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Kenya's Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 2011-2016

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Master’s Thesis M60-IR. NORAGRIC. Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 2011-2016; A Contribution to Insecurity. Okwany, Clifford Collins Omondi . International Relations. The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programs) and assignments. The Noragric Master theses are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master program “International Environmental Studies”, “International Development Studies” and “International Relations”. The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric. © Okwany, Clifford Collins Omondi, August 2016 [email protected] [email protected] Noragric Department of International Environment and Development Studies P.O. Box 5003 N-1432 Ås Norway Tel: +47 67 23 00 00 Internet: https://www.nmbu.no/om/fakulteter/samvit/institutter/noragric i DECLARATION I, Okwany, Clifford Collins Omondi, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree. Signature Date…12th August 2016….…. This proposal has been submitted for approval to the supervisor named below. Prof. Stig Jarle Hansen, Department of Noragric. NMBU, Norway. Harvard Fellow, International Security Program. USA. ii Acknowledgement Much appreciation goes to my supervisor, Professor Stig Jarle Hansen, a lecturer at the Norwegian University of Life Science and a Harvard fellow at the International Security Program. Hansen’s dedication in this study is remarkable. More gratitude goes to Professor Philip Nying’uro, Mr. Leonard Oluoch Maumo and Dr. Musambayi Katumanga, lecturers at the Political Science department, University of Nairobi. Consultation from Prof. Nying’uro and Mr. Maumo’s expertise on Kenya’s foreign policy is highly appreciated. Dr. Katumanga’s guide towards security studies and connections to high level government officials helped this study to gather credible information. Besides academic field, special appreciating goes Ingeborg and Jan Einar Karlsen from Nevlunghavn, Larvik; their financial support and hospitality during the thesis writing is highly indebted. Special gratitude goes to Birgit Brøvig Hauge and Jan A. Iversen. Their great encouragement and support has contributed to this study. Jan’s philosophical thoughts has contributed to the study theoretically. I give teachers from Østre Halsen Skøke, a school in Larvik, Norway. Their support and encouragement is highly reflected in the study. Hanne and Tøre Fjeltveit are appreciated for their belief and support to the end of this study. Tøre’s constructive thinking really influenced the study. More gratitude goes to Eldbjørg Volldal Eversen and Sidsel Kristiane Gundersen. Dedicated teachers who inspired the study. Their financial support is highly appreciated. Appreciation goes to everyone from Berg Kirke, Nevlunghavn and entire Larvik friends for their great support. Much gratitude to Gladys Njeri for her supporting initiatives from Kenya. Appreciation also goes to the friend in Majengo, Eastleigh, Garissa and Madera for their collection towards informants interviewed. iii Abstract The study seeks to explain and give an understanding of Kenya’s foreign policy towards Somalia. In order to understand the increased security situation; it explains how Kenyan government decisions lead to more al-Shabaab attacks. The study shows how the Kenyan government miscalculation and reactions towards al-Shabaab attacks leads to radicalization. It also gives an understanding on how the increased insecurity contributes to the sabotage of Kenya’s tourism industry. The study therefore applies qualitative methodology in order to give an explanation of increased insecurity in Kenya. The concepts hereby emphasised are operation linda nchi , extrajudicial killings, nyumba kumi , operation usalama watch , radicalization, Westgate siege, Mpeketoni, Mandera, Garissa and El-Ade attacks and al-Shabaab. Kenyan’s foreign policy towards Somalia from 2011 to 2016; a contribution to insecurity will be explain in reference to identities and interest proponent. In order to explain and give an understanding of Kenyan foreign policy towards Somalia, in relation to the resent increased security; the study opens the ‘black box’ to give a deeper meaning of insecurity. iv Map of Kenya and Somalia Source; (Economists, 2011) v Table of Contents DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................................ iii Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. iv Map of Kenya and Somalia .............................................................................................................. v CHAPTER I ...................................................................................................................................... 1 1.0 INTRODUCTION/ BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY. ........................................................ 1 1.3 Statement of the problem ........................................................................................................... 4 1.4 Objectives/Aims of the study ...................................................................................................... 4 1.5.0 Research Questions .................................................................................................................. 4 1.5.1 Main research question ........................................................................................................... 4 1.5.2 Sub research questions ............................................................................................................ 4 1.6 Scope and limitations of the study ............................................................................................. 5 CHAPTER II ..................................................................................................................................... 6 2.0 Literature review ........................................................................................................................ 6 2.1 Conceptual/Theoretical framework. ....................................................................................... 16 CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................................. 21 3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 21 3.2 Sampling and data collection procedures ............................................................................... 22 3.3 Analysis of data ......................................................................................................................... 26 3.4 Strength and weaknesses of the methods. ............................................................................... 27 CHAPTER IV .................................................................................................................................. 29 4.0 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND IT’S CONTRIBUTION TO INSECURITY. ...... 29 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 29 4.2 Kenya involvement in the Jubaland politics and Self-Defence. ............................................ 30 4.3 Diplomatic Crisis ....................................................................................................................... 34 4.4 Increase of the Sporadic Attacks ............................................................................................. 39 4.5 Explaining the Westgate Siege ................................................................................................. 40 4.6 Mpeketoni Attacks; Not yet a lesson to learn ......................................................................... 44 4.7 Mandera Massacres .................................................................................................................. 48 4.8 Garissa attack; a repeated of Westgate ................................................................................... 49 4.9 El-Ade attacks ........................................................................................................................... 51 CHAPTER V ................................................................................................................................... 55 5.0 GOVERNMENT’S MISCALCULATIONS AND REACTIONS; A CONTRIBUTION TO INSECURITY. ...............................................................................................................................
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