The Federal Government, with the The coal strike mmlssloner of Labor in a factflndlng role, acted as a 'neutral' for the first time of 1902­ in contributing to settlement of the bitter coal strike turning point

JONATHAN GROSSMAN in U.S. policy

AlDAY, October 3, 1902, President. Theodore Statistics. In 1886, Oeveland asked Congress to It called a precedent-shattering meeting at "engraft" on the Bureau of Labor a commissioft to porary White House at 22 Lafayette Place, prevent major strikes. In 1888, Congress passed a "flin,gton, D.C. A great strike in the anthracite law aimed at promoting industrial peace in the rail­ - ds of Pennsylvania threatened a coal famine. road industry. After the Pullman strike, U.S. Com­ sident feared "untold misery ... with the missioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright headed a group of riots which might develop into social which made a colorless but honest report of the dis­ ~ Although he had no legal right to intervene, pute. One recommendation provided the basis for telegrams to both sides summoning them the Erdman Act of 1898, uftder which the Com­ ""~_},;'n gton to discuss the problem. missioner of Labor· and the Chairman of the Inter­ velt, who had been injured a month earlier state Commerce Commission tried to mediate rail­ . carriage was hit by a trolley car, sat in his road strikes. The law had not yet been applied when -=idlliLir' pleading with representatives of manage­ a new Federal policy erupted from the· industrial d labor. "With all the earnestness there is warfare in the coalfields ift 1900 and 1902.' .. .," the President urged, "I as.k that there The groundwork for the 1900 anthraelte coal immediate resumption of operations in the strike was laid by the unexpected results of strikes in . es in some such way as will ... m~et the the bituminous or soft coalfields in 1897. A depres­ _ needs of the people." He appealed to the sion in 1893 forced down wages and, according to ..:s:·ism of the contestants to make "individual a Pennsylvania legislative committee, many miners for the general good." 2 lived "like sheep in shambles." A spontaneous up­ meeting marked the tum of the U.S. Govern­ rising had forced many mineowners to sign a con­ m strikebreaker to peacemaker in industrial tract with the United Mifte Workers. Both sides · In the 19th century, presidents, if they acted struck a boftaoza as operators raised both wages and nded to side with employers. Andrew Jack­ prices. Coal companies prospered, and uftion mem­ me a strikebreaker in 1834 when he sent bership soared from 10,000 to 115,000.8 to the construction sites of the Chesapeake John Mitchell, who at the age of 28 became · Canal.s war Department employees op- president of the United Mine Workers in 1898, e Philadelphia and Reading Railroad during hoped to achieve the same kind of success in the · War. 4 In the violent rail strikes of 1877, anthracite or hard coalfields of Pennsylvania. ord B. Hayes sent troops to prevent obstruc­ Anthracite coal at the turn of the century was an the mails. 6 Grover Cleveland used soldiers unusual business. Unlike soft coal, anthracite was the Pullman strike of 1894.8 a natural monopoly heavily concentrated in a few and there a ray of neutrality broke through hundx:ed square miles in five counties in Pennsyl­ abor atmosphere. Congress established a vania. Anthracite coal, because it burned cleaner of Labor in 1884, which was the forerunner . than soft coal, had become the main heating fuel resent Department of Labor, Federal Media­ in many Eastern cities. Rivalry for control of the Conciliation Service, and Bureau of Labor industry led to overexpansion, violent business fluc­ tuations, and eventually control by a few large inde­ Grossman, a labor historian, is a social science pendent mineowners, coal railroads, and bankers. the U.S. Department of Labor. For miners the work was hard, intermitt~nt, and

21 22 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, OCTOBER 1975

hazardous. To keep wages low, operators. ft.ooded 6-week strike on October 29, a week before the the coalfields with immigrants from Eastern and Presidential election of 1900. McKinley won by Southern Europe. The men were of 14 different wide margin. Although its motives may have been nationalities, spoke different languages, and had dif­ partisan, the Administration was setting the sta~ ferent customs. Of 150,000 workers, only 8,000 for a new role for the Federal Government as , belonged to the United Mine Workers. But Mitchell peacemaker rather than a strikebre~ker in industria.: hoped that the anthracite industry would negotiate confiicts.13 with the union in order to reduce competition. Mitchell underestimated the opposition of the The coal strike of 1902 mine operators, and the operators underestimated the militancy of their workers; In August 1900, the union The strike of 1900 was the prelude to a larger drew up demands .and asked for a conference. The drama-the great anthracite coal strike of 1902. operators refused to deal with the union. Mitchell Restless miners demanded more pay and shorter offered to have the dispute arbitrated. The operators hours, while the mine operators complained tha1 rejected the offer. Mitchell reluctantly called a strike profits were low, and that the' union destroyed disci­ on September 17, 1900. He was apprehensive about pline. When the owners refused to negotiate with the miners' response. But "poetic justice has been the union, miners appealed to President RooseveL meted out," he exultantly recalled. The non-English to call a special session of Congress. The operators, speaking miners, introduced to break labor organiza­ on the other hand, resented the Federal mediation tions, had become staunch supporters of the United which had brought about the shotgun agreement of Mine Workers. S 1900, and they bristled at the idea of renewed Fed­ The White House was caught off guard by this eral interference.a major strike on the eve of a Presidential campaign. John Mitchell was frustrated by the refusal of President William McKinley was running for re­ employers to deal with the union. He proposed election against William Jennings Bryan under the mediation through the National Civic Federation and slogan of "Four Years More of the Full Dinner if that were not acceptable then a committee of Pail." Some newspapers charged that the strike was eminent clergymen should report on conditions in fostered by "conspirators working in the interests of the coalfields. George Baer expressed the sentiment Bryan." Mitchell repeatedly denied that politics of many coal operators when he replied, "Anthracite motivated the strike, but he admitteq that tbe forth­ mining is a b1,Jsiness, and not a religious, sentimental, coming election "proved of incalculable assistance or academic proposition. ...I could not if I would to the mineworkers." 10 delegate this business management to even so highly Senator Marcus A. Hanna, political "kingmaker," a respectable body as the Civic Federation, nor can led the campaign for conciliation. "Uncle Mark" had I call. to my aid ... the eminent prelates you have become a champion of industrial peace and argued named." 15 that responsible trade unions would wean workers The miners struck on May 12, 1902. There was away from Democrats and radicals. Hanna worked hope for a settlement as long as firemen, engineers, with banker J. P. Morgan to persuade coal railroad and pumpmen remained at work. But when these presidents of "the dangers that would accrue from maintenance crews walked out on June 2" both sides the election of Mr. Bryan to the Presidency." 11 settled down for a long and bitter fight. Commis­ George Baer, president of a coal railroad, claimed sioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright wrote that of that both McKinley and Hanna had warned him 147,000 strikers, 30,000 soon left the region, and of that the coal strike could seriously hurt their party these 8,000 to 10,000 returned to Europe.16 Although At the polls.lI Mitchell exhorted the miners to strike peaceably, Under political pressure, coal operators posted . strikers attacked scabs, terrorized their' families, and a pay increase and agreed to a grievance procedure lashed out at private police forces and armed guards but refused to recognize the union. John Mitchell, hired by mineownersY though boasting that the workers were victorious, The political climate had changed between the accepted half a loaf as better than none and dropped coal strikes of 1900 and 1902. McKinley had been the fisht for union recognition. He called ott the assassinated, and Hanna had lost much of his in- COAL STRIKE OF 1902 23

. Theodore Roosevelt, who stepped into the tone greatly...." But after discussion Roosevelt h, believed that both capital and labor had questioned whether publication might be construed ~lOIlSibilities to the public. as Presidential approval of Wright's recommendation before he was prepared to make commitments. He II Wright's mission therefore held in abeyance his decision on publica­ tion. 21 ident Roosevelt was an activist who itched to Newspapers reported that the President had the fray'. On JuIfe 8, 1902, he asked his Com- "pigeonholed" the report because it was favorable · ner 6f Labor, Carroll D. Wright, to investigate to the miners. Wright angrily denied the charge. But strike and !eport back to him. Wright avoided Roosevelt was troubled by the accusation, and he _ to the coalfields because he felt that as the made the report public in August of 1902.12 · nt's representative his "presence there would re harm than good." Instead, he headed for Roosevelt" quandary York City, where he interviewed presidents of roads, independent mine operators, financiers, As the strike dragged on, Roosevelt became more , foremen, and superintendents. He also heard and more restless. His attorney general, Philander · ers' side from John Mitchell, whom he sum­ Knox, told him that the strike was not his concern. to New York. Wright worked assiduously, Roosevelt repeatedly raised the issue, but Knox con­ ·thin 12 days, he sent by special courier to the tinued to advise the President that he had no right · nt a substantial report accompanied by tables to intervene. 2s ·stics.18 The coal operators were determined to break the 'right reported that both parties cooperated with strike and rejected all union offers to conciliate on tigation and that sharply different opinions the grounds that there was nothing to talk about. out of different positions and not out of mis­ When George Baer, spokesman for the operators, 1PI:sf31tation. Then Wright proceeded to reduce received a letter appealing to him as a good Christian ._ y emotional claims to a factual account. The to make concessions, he replied that the "rights and he observed, had more varying conditions, interests of the laboring man will be protected and _&::t'mg views, and irritating complaints than any cared for-not by the labor agitators, but by the encountered. He then explained the origins Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom strike, the demands of the workers, the claims has given the control of the property interests of mplaints of the employers, a dispute over the country." Union supporters brilliantly exploited · g coal, wages, and the cost of production, this "divine right" letter of "George the Last," and and the question of freights. public opinion turned against the operators.2' Per­ · t expanded his original assignment by in­ haps for the first time in American history, a dis­ in the report "suggestions that seem rea­ tinguished scholar wrote, a union tied up a basic and just." He proposed an experimental re­ industry "without being condemned as a revolu­ from 10 to 9 hours a day, protection of tionary menace." 25 . n men, a joint committee on conciliation, President Roosevelt was in a quandary. "There is erever practicable, collective bargaining. literally nothing ... the national government has ggestions, he concluded, might not lead "to any power to do," he complained to Senator Henry enium" but they would "help reach the day Cabot Lodge of M"lssachusetts. "I am at wit's eqd e anthracite coal regions shall be governed how to proceed." 26 Lodge too was worried. He greater justice and higher moral principles did not understand the folly of the operators which w generally prevail on either side." 19 would cause great suffering and probably defeat the '_ t's report had aroused hopes of early settle­ Republican party.21 As winter neared and coal prices d the strikers eagerly awaited its publica­ soared, Roosevelt feared "the untold misery ... with On June 28, Roosevelt sent the report to the certainty of riots which might develop into social y General Philander Knox with the comment, war." Although the President agreed with his ad­ . an important report by Carroll D. Wright. visers that he had no legal right, he determined to read it over and then at cabinet we can bring both sides together and see whether he could whether it shall be made public. I like its bring about an agreement.II 24 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, OCTOBER 1975

A historic confrontation Alth'ough Roosevelt blamed the operafors for spurning mediation, he again appealed to the strikers. At a historic meeting, Roosevelt called in repre­ On October 6, he asked Wright to propose to John sentatives of government, labor, and management. Mitchell that if the miners returned to work, he, the "The ten men met in' my room on October 3," . President, would appoint a new commission to in­ Roosevelt wrote, "I being still unable to leave my vestigate all matters and would do all within his wheelchair." Attorney General Knox, Labor Com­ power to' enforce the commission's findings. 57 missioner Carroll D. Wright, and Secretary Cortelyou Roosevelt recognized that the operators' position were present. 29 Roosevelt "disclaimed any right to was "exquisitely calculated" to prevent compro­ intervene" but the "terrible nature of the catastrophe mise.58 But both he and Wright tried to persuade impending" impelled him to use his influence "to Mitchell. For a time Mitchell wavered. Then he wrote bring to an end a situation which has become literally the President that, in view of his experience with the intolerable." so coal operators in the past, he did not trust them. For Mitchell, the calling of the conference implied The miners had gone more than half way and ob­ union recognition. Breathing the sweet smell of suc­ jected to further sacrifice, he believed. Mitchell felt cess, he was at his conciliatory best. Mitchell, Roose­ that compliance with the President's request "would velt wrote, "behaved with great dignity and modera­ mean surrender'of the cause for which the miners tion. The operators, on the contrary, showed ex­ had so heroically fought." By a near unanimous vote, traordinary stupidity and bad temper." 51 The op­ miners determined not to go back to the pits until erators were "insolent" to the President,' and they the operators made real concessions. 89 savagely berated Mitchell as a leader of agitators Since no end of the strike was in sight, the Presi­ and extremists who killed 21 people and deterred dent prepared to send Carroll Wright on another thousands from working by intimidation and vio­ investigation. Former President Grover Cleveland lence. 52 wrote Roosevelt that the miners should first go back . The operators told the President that instead of to work and then negotiate a settlement. Roosevelt wasting time negotiating with the "fomentors of this welcomed Cleveland's support and proposed to ex­ anarchy," he should use the power of government pand Wright's investigation in an extraordinary way. "to protect the man who wants to work, and his He wanted Cleveland and other eminent men to wife and children when at work." With proper pro­ "join" Wright. "I earnestly beg you to say that you tection they would produce enough coal to end the will accept," the President wrote Cleveland. The fuel shortage. The operators angrily rejected the latter reluctantly agreed and sold at a loss his stock President's efforts to mediate and refused to deal in coal railroads to avoid a conflict of intere~t. with Mitchell. 88 Roosevelt then searched for other prominent men to 40 "Well, I have tried and failed," Roosevelt wrote add to Wright's commission. . that evening to Marcus Hanna. "I feel downhearted President Roosevelt also was ready as a last resort over the result." 5~ The President did not hold the to order the U.S. Army to take over the coalfields. strikers blameless, but he disagreed with the oper­ He would do whatever was necessary to prevent ators' position that there was nothing to discuss. interference with the resumption of work and would ''Commissioner Carroll D. Wright, in whom I have run the mines. In the meantime, his commission of the utmost confidence." Roosevelt wrote, "has re­ .eminent men would decide the rights and wrongs of ported to me that ... there is certainly 'right and the case.·1 wrong on both sides." The operators, Roosevelt de­ The rising crescendo of public rage was setting clared, had no reason to reject conciliation.58 the stage for drastic measures. Roosevelt feared that At first, the operators seemed to have won a vic- the "attitude of the operators" would "double the -.tory by their recalcitrance. The Governor of Pennsyl. burden" of those who stood against "Socialistic ac­ vania ordered the entire State National Guard to tion'" Carroll Wright noted that public men and the coalfields. But soldiers don't dig coal. The miners industrialists were "rapidly becoming State socialists remained on strike, and the operators failed to make insofar as the coal industry was concerned," and aood their promise to mine enough coal to meet that even Congressmen advocated revolutionary public needs.at change.·' 25

• organ makes a deal Finley Peter Dunne. "If you or anyone else produced it and ascribed it to a fictitious character all people evelt's Secretary of War, Elihu Root, was would unite in saying it was too gross a caricature to -'ccied about the course of events. He had been a possess literary value." 45 Although the operators' "iE::1gtlished corporate lawyer and was a friend of representatives feared class warfare, they refused to .di~ J. P. Morgan. Root told Roosevelt that he accept a labor man on the commission. Finally, like to mediate in a way which would not Roosevelt recounted, they "happened to mention that Icm::::ni't the President. On October 9, he enlisted they would not object at all to my. exercising any 1.h1~'s influence in a proposal whereby the miners latitude I chose in appointments under the headings go back to work while a commission con­ they had given. I instantly said I should appoint my I_zn:d the issues. Although this was an oft-made labor man as the 'eminent sociologist.'" Roosevelt IJlCP«lSal, Root added a face-saving wrinkle. Each never forgot "the mixture of relief and amusement" IClII!;)8l}y and its own employees would present their he felt, when he "thoroughly grasped the factll that .4ierences to the commission. This would spare the th~ operators "would rather have anarchy than tors from dealing directly with the miners' Tweedledum," but "if I called it Tweedledee they and show the public that the coal industry would accept it with rapture." Roosevelt then ap­ 1.rP.'trI arbitrate with its workers.4s pointed E. E. Oark, head of the railway conductors' rgan asked Root to come to New York. On union, as the "eminent sociologist," a term that lC::Clber 11, 1902, the two men met for 5 hours on Roosevelt doubted Clark "had ever previously I Ji::rgan's yacht, the Corsair, allegedly because news- heard." With the consent of the operators, Roosevelt reporters could not bother them there. They also added a Catholic bishop to the commission. 46 Ida:~ an arbitration proposal. The mine operators, Lost in the shuffle were ex-President Grover ,,:X=J.l of rising public hostility and under pressure Cleveland and Commissioner of Labor Carroll Morgan, accepted the Root-Morgan recom­ Wright, who only a few days earlier were to have I "III~I:ltion provided that they could set ground rules. been the cornerstones of the President's strike­ October 13, Root and Morgan brought their settling commission. Roosevelt apologized to Cleve­ . tion proposal to Roosevelt, whq then made land for dropping him. However, he utilized the lic. 44 services of Wright, who had "been a real strength and help" to him. He first made him recorder of the 'eminent sociologist' new commission and shortly thereafter he appointed Wright as the seventh commissioner.41 ough the operators had at last agreed to arbi­ More important than the incredible maneuvering they would not negotiate with Mitchell in his in the selection of the Anthracit~ Coal Strike Com­ ._&;,.,..,.,,'ty as president of the United Mine Workers mission was the overriding fact that finally miners . ,but merely as a spokesman for mineworkers. and operators alike agreed that all disputed issues dition they limited the makeup of the com­ should be submitted to arbitration. Both sides also 'on to five men-a military engineer, a mining agreed to abide by the findings of the commission. _. eer, a judge, an expert in the coal business, and "The child is born," wrote Carroll Wright, "and I eminent sociologist." trust will prove a vigorous. :. member of society." 48 'tehell agreed that he would not force the issue won recognition but he balked at the effort to k" the commission. He wanted the President The Anthracite Coal Strike Commission add to the commission a labor man who was to understand the workers' point of view and On October 23, 1902, the 163-day anthracite coal man Catholic prelate because most miners were strike ended. The following morning President olies. Roosevelt thought Mitchell's request rea­ Roosevelt met briefly with the commissioners and Ie and told him he would try to appoint two asked them to try to establish good relations between ..onal men to the commission. the employers and the workers in the anthracite -. othing you have ever written can begin to ap­ fields. The commissioners refused to comment to ch in screaming comedy" the appointing of the reporters, and then met for almost 2 hours at commission, Roosevelt wrote to political satirist Wright's office, one block from the White House. 26 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, OCTOBER 1 _

There photographers took pictures, and the room recognize the United Mine Workers union. became so saturated with smoke from their flash Mitchell believed that he ..had won de facto reco ... powder it had to be aired out. After organizing and tion and wrote that the "most important feature scheduling future sessions, the commissioners the award" was the creation of a six-man arbitrati lunched with the President, and then began their board to settle disputes that could not be work arduous task of settling the strike. 49 out with mine officials. The employees selected three Before listening to testimony, the commissioners members and the employers three members. spent a week touring the coal regions. They rejected The Commission dealt with many other subje the offer of the coal operators for a special train and such as private police forces, child labor, and blac ­ visited mines selected jointly by the opposing parties. listing. But the panel observed that what was really They saw first hand the conditions under which needed was a spirit of good will. "A more con­ miners lived and labored. ciliatory disposition in the operators and their em­ Carroll Wright was overwhelmed with work and ployees in their relations toward one another," tha deferred as far as possible other duties he had as Commission commented, "would do a better and Commissioner of Labor. He used a large part of more lasting work than any which mere rulings, how­ the meager resources of the Department of Labor, ever wise or just, may accomplish." 53 which then had a total annual budget of $183,000, to support the work of the Commission. Wright Strikes and the public Interest ordered special agents,experts, and clerks to drop current assignments and go to the coalfields to obtain The history of the coal strike of 1902 is an oft­ prices of items commonly used by employees of told tale. Samuel Gompers, near the end of his long anthracite mines. He repeatedly reminded these career, wrote: agents of the "extreme and urgent need" for data, and when they ran into language barriers, he author­ Several times I have been asked what in my opinion was the most important single incident in the labor ized them to hire interpreters.50 movement in the United States and I have invariably The commissioners, after their inspection tour, replied: the strike of the anthracite miners in Penlisyl. met for nearly 3 months. Five-hundred fifty-eight vania ... from then on the miners became not merely witnesses appeared, including 240 for the striking human machines to produce coal but men and citi­ miners, 153 for nonunion mineworkers, and 154 for zens.... The strike was evidence of the effectiveness of trade unions....54 the operators. The Commission itself requested the appearance of 11 witnesses. The testimony ran to The victory in the anthracite coalfields breathed 10,047 legal-sized pages in addition to other exhibits. new life into the American labor movement. 55 It John Mitchell played a prominent role in presenting strengthened moderate labor leaders and progressive the case for the miners. George Baer made the businessmen who championed negotiations as a way closing arguments for the coal operators, while to ,labor peace. It enhanced the reputation of Presi­ Clarence Darrow closed for the workers. dent Theodore Roosevelt. Sometimes overlooked, Although the commissioners heard some evidence howe"er, is the change the conflict made in the role of terrible conditions, they concluded that the "mov­ of the Federal Government in important national ing spectacle of horrors" represented only a small strikes. number of cases. By and large, social conditions in The Anthracite Coal Commission, toward the end mine communities were found to be good, and miners of its report, summarized in a cautious way the re­ were judged as only partly justified in their claim sponsibility of the National Government in "cases that annual earnings were not sufficient "to maintain where great public interests are at stake." The peo­ an American standard of living." 51 ple had "the right ... to know the facts, and so be The Commission's fYldings seemed to split the able to fix the responsibility. In order to do this, differences between mineworkers and mineowners. power must be given the authorized representatives The miners asked for 20-percent wage increases, of the people to act for them by conducting a thor­ and most were given a 10-percent increase. The ough investigation." 56 miners had asked for an 8-hour day and were Roosevelt stated the matter more vigorously. His awarded a 9-hour day instead of the standard 10 letters are sprinkled with sentences such as "no wise hours then prevailing. 52 The operators refused to man would controvert that in this anthracite coal . COAL STRIKE OF 1902 27

tion the public has an interest." The "National • Philip Taft, Organized Labor in American History (New rnment represents ... the interests of the York, Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 152-58. " as a whole." "I fear there will be fuel riots 1 John Lombardi, Labor's Voice in the Cabinet (New bad as a type as any bread riots we have ever York, Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 47; "Report " 51 of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission," Bulletin of the Department of Labor, 46 (May 1903), pp. 437-683; Letter, draft of his statement to the coal operators CarrolI D. Wright to Dr. ~tephen Bauer, Nov. 8, 1902, in union leaders at the temporary White House on Department of Labor, Letters Sent, National Archives Rec­ er 3, 1902, stated that "no precedent of inter­ ord Group 257, Washington, D.C. (to be referred to as e in strikes will be created." But Roosevelt NARG 257); The New York Times, Apr. 23,1886. he was breaking new ground, and he deleted • Robert H. Weibe, "The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902: sentence from his final speech. He recognized A Record of Confusion," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, September 1961, pp. 229-51; Arthur E. Suffern, der ordinary conditions he had no right to· Conciliation and Arbitration in the Coal Industry of America lIII::c:fjere in the strike. But Roosevelt was not the (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915), pp. 41-44. man to "sit by idly" while "misery and death • John MitchelI, Organized Labor, Its Problems. Purposes to the great masses of people in our large and Ideals (Philadelphia, American Book and Bible House, He told his Attorney General and Secretary 1903), p. 357; Robert J. CornelI, The Anthracite Coal Strike that strong·· action might be an "evil prece­ of 1902 (Washington, The Catholic University of America but he would run the risk of impeachment Press, 1951), pp. 44-48; Suffern, Conciliation in the Coal Industry, pp. 240-44. Iban expose the Nation to chaos. 58 10 Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, pp. 53-54; Mitchell, velt's efforts to end the strike were success­ Organized Labor, p. 366. sides finally agreed to the findings of the a.~ci·te Coal Strike Commission, and peace was 11 John MartelI, "The Operators' Side of the Great Coal Strike," Collier's Weekly, Oct. 25, 1902, as quoted in in the coalfields. More important in the Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, p. 55. ...~:.t, a new role was established for the Federal 12 CarrolI D. Wright, "Report to the President on Anthra· "UI:lllDent in labor disputes. During the dramatic cite Coal Strike," Bulletin of the Department of Labor, 43 .ii::::Jotation with the mine operators and workers (November 1902), p; 1204. her 3, 1902, Roosevelt had said, " 1 speak 18 Weibe, "Anthracite Coal Strike," pp. 234-37; Mitchell, . er the operators nor the miners but for the Organized Labor, pp. 366-67; Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo ....:al public." He made labor and industry accept Hanna (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1919), p. 328; "that the third pa~, the great public, had Elsie Gluck, John Mitchell (New York, John Day Co., rests and overshadowing rights" and so set 1929), pp. 76-78; The Harrisburg Patriot, Sept. 25, 28, Oct. 1, 6, 23, 26, 1900. ent for the Federal Government to inter- . labor disputes, not as strikebreaker but as ,. Wright, "Report to the President," pp. 1143-55; The Harrisburg Patriot, Aug. 25, 1902; Gluck, John Mitchell, p. a:.::J=;r::sentative of the public interest. 59 0 93; Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, An Autobiography (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925), Vol. II, p. 116. --FOOTNOTES-- 1. Letter, George F. Baer to John Mitchell, May 9, 1902, Wright, "Report to the President," pp. 1186-87. , Theodore Roosevelt to Winthrop Murray Crane ,. Letter, Wright to R. W. PowelI, June 14, 1902, NARG Ii-..:mor of Massachusetts), Oct. 22, 1902, in Elting E. 257. "'II::lIDO, ed. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. III Pai:r:id"ge, Harvard University Press, 1951 ) (to be reo 11 "Anthracite Commission Report." p. 499. as Roosevelt Letters), p. 360. 18 Lette~, Wright to George Baer, 1une 16, 1902; Wright ore Roosevelt, opening address to Oct. 3, 1902, to W. H. Truesdale, June 18, 1902; Wright to 1. F. O'Keefe, "~:cce, Washington, D.C., in Theodore Roosevelt June 19, 1902; Wright to Rev. B. F. Hammond, June 19, u.l>rary of Congress (to be referred to as TRP). 1902; Wright to President Theodore Roosevelt, June 20, B. Morris, "Andrew Jackson, Strikebreaker," 1902; Wright to Herman Justi, June 30, 1902; all in NARG Historical Review, October 1949, pp. 54-63. 257; The Independent, June 12, 19, 1903. L. Blackman, Jr., Presidential Seizures in Labor "Wright, "Report to the President," pp. 1147-87. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 20 The Harrisburg Patriot, June 10, 28, 1902.

21 Letter, Roosevelt to Philander Knox, June 28, 1902, Dacus, Annals of the Great Strikes (Chicago, L. T. TRP; Letter, Roosevelt to Crne, Oct. 22, 1902, Roosevelt Co., 1877). Letters, Vol. III, p. 3'9. 28 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, OCTOBER 1975

II Unidentified page JlI'e~edU!.g letter, Wright to R~velt, for the President, Reas()ns for the Appointment of the June 20, 1902, TRP; Letter, Roosevelt to Nelson W. Aldricll, Anthracite Coal Strike Commission," Nov. 19, 1903, TRP. Aug. 26, 1902, Roosevelt Letters, Vo). III, p. 323; Wright 68 Letter, Elihu Root to J. P. Morgan, Oct. 9, 1902, quoted to C. M. Walker, Sept. 15, 1902, NARG 237; "Report to in Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, pp. 215-16 the President," "Taft, Organized Labor, pp. 179-80; GlUck, Mitchell, p. 18 Letter, Roosevelt to Crane, Oct. 22, 1902, Roosevelt 130; Letter, Roosevelt to Bacon, Oct. 22, 1902, Roosevelt Lellers, Vol. III, p. 360. Letters, Vol. III, pp. 363-65. .. Quoted from Mitchell Papers in Cornell, Anthracite '" Letter, Roosevelt to Finley Peter Dunne, Oct. 20, 1902, Coal $'rike, pp. 169-10. Roosevelt Leiters, Vol. III, pp. 357. .. Selig Perlman Quoted in Weibe, "Anthracite Coal '" Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Auto­ Strike," p. 240. biography

Roosevelt Le"eTs, Vol. III, p. 331. GO "Report to the President," pp. 437-683.

M Letter, Roosevelt to Bacon, Oct. .5, 1902, Roo.sevelt 6a Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 394; GlUck, Mitchell, p. Letters, Vo). III. p. 3~.1; Letter, Roosevelt to Seth Low 154; "Anthracite Commission Report," pp. 464, ft. (Mayor of New York City), Oct. 4. 1902, TRP. 114 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, .. Mitchell, Organized Labor, pp. 389-90. Vol. II, pp. 117, 126-27..

'" Letter, Wright to Roosevelt, Oct. 6, 1902; Telegram, 56 Following the strike, the United Mine Workers became Wright to G. B. Cortelyou, Oct. 6, 1902; Telegram, Cor­ for a time the largest and most powerful labor union in the telyou to Wright, Oct. 7, 1902; all in TRP; Letter to Crane, United States. When a Cabinet-level Department of Labor Oct. 22, 1902, Roosevelt Letters, Vol. III, p. 361. was created a decade later, President Woodrow Wilson .. Letter, Roosevelt to Bacon, Oct. 7, 1902, Roosevelt wanted to appoint Mitchell as the first Secretary of Labor. Letters, Vol. III, pp. 343-44. Mitchell did not push his candidacy, but another top official of the Mine Workers during the great strike of 1902, William .. Wright to Roosevelt, Oct. 6, 1902, TRP; Roosevelt to B. Wilson, became the first Secretary to represent labor's Hanna, Oct. S, 1902, Roosevelt Leiters, Vol. III, pp. 332­ voice in the Cabinet. 33 Cornell, Anthracite ·Coal Strike, pp. 388-89; Letter, Mitchell to Roosevelt, Oct. 8, 1902, TRP; Mitchell. Or­ .. "Anthracite Commission Report," pp. 512-13.

ganized Labor, p. 389. 61 Letter, Roosevelt to Low, Oct. 3, 1902, Roosevelt .. Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, pp. 209-11; Letters, Papers, Vol. III, p. 336; Letter, Roosevelt to Low, Oct. 5, Grover Cleveland to Roosevelt, OCt. 4, 12, 1902; TRP; 1902, TRP; Letter, Roosevelt to Bacon, Oct. S, 1902, Letter, Roo'sevelt to Joseph Bishop, Oct. S. 1902; TRP; Roo.sevelt Papers, Vol. III, p. 340.

Letter, Roosevelt to Bacon, Oct. 5, 1902; Letter, Roosevelt GB Draft and final copy of opening address to Oct. 3, 1902 to Cleveland, Oct. 10, 1902; Letter, Roosevelt to Hanna, Conference, TRP; Letter, Roosevelt to Mrs. W. S. Cowles, Oct. 12, 1902, Letter, Roosevelt to Crane, Oct. 22, 1902; OCt. 16, 1902, TRP; Letter, Roosevelt to Crane, 9ct. 22, All in Roosevelt Letters, Vol. III, pp. 342-48, 3~1. 1902, Roosevelt Letters, Vol. III, pp. 361-62.

61 Cornell, Anthracite Coal Strike, pp. 210-11. 59 Draft and final copy of opening address to Oct. 3, 1902 .. Letter. Roosovelt to Hanna, Oct: 3. 1902,Roosevelt Conference, TRP; Letter, Roosevelt to H. H. Woodward, Uti"" Vol. III. p. 337; Carroll D. Wright, "Memorandum Oct. 19. 1902, Roosevelt Letters, Vol. III, pp. 356-S7.