Weekly Geopolitical Report by Thomas Wash

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Weekly Geopolitical Report by Thomas Wash Weekly Geopolitical Report By Thomas Wash March 1, 2021 Background Western Sahara is a disputed territory on the The Western Sahara: Part I northwest coast of Africa bordering Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. To To facilitate a restoration of diplomatic understand the conflict over the territory, it relations between Morocco and Israel, the is important to review the history of the Trump administration acknowledged region starting with its time as a Spanish Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western colony, when it was known as Spanish Sahara territory on December 10, reversing Sahara. Spain had established control over the three-decade U.S. policy of supporting the territory following the Berlin Conference self-determination for the Sahrawi People of 1884, where the major powers of Europe who make up most of the region’s met to divide Africa among themselves. In population. The reconciliation between 1957, with the end of France’s protectorate Morocco and Israel was part of the so-called over Morocco, the Moroccan government “Abraham Accords,” which seek to claimed Western Sahara as its territory. normalize relations between Israel and However, this move was immediately various Muslim countries in the Middle East repelled by the Spanish. Unable to remove and North Africa. However, the decision to the Spanish military from the territory, recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Morocco supported a UN resolution in 1966 Western Sahara has drawn scrutiny from that would allow the region to hold a across the world as it marks a departure referendum to determine its independence. from the traditional U.S. approach of Although the resolution was approved by the resolving conflicts through mediation. UN Security Council, disagreements about Rather, the Trump administration’s the conditions of the referendum prevented Abraham Accords process reflects a more one from ever happening. In 1973, the transactional approach that attempted to Polisario Front, an indigenous Sahrawi rebel solve conflicts through ultimatums. group, helped Morocco in its efforts to force Spain out of Western Sahara by starting its In this week’s report, we discuss the dispute own insurrection. over Western Sahara and the possibility of a broader conflict. We begin with a short The dispute between Morocco and Spain history of the conflict between Morocco and over the referendum would eventually make Western Sahara. Afterward, we discuss the its way to the International Court of Justice truce between the two sides and why it has in 1974. In its ruling, the court denied been difficult to come to a resolution. We Morocco’s and Mauritania’s legal ties and will conclude the report next week in Part II territorial sovereignty over the region, with a discussion of how the next formally opening the door for the people of administration might deal with this shift in Western Sahara to hold a referendum to policy. As usual, we will close with possible decide whether it would be its own nation or market ramifications. join Morocco or Mauritania. In a signal of its disapproval with the court decision, Weekly Geopolitical Report – March 1, 2021 Page 2 Morocco sent 200,000 unarmed protesters to state received recognition from over 80 reclaim the region in what is now called the countries, although some of these countries “Green March.” In order to prevent an have since withdrawn their recognition. In escalation of tensions, Spain withdrew its 1984, Western Sahara was admitted into the troops from the region and allowed it to be African Union, giving it an international split between Morocco and Mauritania. platform. Additionally, it has been able to maintain trade relationships with other Although Mauritania forfeited its territory to countries. The region’s biggest trade partner the Polisario Front, Morocco retook the is the U.S., but it also has trade relations forfeited land and forced the rebel group with the EU and China. into hiding in neighboring Algeria, thereby triggering the rivalry between the two sides. That being said, the Polisario Front lacks the Following its removal from the region, the means to protect itself from Morocco in Front participated in guerilla war tactics to direct combat. The group relies heavily on regain control in 1979. Algeria for military and financial support. For its part, Algeria views the Front as a cheap insurance policy to keep Morocco off its border. In the past, Morocco and Algeria have had their own territorial disputes. Morocco has laid claim to portions of the Tindouf and Bechar provinces, and the two sides fought a war over the area in 1963. Although Morocco was unsuccessful and agreed to respect the border, Algeria suspects it may try to reclaim the land and thus views the Polisario Front as an ally. The UN Solution and the Fragile Truce In order to resolve the dispute and minimize tensions in North Africa, the U.S. and UN (Source: Wikipedia.com) helped broker an agreement between Morocco and the Polisario Front in 1991. After being forced out of Western Sahara The agreement laid the groundwork for the into Algeria, the Polisario Front created its previously agreed-upon referendum to take own government and renamed the region place in which the people of Western Sahara Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. In would decide whether they would like to exile, the group structured its government as join Morocco or form their own country. a parliamentary republic with its own Just like before, disagreements about the president, prime minister, and a legislative conditions under which a referendum would body called the Sahrawi National Council. be held prevented one from taking place. In Located in the Tindouf refugee camps, the 2007, Morocco did offer the region a Front controls about a third of Western proposal for autonomy if it accepted its rule, Sahara, although it is mostly desert. but the Front turned it down, preferring independence instead. Despite the Polisario Front’s lack of control over Western Sahara, it has received some international support. The self-proclaimed Weekly Geopolitical Report – March 1, 2021 Page 3 Nervous about the potential outcome of a Over the last few years, Morocco has referendum, Morocco has spent three become less tolerant of protests and has sent decades undermining efforts to hold one. It its military into the area to quell them. Its has done so by paying Moroccans to move perceived heavy-handedness has into the disputed areas, often offering food, exacerbated tensions between the two sides shelter, and jobs. The country has also as the Polisario Front has posted clips of the consistently pushed back the date for the interactions on social media platforms such referendum so that new Moroccan residents as YouTube to incite the youth and persuade can be added to the voter registry. There is them to join the cause. Moreover, also a belief among Moroccans that if they Morocco’s most recent decision to send in wait long enough, attitudes within Western the military to remove protesters that were Sahara will eventually change. Moroccan blocking a trade route into Mauritania was maneuvering to control the outcome of the used as propaganda to influence the youth. referendum has made the truce between the As a result, many young Sahrawis view two sides fragile as local Sahrawi people Morocco’s military action as a reason to have expressed concern and annoyance with take up arms to solve this dispute once and Morocco’s persistent stall tactics. for all. For the most part, the stalling has backfired. Attitudes for self-determination within the region have hardened over the past few decades. The Polisario Front has proven to be adept at promoting nationalism throughout the region. The Sahrawi youth have become increasingly dismissive of the UN’s attempts to help the two sides come to a peaceful resolution, with many believing war is inevitable. (Source: ma.USEmbassy.gov) The two sides have been heading down a collision course for quite some time now. Risks of War Following the death of Polisario Front leader Prior to the agreement between Morocco Mohamed Abdelaziz in 2016, his successor, and Israel in December, ties between the two Brahim Ghali, has taken a more countries had existed unofficially for confrontational approach against Morocco. decades. In 1961, Israeli agents told then- One of his primary targets is Guerguerat, a King Hassan II about a plot to overthrow small village located in the southern region him. Since then, the two countries have been of Western Sahara. The area is considered a working together to trade arms and UN-designated buffer zone that neither side intelligence. In fact, Morocco even allowed can cross. When Morocco began Israeli agents to wiretap its meeting rooms construction of a road through the village, and private suites in order to help them Ghali argued that the project was a violation gather intelligence on other Arab countries. of the ceasefire agreement. Following This intelligence was crucial in assisting Morocco’s decision to continue construction Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. and unwillingness from the UN to intervene, Nevertheless, the implications of the Sahrawis began protesting along the road. agreement on Moroccan-Israeli relations may not be as important as the regional Weekly Geopolitical Report – March 1, 2021 Page 4 implications between Morocco and Western spread throughout North Africa. The Sahara. Polisario Front is rumored to have ties to radical Muslim groups such as the Islamic Indeed, a truce in the long conflict between State in the Greater Sahara, which is Morocco and Western Sahara had already affiliated with Boko Haram. Additionally, broken down prior to the U.S. recognition of Sahrawi youth have been susceptible to Morocco’s claim over the disputed territory, violent propaganda. Thus, Morocco could but the proclamation likely worsened find itself a target of terrorism again, as it tensions between the two sides.
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