO A SINGLE CURRENCY AND CENTRAL BANK, formation of the German Reich in 1871 took THE REICHSBANK, WAS AN INTERESTING ASPECT place under the conquering leadership of OF THE 19TH CENTURY GERMAN FEDERAL MODEL. William I of Prussia and Otto von Bis- marck, who originally brought together twenty seven previously independent States, of which Prussia was the largest. These States (Staaten or Bundesstaaten), in other words, federate states, were given the name Länder during the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), and it remains the term today. From an economic-monetary perspective, the change in currency and monetary policies in the different states to a single currency and central bank, the Reichsbank, was an interesting aspect of the 19th century German federal model. The move from monetary sovereignty to a common authority raised several problems. At the time, the loss of seigniorage income13 from the states that had become part of the federation had a huge impact, particularly on the resources of smaller states. Today, this is generally no longer an issue, except in the case of economies affected by high inflation, where the power to issue currency can be considered a kind of « hidden seigniorage tax». The circulation of bank notes is another substantial difference with that of the economy today; at the time, it was almost marginal and the circulation of coins was much more widely used. Bank notes did not have the same legal tender as today; they were used mostly to facilitate business payments, in other words, they were generally seen as credit instruments. In addition to these differences resulting from the economy’s characteristics at that time, other interrelated aspects should be noted that are of greater relevance to today. The first, which is worth remembering again, concerns the creation of a political and economic federation in Germany in the 19th century – a process which was far from equalitarian or devoid of power struggles. Quite the contrary, the supremacy of the northern states, particularly Prussia, was visible in the design of the federation and in the bureaucratic-administrative state machine. To give an example: Friedrich List, the main theoretician of the customs union and German industrialisation, advocated a central bank to issue bank notes for the Zollverein group. What in fact happened was that the Prussian government, eager to maintain monetary control, followed a different course. It started by creating an exclusively Prussian central bank in 1847; it was only later, after

Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes 063 the political unification in 1871, that this became the Bank of the Empire in the Reichs- bank in 1876, as a clear symbol of its supremacy over the federation. The second is that the Prussian and northern states’ dominion gave rise to major economic and cultural-religious cleavages between Protestants and Catholics. The latter were the object of a Kulturkampf (culture war) driven by the protestant and Prussian elite that dominated the State. Max Weber’s well-known The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, published in 1905, to some extent reflects those deep-set divisions in Ger- many a century ago. The third aspect concerns the use of this federal model for analogies with the current European economic and monetary unification. The comparison is not evident without taking into consideration the previous political unification – in the case of Germany in the 19th century but not in the European Union in the 21st century. As João Ferreira do Amaral pointed out, «contrary to what happened in the European Union, German monetary integration took place two years after the political unification (in 1871, and the German monetary union took place in 1873). Although this aspect made all the difference, it was underestimated by federalism, which continued to believe that the historic role played by the Euro would be to create conditions for the political unification of Europe14.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTEGRATION BY STEALTH The federal ideas that inﬂuenced the construction of the Communities/European Union can be simply grouped under two theoretical approaches: that of Jean Monnet, and Altiero Spinnelli’s approach. That of Monnet, the French businessman, is characterised by its essentially pragmatic character and is not explicitly federalist. Above all, it opts in favour of advancing economic integration with the aim of ultimately triggering a spill over effect. This will lead to even greater economic integration which will require federal solutions and political institutions. The latter approach, championed mostly by the Italian left-wing politician, Spinnelli, is openly and explicitly federalist and advocates that federal solutions and political institutions should be adopted without waiting for the spill over effects of the economy. In fact, there is a certain scepticism about the possibility that the strategy to move towards economic integration may, in the future, generate a spill over effect that will lead to a federal political union. Although the Communities/European Union is not a federation of states comparable to either of those analysed above, historically it echoes classic federal and other ideas. This is clearly the case within the European Union institutions, namely those with a supranational proﬁle, such as the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice. The case of Altiero Splinelli is emblematic. He was a member of the Commission consecutively from 1970 to 1976, and later a member of the European Parliament from 1979 to 1986. But the Court of Justice is the most interesting and possibly least well-known aspect (except in legal areas) of the federalist ambition pervading European institutions. An article by Eric Stein written over thirty years ago on the role played by this institution in the creation

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 064 of a transnational Constitution, through jurisprudence, clearly showed this tendency15. In fact, the case of European Union Law, in which historically the role of establishing the interpretation and application of the Court of Justice is enormous, is an example of what can be called integration by stealth16. This expression suggests the idea that integration is made by elite groups, backstage, almost furtively and away from the public eye. It would be no exaggeration to say that the cases of Van Gend en Loos versus Dutch Tax Administration (1963) and Flaminio Costa versus Enel (1964) are permeated with legal federalism; the former in establishing the direct applicability principle, the latter in drafting the also jurisprudential principle of the primacy, or precedence, of the union’s rule of law over national law. Nevertheless, neither of these principles is the direct and unequivocal result of the European Treaty texts. This jurisprudential formulation became dominant because it was generally accepted by the doctrine and national judges, and away from the eyes of public opinion. However, it does not completely set aside the possibility of contestation. Ultimately, the question of primacy would only be closed with a provision similar to the one in the abandoned European Constitutional Treaty project. Its article I-6 explicitly stated the following: «When exercising the competences granted, the Constitution and the law adopted by the institutions of the Union take precedence over the law of the member states». In other words, if it had been approved, the precedence of the primary law (Treaties) and secondary law (legal acts by the institutions) over any national rule, including the Constitution, would have been unequivo- cally established in writing. In fact, this provision was one of the few that, for one reason or another, was not included in the current European Union Treaties (EUT) and the Treaty on the Function- ing of the European Union (TFEU), in the text of the Lisbon Treaty. This was very probably for political reasons. It suggests an integration strategy that has been followed far from the eyes of public opinion. Such a provision – one that anyone initiated in matters of European Union Law can easily understand – would have clear political implications. The ordinary citizen would then «find out» that the Law of the Union prevails over any national regulation, even a constitutional ruling. Although this would not be a problem in some member states, in others, where public opinion is more Eurosceptic or there is greater scrutiny of European processes, it would probably be difficult to accept for political reasons. The option was to continue the integration away from the public eye, as has been the case so far. By not including this provision in the Treaties, it avoided a delicate political problem for governments. Using this subterfuge, they managed to sidestep the thorny issue of having to explain absolute primacy over national law to national electors. However, contrary to what a lay citizen might think, the solution obtained through jurisprudence is basically very similar: it has the advantage of working in a «closed circuit» and being reserved to experts with a European- federalist ideology. The article by Majone17 on this specific European political culture and the fear of how citizens vote in referendums is one such example.

Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes 065 THE USE AND ABUSE OF MONETARY INTEGRATION As well as legal federalism and the jurisprudence interpretation of the Treaties, monetary integration is another interesting case of influence by federalist ideas. This aspect is mainly linked to the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) initiated with the Delors Plan in 1988 and which culminated with the adoption of the Euro as physical currency on 1st January, 2002. Upon AS WELL AS LEGAL FEDERALISM the creation of the EMU, it was established AND THE JURISPRUDENCE INTERPRETATION that member states wishing to participate OF THE TREATIES, MONETARY INTEGRATION in this process would have to comply with IS ANOTHER INTERESTING CASE OF INFLUENCE a set of rules, usually known as nominal BY FEDERALIST IDEAS. THIS ASPECT IS MAINLY convergence criteria. The aim was to ensure LINKED TO THE CREATION OF THE ECONOMIC that they met all the necessary conditions AND MONETARY UNION (EMU) INITIATED to participate in the Euro without putting WITH THE DELORS PLAN IN 1988. its good operation at risk. With this in mind, among other requirements that had to be met – namely in terms of full liberalisation of the movement of capital and the independence of the central bank from governments – the following rules were determined: budget deficit no more than 3 per cent of GDP; an accumulated public debt not exceeding 60 per cent of GDP; inflation below the average of the three countries with the lowest rates, plus 1.5 per cent; long-term interest rates no more than the average of the three countries with the lowest rates, plus 2.0 per cent; exchange rate within the range of appreciation/depreciation admitted by the European Monetary System (EMS). In theory, these were sine qua non conditions for the Euro. The reality was different18. A flexible interpretation of these economic targets prevailed. In terms of accumulated public debt, for example, the criteria of not exceeding 60 per cent of GDP was replaced with a benevolent interpretation: it was enough to be reasonably close to this figure and show a downward trend in the accumulated public debt. As for the exchange rate, theoretically the criterion was that it had remained permanently within the narrow EMS band in previous years, with the maximum possible exchange depreciation/reapprecia- tion rate of 2.25 per cent. However, this was also subjected to a more flexible evaluation (varying up to 15 per cent). As regards the deficit not exceeding 3 per cent of GDP, although most countries met (or nearly met) this requirement, European institutions were not concerned about (or were prevented from being concerned about...) the statistical method used to reach this figure. Apparently, at the time, the European Com- mission and Eurostat did not see the lack of statistical rigour or the dubious manner in which the actual national public accounts were presented as being problematic. Nevertheless, as we now know, systematically resorting to extraordinary revenue, pri- vatisations, pension funds, etc., off-budget expenses and the questionable use of financial derivatives – at the time creating the illusion of a balanced budget and controlled public debt – were devices some States used freely.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 066 To some extent, this explains how Club Med countries 19 were able to be part of the Euro from the start. At the time, there was no shortage of specialist literature warning of the risks of weak economies (which had chronic difficulties with their public accounts) adopt- ing a strong common currency. The very idea of a common currency in the European Union was questioned by some economists, especially North Americans. The better known of these are Paul Krugman and Milton Friedman, two economists with very different views on the economy and from very different political backgrounds. Taking substantially different perspectives (Krugman with a Keynesian perspective, and Friedman neoliberal), both believed that the requirements for an optimum monetary area20 in the European Union were not in place. For example, at the start there were no requirements on free movement of the workforce, generalisation of preferences, a suitable common budget, etc., so that the advantages of a common currency would clearly outweigh the disadvan- tages. In light of the Europeans’ general distain at doubts raised about the success of the Euro, Krugman now speaks of a «vengeance of the optimum monetary area theory»21. What is the explanation for the flawed architecture of the Euro? And the ineffective rules for access to and remaining in the Euro? Was it technical and/or political inepti- tude? Excessive optimism about the future creation of an optimum monetary area? Was the Euro being used as leverage for a federal-type political union? Any careful analysis shows that the project to create the Euro had significant shortcomings from the outset. The most obvious has already been pointed out: the requirements for an optimum monetary area were not verified. Such an intrinsic weakness should in itself have been a warning for a more careful, differently configured process, or, should that not be possible, delaying or even dismissing its adoption. To make matters worse, the convergence criteria outlined were often bypassed, especially by the Club Med/PIIGS coun- tries22. Were the European decision-makers unaware of these risks? Probably not, but it is likely they were underestimated due to a set of intellectual and political constraints linked to the manner in which the European construction is usually viewed. Knowing the population’s resistance to the federal idea, the European leader elite sought to overcome this by using strategies such as economic integration with the dual aim of acting also as an instrument for political union. In this way, the successive advances in economic integration – customs union, common market, the Euro, etc. – as proposed by Jean Monnet, would also be used to trigger a spill over effect for political unification – in diplomacy, common defence, in a federal-type budget and taxation, etc. According to João Ferreira do Amaral, this was actually one of the main motivations for the creation of the Euro. He notes that supporters of European federalism «trusted that the need to make the monetary union work would mean that federal institutions would have to be created (such as a single central bank, for example, and an adequately-sized European budget) [...]. Thus, no sooner had the single currency been created, they invested in approving a European constitution with a federal bent for this purpose, prepared by a convention similar to some historic cases of forming a federal State »23.

Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes 067 The intellectual atmosphere in which «Europe cannot stop» – to use the common political-mediatic jargon – linked to the preliminary concept that «more Europe» is always good, were determinant factors towards the decision to create the Euro. In fact, the ideologically contradictory coalition that supported its creation can only be understood by taking this intellectual atmosphere into account, which worked as an obstacle to critical thought in the political debate. «In fact, the single currency was only created because (the initially highly unlikely) convergence between the federalist and the neoliberal views was possible in the 1990s, and was on the rise in areas connected to business and economic policy-making bodies»24. In the end, the idea that the single currency could implicitly help attain political union seduced the European left-wing parties with marked pro-federal affinities, which therefore accepted the «creation of monetary union institutions that reflect the main neo-liberal conceptions». The problem that resulted from this was that the whole macro-economic adjustment tends to be «made at the expense of labour (by increasing unemployment or decreasing salaries)» with this configuration of the Euro. Furthermore, «the survival of the so-called social European model is put at risk, a possibility welcomed by neo-liberalists as they believe the Euro- pean social model is not compatible with globalisation». Despite agreeing with the diagnosis of the failure of current European economic governance, the proponents of a federal solution for the European Union naturally put forward another interpretation, and above all, another solution. This is the case of Jean-François Jamet25, who defends that a European economic government, based on budgetary federalism, is the best way out of the current crisis in the Euro area. As for the weakness of the current European economic and monetary architecture, Jamet describes it as: «The crisis has revealed this model’s weaknesses both in terms of its effectiveness and legitimacy. Faced with recession and the added risks of sovereign and bank insolvency, it was the European Central Bank (ECB) that played the stabilising role. But this entailed going beyond its mandate by buying part of the public debt of States in difficulty, for example, notably to stop speculation over the Italian debt»26. Furthermore, the «member states’ economic coordination policies and budgetary rules lost credibility, either because they were not enforced, like for example the budgetary rules of the Growth and Stability Pact, or because the institutional tools were not adapted to a crisis situation (the Union’s budget is not in itself enough to have a significant relaunch effect, and budgetary and fiscal decisions require the unanimity of member states and, therefore, long diplomatic negotiations), or because they simply listed objectives without defining an obligation of means», as in the Lisbon Strategy. According to Jamet, the inability to resolve this crisis is essentially due to what he qualified as being the weakest and most «decentralised [part] of the European economic crisis». This added a «political uncertainty and even a feeling of economic impotence and uncertainty», that made it impossible to «prepare a clear common urgent strategy in response to the crisis». Jamet concluded that «Europe did not know how to communicate in a united voice, nor extend the right level of solidarity and control among member states».

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 068 THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT/ ECONOMIC FEDERALISM We now examine the current economic governance model, and what it consists of besides its monetary aspects. As expected, it results in part from the above-mentioned European preference for integration by stealth, with its ensuing consequences, including that of its questionable democratic legitimacy. But before our critical analysis, we will review its fundamental features and also take a close look at the presentation made by Jamet27. He states that the current European economic governance «has been characterised by the compromise between the joint management of a limited number of competences, a power to regulate under common negotiated rules, and an invitation to coordinate the policies based on national decisions». Jamet talks of three domains in which this model is used, the main features of which are described below. The first domain is that of competences centralised at a European level; these are typically «technical» matters that come under the responsibility of an independent supranational institution. It is the case, for example, of the ECB in monetary policies; the Court of Justice in controlling the enforcement of legal regulations within the European Union; the Commission in areas related to the customs union and common market (trade policy and competition policy, for example), «redistributive policies» such as the economic and social cohesion policy, or policies addressing concerns such as self-provision, food safety, and the farming community’s standard of living (the common agricultural policy). These last two policies absorb the bulk of the EU’s budget (over 80 per cent of total expenditure), which represents about 1 per cent of the GDP of EU28 countries as a whole. This is the quintessential domain of European technocratic governance in which government matters are «depoliticised», and taken to an extreme in the case of the ECB with its status as totally independent from the democratic power of national governments. A second domain of European economic governance is that of ensuring national policies are coherent with a specific set of rules negotiated among the member states. Examples of these are the previously mentioned budgetary rules for the Eurozone, which sought to prevent quite distinct national policies putting the common currency at risk. The idea of further solidarity if there were any budgetary difficulties was also implicit. Note that these are not legal regulations subject to jurisdictional control by the European Union’s Court of Justice; they are political provisions, only subject to political control by the member states through the Council. Linked to this is what could be considered a third domain of European governance of «weak regulation»: the coordination of national policies through non-binding objectives on competitiveness and employment matters (for example, R&D expenditure of around 3 per cent of GDP, as foreseen in the Lisbon Strategy). As this was the economic governance model at the time of the 2007/2008 crisis and there is broad consensus that it was unable to respond to a crisis of this size and gravity, it raises the question of alternatives. The main proposals have been that of moving towards a banking and fiscal union, issuing Eurobonds, and, in more general terms,

Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes 069 European economic governance. Our focus goes to this last proposal as it is the most ambitious and has the greatest impact. Before assessing its merits or shortcomings, it is important to understand what European economic governance means. The first problem is that the use of the concept has taken various shapes and forms. Originally, the term was used by François Mitterrand in around 1990 after the presentation of the Delors Plan when the first phase in the creation of the Euro began. At the time, it was primarily a kind of slogan for the European Union used in French politics. Meanwhile, it re-emerged in the context of the current crisis. As Jamet pointed out, one decade later the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, started using the term but now shaped by her government’s vision on how to solve the European crisis28. Essentially, European economic governance is therefore now understood to be «a strengthening of the rules for budgetary discipline linked to the use of more automatic control mechanisms ». This perspective has to a great extent been the inspiration for a number of directives and regulations proposed by the Commission and voted by the Parliament and the Council. Among others, it includes the creation of the European semester29, which allows for the Commission and the Council to issue opinions on proposals for national budgets. The idea of European economic governance underwent further developments. In the summer of 2011, Germany and France introduced a clearly political dimension to the debate. They proposed the creation of «a Council of Heads of State and Government of the Eurozone, which would meet twice a year, and be headed by a stable presidency for two and a half years ». Former ECB Presi- dent Jean-Claude Trichet joined the debate by stating his preference for «a confederal government with a confederal finance minister, who could assure the governance of the Eurozone and enforce this or that decision». How would this European economic government be put into effect? Various proposals were made. One was that there would be a common Presidency of the Commission and European Council, headed by the same person. Another was that the European Commissioner for economic and financial matters would also chair the Council (of Ministers) meetings on economic and financial affairs (ECOFIN). The aim would be that the European Union would «express itself with one voice in international institutions, as is already the case in the WTO through the Com- missioner for International Trade». According to Jamet, these proposals for European economic governance have two main flaws: they «do not link national parliaments and they do not endow this government with resources for its own budgetary intervention ». He adds that the first flaw could be overcome if the «national parliaments and the European Parliament were linked to the European semester and the European decisions on budgetary matters» by «creating an interparliamentary conference linking representatives of national parliaments and Euro- pean Parliament » for example, as proposed by the well-known pro-federalist member of the European Parliament, Alain Lamassoure30. As for the second flaw, the solution would be an «increase in European budgetary capacities, which could take various forms: funding investment projects through European loans (project bonds), creation of a European

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 070 treasury and joint issuance of part of the member states’ debt (Eurobonds) – most likely with a bonus-malus system to reward States with better budgetary behaviour, increase in the European budget, or increase in the loan capacity of the European Investment Bank ». While aware of the advantages of this solution, Jamet recognises that it would be difficult to put into practice. In his own words, it is in the «area of the increase in the European budget capacities that, technically and politically, advances will be most difficult to accept». He does, however, point out that the crisis is slowly pushing the EU towards « a growing federalisation of economic policy», which can cause problems as it is being done «without any previous design or sufficient political legitimation».

CONCLUSION: THE RISKS OF AN ECONOMIC FEDERALISM SOLUTION We now turn to analysing the advantages of a solution of European economic federalism as described above from a Portuguese perspective. This implies two major risks from the outset, not to mention the question of democratic legitimacy, which for the purposes of simplicity we do not analyse herein. The first risk is intrinsically Portuguese and derives from the economy’s inability to grow significantly over the last fifteen years. Going back further in time, it should be recalled that at the time of Portugal’s adhesion to the Euro- pean Communities on 1st January 1986, the Portuguese currency – the escudo –, like the Spanish peseta, was left out of the exchange mechanism. Preserving exchange sovereignty was not a political choice but was due to the weakness of both economies. Portugal’s entry in the EMS, at the same time as Spain, came later at the end of the 1990s, when the PARTLY ON ITS OWN MERIT, AND PARTLY BECAUSE system became more flexible in terms of OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED FLEXIBLE exchange rate fluctuations. However, it had INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NOMINAL been Portugal’s aim since the launch of the CONVERGENCE CRITERIA, PORTUGAL WAS A EMU to participate in the creation process FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE EURO IN 1999/2002. of the Euro. Successive Portuguese govern- IRONICALLY, A HIGH PRICE WAS PAID AND WILL ments established it as a «national goal», PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE PAID FOR THIS more important than political divisions SUCCESS; A PRICE WHICH PORTUGUESE SOCIETY domestically. As a result, the Portuguese IS ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO FULLY UNDERSTAND. economy was able to meet – statistically at least – most of the required nominal convergence criteria. Partly on its own merit, and partly because of the above-mentioned flexible interpretations of the nominal convergence criteria, Portugal was a founding member of the Euro in 1999/2002. Ironically, a high price was paid and will probably continue to be paid for this success; a price which Portuguese society is only now beginning to fully understand. Before the 2007/2008 crisis, the Portuguese economy was already remarkably weak. GDP growth rates were below the European average over the entire previous fifteen years. Whether it was a coincidence or not, the fall in the growth rates stems back to the end of the 1990s, when the exchange rates were fixed for the 3rd stage of the EMU.

Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes 071 Instead of converging, the country fell further behind the European average for GDP per capita – the main indicator of the populations’ standard of living. As of 2002, and now coinciding with the physical introduction of the Euro, non-compliance with the budgetary deficit below 3% became a chronic problem. As the 2007/2008 economic-financial crisis unfolded, the situation became dramatically worse, reaching its climax when the Portuguese State had to request an international loan of 78 billion Euros in 2011. The second risk involves a subject that is not officially part of European rhetoric: the power relationships within the European Union. Once we admit that strengthening European integration is, in itself, advantageous, it is important to reflect on how a federalising solution could be conceived and implemented. Basically, what should its precise form be? We will take the case of the broadest and most ambitious idea of European economic governance. Not only is there no official proposal that clearly outlines the discussion, but different meanings and appeals for the Southern and North- ern EU countries are implicit from the outset. In countries like Portugal (Greece, Spain, etc.), traditional net beneficiaries of the European budget, it brings financial transfers to the minds of politicians and citizens. In almost thirty years of European integration, Portugal has never been a net contributor and, realistically, will not be so in the foreseeable future. In other words, the idea of an EU of transfers is implicit when this subject is discussed. Another underlying idea is that of access to funding on international markets on similar conditions to Germany, the Netherlands or France, for example, through the issue of Eurobonds. Looking at the matter from the perspective of the Eurozone’s core countries (Germany, but also, to different degrees, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and partly France), which are traditional net contributors, European economic governance has other nuances. Even though the language used is similar, implicitly the design is another one; it is different from the one feeding the pro-European imagination of financial solidarity for southern countries. The idea evoked is above all a logic of budgetary discipline and public accounts, following a pattern close to the one already used in those countries, as the ideas advanced by Germany’s Angela Merkel demonstrate. Economic and budgetary federalism does not necessarily mean a significant increase in the European Union’s financial transfers, nor that Eurobonds are automatically issued, which would reduce the southern countries’ funding costs on the market. Its most important feature may be the mandatory adoption of economic policies by all Eurozone members. In other words, although it would indeed provide greater European economic and political integration, it may become an instrument of the dominant vision of a restricted group of «directory powers». Recalling the aforementioned examples of classic federalism, we see that any significant increase in integration entails a fundamental problem due to the characteristics of the current EU28. A «Hamiltonian moment»31 is highly unlikely to come about in the current context. The political units are vastly different in size, and this is aggravated by substantial economic heterogeneity.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 072 In demographic terms, and taking the extremes, there are 81.5 million people in Ger- many which is 163 time larger than Malta’s population of 0.5 million. This is not an exceptional case. Enormous disparities are also found in the following political units: France’s population of 64 million people is more than 106 times larger than that of Luxembourg with 0.6 million; and Italy’s population is more than 81 times larger than that of Cyprus, with 61 million and 0.75 million inhabitants, respectively. And when the EU’s biggest political units, such as Germany and France, are compared with other medium-sized units, like Portugal or the Czech Republic (countries with similar-sized populations), Germany is 7.7 times bigger and France 6 times. The obvious and unwelcome question is this: in light of the (extreme) heterogeneity of the political units forming the European Union, is it possible to advance towards some sort of federalism based essentially on a logic of equality and solidarity, in which the large political units would agree to reducing their power and sharing more wealth through European budgetary mechanisms? The answer is that it is extremely unlikely, at least in the current circumstances. The smaller or average-sized political units (Cyprus, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, etc.), are undoubtedly weakened by the crisis and by their (over)indebtedness. In terms of the negotiating power required to obtain a good deal on European economic governance or other economic federalism solutions, the time is not right. Portugal’s already minimal inﬂuence on European matters, even in normal conditions, has been reduced to zero by its enormous dependence on foreign funding. Based on the arguments herein, in the current context, there is a real risk that a solution of economic and budgetary federalism would in practice be close to the logic of the «directory of powers». Indeed, there are signs that it is not a European Union with greater equality and solidarity that is emerging. Another European Union threatens to emerge under the guise of providing pro-European federalist solutions. With the façade of a European economic government, or some other, in this European Union, a restricted number of core States could acquire institutional powers and legitimacy to deﬁne broad mandatory guidelines. An in- depth discussion on which political choice to make is therefore of the utmost importance, and we must put a stop to empty clichés such as the need for «more Europe».

TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

Date received: 18th July, 2014 | Date approved: 11th November, 2014

José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes Professor at the the Universidade Católica Portuguesa Instututo Superior de Ciências Empresariais and holds a PhD in Political Science and e do Turismo and the Instituto Superior de International Relations from the Universidade do Contabilidade e Administração do Porto. Minho. Researcher at IPRI-NOVA. Graduated in Law from > [email protected]

Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes 073 ENDNOTES

* 21 This paper was first published in Rela- 1994, is also an asset for a more thorough KRUGMAN, Paul – «Revenge of the ções Internacionais no.44, December conceptual analysis. The article by John Optimum Currency Area», in The New York th 2014. Pinder on the neo-federalism concept, Times, 24 June, 2012. Available at: http:// entitled «European Community and krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/ 1 The text corresponds essentially to Nation State: A Case for a Neo-federal- revenge-of-the-optimum-currency-area/. a paper presented within the scope of ism?», In International Affairs, vol. 62, N.º 1, 22 the international conference: «40 Anos 1985-1986, pp. 41-54, is relevant for the PIIGS – the English derogatory acro- após o 25 de Abril. A Crise das Democ- debate on the current European integra- nym for – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, th racias Liberais» [40 Years after the 25 tion experience. Spain. April. The Crisis of the Liberal Democra- 9 23 cies], at ISCTE-IUL, in Lisbon, from 8th FØLLESDAL, Andreas – «Federalism», AMARAL, João Ferreira – «Euro: um to 10th May, 2014. The author acknowl- in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, futuro incerto», pp. 97-98. edges the comments and suggestions by Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/ 24 the scientific mediation which contrib- entries/federalism/. Ibidem, p. 98. uted towards improving the final version 10 25 of the article. ZIPPELIUS, Reinhold – Teoria Geral do JAMET, Jean-François – L‘ Eu r o p e p e u t- Estado, 3rd ed. Lisbon: Fundação Calouste elle se passer d’un gouvernement économ- 2 LÉVI, Bernard-Henri – «Crise da zona Gulbenkian.1997. ique?, 2nd ed., Paris, La Documentation euro: o federalismo ou a morte» [Crisis in Française, 2012; JAMET, Jean-François 11 the eurozone: federalism or death], In Le DUVERGER, Maurice – A Europa dos – «Gouvernement économique européen: Point, 28th September, 2012. Available at: Cidadãos, Porto: Edições Asa, 1994, p. 47. la question n’est plus quand mais com- http://www.presseurop.eu/pt/content/ ment», In Question d’ Europe, nº 216, 10th 12 article/2777771-o-federalismo-ou-morte. Ibidem, pp. 46-47. October, 2011. Available at http://www. robert-schuman.eu/fr/doc/questions-d- 3 13 SCHEFFER, Paul – «Federalismo: por As SCHOR, Armand-Denis explains – europe/qe-216-fr.pdf. favor, nada de Estados Unidos da Europa» Euro – O que é a moeda única?, Lisbon: 26 [Federalism: not a United States of Publicações Dom Quixote, 1996, p. 22, JAMET, Jean-François – «Gouverne- Europe, please!], In NRC Handelsblad, 5th seigniorage is the «difference between the ment économique européen: la question December, 2013. Available at http://www. face value of a coin and how much it costs n’est plus quand mais comment». presseurop.eu/pt/content/article/4380781 to be produced. In the past, mints would 27 -por-favor-nada-de-estados-unidos-da- turn the ingots into coins. The coin-shaped Ibidem. europa. metal weighed less than the ingots, and 28 the difference covered the production cost Ibidem. 4 See MAJONE, Giandomenico – Dilem- and the levy paid to the prince. By exten- 29 mas of European Integration. The Ambigui- sion, any advantage connected to monetary The European semester is «a coordi- ties & Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, power can be called a seigniorage tax». nation cycle of the European Union’s eco- Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; nomic and budgetary policies», centred 14 MAJONE, Giandomenico – «The ‘Referen- AMARAL, João Ferreira – «Euro: um on the first six months of each year. The dum Threat’, the Rationally Ignorant Voter, futuro incerto» [Euro: an uncertain aim is that, during those first months of and the Political Culture of the EU», In future], In Relações Internacionais, nº 27, the year, the member states «place their RECON Online Working Paper 2009/04, 2010, p. 98. national economic and budgetary policies Available at http://www.reconproject.eu/ in line with the objectives and rules agreed 15 projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorking- STEIN, Eric – «Lawyers, Judges and on at European Union level». Cf. European Papers2009.html. the Making of a Transnational Constitu- Union Council – O que é o Semestre tion», In The American Journal of Interna- Europeu?, Available at http://www.con- 5 We use here analyses on federalism, tional Law, Vol. 75, nº 1, 1981, pp. 1-27. silium.europa.eu/special-reports/euro- from a political and/or economic perspec- pean-semester?lang=pt. 16 tive. See FERNANDES, José Pedro Teix- MAJONE, Giandomenico – Dilemmas 30 eira – Elementos de Economia Política of European Integration. The Ambiguities & On Alain Lamassoure’s federalist posi- Internacional, 2nd ed., Coimbra: Almedina; Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth. tions, see Union of European Federalists, FERNANDES, José Pedro Teixeira – A Alain Lamassoure, a case for an optimistic 17 Europa em Crise, Porto: QuidNovi, 2012. MAJONE, Giandomenico – «The ‘Ref- federalism, 12th July, 2011, Available at erendum Threat’, the Rationally Ignorant http://www.federalists.eu/uef/news/ 6 DIMITRIOS, Kamis and WAYNE, Norman Voter, and the Political Culture of the EU», alain-lamassoure-a-case-for-an-optimis- (eds.) – Theories of Federalism: A Reader, in RECON Online Working Paper 2009/04. tic-federalism/. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 18 31 On this matter, we also closely fol- Among us, and by analogy with the 7 BURGESS, Michael – Comparative Fed- lowed previous analyses. See FERNAN- United States’ federal process in 1787, eralism. Theory and Practice, London: Rout- DES, José Pedro Teixeira – Elementos de Lobo-Fernandes backs the need for a ledge, 2006. Economia Política Internacional; FERNAN- «Hamiltonian moment» for the EU. «We DES, José Pedro Teixeira – A Europa em have defended that the European Union 8 There is an important archive of lit- Crise. needs a similar solution to that proposed erature on federalism which we have not by Hamilton and which we had the oppor- 19 analysed directly here as it is beyond the «Club Med» was the derogatory tunity to show in terms of the need for a specific scope of this article. Among oth- expression typically used in the 1990s to Hamiltonian moment. The new federal ers, we would like to highlight the work refer to the weaker and more undisci- authority created at the time took on the by Paul REUTER and Jean COMBACAU, plined economies of Southern Europe, debts of the former Confederation States, Institutions et Relations Internationales, such as, Portugal, Spain and Greece, as issued public debt bonds supported by Paris, P.U.F., 1980, relevant, for example, well as Italy. direct taxes, and issued its own currency. for its conceptual distinction between The practical outcome helped to turn a 20 internal federalism and international fed- On the concept of an optimum mone- recent nation into an economic power». eralism. Also on a conceptual level, the tary area see SCHOR, Armand-Denis – Despite being intellectually appealing, collective work under the direction of Euro – O que é a moeda única?, and based on the reasons given in the text, it Denis de ROUGEMONT – Dictionnaire inter- AMARAL, João Ferreira – «Euro: um seems a far-fetched analogy in the current national du fédéralisme, Brussels: Bruylant, futuro incerto», among others. European situation. Cf. LOBO-FER-

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 074 NANDES, Luís – «Pragmatismo e reforma more cohesive EU: apropos the banking http://www.ipri.pt/publicacoes/working_ numa UE mais coesa: a propósito da união union, In Occasional Paper nº 58, Lisbon: paper/working_paper.php?idp=854. bancária» [Pragmatism and reform in a IPRI-UNL, March 2014. Available at:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

«Alain Lamassoure, a case for an optimis- plus quand mais comment», In Question PINDER, John - «European Community tic federalism», In Union of European Fed- d’ Europe, nº 216, 10th October, 2011. and Nation State: A Case for a Neo-federalists, 12th July, 2011. eralism?». In International Affairs, vol. 62, JAMET, Jean-François – L‘Europe peut-elle N.º 1, 1985-1986, pp. 41-54. AMARAL, João Ferreira – «Euro: um se passer d’un gouvernement économique?, futuro incerto». In Relações Internacionais, 2nd ed. Paris: La Documentation Française, REUTER, Paul and COMBACAU, Jean - nº 27, 2010. 2012. Institutions et Relations Internationales. Paris: P.U.F., 1980. BURGESS, Michael – Comparative Federal- KRUGMAN, Paul – «Revenge of the Opti- ism. Theory and Practice. London: Rout- mum Currency Area», In The New York ROUGEMONT, Denis de – Dictionnaire ledge, 2006. Times, 24th June, 2012. international du fédéralisme. Brussels: Bruylant, 1994. FERNANDES, José Pedro Teixeira – A LÉVI, Bernard-Henri – «Crise da zona Europa em Crise. Porto: QuidNovi, 2012. euro: o federalismo ou a morte», In Le SCHEFFER, Paul – «Federalismo: por Point, 28th September, 2012. favor, nada de Estados Unidos da Europa», FERNANDES, José Pedro Teixeira – Ele- In NRC Handelsblad, 5th December, 2013. mentos de Economia Política Internacional, LOBO-FERNANDES, Luís – «Pragma- 2nd ed. Coimbra: Almedina, 2013. tismo e reforma numa UE mais coesa: a SCHOR, Armand-Denis explains – Euro – O propósito da união bancária». In Occa- que é a moeda única?. Lisbon: Publicações DIMITRIOS, Kamis and WAYNE, Norman sional Paper nº 58, Lisbon: IPRI-NOVA, Dom Quixote, 1996. (eds.) – Theories of Federalism: A Reader. March 2014. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. STEIN, Eric – «Lawyers, Judges and the MAJONE, Giandomenico – Dilemmas of Making of a Transnational Constitution». DUVERGER, Maurice – A Europa dos European Integration. The Ambiguities & In The American Journal of International Cidadãos. Porto: Edições Asa, 1994. Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth. Oxford: Law, Vol. 75, nº 1, 1981, pp. 1-27. Oxford University Press, 2005. FØLLESDAL, Andreas – «Federalism», In ZIPPELIUS, Reinhold – Teoria Geral do Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MAJONE, Giandomenico – «The ‘Referen- Estado, 3rd ed. Lisbon: Fundação Calouste dum Threat’, the Rationally Ignorant Voter, Gulbenkian.1997. JAMET, Jean-François – «Gouvernement and the Political Culture of the EU», In économique européen: la question n’est RECON Online Working Paper 2009/04.

Federalism: is it the solution to the European Union crisis? A Portuguese view José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes 075

PORTUGAL AND EUROPE Portugal, the European Union and the crisis*1 Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar

uropean integration is of vital importance to Portugal. E From the outset, Portuguese democracy and Euro- ABSTRACT pean integration have been inseparable: the democratic he two crises – the national and path taken during the post-authoritarian transition was T the European crisis – changed indispensable to assure Portugal’s return to Europe after the terms of reference of the strategic debate in Portugal and, for the first the empire cycle came to an end and it was able to rely time since the Maastricht Treaty, there on the support of European and Western democracies at was again a domestic debate on Por- tuguese foreign policies. The Portu- critical moments of the revolutionary process. It is this guese elites’ trust in the future of solidarity that explains the Socialist Party’s (PS) famous Europe (and in their own European future) was called into question. Euro- slogan – «Europe is with us» in anticipation of its victory pean integration had been seen as an in the first election of the Assembly of the Republic. irreversible project, the Euro was supposed to be immune to crisis and the On the other hand, the crucial orientation of the new European Union was represented as democracy’s foreign policy was defined by accession to one of the crucial poles of the international system; however, the last years the European Communities, which Portugal’s two leading have shown a more complex reality. political parties, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Keywords: Portugal, European Union, Democratic Party (PSD) as well as the Centrist Democrats Portuguese foreign policy, financial (CDS) proclaimed as the «priority of all priorities». Simi- and economic crisis. larly, the common economic and social modernisation programme of the democratic forces was focused on a poor and backward country with average development levels of Western Europe. RESUMO Lastly, Portugal’s new international position was set by Portugal, the political and strategic congruence between democra- a União Europeia e a crise tisation and Europeanisation, the best guarantee against the dangers of isolation and marginalisation that had been s duas crises – a crise nacional e A a crise europeia – mudaram os so marked during both the colonial war and also the termos de referência do debate estra- revolutionary transition. Portugal’s stable insertion in the tégico em Portugal e, pela primeira vez desde o Tratado de Maastricht, voltou western community, which was consolidated by its entry a haver um debate interno sobre as

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 077-092 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sia06 políticas externas portuguesas. A con- in the European Community, underpinned the national fiança das elites portuguesas no futuro legitimacy of the Portuguese democracy2. da Europa (e no seu próprio futuro europeu) foi posta em causa. A inte- gração europeia era vista como um THE PAST: INTEGRATION processo irreversível, a moeda única era suposta ser imune às crises e a Portugal’s first decade of European integration, between União Europeia era representada como 1985 and 1995, took place under the banner of change. um dos pólos fundamentais do sis- tema internacional, mas os últimos At the national level, the end of the constitutional transi- anos revelaram uma realidade mais tion, with the presidential election of Mário Soares, complexa. opened a long period of political stability and assured Palavras-chave: Portugal, União Euro- conditions for rapid economic growth; this was sustained peia, política externa portuguesa, crise económica e financeira. by access to the community structural funds, which gave credibility to the strategy of convergence with European standards3. At the international level, the end of the Cold War and of European division following the peaceful reunification of Germany gave rise to profound changes in the international balances that constrained Portuguese foreign policies. The stabilisation of Portugal’s international status as a member of the European Union and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation led to a new cycle of bilateral relations with Spain, Brazil and also the former African colonies. Post-Franco Spain was no longer seen as a threat to national independence and became the main economic part- ner of the smaller of the two Iberian States4. Portugal became one of the main foreign investors in Brazil and endeavoured to institutionalise relations between the largest power in South America and the European Union. The intervention of Portuguese diplomacy proved indispensable in bringing an end to the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, and the normalisation of the relations of the former metropolis with the new African States made it possible to form the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). In this initial phase, Portugal’s European policy was much closer to that of Great Brit- ain, as part of an «Atlanticist party» in the European Union, which resisted both a federal definition of the European Union in the Maastricht Treaty and the institutionalisation of a European defence policy that integrated the Western European Union (WEU) and questioned NATO’s role as its continuity was no longer guaranteed after the end of the Soviet Union5. In the second decade of integration and following a change in government to PS, led by António Guterres, Portuguese governors acknowledged the need to join the «front- runners» of European construction alongside Germany and France; they wanted Por- tugal to become «as pro-European as Spain»6. The new strategy sought to obtain Portugal’s recognition as a «medium power» in the European Union, committed to defending the principles of solidarity and equality in relations between Member States, against the threat of a «directorate» formed by the strongest powers. Portugal was

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 078 committed to deepening community relations, as demonstrated by its membership of the «Schengen Space» and its determination to be one of the founders of the European single currency, after Spain’s entry was decided upon7. Similarly, it not only took a position in favour of the enlargement of the European Union (and of NATO) and supported the accession of the new post-Communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe even though it could be more negatively affected by their entry than any other of the «EU 15» countries, but it also took part in the NATO missions in Bosnia-Herze- govina and Kosovo with significant military deployments. Parallel to this, the evolution of Portugal’s position in the European Union revealed new challenges. The recognised virtues of enlargement and the democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe forced the regional «centre of gravity» to change from Brussels and Paris to Vienna and Berlin, thus shifting the balance of the «EU-12». The advantages of the «joint accession» of Portugal and Spain to the European Community8 did not prevent the undermining of the international position of the smaller Iberian State, nor did the benefits of intensifying the Iberian convergence prevent the Portuguese economy’s excessive dependence on Spain: the volume of bilateral trade was to outstrip trade with Germany and France together, Portugal’s main trading partners prior to community accession9. The most western State of the European Union ran the risk of becoming a periphery within a periphery; recognition of this danger is in large part the explanation for the Portuguese strategy of accepting the alternative risk of adhering to the European single currency despite the differences in productivity and competitiveness between the Portu- guese economy and those of the more advanced Eurozone countries. In this context, it was unthinkable to remain isolated at the margins of the economic and monetary union; however, Portugal’s first decade of the Euro was a period of stagnation that accentuated not only its internal economic crisis but also its external financial vulnerability.

THE PRESENT: THE CRISIS The request for ﬁnancial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had serious consequences for Portugal. The conditions of the Adjustment Programme, negotiated with the troika formed by the European Commis- sion, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF, were very harsh from the start. These measures were imposed not only because of the seriousness of the national crisis manifest in the unsustainable levels of Portuguese debt accumulated over the previous ten years10, but also due to the extension of the European crisis; they were to put the response capacity of democratic institutions to the test as well as the autonomy of the Portuguese economy. On the other hand, the very foundations of the European convergence strategy, which assured political consensus among the largest national parties and deﬁned the social contract of Portuguese democracy, was called into question both because of the austerity policies and due to the growing inequalities within the

Portugal, the European Union and the crisis Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar 079 European Union, a situation that had been worsened by the crisis. Lastly, Portugal’s image as a «medium power» of the European Union was tarnished by its external representation as a pariah, expressed in the formula that described the «cohesion countries» as the «PIGS» – Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain – and quantified in the classifications of the international rating agencies which downgraded Portugal’s debt rating to junk. Following the bailouts of Greece and Ireland, which defined the framework of the European response to the sovereign debt crisis from May 2010, Portugal was unable to avoid the external intervention of the European Commission, ECB and IMF11. The Socialist Government in Madrid, which was equally vulnerable, wanted to set itself apart from the Socialist Government of Lisbon – «Spain FOLLOWING THE BAILOUTS OF GREECE is not Portugal»12 – which was isolated by AND IRELAND, WHICH DEFINED THE FRAMEWORK Germany and France in their determination OF THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE SOVEREIGN to rein in the crisis of the single currency DEBT CRISIS FROM MAY 2010, PORTUGAL in the peripheries of the Eurozone, putting WAS UNABLE TO AVOID THE EXTERNAL the resilience of the democracies of South- INTERVENTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ern Europe to the test13. ECB AND IMF. THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT Up against exceptional circumstances, the IN MADRID, WHICH WAS EQUALLY VULNERABLE, Portuguese democracy demonstrated its WANTED TO SET ITSELF APART FROM THE ability to respond to the national crisis and SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT OF LISBON WHICH external intervention14: the alternative would WAS ISOLATED BY GERMANY AND FRANCE. have been to leave the Eurozone which everyone realised would be disasterous at a time of crisis. In March 2011, the Stability and Growth Programme for 2012-2014 (PEC IV), negotiated between the Socialist Government and the European Commission, was rejected by the Portuguese Parliament, which was promptly dissolved by the President of the Republic, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who had just been re-elected for a second term. The parliamentary vote made the request for external financial assistance inevitable15; this was presented by Prime Minister José Sócrates and in May, on the eve of early elections, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) negotiated with the European Com- mission, ECB and IMF was signed by the outgoing Socialist Government and formally accepted by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and CDS-People’s Party (CDS-PP) 16. The MoU defined a scheduled economic and financial Adjustment Programme in return for a loan of €78bn. The following month, the PSD won the parliamentary elections but had to form a coalition government led by its President, Pedro Passos Coelho, to guarantee a majority in Parliament. The new centre-right Government assumed the responsibility of complying with the financial stabilisation programme, which it saw as an opportunity for budgetary consolidation and the liberalisation of the Portuguese economy; this was indispensable for a reformist strategy and to recover external competitiveness even though it came at the cost of unprecedented levels of unemployment17.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 080 The presidential decision saved Portugal from the trend towards «technocratic governments», which had marked the cases of Greece and Italy with Lucas Papademos and Mario Monti respectively; both former senior European officials, their appointment as heads of government accelerated the political turn in the two countries. In contrast, the results of the Portuguese election maintained the dominance of the two main parties in a framework of essential continuity18 which guaranteed the minimum consensus between the new Government and the PS necessary for the execution of the Memorandum. In an original exercise of political arithmetic, the Minister of Finance, Vitor Gaspar, declared that the signatories of the Adjustment Programme had enjoyed a «great electoral success with popular support of nearly 80% and the election of around 90% of MPs». In 2011, thanks to alternation between PS and PSD, the necessary stability was assured for the execution of the assistance programme and to contain the rise of populist and anti- European movements that characterised the crises in Greece, Spain and Italy19. Counter to the most pessimistic forecasts, over the next three years the Government was able to meet the targets fixed in the Memorandum and «pass» the series of «exams» set by the troika. These came to an end in May 2014 when Portugal made a «clean» exit from the external assistance programme, just as Ireland had done some months earlier. During that time, the Government had recovered reasonably well from two general strikes, in November 2011 and June 2013, called by the General Confederation of Por- tuguese Workers (CGTP) and the General Union of Workers (UGT). The two main trade unions proved they were able to sustain a formal framework of social dialogue, con- textualising labour conflicts and containing the risks of escalating violence at a time of recession and an exponential rise in unemployment20. On the other hand, the Government benefited from a context of political and institutional stability, which separated the Portuguese case from that of Greece and Italy. In July 2013, the Prime Minister, Passos Coelho, was able to avoid the collapse of the coalition when Paulo Portas, Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs, precipitated a government crisis following the resignation of Vítor Gaspar, citing incompatibility with the President of CDS-PP, who wanted to return to the orthodox line of financial discipline considered necessary for the «good Portuguese student» to regain the trust of Germany and the external creditors21. This was the last crisis of the kind in the coalition, which in addition to completing its parliamentary mandate, took the unprecedented decision to form the Portugal Ahead platform to present a joint PSD and CDS-PP list in the general elections of October 2015. Not only was the Government able to rely on the responsible opposition of PS during this period, but also on the support of Presi- dent Cavaco Silva and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso. Notwithstanding conjunctural tensions, the limits imposed by the President of the Republic and the Constitutional Court in response to the government’s excessive zeal in the execution of the Adjustment Programme were equally important to guaranteeing political and institutional stability during the crisis.

Portugal, the European Union and the crisis Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar 081 Lastly, it was possible to contain the worst internal consequences of the escalation of the European crisis – an «existential crisis» according to Chancellor Angela Merkel22 – and avoid its most dangerous effects. The Portuguese strategy made it an absolute priority to neutralise any attempts to change the composition of the Eurozone that threatened to exclude Portugal, and also to avoid the external demand for new bailouts that Greece had experienced23. With the troika already out of Portugal and during the negotiation of the third bailout, the centre-right Government aligned with those advocating Greece’s exit from the Eurozone24. Moreover, it was important to constrain the projects to create a European currency with a variable geometry in which there was a «Euro of the North» and a «Euro of the South»25 which would lead to a permanent cleavage between rich and poor, or between creditors and debtors, within the Eurozone. The political and institutional stability of the Portuguese democracy, the fiscal discipline of the «good student», the strategy of rigorous alignment with Germany and the political radicalisation of Greece were vital to Portugal’s reaching the end of the execution of the Adjustment Programme without further problems. It seems the Portuguese decided to confront the crisis with a mixture of public indif- ference and private stoicism, which may be interpreted as a form of apathy or as a social anomaly. In the worst years, there were no violent conflicts despite the tough measures with far-reaching economic and social impacts, notably in the middle classes who were hit not only by the increased tax burden, but also by unemployment and the wave of emigration of the younger and better educated generations. Even though the Portuguese were among the most pessimistic of all Europeans in their evaluation of the crisis and among those that had least trust in representative institutions, the polls showed no change in the traditional concentration of votes in the two main pro-European parties: the results of the October 2015 general election confirmed this forecast and the sum of PSD plus PS members of parliament continues to guarantee them a two thirds majority26. Along the same lines, the minority parties, including the CDS-PP, the Communist Party (PCP) and the Left Bloc (BE) also managed to maintain their share of the electoral preferences and prevent the emergence of new populist movements27. Finally, the «euro-sceptic» trend in the smallest parties – which is constant in PCP, fluctuates in BE, sporadic in CDS-PP – might also have helped neutralise the emergence of new anti-European formations. Nevertheless, the stability of these political choices has been accompanied by a growing polarisation between the political forces that reflects the crisis of the main parties28, as well as by a loss of trust in democratic institutions, which reveals the extent of the effects of austerity policies on the erosion of the constitutional regime29. Since May 2014, the conclusion of the Adjustment Programme has allowed the governing parties to highlight the virtues of the «Portuguese model», insist on their ability to implement the necessary reforms and to recognise the importance of the unique conditions of political and social stability. In 2015, with the debacle in the Greek elections,

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 082 the government’s catch phrase – «Portugal is not Greece» – gained credibility and the authorities set out to restore the State’s image abroad. This said, compliance with the Adjustment Programme allowed Portugal to contain the risks of expulsion from the Eurozone, avoid new bailouts and gain enough time for the European Union to have the necessary political conditions for a joint response to the crisis, despite the economic and social costs that it brought to the country and the still mediocre growth of the Portuguese economy. The crises in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, as well as in Italy and France, are all an integral part of a European crisis, and the effective response to the Portuguese crisis, just as in the other cases, should be a European response. The adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union («Budg- etary Treaty»), the creation of the European Stability Mechanism and the Growth and Employment Pact, as well as Greece’s successive bailouts are evidence of the political commitment of Germany and the European Union to resolving the common crisis without disrupting the composition of the Eurozone30. In light of this, it is possible to justify the strategy for the national response to the crisis, but the next phase calls for a Portuguese vision for the future: the European integration of Portugal, including participation in the single currency, should not be considered an end in itself, but an integral part of a strategy of international integration31.

THE EUROPEAN FUTURE The two crises – the national crisis and the European crisis – have changed the terms of reference of the strategic debate in Portugal and, for the ﬁrst time since the Treaty of Maastricht, there is again an internal debate on Portugal’s foreign policies. The conﬁdence of the Portuguese elites in THE TWO CRISES – THE NATIONAL CRISIS the future of Europe (and in their own AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS – HAVE CHANGED European future) has been called into ques- THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE STRATEGIC tion32. European integration was seen as an DEBATE IN PORTUGAL AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME irreversible process, the single currency SINCE THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT, was supposed to be immune to crises33 and THERE IS AGAIN AN INTERNAL DEBATE the European Union was represented as one ON PORTUGAL’S FOREIGN POLICIES. of the key poles of the international system; however, the last few years have revealed a more complex picture. The main European leaders admit that the end of the Euro and of the actual European Union is a possibility; the dangers of fragmentation with the inversion of the regional integration process are now included when devising national strategies and there is general recognition of the relative decline of Western Europe in the balance of international regions34. In this context of growing uncertainty, the dominant position of the pro-European line in the formulation of Portuguese strategies has been confronted by a resurgence of a nationalist line. The President of CDS-PP signalled this before the 2011 elections,

Portugal, the European Union and the crisis Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar 083 when Paulo Portas protested about the way in which Portugal was being treated by its European peers saying that «Portugal is not a protectorate»35; later, after assuming the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, he felt it necessary to repeat that the external intervention had turned Portugal into a «protectorate». This would be a banal statement if it had come from a populist or anti-European faction36, but it marked the public debate precisely because it came from the leader of a party that was a member of the European People’s Party (EPP). Although the Social Democrat Prime Minister did not repeat the formula of the Christian Democrat Minister, the latter did not stop using it, calling the fundamental congruence between democracy and Europeanisation into question. The resurgence of the nationalist line has opened up the possibility to counter the European ideology with a new idealist vision built around the «strategic potential» of the CPLP, which should be able to support a «Portuguese speaking option» as an alternative to the «European option»37. However, the European consensus among the national elites remains38 and even the most substantiated positions in favour of Portugal’s exit from the single currency are still isolated and marginal39. Contrary to what happened at the end of the authoritarian regime, when the strategy of accession to the European Communities represented an alternative to the Estado Novo’s stubborn imperial position, no credible alternative has emerged in the last national crisis to Portugal’s European and Western integration. President Cavaco Silva underlined this position when the parliamentary elections of October 2015 resulted in a stalemate; he explicitly stated that respect for the continuity of Portuguese foreign policy, including Portugal’s position in NATO, the European Union and CPLP was a condition for the formation of a new Government40. Similarly, the Secretary General of PS, António Costa, pushed through a Government Programme in which the pro-European line of his party is recognised41, limiting bilateral agreements with the Left Bloc and PCP and the Ecologist Green Party (PEV) to economic and social policies that are compatible with the fiscal and budgetary discipline required under the institutional rules of the European Union and the Eurozone42. Notwithstanding, the new bipolarisation between the left and right wing parties in the national parliament will put the historic consensus between the PS and PSD on European and Western integration to the test. Meanwhile, the evident strength of the Left Bloc and the PCP, two political forces with a marked critical stance on the European status quo43, in the new parliamentary coalition will not be sufficient to turn the Socialist Government away from its Euro-Atlantic option, confirmed over the last 40 years. Between the two crises, national and European, divided between the «good student» syndrome and the spectrum of the «protectorate», the last seven years has been the most difficult period for Portuguese foreign policy since Portugal’s entry in the European Communities. From the outset, it was impossible to maintain the indispensable balance between the European and the Atlantic dimensions in the definition of foreign priorities.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 084 The extreme conditions of financial dependence and the need to recover minimum credibility in the relations with external creditors expressed itself in an excessive alignment with Germany, notably in the framework of the European Union. Parallel to this, the relations with the United States were subordinated at a critical moment in which Madrid was actively engaged in normalising their relations with Washington and managed to have the Route44 reassessed, after which was Lages was put on reserve status in the North American military base system45. In the same vein, since the foreign intervention in Libya in 2011, which was the first time after the end of the Cold War that the Portuguese Armed Forces did not participate in a military mission of Western allies, Portugal’s presence in NATO’s international operations has been reduced to historic lows. The change, which cannot be explained merely by financial constraints, has not only damaged relations with the United States, Great Brit- ain and France, but also Portugal’s reputation as a «producer of international security». On the other hand, bilateral and multilateral relations beyond the European and transatlantic community have gained greater importance. Portugal sought to form a «strategic triangle» with Brazil and Angola, which ultimately forced Lisbon to accept the decision of Brasilia and Luanda to extend membership of the CPLP to Equatorial Gui- nea in the CPLP. The foreign policy strived to identify new «strategic partners», like China – Portugal has become the main destination of Chinese investments in Europe after Germany, Great Britain and France – while «economic diplomacy» explored opportunities in Asia, Latin America and North Africa. An economic internationalisation strategy was tried out as part of this process, with the explicit aim of reducing the excessive dependence on Spanish and European partners; the European Union states together represented over 80% of Portugal’s total trade. But the attempt to «de-Europeanise», evident in the privatisation policy, resulted in growing de-nationalisation and a strong penetration of strategic sectors – including energy, the financial sector and the media – by foreign partners with whom it is not possible to establish a framework of co-sovereignty in the management of key companies46. Lastly, the Portuguese authorities have reassessed the importance given to the Portuguese language in international relations; the relevance of the «Portuguese Diaspora» is highlighted for Portugal’s projection abroad and a new policy is being developed for a broad maritime platform; this will entail consolidating relations with the Western allies in the transatlantic community including the United States and Germany. These new orientations, which have become consensual47, confirm a trend towards the «re-nationalisation» of foreign policies, otherwise shared by a large number of the Member States of the European Union. Although the crisis did not damage the framework of necessary continuity, it shifted the balance between the two vectors of the foreign policy of the Portuguese democracy – Europe and the Atlantic48: while the primacy of the European dimension is not in

Portugal, the European Union and the crisis Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar 085 question, it no longer dominates the hierarchy of internal priorities. A new distancing from European integration is signalled by criticisms of «German hegemony»49 – according to the former Socialist Minister, João Cravinho, «Germany has united the left»50 – and the defence of a «re-balancing» of the Euro- ALTHOUGH THE CRISIS DID NOT DAMAGE pean Union51, as well as a re-assessment of THE FRAMEWORK OF NECESSARY CONTINUITY, both the Atlantic and Portuguese speaking IT SHIFTED THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO dimensions. The relevance given to the VECTORS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE Atlantic is not simply due to a recognition PORTUGUESE DEMOCRACY - EUROPE of the importance of relations with the AND THE ATLANTIC: WHILE THE PRIMACY United States and with NATO on security, OF THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION IS NOT dictated by the escalation of conflicts in the IN QUESTION, IT NO LONGER DOMINATES periphery of Europe, but above all by a new THE HIERARCHY OF INTERNAL PRIORITIES. vision of the unity of the Atlantic which seeks to recover a strategic articulation between the North and South Atlantic52, despite the usual resistance from Brazil and the predictable disinterest shown by the dominant power in the Western hemisphere53. The inclusion of the South Atlantic may, in turn, integrate much of the Portuguese speaking dimension given that all the members of the CPLP, except Mozambique and East Timor, are Atlantic States. At the end of a critical phase of the national crisis, it is the defence of European and Western insertion that has prevailed and defines the international position of Portuguese democracy54. Nevertheless, everyone recognises that it is impossible to return to the status quo ante: the European Union is transforming itself in response to its internal crisis and the changes in the international system. While it is difficult to foresee a clear direction for the evolution of the European crisis, which will be decisive to the future of Portugal, a set of positions can be identified in which the affinities between the Portuguese interests and those of Europe can be combined. Firstly, the scenarios of a «Great Leap Ahead» on the path of political integration seem highly unlikely given the trend towards a great affirmation of sovereignty, both for historical and international reasons, notably in the case of Germany55, but also in France and Great Britain. In this context, it is important to consolidate the Community acquis, complete the European single market, and make the harmonisation of monetary, fiscal and budgetary policies a new priority with a view to seeking a virtuous relationship between the discipline of the monetary union and economic growth; this is vital to overcoming a crisis that has highlighted the risks of division between the North and South of Europe so dangerously56. The Budgetary Treaty seems a step in that direction, as does the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, the approval of the Growth and Employment Pact and the evolution towards a banking, budgetary and fiscal union. In Portuguese politics, there are two distinct positions on the institutional balances, with the traditional defenders of the European Commission who want to limit the

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 086 Eurogroup’s intervention in European governance on one side57 and, on the other, new supporters of the strengthening of the Eurozone institutions, including the formation of a European Monetary Fund58. Similarly, distinct evaluations are made of prioritising the German proposals to create specific plans to respond to the problems entailed in the modernisation of individual Member States59 or of the search for arrangements for the partial mutualisation of «sovereign debts». On the other hand, it is important to separate certain European policies in order to ensure their autonomous development, without revising the existing treaties. Portugal is committed to guaranteeing the stability of the rules in the «Schengen Space» and contributing to the gradual convergence of immigration policies and the integration of emigrant communities, one of the few areas in which Portugal’s performance has been exemplary. In the refugee crisis, Portugal showed it could recognise the importance of defending the Schengen rules and open its doors to a significant number of refugees in response to appeals initially made by Germany. Parallel to this, the national position advocating the setting up of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as the development of the European Union’s effective military capacity to intervene in priority areas of strategic interest has been hampered by the Euro- pean Union’s paralysis, in which the crisis has led to a dangerous reduction in the resources available for military defence. But the revision of the European Security Strategy (ESS) is of continued importance to Portuguese interests60, as is the consolidation of the European Union’s collective security capacities, notably to re-establish control on its external borders and to guarantee the protection of refugees in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In the same vein, it is worth putting aside the post-sovereignist orthodoxy and recognising the existence of alliances between the States in the European Union61. The hegemonic regional trends can only be contained through stable conciliation between Germany, France and the United Kingdom, and all European powers need allies: Germany wants liberal partners to balance Southern Europe’s resistance to reforms to the European social model and Northern Europe’s opposition to the financing of cohesion programmes; on the other hand, France and the United Kingdom, the two nuclear powers responsible for European defence and security policies, not only need to assure the European democracies’ capacity for external military intervention but also to define the much needed consensus that guarantees common defence in the framework of a continuing transatlantic alliance. Portugal can be present in each of these groupings of States, contributing to the European response to the crisis and showing its determination to return to the centre stage of European integration. At the same time, Portuguese foreign policy cannot remain the hostage of just one narrow alliance; it should be aligned with Germany, with France or with the United Kingdom in the different fields in which their interests converge most.

Portugal, the European Union and the crisis Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar 087 Finally, the European Union must stop being so self-absorbed and find ways to intervene in the crisis resulting from the strategic diffidence of the United States, from Russia’s revisionist turn and from the emergence of the Asian powers. It is too soon to talk of the inevitability of Europe’s decline, and it is reasonable to argue that a «world without Europe» would become more dangerous, THE EUROPEAN UNION MUST STOP BEING more unbalanced and less civilised. The SO SELF-ABSORBED AND FIND WAYS recovery of the European Union’s global TO INTERVENE IN THE CRISIS RESULTING economic and financial competitiveness is FROM THE STRATEGIC DIFFIDENCE only possible if it is based on a true capac- OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM RUSSIA’S ity for autonomous political and military REVISIONIST TURN AND FROM THE EMERGENCE intervention in the critical domains of inter- OF THE ASIAN POWERS. national politics, starting with the conflicts threatening European and Western security in the new range of crises that extend from Ukraine to Syria and to Mali. In this context, it is essential to consolidate the Atlantic Alliance and at the same time draw up a realistic international strategy for the European Union that can articulate the positions of the leading European powers62. Yet again, Portugal, whose geographic centrality in the Atlantic should be able to counter-balance its relatively marginal position in the European space, has a vital interest not only in the continuity of the Atlantic Alliance, but also in ensuring complementarity between NATO and the European Union in consolidating relations between the United States and the European Union, notably in the framework of the future Transatlantic Trade and Investment Treaty (TTIP) and strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy. The end of the European Union is possible, but Europe does not need to be reinvented to prevent this happening. On the contrary, holding on to the memory of a century of total wars and totalitarian revolutions, which runs the risk of getting lost in the «fog of the crisis», is the best way to stop going back to the past and uniting Europe once again.

TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

Date received: 20th September, 2015 | Date approved: 2nd November, 2015

Teresa de Sousa Journalist for the Público newspaper. >[email protected]

Carlos Gaspar Researcher at the Portuguese (NOVA FCSH). Member of the European Council Institute of International Relations of the on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and of the Portuguese Universidade NOVA de Lisboa (IPRI_NOVA). Invited Political Science Association (APCP). Author of Associate Professor, Faculty of Social and Human O Pós-Guerra Fria (2016) and A balança da Europa (2017). Sciences of the Universidade NOVA de Lisboa >[email protected]

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 088 ENDNOTES

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Portugal, the European Union and the crisis Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar 089 34 Eurozone, Portugal did not stand by KUPCHAN, Charles – «Centrifugal (TTIP), while the PCP wants to dismantle France, Italy or Cyprus and should there- Europe», In Survival, vol. 54, n.º 1, 2012, the Economic and Monetary Union and fore have aligned with Germany. «Inter- pp. 111-118. WRIGHT, Thomas – «What If prepare «the country’s liberation from view with Wolfgang Schauble. ‘There is No Europe Fails?», In The Washington Quar- submission to the euro». «Manifesto Elei- German Dominance’», In Der Spiegel, 17 terly, Vol. 35, n.º 3, 2012, pp. 23-41. See toral», Left Bloc, Legislative Elections July 2015. also FRIEDBERG, Aaron – Beyond the Euro 2015. Programa eleitoral do PCP. Legislativas Crisis: Implications for U.S. Strategy. 2015. Soluções para um Portugal com future, 25 ALMEIDA, João Marques de – «Por- Bruxelas: German Marshall Fund, Euro- Portuguese Communist Party, 2015. tugal na União Europeia». In Relações Future Project Paper, 2012. See also GAS- 44 Internacionais, n.º 28, pp. 81-90, 2010. See PAR, Carlos – «O declínio europeu». In POWELL, Charles – «A second transi- also MAYER, Thomas – Europe’s Unfinished Finisterra, n.º 77, 2015, pp. 29-37. tion, or more of the same. Spain’s foreign Currency. The Political Economy of the Euro. policy under Zapatero», In South European 35 London: Anthem Press, 2012. «PEC. Portugal não é um protetorado Society and Politics, Vol. 14, n.º 4, 2009. mas um Estado Nação – Portas», In 26 45 In June 2011, PSD, with 108 MPs, and Expresso, 13 March 2011. SÁ, Tiago Moreira de – Política externa PS, with 74, elected 182 of the 230 MPs. In portuguesa, pp. 78-79. 36 October 2015, the Parliamentary Groups of The leaders of the Left Bloc also 46 the PSD, with 89 MPs, and PS, with 86, had referred to Portugal as a «protectorate» According to Félix Ribeiro, some of a total of 175 of the 230 MPs in Parliament. in the last election campaign, but neither the Portuguese elite were willing to accept the BE not the PCP wanted to use the term that Portugal was a «German protectorate 27 In the elections for the European Par- in their electoral programmes. Left Bloc. and a Chinese factory». RIBEIRO, José liament in June 2014, for the first time a Manifesto Eleitoral. Legislativas 2015. Por- Manuel Félix – Portugal. A economia de uma populist candidate running under the ban- tuguese Communist Party. Programa elei- nação rebelde, p. 11. ner of the Earth Party (PT), was able to toral do PCP. Legislativas 2015. Soluções 47 win 7% of the votes and elect two MPs. Of para um Portugal com futuro. Among others, the PS electoral Pro- the various new movements in October gramme adopted this line and stressed 37 2015, PAN (People Animals Nature) SÁ, Tiago Moreira de – Política externa above all the Diaspora, which included five elected just one MP; the total number of portuguesa, pp. 66-67. million Portuguese. Socialist Party. Pro- MPs elected by BE, Unitary Democratic grama eleitoral do PS. Eleições Legislativas 38 Coalition (CDU), including the PCP and the Both the Strategic Concept 2013 and 2015. Green Ecologist Party (PEV), and the CDS- the electoral Programmes of the PS and 48 PP in the Parliament went up from 48 to the Coalition Portugal Ahead in 2015 TEIXEIRA, Nuno Severiano – «Breve 52. On the elections for the European returned to the foundations of foreign ensaio sobre a política externa portu- Parliament, see LISI, Marco – «Portugal. policy of the Portuguese democracy. Con- guesa». In Relações Internacionais, n.º 28, Between apathy and crisis of the main- ceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional 2013 2010, p. 54. stream parties». FREIRE, André and In Instituto de Defesa Nacional, 2013. 49 PEREIRA, José Santana – «More Second Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional. FERREIRA, José Medeiros – Não há Order than ever? The 2014 European Elec- Contributos e Debate Público, Lisboa: INCM, mapa cor-de-rosa. A história (mal)dita da tion in Portugal». In South European Society pp. 509-548. «Agora Portugal pode mais. integração europeia. RIBEIRO, José Manuel and Politics, vol. 20, n.º 3, 2015, pp. 381-401. Programa eleitoral», PSD, CDS-PP. Coa- Félix – Portugal. A economia de uma nação lition Portugal Ahead, Legislative Elec- rebelde. See also MARQUES, Viriato 28 On the crisis of the Portuguese par- tions 2015. «Programa eleitoral do PS», Soromenho – Portugal na Queda da Europa. ties, see LISI, Marco – «Portugal. Legislative Elections 2015. Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2014. Between apathy and crisis of the main- 39 50 stream parties». AMARAL, João Ferreira do – Porque «Rising bloc of left-leaning parties in devemos sair do Euro. Lisboa: Lua de Portugal threatens austerity drive», In 29 The loss of confidence in the political Papel, 2013. See also RIBEIRO, José International New York Times, 9 November institutions was not limited to parties but Manuel Félix – Portugal. A economia de uma 2015. also included the President, the Govern- nação rebelde. Lisboa: Guerra e Paz, 2014, 51 ment and the Parliament. André Freire 208-209. The PS electoral Programme stated estimated that the level of satisfaction that the European Union «needed to be 40 with the «functioning of democracy» President of the Republic, «Comuni- rebalanced». «Programa eleitoral do PS», could have fallen from 40 per cent to 10 cação ao País», 6 October 2015. Legislative Elections 2015, p. 22. per cent in the last years of the crisis. 41 52 FREIRE, André – The Condition of Portu- The Socialist Government Programme GASPAR, Carlos – «A posição inter- guese Democracy during the Troika’s Inter- was approved in the National Council of nacional de Portugal», In REIS, Bruno vention. the Socialist Party on 7 November 2015. Cardoso and GASPAR, Carlos – Uma estra- «PS aprova por esmagadora programa de tégia global para Portugal numa Europa em 30 SOARES, António Goucha – «As insti- Governo apoiado pela esquerda», In crise. Lisboa: Cadernos do IDN, 2013. tuições da UE na ressaca de Lisboa e da Público, 7 November 2015. Socialist Party. RIBEIRO, José Manuel Félix – Portugal. A crise. A quadratura do círculo». In In Programa de Governo para a XIII Legis- economia de uma nação rebelde. SÁ, Tiago Relações Internacionais, n.º 41, 2014, pp. latura. Comissão Nacional do Partido Moreira de – Política externa portuguesa. 11-26. Socialista, 7 November 2015. 53 REIS, Bruno Cardoso – A centralidade 31 42 FERREIRA, José Medeiros – Não há The PS did not want to raise questions do Atlântico, Portugal e o futuro da ordem mapa cor-de-rosa. A história (mal)dita da of foreign policy, security and defence in internacional. Lisboa: Cadernos do IDN, integração europeia, Lisboa: Edições 70, the negotiations with the far-left forma- 2015. 2014, p. 148. tions and reached three separate agree- 54 ments with the BE, PCP and PEV on other FERREIRA, José Medeiros – Portugal. 32 MOURY, Catherine and FREIRE, André matters, namely social and economic Os próximos 20 anos IV. Posição de Portugal – «O apoio dos ‘cidadãos’ e das ‘elites’ à policies, to ensure they had the minimum no Mundo. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gul- UE, antes e depois da crise financeira: os conditions to form a «stable and lasting» benkian, 1988. países periféricos da Europa do Sul (Gré- Government, according to the formula 55 cia, Portugal e Espanha) numa perspetiva used by President Cavaco Silva. On the German identity after reunifi- comparada». In Relações Internacionais, cation, see WINKLER, Heinrich August – 43 n.º 41, 2014, pp. 97-122. According to their electoral Pro- «Rebuilding of a Nation. Germany Before grammes: the Left Bloc demands the end and After Reunification», In MERTES, 33 As explained by Vitor Gaspar. AVILLEZ, of the Budget Treaty and is opposed to the Michael; MULLER, Steven; WINKLER, Maria João – Vitor Gaspar, pp. 131-165. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Treaty Heinrich August (eds) – In Search of Ger-

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 090 57 61 many, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, «Programa de Governo para a XIII GASPAR, Carlos – «A posição inter- 1996, pp. 59-78. GLOANNEC, Anne-Marie Legislatura», Socialist Party, p. 16. nacional de Portugal», In REIS, Bruno Le – «On German Identity», In MERTES, Cardoso and GASPAR, Carlos – Uma estra- 58 Michael; MULLER, Steven; WINKLER, The European Monetary Fund is an tégia global para Portugal numa Europa em Heinrich August (eds), pp. 147-166. GAR- old proposal of Schauble that was later crise. The Programme of the Coalition TON-ASH, Timothy – «Germany’s Choice». taken up by Passos Coelho. «Coligação Portugal Ahead speciﬁcally recognises the In Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, n.º 4, 1994. On Portugal à Frente. Agora Portugal pode need for «intra European alliances», Germany’s evolution in the European cri- mais. Programa eleitoral», p. 147. «Coligação Portugal à Frente. Agora Por- sis, see KUNDNANI, Hans – The Paradox tugal pode mais. Programa eleitoral», 59 of German Power. London: Hurst, 2014. The PS defends this position in a New PSD, CDS-PP. p. 146. PATTERSON, William – «The Reluctant Impulse for Convergence with Europe 62 Hegemony? Germany Moves Center Stage Programme. «Programa eleitoral do PS. DENNISON, Susi; GOWAN, Richard; in the EU», In JCMS Annual Review of the Eleições Legislativas 2015», Socialist KUNDNANI, Hans; LEONARD, Mark and EU, Vol. 49, 1, 2011, pp. 57-75. Also see Party. p. 22. «Programa de Governo para WITNEY, Nick – Why Europe Needs a New BECK, Ulrich – German Europe, Cam- a XIII Legislatura», Socialist Party. 20-21. Global Strategy. London: ECFR Policy Brief, bridge: Polity Press, 2013. 2013. 60 «Programa eleitoral do PS. Eleições 56 ZIELONKA, Jan – Is the EU Doomed?, Legislativas 2015», p. 21. Programa de Cambridge: Polity, 2014. Governo para a XIII Legislatura, p. 19.

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RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 092 BOOK REVIEW

BOOK REVIEW TIAGO MOREIRA DE SÁ In defence Política Externa Portuguesa of a benign Lisbon, Fundação Francisco * Manuel dos Santos, 2015, 100 pp. dual hegemony ISBN 978-989-881-914-7 Bernardo Pires de Lima

he book by Tiago Moreira de Sá has three noteworthy T features. Theoretically, it offers a succinct framework of the evolution in the international order that delineates the foreign policy of a State like Portugal. Historically, it presents a parsimonious description of the ﬁve main political regimes in Portugal under analysis. Politically, it is pertinent for the interpretation of the current foreign policy options open to Portugal. This intellectual alignment is present throughout the book, which is one of the increasingly important collection of essays from the Fran- cisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation. In this way, its author - IPRI-NOVA professor and researcher - achieves an outcome that is unusual in our international relations literature in that it does not fall into a theoretical vertigo, excessive historicism States has been distinct in that it has been or doctrinal motivation. more liberal than imperial and unusually The fundamental thesis of this essay accessible, legitimate and long-lasting. results from the author’s framing of Por- The aggregation of the largest number of tugal’s foreign policy within the theory of open democracies and democratic states international relations. According to Tiago not only became a factor in the accumula- Moreira de Sá, we have a historically tion of geopolitical power, but also shifted unique Western post-war order, the insti- the balance in favour of the order. Moreo- tutions of which govern and delineate our ver, the Western post-war order has a external orientations. Any international widely supported, unusually dense and order dominated by one major power relies comprehensive set of institutions and sys- on a combination of coercion and consent; tem of norms. The most important ben- however, the hegemony of the United eﬁt of these characteristics is that they give

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 095-098 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sibr01 the West a remarkable capacity to accom- and those of similar size. These countries modate emerging powers. The democratic have, in turn, shifted the gravitational cen- and pluralist order is a powerful circle tre of the EU to the east, assigning Portu- which is both durable and geographically gal to the position of the western extensive: the global position of the United periphery of the enlarged EU. Moreover, it States might weaken on many fronts, but was both natural and predictable that Ger- it is unlikely that the international system man reunification resulted in Berlin led by the North Americans will cease to becoming the EU’s real political centre, predominate in the coming decades. consolidating a truly German unipolarity The last thirty years have changed Portu- in the context of the various European gal. The economy has been modernised, policies. In other words, while the United the educational and health systems have States has a systemic hegemony in the post been consolidated, and relations between war and post Cold War international order, the civil and military spheres have been Germany holds a similar status in the normalised; the Armed Forces are now European regional order. It is in relation placed in a Euro-Atlantic “pluralist security to this dual hegemony that Tiago Moreira community” that respects standards of de Sá sets out the Portuguese position and technological cooperation and sophistica- its foreign policy options. tion in a continental framework of deepen- It should be said that the author does not ing economic, financial. commercial, have a problem with the dual hegemony. educational and military integration. In He considers it to be benign, structural other words, Portugal’s membership of the and necessary for the respective orders in European Union (EU) was vital for the that both are pillars of the pluralist West normalisation of democracy and to ensure and of its leadership in the international an appropriate international post-imperial economy and geo-politics. But he goes insertion. However, the deepening Euro- further. He does not believe Portugal is pean integration, notably since the intro- interested in disputing the American and duction of monetary union and the entry German primacy through anti-hegemonic into force of the singly currency, consoli- alliances, or that it is in a position to do dated European policy as a truly key so. Rather, it should consolidate its posi- dimension of the Member States’ various tion as a close ally to try and inﬂuence its national polices. Sufﬁce it to say that 80 strategic options. While this argument per cent of Portuguese public investment makes sense given the EU’s current situ- originates from community funds, not to ation, the author makes a distinction mention the fact that the vast majority of between being close and being a follower. our legislation derives from European The fact that Southern Europe is now more institutions. coordinated in its questioning of the terms Portugal’s relative weight on the European of the budget treaty, which may be the near- stage has naturally declined since enlarge- est thing to a mechanism to “dispute” Ger- ment and the inclusion of larger countries man hegemony, is a topic that perhaps

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 096 warrants further analysis. The conse- office, the President of the Republic and quences of this debate remain unclear, but even the Constitutional Court. it cannot ignore the moment of European The author defends, correctly, the position pressure that also centres the leadership that the three constituencies of democratic of the refugee crisis in Germany due to its Portugal’s foreign policy - Europe, the many visible implications for European Atlantic Alliance, Portuguese speaking security and cohesion. That is, German countries – have a continuity and comple- hegemony is being tested for the first time mentarity that is strengthened by Lisbon’s since reunification and this could lead to greater commitment to their institutions, the emergence of other countries that namely the EU, NATO and CPLP. Moreira bring balance to or upset this primacy. de Sá states decisively that there are no We have delegated the consolidation of our compensatory formulas for Portugal’s regime and the modernisation of the econ- insertion in the world, and argues that omy to the EU, and the supranational path there is no need for any of these three pil- taken in the last twenty years has crystal- lars to clash strategically in order to sur- lised it as an integral part of Portuguese vive. In fact, although he could have gone domestic policy. This is precisely why there further, the author sets out a good argu- is now a void in the design of foreign ment for an “Atlantic alliance” as a space policy. On one hand, the relations within for the rescaling of Portuguese foreign Europe have become an internal matter for policy, as a complement rather than sub- Portugal, exposing the country to the peri- stitute to European integration. Another ods of generalised economic recession in key point raised in this essay is the rela- this space and political and financial diso- tionship with Spain, which Victor Cunha rientation in relation to the single cur- Rego, the former ambassador in Madrid, rency. On the other, the fact that we have refers to as “our permanent foreign pol- not worked vigorously on the Atlantic ties icy”. While Moreira de Sá recognises the has restricted the range of compensatory two countries have taken a parallel path alternatives. Moreira de Sá sees this as the since Community membership, he claims great Portuguese challenge without calling this should be reassessed and become less into question the European pillar; the dependent and subordinate, more differ- author’s analysis could, however, have entiating and personalised, so as to lessen dared to question the need (or not) to the perception abroad, notably in Wash- revise the governmental structure in ington, of an Iberian bloc and of the deval- response to the consolidation of European orisation of Lisbon vis-à-vis the rise of affairs as an internal rather than external Madrid. dimension. It would also have been inter- Foreign policy should not be an à la carte esting to understand how the State organs menu that takes a different course depend- could interact in this architecture and the ing on our economic frailties. Foreign friction it could generate between the Min- policy should be resistant to the storms istry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s precisely because its foundations protect

In defence of a benign dual hegemony Bernardo Pires de Lima 097 the country from the more negative cycles investment whilst defending the country’s in the economy and do not leave the State strategic sectors, boosting the economy weakened in its relations with the outside and providing the State with a sensible world. Shared political values, comple- but inevitable investment in defence so mentary strategic interests, interlinked that it can exercise sovereignty. The essay economies make the foreign policy of a by Tiago Moreira de Sá sets out these cau- country like Portugal an added value that ses in a sober, elegant and courageous builds trust in allies, attracts foreign manner.

TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

Bernardo Pires de Lima Researcher at IPRI-NOVA Poder (2008) and regular lecturer at universities and the Center for Transatlantic Relations of the and diplomatic academies. He was a researcher Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC. He at the National Defence Institute and has is both a columnist for Diário de Notícias and a published regularly in the international press, commentator on RTP and Antena 1 on international including in Huffington Post, The National politics. He is author of A Síria em Pedaços (2015), Interest, Hurriyet Daily News and The Diplomat. A Cimeira das Lajes (2013) and Blair, a Moral e o > [email protected]

ENDNOTE

* This book review was ﬁrst published in Relações Internacionais no.49, March 2016.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 098 BOOK REVIEW RUI LOPES The splendour West Germany and the Portuguese of political Dictatorship,

* 1968-1974. history Between Cold War David Castaño and Colonialism. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 269 pp. ISBN 978-1-349-48664-9

he thesis defended by Rui Lopes in October 2011 at T the London School of Economics is now made available to a wider public that includes not only scholars of the history of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), but also all those interested in political history; this is understood not just as a chronological description of events but as a means of understanding the many dynamics within the complex of political chess (in the broad sense, encompassing everything related to pólis, be it domestic or international). The key ideas of this book are set out with analytical and methodological rigour based on an in-depth knowledge of primary and secondary sources. Moreover, the book stands out due to the author’s remarkable capacity not to oversimplify what is com- bilateral relationship with Portugal plex but to clearly present the ambitions, (chapter 3); the attempts to delimit mili- contradictions and constraints of the many tary cooperation to the metropolis (chapter agents described. It develops around the 4); the evolution of West Germany’s diplo- Federal Republic of Germany’s foreign matic strategy in the period under study policy binomial of continuity/rupture in (chapter 5); and the Social Democratic Party relation to the Portuguese regime under (SPD) responses in the contacts with the Marcelo Caetano. The book is divided into Portuguese opposition (chapter 6). The six six chapters that analyse the external and areas addressed (foreign, domestic, eco- internal pressures faced by Germany nomic, military, diplomatic and parties) (chapters 1 and 2); the tensions in the Fed- reveal the different positions adopted by eral Government itself regarding the eco- the various actors that shaped them and nomic policy that should be adopted in the gave them substance. Let’s see how.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 099-102 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sibr02 RUPTURE VS CONTINUITY In the second chapter, Rui Lopes describes In the ﬁrst chapter, Rui Lopes shows how another distinction between the positions West Germany reconciled the calls for a adopted by West Germany and the Nordic rupture from some African leaders as well countries. Unlike what happened in some as from leaders of independence move- of these countries, criticisms of the Lisbon ments with German interests, notably in regime never became a major issue in West the Cahora Bassa project, and sought out a Germany’s internal political debate. Despite moderate ally in Kenneth Kaunda. Bonne the growing number of critics and their did not change its position on Portugal even steady advance from the left to the centre, though West Germany was criticised, accu- it becomes clear how they were opposed sed of involvement in “Operation Green and thwarted by important sectors of Ger- Sea” and warned that efforts to foster an man society; from trade and industry to the opening in Portuguese colonial policy were church, they either defended their own inte- not feasible. While on one hand it remained rests or were sensitive to the arguments engaged in the development aid program- made by the propaganda disseminated by mes, on the other, it did not break off rela- Portugal. This is one of the most original tions with Lisbon; it believed it was possible aspects of the book; it reveals the impor- to safeguard good relations with the Por- tance that both the Lisbon regime and its tuguese Government without jeopardising opponents gave to the media and German its involvement with African countries, even public opinion and brings new data on a at a time when it was essential to have their subject that is so often considered secon- support in the United Nations (UN) to gua- dary. In this case also, it is concluded that rantee the success of West Germany’s appli- there was not enough pressure for change cation for UN membership. Rui Lopes to bring about a rupture. explains what made this difﬁcult path pos- It is on the economic front that the contra- sible, linking the colonial questions with dictions within the German Government the Ostpolitik promoted by the Bonne were most visible and Rui Lopes highlights Government and describing how the latter the tension between the Minister for Eco- prevailed without coming up against oppo- nomic Cooperation and some of his collea- sition from the East Bloc which was also gues in government. Despite the Minister’s prioritising détente. Parallel to this, the strong opposition and commitment to obs- author argues that the Nordic countries’ tructing the good economic relations criticisms of the Portuguese colonial policy between the two countries, it is clear that did not affect the path proposed by West fostering Portugal’s economic development Germany; in fact, they were more reticent was the vision that prevailed and the streng- about criticising Lisbon because the Fede- thening of ties with Europe favoured the ral Government considered it essential that progressive forces in the Marcelo Govern- there was no rupture within NATO at a ment. This positioning extended beyond time when the two blocs were attempting bilateral relations. Besides defending the a rapprochement. free trade agreement between Portugal and

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 100 the European Economic Community (EEC), there were guarantees they would not be formalised in 1972, some members of the used in Africa. But this is not what stands Federal Government, notably the Ministers out most in this chapter. The most striking of Foreign Affairs and of the Economy, aspect is the complexity and intensity of openly said this was just the first step and the web that involves two such different would be followed by the concession of countries, connected by an almost perfect associated country status. Essentially, it was symbiotic relationship that can be con- a question of applying the formula being veyed by one concrete fact: in 1970, Portu- used in the East and adjusting it to the West. gal became the second largest importer of Meanwhile, the West continued to play both German war material and in that year it fronts and so, as Rui Lopes explains, while bought the three largest ships built in West the Portuguese moderates were supported Germany since the Second World War. This in their efforts to draw close to Europe, the involvement makes the decision to impede ultras were not abandoned as advocated by new exports to Portugal easier to unders- the Minister for Economic Cooperation in tand. Discretion was necessary after such his Cahora Bassa project. flagrant complicity. On the military front, this duplicity is not The phases of this evolution from the nearly so marked. The ties established in Government of the “Great Coalition” to the the late 1950s were so strong that even the SPD-FDP Government is analysed in depth increasingly audible critics were unable to throughout the fifth chapter, which picks weaken them. Despite various difficulties up again on some of the topics addressed that arose with the Beja Base project and in previous chapters. the attempts to reduce or dissemble the The continuity which occurred is largely export of war material from West Germany explained by the fact that Willy Brandt left to Portugal, here too we cannot speak of the Foreign Affairs portfolio in the “Great rupture. The author points out that while Coalition” to lead the alliance with the on one hand the Government led by Kis- liberals. Indeed, Rui Lopes argues that the singer had previously curbed the ambitious changes that took place (a position favou- military cooperation projects put in place ring more intervention so as to find a way by Minister Strauss, on the other, in 1973 to steadily withdraw from Africa and trying it was the Minister of Defence himself who to involve Paris and London in this argued that the reduction of military invest- manoeuvre) were essentially responses to ments in Portugal was a practical matter a set of factors that were external to the and had nothing to do with Portugal’s colo- Government. nial policy. Nevertheless, due essentially to The most striking of these factors was that pressure exerted by the SPD deputies, the some SDP deputies had proved to be parti- relations between the two countries suffe- cularly committed to the cause of the inde- red from the effects of the Federal Security pendence movements; this is one of the Council’s decision, approved in May 1971, signs of what Rui Lopes calls the “parallel to block the export of war materials unless front”. This had other ramifications and

The splendour of political history David Castaño 101 went beyond just having contacts with a black picture because he distinguishes these movements; it also involved opposi- between the range of colours on the canvas; tion to the Caetano regime in articulation in addition, he does not make the mistake with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. These of presenting a blank canvas by overlapping links and their importance to the affirma- all the primary colours. Besides separating tion of the Portuguese socialists are already the colours and then mixing them again, well known. But Rui Lopes defends an the author takes care to show the rela- idea that is not so widely disseminated, tionship between them and how chromatic namely that the purpose of SPD’s action hierarchies are established so that it beco- in this field was not only to cause a rupture mes clear to the reader how one colour in the relationship with Portugal, but, stood out over the others. paradoxically, also to safeguard good rela- The result is a portrait focussing on West tions with the Lisbon Government. This Germany’s relationship with Portugal. It constitutes an excellent example of is drawn taking other perspectives into Bonne’s political ambiguity. account and including a more complex context in which we also find multilateral PRIORITIES organisations, like NATO, EEC, OSCE Notwithstanding, the book by Rui Lopes and UN, both Federal State and private does not paint a black picture of Machiave- interests, party strategies, divergences at llian politics or of the pragmatism of its the governmental level, ministerial sensi- actors. On the contrary, by presenting the bilities, the role of public opinion, the materialistic and ideological arguments of relationship with the African countries and those in favour of rupture and those who independence movements and it explains favoured continuity, he reveals the many how Willy Brandt managed to make these nuances in the relationship between the two different vectors of foreign policy subor- countries. Indeed, Rui Lopes does not paint dinate to a grand plan: Ostpolitik.

TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

David Castaño Researcher at IPRI-NOVA where contemporary history and the history of he is working on a post-doctoral project on the international relations, in particular in the period consolidation process of Portuguese democracy of the Estado Novo, transition and democratic (1976-1982). He holds a PhD in Contemporary consolidation. History. His studies focus on Portuguese > [email protected]

ENDNOTE

* This book review was ﬁrst published in Relações Internacionais no.46, June 2015.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 102 BOOK REVIEW JOÃO ROSA LÃ The importance AND ALICE CUNHA (ORGS.) Memórias of historical da Adesão à Mesa das Negociações. memory Silveira, Book Builders, 2016, 358 pp. A ﬁrst person account ISBN 978 989 994 546 3 of the negotiations for Portugal’s accession to the European Community* Isabel Camisão

he negotiations for Portugal’s accession to the then TEuropean Community was a lengthy process that spanned several years. Discussions on the most sensitive chapters (which included agriculture, fisheries and social affairs) took place over countless rounds of negotiations and technical meetings, putting to the test the negotiating and diplomatic skills of the many people that were part of the Portuguese delegation during this period. The negotiation process is obviously of historical interest, not least of all because its success allowed Portugal to embark on the path of economic development and democracy with greater confidence. However, few studies have specifically addressed the intricacies of the negotiations and even fewer include direct testimonies of those involved in them. The book entitled thirtieth anniversary of the entry into force Memórias da Adesão à Mesa das Negociações, of the Act of Accession, and is a compila- organised by João Rosa Lã and Alice tion of testimonies from thirty five of the Cunha, published by Book Builders, fills negotiators who played a decisive role in this gap in the Portuguese literature on the discussion of the different dossiers. It European studies. It is the outcome of a thus sheds light on a milestone in the path cycle of conferences commemorating the of modern Portugal or, in the words of

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 103-106 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sibr03 Luís Aires-Barros who wrote the preface, includes, for example, the chapter tran- on “the history of our country in a period scribing the communication made by of the utmost importance to the evolution António Martha, then President of the of our society” (p. 11). Commission for European Integration (CEI). The description of the negotiation THE NEGOTIATORS TAKE US process offers insights into the complexity ON A JOURNEY TO THE PAST of these negotiations for membership of a The reports from those involved in the supranational organisation sui generis, an negotiations on Portugal’s accession to the area few people know about. If there were European Community are divided into any doubts, this reports confirms the dis- twelve chapters. These follow the usual tance between negotiations in practice and preface, and an introductory note written the theory described in the manuals. by João Rosa Lã in which he contextualises António Martha also shares some episodes and describes the research project “Memo- of interest though little known to the gen- ries of the Accession”, now published in eral public. This is the case, for example, book form. The closing text is written by of his appointment as President of CEI Alice Cunha, co-organisor of the project. which, in his own words “was by chance Over 358 pages, the testimonies written in ... a wrong telephone call and a matter of straightforward and easy-to-read language persuasion and adventure” (p. 53); and also provide a detailed description not only of the way Portugal managed to postpone the the official negotiations but also of what first Portuguese Presidency of the European went on behind the scenes. As the aim of Community, which he acknowledges was the book is to allow the reader to go back a difficult but sensible decision as it gave in time and to accompany the difficulties the country time to acquire greater experi- and successes of these negotiations, it was ence and knowledge of European affairs, decided to use direct discourse, in a regis- which in turn assured the success of the ter of memory. The work includes reports Presidency in 1992. In the chapter by João describing the most technical details and Salgueiro (then Minister of Finance and strategies that governed the definition of Planning), he provides a detailed descrip- the Portuguese position on the different tion of the context and circumstances that matters under discussion (the chapters led to Portugal’s request for European addressing the dossiers of the negotia- Community membership and the chal- tions, pp. 99-298, and the chapter on Luso- lenges resulting from accession. In addi- Spanish relations, pp. 299-312), the tion to the description, we find a critical background to and start of the negotiations analysis of the last thirty years which high- (pp. 73-99), the view of the journalists cov- lights the importance of learning from the ering the negotiations (pp. 313-329), and «Experiences and lessons of accession to testimonies presenting a broader picture the European Union» (title of the chapter) of the negotiations and the domestic and and alerts readers to the fact that Portugal international context. This last group has been ignoring “in practice, the need to

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 104 constantly affirm itself in the new Euro- AN EXTREMELY VALID CONTRIBUTION pean context” (p. 45). Nonetheless, João TO THE PRESERVATION OF MEMORY Salgueiro does not make Brussels the In short, at a time of growing Euroscepti- scapegoat for the problems Portugal is cur- cism in which many people both in Por- rently experiencing; swimming against the tugal and across Europe are questioning tide of the increasingly popular Euroscep- the relevance of the European Union (see tic discourse, he notes that these problems the result of the referendum in the United are a result of “postponing solutions that Kingdom which has left the Union facing we are entirely responsible for” (p. 49). In the imminent exit of a Member State), the “The day after”, Vítor Martins, former Sec- register of the memories of the accession retary of State for European Integration, in conjunction with the critical evaluation draws attention to the path that had to be of the importance of the integration pro- taken to make our participation in the cess to Portugal’s modernisation and Community credible and to take advantage democratic consolidation make this a of the benefits that this brought Portugal book of great relevance in the current both internally and externally, whilst not times. The book also reminds us (again) ignoring «participation in an EEC that that accession was not the end but the intervenes and takes initiative” and “total beginning of a process that requires cons- commitment to European integration” (pp. tant and on-going work, an idea that is 338-339). In the final chapter, Alice Cunha clearly reflected in the words of Vítor Mar- abandons the memory register and pro- tins: «In the post accession phase (…) the poses a reflection on the interest that Euro- results are not yet crystallised, rather there pean integration aroused among are on-going and dynamic negotiations in academics, leading to a new area of study: all areas, and this is much more deman- European Union studies (p. 346). In rela- ding» (p. 334). This book is therefore tion to Portugal, this reflection is partly recommended reading not only for those limited to a list of works on the subject of interested in European matters but also Europe; out of necessity, this is not exhaus- for those who want to glean a better tive but, for example, it lacks a critical understanding of the circumstances and analysis of the contribution these works the historical context of Portugal’s acces- make to the affirmation of European stud- sion. As João Salgueiro noted, the book ies or an evaluation of the evolution in the also has merit in that it preserves a memory teaching of this area at our universities, “already in danger of disappearing” whilst and above all of courses that confer a providing a framework to assess the chal- degree (perhaps because an exercise of this lenges that the European project presents kind does not fall within the objectives of this today” (p. 21). book). Nevertheless, it is an interesting starting point for the more in-depth reflection TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS that needs to be made on the state of the art of this disciplinary area in our country.

The importance of historical memory Isabel Camisão 105 Isabel Camisão Assistant Professor at the Coordinator of the Section of European Studies, University of Coimbra. Member of the Centre of Portuguese Political Science Association. Research in Political Science (CICP) and > isabelc@ﬂ.uc.pt

ENDNOTE

* This book review was ﬁrst published in Relações Internacionais no.52, December 2016.

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 106 BOOK REVIEW MARIA INÁCIA REZOLA The double drama Ernesto Melo Antunes, of Ernesto Melo uma biograﬁa

* política.

Antunes Lisbon, Âncora, 2012, 792 pp. António Reis ISBN 978 972 780 373 6

t the Colloquium on Freedom and Civic Coherence: A The Example of Ernesto Melo Antunes in Portuguese Contemporary History, which took place at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon in November 2009, I commented on the paper presented by Maria Inácia Rezola and noted that her excellent historiographic analysis of Melo Antunes’ role in the Portuguese Revolution was a prelude for a ﬁrst rate biography and that it was high time such a biography was written. Three years later, the biography has been published by Editora Âncora; it is of course a political biography. The author did not know Melo Antunes personally and, in this case, the temporal and even affective distance prove an asset as they permit a more objective analysis. The lack of a The author’s in-depth knowledge of the personal interview with Melo Antunes history of the 25th April Revolution, of has been overcome by drawing on the PREC and of the Revolutionary Council interviews he granted during his life- are, in fact, of greater importance than time; the following interviews stand out personal acquaintance, which the cir- in particular: with Maria Manuela Cru- cumstances of life never permitted. It is zeiro for the 25th April Documentation this knowledge that makes the author Centre; with Maria João Avilez for the particularly qualified for a work of such Público newspaper; and with Fátima dimension and scope, even though the Campos for RTP television. In addition, biography obviously spans the period the author had access to Melo Antunes’ from before 1974 and beyond 1976. personal archives which are deposited In fact, the historical biography is a his- in the Torre do Tombo and were made toriographic genre that has regained available by Fernando Melo Antunes. strength in the last twenty five years and

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 [ pp. 107-113 ] https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2018.sibr04 become increasingly refined. It requires FROM MILTARY OFFICER, OPPOSITION a dialectical interaction between the con- MEMBER AND MAN OF CULTURE text of the era and the subject of the biog- TO MFA REVOLUTIONARY raphy and it cannot be reduced simply to The structure and content of the book are a chronological report of the facts of a of course based on the different dimen- life or limit itself to passively following sions of Ernesto Melo Antunes’ personality the subject’s narratives about him/herself and interventions and these are interwoven or those of his/her contemporaries, no throughout the biographical narrative. matter how important these are. The his- The first part of the book covers the period torian must complete these and even up to 25th April 1974 and focuses on the enhance them with new data and inter- military officer and member of the oppo- pretations collected from the different sition, man of culture and MFA revolution- sources: diverse archives, the press of the ary. Here, the author presents Melo era and interviews with relevant partici- Antunes, part of the 1960s generation, pants in the historical transformations in passionate about the authors and works which the subject of the biography played typically revered by this generation, a leading role. Moreover, when the biog- attracted by existentialists and by Gramsci rapher is constructing the narrative, at and Rocard Neo Marxism, a man who the formal level it is necessary to be able devoured novels and poetry, was in love to separate the essential from secondary with classical music and had a multiplicity information so as avoid going into exces- of cultural interests. This period starts sive details that hamper the desirable flu- with his time at the Army School, where ency. It is also necessary to articulate the Melo Antunes emerged as an avis rara com- chronological thread with the thematic pared to others at the school. But he is construction around the main dimen- also the Melo Antunes who, from a very sions of the subject’s interventions, which young age, sought to reconcile militant sometimes entails advancing and retreat- opposition to the regime with a full mili- ing in time. tary career because he also firmly believed In doing this, the biographer should from early on that the Army was key to the always strive to adopt a discursive style change required in Portuguese society. He that is both rigorous and communicative, expressed this clearly when he spoke to and this is no insignificant challenge. the Cooperative of Studies and Documen- Another such challenge is finding the right tation in 1970 at the invitation of Francisco balance between critical distance and Salgado Zenha, as reported by a PIDE/DGS empathetic intuition, else the biography agent. In fact, it is worth noting here that may take the shape of a hagiography... the archives of the political police are a I finished reading Maria Inácia Rezola’s valuable source to accompany his activity book with the feeling that she was indeed for the opposition in the Azores where his up to the many difficult challenges that candidacy for the Democratic Electoral face the historian-biographer. Commission (CDE) in the 1969 elections

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 108 was rejected by the military hierarchy in lution in the scope of the MFA/Coordinat- what was blatant discrimination against the ing Commission; as Minister without military candidates of the National Union. Portfolio in the II Provisional Government But this is also the period of the three com- after Spínola opposed his appointment as missions Melo Antunes served in Angola Prime Minister; and in the III Provisional between 1963 and 1973, where he earned Government when he stood out for his the praise and deep admiration of the men presentation of the Economic and Social under his command. António Lobo Antunes Policy Programme (PPES). In this period, testifies to this in the splendid preface he it is important to stress his reservations wrote for this book: “Contrary to what about the MFA/Parties Pact, which he many believed, Ernesto was not a uni- accepted as “the lesser of evils”, and the formed civilian: he was deeply military... in defence of the elections for the Constituent the sense of servitude, camaraderie and Assembly, opposing the blank vote. loyalty. In Angola, Melo Antunes was loved After the elections for the Constituent and respected.” Also for the extreme cour- Assembly (25th April 1975), he expressed age he demonstrated on the front lines of similar reservations about MFA’s Political combat in particularly dangerous areas. Action Plan (PAP), in which it is defined This does not mean that he did not experi- as a “movement for the liberation of the ence and confess to the trauma of feeling Portuguese people” (“I had nothing to do he was fighting on the wrong side, a trauma with the PAP», p. 299). This was followed that was only overcome by the above-men- by the drafting of the Document of the tioned conviction that the revolution origi- Nine (see below the Socialist ideologue nates from within … model), the approximation to PS and the Ernesto Melo Antunes made his cautious question of leadership of the resistance to approximation to the Movement of Cap- Gonçalvism: who created the conditions for tains step by step. It was only in mid Febru- the leadership of whom? He accused Mário ary 1974 that he set his doubts aside and Soares of believing “he and PS were became fully engaged; he made a point of responsible for everything of importance transmitting this decision to me and Sot- that had happened” and did not hesitate tomayor Cardia at a meeting he requested in saying that “what happened in summer at the editorial office of the Seara Nova 1975 was driven by the so-called Group of journal. This was when he became involved Nine much more than by anyone else” in the drafting of the MFA programme (opinion also expressed in the Silva Lopes (inspiration of the opposition experience), interview). At this point, the biographer after the Cascais document (5th March assumes a critical distance and notes the 1974). importance of putting Mário Soares’ and After 25th April 1974, Melo Antunes’ inter- Melo Antunes’ interpretations into per- vention as an MFA revolutionary and polit- spective: “more than attributing a cause- ical strategist intensified. Firstly, in the effect relationship to these two processes immediate aftermath of the 25 April revo- («Socialist challenge-rupture of the nine)

The double drama of Ernesto Melo Antunes António Reis 109 one should refer to the development of two standing role was acknowledged from mutually reinforcing parallel projects” various quarters), special advisor to the (p. 327). President of the Republic, Ramalho Eanes, Also of note in this period we find Melo within the CR, and an attentive and critical Antunes’ confrontation with Vasco Gon- voice on the progress of Portugal’s young çalves at the Tancos Assembly; his role in democracy. This was the time of his the attempt to form the Fabian Govern- involvement in the institutional warfare ment; his opposition to the appointment between the Presidency of the Republic of Pinheiro de Azevedo as Prime Minister, and the AD Government but also when he but also his role as mediator (together with took his position on the 1982 constitu- Mário Soares) in the formation of the VI tional revision, minimising the removal of Provisional Government; the return to the the word socialism from Article 2 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see foreign Constitution, and welcoming the creation policy below); and, finally, the events of of the Constitutional Court and the Coun- 25th November (opposing a retreat to the cil of State. When the Revolutionary Coun- North and the self-suspension of the VI cil was disbanded (1982), Melo Antunes Provisional Government, but backtrack- moved to the Council of State where he ing; meeting with Álvaro Cunhal at his remained until the election of Mário Soares own initiative; his declaration to RTP on as President of the Republic. The following 26 November defending the need to keep are among his most noteworthy interven- PCP in the revolution and the reactions). tions in this decade: his support for the After the 25th November crisis, Melo dissolution of the Assembly of the Repub- Antunes was a key figure in some of the lic counter to the opinion of the Council debates on the revision of the MFA-Parties of State (1983); participation in PRD meet- Pact (for example, assuring that the Revo- ings and preparatory documents; support lutionary Council (CR) would act as the for the dissolution of the Assembly of the Constitutional Court by means of the Con- Republic following Mário Soares’ resigna- stitutional Committee); he participated tion from the Central Bloc Government; actively in the debate on the presidential his support of Francisco Salgado Zenha candidacy when he supported Eanes (who rather than Maria de Lourdes Pintassilgo was sensitive to his support), despite being in the 1986 presidential elections. in a position himself to run as the MFA Finally, in the 1990s, Melo Antunes joined candidate (cf. Eanes: “he was the one that PS, then led by Jorge Sampaio, after the was best placed to be candidate”). loss in the 1991 election (“manifestation Having revisited the Processo Revolucionário of indignation and revolt to save what em Curso (PREC) (Ongoing Revolutionary could be saved of the Socialist idea”, Process) through the role played by Melo according to Jorge Sampaio); he was a Antunes, the political strategist remained member of the Honorary Committee for active and involved. He was President of Mário Soares’ candidacy for a second term the Constitutional Commission (his out- as President of the Republic, and, again,

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 110 of the Council of State (1996); he sup- democracy that should take effect gradu- ported Alegre’s motion at the PS Congress ally and peacefully at a pace that was in in 1999. line with the Portuguese social reality; it would be directed by the MFA, seen not so THE IDEOLOGUE much as a revolutionary vanguard but as Another key dimension of Ernesto Melo a catalyst and guarantor of this transfor- Antunes’ proﬁle is that of the ideologue mation project for Portuguese society. The who deﬁned a model of society conceived proposal of the nine was presented as an on the basis of his cultural background in alternative to the Guideline Document of conjunction with his experience of politi- the People-MFA Alliance, which was cal intervention throughout the PREC; one understood as defending a socialism based in search of a third way between bureau- on popular and anti-democratic power; cratic collectivist socialism and neoliberal however, parties that had been legitimately social democracy (influenced by PSU/ elected expressed reservations and were Rocard and Gramsci Euro-communism), suspicious of a supra-party military author- which granted the State a regulatory role ity with purely revolutionary legitimacy without eliminating the market. setting itself up as the bearer of its own Melo Antunes played a decisive role in the and autonomous project; for the socialists, drafting of the Economic and Social Policy such a conception came close to naivety. Programme (PPES, December 1974-Febru- ary 1975), working with an outstanding THE MAIN ACTOR OF DECOLONISATION team (Rui Vilar, Silva Lopes, Maria de This is the third dimension of Melo Lourdes Pintasilgo); the decision not to Antunes’ political intervention that Maria nationalise private banking and to avoid Inácia Rezola analyses in detail. From his State capitalism with the central direction immediate opposition to Spínola’s federal- of the economy led to the souring of rela- ist project to the very important role he tions with PCP and Gonçalvism (they played in the decolonisation of Angola. accused him of being reactionary and an Special focus is given to his heading up the entrenched social democrat). Among the negotiations that led to the Alvor Accord testimonies the author collected on this and, after its failure on the ground, his matter, those by Diogo Freitas do Amaral assuming responsibility for not having and Silva Lopes stand out; they state that foreseen the struggle for power between the evolution of our economy would have the three liberation movements. Maria Iná- been much better if the PPES had not been cia Rezola closely follows Melo Antunes’ superseded by the nationalisations trig- desperate efforts to obtain an understand- gered by the events of 11th March. ing between the three liberation move- Finally in this respect, mention must be ments and to avoid the exodus of the made of the Document of the Nine, a settlers, which in fact earned the praise of national project for transition to a social- Almeida Santos. Efforts that did not stop ism based on pluralist representative him criticising MPLA for its dependence

The double drama of Ernesto Melo Antunes António Reis 111 on the USSR and that even made him he was of crucial importance. He fought encourage this movement’s approximation for a new vision for Portugal’s place in the to UNITA in order to ward off FNLA - a world; he presented it as a bridge between plan that only failed because of UNITA and Europe and the Third World with priority pressure exerted by North America. Special for the Mediterranean (a naive notion attention is given to his argument to justify according to Kissinger), that he shared the need for the Portuguese State’s rapid with Jorge Sampaio and ex-MES (Movi- recognition of the MPLA government after mento de Esquerda Socialista). He also the declaration of independence on 11th defended: a) national independence in a November 1975. An in-depth analysis is world divided between two blocs of super- also made of the controversy of decolonisa- powers, in search of a third way and in the tion triggered by the well known article scope of a united Europe that counterba- written by António José Saraiva in the lanced the two blocs; b) an approximation Diário de Notícias in January 1979, in to non-aligned countries without ever which Melo Antunes is the target of brutal calling NATO into question, a standpoint attacks. Throughout the controversy, Melo Kissinger considered somewhat contradic- Antunes acknowledged mistakes - some of tory; c) the importance of diversifying which were inevitable, others that arose external relations (Third World, East due to the complexity of the PREC, and Europe, China); d) the importance of Wes- others due to human shortcomings - and tern Europe and EEC support for the con- he assumed his share of the responsibility solidation of Portuguese democracy, with (cf. interview with the Expresso on 17 Feb- praise for the role played by Mário Soares ruary 1999). And he emphasised that “if a in the Socialist International (IS); e) a new situation evolved in which the communist and more just international order. camp was favoured, it was against our His foreign policy interventions were the will”. However, according to Melo Antunes, butt of intense criticisms, notably in the decolonisation was not simply what could context of the institutional warfare between be done under the circumstances, as many Belém and São Bento (due to his role as began to say, but what had to be done; it Eanes’ special envoy or the development was a historical obligation. This did not of his own initiatives), notably by the right stop him recognising that it was a tragedy. wing and Atlanticist sectors of PS. Just as colonisation was a tragedy (cf. inter- His international career came about as a view with RTP on 24th April 1999). natural consequence of his experience as Minister of Foreign Affairs; special note CRAFTSMAN OF PORTUGUESE FOREIGN here goes to his candidacy to Deputy Secre- POLICY AND DIPLOMACY tary General of the UN for Science and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the IV and Technology (annulled by Diogo Freitas do VI Provisional Governments (year and a Amaral, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the half), this is an area in which history did AD Government), and his appointment to not do Melo Antunes justice even though advisor and Deputy General Director/Head

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS SPECIAL ISSUE : 2018 112 of Cabinet of UNESCO by Amadeu M’Bow. we see today, and which would undoubte- On ﬁnishing this book, I confess I felt an dly have led him to search for suitable even greater admiration for Melo Antunes alternatives as he always did and as so and his role in history, despite some criti- many of his MFA comrades do today. But cal reservations I have made in the past of I also believe that, wherever his spirit is, positions he took, notably on the role of he would not be able to resist smiling MFA. This biography clearly highlights the somewhat ironically at a world where the double drama Ernesto Melo Antunes went emerging countries of his beloved Third through and that led so often to his being World deal the cards on the international misunderstood and even hated: stage, inverting the old positions vis-à-vis • the historical drama of tardy decoloni- the First World countries. sation with all its violence and injustice; It would be unforgivable to end this review • the ideological drama of a democratic without making reference to the extraor- socialism that was able to combine not dinary preface written by António Lobo only the representative democracy of the Antunes, in which he gives us a picture in parties and of Parliament with participative words, as only he can do, of the magnitude democracy, but also the role of regulating of Ernesto Melo Antunes’ character: and distributing the State’s wealth with «A profoundly kind man who, largely the market’s role of boosting growth. through his own fault, was often misun- Before concluding, I wonder what Ernesto derstood. He possessed a great capacity Melo Antunes would have said of Portugal for tolerance and a genuine love for today and the world in which we live, at mankind that his stern posture and the so many levels, quite different from when austerity of his ways concealed.” he left us fourteen years ago. His death certainly saved him from all the madness TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

António Reis Retired Assistant Professor of the Contemporary Mentalities. He has published a Universidade Nova de Lisboa and Researcher at number of books and dozens of articles in the the NOVA FCSH Institute of Contemporary area of Contemporary History. History. Holds a PhD in Cultural History and > [email protected]

ENDNOTE

* This book review was ﬁrst published in Relações Internacionais no.45, March 2015.

The double drama of Ernesto Melo Antunes António Reis 113

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