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United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, And A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s A dissertation presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Matthew D. Jacobs May 2015 © 2015 Matthew D. Jacobs. All Rights Reserved. 2 This dissertation titled A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s by MATTHEW D. JACOBS has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Chester Pach Associate Professor of History Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 Abstract JACOBS, MATTHEW D., Ph.D. May 2015. History A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s Director of Dissertation: Chester Pach In January 1959 Fidel Castro took power in Cuba and soon proved to be a perplexing opponent for the United States. The island nation did not have to commit soldiers or weaponry to advance its revolutionary agenda in Latin America. The ideas and romanticism associated with the Cuban Revolution were enough to foster anti-U.S. and pro-Cuban sentiment in the region. Historian Thomas Wright wrote that the Cuban Revolution “embodied the aspirations and captured the imagination of Latin America’s masses as no other political movement had ever done.” Castro declared during the “Second Declaration of Havana” in 1962 that “it is the duty of every revolutionary to make the revolution. In America and the world, it is known that the revolution will be victorious, but it is improper revolutionary behavior to sit at one’s doorstep waiting for the corpse of imperialism to pass by.” For U.S. policymakers, confronting Castro and his revolutionary agenda became a top priority during the 1960s. Adolf Berle, a veteran U.S. foreign policymaker with experience dating back to the Franklin Roosevelt administration, headed John Kennedy’s task force on Latin America and offered the president counsel on how best to confront the growing unrest in the region. While Berle noted the positive effects that a focus on democracy, economic development, and social reform could have, he also called on the administration to launch a “psychological offensive.” 4 In an attempt to co-opt the energies of the Cuban revolution and impede Fidel Castro’s influence in Latin America, the United States waged an extensive public diplomacy campaign against the revolutionary fervor emanating from Havana. This international history, based on research in the United States, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, tells the story of Washington’s attempt to discredit the Cuban Revolution, while simultaneously cultivating public opinion in Latin America during the 1960s. Central to U.S. efforts at conducting public diplomacy was the United States Information Agency (USIA). While it contained the word information in its title, that should not confuse readers. The agency engaged in both information and propaganda campaigns. Information is used to educate or to inform, while propaganda is utilized to persuade or manipulate. Throughout its existence, the USIA did both. Historian Nicholas Cull offers a good and concise definition of agency efforts as “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public.” Such actions can encompass different dimensions of U.S. government interactions with local populations, including student exchanges, publications sponsored by the United States, cultural events at U.S. binational centers, television programs, and radio broadcasts. In attempting to sway Latin American opinions of Fidel Castro, the United States could not focus solely on government to government relations; policymakers had to seek out non-state actors in the region. Washington sought to reach particular segments of Latin American society. These included intellectuals, journalists, teachers, students, and peasants. 5 Ultimately, scholars should recognize the centrality of propaganda in U.S.-Latin American relations during the 1960s. It became an essential component of Washington’s approach, equal to, if not greater than, developmental aid and military assistance. Furthermore, this study seeks to recast how historians view post-1945 inter-American relations. A close examination of U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America during the 1960s calls into question just how historians should study the “Cold War” in the region. Local tensions, exacerbated by the Cuban Revolution, most clearly help explain the course of post-1945 U.S.-Latin American relations. In essence, the battle waged by the United States in Latin America during the 1960s, more often than not, was not tied to the larger “Global Cold War” where both U.S. and Soviet interventionism ruled the day. Rather than thinking globally, historians studying the political and social dimensions of Latin America’s long 20th century need to look locally. 6 Dedication For Kanh, a history class brought us together in 2007 and you are still around, I’ll take that as a good sign. I look forward more everyday to our future. 7 Acknowledgments This project began in 2009 during Dr. Chester Pach’s graduate seminar on U.S. foreign policy. Since that time Dr. Pach has provided an immeasurable amount of counsel, criticism, and encouragement. For over a decade he has served as the foundation of Ohio University’s History Department’s graduate program and I was privileged to have him as my advisor. I would also like to thank committee members Dr. Kevin Mattson, Dr. Patrick Barr-Melej, and Dr. Brad Jokisch. All three thoroughly engaged this project and pushed me to think deeply about the issues under study. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Kenneth Osgood for agreeing to be an outside reader. Dr. Osgood’s own work helped inspire me to write about propaganda and his thoughtful critiques have proven very beneficial to my final product. Other members of the Ohio University History Department faculty I wish to thank include Dr. Robert Ingram, Dr. John Brobst, Dr. Brian Schoen, and Dr. Mariana Dantas. Also, I was very fortunate to have an outstanding graduate cohort. I thank Jack Epstein, Todd Pfeffer, Brad Eidahl, and Sebastian Hurtado Torres for their friendship and constructive critiques. Particular thanks goes to Jasper Verschoor who shared an office with me and heard about this project on many occasions. He has proven to be a valued friend. Scholars outside of Ohio University who have aided my work, whether at formal conferences or just during informal chats, include Dr. Alan McPherson, Dr. Jason Parker, Dr. Jeffrey Taffet, Dr. Jonathan Brown, Dr. Michelle Getchell, Dr. Thomas Fields, Dr. Tanya Harmer, Dr. Matt Shannon, Dr. Doug Snyder, Rob Morrison and Aaron Moulton. Participants of the Society for Historians of Americans Foreign Relations 2013 Summer 8 Institute are owed special thanks. I was able to present parts of my work and receive critical feedback as Dr. Mark Atwood Lawrence and Dr. James McCallister hosted an engaging week at Williams College. This project required research in seven countries and numerous organizations and individuals helped me along my travels. First, thank you to all of the archivists who worked so diligently and greatly aided my research trips. The Smith Richardson Foundation awarded me a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship in 2013, which allowed for extensive time to be spent in Latin America. I thank the organization for continuing to support work in the humanities. On several occasions I received funding from different departments within Ohio University. Thank you to the Student Enhancement Award Committee and the Graduate Student Senate as well as the History Department. Their funding helped offset several research trips and conference presentations. Dr. Steve Miner, Kara Dunfee, and the Contemporary History Institute proved especially instrumental to helping me finish this project, many thanks to Brown House. I also want to acknowledge Dr. Michael Donoghue for providing me contact information for my trip to Panama. In the same vein, Dr. Victoria Gonzales-Rivera and Dr. Justin Wolfe gave me great insights into researching in Nicaragua. I thank both Dr. Max Paul Friedman and Dr. Tom Long for offering advice on navigating Bogotá, Colombia. For quite some time I attempted to gain access to Cuban archives with little success. It was not until I contacted Dr. Lillian Guerra did doors open. I am forever grateful for her help in facilitating me gaining a student visa from the Institute of Cuban History in Havana. Finally, I also want to thank my parents, along with my brothers and sisters, who constantly provided encouragement as I moved closer to completion. 9 Abbreviations AGNC Archivo General de la Nación de Cuba AGNCOS Archivo General de la Nación de Costa Rica AGNCOL Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia AGNNIC Archivo General de la Nación de Nicaragua AGNRD Archivo General de la Nación de República Dominicana APP American Presidency Project BLAA Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, Bogotá, Colombia. BNP Biblioteca Nacional de Panama BRC Biblioteca Roberto Chiari, Panama City Panama BSOF British Foreign Service Office Files DNSA Digital National Security Archive FAOC Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association of Diplomatic
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