The Federal Government, with the The coal strike mmlssloner of Labor in a factflndlng role, acted as a 'neutral' for the first time of 1902­ in contributing to settlement of the bitter coal strike turning point JONATHAN GROSSMAN in U.S. policy AlDAY, October 3, 1902, President. Theodore Statistics. In 1886, Oeveland asked Congress to It called a precedent-shattering meeting at "engraft" on the Bureau of Labor a commissioft to porary White House at 22 Lafayette Place, prevent major strikes. In 1888, Congress passed a "flin,gton, D.C. A great strike in the anthracite law aimed at promoting industrial peace in the rail­ - ds of Pennsylvania threatened a coal famine. road industry. After the Pullman strike, U.S. Com­ sident feared "untold misery ... with the missioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright headed a group of riots which might develop into social which made a colorless but honest report of the dis­ ~ Although he had no legal right to intervene, pute. One recommendation provided the basis for telegrams to both sides summoning them the Erdman Act of 1898, uftder which the Com­ ""~_},;'n gton to discuss the problem. missioner of Labor· and the Chairman of the Inter­ velt, who had been injured a month earlier state Commerce Commission tried to mediate rail­ . carriage was hit by a trolley car, sat in his road strikes. The law had not yet been applied when -=idlliLir' pleading with representatives of manage­ a new Federal policy erupted from the· industrial d labor. "With all the earnestness there is warfare in the coalfields ift 1900 and 1902.' .. .," the President urged, "I as.k that there The groundwork for the 1900 anthraelte coal immediate resumption of operations in the strike was laid by the unexpected results of strikes in . es in some such way as will ... m~et the the bituminous or soft coalfields in 1897. A depres­ _ needs of the people." He appealed to the sion in 1893 forced down wages and, according to ..:s:·ism of the contestants to make "individual a Pennsylvania legislative committee, many miners for the general good." 2 lived "like sheep in shambles." A spontaneous up­ meeting marked the tum of the U.S. Govern­ rising had forced many mineowners to sign a con­ m strikebreaker to peacemaker in industrial tract with the United Mifte Workers. Both sides · In the 19th century, presidents, if they acted struck a boftaoza as operators raised both wages and nded to side with employers. Andrew Jack­ prices. Coal companies prospered, and uftion mem­ me a strikebreaker in 1834 when he sent bership soared from 10,000 to 115,000.8 to the construction sites of the Chesapeake John Mitchell, who at the age of 28 became · Canal.s war Department employees op- president of the United Mine Workers in 1898, e Philadelphia and Reading Railroad during hoped to achieve the same kind of success in the · War. 4 In the violent rail strikes of 1877, anthracite or hard coalfields of Pennsylvania. ord B. Hayes sent troops to prevent obstruc­ Anthracite coal at the turn of the century was an the mails. 6 Grover Cleveland used soldiers unusual business. Unlike soft coal, anthracite was the Pullman strike of 1894.8 a natural monopoly heavily concentrated in a few and there a ray of neutrality broke through hundx:ed square miles in five counties in Pennsyl­ abor atmosphere. Congress established a vania. Anthracite coal, because it burned cleaner of Labor in 1884, which was the forerunner . than soft coal, had become the main heating fuel resent Department of Labor, Federal Media­ in many Eastern cities. Rivalry for control of the Conciliation Service, and Bureau of Labor industry led to overexpansion, violent business fluc­ tuations, and eventually control by a few large inde­ Grossman, a labor historian, is a social science pendent mineowners, coal railroads, and bankers. the U.S. Department of Labor. For miners the work was hard, intermitt~nt, and 21 22 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, OCTOBER 1975 hazardous. To keep wages low, operators. ft.ooded 6-week strike on October 29, a week before the the coalfields with immigrants from Eastern and Presidential election of 1900. McKinley won by Southern Europe. The men were of 14 different wide margin. Although its motives may have been nationalities, spoke different languages, and had dif­ partisan, the Administration was setting the sta~ ferent customs. Of 150,000 workers, only 8,000 for a new role for the Federal Government as , belonged to the United Mine Workers. But Mitchell peacemaker rather than a strikebre~ker in industria.: hoped that the anthracite industry would negotiate confiicts.13 with the union in order to reduce competition. Mitchell underestimated the opposition of the The coal strike of 1902 mine operators, and the operators underestimated the militancy of their workers; In August 1900, the union The strike of 1900 was the prelude to a larger drew up demands .and asked for a conference. The drama-the great anthracite coal strike of 1902. operators refused to deal with the union. Mitchell Restless miners demanded more pay and shorter offered to have the dispute arbitrated. The operators hours, while the mine operators complained tha1 rejected the offer. Mitchell reluctantly called a strike profits were low, and that the' union destroyed disci­ on September 17, 1900. He was apprehensive about pline. When the owners refused to negotiate with the miners' response. But "poetic justice has been the union, miners appealed to President RooseveL meted out," he exultantly recalled. The non-English to call a special session of Congress. The operators, speaking miners, introduced to break labor organiza­ on the other hand, resented the Federal mediation tions, had become staunch supporters of the United which had brought about the shotgun agreement of Mine Workers. S 1900, and they bristled at the idea of renewed Fed­ The White House was caught off guard by this eral interference.a major strike on the eve of a Presidential campaign. John Mitchell was frustrated by the refusal of President William McKinley was running for re­ employers to deal with the union. He proposed election against William Jennings Bryan under the mediation through the National Civic Federation and slogan of "Four Years More of the Full Dinner if that were not acceptable then a committee of Pail." Some newspapers charged that the strike was eminent clergymen should report on conditions in fostered by "conspirators working in the interests of the coalfields. George Baer expressed the sentiment Bryan." Mitchell repeatedly denied that politics of many coal operators when he replied, "Anthracite motivated the strike, but he admitteq that tbe forth­ mining is a b1,Jsiness, and not a religious, sentimental, coming election "proved of incalculable assistance or academic proposition. ...I could not if I would to the mineworkers." 10 delegate this business management to even so highly Senator Marcus A. Hanna, political "kingmaker," a respectable body as the Civic Federation, nor can led the campaign for conciliation. "Uncle Mark" had I call. to my aid ... the eminent prelates you have become a champion of industrial peace and argued named." 15 that responsible trade unions would wean workers The miners struck on May 12, 1902. There was away from Democrats and radicals. Hanna worked hope for a settlement as long as firemen, engineers, with banker J. P. Morgan to persuade coal railroad and pumpmen remained at work. But when these presidents of "the dangers that would accrue from maintenance crews walked out on June 2" both sides the election of Mr. Bryan to the Presidency." 11 settled down for a long and bitter fight. Commis­ George Baer, president of a coal railroad, claimed sioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright wrote that of that both McKinley and Hanna had warned him 147,000 strikers, 30,000 soon left the region, and of that the coal strike could seriously hurt their party these 8,000 to 10,000 returned to Europe.16 Although At the polls.lI Mitchell exhorted the miners to strike peaceably, Under political pressure, coal operators posted . strikers attacked scabs, terrorized their' families, and a pay increase and agreed to a grievance procedure lashed out at private police forces and armed guards but refused to recognize the union. John Mitchell, hired by mineownersY though boasting that the workers were victorious, The political climate had changed between the accepted half a loaf as better than none and dropped coal strikes of 1900 and 1902. McKinley had been the fisht for union recognition. He called ott the assassinated, and Hanna had lost much of his in- COAL STRIKE OF 1902 23 . Theodore Roosevelt, who stepped into the tone greatly...." But after discussion Roosevelt h, believed that both capital and labor had questioned whether publication might be construed ~lOIlSibilities to the public. as Presidential approval of Wright's recommendation before he was prepared to make commitments. He II Wright's mission therefore held in abeyance his decision on publica­ tion. 21 ident Roosevelt was an activist who itched to Newspapers reported that the President had the fray'. On JuIfe 8, 1902, he asked his Com- "pigeonholed" the report because it was favorable · ner 6f Labor, Carroll D. Wright, to investigate to the miners. Wright angrily denied the charge. But strike and !eport back to him. Wright avoided Roosevelt was troubled by the accusation, and he _ to the coalfields because he felt that as the made the report public in August of 1902.12 · nt's representative his "presence there would re harm than good." Instead, he headed for Roosevelt" quandary York City, where he interviewed presidents of roads, independent mine operators, financiers, As the strike dragged on, Roosevelt became more , foremen, and superintendents.