A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and
the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s
A dissertation presented to
the faculty of
the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University
In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Matthew D. Jacobs
May 2015
© 2015 Matthew D. Jacobs. All Rights Reserved.
2 This dissertation titled
A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and
the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s
by
MATTHEW D. JACOBS
has been approved for
the Department of History
and the College of Arts and Sciences by
Chester Pach
Associate Professor of History
Robert Frank
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
3 Abstract
JACOBS, MATTHEW D., Ph.D. May 2015. History
A “Psychological Offensive”: United States Public Diplomacy, Revolutionary Cuba, and the Contest for Latin American Hearts and Minds during the 1960s
Director of Dissertation: Chester Pach
In January 1959 Fidel Castro took power in Cuba and soon proved to be a perplexing opponent for the United States. The island nation did not have to commit soldiers or weaponry to advance its revolutionary agenda in Latin America. The ideas and romanticism associated with the Cuban Revolution were enough to foster anti-U.S. and pro-Cuban sentiment in the region. Historian Thomas Wright wrote that the Cuban
Revolution “embodied the aspirations and captured the imagination of Latin America’s masses as no other political movement had ever done.” Castro declared during the
“Second Declaration of Havana” in 1962 that “it is the duty of every revolutionary to make the revolution. In America and the world, it is known that the revolution will be victorious, but it is improper revolutionary behavior to sit at one’s doorstep waiting for the corpse of imperialism to pass by.”
For U.S. policymakers, confronting Castro and his revolutionary agenda became a top priority during the 1960s. Adolf Berle, a veteran U.S. foreign policymaker with experience dating back to the Franklin Roosevelt administration, headed John Kennedy’s task force on Latin America and offered the president counsel on how best to confront the growing unrest in the region. While Berle noted the positive effects that a focus on democracy, economic development, and social reform could have, he also called on the administration to launch a “psychological offensive.” 4 In an attempt to co-opt the energies of the Cuban revolution and impede Fidel
Castro’s influence in Latin America, the United States waged an extensive public diplomacy campaign against the revolutionary fervor emanating from Havana. This international history, based on research in the United States, Colombia, Panama, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, tells the story of Washington’s attempt to discredit the Cuban Revolution, while simultaneously cultivating public opinion in Latin America during the 1960s.
Central to U.S. efforts at conducting public diplomacy was the United States
Information Agency (USIA). While it contained the word information in its title, that should not confuse readers. The agency engaged in both information and propaganda campaigns. Information is used to educate or to inform, while propaganda is utilized to persuade or manipulate. Throughout its existence, the USIA did both. Historian Nicholas
Cull offers a good and concise definition of agency efforts as “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public.” Such actions can encompass different dimensions of U.S. government interactions with local populations, including student exchanges, publications sponsored by the United States, cultural events at U.S. binational centers, television programs, and radio broadcasts. In attempting to sway Latin American opinions of Fidel Castro, the
United States could not focus solely on government to government relations; policymakers had to seek out non-state actors in the region. Washington sought to reach particular segments of Latin American society. These included intellectuals, journalists, teachers, students, and peasants. 5 Ultimately, scholars should recognize the centrality of propaganda in U.S.-Latin
American relations during the 1960s. It became an essential component of Washington’s approach, equal to, if not greater than, developmental aid and military assistance.
Furthermore, this study seeks to recast how historians view post-1945 inter-American relations. A close examination of U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America during the
1960s calls into question just how historians should study the “Cold War” in the region.
Local tensions, exacerbated by the Cuban Revolution, most clearly help explain the course of post-1945 U.S.-Latin American relations. In essence, the battle waged by the
United States in Latin America during the 1960s, more often than not, was not tied to the larger “Global Cold War” where both U.S. and Soviet interventionism ruled the day.
Rather than thinking globally, historians studying the political and social dimensions of
Latin America’s long 20th century need to look locally.
6 Dedication
For Kanh, a history class brought us together in 2007 and you are still around, I’ll take that as a
good sign. I look forward more everyday to our future.
7 Acknowledgments
This project began in 2009 during Dr. Chester Pach’s graduate seminar on U.S. foreign policy. Since that time Dr. Pach has provided an immeasurable amount of counsel, criticism, and encouragement. For over a decade he has served as the foundation of Ohio University’s History Department’s graduate program and I was privileged to have him as my advisor. I would also like to thank committee members Dr. Kevin
Mattson, Dr. Patrick Barr-Melej, and Dr. Brad Jokisch. All three thoroughly engaged this project and pushed me to think deeply about the issues under study. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Kenneth Osgood for agreeing to be an outside reader. Dr. Osgood’s own work helped inspire me to write about propaganda and his thoughtful critiques have proven very beneficial to my final product.
Other members of the Ohio University History Department faculty I wish to thank include Dr. Robert Ingram, Dr. John Brobst, Dr. Brian Schoen, and Dr. Mariana Dantas.
Also, I was very fortunate to have an outstanding graduate cohort. I thank Jack Epstein,
Todd Pfeffer, Brad Eidahl, and Sebastian Hurtado Torres for their friendship and constructive critiques. Particular thanks goes to Jasper Verschoor who shared an office with me and heard about this project on many occasions. He has proven to be a valued friend.
Scholars outside of Ohio University who have aided my work, whether at formal conferences or just during informal chats, include Dr. Alan McPherson, Dr. Jason Parker,
Dr. Jeffrey Taffet, Dr. Jonathan Brown, Dr. Michelle Getchell, Dr. Thomas Fields, Dr.
Tanya Harmer, Dr. Matt Shannon, Dr. Doug Snyder, Rob Morrison and Aaron Moulton.
Participants of the Society for Historians of Americans Foreign Relations 2013 Summer 8 Institute are owed special thanks. I was able to present parts of my work and receive critical feedback as Dr. Mark Atwood Lawrence and Dr. James McCallister hosted an engaging week at Williams College.
This project required research in seven countries and numerous organizations and individuals helped me along my travels. First, thank you to all of the archivists who worked so diligently and greatly aided my research trips. The Smith Richardson
Foundation awarded me a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship in 2013, which allowed for extensive time to be spent in Latin America. I thank the organization for continuing to support work in the humanities. On several occasions I received funding from different departments within Ohio University. Thank you to the Student
Enhancement Award Committee and the Graduate Student Senate as well as the History
Department. Their funding helped offset several research trips and conference presentations. Dr. Steve Miner, Kara Dunfee, and the Contemporary History Institute proved especially instrumental to helping me finish this project, many thanks to Brown
House. I also want to acknowledge Dr. Michael Donoghue for providing me contact information for my trip to Panama. In the same vein, Dr. Victoria Gonzales-Rivera and
Dr. Justin Wolfe gave me great insights into researching in Nicaragua. I thank both Dr.
Max Paul Friedman and Dr. Tom Long for offering advice on navigating Bogotá,
Colombia. For quite some time I attempted to gain access to Cuban archives with little success. It was not until I contacted Dr. Lillian Guerra did doors open. I am forever grateful for her help in facilitating me gaining a student visa from the Institute of Cuban
History in Havana. Finally, I also want to thank my parents, along with my brothers and sisters, who constantly provided encouragement as I moved closer to completion. 9 Abbreviations
AGNC Archivo General de la Nación de Cuba
AGNCOS Archivo General de la Nación de Costa Rica
AGNCOL Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia
AGNNIC Archivo General de la Nación de Nicaragua
AGNRD Archivo General de la Nación de República Dominicana
APP American Presidency Project
BLAA Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, Bogotá, Colombia.
BNP Biblioteca Nacional de Panama
BRC Biblioteca Roberto Chiari, Panama City Panama
BSOF British Foreign Service Office Files
DNSA Digital National Security Archive
FAOC Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association of Diplomatic
Studies and Training
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
GRDOS General Records of the Department of State
GRUSIA General Records of the United States Information Agency
GUSC Georgetown University Special Collections
IHC Instituto de Historia de Cuba
IHNCA Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica
JFKL John F. Kennedy Library
LANIC Latin American Network Information Center
LBJL Lyndon Johnson Library
10 MINREX Archivo de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba
MREPAN Archivo de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Panama
NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD
NSC National Security Council
OCA Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PSN Partido Socialista Nicaragüense
RG Record Group
SF Standard Fruit
UAR University of Arkansas Libraries Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection
USIA United States Information Agency
USAID United States Agency for International Development
11 Table of Contents
Page
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………. 3
Dedication……………………………………………………………………………. 6
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………... 7
Abbreviations………………………………………………………………………… 9
List of Images………………………………………………………………………... 12
Introduction………………………………………………………………………….. 15
Chapter 1: “Go Line Them Up”: The Resurgence of Anti-Americanism and the Making of a Critical Decade, 1945-1959…………………………………………………...... 40
Chapter 2: “Let Every Nation Know”: The New Frontier, Latin America, and Public Diplomacy…………………………………………………………………………… 85
Chapter 3: In Search of “Decent Democratic Regimes”: Generals, Reformers, and Missed Opportunities in Guatemala and Honduras……………………………...... 131
Chapter 4: “We Will Build a Wall of Dedicated Men”: Public Diplomacy, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Costa Rica and Nicaragua during the 1960s………………...... 182
Chapter 5: Trying to make Peaceful Revolution Possible: Promoting Democracy in Venezuela and Colombia………………………………………………………...... 228
Chapter 6: No More “Zonians”: The Panamanian Challenge to U.S. Power and Image………………………………………………………………………………… 297
Chapter 7: The Dominican Crisis and the Militarization of Public Diplomacy……... 360
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………… 415
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………. 435
12 List of Images
Page
Image 1: Map of the Caribbean Basin…………………………………………………. 22
Image 2: “Saludos Amigos”…………………………………………………………… 44
Image 3: Fidel Castro Speech, courtesy of the Andrew St. George Collection……….. 73
Image 4: The Revolutionary Triumph in Cuba, courtesy of the author……………….. 79
Image 5: President Kennedy with USIA Director Edward R. Murrow, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library………………………………………………………………. 95
Image 6: Ernesto Che Guevara………………………………………………………... 105
Image 7: USIA comic book Los Secuestradores, courtesy of the Ernest Keller Papers, Georgetown University Special Collection…………………………………………… 111
Image 8: President Kennedy greets Peace Corps volunteers………………………….. 125
Image 9: Map of Guatemala…………………………………………………………... 135
Image 10: Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library………………………………………………………………………………… 140
Image 11: President Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with a delegation from Guatemala, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library………………………………… 145
Image 12: Map of Honduras…………………………………………………………... 157
Image 13: Anti-Castro USIA propaganda, courtesy of the U.S. National Archives……………………………………………………………………………….. 165
Image 14: Honduran President Ramón Villeda Morales, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library…………………………………………………………………………………. 170
Image 15: Map of Costa Rica…………………………………………………………. 185
Image 16: USIA publication El Correo Grafico, courtesy of the U.S. National Archives……………………………………………………………………………….. 197
Image 17: Teatro Nacional in Costa Rica, courtesy of the Author…………………… 202 13 Image 18: Costa Rican President José Figueres, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library………………………………………………………………………. 204
Image 19: Map of Nicaragua………………………………………………………….. 210
Image 20: Artistic depiction of Carlos Fonseca……………………………………….. 212
Image 21: Nicaraguan dictator Luis Somoza, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library…………………………………………………………………………………. 225
Image 22: Map of Venezuela………………………………………………………….. 232
Image 23: Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt………………………………… 236
Image 24: President Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy in La Morita, Venezuela, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library…………………………………. 245
Image 25: An AFL-CIO publication for Latin America sponsored by the USIA, courtesy of the U.S. National Archives……………………………………………….. 258
Image 26: Map of Colombia…………………………………………………………... 267
Image 27: Downtown Bogotá, Colombia, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library…………………………………………………………………………………. 274
Image 28: The Kennedy motorcade in Bogotá, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library………………………………………………………………………………..... 277
Image 29: Presidents Kennedy, Lleras Camargo, and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library……………………………………………… 291
Image 30: Map of Panama…………………………………………………………….. 304
Image 31: President Kennedy and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library……………………………………………………….. 308
Image 32: Former U.S. administration building in the Panama Canal Zone, courtesy of the author………………………………………………………………….. 316
Image 33: Balboa High School in the former Panama Canal Zone, courtesy of the author………………………………………………………………………………….. 324
Image 34: President Lyndon Johnson convenes a meeting in the Oval Office concerning the Panama riots, courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library…………… 332
14 Image 35: Panamanian President Omar Torrijos…………………………………… 352
Image 36: Map of the Dominican Republic………………………………………… 365
Image 37: Pro-Trujillo propaganda in the Dominican Republic……………………. 368
Image 38: President Johnson during a meeting on the Dominican Crisis, courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library…………………………………………………... 385
Image 39: U.S. soldiers hand out USIA materials to local Dominicans in Santo Domingo…………………………………………………………………………….. 391
Image 40: U.S. forces distributing a newspaper in Santo Domingo………………… 393
Image 41: Dominican leader Juan Bosch……………………………………………. 400
Image 42: Elecciones Libres, USIA cartoon distributed in the Dominican Republic, courtesy of the Ernest Keller Papers, Georgetown University Special Collection…………………………………………………………………………….. 403
Image 43: USIA publication distributed in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, courtesy of the U.S. National Archives………………………………………………. 411
Image 44: President Kennedy at an Alliance for Progress Ceremony, courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library…………………………………………………………. 417
Image 45: USIA pro-Alliance for Progress pamphlet, courtesy of the U.S. National Archives……………………………………………………………….. 421
Image 46: Support for Fidel Castro following the Cuban Revolution, courtesy of the Andrew St. George Collection………………………………………………………... 431
15 Introduction
In September 2003 the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) released a report titled Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy.
Arguing that the world’s opinion of the United States was deteriorating, particularly since the beginning of the Iraq War, the CFR recommended that public diplomacy “must be an integral part of foreign policy, not something that comes afterward to sell the foreign policy or to respond to criticism after the fact.”1 Just one month later, the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy, formed at the request of Secretary of State Colin Powell and the
United States Congress, released its own report. Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New
Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World stated that
“at a critical time in our nation’s history, the apparatus of public diplomacy has proven inadequate, especially in the Arab and Muslim world.”2
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks there was no shortage of reports in
Washington on public diplomacy, or discussions about its utilization. Even President
George W. Bush waded into the debate, “I'm amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate us. I am, I am—like most
Americans, I just can't believe it, because I know how good we are, and we've got to do a better job of making our case.”3 That case included diminishing the influence of groups such as al Qaeda and individuals like Osama Bin Laden, while also winning Arab hearts and minds.
1 Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy, 31, available from CFR Task Force Report. 2 Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World, 8, available from Advisory Group. 3 “The President’s News Conference,” October 11, 2001, APP. 16 Reaching foreign audiences and influencing public opinion around the world was certainly not new. Throughout the Cold War policymakers in Washington sought to do just that. The CFR recommendation that public diplomacy should be better integrated into actual policymaking included an interesting passage. The authors noted that following the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, Director of the United States Information
Agency (USIA) Edward R. Murrow, having little previous knowledge of the invasion attempt, argued that public diplomacy officials needed to be in on “the take-offs, not just the crash landings.”4 Murrow’s statement is important for two reasons. First, it concisely encapsulates the tension that existed, and still exists, between practitioners of public diplomacy and those in the higher echelons of policymaking circles who want to devote more energy to state-to-state relations. Second, it takes us back to a time period when
U.S. standing in Latin America was waning and public diplomacy became viewed as a vital tool to confront the rising revolutionary tide.
Following Fidel Castro’s coming to power in 1959, Cuba proved to be a perplexing opponent for Washington. The island nation did not have to commit soldiers or weaponry to advance its revolutionary agenda in Latin America. The ideas and romanticism associated with the Cuban Revolution were enough to foster anti-U.S. and pro-Cuban sentiment in the region. Historian Thomas Wright wrote that the Cuban
Revolution “embodied the aspirations and captured the imagination of Latin America’s masses as no other political movement had ever done.”5 For those Latin Americans, tired of U.S. influence in maintaining existing social and economic structures, Castro was a
4 CFR Task Force Report, 30. 5 Thomas Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (London: Praeger Publishing, 2001), 1. 17 hero standing up to “the colossus to the north.” His message of revolutionary upheaval proved alluring. He explicitly understood that “the power of Cuba is the power of its revolutionary ideas, the power of its example.”6 Castro also believed that while ideas and examples were necessary, action was also required. During the “Second Declaration of
Havana” in 1962 he proclaimed that “it is the duty of every revolutionary to make the revolution. In America and the world, it is known that the revolution will be victorious, but it is improper revolutionary behavior to sit at one’s doorstep waiting for the corpse of imperialism to pass by.”7
For U.S. policymakers, confronting Castro and his revolutionary agenda became a top priority during the 1960s. Adolf Berle, a veteran U.S. foreign policymaker with experience dating back to the Franklin Roosevelt administration, headed John Kennedy’s task force on Latin America and offered the president counsel on how best to confront the growing unrest in the region. While Berle noted the positive effects that a focus on democracy, economic development, and social reform could have, he also called on the administration to launch a “psychological offensive.”8 In his view public diplomacy efforts need to “be increased; and [its] depth of impact…intensified.”9 JFK shortly replied to Berle that he intended to expand U.S. “information-propaganda in Latin
America.”10
6 Piero Gleijeses, The Cuban Drumbeat, Castro’s Worldview: Cuban Foreign Policy in a Hostile World (New York: Seagull Books, 2009), 11. 7 Jorge Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 116 8 Frank Mora and Jerry Cooney, Paraguay and the United States: Distant Allies (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007), 162. 9 “Letter From the Chairman of the Task Force on Latin America (Berle) to President Kennedy,” July 7, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 42. 10 “Letter to Adolf Berle on Receiving Final Report of the President’s Task Force on Latin America,” July 8, 1961, APP. 18 While Historians have been right to note the use of the more conventional tools of diplomacy, including economic and military aid, other aspects of U.S. foreign relations during 1960s have been neglected. This work seeks to highlight the role played by, what historian Darlene Rivas recently termed, “tools of attraction.”11 In an attempt to co-opt the energies of the Cuban revolution and impede Fidel Castro’s influence in Latin
America, the United States waged an extensive public diplomacy campaign against the revolutionary fervor emanating from Havana.
This international history, based on research in the United States, Colombia,
Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, tells the story of
Washington’s attempt to discredit the Cuban Revolution, while simultaneously cultivating public opinion in Latin America during the 1960s. The decade offered both profound challenges and opportunities. It was in 1959 when Fidel Castro grabbed power in Cuba and his revolutionary ideology first posed a direct challenge to the United States.
By the end of the 1960s, it was clear that Cuba’s hopes of ushering in an era of profound revolutionary change had failed. Ultimately, Castro turned his attention to other parts of the globe, namely, Africa.12 It was also during this period that Latin America took on increased importance to the United States, particularly during the early to mid-part of the decade, before the Vietnam War consumed the White House.
In addition, the rise of Castro occurred just as democratic reformers in several important countries ascended. Between the years 1956 and 1960 ten Latin American
11 Darlene Rivas, H-Diplo Roundtable Review, Stephen Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), vol. XIII, No. 21 (2012), 16. 12 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 19 dictators were ousted while the well-respected Alberto Lleras Camargo became president of Colombia in 1958, Rómulo Betancourt returned to the Venezuelan presidency in 1959, and Roberto Chiari took power in Panama after a 1960 election.
Students, intellectuals, urban workers, and campesinos (peasants), all who demanded more political participation and higher standards of living, pushed these leaders. Yet, at the same time that it appeared a political shift was occurring, the new revolutionary
Cuban alternative also emerged. The contest over whose vision would succeed played out in what President John Kennedy labeled as “the most dangerous area in the world.”13
Central to U.S. efforts at conducting public diplomacy during the Cold War was the USIA. While it contained the word information in its title, that should not confuse readers. The agency engaged in both information and propaganda campaigns.
Information is used to educate or to inform, while propaganda is utilized to persuade or manipulate. Throughout its existence, the USIA did both. Historian Nicholas Cull offers a good and concise definition of USIA efforts as “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public.”14 Such actions can encompass different dimensions of U.S. government interactions with local populations, including student exchanges, publications sponsored by the United States, cultural events at U.S. binational centers, television programs, and radio broadcasts. In attempting to sway Latin American opinions of Fidel Castro, the United States could not focus solely on government to government relations; policymakers had to seek out non- state actors in the region. Washington sought to reach particular segments of Latin
13 Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 14 Nicholas Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009), 12. 20 American society. These included intellectuals, journalists, teachers, students, and peasants.
In a work of this kind a brief note on scope and terminology is necessary. The countries under study compose part of what is known as the Caribbean Basin, nations in
Latin America that border the Caribbean Sea. This area of Latin America was no stranger to U.S. power and influence and highly susceptible to pro-Castro leanings in the years immediately following the Cuban Revolution. Moreover, as Alan McPherson’s book
Yankee No! highlighted, anti-Americanism became a phenomenon that permeated in the basin throughout the 1960s.15 Regarding terminology, throughout the 20th century U.S. officials employed several definitions in classified communications when discussing ways to influence foreign publics; they included psychological warfare, political warfare, and propaganda. At the most basic level, each of these terms dealt with advancing national security interests through communicating and influencing audiences around the world. The term public diplomacy was coined for mass consumption by retired Foreign
Service officer Edmund Guillion in 1965, even though he preferred propaganda, but believed that term was often thought of as too negative.16 For the purposes of this work, public diplomacy will be used most often, but the terms mentioned above will also be utilized. Such a decision is a result of declassified documents that use the terms interchangeably.
Central to any study of propaganda is the issue of reception. The questions this work seeks to answer include what impact did U.S. public diplomacy have in Latin
15 Alan McPherson, Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). 16 Nicholas Cull, “Public Diplomacy” Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase (University of Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, 2006). 21 America? While gauging how individuals and groups respond to public diplomacy is no easy task, this dissertation will illustrate areas and programs that proved successful, and why, at times, public diplomacy was unable to assist in the advancement of U.S. national interests. Historian Kenneth Osgood writes that “to analyze effectiveness properly, one would need to have a focused case study on a narrowly defined issue, amply supported by a wide range of sources that convey the pulse of public opinion in the
‘target area’.” Osgood also highlights several questions regarding how to study effectiveness that are useful for this study. First, were information programs disseminated on a wide scale and in an effective manner? Second, did the propaganda programs impact local media outlets? Third, how did the intended audiences respond to the propaganda?
This dissertation utilizes those questions as a framework in understanding the overall impact of U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America during the 1960s. In doing so this work, through multi-archival research, demonstrates not only the origins of propaganda policy in Washington, but also the implementation and reception of those programs in
Latin American countries.
Further lines of inquiry include how public diplomacy evolved over time, both in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. It is well known that John Kennedy devoted a significant amount of attention to Latin America, but what were his views on the use of public diplomacy in the region? Moreover, how did Lyndon Johnson envision the role of influencing Latin Americans? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, was the United
States more interested in denouncing Castro’s vision or promoting its own?
22
Image 1: Map of the Caribbean Basin.
Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Relations
The reports issued in the wake of the 9/11 attacks built on a long tradition of U.S. government attempts to influence foreign public opinion. It was after U.S. entry into
World War I that propaganda became viewed as a necessity. Only a week after Congress declared war, President Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public
Information, known widely as the Creel Committee after its head George Creel. While spending time on earning support for the war in the United States, the committee also focused attention on influencing foreign publics concerning the war aims of the United
States. U.S. forces were cast as anti-imperialistic and the Wilson presidency purported to 23 be committed to self-determination. George Creel proclaimed that the committee was spreading the “gospel of Americanism.”17 This foray into government propaganda was short-lived as the Creel Committee disbanded in June of 1919 as the war came to an end.
Peacetime attempts at public diplomacy actually had their origins in Latin
America. During the 1930s, in an attempt to eschew “Big Stick” diplomacy, Franklin
Roosevelt believed better cultural relations would further enhance his Good Neighbor
Policy. Historian Justin Hart contends that Latin America became a “laboratory” for the practice of public diplomacy. An early example occurred during a 1936 Inter-American
Conference in Buenos Aires when the United States introduced the policy of each nation sponsoring the exchange of two graduate students per year. The twenty-one nations that signed the conference’s final treaty agreed to do so.18 Moreover, the first U.S. government peacetime propaganda agency was created to operate in Latin America. Led by Nelson Rockefeller, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) initially sought to improve general inter-American relations, but following the outbreak of World War II the CIAA focused its efforts on combating Nazi propaganda in Latin
America. By the early 1940s, it had a sizeable budget and over 1,000 employees.
United States efforts at reaching foreign publics during the Second World War reached well beyond the Western Hemisphere. In 1942 Roosevelt created the Office of
War Information (OWI). Noted journalist Elmer Davis ran the organization and aimed to promote the war effort at both home and abroad. Again, as at the end of World War I, the
United States government’s apparatus for conducting political warfare ended when the
17 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890- 1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 79. 18 Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 24 war concluded. President Harry Truman transferred all information programs to the
State Department. It appeared, in 1945 at least, that public diplomacy would not be a critical component of U.S. foreign policy moving forward.
The souring of U.S.-Soviet relations fundamentally altered the U.S. role in the world and also caused a reconfiguration of how Washington approached casting its image globally. In 1948 the Smith-Mundt Act expanded the State Department’s ability to conduct public diplomacy and became the first legislation passed supporting peacetime propaganda. That same year the State Department’s George Kennan pushed for more emphasis on “psychological warfare” against the Soviet Union. Following these developments, George Allen, at the time a State Department official and advocate for public diplomacy, wrote that
I am not particularly concerned whether either gunpowder or propaganda have benefited or harmed mankind. I merely emphasize, at this point, that propaganda on an immense scale is here to stay. We Americans must become informed and adept at its use, defensively and offensively, or we may find ourselves as archaic as the belted knight who refused to take gunpowder seriously 500 years ago.19
President Harry Truman eventually heeded the calls for more emphasis on propaganda and established the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) in 1951. The PSB included staffers from the Defense and State Departments as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This body devised operations to influence Soviet bloc nations and also sought to reach populations in Asia and the Middle East.
By 1953 information programs had an ardent supporter in the White House. Even while campaigning for the presidency, Dwight Eisenhower spoke of the need for what he called psychological warfare. He told a crowd in San Francisco not to “be afraid of the
19 Nancy Snow, The Arrogance of American Power: What U.S. Leaders Are Doing Wrong and Why It’s Our Duty to Dissent (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 209. 25 term just because it’s a five-dollar, five-syllable word…psychological warfare is the struggle for the minds and wills of men.”20 Eisenhower followed up his campaign rhetoric once in office with the creation of the USIA. He charged the agency with presenting “to the world the policies and objectives of the United States.” Eisenhower’s decision to establish a full-time public diplomacy agency was connected to his past experiences.21 Historian Kenneth Osgood argues that the general came to view psychological warfare as a vitally important weapon during World War II. C.D. Jackson, head of propaganda for the U.S. campaigns in Europe and North Africa, and later an adviser to President Eisenhower, recalled, “Too much credit cannot be given to
Eisenhower and his staff for having overcome the original hurdle of soldierly distrust, and for having accepted [psychological warfare] as something more than a newfangled nuisance.”22
From the Creel Committee “selling democracy” to contesting Nazi influence in the Americas, reaching and influencing foreign audiences became a component of U.S. foreign policy. Yet, it was the superpower struggle following the Second World War that made an agency devoted to information programs a necessity. That conflict, born out of tensions surrounding occupation forces, atomic weapons, and economic aid became a total cold war.
20 Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 77. 21 Dwight Eisenhower, “Statement by the President on the Responsibility of the United States Information Agency,” July 30, 1953, APP. 22 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 48. 26 Themes and Organization
Throughout this work four primary themes will be developed. First, it will be demonstrated that public diplomacy became an optimum weapon in the U.S. diplomatic arsenal during the 1960s. U.S.-Latin American relations during the first half of the twentieth century were mostly characterized by periodic U.S. military interventions, at times followed up by significant occupations. Covert action, military assistance programs, and support of right-wing dictators came to define early post-1945 U.S. approaches to the region, but by the late 1950s something changed. Rising anti-U.S. sentiment collided with Fidel Castro’s revolution. The young leader’s ability to tap into
Latin American feelings of frustration and hope made it clear in Washington that the
“masses” could no longer be ignored. This study contends that public diplomacy, as a tool to advance national security interests, became central to combating revolutionary
Cuba’s ambitious agenda in Latin America. A House Foreign Relations Committee report from 1964 supports that assertion,
For many years military and economic power, used separately, or in conjunction, have served as the pillars of diplomacy. They still serve that function but the recent increase in influence of the masses of the people over government, together with greater awareness on the part of the leaders of the aspirations of people… has created a new dimension of foreign policy operations. Certain foreign policy objectives can be pursued by dealing directly with the people of foreign countries, rather than with their governments.23
For their part, historians have yet to examine public diplomacy during the 1960s; this is the first systematic regional study of the subject during that decade. Justin Hart’s recent work, Empire of Ideas, traces the origins of public diplomacy but ends its inquiry in the early 1950s. Kenneth Osgood’s Total Cold War analyzes President Eisenhower’s
23 Herbert Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 56. 27 propaganda campaign both at home and against the Soviet Union abroad. Laura
Belmonte’s Selling the American Way examines how the USIA sought to cast the United
States as the true beacon of freedom during the 1950s, all the while disregarding the inherent inequalities in American society. Nicholas Cull’s The Cold War and the United
States Information Agency is a standard narrative of the history of U.S. public diplomacy from 1945 to the end of the Cold War. In that, it includes chapters on the 1960s. While thorough and well documented, it is short on interpretations. Even with the laudable work published by these scholars, the burgeoning field of public diplomacy still offers many avenues of inquiry.24 Moreover, there is a need for scholars to go beyond just
Washington’s implementation of information policy and examine how U.S. propaganda efforts played out on the ground. Through research in Latin American archives this dissertation will illustrate how public diplomacy operations intersected with local realities. While acknowledging the importance of local conditions, the shortcomings of the United States should not be absolved. Too often public diplomacy was not fully incorporated into overall foreign policy goals, and much too often U.S. words did not match U.S. deeds.
This dissertation also examines the ebb and flow of U.S. public diplomacy in
Latin America during the 1960s. The decade began with the transition from the
Eisenhower to Kennedy. While Ike had developed a powerful propaganda apparatus in the USIA, the administration lacked a clear and cohesive strategy towards Latin America.
Moreover, the primary focus of agency operations in the region focused on selling U.S.
24 Hart, Empire of Ideas; Osgood, Total Cold War; Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945- 1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 28 business and the merits of a free market system. Overall, much more of a focus was placed on countries behind the Iron Curtain during the 1950s. During the Kennedy years there was new emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and a substantial focus on selling the economic development program the Alliance for Progress and curtailing Fidel
Castro’s influence in the region. Rather than centering operations on the virtues of U.S. business, the USIA during the Kennedy era sought to sell a vision of U.S. led development. Though the Johnson administration initially supported a continuation of the
New Frontier’s Latin American approach, regional and global events overwhelmed any comprehensive propaganda plan. LBJ faced crises in Panama and the Dominican
Republic early in his presidency and then confronted an escalating war in Vietnam.
Johnson’s most extensive use of public diplomacy was when he sent a USIA team to the
Dominican Republic (DR), shortly after U.S. marines arrived, in order to sell the first
U.S. intervention in the hemisphere in decades. Using the USIA as battlefield tool in the
DR laid the foundation for an intensive psychological program led by the agency in
Vietnam.25 Ultimately, by the end of the 1960s the U.S. propaganda approach in Latin
America reverted back to a focus more on promoting free markets and less on development. Gone from U.S. public diplomacy was the sense of idealism and expectations that characterized the early years of the decade.
The second theme developed in this study deals with presidential leadership in advancing national security through influencing foreign publics. While it is well known that John Kennedy made use of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and covert actions
25 For more on USIA operations in Vietnam refer to Robert Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). 29 during his presidency, JFK also focused attention on improving standards of living in the developing world. In 1961 he established the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and that same year he announced the Alliance for Progress, a multi-year economic development program in Latin America.26 Historian Stephen Rabe, a noted scholar on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, argues that Kennedy’s decision to wage the Cold War in Latin America caused the “mutilation” of his developmental goals. In a traditional approach, relying exclusively on U.S. documents, Rabe focuses on high level diplomatic exchanges. He writes that “President Kennedy and his advisors valued stability and anticommunism over the rule of law in Latin America.”27 Such a conclusion is simplistic, particularly when scholars take into account that the Kennedy administration approached each country in a different manner. This dissertation posits that by examining JFK’s efforts at public diplomacy, coupled with an understanding of the political realities that existed in Latin America, a more nuanced foreign policy than previously thought comes into view. To put it simply, the United States never dictated outcomes in the region.
Kennedy purported to be gravely concerned with global public opinion and consistently argued that the United States needed to be on the side of reform in many
Third World battlegrounds. At times, his administration strenuously promoted democratic regimes. At the same time, as this study will demonstrate, too often public diplomacy was not fully incorporated into overall foreign policy goals, and much too often U.S. actions fell short of stated goals. Historians Rabe, Jeffrey Taffet, Philip Muehlenbeck, and Robert
26 For a recent study on Kennedy’s developmental efforts in Latin America refer to Thomas Field, From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and The Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). 27 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 124. 30 Rakove have all documented aspects of Kennedy’s foreign policy, yet none has offered a detailed discussion of his attempts at public diplomacy, this study seeks to fill that lacuna.28 Moreover, the vast majority of scholarship on Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, in the realm of foreign policy, focuses on the Americanization of the war in Vietnam. His record in Latin America has almost been completely ignored, save for a few articles and book chapters.29 However, Latin America was an important region during the Johnson years, particularly during the first two years of his presidency, 1964-1965.
The importance of foreign public opinion and its ability to fundamentally alter the global landscape, as witnessed by the recent Arab Spring, makes it imperative that diplomatic historians take seriously past presidential efforts to shape the U.S. image abroad. In sum, while much is known regarding the foreign policies of Kennedy and
Johnson, notably absent is a discussion on how these presidents to cultivate public opinion around the world. Understanding their views and use of public diplomacy allows for a more complete understanding of their respective presidencies. Furthermore, a close examination of public diplomacy in Latin America can shed light on one of the most important challenges for any president—how they harness and project U.S. influence around the world.
28 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World; Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007); Philip Muehlenback, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Robert Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 29 Alan McPherson, “Latin America,” in A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson, ed. Mitchell Lerner (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 387-405; Joseph Tulchin, “The Promise of Progress: U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson," in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968, eds. Warren Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 211-243. 31 The third theme of this work speaks to is the ongoing debate surrounding the nature of Latin America’s Cold War. This study seeks to recast how historians view post-
1945 inter-American relations and the terminology they employ. It also presents Latin
American historical trajectory during the latter half of the 20th century as more than just conflict beset by political violence. 30 Though military assistance and covert actions did occur, a more complete understanding of U.S. foreign policy in the region must take into account public diplomacy. The region was not merely a “killing zone” where the United
States brought about violent outcomes, but an arena of competing visions.31 Winning hearts and minds and attempting to alter public opinion were important objectives of U.S. policymakers, and in many instances local political realities aided in determining just how much of an effect Washington could have. The lack of democratic regimes in the region, answerable to their citizens, created a difficult atmosphere for the United States to promote widespread reform.
Recently, in an edited collection dedicated to new approaches in Latin America’s
Cold War history, noted scholar of inter-American relations Alan McPherson introduced an interesting paradox, which “holds that the more historians find out about the Cold War in the hemisphere, the more the Cold War itself fades into the background.”32 This study seeks to explore that “paradox” further. A close examination of U.S. public diplomacy in
Latin America during the 1960s calls into question just how historians should study the
“Cold War” in the region. Local tensions, exacerbated by the Cuban Revolution, most
30 Political violence by both the left and right is the main focus of Hal Brands’ recent work Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 31 Stephen Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012). 32 Alan McPherson, “Afterword” in Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War, edited by Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio Morena (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 307. 32 clearly help explain the course of post-1945 U.S.-Latin American relations. In essence, the battle waged by the United States in Latin America during the 1960s, more often than not, was not tied to the larger “Global Cold War” where both U.S. and Soviet interventionism ruled the day.33 Rather than thinking globally, historians studying the political and social dimensions of Latin America’s long 20th century need to look locally.
Fidel Castro was from a long line of Latin American leaders in the 20th century who sought to defy the United States. He followed in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s Augusto
Sandino and Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz. Here, public diplomacy can be instructive.
Attempts by the USIA to influence the region consistently revolved around questions over democratization, dictatorship, economic aid, and how to respond to revolutionary nationalism. These issues did not develop from a “Global Cold War,” but rather were constant throughout what historian Greg Grandin called “Latin America’s revolutionary twentieth century.”34
The most important issue at hand in Latin America was who would be politically represented. At its most basic level, the struggle that occurred in the region originated from conflict between the underrepresented and entrenched elites. Regional events, such as the Cuban Revolution, heightened those tensions. Along the way, and through its public diplomacy, Washington sought to strike a balance between harnessing the aspirations of the oppressed and catering to the wishes of the ruling elites. As a result, conflict with Cuba arose by Washington seeking to maintain its position of influence in
33 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 34 Greg Grandin, “Living in Revolutionary Time: Coming to Terms with the Violence of Latin America’s Long Cold War,” in A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War, eds. Greg Grandin and Gilbert Joseph (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 28. 33 Latin America. U.S. public diplomacy in the region developed a singular inter-
American focus, promoting the United States as a force for good in the region and discrediting a local challenge in Fidel Castro. While the Soviet Union perhaps desired a more prominent role in the region, it never developed a cohesive strategy towards Latin
America. Soviet support of Cuba proved to be more problematic as more often than not,
Moscow and Havana disagreed over just how revolutionary a foreign policy should be implemented. In this way, the U.S. Cold War in Latin America owed more to local conditions.
In essence, this dissertation argues for a fundamental reconceptualization of how historians study 20th century inter-American relations. For too long historians have utilized the term Cold War to describe the political, social, and cultural developments that took place in the inter-American system during the post-World War II period. As the superpower struggle between Washington and Moscow did not define developments in the Western Hemisphere, a new conceptual framework is necessary to better appreciate the regional dynamics. Rather than appropriaitng the Cold War to describe U.S.-Latin
American relations, scholars should view the trajectory of revolution and resistance that engulfed Latin America during the latter half of the 20th century as the “Cuban Moment.”
From 1959 forward Cuba shook off its colonial, and neocolonial, past and challenged the
United States in the Western Hemisphere. Both Washington and other governments throughout Latin America focused intently on developments in Havana and the possibility of Castro’s revolutionary vision dominating the region. This “moment” did not originate by way of the Cold War nor did it end with the collapse of the Soviet Union as evident by the contentious nature of U.S-Cuban relations into the 21st century. 34 The final theme under discussion concerns Fidel Castro’s foreign policy and his failure to successfully export the Cuban Revolution to other areas of Latin America.
Despite numerous pronouncements of the need for hemispheric revolution and some tangible support for guerilla groups operating in Latin America, there were no more
Cubas during the 1960s. While Jorge Domínguez and Piero Gleijeses have written on
Castro’s goals to make the world safe for revolution and his ideological commitment to doing that, more scholarship needs to be devoted to the Cuban record in the region. While the United States consistently saw revolutionary turmoil, civil strife, or challenges to existing governments in Latin America as either Cuban supported or inspired, documents from the foreign ministry in Havana tells a different story. Though Castro galvanized large crowds and earned admirers from around the world, all the while creating fear in the
White House that the Cuban Revolution was set for export, his revolutionary government also had a realistic worldview. This work will demonstrate that Washington continually overestimated Cuban involvement in the internal affairs of neighboring nations, as Fidel
Castro’s foreign policy in the region proved to be pragmatic.
This dissertation begins by discussing U.S.-Latin American relations at the end of
World War II and concludes in the late 1960s. Chapter 1 examines the early postwar the period up to the Cuban Revolution. While Washington was successful at sustaining a dominant role in the inter-American system, even creating new avenues for power, by the end of the 1950s the burgeoning anti-American resistance in the region threatened to upend U.S. influence. Nothing illustrated this more than the rise of Fidel Castro and his revolution’s regional appeal. Chapter 2 explores how the Kennedy administration approached public diplomacy towards Latin America. The central question here will 35 include just what did John Kennedy want out of public diplomacy in Latin America?
Desiring to implement more enlightened policies in the region than his predecessor, this chapter will demonstrate that the administration not only pursued economic development and military assistance, but also implemented an extensive public diplomacy campaign.
The next three chapters focus on Kennedy administration efforts in Central and
South America. Chapter 3 is devoted to Guatemala and Honduras while chapter 4 looks at policies and operations in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Central America became critically important due to its closeness to Cuba and population demographics. The widespread inequality in these countries, coupled with their vulnerability to guerilla warfare created an atmosphere ripe for a second Cuba. In attempting to blunt Castro’s influence and promote a U.S. led vision of reform the USIA sought inroads with students, teachers, and labor. President Kennedy himself aided in this venture when he visited
Costa Rica in 1963 for a meeting of Central American leaders.
In Costa Rica Washington found dependable partners in leader José Figueres and his allies. They accepted U.S. support and worked diligently to lead their country down a peaceful path of reform. In complete contrast, U.S. public diplomacy struggled in
Nicaragua as the ruling Somoza family dictatorship proved to be an obstacle to USIA campaigns designed to sell a vision of reform. The lack of cooperation found in Managua demonstrated the importance of having reliable allies in order for public diplomacy to be successful. Honduras and Guatemala also provided challenges as their fragile political systems were not always amenable to U.S. modernization efforts. At the same time, though the prospects existed for liberal reform leaders to maintain power in Tegucigalpa and Guatemala City, the Kennedy administration erred in not definitely supporting 36 democracy. U.S. policymakers wrongly eschewed individuals such as Ramón Villeda
Morales and Juan Arévalo
Chapter 5 shifts to South America and explores Venezuela and Colombia. The choice to focus here reflects the importance the Kennedy administration placed on these two countries. Due to its large population, oil wealth, and recent development of democratic government by way of the election of Rómulo Betancourt, Venezuela became a key country in Washington’s strategic vision. Concerning Colombia, the Kennedy administration hoped that it could become an example, along with Venezuela, of a viable
Latin American capitalist democracy. Following the ousting of military rule in the late
1950s, Colombia enjoyed a democratic period. U.S. policymakers viewed these two countries as offering the best chance for the United States vision of modernity to succeed in Latin America. Special attention will be afforded to Kennedy’s December 1961 visit to
Caracas and Bogota. Through the leadership of Betancourt and Lleras Camargo,
Venezuela and Colombia became prime examples of what Washington led development could achieve. In the end, this chapter showcases the often overlooked aspect of the promotion of democracy in Latin America during the Kennedy years.
In turning towards public diplomacy during the Lyndon Johnson presidency, the final two chapters, 6 and 7, analyze two crises that erupted during LBJ’s time in office.
First, the uprising that broke out in Panama in January 1964 and second, the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in May of 1965. Following violent riots, caused by tension surrounding the flying of country flags in the Canal Zone, the Johnson administration utilized the USIA to tamp down anti-American sentiment and attempt to improve the image of the United States. Panama differed, to a certain extent, from other 37 countries under review in this dissertation due to existence of the canal. U.S. power confronted Panamanians on an everyday basis, thus forcing them to constantly question their nation’s sovereignty. While the riots stemmed from growing discontent regarding the parameters of the canal treaty, the Johnson administration initially saw Cuba’s hand in stoking the unrest. Moreover, the USIA devoted too many resources to anti-Castroism as a main theme in post-1964 Panama. Washington’s reluctance to immediately admit fundamental changes in their approach to Panama only fueled continued anger amongst
Panamanians. That resentment aided in the rise of nationalist General Omar Torrijos who took power in 1968 and worked tirelessly to ultimately earn a new treaty in 1979.
While U.S. policymakers sought to alleviate anti-Americanism in Panama through public diplomacy, they were faced with a larger and more pressing situation in the
Dominican Republic (DR). The rule of Rafael Trujillo, in power for over three decades, impeded Dominican society from developing socially, culturally, and politically. Due to rampant unrest following Trujillo’s ouster in 1961, U.S. public diplomacy focused on attempting to build up a democratic conscience and promote stability rather than selling the idea of far-reaching economic development through the Alliance for Progress. The situation further deteriorated in 1965 when a civil conflict erupted between political factions vying for power. Again fearing Castro machinations, Lyndon Johnson intervened by ordering U.S. marines to the DR. The Dominican intervention also heavily involved the USIA as President Johnson personally requested agency assistance. He ordered
Director Carl Rowan to deploy an agency team even before all 23,000 troops had landed.
U.S. policymakers lauded the USIA’s performance during and after the conflict, so much so that it helped the agency earn an increasing role in the U.S. war in Vietnam. 38 Collectively, these chapters illustrate several common elements concerning
U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America during the 1960s. First, propaganda was never static as each administration approached the goal of winning hearts and minds differently.
While John Kennedy implemented a wide-ranging public diplomacy program, Lyndon
Johnson’s personal utilization of the USIA proved more intermittent. Second, U.S. psychological operations showed a keen ability to recognize distinct local realities in each country. The agency executed programs and operations for specific countries based on particular demographic, racial, and class differences. Finally, U.S. public diplomacy consistently focused on Fidel Castro as U.S. policymakers came to believe that any unrest in Latin America was likely instigated from Havana. While revolutionary Cuba did inspire much animosity towards the United States in the region, it was not the sole driving force behind Latin American discontent. The USIA’s focus on Castro proved detrimental at times as it prevented policymakers from accurately assessing the sources of unrest and implementing effective public diplomacy campaigns.
Following the end of the Cold War the need for extensive and wide-ranging public diplomacy programs declined, at least in the view of many in Washington. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the United States had triumphed; the world was entering “the end of history.”35 The lack of ideological struggle during the 1990s made the USIA look more and more outdated. In fact, by the end of the decade the agency no longer existed. In the wake of the September 11th attacks the United States once again found itself in an ideologcial struggle for the hearts and minds of the Arab world. In recent times the wars in the Middle East and the Arab Spring underline the importance of
35 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 3-18. 39 public diplomacy efforts to reach the “Arab Street.” These recent developments make it important to step back and examine previous ideological struggles and how they were waged. The account that follows aims to demonstrate that central to Latin America’s
Cold War was a battle of ideas. Revolutionary Cuba proposed a vision that sought to overturn the dominant position held by the United States. For its part, Washington tried to win the support of Latin Americans for its goal of gradual and peaceful change, all while trying to foil to the new liberator of the region, Fidel Castro.
40 Chapter 1: “Go Line Them Up”: The Resurgence of Anti-Americanism
and the Making of a Critical Decade, 1945-1959
In April 1945, at the founding conference of the United Nations (UN), diplomats and policymakers from around the world gathered in San Francisco to vote on articles and the charter of the newly formed global organization. Unlike many African and Asian nations, still under colonial rule, Latin American countries could fully participate. Yet, their representatives needed to follow Washington’s lead. When Latin American leaders showed autonomy in their voting, a U.S. senator approached Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Nelson Rockefeller and declared to the diplomat that “your God- damned peanut nations aren’t voting right. Go line them up.”36
The senator’s avowal to Rockefeller underscored the lengthy and contentious history that comprised U.S.-Latin American relations, while also highlighting the tensions that existed following the Second World War. The years from 1945 to 1959 were critical to the inter-American system. During this brief period Latin America experienced a wave of democratization, a reversion back to dictatorship, the signing of important pacts and treaties with the United States, the emergence of revolutionary nationalism, a resurgence of anti-Americanism, and finally the culminating event of the period, the Cuban Revolution. All along the way U.S. policymakers sought to “line up”
Latin American nations by implementing policies to help provide stability and maintain
U.S. influence. By the end of the 1950s, U.S. standing in the region was teetering as a young, charismatic, and revolutionary leader took power in Havana.
36 Alan McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945 (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), 20. 41 From Democracy to Dictatorship
In the years that immediately preceded 1945, U.S.-Latin American relations operated under the policy of the Good Neighbor. This approach can be traced back to
Herbert Hoover when he stated that his administration “established goodwill in Latin
America not hitherto known for many years, under the specific term Good Neighbor.”37
Though Hoover coined the term, Franklin Roosevelt’s administration attempted to implement the policy. The Good Neighbor approach consisted of political, economic and cultural facets. U.S. policymakers reached the conclusion that military intervention was too costly, and in some cases counterproductive. The Roosevelt administration believed that by offering Latin America political concessions, the United States would receive economic advantages in the region. Roosevelt also hoped to increases cultural ties as he continually pointed out that while the Old World (Europe) continued falling to dictatorial governments, the New World stood for justice and democracy under the leadership of the
United States.38
Roosevelt called for the implementation of the policy as early as his first inaugural address in 1933 when he stated that “in the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.”39 In December 1933 Secretary of State Cordell Hull reiterated this approach
37 Bryce Wood, “The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy,” in Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.- Latin American Relations, eds. Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 106. 38 Peter Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 73-75. 39 “Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1933, APP. 42 while speaking at a conference of American states in Montevideo, Uruguay. He declared "no country has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”40 President Roosevelt shortly thereafter echoed that opinion in a speech to the
Woodrow Wilson Foundation on policy towards Latin America, when he declared, “The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.”41
After the attacks on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, all nine Central American and Caribbean nations declared war on the Axis powers. Colombia, Venezuela, and
Mexico all soon followed suit. By January 1942 eighteen Latin American nations had severed ties with Axis nations. Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle concluded, “If a policy paid dividends, the Good Neighbor policy has. So far, they [Latin America] are sticking to us with scarcely a break and you will have a united hemisphere.”42 For their firm stand against Nazism and Japanese militarism during the war, leaders in Latin
America expected to be rewarded when the conflict concluded. At the very least, they hoped for the Good Neighbor Policy would to remain in effect.
Latin American governments experienced profound changes towards the end of the World War II. Widespread political transformations, wrought by the global conflagration of the 1940s were not confined only to Europe and Asia. A wave of democratization took hold in Latin America. In some instances countries continued democratic practices, while in others the base of political participation expanded.
Elections with relatively high participation took place in several countries, including
40 Walter LaFeber, The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to Present, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1994), 376. 41 “Address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation,” December 28, 1933, APP. 42 Irwin Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America. 1933-1945 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 121-125. 43 Chile (1946), Colombia (1946), Costa Rica (1944), Cuba (1944), Guatemala (1944), and Peru (1945). The reasons for this occurrence are complex. Historians Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough point to several factors. First, the allied victory in the war proved critical. The conflict reinforced existing political, economic, and military ties between the
United States and Latin America. Even before hostilities officially ended, ruling elites in
Latin America concluded that a U.S. victory would necessitate some political adjustments. Second, the rise of an urban middle class in Latin America, a process that began prior to World War II, combined with the growing urban working class, in part a by-product of the U.S. need for wartime materials, created internal pressure for more open political systems.
Exacerbating the political situation was the high volume of pro-allied propaganda the United States transmitted to Latin America during the war. This task fell to Nelson
Rockefeller, head of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Rockefeller put into action a public diplomacy campaign on a widespread scale. U.S. citizens residing in the region helped with the effort by distributing pro-U.S. propaganda as coordination committees disseminated posters and pamphlets. They also sponsored film viewings. The themes included the importance of the fight taking place between democracy and totalitarianism and the idea of Pan-Americanism. Propaganda materials consistently made the argument in favor of hemispheric solidarity. The works of well-known U.S. citizens found their way onto Latin American airwaves. Local radio programs included a collection of Walt Whitman’s writings on democracy.43 The United States even enlisted the help of Walt Disney. In 1941 the State Department sponsored a goodwill trip for
43 Thomas Leonard, “Central America: On the Periphery,” in Latin America during World War II, eds. Thomas Leonard and John Bratzel (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 47-48. 44 Disney and several of his writers and artists. They toured Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and
Peru. Disney chronicles this trip, along with animated stories including Donald Duck and
Goofy, in the 1942 short-film Saludos Amigos (Greetings Friends). Released throughout
Latin America, U.S. officials hoped to enhance the cultural understanding between the
United States and Latin America. The film also introduced a new Disney character, a cigar-smoking parrot from Rio de Janeiro known as José Carioca.44
Image 2: Saludos Amigos.
44 Dale Adams, “Saludos Amigos: Hollywood and FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy,” Quarterly Review of Film and Video, 24 (2007), 289-295. 45 A further feature of this period included the expansion of organized labor in many Latin American cities. While service and transportation sectors were important aspects of the pre-World War II economy, wartime production fundamentally altered industry in Latin America. In Mexico, over 300,000 people became industrial workers between 1940 and 1945. Argentina added over 200,000 and by 1950 Brazil had over one million manufacturing workers. It should be noted that these patterns of growth differed from country to country. Those nations, such as Brazil, that already had a large urban class experienced a much more rapid rise in industry. An increase in union membership accompanied the growth. The number of union members in Argentina in 1941 stood at
448,000, which increased to over two million by 1949. Brazil had over 700,000 union workers by 1947. Even Colombia, not known as an industrial power, had over 150,000 union members by late in the decade. The Confederación de Trabajadores de América
Latina (Confederation of Latin American Workers, CTAL) increased its popularity, maintaining that they held influence in sixteen Latin American nations with over three million members.45 Though the numbers signified important changes, the way in which unions sought to operate was also significant. Rather than keeping close ties to governments, unions sought more autonomy in the spirit of democratization.
The postwar push towards more democracy also opened up opportunities for more leftist elements to operate freely. Communist parties were legalized, or at least allowed to exist in most Latin American countries by the mid-1940s. As a result membership grew significantly; from less than 100,000 in 1939 to 500,000 Communist Party members in
45 Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, “The Postwar Conjuncture in Latin America: Democracy, Labor, and the Left,” in Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948, eds. Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13. 46 Latin America by 1947.46 Due to their support of the allied fight against fascism, communists in Latin America lined up behind non-communist government leaders. Also aiding in the communist surge was the fact that Latin American Communist parties adhered to the Popular Front strategy introduced by the Comintern in 1934. This called for more coalition building and collaboration between communists and other members of the left, primarily in order to fend off the rise of fascism. A further cause for party growth included that fact that many individuals viewed Latin American communists as not being tied to a foreign power. Such a view became even more popular once the Comintern dissolved in 1943 and Latin America communists were left to their own devices in many instances. While they might have welcomed more Soviet support, none was forthcoming.
In fact, the Soviet Union never established much of a presence in Latin America during the first half of the 20th century. By the end of WWII only Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and
Uruguay had formal diplomatic relations with the Soviets.47 Furthermore, the Committee for State Security (KGB) had residencies in only three Latin American capitals, Mexico
City, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. Joseph Stalin once remarked that the twenty Latin
American countries were the “obedient army of the United States.”48
The ultimate importance of the democratization movement in Latin America during the late 1940s was the response it engendered. The opening of political participation, growth in labor unions, and legalization of political parties offered new opportunities for many segments of Latin American society, while simultaneously
46 Ibid, 10. 47 Leon Gouré and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975), 129. 48 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2005), 27. 47 threatening the position held by established elites and the military. By 1948 the changes proved too much for the entrenched ruling elites. Coups in Peru and Venezuela brought military dictators to power. Democracies continued to fall in the early 1950s when General Fulgencio Batista took control in Cuba while General Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla took power in Colombia. By the end of 1954 dictators ruled the majority of Latin
American nations. While each country’s government had stark differences, they also held commonalities. In many instances military leaders declared Communist parties illegal, removed leftist labor leaders from unions, and canceled regular free and fair elections.
During this shift from democracy to dictatorship U.S. policymakers watched events closely, but did not issue strong rebukes of military takeovers. Though during the war Washington had actively promoted the ideals of representative government in opposition to fascism; democracy could be a messy process leading to instability. As the administration of Harry Truman focused on rebuilding Western Europe, U.S. leaders did not seek to push too much change on Latin Americans. Two standard lines of argumentation exist among historians as to why the United States eschewed the wave of democratization in Latin America and supported military dictatorships. The first contends that fearing encroachment by the Soviet Union in the region, U.S. policymakers chose to back strong, anti-democratic, and anti-communist leaders. The second posits that the
United States consistently sought allies that would not harm U.S. economic interests in the region, even if those allies were dictatorial strongmen. In truth, the support for dictators owed more to U.S. views on Latin American inabilities to implement good governance. Secretary of State Dean Acheson recalled that Latin America of the late
1940s held “an explosive population, stagnant economy, archaic society, primitive 48 politics, massive ignorance, illiteracy, and poverty.”49 In 1950, the father of containment, George Kennan visited several Latin American nations, including Mexico,
Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Panama. He came away highly disturbed.
Kennan recoiled at the traffic jams, the noise at night, and the vast disparities between the have and the have-nots. The official reason for the trip included a U.S. Ambassadors meeting in the region. Kennan later wrote about feeling embarrassed that he had to engage in diplomacy in such places.50 Upon his return he wrote a scathing report on Latin
America’s future. He reasoned that while an external challenge from the Soviet Union would not be on the immediate horizon, internal subversion by local communists remained a potential threat. Kennan held nothing back when discussing democracy in
Latin America. He rationalized that the citizens of the region could not implement democracy and that “it is better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and penetrated by communists.”51 While harsh and, at times, overtly xenophobic, some of Kennan’s conclusions were buttressed by Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller. A more seasoned Latin
American diplomat, Miller agreed that democracy would be difficult in the region. He cautioned U.S. policymakers to be patient regarding dictatorships “as long as they do not involve Western Hemisphere security…or totalitarian infiltration.”52
49 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton & Company, 1967), 257-258. 50 Stephen Rabe, The Killing Zone, 23. 51 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 24. 52 Ibid, 24. 49 Maintaining U.S. Influence
For the support given during World War II Latin American governments expected a continuation of a more equitable relationship. On the top of the list was economic aid.
For its part, the United States focused more attention on rebuilding postwar Europe. Yet, through conferences, pacts, and military assistance the Truman administration maintained
U.S. influence in the region. Washington also proved adept at postponing and delaying any discussions on monetary support. At a February 1945 inter-American conference, held just outside Mexico City in Chapultepec, the United States hoped hemispheric security would be the number one priority, while the top issue concerning Latin
American governments remained economic aid. Following meetings in Washington just before the conference, Merwin Bohan, a technical adviser in the U.S. delegation wrote to the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs that he “left
Washington with a briefcase full of ideas and little in the way of a general conception of our approach to the economic problems which will arise in the forthcoming conference.”53 The United States had to decide how much responsibility it wanted to take regarding economic aid for Latin America. Bohan continued that “we asked for and obtained the help of Latin America in the prosecution of the war—Latin America will ask, and we must give, help in the transition from war to peace.”54
The answer to Bohan’s inquiries was to divide any discussion over aid into three sections: wartime, transition, and postwar. Regarding wartime, the United States pushed for continued inter-American cooperation until the conclusion of hostilities. Concerning
53 “Memorandum from Mr. Merwin L. Bohan (a Technical Officer of the delegation) to Mr. John McClintock, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rockefeller),” January 27, 1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. IX, 64. 54 Ibid, 64. 50 the transition and postwar aspects, an emphasis on liberal free-trade policies needed to be adopted if anyone raised the issue of U.S. support. Not surprisingly, the Mexican
Foreign Minister wanted to discuss the postwar section most. A U.S. diplomat in the meeting recalled that “his dynamic personality and the deep sincerity with which he expressed his ideas was not only stimulating but almost hypnotic.”55 The minister pushed for aid along the lines of New Deal style programs. Holding nothing back when discussing the need for tangible progress, “He pointed out that people are no longer moved by pamphlets filled with high sounding principles and that the way to the heart of the masses is through raising the standard of living and bringing about the economic development of the countries of Latin America.”56 The Mexican Foreign Minister proved to be a keen observer of Latin American affairs. U.S. policymakers received numerous economic aid requests just prior to the conference. The Colombian government sought more trucks and tires, along with other agricultural equipment.57 The U.S. Embassy in
Panama City reported that Panamanian officials would bring up a ten million dollar loan and help in the construction of a concrete highway. In order to avoid these types of requests, Washington cautioned ambassadors throughout Latin America to make it clear that only hemispheric issues should be debated in Mexico City; individual nation requests could be discussed at a later date.58
U.S. officials hoped the conference would focus on defense, and they achieved what they wanted with the Act of Chapultepec in March 1945. The principle of collective
55 “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Merwin L. Bohan, a Technical Officer of the delegation,” January 29, 1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. IX, 72. 56 Ibid, 72-73. 57 “The Ambassador in Colombia (Wiley) to the Secretary of State,” January 30, 1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. IX, 20. 58 “The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Panama,” February 10, 1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. IX, 30. 51 security, considering an attack on one nation as an attack on all, received approval.
Historian Alan McPherson wrote that the Act of Chapultepec “was the crowning achievement of President Franklin Roosevelt in Latin American affairs.”59 It also proved to be one of his last accomplishments as FDR died a month after the conference. In order to placate Latin American delegations more concerned about economic issues, the United
States voted in support of an inter-American economic conference to take place in June
1945. That meeting never materialized, and the American republics did not convene again for another two years.
When American delegates gathered in Rio de Janeiro in August 1947, U.S. policymakers again hoped to concentrate on security issues rather than economic aid. On
September 2 the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, more commonly known as the Rio Pact, was signed. It reiterated the principle of collective security, but more importantly it stated that disagreements between nations should first try to be resolved in the Inter-American system. The pact stated that “high Contracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement……in the Inter-American System before referring it to the General
Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations.”60 With the Soviet Union holding veto power in the U.N., settling regional issues locally remained imperative for
Washington. Once again, security issues stood at the forefront at an inter-American conference, though Latin American delegates continually brought up the need for substantive discussions concerning economic aid to take place. Soon after U.S. Secretary
59 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Biter Struggles, 19. 60 James W. Gantenbein, ed. The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy: A Documentary Record (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 823. 52 of State George Marshall addressed conference goers, Guatemala’s Minister of
Finance Carlos Leonidas Acevado delivered an address stressing that economic considerations should also be included in delegation discussions.61 Any hopes that economic aid comparable with the Marshall Plan would be given to Latin American governments for agreeing to the Rio Pact were dashed when Harry Truman addressed the conference at the closing ceremonies. Having arrived in Rio de Janeiro aboard the USS
Missouri, the very ship on which the Japanese had surrendered, many Latin American delegates hoped for a dramatic announcement. The president disappointed, declaring that
“the problems of countries in this hemisphere are different in nature and cannot be relieved by the same means and the same approaches which are in contemplation in
Europe.”62 Truman had previously made his opinion known during an August 14 press conference, several weeks before he arrived in Brazil. When asked if “the United States
[was] taking any notice of the clamor on the part of Western Hemisphere nations for a
Marshall Plan, as it were, of their own,” Truman responded “well, I think there has always been a Marshall Plan in effect for the Western Hemisphere. The foreign policy of the United States in that direction has been set for one hundred years, known as the
Monroe Doctrine.”63 Once again, United States actions had dissatisfied Latin American leaders. Soon after the conference, the Chilean delegation announced that economic issues must be addressed in the “immediate future.” Venezuela’s Minister of Foreign
61 “The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Marshall) to the Acting Secretary of State,” August 21, 1947, FRUS, 1947, vol. III, 52. 62 Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations since 1889 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 124. 63 “The President’s News Conference,” August 14, 1947, Harry Truman Library, available from Truman Library. 53 Relations, Carlos Morales, echoed that sentiment and hoped that economic aid agreements could soon be reached.64
U.S. policymakers were proving themselves quite adept at earning agreements they desired without having to make too many concessions. In the spring of 1948 Latin
American delegates and their U.S. counterparts convened once again, this time in Bogotá,
Colombia. In preparing for the conference, U.S. diplomats knew that economic aid would be a subject pushed by other delegations, and in inter-departmental memorandums they assessed that “to the Latin American countries economic development is a foremost objective of national polity. At international conferences, at United Nations meetings and whenever the opportunity arises, they have actively sought measures to promote economic development…they have been increasingly dissatisfied over their economic relations with the U.S.”65 U.S. Ambassador to Brazil William Pawley urged President
Truman to announce a vast program of economic assistance, but Secretary of State
George Marshall told conference delegates that the United States did not have infinite sources of aid, and that funds for development should come from private sources.66 The conference did establish the Organization of American States (OAS). The beginning of the charter echoed the United States Declaration of Independence, but quickly took on an inter-American tone. It stated that “all men are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights, and being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they should conduct
64 “The Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) to the Secretary of State,” September 9, 1947, FRUS, 1947, vol. III, 80; “The Chargé in Venezuela (Maleady) to the Secretary of State,” September 26, 1947, FRUS, 1947, vol. III, 87. 65 “Memorandum by the Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy (Ness) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp),” February 19, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. IX, 5. 66 Roger Trask, “The Impact of the Cold War on U.S.-Latin American Relations, 1945-1949,” in Neighborly Adversaries, eds. Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora, 121. 54 themselves as brothers one to another.”67 Headquartered in Washington the OAS provided the mechanism through which the United States believed it could approach inter-American issues on a regional level. As well as reaffirming the theme of collective security, the charter also included a new provision that U.S. policymakers desperately wanted which allowed for that security to guard against “any other form of interference or attempted threat.”68 This provision, explicitly referred to the threat that communism could pose to the region.
As it happened, local events in Bogotá aided the United States in its push for a more hard-line anti-communist stance. While the conference occurred a local assassin shot to death Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, a member of the Liberal Party in Colombia and possible future president. As a result, riots erupted in the capital city sparking a period known in Colombian history as La Violencia. U.S. diplomats, including Marshall quickly pointed out that communists took part in the rioting, even using that as an argument for an anti-communist provision in the OAS Charter. Gaitán’s murder underscored the fragility of Latin American democracy in stark fashion, while also prodding some Latin
American delegates to agree with the United States for more of an overt anti-communist line.
The inclusion of article 19, which specifically targeted communism, brings up the question as to just how important was the burgeoning Cold War between Washington and
Moscow to U.S.-Latin American relations during the late 1940s? It is apparent that the conflict colored the view policymakers held towards their neighbors to the south. Such an argument is certainly not new. Numerous declassified national security documents
67 Gantenbein, The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy, 832. 68 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 23. 55 provide substantiation. Yet, the central concerns in inter-American relations still revolved around longstanding issues, namely, economic aid and cooperation. Moreover, through the pacts and treaties signed during this period, the United States succeeded in keeping regional issues out of the global arena. Being able to handle inter-American issues without facing outside pressures helped achieved stability, and in the eyes of leaders in Washington, allowed them to focus on more pressing Cold War matters in
Europe and Asia. Historian Stephen Rabe’s views on economic aid buttress the argument that the region was viewed as not being in any direct danger of outside communist subversion during the early Cold War. He writes that “the denial of aid reflected not only
American confidence in private investment and the relative security of Latin America but also the changing evaluations within the State Department on the role and significance of the southern neighbors in the world arena”69 U.S. policymakers believed the region remained more susceptible to internal threats than external ones. George Kennan’s 1950 memorandum following his trip supports such a view. He wrote that the Latin American communist “bond with Moscow is tenuous and indirect…It is also true that in no Latin
American country, with the possible exception of Guatemala, does there seem to be any serious likelihood that the communists might acquire the strength to come into power by majority opinion.”70
What tells us more about the inter-American system and the effects of the Cold
War on it is the view from Latin America, where superpower tensions mattered little.
Local conditions determined the most prominent changes underway in the region, the
69 Stephen Rabe, “The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with Latin America, 1945- 1952,” Diplomatic History vol. 2 (Summer 1978), 292. 70 “Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” March 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. II, 603. 56 move to democratization and the response it produced. Students, journalists, intellectuals, and peasants did not need to be told that their political strength was minimal, while entrenched elites in Latin America did not need to be told that a more open political and social system threatened their hold on power. As Max Paul Friedman writes, “for most Latin Americans, political conflict was about land tenure, access to political power, workers’ rights, and disputes with neighboring countries.”71 A persuasive argument can be made that Latin American governments sided with including Article 19 primarily for the same reason they agreed to the Act of Chapultepec and Rio Act, they hoped cooperation would bring economic aid. Their hopes did not come to fruition in the early Cold War period, as a conference devoted to issues of aid never occurred. Stephen
Rabe called the lack of an inter-American meeting devoted solely to economic issues the
“elusive conference.” Repeatedly, the United States sought to postpone any extensive discussion over aid. Rabe writes that “as early as September 1945, officials predicted that a bitter clash would erupt at an economic conference, since the United States was unprepared to grant ‘requests which they [Latin American governments] are likely to make.’”72
A final way the Truman administration maintained, and even advanced, their influence in Latin America was through its military assistance program. By the late 1940s both the State Department, Defense Department, and Congress agreed to support the
Inter-American Military Cooperation Act (IAMCA).73 This measure allowed the United
71 Max Paul Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 123. 72 Rabe, “Elusive Conference,” 291 73 For more on the IAMCA refer to Chester Pach, Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). 57 States complete control of supplying equipment to Latin America and assisting in the training of Latin American military officers. The military assistance program act not only conditioned Latin American governments to be beholden to the United States for military equipment, but also created close cooperation between U.S. policymakers and Latin
American military leaders. The administration further expanded control in 1950 with the approval of National Security Council memorandum 56/2, “United States Policy Toward
Inter-America Military Cooperation.” The Truman administration now put into operation a comprehensive hemispheric defense plan. As a result, U.S. capital directly flowed to the region for military use. In 1951 Congress approved $38.1 million dollars for direct military assistance to Latin America, the next year that figure increased to $51.7 million.74
Through Chapultepec, the Rio Pact, the establishment of the OAS, and military assistance the United States developed a postwar inter-American system. These agreements and organizations did aid in achieving stability in the region, yet the growing clamor for economic assistance and cooperation was not going to dissipate. Though
Washington continually scoffed at the idea of a large-scale aid program, Latin American leaders grew impatient. It remained only a matter of time before Latin American displeasure would turn into action. By the 1950s, emerging challenges brought on by economic nationalists shook the newly established inter-American system.
The Origins of Revolutionary Nationalism
When Dwight Eisenhower became President in 1953 he inherited the Truman administration’s Latin American policy. Many officials in the Eisenhower administration
74 Kyle Longley, In the Eagle’s Shadow: The United States and Latin America (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2002), 208. 58 believed that Truman’s foreign policy towards the southern countries of the Western
Hemisphere was flawed. Eisenhower declared while campaigning in 1952 that the
Truman administration had turned the Good Neighbor Policy into “a poor neighbor policy.”75 Eisenhower vowed not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor and promised to give Latin America his attention. Almost immediately after taking office he made anti- communism the central theme of his foreign policy regarding Latin America. Leaders who had communist tendencies would not be tolerated.76 To help fight communism in
Latin America President Eisenhower turned to a man he greatly admired, his younger brother, Milton. In a speech to the OAS on April 12, 1953 President Eisenhower announced that Milton would “visit shortly a number of these great republics (Latin
America). He will carry to each of the governments he visits the most sincere and warm greetings of this Administration. He will report to me, to Secretary of State Dulles and to
Assistant Secretary Cabot, on ways to be recommended for strengthening the bonds of friendship between us and all our neighbors in this Pan American Union.”77 Milton
Eisenhower took his job as presidential envoy very seriously; after the announcement he requested that the Assistant Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce accompany him on his trip so a comprehensive report would be drafted for the president.78 His duties included a thirty-six day journey through ten Latin American countries. President
Eisenhower had a deep respect for his younger brother. He noted in his private diary while campaigning for the presidency in 1951 that, “Incidentally my real choice for
75 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 6. 76 Ibid, 40. 77 “Address Before the Council of the Organization of American States,” April 12, 1953, APP. 78 Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 9. 59 president, by virtue of character, understanding, administrative ability, and personality, is my youngest brother, Milton.”79
Sending his brother on an extended trip was a significant sign that the Eisenhower administration stood serious about improving U.S.-Latin American relations, but the policy established after the trip looked very much like the policy of the past. The main goal of the administration included improving the living conditions of Latin Americans so that they would be less vulnerable to the blandishments of communism. An adamant
Milton Eisenhower argued that economic aid was the best way to strengthen relations.
However, he believed that this effort should be done through private enterprise and investment rather than through direct government to government loans.80 In a sense, the
Eisenhower administration simply wanted to pump money into Latin American nations to improve their standards of living. In President Eisenhower’s own words, “Between 1953 and 1960, to help in finding solutions, we had done many things, starting with that popular export, money.”81 The problem with sending that “popular export” was that Latin
American nations needed political and economic reform as much as they needed capital.
Between 1953 and 1954 re-invested earnings from private sources increased from $152 million to $193 million. Even with that increase, direct private investment decreased from
$93 million to $82 million.
Moreover, during this time period Latin American leaders and economists desperately wanted foreign aid to the United States to help in development projects.
Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch articulately argued in favor of the import substitution
79 Dwight Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Robert Ferrell (New York: Norton, 1981), 205. 80 Frederico Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 216. 81 Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), 515. 60 industrialization (ISI) theory. This belief held that Latin American governments needed to fundamentally alter their internal production patterns and seek to industrialize.
For such an approach to work the region needed outside financing. Prebisch’s arguments centered around the belief that Latin American economies remained too reliant on one staple crop, thus concretely tied to global price fluctuations. In order to be independent, industrial bases had to be established. Such arguments fell on deaf ears in Washington for most of the 1950s, and as Stephen Rabe writes, “During the 1950s Latin American economies stagnated, with the prices of primary exports, such as coffee, constantly falling.”82 In essence, the private sector, which the Eisenhower administration supported, would not meet the needs for growth in Latin America.83
The first real test of U.S. post-1945 power in Latin America came from
Guatemala. Following the 1944 overthrow of military strongman Jorge Ubico, the country began what became known as the “ten years of spring.” Juan Jose Arévalo won election to the presidency and instituted a new democratic constitution. Arévalo also sought to improve the living conditions of the average Guatemalan. He set up a social security system, new labor laws, and began using government funds to promote progress in education, health, and the building of roads. While Arévalo tried to protect workers with new labor laws, he did not seek to touch the unequal distribution of land, primarily because he knew such a move would draw the ire of the powerful United States based
United Fruit Company. For decades, the corporation dominated Guatemala’s economy.
At the end of World War II it owned more than 500,000 acres of land and employed
82 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 176. 83 Burton Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953-1961 (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 162. 61 thousands of Guatemalans; it was both the largest landowner and employer in the country.84 This earned the company the nickname of el octopus since its tentacles went everywhere.
Perhaps Arévalo’s greatest achievement was that when his constitutionally mandated six year term ended, he left office following a democratic election. His successor, Jacobo Arbenz, proved more willing to tackle the issue of land redistribution.
Thirty-seven years old when he took office, Arbenz was the youngest head of state in the
Americas. During his inaugural address he clearly articulated a vision “to transform
Guatemala from a backward country with a semifeudal economy into a modern capitalist country; to proceed in a way that will ensure the greatest possible improvement in the standard of living of the great masses of people.”85 Arbenz also allowed known communists to be members of his government. Less than one year after being in power the Guatemalan leader was high on the United States watch list for possible communist leanings. A CIA National Intelligence Estimate in March 1952 portrayed Guatemalan communists as having significant power in the government, and asserted that “the political alliance between the administration and the Communists is likely to continue.”86
In June 1952 the Arbenz government passed Decree 900, a vast program of land reform. Over a short time period, the United Fruit Company lost over 300,000 acres to
Guatemala’s program of redistribution.87 What exacerbated the situation even more was that Arbenz offered the corporation compensation according to the land’s value, based on
84 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 37. 85 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 149. 86 “National Intelligence Estimate,” March 11, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, Guatemala, 7. 87 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 164. 62 tax assessments. When United Fruit representatives admitted that they had undervalued the land to pay less in yearly taxes, Arbenz was not sympathetic. He offered a little over a million dollars, while the U.S. company claimed Guatemala owed more than nineteen million. The State Department supported United Fruits claims and launched a protest.
In the fall of 1953 Arbenz purchased weapons from Czechoslovakia, a member of the Soviet bloc. The decision was based in part on the fact that the United States stopped selling Guatemala military hardware in 1949, and since Arbenz’s election attempted to thwart any country from selling Guatemala weapons.88 By late 1953 President
Eisenhower authorized the CIA to prepare a covert action to destabilize Guatemala and cause Arbenz’s downfall. In an attempt to make the case against Arbenz the Eisenhower administration enlisted help from The USIA. The agency published 27,000 cartoons and
100,000 pamphlets designed to weaken Arbenz’s status.89 U.S. ambassador to Guatemala,
John Puerifoy, testified to congress that Guatemala’s government “beyond any question, was controlled and dominated by Communists. Those Communists were directed from
Moscow.”90 Puerifoy, who did not speak Spanish and had no real background in
Guatemalan affairs before being appointed ambassador, was not the only diplomat taking note of Arbenz. Chile’s Ambassador in Guatemala City Federico Klein Reidel contended that the Arbenz government had no direction from communists and it did not pose a threat to the United States.91 Western European diplomats also had knowledge about the
88 Ibid, 279. 89 Osgood, Total Cold War, 147. 90 Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956 (New York, Doubleday, 1963), 422-423. 91 Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism, 133. 63 Eisenhower administration’s plans and felt the United States acted “hysterical” about
Guatemala. They warned against attempting a coup.92
Before the overthrow of Arbenz, the Eisenhower administration attempted to garner a consensus among Western Hemisphere nations. In March 1954 Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles led the American contingent at an Inter-American conference in
Caracas, Venezuela. There he gave a passionate speech declaring that “our United States proposal is a foreign policy declaration directed to the Soviet despots who operate the subversive apparatus of international Communism…..All past threats have been tea parties compared to this one."93 The conference concluded with the American Republics reiterating their support to impede communist activities in the Western Hemisphere by condemning “the activities of the international communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs.”94 Though many Latin American governments sided with the United States in the end, there still existed a sense of dissention. Guatemalan
Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello responded to Dulles’ accusations saying the United
States continued “cataloguing as ‘communism’ every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in liberal and progressive reforms.”95 At the conclusion of Toriello’s speech he earned twice the applause that Dulles had received. One Latin American delegate said
“he [Toriello] said many of the things some of the rest of us would like to say if we
92 Max Paul Friedman, "Anti-Americanism and U.S. Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 32, no. 4 (September 2008), 506. 93 “Success at Caracas,” March 22, 1954. Time Magazine. 94 “Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954,” The Avalon Project, Yale University, available from Avalon. 95 Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century Regime of Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Macmillan, 2006), 139. 64 dared.”96 In order to gain the votes needed to pass a resolution condemning communism and obtain leverage for intervening against Arbenz, Dulles stayed in Caracas over two weeks.97 His perseverance helped earn the passage of a resolution by a vote of seventeen to one. Historian Piero Gleijeses classifies those Latin American countries who sided with the United States as succumbing to “severe arm twisting.”98 In the end, Dulles and other U.S. officials ignored any Latin American objections to U.S. intervention in
Guatemala.99
By early May 1954 Guatemalans began hearing anti-Arbenz programs on their radios. La Voz de la Liberación (The Voice of Liberation) declared that the time for
Arbenz to go was now. Though purporting to be “deep in the jungle” the programs originated in Miami.100 This propaganda campaign helped put Guatemala City on edge.
On June 18, 1954 action against the Arbenz government began. The “Liberation Army,” led by exiled Guatemalan Colonel Castillo Armas, crossed into Guatemala from
Honduras, set up camp and waited. Armas’s forces numbered only several hundred men, so the CIA engaged in psychological warfare against the Arbenz government. La Voz de la Liberación announced that an immense force stood ready to attack. The support for the
Arbenz government withered as many began to fear for their lives. On June 27, only six days after the attempted coup began, Arbenz resigned the office of president.101
96 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 58; Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 144. 97 Stephen Rabe, “Dulles, Latin America, and Cold War Anticommunism,” in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard Immerman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 180. 98 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 276. 99 Friedman, “Anti-Americanism in U.S. Foreign Relations,” 507. 100 Cullather, Secret History, 75. 101 Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Towards Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 59 65 Not surprisingly, worldwide reaction regarding events in Guatemala went against the United States. Though Washington did not overtly admit to complicity in
Arbenz’s overthrow, it was rather obvious. Max Paul Friedman’s excellent international history on anti-Americanism documents the backlash. Friedman notes that West
Germany’s anti-communist paper the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung argued that due to the coup “the image of the United States as the leader of the West is endangered.” Great
Britain’s The Economist concluded that the United States lost more than it gained in overthrowing Arbenz. Canada’s Ottawa Citizen aptly wrote that the west cannot “afford to have a U.S.-hating peasantry in Latin-America, with only the Communists to turn to for support in their desire for a better life.” Latin Americans also responded due to the coup. Political leaders condemned a return to big stick diplomacy and posited that
Washington had helped anti-U.S. sentiment be “rekindled.” Rioters in Argentina,
Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, and Chile burned U.S. flags, as well as Secretary Dulles and
President Eisenhower in effigy.102
For their part, U.S. policymakers paid little attention to the global criticism. The
National Security Council put the unrest on the fact that “many Latin Americans are jealous and resentful of the size and wealth of the United States.”103 When the protests subsided, the Eisenhower administration entered into a period of complacency in its relationship with Latin America. Vice President Richard Nixon reported that his ten country tour of the region, completed in March 1955, proved to be a great success. He remained hopeful the construction of an Inter-American highway would soon begin and
102 Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism, 142-143. 103 “Outline Plan Prepared for the Operations Coordinating Board,” April 18, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. VI, 63. 66 that goodwill in the region would continue to be strong.104 A National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) in December 1955 predicted Latin American governments would continue trending towards more moderate leadership. It argued that governments akin to that of deposed leaders Juan Peron in Argentina and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala unlikely to take power. Also, U.S. economic superiority would continue. The NIE concluded, “The tendency in Latin America to place responsibility for its economic development upon the United States is likely to continue.”105
Throw a Brick at Tricky Dick: Nixon in Latin America
Towards the end of 1957 Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs
Richard Rubottom advised John Foster Dulles that he should make a trip to Latin
America. Rubottom believed that due to an economic crisis in the region, brought on by declining coffee and metal prices, a visit was necessary. Dulles, already scheduled for conferences in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia declined but forwarded the request to President Eisenhower.106 Not ready to make a trip south just yet, Eisenhower did what many presidents would do; he sent his vice-president. Ever the good soldier,
Richard Nixon agreed to go, though he made it clear that upon his return he would not to hold formal briefings with the State Department or the CIA. He preferred to discuss his trip with Dulles informally, “I cannot be loaded down with people who are interested in
South America.”107
104 “National Security Council Progress Report,” August 10, 195, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. VII, 6. 105 “National Intelligence Estimate,” December 6, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. VII, 31. 106 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 101. 107 Ibid, 101. 67 The May 1958 visit proved disastrous as Nixon endured protests by law students in Montevideo, Uruguay and a bombardment of rocks from Peruvian youths in
Lima.108 The trip ended in Caracas, Venezuela when several hundred Venezuelans attacked his motorcade. Not wishing to go quietly, Nixon shouted at the protesters “you are cowards, you are afraid of the truth! You are the worst kind of cowards.”109 After hearing of Nixon’s reception in South America, an aide to Secretary of State Dulles remarked that “the preponderance of U.S. influence in Latin America is being challenged.”110 President Eisenhower sent a Navy flotilla to the coast of South America just in case Nixon needed to make a quick exit. The president also sent Nixon a message of encouragement, writing “dear Dick, your courage, patience, and calmness in the demonstration directed against you by radical agitators have brought you a new respect and admiration in our country.”111
Overall, the trip was a public relations nightmare for the United States. Latin
Americans openly attacked the Vice President of the United States and forced him out of the region. Nixon remarked in his memoirs that “of all the trips I made abroad as Vice
President, the one I least wanted to take was my visit to South America in 1958…because
I thought it would be relatively unimportant and uninteresting.”112 Famed American journalist Walter Lippmann asserted that it would not be an exaggeration to classify the trip as a “diplomatic Pearl Harbor.”113 The Nixon trip had repercussions for another diplomats scheduled travels to Latin America. President Eisenhower’s brother Milton, a
108 Ibid, 101-102. 109 Alan McPherson, Yankee No! 28. 110 Ibid, 9. 111 “Message to the Vice President After the Demonstration in Peru,” May 9, 1958, APP. 112 Ibid, 183. 113 Walter Lippmann, “Days of Trouble,” Washington Post, May 15, 1958, read into the Congressional Record by Joseph Clark, May 15, 1958. 68 trusted adviser on Latin American issues, had a visit scheduled to the region, but State
Department officials recommended that the trip be cancelled. Foggy Bottom reasoned that “in view of recent events in and intelligence reports from Panama and Guatemala in particular and to a lesser extent the other Central American countries, it seems best to recommend that Dr. Milton Eisenhower’s visit to that area be postponed for the time being.”114
Latin American reactions to Richard Nixon in 1958 can be attributed to local conditions, a breakdown in security, and rowdy young agitators. But, they can also be attributed to rising resentment of U.S. foreign policy in the region. Here, the context of the post-World War II relationship is important. For years Latin Americans desired to be treated in a more equitable manner in the inter-American system. As economic growth stagnated, unemployment rose, and political freedoms remained repressed, some in the region looked north. Throughout the 1950s the Eisenhower administration supported dictatorships and anti-communist crusaders. The administration did not concern itself so much with economic or social justice issues as long as the rulers with whom they dealt committed themselves to the best interests of the United States.115 The administration’s policy was an abrazo (hug) for democratic reformers while only a “handshake for dictators.”116 That kind of thinking produced widespread resentment among some Latin
Americans. Venezuelan politician Rómulo Betancourt put the reaction to Nixon on
Washington’s support for dictatorships. Costa Rica’s democratically elected president
114 “Postponement of Dr. Milton Eisenhower’s trip to Central America and Panama,” May 1958. GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. RG59, Lot File 61 D 110, Box 25, NARA. 115 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 38. 116 Ibid, 104. 69 José Figueres was even more blunt, “People cannot spit on a foreign policy, which [is] what they meant to do.”117
While the goal of Nixon’s trip included producing goodwill among the nations of the Western Hemisphere, the visit exposed the fragility of the inter-American system.
The trip also introduced policymakers to rampant anti-Americanism. As Alan McPherson writes, “The trip did at least signal the readiness of mass based groups to express hostility directly at the U.S. government…before the late 1950s critics in the region were poor, disunited, or powerless to challenge the U.S. government or military. By 1958, however, the right conditions lined up to transform widespread anti-U.S. sentiment into a compelling political strategy.”118
Publicly, the Eisenhower administration lambasted communist elements in Latin
America as being responsible for the attacks. Nixon commented that “there is no question but that the Communists have selected Latin America as a major target in their international policy.”119 Privately, U.S. policymakers knew they needed to make some changes. Nixon himself admitted to other administration officials that the incidents demonstrated that the United States had to give more attention to Latin America.120 He concluded that “Caracas was a much-needed shock treatment which jolted us out of dangerous complacency.”121 President Eisenhower agreed, admitting that in many ways the United States held a “superior attitude” towards Latin America and discussed the
117 Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism, 146. 118 McPherson, Yankee No! 9-10. 119 Stanford Bradshaw, “There is no question but that the Communists have selected Latin America as a major target in their international policy,” Washington Post, May 9, 1958, read into the Congressional Record by Senator Olin Johnston, May 15, 1958. 120 “Los Incidentes demuestran que Latinoamérica debe recibir más atención de Estados Unidos,” El Nacional, May 16, 1958, p. 1. 121 Richard Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 270. 70 “vital necessity to avoid giving rise to injured feelings by the other American
Republics.”122 The administration’s shift occurred on political and economic fronts.
Politically, Eisenhower created the National Advisory Committee on Inter-American
Affairs along with the State Department post of an Undersecretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs.123
The administration also broke off relations with dictators and embraced former rivals. Between 1956 and 1960 ten Latin American dictators fell from power. In August
1960 Eisenhower rebuffed Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and established links with democratically elected leaders Arturo Frondizi in Argentina and Rómulo
Betancourt in Venezuela. The administration’s rebuke of Latin American dictators completely contradicted Eisenhower’s early policy of tolerating corrupt authoritarian leaders throughout the region. Eisenhower also developed closer personal relations with
Latin American presidents. In 1958 he consulted with Brazilian President Juscelino
Kubitschek on the threat of Soviet communism and in 1959 welcomed El Salvador
President José Maria Lemus to the White House. Eisenhower’s shift in policy towards
Latin American leaders culminated in February 1960 when he embarked on a two week visit to South America.124 Two days before his visit, when discussing the importance of inter-American relations he declared that “yet even among close comrades, friendships too often seem to be taken for granted. We must not give our neighbors of Latin America cause to believe this about us.”125
122 McPherson, Yankee No! 33. 123 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 135. 124 “President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Trip to South America, February 23-March 7, 1960,” December 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. V, 267. 125 “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Eve of South American Trip,” February 21, 1960, APP. 71 Possibly the most drastic shifts in policy took place in the economic realm. In the final two years of his presidency Eisenhower established a regional lending agency, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and he also pushed Congress to allocate more funds for the region. No longer did the administration formulate economic policy with an emphasis solely on private investment. The IDB became the cornerstone for the administrations new look economic policy towards Latin America. In his 1959 State of the Union address Eisenhower stated that the IDB would “promote the finance of development in Latin America, and make more effective the use of capital from the
World Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and private sources.”126 Along with the IDB the administration also allocated $500 million dollars for the region through the Social
Progress Trust Fund. Eisenhower hoped that such a fund could be used to reduce rampant poverty throughout the region by supporting health advancements, education, housing, and land reform projects throughout Latin America.127 For the first time in Eisenhower’s presidency the administration attempted to utilize loans rather than rely on American business to solve the economic woes of Latin America.128
Unfortunately for Eisenhower, the administration’s new posture was not implemented until his final years in office. At that point the rising tide of anti-American sentiment had greatly increased. Before being able to completely digest the consequences of the Nixon trip, the administration gave its attention on the island of Cuba, where by
126 “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 9, 1959, APP. 127 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 141. 128 There is a burgeoning literature reinterpreting the last years of Eisenhower’s presidency and his approach to Latin America. For more on the Eisenhower shift refer to Thomas Tunstall Allcock, “The First Alliance for Progress?: Reshaping the Eisenhower Administration’s Policy toward Latin America,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 16, Number 1, Winter 2014, 85-110; Christopher Darnton, “Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in U.S.-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 14, Number 4, Fall 2012, p. 55-92. 72 1958 a rag-tag group of rebels had made significant progress in their attempt to oust dictator Fulgencio Batista.
The Triumph of the Cuban Revolution
In November 1956 Fidel Castro and no more than 80 members of his 26th of July
Movement set out from Mexico bound for Cuba. Exiled since a failed 1953 overthrow attempt, the plan was simple: begin a guerilla war that would force Batista to abdicate power. Shortly before embarking Castro declared to supporters during a fundraising speech that “in 1956 we will be free or we will be martyrs.”129 They landed in eastern
Cuba and developed a base of operations for guerilla attacks in the Sierra Maestra
Mountains, far from Havana. Castro broadcasted messages via Radio Rebelde (Rebel
Radio), the makeshift station he and his followers established. Less than three years later the movement grew to include numerous supporters in both Cuban cities and the countryside. Castro’s forces slowly headed towards the capital and by 1958 Fulgencio
Batista’s hold on power was tenuous. In March of that year the Eisenhower administration ceased all weapons shipments to Batista’s Cuba. Persuasive arguments made by the State Department that U.S. arms were being used against Cuban citizens in order to quell an internal rebellion, a clear violation of the U.S.-Cuban military treaty, led
Eisenhower to cut ties.
The combination of the United States pulling back support and Castro’s continued growth in popularity proved too much. In the early morning hours of New Year’s Day
1959 Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba. Radio Rebelde announced that “no matter what news
129 Van Gosse, Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left (London: Verso, 1993), 64. 73 comes from the capital, our troops should not cease firing at any time.”130 Though
Castro’s revolution had vanquished Batista on the first day of January, Fidel Castro did not reach Havana until one week later. He stopped at every provincial capital to speak to large crowds. Cubans gathered in massive demonstrations to hear the young revolutionary. Castro recalled that “a tank was the only thing that could get through—you couldn’t get through in a truck or you’d be crushed.”131
Image 3: Fidel Castro delivers a speech before a large audience as Cuban revolutionaries
make their way to Havana, late 1958.
130 “Instructions from General Headquarters to all Rebel Army Commanders and the people,” January 1, 1959, in Cuban Revolution Reader: A Documentary History of 40 Key Moments of the Cuban Revolution, ed. Julio García Luis (New York: Ocean Press, 2001), 13; The 26th of July Movement was formed in 1953 after Fidel Castro led a failed attempt to overthrow the government of Fulgencio Batista. Castro and his followers attacked the Moncada Army Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. They hoped their attack would lead to a general uprising. Fidel, along with Raul, were arrested and later deported to Mexico. For more on the formation of the 26th of July Movement refer to: Antonio Rafael de la Cova, The Moncada Attack: Birth of the Cuban Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007). 131 Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramónet, Fidel Castro: My Life: A Spoken Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008, 204. 74 The Eisenhower administration looked on at these events with both apprehension and confusion. On December 23, 1958 President Eisenhower received a
State Department memorandum declaring that the United States “clearly does not want to see Castro succeed to the leadership of the government.”132 That same day CIA Director
Allen Dulles stated, during a National Security Council meeting, that a Castro victory needed to be prevented. Eisenhower stood alarmed at both the memorandum and Dulles’s contention, for he had yet to hear such stark opinions.133 Up to that point, the administration remained more indifferent to Castro than anything else. On December 31,
1958 Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “I would not be happy with Castro solely in command, I cannot quite visualize that at this step.”134 Simultaneously, policymakers suddenly came to the conclusion that a Castro victory could harm U.S. interests and a seasoned Latin American specialist, Rubottom, predicted a Castro takeover unlikely just days before Fidel reached Havana victorious.
Historian Thomas Paterson’s argument that the Eisenhower administration failed to develop a cohesive strategy, or even understanding, regarding Castro’s insurrection appears persuasive.135
Once in power, Fidel Castro quickly sought to consolidate control and implement his revolutionary agenda. Reforms came rapidly, more than 1,500 in the first few months of his rule. The new government cut electricity rates, increased wages for sugar workers, and placed restrictions on the number of imported luxury goods. In March 1959, he
132 McPherson, Yankee No! 49. 133 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 392nd Meeting of the National Security Council,” December 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. VI, 302. 134 Rabe, Eisenhower And Latin America, 122 135 Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 75 enacted the Urban Reform Law, reducing rents and confiscating unused land for public housing.136 Castro also delivered numerous speeches throughout the capital and provinces appealing to Cubans to embrace the nationalistic sentiment the revolution created. He called on Cubans to act in an autonomous manner, “I believe that this nation has the same right of other nations to govern itself, to chart its own destiny, freely, and to do things better and more democratically than what others do, who spoke of democracy and sent
Sherman tanks to Batista.”137 During this time Castro frequently employed anti-American rhetoric. State Department official Daniel Braddock remarked that, “there has not been a single public speech by Castro since the triumph of the revolution in which he has not shown some feeling against the United States, American press or big business concerns in
Cuba.”138 Many Cubans, fearful of the new government, fled the island. Expatriates quickly started contemplating seeking Castro’s overthrow. As early as March 1959 Allen
Dulles argued that the administration “must not do anything which would tend to discourage the growth of this movement.”139
In April U.S. policymakers received a first-hand look at Castro. Invited to the
United States by the American Society for Newspaper Editors, not the U.S. government, the Cuban leader made a more favorable impression on the general public than administration officials. One woman declared that “I don’t know if I’m interested or not in the revolution…but Fidel Castro is the biggest thing to happen to North American
136 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 47. 137 Ibid, 48. 138 Louis Pérez, “Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of U.S. Policy towards Cuba,” Journal of Latin American Studies (2002), 229. 139 “Memorandum of discussion at the 400th Meeting of the National Security Council,” March 26, 1959, The Paterson Collection, The United States and Castro’s Cuba, 1950-1970., microform, Reel 8, slot 1875, Anti-Batista Activities, 1958-1958. 76 women since Rudolph Valentino.”140 Castro spoke to packed audiences at Harvard,
Princeton, and Columbia. Those in the Eisenhower government who met the young leader were not as taken. Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter described the Cuban as “a most interesting individual, very much like a child in many ways, quite immature regarding problems of the government.”141 Vice President Nixon, who held a meeting of several hours with Castro, wrote that he “is either incredibly naïve about Communism or under Communist discipline—my guess is the former and I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries.”142
Possibly the most important subject to be addressed during Castro’s visit was economic aid for Cuba. Fidel preferred not to ask, telling his treasury minister that “I don’t want this trip to be like that of other new Latin American leaders who always come to the U.S. to ask for money. I want this to be a good-will trip. Besides the Americans will be surprised. And when we go back to Cuba, they will offer us aid without our asking for it.”143 Though Castro did not explicitly request aid, it is questionable if the
United States stood ready to make any sort of offer. British officials reported prior to the trip that while some Cubans hoped to obtain an increase in the Cuban sugar quota, U.S. policymakers did not plan on offering an increase or any form of aid.144 At the end of
140 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 48. 141 “Memorandum of a Conference between the President and the Acting Secretary of State, Augusta Georgia,” April 18, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. VI, 475. 142 “Conversation between Vice President Nixon and Fidel Castro,” April 25, 1959, Office of the Vice President, Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, DNSA, item #CU00007. 143 Rufo López Fresquet, My 14 Months with Castro (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1966), 106. 144 “Memorandum from David Muirhead to Henry Hankey (British Foreign Officer in Charge of South American Affairs),” April 9, 1959, BFSOF, Cuba Part I: Revolution in Cuba, 1959-1960, microform, reel 1, FO 371/139396-139415, Davis Library, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. 77 Castro’s April visit, the British again reported that the United States had “had no intention of extending economic aid to Cuba or of making any official gesture of support for the regime.”145
The pace at which U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated following April 1959 was remarkable. In May the Castro government enacted an agrarian reform law that prohibited estates over 1,000 acres. Lands used for sugar, rice, and livestock could be a little over 3,000 acres. Owners whose land had been expropriated received promises of compensation that included twenty-year bonds at 4.5 percent; those promises were never kept.146 By the fall of 1959 many of the more pro-U.S. elements of Castro’s government had been replaced. Argentine revolutionary Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara took charge of Cuba’s
National Bank, though he appeared to have little or no experience in financial matters.
While these changes took place, U.S. apprehension and confusion gave way to anger and resentment. President Eisenhower had several problems concerning events in Cuba.
First, the president did not believe that the execution of former Batista government members was necessary or humane.147 Second, the administration worried about communist influences in the Castro government. Third, Eisenhower’s office received numerous pleas by U.S. businessmen regarding their economic interests in Cuba. Robert
Kleberg, owner of King Ranch of Texas expressed his annoyances directly to Eisenhower during a meeting in the oval office. Eisenhower and Foster Dulles had sympathy for
145 “Memorandum from David Muirhead to Henry Hankey (British Foreign Officer in Charge of South American Affairs),” April 23, 1959, BFSOF, Cuba Part I: Revolution in Cuba, 1959-1960, microform reel 2, FO 371/139416-139443, Davis Library, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. 146 Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 99. 147 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 124. 78 Kleberg, even exchanging memos regarding “Bob” and his problems.148 At the same time, the State Department and other U.S. agencies also received complaints concerning
Castro’s economic programs and their effects on U.S. business. Political scientist Lars
Schoultz writes that “the Cuba files in the Eisenhower Library are packed with…memoranda describing encounters with worried investors, and they were not conversations with lobbyists but with executives occupying the pinnacle of corporate power.”149
In late October of 1959 Castro delivered an address to a massive rally in Havana that castigated the United States for its stance towards the revolution. At the end of his speech, given at night in front of the presidential palace, Castro declared that all reforms were “here to stay.”150 The State Department reported that the speech “listed virtually all local American interests as items which were not in the interests of Cuba…He repeatedly mentioned Cuban people fighting to last man in caves and tunnels if necessary to repel foreign invasion.” The Department concluded, probably unhappily, that the “crowd was with him to the last man.”151 Less than a week later, Secretary Herter privately called for the Eisenhower administration to implement policies “designed to encourage within Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America opposition to the extremist, anti-American course of the
Castro regime but that in achieving this objective, the United States should avoid giving the impression of direct pressure or intervention against Castro, except where defense of legitimate United States interest is involved.”152 Around this time, British officials
148 Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 96. 149 Ibid, 97. 150 “Speech to the People of Cuba at Loyalty Rally,” October 26, 1959, Castro Speech Database, LANIC. 151 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Republic, 104. 152 “Current Basic United States Policy Toward Cuba,” November 9, 1959, White House, Staff Secretary, Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, DNSA, item # CU00017. 79 reported back to London that CIA Director Dulles informed them that “something might be made of an opposition consisting of elements outside, and inside, Cuba. But the time for that had not yet come, though for our most confidential information, he was already making some contact with these people for possible future use.”153 Even U.S. embassy officials in Havana, such as Ambassador Philip Bonsal, who had previously been a voice of caution, agreed that Castro could not be managed.
Image 4: Artistic depiction of Fidel Castro’s triumph.
The October speech, known as the Loyalty Rally, starkly revealed to U.S. policymakers that revolutionary Cuba would not be “lined up.” Here again, McPherson’s conception of anti-Americanism is instructive. He argues that Castro used resentment
153 Schoultz, That Infernal Little Republic, 105. 80 against the United States as a powerful tool to help in consolidating power, writing that
“for Castro, fomenting fear and animosity against an outside enemy, real or imagined, was a master stroke against domestic opponents and international allies.”154 By late 1959 the United States resolved to seek new leadership for Cuba, much as they had done in
Guatemala. Here timing is essential to understand. The United States made its decision regarding pursuing regime change in Cuba several months prior to Castro signing a massive trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Even before Cuba became closely allied with the Soviet Union, Washington wanted new leadership in Havana. The State
Department’s Roy Rubottom succinctly explained why Castro needed to go when he stated, “It didn’t make much difference whether Castro was a Communist or not. He was…bitterly hostile to the United States.”155
While the United States viewed Fidel Castro as a dangerous and a highly irritating element in U.S.-Cuban relations, perhaps the most pressing issue remained the revolution’s growing influence in Latin America. In January 1959, only weeks after coming to power Castro received a warm welcome while visiting Caracas, Venezuela.
Over 300,000 Venezuelans gathered in the center of the city to hear the Cuban leader speak.156 A few months later, in May, Castro again visited the region, this time going to
Argentina to represent Cuba at an OAS meeting. His address to the conference focused on economic aid. He argued that private business would not alleviate Latin America’s problems, for business will always seek the best climate, thus leaving many countries behind. Castro spoke as if he represented the entire region, not just Cuba. He concluded
154 McPherson, Yankee No! 68. 155 Ibid, 105. 156 El Nacional, Caracas, Venezuela, January 22, 1959, p. 35; Fidel; Castro Ramónet, Fidel Castro: My Life, 637. 81 that the best path forward was large-scale economic aid from the United States. Here,
Cuba’s leader touched on a topic that dominated inter-American issues since 1945.
Rather than just ask for the aid, Castro offered a specific plan. He called for a ten year commitment of $30 million dollars. The speech received widespread applause. Brazilian
Delegate Augusto Frederico Schmidt proclaimed that Castro was “defending perfectly the spirit of operation Panamerica.”157
It should be noted that not all delegations agreed with Castro’s idea. During a reception U.S. delegate Roy Rubottom posed with the Cuban briefly for photos. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Regino Boti, Cuba’s Minister of Economy, approached Rubottom stating that Castro wanted some time alone with the U.S. representative. Boti handed Rubottom the key to his hotel room and said to meet in five minutes. Rubottom reported that while the United States wished good relations with Cuba, the notion that a program of vast economic should be forthcoming was incorrect. Castro listened intently, but interjected that “frankness” needed to be part of discussions. He hoped the United States would be helpful in finding “solutions to the problems of the people.”158
At the same time Castro pushed his economic and social agenda in the region,
U.S. intelligence reported that Cuban inspired, possibly supported, movements emerged throughout the region. In fact, almost immediately after Castro entered Havana, in
January 1959, intelligence surfaced that Latin American revolutionaries used Cuba as a base for operations. In February, a U.S Ambassador in the region reported that sources told him that Castro was going to attempt to overthrow the Caribbean Basin governments
157 “Castro Calls for Vast Program of Economic Aid,” May 2, 1959, Castro Speech Database, LANIC. 158 “Memorandum of a Conversation, Buenos Aires,” May, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. VI, 502. 82 of Nicaragua and Panama.159 Several hundred Nicaraguans tried to use Pinar del Rio,
Cuba as a base to launch an overthrow of Luis Anastasio Somoza. Also, in April 1959 several Cubans participated in a failed assault on Panama. Historian Piero Gleijeses submitted that “fired by the Cubans’ example, and by Castro’s call to the true revolutionaries to fight, guerillas became active in Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Honduras, [and] the Dominican Republic.”160
The main influence on Castro’s foreign policy was the Argentine doctor, Che
Guevara. By 1962 Cuba became “Guerilla Central” and Che biographer Jon Lee
Anderson argued that Guevara’s insistence that the Cuban Revolution spread its ideology greatly contributed to the island becoming a hotbed for revolution.161 Castro also understood the example that the revolution could represent and publicly spoke out in favor of spreading the revolution. For Castro, exporting revolution served two purposes.
First, it validated Cuban ideas and ideology. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it was a defensive measure. Castro believed that the United States could not focus solely on
Cuba if other areas of the region fell into disarray. Castro made clear his beliefs when he stated to Soviet officials that “the United States will not be able to hurt us if all of Latin
America is in flames.”162
By 1963 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported that the Cuban government trained as many as 1,500 revolutionaries from across Latin America in
159 “Memorandum from Ambassador to Uruguay Henry Hoyt to Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom,” February 26, 1959. GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. RG 59, Records of the Special Assistant on Communism, 1958-1961. Box 1, Lot 64D24, NARA. 160 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 22. 161 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997), 533. 162 Timothy Naftali and Alexandr Fursenko, One Hell of A Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 141; Rabe, Most Dangerous Area, 137. 83 techniques of political subversion and guerrilla warfare.”163 Reports also indicated that
Castro and Che took personal interest in the training and that “the two men frequently appeared before the foreign trainees to give “personal pep talks.”164 While Castro had designs on spreading revolution in Latin America, as further chapters illustrate, Havana often found itself unable to cultivate relationships with reliable revolutionary groups in
Latin America. In sum, Havana limited the majority of its support for subversive activities to providing training on the island.
Conclusion
Beginning in 1945 the United States sought to preserve its position in the Western
Hemisphere. Pacts and treaties formed the cornerstones of the postwar inter-American system. As the wave of democratization swept through Latin America and calls for economic aid were repeatedly made, U.S. policymakers continually hoped to placate
Latin Americans while always maintaining a dominant role. Requests for aid, or even just a conference to discuss such measures, received consistent refusals. When leaders attempted to implement their own programs of economic reform, such as Jacobo Arbenz, they met stiff resistance. The plea to “line them up” at the 1945 U.N. conference reverberated throughout the region as the United States often supported dictatorships to achieve its goals. By the late 1950s patience with the Washington and its policies was wearing thin, as evidenced by Richard Nixon’s reception.
The challenge posed by Fidel Castro was new and menacing. No other Latin
American leader had ever employed such fiery anti-American rhetoric, excited so many,
163 Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Hot Wars in Cold War Africa,” Reviews in American History, Vol. 32, No.1 (March 2004), 114. 164 Ibid, 114. 84 and openly questioned the U.S. standing in the hemisphere. Castro sought to lead a regional movement, embodying the idea that Latin American governments did not have to hope and plead for economic aid. They should demand it, and if denied, chart their own course. In 1953, while on trial for an initial failed attempt to overthrow Fulgencio
Batista, he declared to the courtroom that history would be his final judge.165 The 1960s offered Fidel Castro his historic moment.
165 Antonio Rafael de la Cova, The Moncada Attack, 230-231. 85 Chapter 2: “Let Every Nation Know”: The New Frontier, Latin America, and
Public Diplomacy
In October 1960, during the final days of the presidential election, John F.
Kennedy addressed democratic supporters in Cincinnati, Ohio. His speech focused exclusively on foreign policy, specifically his thoughts on the Eisenhower administration’s failed approach towards Cuba. The Massachusetts Senator stated that the
United States failed to grasp the economic hardships many Cubans faced in the past and, as a result, Fidel Castro exploited the situation in fomenting revolution throughout the hemisphere. Interestingly, Kennedy argued that the U.S. response must be one that took into account the entire region,
But whatever we do in Cuba itself, ultimately the road to freedom in Havana runs through Rio and Buenos Aires and Mexico City…we must create a Latin America where freedom can flourish - where long enduring people know, at last, that they are moving toward a better life for themselves and their children - where steady economic advance is a framework for stable, democratic Government - and where tyranny, isolated and despised, eventually withers on the vine.166
Kennedy continued many of those same themes in January 1961 during his inaugural address, when he declared, “To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge--to convert our good words into good deeds--in a new alliance for progress--to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.167 The rhetoric employed, both on the campaign
166 “Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Cincinnati, Ohio, Democratic Dinner,” October 6, 1960, APP. 167 “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961, APP. 86 trail and on that cold day in Washington, illustrate the young president’s understanding that the Cuban Revolution could not be viewed in isolation.
John Kennedy entered the White House with a belief that U.S. policy towards
Latin America needed reconfiguring. After only days in office he remarked to an aide,
“You remember those people who threw rocks at Nixon. I’d like to believe it was just
Nixon’s personality, but they were sending us a message.”168 The president understood the precarious position the United States faced in Latin America. During one of his first press conferences in office Kennedy received a question about current U.S. policy towards the region. He responded by saying that “now, I'm hopeful that governments will be established throughout all of Latin America and governments which are established will, and I think nearly all of them do, share the same view that we have to provide in this hemisphere a better life for the people involved, that we are interested in that, that we are concerned about it, that American policy will be directed towards that end.”169 In just one thousand days in office, Kennedy made three trips to the region, attempted to cultivate personal relationships with Latin American leaders, and took a personal interest in seeing progress. On a trip to Costa Rica he showed dismay to see an unoccupied and inoperable hospital. He ordered his staff to make sure funds became available. The USAID granted
$130,000 for what became a children’s hospital.170
Kennedy also brought high hopes and goals to his Latin American policies. He desired to rid the region of economic poverty and despair, all the while casting the United
States as the hemispheric example of modernity. Only months into his presidency he
168 McPherson, Yankee No! 73. 169 “The President’s News Conference,” January 25, 1961, APP. 170 James Giglio and Stephen Rabe, Debating the Kennedy Presidency (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 10. 87 announced the Alliance for Progress, an ambitious plan of economic development that pledged billions of dollars in aid. In the eyes of many Latin American leaders, they finally had their Marshall Plan. Yet, at the same time, the administration greatly damaged its standing in the region by doggedly pursuing Fidel Castro’s elimination. In April 1961, only one month following the announcement of the Alliance for Progress, Cuban exiles, trained and equipped by the United States came ashore at the Bay of Pigs. The U.S.- sponsored military attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro proved a disaster. Rather than ridding Latin America of its revolutionary example, Kennedy’s support of the invasion appeared to be a reversion to the past. The image of the United States formed in Latin
America due to the attempted overthrow became not that of a modern society, but of a neighborhood bully bent on having its way. Though the administration continued efforts to remove Castro, Kennedy recognized the hubris surrounding the plot and the exceptionally vulnerable position held by the United States in Latin America following the failed attempt. In response his administration implemented an expansive public diplomacy campaign as an attempted remedy.
Specifically, the administration utilized three key public diplomacy initiatives.
First, the USIA took the lead in “selling” Kennedy’s ambitious program for economic development in Latin America, the Alliance for Progress. One plan included the creation and distribution of anti-Castro and pro-alliance comic books. Second, a widespread book program, a holdover from the previous administration, gained more priority and its output greatly increased. The books chosen exalted the U.S. economic and political systems.
Third, the Peace Corps, a program with global reach, began operating in the region. The strategic goal of the Kennedy administration was to simultaneously sell its vision of 88 economic development and hemispheric solidarity while tarnishing Fidel Castro’s image. To achieve such objectives, U.S. policymakers hoped to bypass Latin American heads of state and directly reach the people.
The New Frontier in Latin America
The common issues that dominated early administration reports on Latin America included “an ancient heritage of poverty, widespread illiteracy, and grave social injustice.”171 The argument went that the vast poverty and inequality were the types of conditions in which Fidel Castro’s ideas could find supporters. A pre-presidency Latin
American task force argued that “politically the contest is in full swing everywhere.
There are many anti-American elements or groups which are not communist, but which the hard-core communists use or seek to use, often successfully, to further their aims in this hemisphere.”172 For all of the negative reports and bleakness that seemed to be the reality in Latin America, there still remained a sense of hope for the region. Kennedy himself remarked that “Latin America’s not like Asia or Africa. We can really accomplish something there.”173 While Kennedy advisers such as Arthur Schlesinger and
Richard Goodwin thought the region was in dire condition, they also saw it as an area where the United States could make a difference. Schlesinger believed Latin America
“was set for miracles.”174
President Kennedy publicly announced the centerpiece of his Latin American policy on March 13, 1961. Infused by modernization theory arguments, which contended
171 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 22. 172 “Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems,” Pre-Presidential Papers Transition Files, Task Force Reports, Box 1074, JFKL. 173 Stephen Rabe, John F. Kennedy: World Leader (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2010), 75. 174 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 24. 89 that the region could be transformed from a traditional society to a modern one by just following several steps, the Alliance for Progress sought to alleviate problems of illiteracy, hunger, and crippling poverty through massive economic assistance. A byproduct would be a political and social transformation conducive to U.S. interests. A top modernization theorist, presidential assistant Walt Rostow, wrote to Kennedy just weeks before the announcement of the program that with U.S. assistance Latin America could move from underdeveloped into “self-sustaining growth.”175 Arthur Schlesinger counseled Kennedy that the main issue in Latin America was “the problem of modernization.”176
The Alliance for Progress established that the United States would provide $20 billion dollars worth of aid over ten years, from both private and public sources. When announcing the program during a White House reception for Latin American ambassadors Kennedy proclaimed the program as “a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools--techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela.”177 Goals of the Alliance for Progress included raising per capita income in Latin
American by 2.5 percent annually, eliminating adult illiteracy, guaranteeing at least six years of primary education, and increasing life expectancy by five years. Latin American nations had to set up plans for national development and implementation of land reforms.
175 Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 69. 176 Michael Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 125. 177 “Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics,” March 13, 1961, APP. 90 To observers, it appeared that the inter-American system was undergoing a transformation.
President Kennedy inherited not only a precarious U.S. position in Latin America once in office, he also inherited a vast information apparatus. In 1953 Dwight
Eisenhower created the USIA and by 1961 the agency had become one of the United
States optimum Cold War weapons. Historian Kenneth Osgood wrote that “psychological warfare [public diplomacy] assumed a place of prominence in the making of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s.”178 Regarding Latin America, Eisenhower’s USIA implemented several initiatives in an attempt to curb the economic nationalism so pervasive in the region during his years in office. An “economic information program” was foremost.
Yet, these efforts basically served to promote U.S. business and the value of free markets.179
Perhaps the most utilized role of the USIA role in Latin America under President
Eisenhower was the agency’s involvement in attempting to discredit Guatemalan
President Jacobo Arbenz just prior to his ousting. It released over 200 press articles and published 100,000 copies of “Chronology of Communism in Guatemala.” The government of Cuba, then under the control of Fulgencio Batista served as a publishing staging ground.180 The problem for Eisenhower’s USIA is that its public diplomacy programs in Latin America too often pressed long-standing ideas that Latin American intellectuals already renounced. To put it simply, the argument that U.S. business was the most effective channel for development became stale in the region by the late 1950s.
178 Osgood, Total Cold War, 6. 179 Ibid, 145-146 180 Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World and the Cold War, 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 132. 91 Latin American economists and leaders, such as Brazilian President Juscelino
Kubitschek and Argentine President Arturo Frondizi, were already developing detailed plans regarding the idea of a large-scale government supported program of development.181
In reality, the USIA under Eisenhower never fully developed a cohesive information agenda in Latin America. Programs towards the region lacked a clear focus and adequate resources. That is not to say that administration officials did not push for more focus to the south. The National Security Council released a policy statement in
1954 declaring that “the principal problem will be to find the means of associating the
United States with the aspirations of the peoples of Latin America, thus counteracting communist propaganda which consistently and often effectively portrays the United
States as the defender of ‘so called exploiters’ in opposition to the interests of the common people.”182 Though it was clearly and concisely stated that the United States needed to rethink its posture concerning information programs, very little changed. In his last year in office Eisenhower ordered Mansfield Sprague, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, to chair a committee charged with evaluating USIA operations and making recommendations for improvements. The committee began its work in March 1960 and for almost a year examined USIA materials, interviewed key policymakers, and debated the strategy of U.S information and psychological programs.
On December 23, 1960, the Sprague Committee submitted its report to President
Eisenhower and “urged major expansion of USIA work in Latin America, where activity
181 Christopher Darnton, “Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in U.S.–Latin American Relations. 182 Osgood, Total Cold War, 144. 92 had lagged behind U.S. economic policy.”183 Kennedy took the Sprague report seriously and implemented several recommendations.184
Prior to the presidency, Kennedy’s transition team put together a task force to study new initiatives for the agency. This group consulted over twenty leading academics, journalists, and foreign policy experts in determining their recommendations.
They suggested that the Director of the USIA attend all cabinet meetings and become a member National Security Council. Task Force members also pushed the incoming administration to request an increase in the USIA annual budget, making it close to $150 million.185 Even before entering the White House, Kennedy attempted to mold the USIA to fit his vision. He offered the post of agency director to CBS President Frank Stanton, only to have him decline since he believed that that his current position held more importance.186 Stanton did recommend a few newspaper editors and also mentioned
Edward R. Murrow, a longtime CBS reporter as a possible choice. Kennedy contacted a former Harvard classmate, CBS Vice-President Blair Clark, to get an opinion on both
Stanton and Murrow. Clark told the president that “if you want a man extraordinarily well connected in Congress, an able, efficient administrator, Stanton is your man. But if you want a man with an international reputation, an honest communicator, then your man is Ed Murrow. I’d pick Murrow.”187 When it became clear that Stanton could not be talked into the position, Kennedy looked to Murrow, though the newsman initially
183 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 180-183. 184 William Keylor, “Waging the War of Words: The Promotion of American Interests and Ideals Abroad during the Cold War,” in Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation Versus Transformation, ed. Cathal Nolan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 93 185 “Recommendations for Action,” Pre-Presidential Papers Transition Files, Task Force Reports, Box 1074, JFKL. 186 Joseph Persico, Edward R. Murrow: An American Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 464. 187 Ibid, 465. 93 demurred. He sought advice from Bill Paley, a giant in the broadcasting industry. Paley strongly counseled that any acceptance be conditioned on Murrow and the agency having access. He told Murrow that “you have to tell Kennedy you have to be on the inside of the family…You can’t represent the country’s viewpoint unless you know what’s going on.”188 In order to make the offer too good to pass up, Kennedy promised Murrow that he would have presidential access and be present at National Security Council meetings.189
Murrow accepted and when asked what should be put in his resignation announcement from CBS, said “tell ‘em I’m off to serve my country.”190 To many, Murrow’s selection signaled that Kennedy took U.S. information and psychological programs seriously.
Murrow was no average news anchor, as he had extensive experience working in media outlets and had been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations for decades. During his confirmation hearing, he stated his belief about the need for the United States government to live up to its ideals and make sure deeds match rhetoric, “In the end of the day it may well be that the example of this nation will be more important than its dollars or its words.”191
Much more power and influence was supposedly placed in the hands of the
Director of the USIA. Kennedy wrote to Murrow that “I consider you one of my principal advisors, with a special concern and competence in assessing the psychological factors
188 Ibid, 466. 189 Nicholas Cull, “The Man who Invented Truth: The Tenure of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency during the Kennedy Years,” Cold War History, Vol. 4 (October 2003), 26. 190 Persico, Edward R. Murrow, 466. 191 Edward R. Murrow Papers, “Murrow at the United States Information Agency (USIA), 1961-1964,” Digital Collections and Archives at Tufts University, available Tufts University; “Statement by Edward R. Murrow at Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing,” March 14, 1961, Edward R. Murrow Papers, microfilm collection, Reel 45. 94 dealing with foreign affairs.”192 Murrow took Kennedy at his word and attempted to carve out a more prominent role for the USIA. Walter Roberts, a former associate director of the agency recalled that “Murrow dispatched now and then little memoranda to John F. Kennedy on little foreign policy matters…None of the [Directors of the USIA], to the best of my knowledge ever suggested to the President of the United States, whoever he was, that certain foreign policy actions might or might not be taken.”193
While Murrow maintained an active role during his early tenure at the USIA, lung cancer eventually forced him to take several leaves of absence before resigning in early 1964.
Another important step the president took in restructuring the USIA included terminating the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). The OCB, established in 1953 by
Eisenhower, took charge of all psychological warfare planning. In essence, the OCB became a large-scale bureaucracy established to implement any and all information programs agreed upon by the National Security Council. Historian Kenneth Osgood noted that “the OCB had wide jurisdiction over programs designed for international persuasion.”194 On February 19, 1961 President Kennedy, through an Executive Order, abolished the OCB. He stated that “this board was used in the last administration for work which we now plan to do in other ways.” Kennedy further explained that he expected the work concerned “with the impact of our actions on foreign opinion—our
192 “Draft letter from President Kennedy to the Director-Designate of the U.S. Information Agency (Murrow),” March 10, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XXV, 232. 193 John Robert Kelly, “Advisor Non Grata: The Dueling Roles of U.S. Public Diplomacy,” in Trials of Engagement: The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, eds. Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2011), 60. 194 Osgood, Total Cold War, 87. 95 “image abroad…to be done in a number of ways: in my own office, in the State
Department, under Mr. Murrow of USIA”195
Image 5: President Kennedy with Edward R. Murrow in the Oval Office.
Also in February 1961 the USIA produced a blueprint for new public diplomacy programs in Latin America. Beginning by assessing the current situation Assistant USIA
Director in charge of Latin America John McKnight wrote that “not for a century – not since European powers, taking advantage of U.S. embroilment in a great civil war, put
Maximillian on the throne of Mexico – has the U.S. claim to hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere been so seriously challenged.” He continued by noting that “the emergence of Fidel Castro, a bearded Cuban Robin Hood of a perilous charisma, to give fire and focus to the long-suppressed aspirations of countless millions of under-privileged in the
195 “Statement by the President upon Signing Order Abolishing the Operations Coordinating Boards,” February 19, 1961, APP. 96 area.” If not properly confronted, Fidel Castro posed the opportunity to “set the entire hemisphere aflame.” 196
The memorandum illustrated a keen awareness of the changing demographics of
Latin American society. The old order, comprised of the Latin American elite, gave way to younger more socio-economic minded individuals. McKnight wrote “dominant in opinion-shaping are persons relatively young, some from lower economic levels, whose own place in the social structure is in transition, and who consequently focus on socio- economic change.” Three key goals included to expose “Castro for the demagogue he is, destroy the myth he embodies, and uproot or nullify the Castro-Communist apparatus in the hemisphere.” Additional objectives included convincing governments in power to sponsor immediate reforms, and creating a “counter-mystique” around reform programs to “offset” Castro’s influence. The last goal was the most elusive. Yet, McKnight argued that “we must find the words to move men’s hearts. Still, only through our deeds can we convince the Latin Americans that our side is the right side for them.”
Echoing the Sprague Report at times, McKnight also wrote that during the
Eisenhower era, “The USIA in Latin America had a low-budget, low-priority program that was little more than a holding operation.” The vast majority of programs had been confined to capital cities. He argued in favor of expansion in the areas of labor, binational centers, student exchange programs, and published materials. Arguing that “USIA must now reach the elite and the masses – if only because Castro and his multiferous, ubiquitous, well-heeled propagandists are contemptuously bypassing governments and the ruling classes to appeal directly to the descamisados (shirtless), the rotos (broken),
196 “Memorandum for Adolf Berle, Consultant to the Secretary of State,” February 22 1961, GRUSIA, UD- WW 142, Box 6, NARA. 97 the guajiros (peasants)…To do this will require considerable expansion in many sectors.” McKnight concluded with some policy recommendations, noting that “policy and propaganda are in practice indissociable.”197 The opinion that practitioners of public diplomacy needed to be involved in policymaking was constantly an issue in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy, though McKnight’s memo recommended more inclusion, and
Kennedy’s promise to Murrow purported USIA would “have a seat at the table,” early in the administration, words did not correlate with actions.
Five Days in April
Shortly after his electoral victory, John Kennedy received detailed briefings on
Operation Zapata, a CIA plan to overthrow Fidel Castro. CIA Director Allen Dulles and
Deputy for Planning Richard Bissell told the President-elect that the training of anti-
Castro Cubans in Guatemala was proceeding and Kennedy agreed that the preparations should continue.198 Dwight Eisenhower echoed those sentiments and advised his successor that the United States should continue supporting anti-Castro forces “to the utmost.” Eisenhower also recommended that the program of training anti-Castro Cubans be “accelerated.”199 Historian James Giglio writes that Kennedy privately grouped Cuba as an area of major crisis, along with Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo, “Yet none tormented Kennedy more in his first months—if not his entire presidency—than
Cuba.”200
197 Ibid. 198 James Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 50. 199 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965) 164. 200 Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy, 48. 98 The initial plan for Castro’s overthrow called for a landing near the colonial city of Trinidad. Air cover provided by the United States would allow the Cuban exiles to come ashore safely while U.S. intelligence predicted that once word of the invasion reached the cities an island wide uprising against Castro would commence. Kennedy scratched the landing site, believing it did not provide the U.S. government with enough deniability and made clear that no U.S. forces, either land or air, should participate in the action. He was told by CIA officials that the plan had a “fair” chance of success.201 The president held conflicted thoughts; he ardently believed that Castro needed to go, but the costs associated with failure were high. John Kenneth Galbraith, a loyal Kennedy ally and newly appointed Ambassador to India, cautioned the president that U.S. involvement in Castro’s overthrow would damage the “reputation you have already won for your conservative, thoughtful, non-belligerent tone.”202 During an April 4, 1961 meeting at the
State Department, the president pushed each adviser present to offer a vote either in favor of or against the operation. Only Secretary of State Dean Rusk opposed the plan, though he would later admit not nearly as forcefully as he should have. Adolf Berle, a veteran
U.S. diplomat and constant proponent of the Good Neighbor Policy, stated that if nothing was done with Castro then the consequences would be risky, while a successful operation would be a quite an achievement. After that less than decisive statement, Kennedy pushed Berle for a yes or no answer, “Well, Adolf, you haven't voted,” Berle replied, “I'd say, let her rip.”203
201 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 54. 202 Howard Jones, The Bay of Pigs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 66. 203 Richard Bissell, Oral History, April 25 1967, JFKL. 99 Though the consequences of overthrowing Fidel Castro could threaten his entire agenda for Latin America, Kennedy resolved to follow in his predecessor’s footsteps: he would launch a covert military action to oust a Latin American leader. For five days, April 15 to April 19, events unfolded disastrously for the United States at the
Bay of Pigs. Initially, eight B-26 bombers piloted by exiles took off from a base in
Nicaragua and attacked Castro’s air defenses. Only partially damaging Cuba’s air force, the bombings alerted Cuba’s leaders that something larger may be on the horizon. The next day Kennedy canceled any further air raids, most likely fearing that continuous attacks would be an obvious sign of U.S. participation. His actions dismayed officials at the CIA. Marine Colonel Jack Hawkins, an operation planner, fumed that “the Cuban
Brigade was doomed.”204
Just after midnight on April 17 1,400 Cuban exiles attempted to land at the Bay of
Pigs. By the morning they were under attack from Castro’s air force and army. Very quickly Cuban forces achieved the upper hand and the entire operation was in danger of failing. Requests were made for U.S. military assets to enter the fight, but President
Kennedy refused. By April 19 Cuban forces had captured the entire exile brigade. An angry President Kennedy thought the CIA and military betrayed his trust. He privately confided that “all my life I’ve known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid?” His anger soon receded to sadness. First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy
204 Warren Trest and Donald Dodd, Wings of Denial: The Alabama Air National Guard’s Covert Role at the Bay of Pigs (Montgomery, AL: NewSouth Books, 2001), 69. 100 recalled that the president “came back over to the White House to his bedroom and started to cry, just with me…just put his head in his hands and sort of wept.”205
Condemnation from around the world came swiftly. The British Foreign Office was particularly bothered by the botched plan for it previously warned the United States not to take action. A cable to London read that “for a long time past we have been impressing on the Americans how damaging it would be to their position in most countries in Latin America if they were to intervene in Cuba.” As could be expected, reactions in Latin America were harsh. Fifty thousand protesters in Mexico City carried signs with “Yesterday Veracruz – today Cuba” written on them. Anti-U.S. protests occurred in Venezuela, Uruguay, and Colombia. President Rómulo Betancourt in
Venezuela labeled the attempt “stupid and criminal.”206 Colombian students proclaimed that they were “with Cuba to the death.”207 Operation planners had argued that the operation would solve a vexing problem by removing Latin America’s revolutionary example. Yet, the “perfect failure” only heightened the tensions that existed between
Washington and Havana while enhancing Castro’s prestige in the eyes of many in the region.208
The fiasco also demonstrated a wide gap between Kennedy’s stated commitment to public diplomacy and his actual use of Murrow’s agency. High-level USIA officials had little previous knowledge that an attempted invasion was on the horizon. In fact, if not for a friendly breakfast between New York Times reporter Tad Szulc and Deputy
205Jacqueline Kennedy: Historic Conversations on Life with John F. Kennedy, interviews with Arthur Schlesinger Jr. The Fifth Conversation, Tuesday March 24, 1964 (New York: Hyperion, 2011), 179. 206 Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism, 149. 207 Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 35. 208 Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989). 101 Director of the USIA Donald Wilson no one in information policy circles would have known. On April 5 Szulc mentioned a story he was about to write regarding a U.S. supported anti-Castro invasion force preparing to embark for Cuba and wondered about
USIA involvement in the operation. From the look on Don Wilson’s face, Szulc ascertained that the agency had no knowledge of the plan. The deputy director soon met with Murrow and the two men scheduled to meet with CIA Director Allen Dulles. Dulles declined to substantiate Szluc’s story, but twenty minutes after the meeting at CIA headquarters, Murrow received a summons to National Security Adviser McGeorge
Bundy’s office at the White House. Bundy confirmed the plan and declared that the president had completely committed himself to going ahead with the invasion.
Astonished, Murrow “predicted a psychological disaster.”209 When the invasion ended in failure, the USIA Director became furious that such important administration policy had been decided with little or no concern for the consequences on the U.S. image. He commented that public diplomacy officials needed to be in on “the take-offs, not just the crash landings.” Two weeks notice, and finding out about the plan during an informal breakfast with a reporter, was not the sort of access Murrow envisioned when Kennedy offered him the directorship.
In the wake of the Bay of Pigs the Kennedy administration realized that an immediate expansion of information programs in the region was necessary. A July 5,
1961 memorandum written by the USIA’s John McKnight to Berle discussed the prospects of “An Expanded Propaganda Program in Latin America.” The number one priority and the reasoning behind an increase in those efforts included “the need to (1)
209 Cull, “The Man who Invented Truth,” 27-28. 102 counteract the effort of the Castro-Communist apparatus and (2) make known the positive…United States contributions to the general welfare of the people of the area.”210
An expanded U.S. program aimed at further infiltrating Latin American and Caribbean
Basin press, radio, and television outlets. Regarding the press, though it conceded that the
United States had success in planting anti-Castro stories in prominent publications, the memorandum argued that an expansion would allow more USIA materials to reach both urban and rural populations. Concerning radio, McKnight contended that the Voice of
America (VOA) could reach millions of more local populations in the region if programming became “tailored” to the individual “provincial stations.”211 Possibly the most alluring anti-Castro psychological operation could be found in television. McKnight argued that “at the present time, there is opportunity for near unlimited placement in this new medium in Latin America.”212 He continued that “television will take almost anything (witness all the U.S. cowboy material being used…dubbed in Spanish), and all that needs to be done is for field posts (and Washington) to gear themselves properly to take advantage of this opportunity.”213
An additional venue that U.S. policymakers believed was conducive for psychological operations were binational center programs. These cultural institutes sponsored educational opportunities that included academic lectures, concerts, and art shows. Though U.S. personnel ran binational centers, their overarching goal was to encourage close collaboration between U.S. citizens and local populations. McKnight
210 “An Expanded Propaganda Program in Latin America,” July 5, 1961, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter- American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 211 Ibid. 212 Ibid. 213 Ibid. 103 maintained that “of all the activities that USIS [USIA] conducts in Latin America, however, binational centers constitute one of the more effective techniques for influencing present or potential community leaders.”214 Persuading potential leaders to reject Castro’s revolutionary ideology and embrace U.S. democracy was essential in combating the allure of the Cuban revolution.
An important, yet overlooked aspect of the post-Bay of Pigs atmosphere in Latin
America was Fidel Castro’s ransoming of captured Cuban exiles. In May the Cuban leader proposed that in exchange for tractors and other farm equipment his government would release all the men held in their custody.215 Murrow quickly went to work making sure that Castro’s offer received front page news coverage in Latin American capital cities.216 The USIA helped place articles focused on the story throughout the region. The response to the proposal was swift and severe. Newspapers in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru all compared Castro’s overture to a Nazi offer of
Jews for trucks during World War II.217 Several Latin American governments, and their citizens, began to collect funds for the ransom.218 Eventually, the prisoners returned home after the United States agreed to pay Cuba and give Castro food and medical supplies.
While Cuba’s decision to seek a ransom did not completely erase the damage done to the
United States image in the region, it certainly did not earn him favor with many Latin
Americans.
214 Ibid. 215 Robert Quirk, Fidel Castro (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), 378. 216 “Item for Presidential Letter, Castro Propaganda Gambit Backfires,” May 24, 1961, GRUSIA, Office of Research, Area Analysis Division, Latin American Branch, Box 6, Entry P23, NARA. 217 “Reaction to Castro’s Prisoners for Tractor’s Proposal,” May, 27, 1961, GRUSIA, UD-WW 142, Box 6, NARA; For more on the Nazi offer of Jews for trucks refer to Richard Breitman, Norman Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Richard Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 54. 218 “Committees in Latin America,” May 26, 1961, President’s Office Files, Countries, Box 121a, JFKL. 104 Fidel Castro further damaged his appeal in Latin America during October of
1962 when the United States discovered the existence of Soviet missiles on the island of
Cuba. The Cuban Missile was a critical moment in inter-American relations during the
1960s.219 The USIA took the lead in publicizing the existence of the weapons and the agency proved up to the task. The primary evidence Washington had against Moscow and
Havana were fourteen U-2 photographs illustrating missile sites in Cuba. After the
USIA’s Donald Wilson, along with other advisors, convinced the president to release the photos publicly, “the USIA distributed some 50,000 prints around the world.” Nicholas
Cull notes that Press Secretary Pierre Salinger “spoke of the distribution of these pictures as ‘the best thing that ever happened. Those pictures played a major role in persuading foreign opinion that the president was justified in taking action.’”220
Selling an Alliance
The most pressing issue confronting Kennedy’s USIA in the early months of the administration included both publicizing and selling the Alliance for Progress. This task became even more difficult following the Bay of Pigs. At the inter-American conference to sign the program’s charter, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Kennedy aide Richard
Goodwin had a private discussion with Cuba’s Che Guevara. The impromptu meeting took place at two in the morning during a conference party. Guevara, wearing green fatigues and maintaining his standard unkempt beard, spoke casually about the course of the Cuban Revolution and its relations with the United States. Towards the end of the conversation, Goodwin recorded that Guevara “went on to say that he wanted to thank us
219 For more on the crisis in Latin America refer to Renata Keller, “The Latin American Missile Crisis,” Diplomatic History, published online March 17, 2014. 220 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 215. 105 very much for the invasion—that it had been a great political victory for them— enabled them to consolidate—and transformed them from an aggrieved little country to an equal.”221 In Guevara’s speech to the assembly, he questioned the motives of the
United States while declaring that Cuba “cannot stop exporting our example, as the
United States wants, because an example is something intangible that crosses borders…What we cannot guarantee is that the idea of Cuba will not take root in some other country of Latin America, and what we do guarantee this conference is that if urgent measures of social prevention are not taken, the example of Cuba will take root in the people.”222
Image 6: Ernesto Che Guevara became the face of revolutionary Cuba’s foreign policy in
Latin America.
221 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy,” August 22, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1962, vol. X, 644. 222 Ernesto Guevara, Our America and Theirs: Kennedy and the Alliance for Progress, The Debate at Punta Del Este (New York: Ocean Press, 2005), 66. 106 Cuban accounts of the Punta del Este conference noted the reception Guevara received from Latin American journalists as they gathered en masse to interview him at the delegation’s hotel. Reports also indicated that the Uruguayan Communist Party paper,
El Popular, labeled the gathering as the “festival of words” and sided with Cuba’s position. A breakdown of each country and their position on Cuba was also included in a detailed memorandum sent back to Havana. Guatemala supported collective action against the island while Nicaragua accused Havana of stoking revolution on its border with Honduras. Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama sided with the United States and declined to support Che’s message of revolution. Ultimately, the delegation from Havana concluded that the Alliance for Progress was merely another program designed to perpetuate U.S. imperialism in the region, and that it would fail as Washington understood little about the needs of Latin Americans.223
By the summer of 1961 the USIA reported that it continued “devoting a substantial portion of its efforts on a continuing basis, in Latin America to publicizing the
Alliance for Progress.”224 Television, radio, film, and news stories were all utilized. The agency even relied on comic books, which showed it had a certain level of awareness regarding social realities in Latin America. Due to the high rates of illiteracy, comic books offered the chance to be better understood by those with little reading ability.
Agency officials even reported that while government leaders, business professionals, landowners, educators, and university students were aware of the economic program,
223 “Informe sobe la conferencia del consejo Interamericano Economico y Social de la OEA celebrada en Punta del Este, a la que asistio el Cdte. Ernesto Che Guevara,” 8 de Septiembre 1961, expediente 661, legajo 36, fondo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, AGNC. 224 “Public Information Program on ‘Alliance for Progress,” GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 107 “Relatively few people in the rural areas of Latin America know about the Alliance for Progress.”225 The comic book program in Latin America originated in Kennedy’s first year in office and included two types of publications, pro-Alliance for Progress and anti-
Castro.
Materials published in support of the U.S. economic program included the comic books Alianza para el Progresso (Alliance for Progress), La Hora Decisiva (The
Decisive Hour) and Hacia Una Vida Mejor (To Make a Better Life).226 Alianza attempted to draw a connection between the United States and Latin America’s revolutionary pasts, while also providing a history lesson for readers, including a drawing of Franklin
Roosevelt and his buen vecino (Good Neighbor) policy. In this vein, the Alliance for
Progress was cast as a continuation of reform in U.S.-Latin American relations. Page after page gave examples of programs and their positive effects on the region. The comic concludes with a sketch of Simón Bolívar and Thomas Jefferson shaking hands with a map of Latin America in the background. La Hora Decisiva appealed more to students. It told the story of Roberto and Maria. Pro-Alliance students want Roberto to lead their group and speak to a federation of young people. Maria believes that Roberto is giving politics and social reform too much of his time, while anti-Alliance students hope to turn
Maria against Roberto. In the end, Roberto delivers a stirring appeal for the economic program, and Maria comes around to understanding just how important a moment it is for
Latin America. As for the anti-Alliance crowd, while walking away dejected their leader
225 “Awareness of the ‘Alliance for Progress’ in Latin America,” April 4, 1962, GRUSIA, Office of Research and Reference, 1956-1962, Entry A1 1032, NARA. 226 These comic books can be located in the Papers of Ernest Keller, Box 4, GUSC. 108 says to himself, “Maybe you have won something, I am beginning to understand the great satisfaction there is to fight for something for the people and the country itself.”
Hacia Una Vida Mejor attempted to reach one of the groups most sought out by the Kennedy administration: Latin American campesinos. This comic told the story of
Manuel, a down and out campesino. Reports indicate that in 1963 this particular comic had “broken all records for first run orders from the posts.”227 The agency printed over
1.5 million copies. The first illustration is Manuel standing over his wife’s grave following her death due to a lack of adequate medical care. Manuel then laments to himself the lack of schools and opportunity. Worst of all, his daughter Juanita now has a fever. Shortly thereafter, a local Alliance for Progress agricultural agent named Juan comes to Manuel’s farm. He quickly deduces that the fever is a result of contaminated water. He points to the river where other farmers are getting their water and tells Manuel that something has to be done so these farmers can get pure water. Manuel responds that they work the land sun up to sun set and do not have time to worry about such things.
Juan then explains the Alliance for Progress to Manuel and later to more local campesinos. Schools, hospitals, and better farming techniques are promised. The locals agree to come together to achieve progress and several pages then depict how hard they work striving to make a new life. At the end of the story, Juan returns and is greeted by
Manuel, whose daughter has now recovered. The last lines are Juan saying to himself,
“The story of these people is repeated in thousands of other towns and cities throughout the hemisphere. Free men gather, discuss problems, decide how to resolve them and work together. Their decisions are based on the basic principles of the Alliance for Progress.
227 “The Cartoon Book Program in Latin America,” May 22, 1963, Box 4, Keller Papers, GUSC. 109 Governments as well as inter-American organizations are prepared to help the people in their march toward a better life.”
Included in the anti-Castro series were La Puñalada (The Stab), El Despertar
(The Awakening), and Los Secuestradores (The Kidnappers). La Puñalada sought to demonstrate the position of the Catholic Church in Latin America. The story begins in
1958 during the Cuban Revolution when a Catholic priest is with Castro’s guerilla movement in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. He is there due to being persecuted by
Fulgencio Batista’s forces. Immediately following the revolution, the Catholic Church and Cuban revolutionaries are on the same side. One particular depiction shows a Cuban priest, Father Pablo, telling young students that the church supports the revolution’s goals of social justice and the principles of agrarian reform. When the Cuban agrarian reform is depicted as collectivization and the Church goes against Castro, they are then denounced as counterrevolutionary and eventually priests are exiled or imprisoned. The point of the story is rather obvious: Fidel Castro turned his back on the Catholic Church, one of Latin
America’s oldest institutions.
Moreover, the comic illustrated that Castro violated the ideals of the Cuban
Revolution. While fighting, Castro’s movement remained sympathetic and supportive of the Catholic Church, but once in power, traditional Latin American institutions were under attack. The theme of violating the goals of the revolution was consistent in other
USIA supported publications. In El Despertar the first scene shows the excitement young people had when Cuban revolutionaries entered Havana. Pepe and Blanca, a young couple, are happy to see Castro and his forces take power, only to become disenchanted with the implementation of Castro’s agrarian reform plan. Blanca’s brother, Mateo, a 110 member of the revolutionary government even comes to view the land reform as too
“inflexible.” After Matteo is arrested for being a counterrevolutionary, Pepe and Blanca head for the mountains to join others who seek to resist the Castro government. They tell each other they hope to “live and work in a Cuba that is truly free.”228
As with the other anti-Castro comic books, Los Secuestradores begins with depictions of jubilation following the revolution. The next scene shows a young boy heading off to a new school. His mother gives credit to Fidel Castro for the school while the older grandfather asks where is “the free press, free elections?” When he is told to be quiet by his daughter, the old man asks whether he still has the right to speak. While in class, the teacher asks students to pray to God for ice cream. When the prayer is not answered, the teacher says that is because God does not exist. She then instructs her students to pray to a picture of Fidel for ice cream. When the students open their eyes an ice cream man emerges. The young boy, Pablito, is told not to trust in God but trust in
Fidel. When his parents and grandfather are told of the story they are shown to be disillusioned with the course of the revolution. At night when the adults are discussing the state of Cuba, the young boy overhears them and bursts in calling them all “traitors to
Fidel.” As time passes, it is announced that Cuban children will receive a socialist education. When Pablito sees the new books he has to study, he throws them out of the window, denouncing communism. Pablito’s father, Don Manuel, makes the decision that his son and wife must leave the island. Late one night the family waits on the beach for a
228 El Despertar, Box 4, Keller Papers, GUSC. 111 small ship. When Pablito hugs his father and asks when he will see him again, Don
Manuel responds “when our country is truly free.”229
Image 7: USIA comic book Los Secuestradores.
By 1964 the USIA comic book program in Latin America printed over 12 million copies of anti-Castro materials and over 10 million comics in support of the Alliance for
Progress. The agency was careful in attempting to reach as broad an audience as possible.
Store shoppers received free copies, while at particular markets, checkers placed copies into store customers bags. Officials also recorded that the “USIA furnishes the books as
‘text-book’ materials to aid in the teaching of reading.”230 Catholic churches helped the
229Los Secuestradores, Box 4, Keller Papers, GUSC. 230 “The Cartoon Book Program in Latin America,” May 22, 1963, Box 4. Keller Papers, GUSC. 112 effort by handing out strips to parishioners following mass. Latin American newspapers published certain strips or included them as supplements. Labor unions also made use of the materials. One post noted that a communist speaker was furious when union members continued reading their comic books while he attempted to speak.231
An additional medium used to sell the Alliance for Progress was film. Early in his tenure as USIA Director, Murrow hired a Hollywood filmmaker to lead the agency’s
Motion Picture Services Division. In the fall of 1961 producer George Stevens Jr., approached Murrow with the idea of making a film covering First Lady Jacqueline
Kennedy’s trip to Pakistan. Murrow thought the proposal was great and that Stevens would be an ideal candidate to lead USIA’s film division. Historian Nicholas Cull writes that Stevens “offered a unique combination of youth, energy, and Hollywood connections.”232 An initial assignment for Stevens included producing films covering
President Kennedy’s policies towards Latin America. An early project Bridges of the
Barrio, narrated by Paul Newman, focused on development through the Alliance for
Progress in a small Ecuadorian village. The film told the story of barrio dwellers who had to walk miles just for clean water. Asserting that more time could be better spent on education, the film shows the Ecuadorian military building a bridge to drastically reduce the time necessary to retrieve water. Newman’s lines include “there is still much work to be done, but as a man works towards the dream of a better life it becomes more and more a reality. Today a child learning instead of waiting.”233
231 Ibid. 232 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 206. 233 “Copy of Script for Bridges of the Barrio,” Bruce Herschensohn Collection, Pepperdine Digital Collection, Pepperdine University. 113 Other film productions featured the president himself. In 1962 John Kennedy and the First Lady visited Mexico City. From this trip came Progress through Freedom.
Touting the close historical ties between neighbors, the film also highlighted the work under way through the Alliance for Progress. Two themes consistently emphasized throughout the film included the connection between the New Frontier and Franklin
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy and the necessity for widespread economic and political change in the region. Initial footage shows President Kennedy immediately following his arrival declaring that “we come as good neighbors and follow in the footsteps of one of my most distinguished predecessors, Franklin Roosevelt, who prophesied that the day would ultimately come when Presidents of Mexico and the
United States would freely meet and freely communicate upon their common responsibilities and common opportunities.”234 When speaking at the Municipal Palace in
Mexico City the president stated that by “working through the Alianza Para el Progreso, a great communal effort, not that of the United States, not that of Mexico, but of all of the sister republics of our free hemisphere working together, it is our obligation to bring to the people of this hemisphere the same opportunities that you gentlemen are working for the people of Mexico City--housing and jobs and education and a future as well as a past.”235
The trip was also a chance for Kennedy to inspect economic programs already underway. He visited the Unidad Independencia Housing Project in Mexico City, created with Alliance for Progress funds, and said to the crowd that “housing, education, jobs, and security go hand in hand with the real concepts of political equality and freedom.
234 “Remarks Upon Arrival at the Airport in Mexico City,” June 29, 1962, APP. 235 “Remarks at a Civic Ceremony at the Municipal Palace, Mexico City,” June 29, 1962, APP. 114 This, Mexico has understood in the revolution. This, this hemisphere must understand if we are going to accomplish the goals of Alianza para el Progreso, a great movement forward by the people of this hemisphere. Viva Mexico, arriba, Mexico.” To which the crowd chanted back “viva.”236
While making sure that U.S. information output regarding economic development continually increased, a central goal early in the formation of the Alliance for Progress was assuring that it became an inter-American initiative, meaning not dominated by
Washington. Officials in the Kennedy administration knew that for the program to achieve staying power, then people in the region had to feel that they had a voice; this was also true in attempts to sell the plan. During the summer of 1962 an information program, supposedly only devoted to the program developed within the OAS. Colombian
Dr. Jaime Posada, then assistant secretary for Cultural, Scientific, and Educational
Affairs for the organization was in charge. With a $1.6 million grant from USAID, the program aimed at giving the Alliance for Progress a “hemispheric voice.” Unfortunately, it never materialized into a cohesive and effective unit.237
Reports indicated by the end of 1962 that several Latin American countries had their own information staffs but received no directives from OAS leadership. Moreover, it remained unclear whether the individuals leading the information push had any experience in economic development or anything related to the Alliance for Progress.238
By the fall of 1963 U.S. officials from the State Department, USAID, and the USIA met
236 “Remarks at the Unidad Independencia Housing Project, Mexico City,” June 30, 1962, APP. 237 “Public Information for the Alliance for Progress – Reorganization of Pan American Union Activities,” September 19, 1963, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 238 “Memorandum of Conversation, OAS Information Program,” December 31, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 115 to discuss ongoing OAS operations. Some argued in favor of the United States taking a more forceful role in OAS program decisions and personnel. DeLesseps Morrison, the
U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, argued that such moves would threaten “the multilateral character of the organization.”239 U.S. policymakers viewed their position as precarious.
Though they wanted a multilateral and hemispheric tone to characterize information efforts, it did not appear that the OAS was capable of providing adequate assistance.
In January 1963, the State Department’s Arturo Morales Carrión expressed harsh opinions towards the OAS, writing that the “information program, today, is a complete mess. It has been enmeshed in the regular bureaucracy. It is riddled with personality problems. It is wasteful, both in terms of production and manpower.”240 The initial goal was for the OAS program to operate separately from other information plans, but still after a year no clear difference existed. The failure to give aspects of the public diplomacy campaign for the Alliance for Progress a “hemispheric voice” only contributed to the program being viewed as a U.S. venture.
Books for the People
Found within John McKnight’s July proposal for “An Expanded Propaganda
Program in Latin America” was acknowledgement that a “book gap” existed. The memorandum read in part that “the gap between the [communist] bloc’s efforts and our
239 “Memorandum of Meeting, Future of PAU Public Information Program for the Alliance for Progress,” September 24, 1963, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 240 “Memorandum, The OAS Alliance for Progress Information Program,” January 14 1963, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 116 own keeps getting bigger.”241 Early in his presidency, Kennedy received questions about the U.S. commitment to providing books around the world. During a press conference a reporter mentioned a growing book gap between the communist world and the United States and asked Kennedy if the gap presented “a tremendous obstacle to our winning the minds of the uncommitted peoples, and does our administration plan to close this gap?” Kennedy deflected the question and replied that “I think the point is excellent.
Mr. Murrow has been considering what we could do in an expanded way in this area.”242
While the president did indeed deflect the question, he was being honest.
As early as November 1961 State Department officials in coordination with the
USIA, USAID, and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) sought to implement policies that would inundate Latin America with books containing pro-U.S. and anti-Castro messages. Officials lamented the fact that the “USSR, Red China, and
Cuba and others with a large stake in the future course of events not only have more money to spend in Latin America, but they have programs more skillfully integrated with local social and political movements.”243 The top projects that the State Department wanted to implement were the “development of a publishing firm for disseminating significant social writing… [And]…the development of a translation service to get significant…American writing into Spanish.”244
241 “An Expanded Propaganda Program in Latin America,” July 5, 1961, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter- American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, Record Group 59, Box 1, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 242 “The Presidents News Conference,” March 23, 1961, APP. 243 “Joint AID, USIA, CU Planning of Projects in Latin America,” November 6, 1961, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 7, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 244 Ibid. 117 Though the administration had clearly defined goals and realized that a book gap existed, they were slow to act on it. In February 1962 officials reported that book program “efforts are generally recognized as meager and inadequate.”245 Later that month
USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson reported to the president that while over 300,000 copies of seventy-nine titles would be published for readers in Latin America during
1962, more could be done with a little increase in funding. Moreover, coordination between the USIA and USAID remained hampered. Wilson wrote that “there is no centralized direction and management of AID’s Latin America book activity.”246
Sensing that Kennedy sought some signs of progress, administration officials compiled a book list for the president’s viewing in April of 1962. Murrow’s Deputy
Director for Policy and Plans, Thomas Sorensen, wrote that works by Kennedy advisor
John Kenneth Galbraith as well as anti-Castro books were being made available in Latin
America. Galbraith’s Economic Development in Perspective and American Capitalism were both being published in Spanish and distributed. Other titles included David
Lilienthal’s TVA: Democracy on the March, Eugene Rostow’s Planning for Freedom, and Adolf Berle’s 20th Century Capitalist Revolution. Anti-Castro publications included
Alberto Baeza’s The Chains Come from Afar and Roger Baldwin’s A New Slavery:
Forced Labor, the Communist Betrayal of Human Rights. 247 Sorensen also informed the president that the USIA was “exploring the idea of getting a good Latin author to write an
245 “Translations of American Books for Latin America,” February 1, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter- American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 16, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 246 “Memorandum for Richard Goodwin-Two Papers for briefing the President,” February 16, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961- 1963, RG 59, Box 17, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 247 “Memorandum for the President,” April 16, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 17, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 118 original book on Communism’s inadequacy for underdeveloped economies.”248
Finding local Latin American authors became a top priority for the USIA. Many in the agency viewed it as the best way to dispel notions that all publications were “Yankee propaganda.” The memo concluded by noting “it has taken us a year to gear up for an improved book program in the area after years of neglect. We expect to move ahead rapidly now, and are giving it highest priority.”
Though Sorensen labeled the program as a main concern, a State Department memorandum just a few weeks after the list for Kennedy was made lamented the still inadequate work being done regarding books for Latin America. The report read that “we seem to have no basic propaganda plan. Thus we have no clear agreement on the priority audiences in Latin America we want to reach and what types of information we want to communicate.” Central to a book program’s effectiveness included figuring out who you wanted to influence and what you wanted to tell them. Officials in the Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs argued that professors, students, economists, and those in intellectual circles (writers, artists, and political philosophers) should be targeted. There were central themes: “the democratic way is better,” the United States model of development will win out, and the “Cuban” model is a “false panacea.”249
The summer of 1962 proved decisive for the USIA’s book program. In May additional titles were added to the availability list. Works by John Locke and Thomas
Paine along with those by United States Founding Fathers were now available in Latin
248 Ibid. 249 “Closing the ‘Book Gap’ in Latin America,” April 30, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 16, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 119 America.250 More importantly, Rusk issued a directive regarding the book program in the region. Rusk reported that “the President has, on several occasions, indicated his concern about the inadequacy of our book programs in Latin America.”251 To remedy the situation, Rusk ordered Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Morales Carrión to take leadership of the book program and implement “maximum…expansion of planned
FY63 efforts in selection, translation, production, and distribution of…books under existing USIA and AID Latin American book program.”252 Morales Carrión became “Mr.
Books for Latin America.”253 He “was personally selected by the President to act…as principal adviser…on all questions of policy formulation and programming of activities for hemisphere countries and peoples.”254 Morales Carrión’s top priorities were to coordinate “psychological warfare activities by all agencies concerned with inter-
American affairs.”255 Rusk also wrote that he desired at least $5 million would be available from the U.S. government for the Latin American book program, quite an optimistic hope.
Less than two weeks later a memorandum detailing “A Maximum USIA Latin
American Book Program” for 1963 received circulation. Utilizing regional publishers in
Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro the agency sought to disseminate over
250 “Availabilities and Suggested new titles for Book Translations in Spanish on American History in Latin America,” May 10, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 6, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 251 “Directive on Books for Latin Americans,” May 21, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 6, Entry A1 3149, NARA. Ibid. 253 “Memorandum to Mr. Morales Carrión,” May 22, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 16, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 254 “Duties of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cultural and Ideological Activities,” August 1962. GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961- 1963, RG 59, Box 7, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 255 Ibid. 120 400 book titles for a total cost of under $2.5 million. Each capital city received a book officer. USAID also replied that its current project, which included a Central American
Regional Educational Materials Production Center would produce over one million books in its first year. Also, a science book translation program was in the works along with plans for fifty bookmobiles. These bookmobiles contained the seal of the Alliance for
Progress and were viewed by policymakers as an excellent tool since they operated not only in urban areas but also in the more rural parts of Latin America.
In July Morales Carrión submitted his first status update following Rusk’s directive. Though he noted progress in several areas, insufficient staffing issues and a lack of integration between the USIA and USAID were still problems. He concluded that
“our program must be stepped up sharply and quickly if we are to begin to hold our own with our ideological adversaries in this contest.”256 To be fair to the agencies assigned with improving the United States output of books to Latin America, the first status update came only two months following the Secretary of State’s directive. By the end of 1963, when Morales Carrión submitted another update he reported that “USIA and USAID activities have improved and grown in effectiveness during the past year.”257 Due to the improved coordination the USIA quadrupled its book numbers in Latin America. In 1962 the agency published 856,000 books, but that number increased to 3,629,750 in 1963.
Morales Carrión also stated that agency officials had instructions to heavily focus on
“target groups,” which included intellectuals, teachers, and students. Concerning USAID,
256 “Status Report on the Latin American Book Program,” July 27, 1962, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter- American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 15, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 257 “Summary of Second Status Report on the Latin American Book Program – FY 1963,” November 19, 1963, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 15, Entry A1 3149, NARA.
121 the agency opened the Central American Production Center in Guatemala and had already provided over 2 million textbooks to school children there.
Not all of Morales Carrión’s status report was positive. He wrote that the USIA budget for the book program in 1964 would again be $1.4 million, meaning that no expansion was going to take place. USAID also prepared for a reduction in the amount they would spend on books. While Secretary Rusk argued in favor of at least $5 million being spent on an enhanced book program, nowhere near that amount was ever allotted.
Furthermore, Morales Carrión criticized the lack of influence he had as coordinator for the book program. He believed that other agency leaders viewed him as more of an adviser. Important decisions were already made before they reached his desk. He asserted that more authority must be put into the hands of the coordinator and that he obtain a staff to help manage day-to-day business. In reality, Morales Carrión’s position, as described in Rusk’s directive, was not coordinator of a book program, but of book programs. The
USIA and USAID, though they sought better cooperation, never linked their programs together. The Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library
Programs, founded in 1962 with both government officials as well as U.S. book publishers on it, also heavily criticized the Kennedy administration for its lack of clarity in its book program. The committee saw too much duplication and overlaps between the agencies regarding their book programs in Latin America.
Criticisms aside, the Kennedy administration increased the number of books to
Latin America, going from publishing several hundred thousand copies to over 3 million in less than three years. One of Kennedy’s primary goals including closing the book gap between the free world and its communist adversaries, by 1964 the United States became 122 the number one supplier of books overseas.258 Yet, had better coordination been implemented, more attention and money put into the Latin America book program, and a clearer definition of agency responsibilities clearly articulated, much more would have been accomplished. An administration officials answer to Arturo Morales Carrión on how to respond to a 1963 letter from noted book publisher Alfred Knopf criticizing the U.S. book program in Latin America as inadequate best sums up the inefficiencies in the book program. The agency noted that Knopf was correct and declared that “more pious sermons have been preached on the subject than can be counted; promises made by official figures to public audiences, sums of money bandied about, but the plain fact is that there is no machinery to do the job, no funding clearly ear-marked for it, and no indication that any of this will be forthcoming.”259
People to People: The Peace Corps in Latin America
It was 2 a.m., not the typical time for a candidate to make a speech, but John
Kennedy had just finished his final debate with Richard Nixon and 10,000 people were waiting to hear the senator at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. It was less than a month away from the general election and Kennedy challenged the students to seize the opportunity before them and help move the country forward. He asked “how many of you who are going to be doctors, are willing to spend your days in Ghana? Technicians or engineers, how many of you are willing to work in the Foreign Service and spend your lives traveling around the world?” As the crowd cheered he continued that “on your willingness to do that, not merely to serve one year or two years in the service, but on
258 Osgood, Total Cold War, 304. 259 “Knopf Letter,” March 1, 1963, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant, Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Box 16, Entry A1 3149, NARA. 123 your willingness to contribute part of your life to this country, I think will depend the answer whether a free society can compete.”260 The origins of the Peace Corps lay not in a Washington D.C. conference room or a campaign headquarters, but in the student union building on a college campus.
In January 1961, during his first State of the Union address Kennedy continued the push to enlist the services of young people, “We can mobilize this talent through the formation of a National Peace Corps, enlisting the services of all those with the desire and capacity to help foreign lands meet their urgent needs for trained personnel.” He supported his rhetoric by signing an executive order on March 1 establishing the Peace
Corps. The organization’s mission became to assist in the development of Third World nations by providing support, while also helping people around the world better understand the United States. Sargent Shriver, the president’s brother-in-law, was chosen as the first director and immediately went to work. The first volunteers soon went to East
Africa and in May 1961 the administration announced that the second project would be in
Colombia. Over sixty volunteers received training and were subsequently sent to rural areas of the country to assist in community development.261 The corps aided in “well- drilling, laying water and sewage pipe lines, working with local crews on building access roads, explaining the use of new farm implements, and organizing youth clubs.” Local
Colombians aided in these projects.262
260 “Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy,” October 14, 1960, available from Peace Corps. 261 “Statement by the President Announcing a Peace Corps Project in Colombia,” May 16, 1961, APP. 262 “Project Descriptions, Colombia,” November 18, 1961, Personal Papers, Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps, Subject Files, Box 30, JFKL. 124 Latin America soon became a primary region for the Peace Corps. In less than a year several hundred volunteers operated in over ten Latin American countries.263 One reason for the surge was President Kennedy’s personal appeals to Shriver. In a 1962 memorandum he wrote that “I note that you have plans of increasing the number of Peace
Corps volunteers in various parts of the world, such as North Borneo…I would like for you to keep in mind the importance of Latin America, which I think should be the primary area. At the present time do we not have as many in the Philippines as we have in all of the Latin American countries?”264 From helping build schools to assisting in healthcare needs, volunteers spread out throughout the region, from Central America to
Andes, down into the Southern Cone. A Chilean official declared that “these young people have brought to us the reality of the generosity of the United States in a way which could not have been done by 15 ambassadors in Santiago.”265 When newsman
Charles Kuralt, then the CBS head in Latin America, got a question about the Peace
Corps impact in the region, he described being in a remote Colombian village and seeing a banner draped across what acted as the town hall that read “welcome to the Peace
Corps.” Kuralt continued that “it’s a touching thing and something that won’t do us any harm, I am convinced.”266
One of the central arguments concerning corps activities in Latin America was how much leeway should volunteers be given to push social and political change through community development. Some in Washington were decidedly against the idea of
263 “Memorandum for the President, Alliance Status Report, Peace Corps,” March 1 1962, Personal Papers, Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps Correspondence, Box 12, JFKL. 264 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 66. 265 Ibid, 66. 266 “Memorandum, Kuralt Remarks,” January 15 1962, Personal Papers, Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps, Subject Files, Box 30, JFKL. 125 injecting social engineering into rural towns and villages, but important officials such as Shriver and Frank Mankiewicz (first a country directory for Peru and later a regional director) believed that political and social change through community development had to be part of the corps mission. As historian James Siekmierer writes, “They thought that community development should be nothing short of revolutionary, empowering the people who lived in poor rural regions.”267
Image 8: President Kennedy greets Peace Corps volunteers, 1961.
A difficult aspect of the Peace Corps continued making sure its status as a volunteer and humanitarian institution was never compromised. In the spring of 1963
267 James Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States: 1952 to the Present (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 138. 126 Shriver called the president to complain about rumors regarding CIA infiltration of the corps, “I’m getting rather suspicious over here that…some of our friends over in the
Central Intelligence Agency…are trying to stick fellows into the Peace Corps.” Kennedy urged Shriver to contact Richard Helms and Langley and “just say to him that you’ve talked to me and that I don’t want anybody in there…and if there is any problem about it, that Dick Helms ought to call the President.” Kennedy continued that “we don’t want to discredit this whole idea.” 268 Fortunately for Shriver, no CIA plants were ever uncovered. Fidel Castro later confided to Senator Chris Dodd, a Peace Corps volunteer himself that “in all the years I have been in office, despite rumors that have flowed from all sources, we never once have had one piece of specific information to link any Peace
Corps volunteer…with any foreign intelligence operation.”269
While worrying about CIA machinations, the corps also had to concern itself with other difficult initiatives. Suspicions among some Latin Americans of Peace Corps motives could be high, perhaps nowhere more than in Bolivia. Though initial operations received a warm welcome, a high-ranking Bolivian official in the early 1960s hailed the corps as being “not a profession, but a crusade,” by the end of the decade anti-corps sentiment increased.270 Resentment arose primarily to the introduction of birth control.
The pills were given out in Peace Corps established health care clinics staffed by
Bolivians. Over time, ultra-nationalistic elements in Bolivia argued that birth control was a ploy by the United States to weaken what little geopolitical power the country had.
268 “Call from Sargent Shriver,” April 2, 1963, in Listening In: The Secret White House Recordings of John F. Kennedy, ed. Ted Widmer (New York: Hyperion, 2012), 256-258. 269 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need is Love, 94. 270 “Statement by Sargent Shriver, Director of the Peace Corps, at Press Conference, Sheraton East Hotel,” November 18 1961, Personal Papers, Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps Trip File, Box 28, JFKL. 127 Tensions continued rising and when a hard-left government took power in 1971 all volunteers were expelled from the country.271 This occurrence illustrated the need for understanding local conditions before implementing policy initiatives. While in the
United States birth control became more accepted by the 1960s, it remained an alien concept to most Bolivians. It also showed that the activities of the corps were subject to political realities in individual nations.
The task before corps volunteers was immense. Earning the respect and trust of individuals, possibly hostile to any foreign interference and skeptical of people from the
“colossus to the north” would never be an easy task. A story from the Second Annual
Peace Corps Report demonstrated this difficulty. A community development volunteer assigned to Caracas, Venezuela described working in the city neighborhood of Catia.
Sixty percent of the residents were between fourteen and nineteen and lived in widespread poverty. Anti-American sentiment was also high with building walls reading
“Viva Cuba,” or “Cuba Si, Yankis No”272
Yet, the Peace Corps became a public diplomacy initiative that offered specific concrete results. Volunteers lived among Latin Americans, particularly campesinos and together worked to improve the quality of life. The corps was not some grand pronouncement on what would eventually happen or some pamphlet promoting an alliance; it included a tangible bond. Such interactions could also be a blunt counterweight to Fidel Castro’s argument that the United States concerned itself only with the economic exploitation of the region. Colombia’s Minister of Health declared that
271 Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 133-141. 272 “On the Job: Community Development Worker,” Personal Papers, Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps, Subject Files, Box 35, JFKL. 128 “the best demonstration giving lie to the communist charge of lack of interest on the part of the United States is the physical presence in Colombia of Americans who have come only to help us.”273
Conclusion
On April 21, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, Deputy National Security
Adviser Walt Rostow wrote to President Kennedy that “we have suffered a serious setback; but that setback will be trivial compared to the consequences of not very soon regaining momentum.”274 The perilous U.S. position in the region, bequeathed to
Kennedy by the Eisenhower administration was weakened even more by the president’s decision to support such a dramatic overthrow effort. In attempting to recover the image of the United States and promote administration policies Kennedy looked to the USIA and public diplomacy. Through an extensive comic strip program, a wide-ranging book initiative, and the Peace Corps, the administration sought to reach vital segments of Latin
American society. Central to the public diplomacy goals of the Kennedy administration was promoting the Alliance for Progress while simultaneously reducing the appeal of
Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution as a model for development. Regarding the former, the administration never adequately sold Kennedy’s initiative as being truly a partnership.
State Department Assistant Secretary Arturo Morales Carrión lamented that the Alliance for Progress looked “foreign” and “imported” to Latin Americans. Colombian President
273 “Statement by Sargent Shriver, Director of the Peace Corps, at Press Conference, Sheraton East Hotel,” November 18 1961, Personal Papers, Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps Trip File, Box 28, JFKL. 274 “Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy,” April 21, 1961. FRUS, Cuba, 1961-1962, vol. X, 610-611. 129 Alberto Lleras Camargo, writing in Foreign Affairs in 1963, viewed the economic plan as solely a U.S. program.275
While those criticisms were valid, the failures to more forcefully sell the Alliance for Progress owed to more than just the United States. The OAS never implemented an effective, or functioning, propaganda program. This reality was not lost on U.S. diplomats, but policymakers constantly worried that a more pronounced U.S. role in OAS information output would give credence to the argument that both the organization itself and the Alliance for Progress were Washington dominated. The administration never successfully found a balance between allowing Latin American members of the OAS to craft public diplomacy and taking a more assertive role.
Even with that sizeable shortcoming, public diplomacy in the Kennedy years had bright spots. During the Cold War’s most harrowing event, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
USIA played a prominent role broadcasting the U.S. position and making sure Latin
Americans were aware of Castro’s decision to initially accept the missiles.276 The agency also produced film versions of Kennedy’s quarantine speech along with U-2 spy plane images of missile sites in Cuba. Pierre Salinger noted that the picture distribution was
“the best thing that ever happened. Those pictures played a major role in persuading foreign opinion that the President was justified.”277 From its inception in 1961 the comic program became one of the USIA’s most popular schemes. From campesinos to students, the comics offered U.S. propaganda in an easily understood, and somewhat entertaining, format. The book translation program, started under the Eisenhower administration,
275 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 43. 276“Latin America,” GRUSIA, Office of Research and Reference, 1956-1962, Box 2, Entry A1 1032, NARA. 277 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 215. 130 received enhancement to the point that the United States became the world’s top exporter of books by 1964. However, the lack of coordination among administration agencies, routinely cited by status reports, prevented the program from enlarging its output and perhaps its effectiveness. The Peace Corps became one of Kennedy’s most effective public diplomacy programs. No substitute existed for the United States sending its own citizens to remote areas of Latin America and providing aid. Though the example of Bolivia illustrated the necessity of understanding cultural differences, the overall effect of the Peace Corps on the U.S. image in Latin America during the 1960s was positive.
While establishing policies and programs that were regional in scope, the administration also focused public diplomatic and psychological efforts on specific Latin
American countries. In particular, Central America became a contested battleground between the United States and Castro’s Cuba. Due to widespread inequality and large swaths of rural areas susceptible to guerilla warfare, this region weighed heavily on the minds of U.S. policymakers during the Kennedy years.
131 Chapter 3: In Search of “Decent Democratic Regimes”: Generals, Reformers,
and Missed Opportunities in Guatemala and Honduras
Following a fact-finding trip to Central America in 1958 presidential envoy
Milton Eisenhower published a book on U.S.-Latin American relations. The Wine is
Bitter, released in 1963, struck a cautious note and warned Washington that long-standing grievances threatened the region. Eisenhower wrote that
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that revolution is inevitable in Latin America. The people are angry. They are shackled to the past with bonds of ignorance, injustice, and poverty. And they no longer accept as universal or inevitable the oppressive prevailing order which has filled their lives with toil, want, and pain…Cuba has succumbed to the lust for blood and violence. The remainder of the hemisphere teeters precariously on the verge of revolution— peaceful or violent.278
Those words described many parts of Central America, where years of dictatorship and widespread poverty made revolution alluring. In April 1959, only a few months after
Castro’s takeover, a meeting of U.S. Ambassadors to Central American and Caribbean nations took place in El Salvador. Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom flew in from Washington for the gathering. U.S. officials hoped to reach a consensus regarding how best to approach the threat of Cuban inspired revolutionary activities in the region.
The New York Times reported that “fierce debates” took place and arguments over policy were so heated that the threat of “resignations were a dime a dozen.” Fidel Castro was said to be “the subject of the most acrimonious discussions among the Ambassadors.”279
Political appointees sought a more hard-line stance through a unilateral communiqué condemning any Cuban support for revolutionary activities. Career Foreign Service
278 Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter, xi. 279 Paul P. Kennedy, “Caribbean Policy Fiercely Debated,” New York Times, April 13, 1959, 11. 132 officers, led by Ambassador to Cuba Philip Bonsal, wanted to work with the OAS and look at possible sanctions. While very few agreements were made, the meeting did make clear that Central America would be a battleground in the ideological war between the United States and Castro’s Cuba.
Central America became a critical battleground in the eyes of Washington policymakers. Officials feared the possibility of another Cuba as the political and social realities of the region were similar to pre-Castro Cuba. Very few citizens believed that they were part of the political process while economic development was stagnant. To alleviate the situation the Kennedy administration sought to achieve several objectives.
Undermining Fidel Castro’s image and promoting a democratic vision were foremost. To be successful, local leaders had to support large-scale reforms and the people needed to believe that real progress could be achieved. Bridging the divide between political elites and the average citizen often proved a difficult task. For many Central Americans, years of government corruption made them hesitant to have faith that their respective leaders would now implement real reform.
In order to have an impact on Guatemalans and Hondurans the USIA utilized several strategies and mediums. These included the distribution of pamphlets, books, and films. Radio broadcasts were also increased and cultural exchanges continued. U.S. officials sought to manipulate local media outlets and enlisted Catholic Church officials and Cuban exiles residing in the region to help sell the anti-Castro message. As for intended targets, presidential adviser Arthur Schlesinger clearly delineated the primary groups who needed targeting when he wrote the following in 1961, “In Europe our main target is essentially an elite audience – politicians, editors, and opinion-makers. In Latin 133 America, most elite opinion is probably pretty well convinced by now of the main propositions: those still unconvinced are probably beyond intellectual persuasion. This means that in Latin America our main targets are popular groups – intellectuals, students, labor, campesinos.”280
While the USIA inundated both Guatemala and Honduras with an anti-Castro and pro-U.S. message, sustained economic progress and democratic reform were not achieved in either country. At times, impediments to change in the region almost proved too much as political instability coupled with the reluctance of powerful economic actors to accept reform weakened the chances for progress. Moreover, U.S. policymakers often exacerbated political tensions in each nation when they rebuked reform minded leaders for being too weak on Castro. In 1963 fears of a purported Castro ally taking power led the United States to play a role in undermining Guatemalan democracy. Only a few months later, the administration offered a weak response to a military intervention in
Honduras that ousted a democratically elected president, one who important leaders in
Washington believed not anti-Castro enough. Such intransigence led the Kennedy administration, at times, to undermine its own public diplomacy campaign.
Guatemala
While numerous historical studies examine the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz, the years that followed receive much less attention. The coup leader, Carlos Castillo
Armas, previously attempted a military takeover following the 1950 election that brought
Arbenz to power but failed. As a result, Armas was briefly imprisoned and exiled to
280 Arthur Schlesinger, “Memorandum to the Political Warfare Subcommittee of the Cuban Task Force,” May 8, 1961, in Psywar on Cuba: The Declassification History of Anti-Castro Propaganda, ed. Jon Elliston (New York: Ocean Press, 1999), 70. 134 Colombia. Historian Piero Gleijeses writes that he “would hardly deserve a footnote were it not that in 1953 he was selected by the CIA to lead the liberation of
Guatemala.”281 Early CIA reports described him as “as a quiet soft spoken officer who does not seem to be given to exaggeration.” Another less flattering description claimed that he “didn’t know what he was doing and was way in over his head.”282
Following the coup Castilo Armas received full support from the United States.
Washington quickly recognized his government and showered it with aid. During his first two years in office over $90 million in economic assistance flowed to Guatemala City.283
Moreover, Eisenhower officials paid little attention to how Castillo Armas ruled. During a National Security Council meeting a few months after the coup, Secretary of the
Treasury George Humphrey declared that “we should…stop talking so much about democracy, and make it clear that we are quite willing to support dictatorships of the right if their policies are pro-American.”284 Vice-President Nixon made public his view that "the goal of president Castillo Armas is to do more for the people in two years' time than the communists were able to do in ten years . . . This is the first instance in history where a communist government has been replaced by a free one.”285 When Nixon visited
Guatemala in 1955, Castillo Armas spoke bluntly, “Tell me what you want me to do and I will do it.”286
281 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 82. 282 Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 98-99. 283 Rosemarie Stewart, The United States in the Caribbean (Oxford, UK: Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1982), 14. 284 Stephen Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 33. 285 Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 2008), 48. 286 Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 120; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 58. 135 As the United States pursued stability in post-Arbenz Guatemala, Armas sought to roll back many of the social and political reforms implemented during the early
1950s. All unions and political parties that cooperated with the Arbenz government ceased to exist. At the same time a law allowing only literate citizens to vote came into existence and previously expropriated land given to peasants returned to the United Fruit
Company. Also, Armas created the Comité Nacional de Defensa contra el Comunismo
(Committee for the National Defense against Communism) and the Ley Preventive Penal contra el Comunismo (Preventive Penal Law against Communism). These measures caused thousands of Guatemalans to be blacklisted and arrested. At the same time, many more people fled into exile fearing political retribution.287
Image 9: Map of Guatemala.
287 Hilde Hey, Gross Human Rights Violations: A Search for Causes, a Study of Guatemala and Costa Rica (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 34. 136 The policies pursued by Armas to erase Guatemalan political and social reforms did little to foster an atmosphere of stability. Member of his own Movimiento de
Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Movement, MLN) frequently argued over what the role of the armed forces should be in a post-1954 Guatemala, while students and other more reform minded elements wanted a return to democracy.288 Armas never fully consolidated political control and in 1957 was shot to death by a presidential palace guard. Uncertainty still surrounds his death. While walking with his wife the young guard approached and fired two shots before going upstairs and allegedly committing suicide.
Government officials labeled the guard a communist, though no evidence of that claim ever materialized. CIA Director Allen Dulles expressed surprise by the speed with which officials in Guatemala City acted following the murder, almost as if they knew something was coming.289
Following a brief period of intense turmoil General Miguel Ydígoras won the presidency in a January 1958 election. Ydígoras represented a more moderate wing of the
Guatemalan political right and preferred a less heavy-handed approach than his predecessor. His style drew the ire of some in Washington. The State Department reported, only a year after he took power, that “Ydígoras’ approach to the communists has been a subject of grave concern for us…The great defect in Ydígoras’ handling of the communist problem has been his unwillingness to clamp down on clearly identified organizers and agitators.”290 Inside Guatemala many politicians viewed Ydígoras as a counterweight to the MLN but an ineffective leader. Moreover, it was not clear what sort
288 Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 42. 289 Ibid, 54-55. 290 Robert Holden, Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 147. 137 of political and social program he wanted to follow. He made few declarations regarding reforms while appearing to be more tolerant of leftist elements. U.S. diplomats reported that he was “senile” and may have a “mental imbalance.”291 One historian wrote that “lacking any consistent ideological appeal and heavily dependent upon distribution of the spoils of office to sustain its supporters, the regime was confronted by a divisive but growing opposition within its second year in power.”292 In 1961 almost one-third of the military attempted to overthrow Ydígoras, including numerous military officers upset that the president allowed the United States to use Guatemala to train Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion.293 The military did not sympathize with Fidel Castro, but rather believed that U.S. forces training the exiles violated Guatemalan sovereignty. While
Washington viewed Ydígoras as an ally, his ability to maintain control and prevent the country from descending into chaos was questionable at best.
The USIA and the Ydígoras Administration
A stagnant economy, rampant poverty, and political instability were the reality in
Guatemala when the Kennedy administration sought to launch a large-scale public diplomacy campaign. In a comprehensive report sent to Washington in August 1961 the
USIA provided their viewpoints on Guatemala’s background, important sectors of society to influence, and possibilities for the achievement of U.S. goals. For a country heavily reliant on agricultural exports land ownership patterns remained similar to the colonial era of large latifundias where few people owned the fields they toiled. Yet, for all of the
291 Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 81. 292 James Dunkerley, “Guatemala since 1930,” in Central America since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 138. 293 Julie Charlip, “Central America in Upheaval,” in A Companion to Latin American History, ed. Thomas Holloway (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 419. 138 despair, agency officials wrote that “the conditions which do exist offer opportunities for realizable improvements in the situation. There can be in Guatemala the hope for a better life.”294 The more positive outlook was a result of the country having a built-up agricultural industry and the necessary infrastructure to deliver goods to market. The key to achieving economic progress revolved around opening up the economy to more segments of society. Regarding Ydígoras, the USIA appeared to understand him quite well. He was anti-Castro but failed to provide any definitive goals for Guatemalan society. Consolidating and keeping power appeared to be the only issues his administration spent any considerable time on.
Fearing Ydígoras was not quite up to the job of helping Guatemalans understand the Cuban threat, the USIA launched an extensive anti-Castro program. The agency’s main objective included to “counteract the activities and propaganda of Castro-
Cuba…which threaten to undermine the unifying spirit of the inter-American system.”295
Gaining influence in Guatemala’s media services was the key to USIA objectives. Such an approach sought to counter the high number of Guatemalan intellectuals, writers, reporters, poets, celebrities, and musicians who held sympathies for Castro’s program of action. In February 1960 the Cuban Foreign Ministry in Havana received a cable from its embassy in Guatemala City with a list of over twenty individuals considered “friendly.”
José Humberto Hernandez Cobos, a columnist for the newspaper Diario de Centro
América, Guillermo Noriega Morales, a well-known economist, actress Ligia Bernal, and
294 “Country Plan,” August 1, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 295 Ibid. 139 pianist Jorge Sarmientos all made the list.296 The agency supported local anti-Castro individuals and organizations involved with media activities in an attempt to “ensure that the Guatemalan people understand that Castro’s socialism is but another name for…totalitarianism.” In order to accomplish that goal the USIA in Guatemala City implemented policies for “maximum use of agency…material in all news media which depicts Cuban economic and political life under the Castro regime.”297 The agency accomplished placement through close collaboration with prominent members of the local media. Public statements by Guatemalans denouncing Castro’s Cuba and articles, written by both locals and foreign reporters, critiquing the Cuban Revolution appeared in local newspapers. One edition of Diaro de Centro America featured a depiction of Fidel
Castro with a baseball in his mouth with the words “Plan Kennedy” written on the ball.
The headline stated “Play ball! Strike One.”298 Other newspaper articles focused on
Cuba’s negative treatment of Catholic Church officials.299
Radio also proved to be quite a useful medium. In just the span of a little over a year twelve anti-Castro programs were broadcast, including “La Verdad Detras de la
Noticia” (The Truth Behind the News). In total, 268 hours of anti-Castro programming was on the air per month.300 Comic books with an overtly anti-Castro theme also were popular. El Despertar (The Awakening) told the story of the Castro’s “failed” land
296 “Memorandum, Asunto: Intelectuales Guatemaltecos,” 29 de Febrero 1960, A. Latina, Guatemala, 1917- 1962, Patrimonio Ordinario 1, MINREX. 297 Ibid. 298 “Play Ball! Strike One,” Diario de Centro America, 7 de Abril 1961, p.15. 299 “Castro en Pugna Anticlerical,” El Imparcial, 17 de Marzo 1961, p. 1. 300 “Country Assessment Report-Guatemala,” February 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 140 reform and though the USIA in Guatemala initially only requested 2,500 copies, that number soon increased. By 1963, 60,000 copies a year began circulating.301
Image 10: Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras.
While decreasing Castro’s popularity was the top priority, other important issues confronted Guatemala in the USIA’s view. Improvements in the fields of education, labor, and economic opportunity to rural areas were necessary. The crippling illiteracy rate—almost 70 percent of the total population could not read was largely due to the fact that 46 percent of primary school aged children did not receive any education. Outside of cities, the education system was almost nonexistent. Teachers received inadequate training and necessary materials such as books were not readily available. The lack of adequate schools caused concerns for U.S. officials that Guatemalans would follow the
301 El Despertar Printings, Box 4, Keller Papers, GUSC. 141 Castro promise of education for all, particularly campesinos.302 School construction and teacher training quickly became components of the Alliance for Progress in
Guatemala. Washington earmarked over $27 million for infrastructure projects, and the
USIA did its part in attempting to foster an atmosphere of cooperation. Making locals view the aid program as a partnership was a top priority.303
Perhaps the most widely used tool to promote education and reach students was the binational education center, the Instituto Guatemalteco-Americano (Guatemalan-
American Institute, IGA). Founded in 1945, the center sought to foster better cultural relations between the United States and Guatemala. It reached numerous students primarily through English language courses. In 1963 over 1,000 students enrolled, with a vast majority being at the university level. Even more college-aged pupils took part in
IGA English courses offered at San Carlos University. Teachers were also included in
IGA activities, primarily through regular seminars. These sorts of connections were indispensible. The USIA reported that “from these contacts it is then possible to cultivate…students, particularly those who have leadership or potential leadership capacities, and draw them into discussion groups and informal meetings with Americans in the IGA’s coffee shop or in the homes of USIS [A] staff members.” When requesting more funding or defending current levels, officials always argued that the center played an integral role in meeting the agency’s psychological objectives in Guatemala. One
USIA staffer wrote that when “dealing with the development of civic responsibility, support for the Alliance for Progress and awareness of the threat to Guatemala of
302 “Country Plan,” August 1, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 303 “Country Plan-Guatemala,” June 28, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 142 Communist-Castro activities, the center has and does make a significant contribution to the achievement of these objectives.”304
Student outreach proved imperative as young Guatemalans became viewed as the most ardent supporters of Fidel Castro. Cuban diplomats noted in February 1961 that the
Juventud Patriótica del Trabajo de Guatemala (Young Patriotic Workers of Guatemala,
JPT) openly supported the revolution. The JPT argued that “imperialists” would never forgive Castro for achieving freedom from exploitation.305 Some members of the organization eventually traveled to Cuba and received training in guerilla warfare.306
Student groups also did not hesitate to launch verbal assaults on the Ydígoras administration. When Guatemalan Foreign Minister Jesus Unda Murillo, on the president’s orders, accused Cuba of not belonging in the inter-American system, the
Asociación de Estudiantes Guatemaltecos (Association of Guatemalan Students) labeled the charge baseless and pronounced Ydígoras as a “traitor” to their country.307
Deputy Public Affairs Officer (PAO) Dorothy Dillon recalled that the IGA became a central place for U.S. public diplomacy. When she first arrived in Guatemala many of her colleagues advised her that “you must go see the IGA.” She recollected, “At that time Guatemala had the largest cultural program in Central America. I had three assistant cultural affairs officers in addition to myself, so there were four Americans on the cultural side plus a fairly sizable Guatemalan staff.” The IGA served as a meeting ground, a place where the sort of informal contacts that allow public diplomacy to thrive
304 “Evaluation of Binational Centers,” March 29, 1963, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 305 “Informe Semanal de Guatemala, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 20 al 25 de Febrero 1961, A. Latina, Guatemala, 1917-1962, Patrimonio Ordinario 1, MINREX. 306 Brockett, 99 307 “Informe Semanal de Guatemala, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 8 al 14 de Enero 1962, A. Latina, Guatemala, 1917-1962, Patrimonio Ordinario 1, MINREX. 143 could be established. Take the example of Julio César Méndez Montenegro, a law professor at Guatemala’s National University. In the 1950s he was set to visit the United
States on a cultural exchange grant but had a difficult time at the U.S. consulate during a visa interview and walked “out in indignation.” As a popular law professor on the political left, U.S. officials viewed him as a priority target since he held sway over many students and soon to be young professionals. The USIA courted him again in 1963, this time through more informal channels. The offer of a travel grant was made to the professor through a friend and Dorothy Dillon promised to personally handle all of the necessary paperwork. Méndez Montenegro accepted and when he returned to Guatemala he could not stop talking “about the United States and how wonderful the people were to him.” The targeting of Méndez Montenegro was prescient. While U.S. officials believed he was in line to become a university rector, he actually became the President of
Guatemala in 1966.308
Teachers and students were not the only groups who utilized the IGA. Labor union members took part in English classes. Their participation allowed for “USIA material [to] be distributed to the union members by the Center teachers involved in the
English teaching.”309 Given the contentious history of labor relations in Guatemala, workers gained more rights in the Arbenz era only to have those taken away, the USIA attempted to strike a balance between promoting social change and keeping influential landowners content. Unfortunately, Guatemalan labor was never effectively incorporated into any comprehensive plans by the United States. The USIA in Guatemala never made
308 Oral History, Dr. Dorothy Dillon, May 10, 1988, FAOC. 309 “Evaluation of Binational Centers,” March 29, 1963, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 144 any serious attempt to cultivate relations with labor. Though U.S. officials labeled
Ydígoras as “intransigent” towards the plight of workers, they still did not push any comprehensive plan to win them over. From Arbenz’s overthrow in 1954 to 1963 not a single labor union leader in Guatemala traveled to the United States on a grant.310 These types of programs were popular with teachers and students, but labor was completely ignored. The USIA’s lack of attention to labor was highly problematic as a prevailing fear for the United States was that pro-Castro propaganda would resonate with exploited groups. One USIA report cautioned that “Guatemalan labor has been called a ‘sleeping giant’ awaiting its re-awakening. The well-established political potential of organized labor in Guatemala must be recognized.”311
While the threat of a Cuban-style revolution was real, Ydígoras quickly learned how to masterfully play the Castro card. He wrote to Kennedy in March 1961 that
“Guatemala has been strongly hit by Castro. He brought strikes upon us, riots.”312
Repeatedly, the strongman placed all of his problems on Cuba. In January 1962 he publicly blamed Cuba for constantly stoking rebellions in his country.313 Rather than allowing that unrest was a result of internal issues such as tax increases on workers or general unhappiness with his rule, the Guatemalan leader pointed to Havana.314 Not all
U.S. policymakers bought into Ydígoras’s fears. Edward Martin, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, cautioned that he constantly “cried wolf” regarding Castro’s
310 Oral History, Dr. Dorothy Dillon, May 10, 1988, FAOC. 311 “Country Plan,” August 1 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 312 “Letter from President Ydigoras of Guatemala to President Kennedy,” March 16, 1961, Guatemala and the U.S., DNSA, item #GU00044. 313 Informe Semanal de Guatemala, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 22 al 28 de Enero 1962, A. Latina, Guatemala, 1917-1962, Patrimonio Ordinario 1, MINREX. 314 Informe Semanal de Guatemala, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 13 al 17 de Marzo 1961, A. Latina, Guatemala, 1917-1962, Patrimonio Ordinario 1, MINREX. 145 threat to Guatemala. Moreover, he wrote that Ydígoras showed “little or no interest in governing the country in an even moderately decent way, particularly with respect to the
Alliance for Progress objectives.”315
Image 11: President Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with a delegation from
Guatemala, 1961.
Obstacles in the Countryside
A key goal of the USIA in Guatemala was to make campesinos believe that real change was on the horizon. In an attempt to do so the agency contracted noted Bolivian filmmaker Jorge Ruiz to produce a documentary on land reform in Guatemala.316 Los
315 “State Department Memorandum, Guatemala,” April 26, 1962, Guatemala and the U.S., DNSA, item #GU00082. 316 José Sànchez-H, The Art and Politics of Bolivian Cinema (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1999), 43. 146 Ximus followed Andres Ximus and his family as they received assistance in obtaining
50 acres of land from the government. Andres is put on the path towards owning his plot while the Guatemalan government builds schools and health centers in his village. The film’s Spanish-language narrator concludes by saying that “Andres has found his way…Tomorrow, perhaps, millions more throughout the Americas will follow him…The way, not of confusion and despair, not of chaos and conflict, not of seizure and violence, but the way of orderly, civilized development under a just law, as in the Rural
Development Program of Guatemala.”317 U.S. officials hoped that film viewers in Latin
America would see modernizing the countryside as a realistic goal.
Yet, one of the most pressing issues for the United States was pushing
Guatemalan elites to accept any sort of social reform that offered upward economic mobility to more than just a select few. The Alliance for Progress, and the selling of the program, required Guatemalans to buy into the idea of modernizing their society.
Historian Michael Latham notes that “if modernization were to go forward [in
Guatemala], many experts believed, it would have to restructure rural life, alleviating the poverty and desperation that made peasant populations susceptible to insurgent movements.”318 An example of this sort of change was in 1962 when USAID sought to create a cooperative among 14,000 Guatemalan farmers. The goal included better integration of peasants into the cash economy through collective action. At the same time, Peace Corps volunteers operating in rural areas implemented literacy drives. These programs found allies in Catholic missionaries who desired to institute social reform in
317 “Film about Guatemalan rural development program,” July 27, 1961, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter- American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary. Subject Files, 1961-1963, RG 59, Entry A1 3149, Box 22, NARA. 318 Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution, 129. 147 the Guatemalan countryside. Latham writes that prompted by the Second Vatican
Council, which placed an emphasis on helping the poor and respecting human rights,
“Maryknoll and Jesuit missionaries also organized peasant discussions of social and economic problems.”319
Not wanting to discourage such cooperation, U.S. officials offered money to the missionaries to help train students before sending them to the countryside. As these drastic changes occurred, USIA officials continued their efforts to promote the Alliance for Progress. These extensive changes quickly elicited a backlash from local landowners and other vested interests. Ultimately, the Guatemalan government expelled missionaries and harassed anyone trying to support campesinos. A USAID officer claimed that efforts to enact social change were soon viewed negatively. He lamented that “no visitor to
Guatemala could fail soon to note the widespread cynicism, ridicule, and anger expressed whenever the government and its works are mentioned.” He continued, “Special interests are pursued for private gain and evidence of bribery, patronage, repression, and indifference to human misery abound.” U.S. Ambassador John Bell complained to local business leaders that “you take more interest in your goddamn horses and cows than you take in your country.”320 Bell’s admonition was all the more important given a top USIA objective in Guatemala was “to persuade the wealthy, the influential, and other vested interest groups that their own ultimate best interests are served by undertaking, while yet there is still time, the fiscal reforms which will better the lot of the many.”321
319 Ibid, 130. 320 Stephen Streeter, “Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal Counter-Insurgency: Guatemala and the Contradictions in the Alliance for Progress,” in From Nation-Building to State-Building, ed. Mark Berger (New York: Routledge, 2008), 60. 321 “Country Plan-Guatemala,” June 28, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 148 The USIA in Guatemala was promoting a program of change that had little support and outright disdain from powerful economic interests. The reluctance of wealthy
Guatemalans to support reforms was not completely lost on President Ydígoras. During a candid conversation with U.S. officials, including Ambassador Bell, the Guatemalan leader pledged support for reforms, even laying out specific areas where improvements were vitally necessary. He stated that 200,000 Guatemalan schoolchildren were without adequate schools while the tax system was wholly inefficient. Yet, for all of his private pronouncements, Ydígoras sometimes made puzzling decisions. In early 1962 he closed down a popular school in the city of Quetzaltenango that provided locals with many social services.322 More protests occurred as a result. When defending his decisions to the
United States, Ydígoras always stated his belief that Guatemalans did not know how to handle democracy and that many still preferred the rule of a strong man.323
The Return of Arévalo
For all of his talk regarding the need for change, Ydígoras did not have the political acumen or sway to secure any sort of reform. When he did attempt to transform economic and social systems he received widespread criticism from the powerful Comité
Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras
(Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial
Associations, CACIF). Following Ydígoras’s attempt to enact personal property and land taxes CACIF flooded Guatemalan newspapers with ads denouncing the administration’s
322 Informe Semanal de Guatemala: Conclusiones de Departamento, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 8 al 14 de Enero 1962, A. Latina, Guatemala, 1917-1962, Patrimonio Ordinario 1, MINREX. 323 “Memorandum of a Conversation,” September 21, 1962, Decimal File 714.00/9-2962, RG 59, NARA. 149 “lack of capacity, sincerity, organization, guarantees and security.”324 Viewed as not sufficiently pro-business by the right and not reform minded enough by the left, Ydígoras was without any real allies in Guatemala. He also created great concern in Washington with his lenient attitude toward exiled former President Juan Arévalo, a leader
Guatemalans viewed as the father of democratic and social reform. Arévalo constantly spoke out against military influence in Guatemala and U.S. imperialism. In 1956 he published El Tiburón y las Sardinas, later released as The Shark and the Sardines in
English. He wrote that his book “declares that international treaties are a farce when they are…between a ‘shark’ and a ‘sardine.’” He denounced “the Pan-American system of diplomacy as an instrument at the service of the shark. It denounces the Pan-American idea of ‘allegiance to the hemisphere’—a juridical device that will inevitably lead to the establishing of an empire from pole to pole.”325 Arévalo never wavered in his critiques of the United States and Ydígoras. Among Guatemalan officials he became a scapegoat. In
1959 the Ydígoras administration charged that dissenters in Guatemala City were not protesting against military rule but were “unwittingly…tools” of a Castro inspired plot to return Arévalo to power.326 U.S. policymakers also worried about Arévalo’s political prospects. They viewed him as too left and not sufficiently anti-Castro. Then Ambassador to Guatemala Lestor Malloy warned in 1959 that Arévalo being in power, or even being allowed back in the country was “nothing short of disastrous.”327
324 Rolan Ebel, Misunderstood Caudillo: Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes and the Failure of Democracy in Guatemala (Lanham, New York: University Press of America, 1998), 271. 325 Selection from The Shark and the Sardines, Juan José Arévalo, in John Charles Chasteen and James Woods, Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations (Lanham, MD: SR Books, 2005), 195-198; Juan José Arévalo, The Shark and the Sardines (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961). 326 Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 213. 327 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 74 150 In an attempt to appease his opposition and quiet critics that he ruled as a dictator Ydígoras promised that the scheduled 1963 presidential election would be free and fair. Anyone eligible to run could do so. Arévalo vowed to return to Guatemala and compete for high office. He rebuked Ydígoras’s authoritarian tendencies and castigated him for having allowed Cuban exiles to train for the Bay of Pigs inside Guatemala. The president had, in Arévalo’s words, “Delivered the lands of our country to train mercenaries.”328 The pledge of a free election did not lessen Guatemalan opposition to
Ydígoras’s failure to implement real reforms. The fraudulent congressional elections that took place in February served as a catalyst for more unrest. In March student activists took to the streets upset over the lack of economic opportunity and the corrupt political system. Protesters represented a cross-section of Guatemalan society; students, teachers, and laborers all joined. Their numbers quickly increased almost paralyzing Guatemala
City. Students placed a wreath on the front door of Congress to symbolize the death of democracy.329 Ydígoras ordered a military response and ended the demonstrations with bullets; dozens of people died. The deaths of civilians prompted demonstrations to expand to other areas of the country.330 U.S. officials now openly worried that Guatemala was on the verge of complete chaos.
328 “Informe Semanal de Guatemala, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 22 al 28 de Enero 1962, A. Latina, Guatemala, 1917-1962, Patrimonio Ordinario 1, MINREX. 329 Miguel Angel Sandoval and María del Rosario Ramírez, “Long Live the Students,” in The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture, Politics, eds. Greg Grandin, Deborah Levenson, and Elizabeth Oglesby (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 252. 330 René De la Pedraja, Wars of Latin America, 1948-1982: The Rise of the Guerrillas (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2013), 118; Daniel Wilkinson, Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2004), 223; Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit: Guatemala Under General Efrain Rios Montt 1982-1983 (New York: Oxford, 2010), 193 151 In a lengthy cable to Washington Ambassador Bell argued that while he previously believed that Ydígoras could stay in power, the violent methods utilized by the
Guatemalan government produced increases anger among the people. Bell wrote that “I do not believe that Ydígoras will find it as easy to stay in office as he seems to think and I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that, if he does succeed through the use of his present tactics, we will have lost Guatemala.” Bell also showed a keen understanding of a main grievance Guatemalans had against their government. He reported that Ydígoras’s had “overstepped the bounds of permissible graft, that is, that the ‘take’ has been and continues to be greatly excessive.” While the ambassador took a dim view on the current situation, he was not completely against a military coup. He concluded that if one were to occur then “the interests of the U.S. would not necessarily be damaged and in reality might be advanced.”331
The actions taken by the Guatemalan government to quell protesters weakened
USIA attempts at winning hearts and minds. The same groups that U.S. public diplomacy was targeting were among the victims of the March violence. It was virtually impossible to promote a message of democracy and good governance when the current political leadership held very little credibility among its citizenry. The “old man,” as Ambassador
Bell liked to call Ydígoras, became more and more isolated. By April it was a common belief in U.S. policymaking circles that Ydígoras’s fall from power could happen. Bell counseled that the United States should quickly recognize the new government,
331 “U.S. Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, U.S. Interests and the Guatemalan Political Scene,” March 30, 1962, Guatemala and the U.S., DNSA item # GU00078. 152 particularly if it was a military junta.332 Such action would allow for a quick succession of power and prevent any Cuban machinations.
As rumors of a possible coup increased Adolf Berle, a former Kennedy adviser on
Latin America and consistent proponent of democracy in the hemisphere, publicly spoke out against an overthrow of the government. He cautioned that the Kennedy administration needed to issue a strong denial of such reports and support Ydígoras since he was the elected leader. A coup invited chaos in Berle’s view and might also provide
Castro with an opening to increase his influence in Guatemala. At the same time, as warnings from Guatemala City continued over the possibility of an Arévalo return,
Ambassador Bell wrote that “I continue to regard Arévalo as a great danger to United
States interests.”333
By the fall of 1962 the State Department concluded that if allowed to participate in the upcoming election, Arévalo would win. Soon thereafter discussions over preventing his victory took place. Ambassador Bell reported that Defense Minister
Enrique Peralta proposed that the military would intervene and prevent Arévalo from gaining power if it had U.S. support. Bell argued that the chances of a coup attempt largely depended on the U.S. posture. General Peralta wanted assurances that aid would not be cut off. At a critical January 1963 meeting President Kennedy asked several advisers what was in Arévalo’s past that convinced everyone he was “a communist or a fellow traveler?” One meeting participant described Arévalo’s writings as “violently anti-
332 “U.S. Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, Military and Political Opposition in Guatemala,” April 30, 1962, Guatemala and the U.S., DNSA, item #GU00084. 333 Letter from Adolf Berle to George Ball (Undersecretary of State), May 21, 1962, Decimal File 714.00/5- 1062, RG 59, NARA; U.S. to Guatemala Ambassador John Bell to the Department of State, March 28, 1962, Decimal File 714.00/5-2862, RG 59, NARA. 153 American. Very violent.”334 JFK ultimately agreed that U.S. policy should be to prevent an Arévalo victory and arranged to meet privately with Ydígoras during a Central
American summit in Costa Rica in March. With only an interpreter present, the U.S. leader cautioned that Arévalo “would undoubtedly campaign as an anti-Communist moderate, but he would be dangerous if he [were elected].”335 He implored Ydígoras not to allow Arévalo back in Guatemala. Havana took a different view, rather than seeing the
Guatemalan leftist as a natural ally, they believed that he had gone to great lengths in order to placate Washington and earn approval from the State Department. Cuban diplomats cited Arévalo’s consistently positive comments regarding the Alliance for
Progress.336 Unfortunately, members of the Kennedy administration, including the president, never questioned their own basic assumptions regarding Arévalo’s leftism.
They viewed him Cuban sympathizer and a threat to regional stability. In reality, the former Guatemalan president’s political views aligned closer to the New Deal than the
Cuban Revolution.337 The Kennedy administrations fears of an Arévalo-Castro alliance appear severely overstated.
As the election approached unrest continued. Not everyone supported Arévalo’s possible return as thousands took to the streets to protest him being allowed to run for office.338 Pro-Arévalo factions responded and in most instances pro-business elites went against students, intellectuals, and campesinos. Arévalo attempted to assuage fears that
334 Friedman, Rethinking Ant-Americanism, 153. 335 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 75; “Memorandum of a Conversation,” March 20, 1963, FRUS, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document #135. 336 “Informe Especial Sobre el Golpe de Estado Perpetrado en Guatemala,” 30 de Marzo 1963, A. Latina, Guatemala, 1917-1962, Patrimonio Ordinario 1, MINREX. 337 Russell Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 240; Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 96. 338 Ebel, Misunderstood Caudillo, 286. 154 his return would provide Castro with an ally, publicly declaring to be in favor of
“spiritual socialism” rather than communism. He failed to sway many people. Only three days after Arévalo secretly arrived back in Guatemala, and shortly before the presidential election, Defense Minister Peralta stormed the presidential palace and relieved Miguel
Ydígoras of the presidency. Juan Arévalo fled Guatemala as newspaper boys exclaimed the next day in the streets “Extra—El Viejo ya Cayo” (The Old Man Has Fallen).339
The State Department characterized the coup as a “gain” and Ambassador Bell argued that the United States achieved its “objective” in preventing an Arévalo return to power. The military intervention in Guatemala did not take place in a vacuum but earned widespread regional attention. Newspapers in neighboring countries published numerous stories coming from Guatemala City. Costa Rica’s La Nacion printed photos of both
Ydígoras and Peralta and led with a banner that announced the military takeover in
Guatemala. In the same edition, a commentary lamented the “typical” military coup and declared that it was not a good solution for political problems. Occurring only weeks after the meeting of leaders in San José, which included President Kennedy, one La
Nacion headline read that the coup was a blow to the Declaration of San José which promoted democracy in the region.340 The Costa Rican government suspended relations with Guatemala and argued that the overthrow “had serious repercussions”341 In
Nicaragua both La Prensa and Novedades ran stories of Ydígoras’s fall from power. As early as April 2, only days after the coup, Novedades issued a story that Washington was
339 Paul P. Kennedy, “Guatemala Rule Seized by Army; Ban on Reds Seen,” New York Times, April 1, 1963, p. 1. 340 “Derrocado Ejercito President Ydígoras Fuentes, La Nacion, 1 de Abril, 1963, p. 1; “El cuartelazo típico Guatemala no es Buena solución,” La Nacion, 1 e Abril, 1963, p. 6; “Duro golpe a la Declaración de San José significa golpe militar en Guatemala,” La Nacion, 3 de Abril, 1963, p. 19. 341 “Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Costa Rica, Asunto: Informe Político,” 16 de Abril de 1963. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 161, AGNCOL. 155 already seeking consultations with regional allies regarding recognizing the new military government.342
The coup of 1963 allowed for the military to transition from being an influential institution to the most powerful political actor in Guatemala. It also did much to further unrest as a brutal civil war began that lasted until the 1990s and took the lives of over
200,000 people. USIA operations were greatly affected by the instability, but like other organs of the U.S. government, public diplomacy officials became part of the anti-
Arévalo crusade. As early as 1961 the agency warned that Arévalo’s possible return to
Guatemala threatened operations and could upend their entire public diplomacy campaign.343 Though the USIA greatly increased its information output in Guatemala during the Kennedy years, its message was lost on the many Guatemalans who only saw a corrupt government and entrenched elite reluctant to allow any social change. In many instances, the lack of leadership and willingness to implement a reform agenda by the
Ydígoras government aided in creating hostility within Guatemala, yet Washington’s unyielding attitude to a possible presidential candidacy of Juan Arévalo greatly undermined U.S. development and public diplomacy efforts. Moreover, the reality that
Fidel Castro held contempt for Arévalo makes the Kennedy administration’s approach even more mistaken. In essence, Washington supported, even applauded, the prevention of a presidential candidacy by an individual that Cuba wanted nothing to do with.
342 “Ydigoras Derrocado el 30,” La Prensa, 1 de Abril, 1963, p. 1; “Ydígoras Pide se Reconozca Al Gobierno de Coroneles,” La Prensa, 2 de Abril, 1963, p. 1; “Ydigoras Depuesto!” Novedades, 1 de Abril, 1963, 1; “Estudie EE. UU. el reconocimiento al Nuevo Gobierno de Guatemala,” Novedades, 2 de Abril, 1963, p. 8. 343 “Country Plan,” August 1, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 156 Honduras
Like other Central American countries, Honduras experienced much political and economic unrest during the 20th century. Heavily reliant bananas, which made up 90 percent of exports by the end of the 1920s, the economy was vulnerable to a drop in world prices. Honduras was also deeply dependent on international companies such as the United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit.344 When the Great Depression struck
Hondurans felt the economic downtown particularly hard as export prices plunged. This period of economic instability witnessed a rare episode of political stability. Tuburcio
Carías, a military leader who founded the right-wing Honduran Partido Nacional
(National Party, PN) held power from 1933 to 1948. Initially granted only a four-year term by the constitution, Carías earned congressional approval first for a six-year term to end in 1939. He extended his political career once more through congress and his sixteen years in power became known as the Cariato. Honduras became a strong U.S. ally during
World War II but the country’s bleak economic outlook did not improve and its financial system remained in a backward state. One historian wrote that the Cariato was “order without progress.”345 In fact, in 1943 a U.S. economic mission invited by the Honduran government lamented the lack of any modern financial institutions in the country. Led by members of the U.S. Treasury Department the delegation heavily criticized the lack of a central bank.346
344 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, “Honduras since 1930,” in Central America since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell, 196. 345 Ibid, 199. 346 “Memorandum from the Ambassador in Honduras (Erwin) to the Secretary of State,” July 7, 1943, FRUS, 1943, vol. XI, 389-393. For the comprehensive report refer to E.M. Bernstein, Informe de la Misión Técnica sobre Condiciones Monetarias y de Crédito de en Honduras, 1943 (Tegucigalpa, Publicaciones del Banco Central de Honduras, 1950). 157 The postwar wave of democracy in Latin America did not bypass Honduras.
In 1948 Carías, by then well into his seventies, announced he would step down and called for an election. The PN continued its dominance as Juan Manuel Gálvez, a former United
Fruit lawyer, became president. During his five-year term in office Honduras experienced growth through economic diversification and modernization. Gálvez established the
Banco Nacional de Fomento (National Bank) and more government aid flowed to the agricultural sector. Honduras also continued a close alliance with the United States. In
May 1954 Gálvez signed a bilateral Treaty of Military Assistance and just one month later his administration allowed U.S. supported forces to stage their operation from
Honduras to overthrow the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz.
Image 12: Map of Honduras.
158 Also in 1954, Honduras held an election. It appeared the PN would continue its political control but the decision by Tuburcio Carías to re-enter the political stage caused a party split. Two candidates from the conservative right vied for presidency along with liberal Ramón Villeda Morales. While Villeda Morales earned a plurality he fell short of a majority and political deadlock ensued.347 A period of uncertainty took hold in Tegucigalpa until the military stepped in during 1956 and promised a return to democratic rule within a year. The armed forces kept their word and a constituent assembly drafted a new constitution in 1957 choosing Villeda Morales as the new president to serve a six-year term. The victory was not without major reservations.
Villeda Morales made a deal with General Oswaldo López Arellano that the military would be free from civilian control and in return civilian leaders had power over municipal and cabinet appointments. The new constitution granted the military so much autonomy that the head of the armed forces could overrule a presidential order if he believed the order violated the constitution. Moreover, article 330 of the document permitted a military budget process lacking civilian oversight.348
Villeda Morales might have believed that he owed the armed forces. During the brief year of military rule in 1956 he became the ambassador to the United States, a position that earned him much political capital. Historian Darian Euraque argues the appointment occurred so policymakers in Washington could get a first-hand appraisal of him so fears of his leftism would be assuaged.349 Once in power Villeda Morales quickly
347 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, “Honduras since 1930,” in Central America since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell, 298-299. 348 Kirk Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America (University Park: The University of Pennsylvania State, 2002), 164. 349 Darío A. Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic: Region and State in Honduras, 1870-1972 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 72. 159 went to work seeking to implement a reform agenda. He introduced a public education system to Honduras, allowing for a more open political process, and labor reforms. While prior to Villeda Morales education was available only to those who could afford it, his administration made it compulsory for all children and began a large-scale school construction program.350 Political infringements on leftists and communists ceased. During the Villeda Morales presidency communist party membership in
Honduras grew to around 2,000 members, which made it the largest Communist Party in
Central America.351 Villeda Morales also created a special labor court, legalized unions, and allowed collective bargaining to occur. Due to these actions workers became a powerful political ally.352 He also allowed Castro’s Cuba to broadcast a weekly radio show discussing news and culture. Havana’s embassy in Tegucigalpa reported that the program’s goal was to convey the friendship of the revolutionary government in
Cuba.”353
By 1961 Villeda Morales’s reforms were taking hold and Honduras’s experiment with democracy slowly progressed. The Kennedy administration looked at the situation as promising, though there were some worries that the Honduran leader was too soft on communists and Castro sympathizers. Furthermore, while Villeda Morales completely agreed with the stated goals of the Alliance for Progress, he sought to push forward reforms much quicker than U.S. officials wanted. Following the inter-American meeting
350 Tom Barry and Kent Norsworthy, Honduras: A Country Guide (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Inter- Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1990), 71. 351 Donald Busky, Communism in History and Theory: Asia, Africa, and the Americas (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002),191. 352 Robert Jackson, A History of Organized Labor in Panama and Central America (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2008), 143. 353 “Transcripción, Radio-America, Embajada de Cuba en Tegucigalpa, Honduras,” 31 de Enero 1960, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 160 at Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1961 to formalize the economic plan Villeda Morales drafted his own extensive agrarian reform law. U.S. policymakers worried that the United
Fruit Company would be adversely affected and urged the Honduran leader to wait for
State Department approval of his plan. He did not delay and United Fruit protested the expropriation of its uncultivated land by cutting back on production. This resulted in the loss of Honduran jobs. Following a trip to Washington in 1962 Villeda Morales attended a meeting in Miami with United Fruit executives and agreed to take into account the company’s grievances over the agrarian reform.354 His willingness to engage in widespread social reform not only irked foreign businesses, but also threatened entrenched elites who consistently portrayed him as sympathetic to Castro’s revolution.
Certain media outlets, such as El Dia, aided elites by portraying Honduras as a nation under siege from communists.355
Though democracy was tenuous in Tegucigalpa there did exist a liberal reformer in power seeking to implement vast change. At the same time, a political opposition wary of their diminished status played the Castro card when it felt too threatened. U.S. public diplomacy sought to carve out a middle ground by simultaneously discouraging widespread Cuban-style reforms and promoting changes in the social and economic structures. This proved to be no easy task. In July 1960 USIA officials in Tegucigalpa reported back to Washington that Honduras “was the most vulnerable and logical target communism has in Central America, if not in the entire hemisphere. It is also a primary
354 Clara Nieto, Masters of War: Latin America and U.S. Aggression from the Cuban Revolution through the Clinton Years (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), 112. 355 “Villeda Reconocio Infiltracion Roja,” El Dia, 22 de Octubre 1962, p. 1. 161 target for the Castro Revolution in Latin America.”356 Those arguments centered on the country’s bleak economic outlook as Honduras suffered from rampant poverty and illiteracy. Villeda Morales once remarked that Honduras was the “70% land: 70% illiteracy, 70% of births out of wedlock, and 70% of deaths that could have been avoided.”357 The July report also contended that Hondurans failed to appreciate the seriousness of the threat posed by Fidel Castro. U.S. officials worried that “many, perhaps a majority, regard Fidel Castro with at least a reserved sympathy and think that he is giving Cuba a long overdue social reform.”358 Such conditions made the possibility of another Cuba appear all the more likely.
Students and Laborers
Two primary target groups for U.S. public diplomacy in Honduras were students and laborers. Reaching students at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras
(National Autonomous University of Honduras, UNAH) became a major focus. The agency went to great lengths to cultivate Rector Hernan Corrales Padilla, who at times believed that the U.S. Embassy was not supportive enough of the university. In 1961 officials backed the buildup of a central library, donating a 1,000 reference volumes and providing a grantee to help organize the entire library and train local staff for when the grant expired. Such a move certainly earned some goodwill and gave the agency a foothold. One official wrote that “books and pamphlets supporting our objectives can
356 “Country Plan,” July 25, 1960, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 357 William Krehm, Democracies and Tyrannies of the Caribbean in the 1940s (Toronto, Canada: Lugos Libros LatinAmerica Inc., 1994), x. 358 “Country Plan,” July 25, 1960, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 162 thus be easily and effectively placed in the library and distributed among students.”359
Maintaining a firm relationship with Corrales Padilla became a key goal, for a successor may not cooperate so fully with the United States. It appeared the rector was in the mold of someone sympathetic to the U.S. program. He went on to be the ambassador to the
United States later in the 1960s and a leader of the center left Christian Democrats during the 1980s.360
Cooperation from UNAH leadership was critical for USIA operations that required direct contacts between U.S. representatives and students. In 1961 four U.S. teachers earned placements there, including Professor Ernest Baca who garnered much acclaim from university leaders and students. These types of informal interactions were critical in the eyes of the USIA in establishing a better view of the United States in
Honduras. The UNAH also allowed selected students to participate in a trip to the United
States where they visited New York City and Washington D.C. The purpose of the visit, in the eyes of public diplomacy practitioners, was for students to “receive orientation on the Alliance for Progress and practical instruction on how to combat communist propaganda and infiltration tactics.” There was also hope that students would gain a positive view of the United States and return to Honduras and better counter the communist supported student group the Frente de Reforma Universitaria (University
Reform Front, FRU) in the upcoming student elections.361 FRU sponsored the publication
359 “1962 Country Plan,” August 3, 1961, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 360 Leyda Barbieri, Honduran Elections and Democracy: Withered by Washington (Washington D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1986), 28. 361 “Assessment Report for Year Ending December 31, 1961,” February 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans. RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 163 Vanguardia (Vanguard) and consistently denounced other student groups who took an anti-Castro stance.362
While a student election may not seem of great consequence, it is important to understand the context. In the USIA’s view these young people were the future leaders of
Honduras and currently at an impressionable age. Moreover, student leaders carried much clout on Latin American campuses. This was where political debates took place and many future politicians gained early experience. Students were also viewed as the most susceptible to Cuban overtures and sympathetic to Castro’s vision of revolutionary change. Numerous Honduran students eventually studied in Havana on educational grants and reported successful visits.363 In the view of the USIA, if a communist backed student group took on more of a leadership role, agency access at Honduras’ National University could be severely curtailed. In the end, the FRU lost in a close race to the Frente Unido
Universitario Democratico (Democratic University United Front) and the agency continued to have a working relationship with the campus.364
Concerning labor, the USIA focused attention on the critical northern coastal area of Honduras. This region had many industries and produced the majority of Honduras’s important export crop of bananas. It was also identified by the agency as the “center of communist activity in Honduras.” That assessment proved correct as Havana also viewed the north as the strongest pro-Cuba region in the entire country. During the summer of
1960 workers from the tobacco, construction, and sewing industries all signed a
362 “Informe Semanal de Honduras, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 29 de Enero al 4 de Febrero 1962, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 363 “Informe Semanal de Honduras, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 5 de Enero al 1 de Marzo 1962, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 364 “1962 Country Plan,” August 3, 1961, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 164 “manifestado en solidaridad” (show of solidarity) with Cuba.365 To combat a growing pro-Castro presence, USIA leadership in Tegucigalpa ordered all available resources diverted north for 1962 operations.366 To counter the sub-standard situation the
USIA sought a better working relationship with the U.S. Consulate in the north at San
Pedro Sula. Developing a presence was imperative since any radio operations launched for northern listeners had to originate there. The assignment of a new Information and
Cultural Affairs Officer also allowed for more local contacts to be made. These resource adjustments coincided with increased use of mobile film units. These small vehicles, equipped with a projector, screen, and generator, showed newsreels and films.367 They proved quite useful in remote areas where a standard movie-theater was absent. Over time, the agency recommended that more efforts be put into establishing cinema “clubs” where workers could congregate and watch films, rather than having the more informal mobile unit be the only medium. In order to form new “clubs” the USIA trained local
Hondurans on how to operate the projector and then distributed materials on a regular schedule.368 In many instances, particularly in the northern coast, local collaboration was vital for the successful dissemination of USIA materials. This was true for films as well as books, pamphlets, and comics. The agency consistently noted that “block distribution”
365 “Memorandum, Asunto: Remitiendo Informe,” 31 de Mayo 1960, “Informe Semanal de Honduras, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 29 de Enero al 4 de Febrero 1962, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 366 “1962 Country Plan,” August 3, 1961, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 367 For more on mobile film units refer to Osgood, Total Cold War, 104-105. 368 “1962 Country Plan,” August 3, 1961, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 165 was the best method and could only be successful with the help of responsible and trusted local officials.369
Image 13: Anti-Castro USIA publication distributed in Latin America.
By the end of 1962 it looked as if some real progress occurred. Reports stated that with the USIA staff addition a closer relationship with United Fruit and Standard Fruit developed, which allowed more inroads into banana unions. These powerful corporations employed many Hondurans in the northern region and were usually skeptical of USIA
369 “Assessment Report for Year Ending December 31, 1961,” February 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 166 materials, since they believed they spoke too highly of unionization and its benefits.
Yet, more worrisome to large land owning multi-nationals was the radical agrarian reforms Fidel Castro promoted. Both companies promised “better distribution and use of
USIS [A] materials.”
Reaching the Masses
The USIA’s mission in Honduras was not only confined to reaching students and laborers. Officials hoped to have an impact on all segments of society. The agency developed a strategy of “mass distribution” as opposed to the “opinion leader” approach.
The latter included finding prominent intellectuals and using them as a conduit for information. Materials would be given to a well-read journalist or prominent author with the hope that the influential local would impart a pro-U.S. message to those who respected his or her opinion. The USIA reasoned that in Honduras the mass distribution
“is more effective than the opinion leader approach, since opinion leaders in a country with a 70% literacy figure are relatively ineffective.”370 As opposed to using prominent politicians and intellectuals, the Honduran USIA focused on using three significant groups that allowed for widespread distribution of anti-Castro materials-the Catholic
Church, Cuban exiles residing throughout the country, and Honduran media outlets.
Regarding the Catholic Church, Radio Suyapa, the church’s popular broadcasting radio station “was instrumental in the change of opinion towards Castro and communism and…also used USIA to good effect.” It made sense to utilize such a powerful and influential organization. Furthermore, the church’s radio programs were also an important
370 Ibid. 167 aspect of community development as they broadcast literacy classes for adults.371
While the church was useful, Cuban exiles proved to be invaluable. Though anti-Castro
Cubans in Honduras did not need prodding to speak out against the Cuban revolution, the
USIA effectively reached out to exiles and provided financial support, films, and other materials. The agency reported that the exiles “are exerting a great influence on local opinion and are conducting a lively campaign against Castro through TV, radio, wall posters, and press commentaries.”372
In order to achieve full effect in their mass distribution strategy the USIA put much effort in combating perceived pro-communist media outlets in the capital city of
Honduras. The title of a top agency project was “Neutralize Prensa Latina in
Honduras.”373 U.S. officials labeled the paper as the most prominent pro-Castro and pro- communist publication inside Honduras and wanted to counteract its influence. In 1962 the agency reported that “USIA materials as well as the personal intervention of USIA officers were utilized without attribution in a sustained campaign…to ban Prensa Latina from this country.”374 Though the goal of banning the paper never materialized, the agency reported that it succeeded in making people more aware of the outlet’s connection to communist causes. Some Hondurans began referring to it as a “Communist
Mouthpiece” and a “Distortionist of the News.” The communist oriented daily El
Cronista even felt compelled to drop any mention of its connection to Prensa Latina in its publications. Not only did the agency attempt to discredit Prensa Latina, it also
371 Eloisa Rodriguez, Esperanza School: A Grassroots Community School in Honduras (Charlotte, NC: 2012), 18. 372 “1962 Country Plan,” August 3, 1961, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 373 Ibid. 374 “Assessment Report for Year Ending December 31, 1961,” February 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 168 combated the publication directly through the VOA, which overwhelmed the
Honduran airwaves with pro-U.S. and anti-Castro news reports. Agency officials doubled and hoped to triple the number of programs heard. Virulent anti-communist programs La
Garra Escondida (The Hidden Hand) and El Testigo (The Witness) aired extensively. La
Garra Escondida became a popular radionovela that told the story of everyday Cubans struggling against their government.375 The onslaught of anti-Castro reports, columns, and shows did have an effect on overall Honduran support for the Cuban revolution.
Castro regime officials reported home that while some students, writers, and other intellectuals favored Cuba, Havana still had a lot of work to do in order to gain support from critical groups such as peasants, urban workers, and women.376
It should be noted that with all of the public diplomacy programs implemented in
Honduras, a missing element in many USIA documents was the promotion of the
Alliance for Progress. While the program was certainly made public, individual events solely dedicated to raising its awareness were few. Rather than promoting economic improvements that could not be seen and felt, the USIA in Honduras instead focused much of their output on the failures of communism and creating a negative image of
Fidel Castro. This approach was the result of the country team’s fear that raising expectations would be unwise. USIA PAO in Honduras Robert Ades concluded that until the Alliance for Progress received full implementation “it would be a great mistake to arouse the people’s hopes only to have them waiting month in and month out for the jobs
375 Ibid; Daniel Walsh, An Air War with Cuba: The United States Radio Campaign Against Castro (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2012), 33. 376 “Informe Semanal de Honduras, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 26 de Febrero al 4 de Marzo 1962, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 169 and social reforms that are so sorely needed.”377 While not wanting to raise expectations was certainly important, Ades and other agency officials failed to see that real progress was already underway in Honduras. The Villeda Morales administration pushed universal education, labor rights, redistribution of uncultivated land, and improvements in housing.378
The same misplaced approach, focusing on Castro rather than reform, came through during formal diplomatic meetings as well. In the fall of 1962 Villeda Morales met with President Kennedy at the White House. JFK’s briefing memo for the meeting described Honduras as a country lacking basic infrastructure and economic institutions, but cast Villeda Morales as being a supporter of economic reforms.379 Meeting notes characterized the conversation as “long and involved.”380 Villeda Morales stressed the need for continued democratic development and Alliance for Progress assistance in
Central America. He also played down the threat of a communist takeover similar to
Cuba occurring in his country, bluntly stating that “in Honduras communism is in a state of lethargy and communism is weaker than in any other Central American country…They are no danger in Honduras.”
377 “Assessment Report for Year Ending December 31, 1961,” February 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 378 Reichman, The Broken Village, 83-84. 379 “Visit of President Villeda Morales, Talking Paper,” November 27, 1962, Digital Identifier: JFKPOF- 118-014, JFKL. 380 “Memorandum of Conversation,” November 30, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 332. 170
Image 14: Honduran President Ramón Villeda Morales.
Kennedy listened intently but countered that the Castro challenge was not just a bilateral problem between the United States and Cuba, but a regional conflict. He also pushed Villeda Morales not to become complacent regarding communism, cautioning that “Communists frequently take over a government in the guise of enlightened, democratic, revolutionary leaders, and not as Communists per se.”381 That last point reflected the overall attitude of the United States towards Villeda Morales. While there was much appreciation in Washington for his support of the Alliance for Progress, there always seemed to be a belief that his reform-minded agenda was too expansive and could be taken advantage of by pro-Castro elements. The meeting illustrated the serious gap between U.S. and Honduran leaders over whether to push reforms or focus on the Cuban threat. Villeda Morales was content to focus more on the need to transform his country’s economy while Kennedy worried about the spread of Castro’s message. In reality, as
381 Ibid, 333. 171 evidenced by internal Cuban reports, Havana viewed communists in Honduras as being much too small in numbers and lacking any organization to have a real political impact.382
USIA reports buttressed Villeda Morales’ argument that Castro’s influence was on the wane and apathy toward the larger U.S.-Cuban struggle on the decline. The agency wrote that many Hondurans now understood that a Cuban inspired takeover “can happen here.”383 Villeda Morales even attempted to assuage U.S. fears by publicly rebuking
Castro on more than one occasion. In January 1962 he advised other Latin American nations not to sit idly by and pushed for regime change in Cuba.384 His government also pushed for severe economic sanctions against the island.385 Villeda Morales continued adding to his anti-Cuba position during the 1963 summit in Costa Rica. He was one of the few Central American leaders who went directly after Castro, declaring that Central
America was “under the gun from a communist Cuba” and that the island was a “cancer” that needed to be done away with.386
The Military Moves
For all of his efforts to reform Honduras and appear as an anti-Castro leader,
Villeda Morales could not control the Honduran military. From the beginning of his
382 “Memorandum, Honduras: Situacion Politica Actual y Perspectivas Revolucionarios, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” 14 de Febrero 1964, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 383 “1962 Country Plan,” August 3, 1961, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 384 “Informe Semanal de Honduras, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 15 al 21 de Enero 1962, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 385 “Informe Semanal de Honduras, Ministerioe Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Del 8 al 14 de Enero 1962, A. Latina, A. Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 386 “Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State,” March 19, 1963, FRUS, vol. XII, 136; “Discurso Del Ciudadano Presidente de Honduras Doctor Ramón Villeda Morales En La Reunion De San Jose De Costa Rica Con Los Señores Presidentes De CentroAmerica, Panama Y Estados Unidos De America,” 18 De Marzo De 1963,” Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-043-016, JFKL. 172 presidency in 1957 tensions mounted between his administration and the armed forces. Rather than relying on the army to provide presidential protection, Villeda
Morales commissioned a 2,500 civil guard primarily because he believed that the military might attempt a coup. Infuriating soldiers even more was his decision to publicly support the Liberal Party Candidate for president in 1963 Modesto Rojas Alvarado. During the campaign Rojas Alvarado frequently delivered anti-military speeches and was fervently against the military aligned Nationalist Party. He once declared that “faltarán pinos en
Honduras para colgar los nacionalistas (there are not enough pine trees in Honduras to hang all the Nationalists). In October 1963 the mounting tensions between the Villeda
Morales administration and the more conservative military elements finally exploded. As in Guatemala, an upcoming election was the catalyst for action. The impending victory of
Rojas Alvarado was cause for Nationalist Party supporter General Oswaldo López
Arellano to initiate a coup.387 Ten days before the election Villeda Morales was overthrown and the Congress dissolved.388 Violence in Tegucigalpa erupted as Liberal
Party supporters took to the streets in protest only to be met by Honduran soldiers.
Officials in Washington knew a coup was a strong possibility for several months as
Ambassador Charles Burrows even warned forces allied with López Arellano not to make a move, threatening that U.S. economic aid might be cut off. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk publicly tried to dismiss the idea of a coup in September when he stated that “a government democratically elected is getting ready to finish its six-year term, during
387 Donald Schulz and Deborah Sundloff Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 31. 388 “Asume el Poder López A.” El Cronista, 4 de Octubre 1963. 173 which the military forces have been distinguished by its loyalty to the Constitution and the democratic regime.”389
Such public declarations meant very little as one Honduran military official declared that “the North American Embassy in Tegucigalpa informally inspired the coup, frequently complaining that the Villeda Morales government overtly tolerated communist activity in Honduras.”390 Kennedy initially refused to recognize the new government, suspended aid, and withdrew military advisors. The events in Tegucigalpa surprised
Kennedy, and called into question just how prepared the United States was to prevent further instability in Latin America. On October 4, 1963, just a few days after Villeda
Morales’ overthrow, JFK wrote to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, “The events of the past few days… show that the situation could develop in the Caribbean which would require active United States military intervention. I am not sure that we are prepared for this satisfactorily…for example, how many troops could we get into the Dominican
Republic in a 12-24-36-48 hour period? How many into Honduras? How many into
Venezuela?...I think we should have a meeting on this.”391 General López Arellano continued justifying his actions by arguing that he defeated a plot with inspiration from
Cuba and that Villeda Morales was “blind to the communism in his midst.”392 In truth,
Havana viewed the Honduran Liberal Party as being completely inadequate as a political
389 Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development, 174. 390 Ibid, 174. 391 Memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara, October 4, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 739. 392 Paul P. Kennedy, “Honduras Seized by Armed Forces; President Exiled,” New York Times, October 4, 1963, p. 1. 174 bloc capable to challenge U.S. interests.393 Fidel Castro had no desire to work with anyone from the Villeda Morales administration.
Ultimately, López Arellano also did not believe that the United States would remain unfriendly to his government for too long, telling Ambassador Burrows that “you will be back in six months.” Burrows recollected that the United States was back and
“nothing much was accomplished."394 The coup in Honduras had a chilling effect regarding views over the possibility of a democratic transformation in the region.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin wrote in the New York
Herald Tribune that “in most of Latin America there is so little experience with the benefits of political legitimacy that there is an insufficient body of opinion, civil or military, which has any reason to know its value and hence defend it.”395 Martin’s piece sounded like the administration was now open to doing business with Latin American dictators. When asked during a press conference if a policy reversal was at hand,
Kennedy retorted that “we made it very clear that we are opposed to an interruption of the constitutional system by a military coup, not only because we are all committed under the
Alliance for Progress to democratic government and progress and progressive government, but also because of course dictatorships are the seedbeds from which communism ultimately springs up.”396
393 “Informe Sobre Honduras, Panorama Politico de Honduras antes de Producirse la Ruptura de Relaciones entre los Estados Unidos y Cuba, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” Mayo 1962, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 394 Nieto, Masters of War, 113; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 181. 395 William Michael Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 25-26. 396 “The President’s News Conference,” October 9, 1963, APP. 175 Though the president correctly stated that no formal encouragement was given to General López Arellano’s coup, U.S. support to Latin American militaries increased during the Kennedy administration. In fact, military aid averaged $77 million per year from 1961 to 1964, a 50 percent increase compared to the average under the Eisenhower administration.397 With an emphasis on counter-insurgency thousands of Latin American military officers received training in the United States and at the School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. Washington assigned Military Assistance Advisory Groups
(MAAGS) to countries and worked closely with local forces in developing measures to root out subversives. In a memorandum to President Kennedy military officials argued that “with a long tradition of anti-communism and of friendship with U.S. military services, the Latin American military leaders remain one of the strongest bulwarks against the spread of Castroism and communism.” By 1962, members of the military in
Honduras received extensive training in intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency tactics to suppress “communist inspired and supported” insurgencies.398
A further goal of counter-insurgency programs was to create and help sustain professional militaries throughout the region. Not everyone thought this was such a good idea. Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, Dr. José Antonio Mayobre, told
Kennedy that such collusion may “stimulate” Latin American military officers into
“taking political power.” Kennedy countered that “he could not help but believe that close association with American military, who understood so well the need to subordinate
397 Giglio and Rabe, Debating the Kennedy Presidency, 16. 398 “Memorandum to the President,” February 10, 1962, Cold War Activities, US Army, National Security Files, Box 269A, JFKL. 176 the military power to civilian, would be helpful.”399 To say that this failed would be an understatement. As Alan McPherson writes, what was more often created included
“Frankenstein monsters, ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ regimes that were not tied to a charismatic dictator but were self-perpetuating machines of repression and corruption.”400
When reports of human rights abuses surfaced or a coup took place, Washington did little to disavow such actions. Given that reality, it is not to difficult to imagine that Latin
American military leaders such as General López Arellano in Honduras believed they had
Washington’s tacit support to protect their respective nations when they felt threatened.
The events of October 1963 had large impact on how Cuba viewed the prospects for revolutionary change in Honduras. In a detailed post-coup report back to Havana, regime officials argued that the military takeover confirmed previous suspicions that
Villeda Morales and the Liberal Party lacked the staying power necessary for real political and social change.401 More importantly, Cuban diplomats noted that conditions in Honduras were not ripe for an increase of revolutionary support. They wrote that the current state did not exist for the “triumph of a revolutionary process to be achieved.”402
As with the case of Guatemala, the military takeover in Honduras received widespread regional coverage. President Villeda Morales’ decision to seek refuge in
Costa Rica made the coup a front-page story in La Nacion. One report from October 4 quoted elements loyal to the military saying that action was necessary to prevent anarchy and stop the obvious infiltration of communists. The violence and number of killed in
399 Memorandum of conversation, Inter-American Defense College, April 11, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 224-225; Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 24. 400 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 59. 401 “Honduras, Situacion Politica Actual y Perspectivas Revolucionarias, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” 14 de Febrero 1964, A. Latina, Honduras, 1937-1984, Ordinario 1, MINREX. 402 Ibid. 177 Honduras also made headlines.403 In Nicaragua La Prensa described a “tough battle” and “death and confusion” in Tegucigalpa. Other stories recounted General López’s threatening opposition students. On October 10 a scathing editorial blasted the United
States for its criticisms of the deposed Villeda Morales and for its praise of General
López. The article quoted Ambassador Burrows calling the coup leader “an excellent person and great friend.” The editorial declared that the Americas reverted back to a
“time of bayonets.” 404
In Honduras pushing the Alliance for Progress and helping President Villeda
Morales implement his reform vision took a backseat to a robust anti-Castro effort. The
Kennedy administration consistently pressured the Honduran leader to focus on rooting out subversives and making sure Fidel Castro’s message did not gain traction among the local populace. U.S. policymakers failed to see that Villeda Morales embodied the spirit of the Alliance for Progress in many ways. He pushed for education and land reform while adhering to democratic principles. He was also not afraid to take on the Cuban
Revolution, as indicated by his public statements. Yet, for all of those qualities, he never earned the complete support of the Kennedy administration.
403 “Militares Depusieron al President Villeda Morales,” La Nacion, 4 de Octubre, 1963, p. 1; “Coronel López Arellano Gobernante Militar de Honduras,” La Nacion, 5 de Octubre, 1963, p. 1; “Obstáculo para Integración Centroamericana,” La Nacion, 5 de Octubre, 1963, 1; “Más de 500 Muertos en Honduras,” La Nacion, 7 de Octubre, 1963, p. 1. 404 “Villeda a Costa Rica, Reunión Cancilleres en Managua, Recio Combate en Tegucigalpa,” La Prensa, 4 de Octubre, 1963, p. 1; “Muertos y Confusión en Tegucigalpa,” La Prensa, 4 de Octubre, 1963, p. 1; “López Amenaza a Estudiantes,” La Prensa, 5 de Octubre, 1963, p. 1; “Gran Tiroteo A Las 2 P.M., Kennedy inquieto, quiere parar golpes,” La Prensa, 5 de Octubre 1963, p. 1; “Opinión de un Nica: Golpe Fue Retroceso,” La Prensa, 9 de Octubre, 1963, p. 7.; “6 Mil Presos en Honduras,” La Prensa, 10 de Octubre, 1963, p. 1.; “La Alianza para el Retroceso,” La Prensa, 10 de Octubre, 1963, p. 2.
178 Conclusion
For all of the gains made in circulating pro-U.S. and anti-Castro propaganda in
Guatemala and Honduras, military coup d’états in 1963 demonstrated the limits of the
United States ability to generate peaceful change in Central America. Though the internal political and economic realities made public diplomacy efforts difficult, what created even more obstacles was how U.S. policymakers approached the two countries.
Guatemala’s legacy of perceived communist infiltration during the 1950s continued to color how U.S. leaders viewed the Central American nation. Influencing key sectors of society, including students and laborers, was important, but Washington allowed preventing leftist leaders from taking power to dominate their efforts. In this instance, anti-Castro public diplomacy was most prominent, as opposed to more hopeful messages regarding democracy and social change. This was due, in part, to the reality that entrenched conservative forces refused to support any changes that threatened their hold on power. The IGA in Guatemala City initiated programs whose goals included reaching students and laborers. They succeeded in becoming one of the capital city’s most popular cultural centers. Yet, Alliance for Progress promotion proved inadequate as long as there existed no leadership in the country willing to move forward with social reform. President Kennedy’s decision to support the prevention of Juan Arévalo’s campaign was especially egregious. One of the USIA’s top priorities in Guatemala was
“to sustain and extend the belief that the well-being of the Guatemala people is better 179 served by adherence to the rule of law and democratic way of life…rather than resort to anarchy…eventually leading to one man or ‘Junta’ rule.”405
While the administrations own actions aided in undermining prospects for democratic rule, in reality, Arévalo offered the type of liberal democratic governance
Kennedy was looking for. He was more in the form of a New Deal reformer than a
Castro-inspired revolutionary. Most disconcerting regarding U.S. deliberations over
Arévalo’s possible return was the lack of any serious discussion over how such a stance would affect important elements of society in Guatemala. While the USIA put many resources into cultivating students and laborers, policymakers in Washington ultimately stymied the one political leader who championed those groups.
In Honduras, the United States failed to adequately balance their fears of revolution with pushing for real reform. Making Hondurans aware that another Cuba
“could happen here” was a top objective. As a consequence, the USIA sought to reach students through building up the university library. They agency even used the Catholic
Church and Cuban exiles residing in the country to be conduits for the U.S. message.
Influencing laborers in the banana region of the northern coast also became important.
Here again a balancing act was necessary. Laborers needed to be made aware that
Castro’s prescription for change was wrong for Honduras, but that message had to be conveyed in a way that did not push laborers too far to the left. Powerful corporations such as the United Fruit Company pushed the USIA to keep its message toned down. Yet, for all of the problems, a democratic reformer friendly to the United States seeking to promote economic opportunity existed in Honduras. Rather than spending more time and
405 “Country Plan-Guatemala,” June 28, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 180 effort encouraging reform and supporting President Villeda Morales, officials allowed their fears of another Cuba to taint their view of Honduras’ leader. His ability to forestall leftist advances was constantly questioned. Almost immediately after the announcement of the Alliance for Progress, the State Department asked Villeda Morales to table his own agrarian reform. Moreover, pressure was consistently put on Tegucigalpa to make sure the internal security situation remained under control.
The coups of 1963, and Cuban reactions, also give insights into how the Castro government came to view the possibilities for revolutionary change through elections in
Latin America during the 1960s. In case after case, Juan Arévalo and Villeda Morales, being prime examples, Havana looked suspiciously at individuals on the political left who had faith in democracy. Both individuals, and the parties they represented, became viewed as not sufficiently powerful enough to combat vested economic and military interests in their respective countries. The fact that both had their political aspirations ended by military takeovers likely only confirmed Cuba’s position that only radical change could fundamentally alter Latin American societies.
John Kennedy once privately noted that the United States was in search of
“decent democratic regimes” in Latin America.406 Yet, short-term victories ruled the day in Guatemala and Honduras as stability took precedence over reform. U.S. policymakers aided in thwarting a democratic election in Guatemala and accepted military rule in
Honduras with few consequences for the coup initiators. For those students, teachers, laborers, and campesinos that read USIA materials at a binational center or watched
406 Jason Duncan, John F. Kennedy: The Spirit of Cold War Liberalism (New York: Routledge University Press, 2014), 115. 181 Alliance for Progress films, the supposed new era of inter-American relations espoused by President Kennedy seemed very much like the past.
Ultimately, public diplomacy offered the United States the opportunity to win over locals on the ground in both Honduras and Guatemala. The individuals who made up the USIA proved to be reliable “boots on the ground” in the battle for hearts and minds in Latin America. Historian Kenneth Osgood aptly described these individuals as viewing
themselves as foot soldiers in the battle for hearts and minds, ideological shock troops on the front lines of the Cold War…they were starry-eyed idealists who sold the American way of life with missionary fervor, and at the same time hard- nosed realists, cold warriors who intervened in local politics, manipulated indigenous media, disseminated anticommunist propaganda, and did whatever else they could to advance U.S. interests.407
Having such a potent apparatus with the ability to reach millions proved vitally important for Washington’s prospects to blunt Fidel Castro’s gains in popularity among Central
Americans. Whereas military assistance, state-to-state relations, and high level diplomatic exchanges offered Washington few inroads among the populace, public diplomacy allowed for new openings in Honduras and Guatemala to be created. Yet, in order for psychological operations to have a full effect, the battle for hearts and minds had to occupy a central place in U.S. policymaking circles, which was not always the case.
407 Osgood, Total Cold War, 104. 182 Chapter 4: “We Will Build a Wall of Dedicated Men”: Public Diplomacy,
Democracy, and Dictatorship in Costa Rica and Nicaragua during the 1960s
In July 1979 the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) Revolution triumphed in Nicaragua. The Sandinista program called for a “collective spirit” representative of all the people.408 After decades of fighting the Somoza family dictatorship in Nicaragua rebels took to the streets of Managua and gathered in what would become known as Revolutionary Plaza. Shortly thereafter relations between the
United States and Nicaragua deteriorated as Washington placed support behind an anti-
Sandinista movement known as the contras.409 Writing only a few years after the revolution, historian Walter LaFeber posited that the events were “inevitable,” a byproduct of the U.S. system of economic exploitation that dominated the region.
LaFeber wrote that rather than seeking a more formal role, Washington “instead sought informal control, and they finally obtained it through a system that can be described as
‘neodependency.’”410 He defined ‘neodependency’ as “a way of looking at Latin
American development, not in isolation, but as part of an international system in which the leading powers, have used their economic strength to make Latin American development dependent on–and subordinate to–the interests of those leading powers.”411
Yet, was such revolutionary unrest truly inevitable? Given that not every Central
American country experienced such turmoil that claim is highly questionable. Just to the south of Nicaragua lies Costa Rica, a nation whose course during the latter half of the 20th
408 Que es un Sandinista? 1982, Ubicación Física: 320.5F676, IHNCA. 409 For more on the revolution and its aftermath refer to Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). 410 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 16. 411 Ibid, 17. 183 century included free and fair elections, economic growth, and political stability.
Perhaps Costa Rica is the exception and not the rule, but its existence and trajectory make it clear that contingency, rather than inevitability proved more important in post-1945
Central America.
While their histories greatly differed, both Nicaragua and Costa Rica became critical targets of U.S. public diplomacy during the 1960s. The USIA utilized numerous mediums in their attempt to mold public attitudes while forming new relationships with important local opinion makers. In doing so, pro-Alliance for Progress news articles, radio broadcasts, and pamphlets gained widespread distribution. USIA efforts focused on students, labor, intellectuals, and campesinos in both countries. However, the political realities in the two nations produced dissimilar results. In Costa Rica, the Kennedy administration found reliable and reformist allies which led to a workable relationship.
Moreover, Costa Rica benefited from an emerging democratic system. Such a reality led to public diplomacy becoming a critically important component of the overall U.S. strategy to cultivate the country as a prime Central American example of modernity achieved through U.S. led development. Leaders in San José felt accountable to their citizens in ways no member of the Somoza family in Nicaragua ever did. The adherence to the will of the people produced more local action in trying to win over public opinion and more of a willingness to aid U.S. public diplomatic efforts.
In contrast, the Somoza regime in Nicaragua proved to be an immovable barrier to progress and provided a stark example of continued dictatorial rule in Latin America.
While the USIA implemented a variety of psychological operations, winning hearts and minds never fully became a component of U.S. strategy towards Nicaragua. Ultimately, 184 President Kennedy worried more about preventing another Cuba in Nicaragua than pushing the Somoza family to democratize and fully embrace the Alliance for Progress.
The vast difference in outcomes illustrates just how vital it is for U.S. public diplomacy to have workable relationships with foreign partners. It is quite difficult to sell a vision of progress and inclusionary democracy that goes against the ruling government.
Costa Rica
Though well-known for its long periods of stability, Costa Rica was not immune to civil strife during the 20th century. Following World War II what became known as the
War of National Liberation took place in that Central American nation. Led by José
Figueres, who established the Partido Social Demócrata (Social Democratic Party) to counter the ruling Partido Republicano Nacional (National Republican Party, PRN), the war began after the annulment of a 1948 election that led to the PRN losing power. When it became clear that the PRN-controlled congress sought to disregard the election results and appoint former leader Rafael Calderón to the presidency again, Figueres and his forces went into action. Within a few days they gained control of several important
Central Valley cities and prepared for an attack on the capital of San José. All along
Figueres promised Costa Ricans that his cause was not a right-wing campaign for dictatorship, but rather a pro-democracy crusade. As early as 1943, through his book
Ideario Costarricense (Costa Rican Ideology), Figueres outlined his belief that the need for democracy was the most important issue confronting Latin America.412 He vowed to restore the electoral process and not to repeal popular social welfare reforms passed during Republican rule. After six weeks of fighting and the loss of over 2,000 lives an
412 Christina Eguizabal, “Latin American foreign policies and human rights,” in Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, ed. David Forsythe (New York: United Nations University Press, 2000), 298. 185 agreement ended the violence and established a Revolutionary Junta. The military regime lasted eighteen months and then the rightful electoral winner in 1948, Otilio
Ulate, took the presidency. Before the Junta relinquished power Figueres pushed for the complete dismantling of the nation’s army, fearing an active military would always be a threat to democracy. Rather than fading from view during the Ulate government Figueres represented Costa Rica throughout the world at many international conferences and promoted its development.413 He earned the nickname Don Pepe and when Ulate’s term expired in 1953 Figueres became president. The events from the late 1940s not only illustrated that Costa Rica could suffer from internal conflict, but also made José Figueres a crucial political actor in Central America for decades to come.
Image 15: Map of Costa Rica.
413 Monica Rankin, The History of Costa Rica (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Press), 118. 186 During Figueres’s tenure as president, from 1953 to 1958, Washington courted Costa Rica and the two countries maintained good relations.414 Figueres also established a new political party, the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN), which became one of Costa Rica’s most powerful political voices. Many U.S. policymakers were happy to see him maintain such a prominent political voice into the 1960s. By that time Costa
Rica’s reputation as a stable democratic Central American country was growing, but that did not diminish U.S. fears of Castro gaining influence there. Anti-U.S. elements were active in the country even prior to the revolution, as highlighted by material published and promoted prior to a 1955 visit by Vice-President Richard Nixon. The widely circulated pamphlet, titled “Mr. Nixon, Go Home,” argued that Nixon’s trip “will bring nothing good to Latin America” and tied the United States to the Somoza dictatorship in
Nicaragua and Castillo Armas in Guatemala.415 By the 1960s the Costa Rican Servicio de Inteligencia (Intelligence Service) consistently reported on pro-Cuba elements operating throughout the provinces.416 As elsewhere in the region, Castro’s victory struck a responsive chord.
The Perfect Example
For the Kennedy administration and the USIA maintaining Costa Rica as a viable example of democracy in Latin America was crucial. Public diplomacy intensely focused on promoting a continued alliance with the United States, the virtues of the Alliance for
Progress, and the dangers of Fidel Castro. Business leaders, university students,
414 For more on U.S. Costa Rica relations during the Figueres era refer to Kyle Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk: Costa Rica and the United States during the rise of José Figueres (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997). 415 “Mr. Nixon, Go Home!!” Asunto: Envío de Propaganda, 22 de Febrero 1955, Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, Signatura 831, AGNCOS. 416 Memorandum, Ministerio de Gobernación, 1963, Signatura 3668, AGNCOS. 187 professors, urban workers, and even children received attention. An initial priority for the Kennedy administration was finding an ambassador who could improve a slowly fraying U.S.-Costa Rican relationship. Figueres’s successor, Mario Echandi of the
Partido Union Nacional (National Union Party) grew tired of Washington consistently quoting Don Pepe and treating the former president as if he were still in office. President
Echandi wanted more attention. To make matters worse, the U.S. ambassador in San
José, Whiting Willauer, earned the reputation as an absentee statesman. Some members of the Echandi government did not believe him to be all that interested in Costa Rican matters. During the summer of 1961 Kennedy appointed Raymond Telles, a Mexican-
American from Texas, to replace Willauer. Telles had experience as an Air Force veteran and also served as an aide to Presidents Truman and Eisenhower on trips to Mexico.417
Once situated in Costa Rica Telles embarked on his own personal public diplomacy campaign. He made regular trips to far-flung provinces, which were previously neglected, and constantly sought out President Echandi. Within a few weeks the two men were attending futbol games together. Telles learned the names of the most prominent newspaper editors, radio commentators, and television producers. Within just a few months the USIA reported that “the U.S. Ambassador now stands solidly in a unique place of esteem among [the] leaders and masses of Costa Ricans.”418
While having a good working relationship with local leaders was important, the
USIA’s top objective was reaching the people. A main goal during Kennedy’s first year in office included gaining a foothold in Costa Rican newspapers. The USIA desired to
417 Thomas Kreneck, Mexican American Odyssey: Felix Tijerina, Entrepreneur and Civic Leader, 1905- 1965 (Houston, TX: University of Houston Press, 2001), 283. 418 “Country Assessment Report,” April 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 188 influence what papers published and how they framed editorials. Agency officials consistently suggested Inter-Press Service articles to Costa Rican newspaper editors that focused on issues such as “human dignity, peace with freedom, and the Alliance for
Progress.”419 Regarding the Alliance for Progress, the day after Kennedy’s announcement of the program, Costa Rica’s La Nacion had the headline “Kennedy Speaks to Latin
America.” The March 14 edition also had an editorial lauding Kennedy’s speech as
“historic.” In fact, the entire text of the president’s alliance declaration appeared in La
Nacion. Within a few days rather than calling the program the Alliance for Progress, one headline simply referred to it as the “Kennedy Plan.”420 In addition, pamphlets, books, and television programs sought to inundate Costa Ricans with the necessity and virtue of the economic program. Ambassador Telles received instructions to highlight particular projects during his regular press conferences and two local radio stations, La Voz de
America (The Voice of America) and La Voz de la Victor (The Voice of the Victor), broadcast any alliance related news. The agency reported that “by the end of 1961 the concepts, plans and incipient projects of the Alianaza para el Progreso program had thoroughly permeated all USIS [A] output in all media.”421
Coupled with pro-U.S. messages were anti-Castro public diplomacy operations.
USIA officials reported that by mid-1961 there were no daily newspapers in Costa Rica that supported the Cuban Revolution. The lack of support for Havana allowed widespread publication of anti-Castro articles. In fact, while during the entire year of 1960 the USIA
419 Ibid. 420 “Kennedy Habla a Latinoamérica,” La Nacion, March 14, 1961, p. 1; “Mucho optimismo en cuanto a las positivos resultados del Plan Kennedy,” La Nacion, March 26, 1961, p. 23; “Texto Íntegro del Histórico discurso de Kennedy,” La Nacion, March 15, 1961, p. 38. 421 “Country Assessment Report,” April 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 189 placed 140 unflattering Castro stories, they were averaging 170 critical Castro articles per month in 1961. The limited amount of resources available to Costa Rican newspaper editors made them reliant on global wire services, and the USIA was perfectly content to help supply stories. Moreover, USIA cultivation of good working partnerships with editors in San José meant that the United States had an important opening in which to reach large sectors of society. Given that local political and business leaders were avid readers obtaining such a working relationship with influential newspapers proved quite the public diplomacy coup.422
Though influencing newspaper editors allowed for access to be gained among white-collar workers, Washington remained concerned that students and laborers were most susceptible to pro-Castro views. Nothing worried U.S. policymakers more than the prospect of Latin American universities being a breeding ground for revolutionary thought. The University of Costa Rica, with over 4,000 students, became a primary target. The magazine Aros, sponsored by the USIA, became an important medium to reach students. Agency officials praised the student editorial board's “wise policy of using as much original material as possible and of rejecting the hard or too obvious type of sensational anti-Communist material.” Given the lack of magazine publications in
Costa Rica at that time Aros was not only read on campus but also purported to be popular among business and political leaders.
Radio also proved to be a means of reaching the student population. The USIA
“was particularly pleased to have placed with the University of Costa Rica’s station
Radio Universitaria not only cultural programs but also the strongly anti-communist
422 Ibid. 190 series Dr. Zhivago”423 Placement was due to a close working relationship with university administrators and students. Written by Boris Pasternak and published as a book in 1957 Doctor Zhivago earned acclaim as an international sensation. Recently declassified CIA documents demonstrate that the agency attempted to help get the book published in the late 1950s.424 Doctor Zhivago told the story of early 20th century Russian history through several tragic characters. Soviet Union officials attempted to prevent its release since they believed it portrayed communism in a negative light but failed when an
Italian publisher received a smuggled copy and published it. The book took on even more popularity when Soviet officials arrested Olga Ivinskaya, a close friend of Pasternak, and her daughter in 1960. Moscow accused Ivinskaya of aiding with the western publication of Doctor Zhivago. Policymakers in Washington, including President Kennedy, viewed the Ivinskaya case as a way to highlight communist injustices. In a conversation with
Arthur Schlesinger, Kennedy complained that communists seemed always to be able to
“rouse” global support against perceived injustices in the West, perhaps the case of
Ivinskaya would allow the United States to do the same. The president told Schlesinger to pass the message on to Edward R. Murrow and the USIA. Schlesinger cautioned Murrow,
“But obviously we should not seem to be exploiting this tragic affair just to make propaganda points.”425 Placing Doctor Zhivago on university radio was a good way to expose Costa Rican students to a popular story while also possibly encouraging them to follow the Ivinskaya case. As the USIA attempted to portray Cuba as a country moving
423 Ibid. 424 Peter Finn and Petra Couvée,“During Cold War, CIA used ‘Doctor Zhivago’ as a tool to undermine Soviet Union,” April 5, 2014, Washington Post. 425 “Memorandum for Edward R. Murrow,” February 2, 1961, USIA, Memoranda, 1961-1964, Box 1, JFKL. 191 closer to authoritarian government bent on halting intellectual freedom, making the
Ivinskaya situation more known seemed appropriate.
A second critical group for the USIA included laborers, both in the cities and the countryside. While it was doubtful that many members of this target group read La
Nacion on a consistent basis, television could be a reliable source for spreading anti-
Castro propaganda. One station claimed the ability to reach up to 60,000 individuals and the USIA reported that the Hollywood based series I Led Three Lives gained in popularity. The show told the true story of Herbert Philbrick, an FBI agent who infiltrated the Communist Party in the United States. Philbrick also played a key role in reviewing scripts. He later recalled that “I knew of the things that the bureau does and doesn’t do, and the things that Mr. Hoover liked, and the things he didn’t like. So, that was my job, to kind of make sure that they [FBI] didn’t have to take care of this.”426 The show became so popular in one working-class Costa Rican neighborhood that a gentleman with one of the few televisions around moved it out on the porch so everyone could watch the weekly broadcast of I Led Three Lives.427 With television being in its infancy in Costa Rica, individuals with access regularly welcomed neighbors into their homes to watch programs.
When attempting to gain influence in unions U.S. policy struggled at times to overcome inherent difficulties. Prominent corporations, such as the United Fruit
Company and Northern Railway, worried that USIA materials encouraged more union membership and power. USIA officials lamented that they had to contend with “strongly
426 Stephen Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 66. 427 “Country Assessment Report,” April 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 192 anti-union employers, both American and Costa Rican.”428 In this instance public diplomacy had to strike a balance between denouncing Castro, promoting workers rights, and not alienating ownership too much. An effective method to accomplish that task included the USIA’s labor magazine, El Mes Obrero (The Monthly Worker). It had a mailing list of over 6,000 names and published anti-Castro stories and cartoon sketches.
One copy included a cartoon drawn by Pulitzer prize winner Bill Mauldin titled “you’ll get used to it” portraying a farmer during the sugar cane harvest working with a hammer- and-sickle shaped machete given to him by Che Guevara.429 Interviews with Cuban exiles were also commonly published. In 1961 the agency noted that it received positive feedback regarding the magazine. A priest from Sarchi-Sur, north of San José, wrote that
El Mes Obrero was “so interesting and appropriate for workers, to keep them from being deceived by the great Communist lie or by that most recent deceitful criminal Fidel
Castro, his brother and his comrades in crime.” This same priest often sent in the names of workers he believed should receive a copy of the magazine. Another letter, written by
Charles Averre of the Northern Railway Company, was even more laudatory. Averre wrote, “Have just finished reading the El Mes Obrero for June. Congratulations! This issue is well done and serves to really help the working men by the promotion of ideas which will help them and condemning things which are harmful to workers and all men.”430 The USIA viewed the Averre letter as a sign of progress since Northern Railway had previously criticized the magazine as being too pro-labor.
428 “USIS’ Country Plan for Costa Rica for FY 1962,” August 18, 1961, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 429 Bill Mauldin (cartoonist), “You’ll get used to it,” February 27, 1961, St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 430 “Country Assessment Report,” April 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 193 Similar to agency operations in Honduras, an area of particular importance regarding labor was the banana region of Costa Rica. This region included border areas with Panama and land located in the Gulf of Dulce on the Pacific Ocean side of the country. U.S. officials reported that the comic books El Despertar (The Awakening) and
La Traición (The Betrayal) were widely popular. One USIA memorandum explained that the comics “have proved to be the most effective type of publication which USIS [A]-San
Jose has ever received. Significant: this is one publication never dropped on the ground or left on the seats after mobile film showings; all copies are taken home and read and re- read (especially in rural regions)…Cuban exiles in Costa Rica have helped distribute many hundreds—in fact thousands—of these unattributed pamphlets.” Films such as La
Isla Desdichada (Miserable Island) and “Castro and Cuba” had to be replayed by local stations due to so many requests. The Unión Ferroviaria Nacional (National Railway
Union) of the Pacific Railway and Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de Obras
Publicas (Public Works Employees) even hosted viewing parties for its members.
Finally, the radio program Cuba bajor el Terror (Cuba under Terror) became a local favorite in the banana region. It was a short documentary style program narrated by a different Cuban character each episode, sometimes a teacher or a doctor. They illustrated
“the multiple sufferings of the Cuban people under Fidel Castro.”431
Maintaining Democratic Rule
Though there were many positive signs in the U.S.-Costa Rican relationship, including a betterment of relations between Ambassador Telles and President Echandi along with widespread output of U.S. information, policymakers both in San José and
431 Ibid. 194 Washington worried as the Costa Rican presidential election of 1962 approached.
Figueres’s PLN nominated Francisco Orlich while the PRN nominated Rafael Calderón,
José Figueres’s longtime political opponent. It was Calderón whose actions in 1948 caused Figueres to launch his national revolution. Washington worried that violence stemming from a contested election could harm Costa Rica’s burgeoning democratic tradition. Moreover, two other significant issues caused concern. First, while Figueres and his party’s anti-communist and pro-democratic stance was appreciated, at times they were much too public in their condemnation of regional dictators. Figueres made no secret of his desire for the Somoza dynasty in neighboring Nicaragua to be deposed.
Rumors that the PLN not only called for action against Somoza, but might even be actively supporting an overthrow persisted. At the same time, the PLN was staunchly anti-Castro. Figueres consistently counseled the Kennedy administration to keep Latin
America as a priority, stating to presidential adviser Adolf Berle shortly after Kennedy’s election that “the Cold War is on in Latin America. If the United States is a spectator, she is lost.432 A second concern included fears that given Costa Rica’s more developed economic position in relation to its neighbors, leadership in the country might conclude that the Alliance for Progress was not as important for them. Meanwhile, officials in
Havana received accounts that Orlich had the support of powerful interests in Costa Rica and any leftist opposition had little chance of victory as “figueristas” had a tight grip on power.433
432 Samuel Farber, Cuba since the Revolution of 1959: A Critical Assessment (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011), 107; Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 28. 433 “Costa Rica, Sintesis: Economic-Politica,” 11 de Enero 1962, A. Latina, Costa Rica, Ordinario, 1962- 1979, MINREX; “Costa Rica y su Vinculacion al Imperialismo-Comparacion entre los Goberieno de Mario Echandi y Francisco Orlich, 17 de Diciembre 1962, A. Latina, Costa Rica, Ordinario, 1962-1979, MINREX. 195 A free and fair election in February 1962 alleviated any fears of political violence. The PLN candidate Francisco Orlich won with 50% of the vote as international election observers invited to Costa Rica reported no large irregularities.434 Orlich quickly sought to boost the national economy, which was declining due to a drop in coffee and banana prices.435 Concerns that Costa Rica would turn away from the Alliance for
Progress quickly disappeared as the Orlich administration, with counsel from Figueres, dedicated itself to the economic program. Documents from Costa Rica’s National
Archives buttress Orlich’s commitment to U.S.-led development. The Comision
Costarricense de la Alianza Para el Progreso (CCAPP) took the lead in publicizing and coordinating Alliance for Progress activities while the Ministerio de Educacion (Ministry of Education) and the Ministerio de Obras Publicas (Ministry of Public Works) provided detailed studies to assist USAID projects.436 These documents also highlight a keen awareness by the Costa Rican government of the need to cultivate public opinion. The focus could not only be on development but key administration officials also understood that influencing Costa Ricans to believe that progress could be achieved was critical to ultimate success.
By June 1963 Costa Rica, with the help of the United States, embarked on a massive school improvement project. Three hundred and twenty thousand books were made available while school construction was significantly increased. Perhaps most importantly, the Costa Rican government resolved that primary education through the
434 Susan Hyde, The Pseudo-Democrats Dilemma: Why Election Observation became an International Norm (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2011), 56. 435 Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz, “Costa Rica since 1930,” in Central America since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 309. 436 “Documentos Relacionados con La Alianza Para el Progress: Jornadas en Costa Rica,” 1963. Colección Manuel Mora Valverde, Signatura 2965, AGNCOS; “Actividades pro Difusión de Alianza Para el Progreso,” Marzo 1963, Ministerio de Educación, Signatura 10092, AGNCOS. 196 sixth grade was necessary for every child. Moreover, the Orlich government made it a priority that schools must have the appropriate number of teachers. They hoped to leave behind the days of a one-room school house.437 To assist in this transformation, the
United States offered, and Orlich gladly accepted, Costa Rica’s first group of Peace
Corps volunteers. When the young students stepped off of a plane at Juan Santamaría airport in January 1963 Costa Rican Education Minister Ismael Vargas greeted them.
Assigned to the Education Ministry the corps workers received a week or so of in-country training at the University of Costa Rica and were then quickly sent out to aid local teachers.438
The USIA welcomed the Costa Rican government’s attention to primary education as agency officials had already established a relationship with many schools.
This was partly accomplished through El Correo Grafico (Picture Bulletin). Published monthly, the pictures varied from major news in U.S.-Latin American relations to local
Alliance for Progress projects. One particular issue from the mid-1960s highlighted
Ambassador Telles’s history of regularly visiting the Costa Rican countryside and his role in promoting new schools.439 One USIA report to Washington praised Telles and stated that he “has done more than perhaps anyone else to assist in the USIS [A] objective of effectively reaching the provinces. No U.S. Ambassador has made such efforts and has
437 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Costa Rica, Asunto: Informe Cultural, 4 de Junio 1963, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 161, AGNCOL. 438 “Peace Corps Costa Rica volunteer walks memory lane,” Tico Times, July 1, 2011, available from www.ticotimes.net. 439 “Ayuda de los Estados Unidos de America a las Escuelas Rurales de Costa Rica,” 1965, El Correo Grafico: Boletin Pictorico del Servicio de Informacion de la Embajada de los E.E.U.U de Norte America, available from National Archives. 197 been so successful in visiting so many parts of the country.”440 El Correo became very accepted by rural teachers, with one from the very isolated town of San Isidro de
Perez Zeledon writing that “I consider El Correa Grafico an indispensable organ of information in teaching and as an aid to the efforts of persons such as I who want to protect our democracy which is now being threatened.” Another Costa Rican became so taken with the magazine that he requested 30 copies a month to give to friends and family.441
Image 16: El Correo Grafico, 1965.
440 “Country Assessment Report,” April 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 441 Ibid. 198 Orlich’s sustained commitment to development benefited the prospects for
Alliance for Progress success in Costa Rica. The CCAPP also provided plans for health, housing development, agrarian reform, and the private sector.442 President Orlich’s desire to improve the Costa Rican economy through central planning was known even prior to his election. Business International, a publication that specialized in reporting for U.S. companies operating abroad, wrote that part of Orlich’s program for Costa Rica included the establishment of a National Planning Office.443 Orlich also consistently pursued new policies towards advancing telecommunications technology and attempted to implement land reform.444 While pushing for economic development and integration, Orlich also consistently followed an anti-Castro line.445 In essence, he was just the sort of leader the
Kennedy administration hoped for—liberal, democratic, and a U.S. ally.
Kennedy’s Arrival
The U.S. public diplomacy campaign in Costa Rica culminated in March 1963 when President Kennedy visited the nation during a Conference of Central American
Presidents. One month prior to the visit administration officials, including the president, conferred with Costa Rican Foreign Minister Daniel Oduber in Washington. Oduber laid out a hopeful plan that a common customs union and monetary unit in Central America could be established over the next several years. He stated that at an upcoming Foreign
Ministers meeting in Tegucigalpa, Honduras a formal paper would be drafted regarding a
442 “Documentos Relacionados con La Alianza Para el Progress: Jornadas en Costa Rica,” 1963. Colección Manuel Mora Valverde, Signatura 2965, AGNCOS; “Actividades pro Difusión de Alianza Para el Progreso,” Marzo 1963, Ministerio de Educación, Signatura 10092, AGNCOS. 443 “The Business Outlook: Central America,” Business International, 1962, vol. 9, 142. 444 Benedicte Bull, Aid, Power, and Privatization: The Politics of Telecommunication Reform in Central America (Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 89. 445 “Informe Especial Sobre Costa Rica, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” 18 de Diciembre 1963, A. Latina, Costa Rica, Ordinario, 1962-1979, MINREX. 199 common market and he hoped the United States would support the venture. He added that the statement would include mention of Cuba and that the Castro regime
“represented a reactionary threat to the Alliance for Progress and the social and economic development of Central America.”446 The paper drafted in the Tegucigalpa meeting prior to the San José Conference did include a reference to the need to continue implementing policies to “impede” the threat of Cuban penetration.447 This was artful diplomacy by
Oduber. First, he laid out the Costa Rican vision for the region, and then knowing how important the Cuban situation was to U.S. policymakers, concluded with harsh language towards Castro. Oduber and Kennedy went back and forth over issues they thought important. JFK wanted an anti-Castro declaration just prior to his landing in San José so public opinion did not think the United States forced such a position on its neighbors.
Oduber replied that members of his government hoped Kennedy would take time to address university students while in Costa Rica.
As the conference neared, a gap still existed regarding what all sides hoped to achieve. Central American leaders concerned themselves with economic matters. Better integration, tariffs, and coffee prices were top issues.448 The Kennedy administration’s stated goals for attending the conference included “to promote the Alliance for Progress, stimulate Central American economic integration, and consolidate support for the diplomatic isolation of Cuba.”449 The last goal, isolating Cuba, was most important. U.S.
446 “Memorandum of a Conversation,” February 7, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 130. 447 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Costa Rica, Asunto: Informe Político, 15 de Enero 1963, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 161, AGNCOL. 448 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Costa Rica, Asunto: Informe Político, 25 de Enero 1963. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 161, AGNCOL. 449 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 135. 200 officials continued to worry that pro-Castro propaganda and Cuban-trained guerillas were moving too freely around the region.
Along with conducting formal diplomatic meetings, Kennedy and his administration had another goal, they wanted to see the people. A visit to a housing project just outside of San José and a speech at the University of Costa Rica were part of his itinerary.450 Immediately following arrival on March 18 to a thunderous applause,
Kennedy and President Orlich participated in a parade to the Presidential Palace.
Cameras captured somewhat chaotic scenes as thousands lined up to catch a glimpse of
Kennedy sitting atop an open-air car. One account of Kennedy’s initial appearance described it as apoteósico (grand).451
In his most formal public address, at the Teatro Nacional (National Theater) in downtown San José, Kennedy focused on areas of common cause and used history as a reference point. Noting the long record of inter-American relations he argued that the meeting of presidents in Costa Rica compared to early gatherings of men such as Simon
Bolivar and one of Central America’s founding fathers José Cecilio de Valle. In commenting on the vigor of hemispheric solidarity, JFK declared that “we have not attained this strength by merely trying to protect what was already won, to preserve the gains of the past, to maintain the status quo.” He went on to discuss the prospects for
“profound revolutionary change” in Latin America. Kennedy’s use of historic Latin
American leaders and revolutionary rhetoric is interesting. Fidel Castro often did the same, appropriating either Bolivar or José Marti to make his case for revolution. Though
450 “Presidents’ Meeting at San Jose,” March 18-20, 1963, Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-108-009, JFKL. 451 United in Progress, March 1963, United States Government Agencies, Accession Number 1-4, JFKL; Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Costa Rica, Asunto: Informe Político, 22 de Marzo 1963, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 161, AGNCOL. 201 they disagreed over the past as well as the course of the future, Kennedy and Castro both often employed history as a means of highlighting the importance of the present.
Toward the end of his remarks Kennedy mentioned isolating Cuba. He declared that “I am hopeful that at this meeting we will again increase our capacity to prevent the infiltration of Cuban agents, money, and propaganda. We will build a wall around Cuba-- not a wall of mortar or brick or barbed wire, but a wall of dedicated men determined to protect their freedom and their sovereignty.”452
On the day after his speech Kennedy and President Orlich visited a housing project at El Bosque just outside San José built with Alliance for Progress funds. Again, thousands were on hand as the U.S. leader took the podium. Included with the dignitaries on stage were six school aged children from each Central American nation standing in front of a desk, a placard indicating their country. When Kennedy finished shaking each child’s hand and distributing textbooks the crowd erupted in applause. This imagery, the
President of the United States promoting social change and conversing with average citizens of Latin America, was powerful. Kennedy concluded brief remarks by declaring that “education, homes, jobs, health, security—those are the things for which this country stands…Those are the things which together we must achieve for our people, and I want to assure you through the Alliance for Progress we will stand and work shoulder to shoulder in making this hemisphere an example of what democracy can mean. Viva
Costa Rica. Arriba Costa Rica.”453
452 “Address at the Teatro Nacional in San José Upon Opening the Presidents’ Conference,” March 18, 1963, APP. 453 “Remarks at El Bosque Housing Project Near San José,” March 19, 1963, APP. 202
Image 17: Teatro Nacional, San José, Costa Rica.
The president’s final day in San José included brief high-level meetings along with a speech at the University of Costa Rica. Students packed a courtyard where
Kennedy spoke about the necessity of political and economic freedom, all the while casting Cuba as an example of the failure of communism. At times, he had to pause as students clapped and cheered. José Franco Ortega, Colombia’s Ambassador to Costa Rica wrote that students welcomed Kennedy with much enthusiasm.454 After his speech
Kennedy had much difficulty finding his way through the throng of students, who wanted to catch a glimpse, shake his hand, or pat him on the back. Unlike Caracas in 1958, where
Richard Nixon was met with students’ clenched fists, outstretched open arms greeted
Kennedy.455
The images of a young and vibrant John Kennedy were seen throughout Latin
America. Prior to the conference the USIA dispatched photographers, filmmakers, and
454 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Costa Rica, Asunto: Informe Político, 22 de Marzo 1963, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 161, AGNCOL. 455 “Visita de Kennedy a la Universidad,” La Nacion, 21 de Marzo 1963, p. 13. 203 additional press aides to San José. In just a few days they produced 6,000 photos, 20 minute daily radio programs in English and Spanish transmitted on the VOA, and a 30 minute color documentary titled United in Progress. Pamphlets such as Los Presidentes
Hablan (The Presidents Speak), Kennedy en Central America (Kennedy in Central
America), and Cita Con el Destino (Date with Destiny) were quickly produced and distributed. One agency official in a neighboring country reported that he received information within 24 hours. The documentary United in Progress included scenes from a Central American market and stressed the need for economic growth. Kennedy’s arrival at the El Bosque housing project, via Marine One, was also recorded. Costa Rican citizens enthusiastically waved flags as the helicopter landed. The greeting JFK received did not seem to be appropriate for a president and diplomat, but more fitting of a conquering revolutionary.456
The final declaration of the conference included many passages on economic integration and social reform, but lacked any harsh language regarding Kennedy’s top priority of isolating Cuba.457 Yet, agreement was reached in San José that another conference would shortly take place to discuss the Cuban situation. That occurred in
April when Central American and U.S. officials met in Nicaragua. The meeting produced the Declaration of Managua which recommended each nation take several steps in order to stifle Cuban revolutionary ambitions and thwart subversive activities “instigated by
Castro-communist propaganda”458 One recommendation included that special permission
456 “United States Information Agency 20th Report to Congress,” January 1 – June 30, 1963, Edward R. Murrow Papers, Microfilm Collection, Reel 45, page 3-4; United in Progress, March 1963, United States Government Agencies, Accession Number 1-4, JFKL. 457Lee Hall, “We Will Build A Wall of Dedicated Men,” Life Magazine, March 19, 1963, p. 33. 458 “Declaracion de Managua,” Abril 3-4, 1963, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Convenios y Tratados, Signatura 201, AGNCOS. 204 was necessary for citizens to travel to Cuba. Also, signatory nations agreed to share any information related to Cuban propaganda efforts.
Image 18: Costa Rican President José Figueres.
Overall, U.S. public diplomacy towards Costa Rica during the Kennedy presidency had many successes. In particular, the USIA took advantage of Costa Rica’s relative modernity as compared to neighboring countries. The large number of televisions and radios in the county meant that news broadcasts, shows, and anti-Castro films could reach a wide and diverse audience. The extensive cultivation of students and laborers illustrated that the agency had a clear understanding of what were the most critical sectors of society. Most importantly, for U.S. policymakers, Fidel Castro found few inroads in
Costa Rica. In 1963 Costa Rican communist writer Fabian Dobles divulged to Cuban officials that their cause lacked support in his country. Particularly worrisome, due to the 205 low turnout at meetings the Sociedad de Amigos de la Revolución Cubana (Society of
Friends of the Cuban Revolution) changed their name, taking out any reference to
Cuba.459
Attempts to sell the Alliance for Progress benefited from the leadership of José
Figueres and Francisco Orlich, both of whom wholeheartedly supported the economic plan of development. Costa Rica used the Alliance for Progress as a means to better integrate its economy into international markets while newfound economic growth greatly aided in the development of the country.460 The high point of U.S. efforts occurred during Kennedy’s March 1963 visit. The trip was a good example of combining public diplomacy with concrete diplomatic objectives. It reinforced to Central American leaders just how popular the United States president was, while also cultivating a positive image among average Costa Ricans. This aided Kennedy in being able to push his agenda, which included the top goal of isolating Fidel Castro’s Cuba. By 1964 diplomats representing Havana concluded that conditions for revolution “are not ripe yet in Costa
Rica.” Class tensions needed to be heightened and more leftist elements had to be nurtured for the “development of a social revolution in the country.”461
Nicaragua
In contrast to Costa Rica, Nicaragua held striking similarities to pre-Castro Cuba.
Along with a long-running dictatorship and widespread inequality was a history with U.S.
459 “Informe Sobre la Entrevista Realizada al Companero Fabian Dobles, de Costa Rica Invitado a los Actos del X Aniversario del 26 de Julio, Miembro del Partido Vanguardia Popular (Comunista) President de la Delegacion de Dicho Pais,” 28 de Agosto 1963, A. Latina, Costa Rica, Ordinario, 1962-1979, MINREX. 460 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Costa Rica, Asunto: Informe Político, 14 de Mayo 1963, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 161, AGNCOL. 461 “Costa Rica, Analisis de la Situacion Actual,” 20 de Marzo 1964, A. Latina, Costa Rica, Ordinario, 1962-1979, MINREX. 206 imperialism. In fact, U.S. military occupations during the early 20th century helped propel the Somoza dynasty to power. In order to maintain a stable Nicaragua, a possible site for a second Central American canal, U.S. troops occupied the country from 1912 to
1925. During that time conservative Nicaraguan leaders such as Adolfo Diaz, Emiliano
Chamorro, and Diego Manuel Chamorro earned the support of the United States. After more than a decade of occupation U.S. forces left believing the conservatives could preserve stability. When anti-U.S. Nicaraguan nationalists launched a series of attacks in
1926 the United States intervened again and another six-year occupation commenced.
This time though Washington was willing to work with both conservatives and liberals to keep the peace, but as Nicaraguan expert Thomas Walker writes, “The importance of this period [1927-1933] lies much less in the individuals who happened to occupy the presidency than in the fact that, during these six years, forces were being shaped that were to have a powerful and paradoxical impact on Nicaragua for at least the next half century.”462 Those forces included the rise of revolutionary Augusto César Sandino and the creation of an organized threat to U.S. interests. Sandino, dismayed at the lack of willingness among local political leaders to stand up to the United States, established his base in the northeast of the country and led a protracted guerilla war against U.S. forces and their Nicaraguan allies. A second key outcome from the 1927-1933 period was the
United States decision to train a Nicaraguan force capable of repelling internal rebellions.
The Guardia Nacional (National Guard) became an important military and political institution in Nicaragua. Though supposedly apolitical, the Guardia soon became intricately tied to the ambitions of General Anastasio Somoza García. When U.S. marines
462 Thomas Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), 21. 207 left in early 1933 they placed the Guardia under the control of Somoza, who used it to accumulate power. He had Sandino assassinated in 1934 and became president in
1937. As a result, Walker notes that “an elitist dictatorial system based on a symbiotic relationship between the now corrupted and thoroughly politicized National Guard and the Somoza family had come into being.”463
Anastasio Somoza cultivated close relations with both Washington and elites in
Nicaragua. U.S. policymakers appreciated the stability Somoza provided while select local actors benefited economically from policies that precluded anything close to an equitable distribution of Nicaragua’s wealth. A 1950 pact with conservative leader
Emiliano Chamorro allowed Somoza to continue ruling with no opposition while conservatives received a guarantee that they would be included in the cabinet, legislature, and judiciary.464 The agreement did not erase all opposition; Somoza’s close relations with the United States and anti-democratic rule proved too much for some. In the fall of
1956 poet Rigoberto López Pérez wrote to his mother that “seeing that all efforts to return Nicaragua to being (or to becoming for the first time) a free country without shame or stain have been futile, I have decided that I should be the one to try to initiate the beginning of the end of this tyranny.”465 Only a few days after leaving the note, on
September 21, Rigoberto shot Anastasio Somoza in León, Nicaragua. The fallen ruler was flown to a hospital in the Panama Canal Zone where he died almost a week later.
463 Ibid, 23. 464 Michael Gambone, Eisenhower, Somoza, and the Cold War in Nicaragua, 1953-1961 (Westport, Connecticut, 1997), 52. 465 John Brentlinger, The Best of What we Are: Reflections on the Nicaraguan Revolution (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), 347. 208 Another Somoza and the Rise of the Sandinistas
Louis Somoza Debayle succeeded his father and had several critical issues to confront. The Cuban Revolution soon exacerbated anti-Somoza activities in Nicaragua.
When Castro took power in Havana La Prensa reported that fireworks littered Managua’s skyline and cries of “Viva Cuba” and “Viva Fidel” could be heard. Kenneth Morris notes that “Nicaraguans immediately threw themselves into a rash of revolutionary action.”466
Somoza Debayle struggled to handle such widespread unrest. University students were a particular concern. In July 1959 students protested the government at the National
University in León. The Guardia Nacional responded with violence and four students were killed. Over 12,000 people marched in a funeral procession for the martyred students. Survivors took on the title the “Generation of ‘59” and observances in memory of the fallen were frequent occurrences in the following years.467 Rather than taking student grievances seriously, and in an attempt to establish some campus support,
Somoza Debayle created the Universidad Centroamericana (Central American
University) located in Managua to act as a counterweight to the National University in
León. The government also began fine tuning its intelligence collection activities. Along with the Guardia Nacional existed the Oficina de Seguridad Nacional (Office of National
Security), and within the presidency the Secretaria de Informacion y Prensa (Secretary of
Information and the Press). These agencies coordinated information regarding possible subversive and revolutionary activities.468
466 Kenneth Morris, Unfinished Revolution: Daniel Ortega and Nicaragua’s Struggle for Liberation (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2010), 28. 467 Morris, Unfinished Revolution, 28; U.S. Ambassador in Nicaragua Aaron Brown to the Department of State, July 24, 1961, Decimal File 717.00/7-2461, RG 59, NARA. 468 Memoranda, Secretaria de Informacion y Prensa a Vice-Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, January 14, 1960, Fondo, Presidencia, Expediente 8, Caja 41, AGNNIC. 209 Anti-Somoza activity was not confined only to León. The city of Matagalpa also became a place for burgeoning revolutionaries. Carlos Fonseca, a young student member of the Partido Socialista Nicaragüense (Socialist Party of Nicaragua, PSN) was so inspired by Fidel Castro’s message that he left Matagalpa for Havana in early 1959. In
Cuba anti-Somoza Nicaraguans like Fonseca and Rodolfo Romero, a friend of Che
Guevara’s from their days in Guatemala, received training and financial support.469 Only a few months later Fonseca, along with several Cubans, was on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border preparing to begin guerilla operations inside Nicaragua. In June the Guardia
Nacional and Honduran forces ambushed the group just inside Nicaragua near the
Honduran town of El Chaparral.470 Fonseca recalled that “it wasn’t a battle, it was the most terrible of massacres.”471 Cuban Onelio Hernandez Tano perished in the fighting and the Castro government quickly worked to recover his body. Officials in Havana also received word that Fonseca had been wounded.472
Soldiers from Honduras took control of the survivors and allowed for safe passage to Havana for those wishing to go to Cuba. The PSN wanted its members to return to
Nicaragua but Fonseca demurred, not for concerns over his safety but because he now believed that the party would never be willing to launch a “real” revolution against the
Somoza dictatorship. Rigoberto Palma, a PSN member who led operations in Honduras
469 Anderson, Che Guevara, 396-397. 470 Alejandro Martínez Sáenz, “Comandante Martínez,” in When the Ak-47s All Silent: Revolutionaries, Guerillas, and the Dangers of Peace, ed. Timothy Brown (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press Publication, 2000), 72. 471 Matilde Zimmerman, Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 55. 472 “Correspondencia cursada entre la embajada de Cuba en Tegucigalpa, Honduras y el Depto. de Asuntos Generales referente a solicitud de informacion sobre situacion del cadaver de joven cubano que result muerto en la massacre del Chaparral, Honduras,” 19 de Octubre 1959, expediente 874, legajo 47, fondo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, AGNC. 210 recalled that the party ordered all members to return home, “I came to Managua, and he [Fonseca] returned to Cuba.” Fonseca biographer Matilde Zimmerman writes that “the victory of the Cuban Revolution convinced Carlos Fonseca that revolution was possible and that a new organization was needed to lead it.”473
Image 19: Map of Nicaragua.
Castro’s Cuba continued to monitor the prospects for revolution in Nicaragua, continually receiving reports from groups seeking sponsorship. In September 1960 a collection of anti-Somoza movements reached out to the new government in Havana pleading for more support, writing that “Cuba, only you are able to help us in our
473 Ibid, 57. 211 fight.”474 Other letters received by the Castro regime demonstrated that while the conditions for unrest, lack of agrarian reform, right-wing authoritarianism, and gross human rights violations, existed in Nicaragua, local groups were not ready to lead. Frente
Revolucionario Sandino (FRS), a group that received limited assistance from Che
Guevara, wrote to Havana that Somoza’s Guardia Nacional proved to be a formidable opponent and that Cuba needed to “keep in mid that the struggle will be long…refrain from attempting decisive action at an untimely period.”475 Furthermore, the Castro regime grew tired of so many disparate revolutionary groups operating in Nicaragua.
Victory over Somoza required unity. In 1961 several prominent revolutionary figures received orders to meet in Havana.476 There, Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás
Borge, all former members of the PSN, agreed to coalesce around a new group, the
FSLN. Thomas Walker argues that “they were determined to create an authentically
Nicaraguan revolutionary movement, based on the tactics and sociopolitical objectives of
Augusto César Sandino.”477
As early as 1962 the Somoza government knew of Fonseca’s emerging group.
Internal communications from the Office of National Security demonstrate that Fonseca along with Borge were leading a new movement that sought to spark a revolution in
Nicaragua.478 Somoza did nothing to dampen revolutionary fervor. In fact, his actions
474 La Pedraja, Wars of Latin America, 81; “Puntos del Moviemiento Revolucionario Nicaraguense,” 10 de Septiembre 1960, América Latina, Nicaragua, 1905-1963, Ordinario, MINREX. 475 “Analisis de las Particularidades Nicaraguaenses y Estrategia General para la Luch Guerrillera, del Frente Revolucionario Sandino,” November 1960, América Latina, Nicaragua, 1905-1963, Ordinario, MINREX. 476 José Obidio "Pepe" Puente León, “The Living Link,” When the Ak-47s All Silent: Revolutionaries, Guerillas, and the Dangers of Peace, ed. Timothy Brown, 28-29; LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 165. 477 Thomas Walker, Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 4th ed,. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 40. 478 “Memoranda, Oficina Seguridad Nacional para Casa Presidencial,” 1962, Ubicación Física LSD D1094, IHNCA. 212 fueled more unrest. Fonseca was imprisoned in 1964 and during this time composed his well-known manuscript, Desde la Carcel Yo Acuso a la Dictaruda (From Prison, I
Accuse the Dictatorship). He listed the government killings that took place in Nicaragua from the late 1950s into the 1960s and called for a “new generation” of leaders to take power in Nicaragua.479 This document went on to galvanize many young Nicaraguans.
Image 20: Artistic depiction of Sandinista founder Carlos Fonseca.
Capturing the Revolution
An emerging revolutionary movement in the FSLN and the harsh tactics employed to keep power by Somoza made the Kennedy administration’s goal of winning hearts and minds in Nicaragua all the more difficult. In March 1961 the USIA reported a rise in anti-U.S. and pro-Castro sentiment, going as far as to caution that “in some segments of the population the tide is definitely against us.”480 The agency requested an increase in the public diplomacy budget and more staff. Yet, the addition of more
479 Talleres de Historia, Cuaderno No. 4, La Dictadura Somocista. Carlos Fonseca, Desde la Carcel Yo Acuso a la Dictaruda, July 8, 1964, Ubicación Física TH-4, IHNCA. 480 “Assessment Report,” March 28, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 213 resources could not cure the underlying issue; the United States hoped to sell a vision of democratic reform and economic progress in a country where a family dynasty ruled and high standards of living were only for the privileged elite.
In September the USIA cabled to Washington a more detailed view of the current situation in Nicaragua and proposed programs of action for the coming year. They charged that democratic institutions in Nicaragua were basically non-existent. Luis
Somoza Debayle stated that he was in favor of representative reforms but did little to nothing in terms of making changes. The Guardia Nacional, under the control of
Somoza’s brother Anastasio, kept the peace and constantly dealt with the threat of revolutionary upheaval. During the summer of 1961 a “state of siege” was declared throughout the country as sporadic fighting erupted.481 These were becoming more and more common in Nicaragua. The government harassed anyone suspected of anti-Somoza activity up and censored any opposition newspapers.482
Along with risk of political instability, the social reality in Nicaragua greatly affected USIA operations. This was clear in the 1962 Country Plan. Agency officials wrote that “Nicaragua, obviously, has no shortage of economic and social problems.
Furthermore, Castro-communist propaganda efforts directed at a backward and gullible population, together with the tide of rising expectations evident everywhere in Latin
America today, are expected to exacerbate the situation in the immediate future.”483 In a predominantly rural society, with astonishing illiteracy rates, radio was the best medium
481 “Country Plan 1962,” September 11, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 482 Clifford Staten, The History of Nicaragua (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Press, 2010), 65. 483 “Country Plan 1962,” September 11, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 214 to reach the population living outside cities such as Managua, Granada, and León.
Television was in a “primitive” stage so mobile viewing units were routinely utilized. It was clear who the primary targets for public diplomacy needed to be. Generally understood in Washington was that privileged Nicaraguans were by and large friendly towards the United States. This would include the Somoza family and those who benefited from their rule. As for university students, teachers, and campesinos, the United
States had some work to do.
A central goal included gaining influence at the National University located in
León. Officials hoped to “reinvigorate the León binational center through relocation, expansion of activities, and the assignment of an American Center Director.” Gaining access allowed for more pamphlets covering different elements of life in the United
States to be printed and distributed along with “unattributed anti-Castro and anti- communist pamphlets and leaflets.” Select students at the National University, those with leadership qualities, received scholarships to attend English classes at the binational center. Officials hoped that two students from the United States would take classes on the campus of the National University. These sorts of exchanges offered the opportunity to foster an atmosphere of trust and understanding. Also, any U.S. government sponsored speakers, musicians, or artists traveling to Nicaragua would have León added to their itinerary.484
Reaching and influencing the Nicaraguan peasantry required the USIA to implement a range of strategies. Radio programs, pamphlet distribution, and person-to- person contacts were all utilized. In each case they had the same goal of emphasizing that
484 Ibid. 215 the United States cared about individual welfare as shown through the Alliance for
Progress and that “Castro-communism offers no solution to the problems of the campesino.” Fifteen-minute radio spots promoting the Alliance for Progress along with a program specifically designed for farmers wives received airplay. Literate peasants received anti-Castro reading materials. Where roads permitted, U.S musicians would be sent, “Especially if the artists are accompanied by a USIS [A] employee able to talk informally about Alianza Para El Progreso projects and other program themes.” The
Catholic Church proved useful as well. When numerous campesinos traveled to Managua for a mass celebration, the USIA distributed 10,000 leaflets condemning Fidel Castro’s persecution of Catholic clergy in Cuba. One of the more resourceful ideas was to develop a relationship with “market women” who sold goods along the streets or at Nicaragua’s markets. Policymakers reasoned that the women came in close contact with farmers looking to sell their produce and other urbanites in Managua. After establishing contact with the unofficial leader, weekly film viewings were set up for groups. Initially, all such
U.S. propaganda dealt with civic responsibility or “how to” pamphlets, but the agency noted that “as time goes on…we expect to place more anti-Castro and pro-U.S. material, which can be expected eventually to reach the campesino audience.”485 Even with such efforts, the problem of landless peasants was not soon going to subside. The government did very little while angst among campesinos continued to increase. Again, the
Nicaraguan government’s unwillingness to institute any meaningful changes hampered
485 “Assessment Report,” March 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 216 outreach. Improving the lives of exploited and impoverished campesinos was not a high priority for the Somoza family.486
While radio programming and pamphlet distribution proved essential, U.S. policymakers in Managua still believed that a concerted effort to increase Nicaragua’s literacy rate was necessary. They wrote that “it is the consensus of the country team that greatly improved education at every level is one of the most pressing needs if Nicaragua is to evolve into a more democratic nation able to continue development under the
Alianza Para El Progreso.”487 Promoting reading provided both difficulties and opportunities. The Somoza government supplied few materials to secondary schools. This meant that the USIA needed a concentrated effort if they hoped to have a real effect. At the same time, the United States had much freedom in choosing what texts made it into
Nicaraguan libraries and schools. Washington had much leeway outside cities where officials acknowledged that U.S. efforts “constitute the main part of the rural reading diet, thereby doing a service to the education program while at the same time advancing our foreign policy objectives.”488 Agency officials quickly realized that the attempt to fundamentally alter primary school education could be obstructed by the inability, or unwillingness, of the Somoza regime to push reform. The Ministry of Public Education earned the reputation as being as completely incompetent, and USIA officials sought to go around ministry officials and work directly with individual schools.489 Moreover, the
Somoza government not only ignored basic educational needs, but also refused to pay a
486 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Nicaragua, Asunto: Envío Informe Económico, 2 de Abril 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 652, AGNCOL. 487 “Country Plan 1962,” September 11, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 488 Ibid. 489 “Assessment Report,” March 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 217 decent wage to educators. The lack of attention given to educators became a major issue when during the summer of 1962 the Federación Sindical de Maestros de
Nicaragua (Union Federation of Nicaraguan Teachers, FSMN) launched a massive protest called Operacion Justicia (Operation Justice) against the government. Composed of twenty-seven teachers unions from across the country the FSMN demanded an increase in salary for all teachers. A three-month strike ensued, critically hampering any
USIA or USAID efforts.490 Initially, Somoza cast the protesters as communists but the work stoppage concluded in August when he relented and raised teacher pay.
In an attempt to both curb domestic opposition and placate the United States,
Somoza began implementing political reforms. He reinstated freedom of the press and advocated a minimum wage law for workers.491 In the most dramatic concession he vowed not to run in a scheduled 1963 presidential election and put his support behind
Foreign Minister and Partido Liberal Nacionalista (Liberal Party, PLN) candidate René
Schick. Though not on the ballot, Somoza Debayle campaigned throughout the country in defense of the PLN, constantly attempting to tie his government to the will of the people.
When not speaking in public he took his message to the radio airwaves.492 These moves earned him praise from some U.S. embassy officials in Managua who viewed Somoza
Debayle as a moderate political actor open to reform.493 Yet, documents from
490 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Nicaragua, Asunto: Envío Informe Económico, 5 de Enero 1962. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 652, AGNCOL; Miguel De Castilla, “50 años del movimiento operación justicia,” El Nuevo Diario, Managua, Nicaragua, available from Nuevo Diario. 491 Mark Everingham, Revolution and Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 58. 492 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Nicaragua, Asunto: Envío Informe Político, 5 de Enero 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 652, AGNCOL. 493 Oral History, James Engle, August 1, 1988, FAOC; Oral History, Robert Service, February 24, 1998, FAOC. 218 Nicaragua’s National Archive and other Latin American repositories portray a leader only concerned with his regime’s image and holding onto power. Somoza Debayle viewed the expansion and advancement of representative government in Central America as a direct threat, continually branding liberal reformers as communists. When Costa Rica succeeded in holding a free and fair election in 1962 he labeled the winner Francisco
Orlich as the communist candidate.494 Furthermore, in June of that year when Alliance for Progress Coordinator Theodore Mosoco visited neighboring El Salvador to praise their social and political reforms, Somoza Debayle worried that U.S. commendation would cast Nicaragua in a negative light. The Nicaraguan Ambassador in San Salvador received inquiries as to whether or not the U.S. official might publicly discuss
Nicaraguan politics. Somoza Debayle’s concern was that any public condemnation would receive much publicity in regional newspapers. The ambassador cabled home that
Mosoco would not make any public judgment regarding the Somoza regime’s political nature; he was wrong.495 Whether he desired his words to be printed is debatable, but
Nicaragua’s La Prensa reported that Mosoco called the Guardia Nacional leader
Anastasio Debayle an “obstacle” to free elections. He also cast the Somoza family and other Nicaraguan elites as impediments to economic growth.496
Improving an Image
By 1962 the USIA reported some successes in its campaign to win support from hesitant Nicaraguans. In March, shortly after Somoza’s announcement that he would not
494 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Nicaragua, Asunto: Envío Informe Político, 6 de Marzo 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 652, AGNCOL. 495 Departamento Diplomatico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, San Salvador, June 14, 1962, Fondo, Presidencia, Expediente 8, Caja 41, AGNNIC. 496 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Nicaragua, Asunto: Envío Informe Económico, 3 de Julio 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 652, AGNCOL. 219 seek the presidency, the agency noted that relations between the U.S. embassy and administrators and students at the National University in León had greatly improved.
Following anti-U.S. protests in 1960, which included the burning the U.S. ambassador in effigy, there existed little to no contact between the two. The improved relationship was partly the result of personal relationships. A new USIA PAO assigned to León worked tirelessly to form bonds with key individuals. Meetings, luncheons, and formal gatherings helped produce a better understanding of intentions on both sides. The Director of the
School of Journalism became a close personal friend of the new PAO, while the Director of the School of Education, purported to previously be anti-U.S., started to request USIA materials on a regular basis. The León binational center benefited from these improvements as more students from the National University signed up for classes and utilized center materials on a more regular basis. Enrollment quickly increased from only six to eighty-five. In an interesting side-note, an agency official wrote the following, “It should be pointed out that once we established a program in León, we deliberately kept it low-key to allay student suspicions and prevent anti-U.S. demonstrations. Having come to a reasonable understanding with the Rector and administration, our aim during the period was to lay the groundwork for a more hard-hitting anti-Castro, anti-communist program.”
Along with a new PAO in León was a new U.S. ambassador. Aaron Brown went to Managua in 1961 and immediately made it a priority to bridge the divide between conservatives and liberals while promoting moderation in government leaders. Informal dinners for members of both parties hosted by the United States took place and Brown 220 constantly sought out meetings with moderate political elements in the country.497 He also had specific orders since, as one historian noted, “President Kennedy instructed his ambassador to Nicaragua…to distance the embassy from the regime, and Brown made every effort to do so.”498 The Somoza family would not be included in major public events sponsored by the embassy. Brown, like Ambassador Raymond Telles in Costa
Rica, often traveled throughout the country to remote areas and the USIA made sure to publicize development efforts. It became policy that “whenever possible, USIA gives advance, detailed publicity to U.S. loans, grants and Alianza projects in an attempt to get the facts to the public before the government can make the financial assistance appear to be a reaffirmation of U.S. faith in the Somoza regime”499 When an AFL-CIO delegation planned on giving the Somoza family an award for its labor efforts, U.S. officials in
Managua strenuously objected. Richard Melton, a U.S. Labor Officer, argued that it
“would be a disaster for the U.S. image and the course of democracy in Nicaragua.”500
Being seen as less tied to the corrupt Somozas offered the U.S. a much better chance of reaching workers, students, and all segments of Nicaraguan society.
Even with those gains the run-up to the election of 1963 negatively affected U.S. public diplomacy in Nicaragua. U.S. officials in Managua considered political uncertainty the greatest obstacle to economic growth. Widespread unrest offered the possibility of jeopardizing Alliance for Progress programs and goals. Simultaneously, the political parties vying for power also affected U.S. attempts to promote a pro-
497 Oral History, James Engle, August 1, 1988, FAOC. 498 Poe Clark Jr. The United States and Somoza, 1933-1956, A Revisionist Look (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 204. 499 “Assessment Report,” March 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 500 Oral History, Richard Melton, January 27, 1977, FAOC. 221 development message. Fernando Agüero, the Partido Conservador Tradicionalista
(Traditionalist Conservative Party, PCT) candidate, disparaged the Alliance for Progress as a program that only aided the Somoza regime. During a public rally Agüero condemned Kennedy as simply following the policies of the past in supporting dictatorial regimes. This line of criticism was not without merit as one U.S. official later conceded that “all assistance tended to feed into the Somoza system making it difficult to separate economic development assistance from support of the Somoza regime.”501 It also did not help that the Somoza regime continually sought to demonstrate a close Nicaragua-U.S. friendship. The pro-regime paper Novedades consistently published articles lauding the
U.S. appreciation of the Nicaraguan leadership. The positive coverage included a front- page story during the election season regarding the speech of Anastasio Somoza
Debayle’s, head of the Guardia Nacional and brother of the president, at his alma mater
West Point. A U.S. congressman put the address into the Congressional Record and
Novedades ran the headline, “The U.S. honors Nicaragua in the person of Gen.
Somoza.”502 Though Louis Somoza Debayle promised free and fair elections in 1963 he refused to allow any international election observers to “violate” Nicaraguan sovereignty and oversee the results. As a consequence, many conservative candidates boycotted the election.503 The victory of René Schick did little to quell protests over the Somoza dictatorship; it was still clear who ran the country.
501 Ibid. 502 U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, March 8, 1962, Decimal File 817.00/3-862, RG 59, NARA; U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, April 6, 1962, Decimal File 717.00 (W)/4-662, RG 59, NARA. 503 U.S. Ambassador in Nicaragua Aaron Brown to the Department of State, September 11, 1961, Decimal File 717.00/9-1161, RG 59, NARA; Mauricio Solaún, U.S. Intervention and Regime Change in Nicaragua (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 73. 222 For all of the United States public diplomacy efforts in Nicaragua, an obvious barrier still existed—the Somoza regime. Though the government attempted to appear to be in full cooperation with the Alliance for Progress whenever possible, little progress in terms of real development was ever achieved. In August 1963 President Schick delivered an address to commemorate the second anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. Lauding the program’s goals, he declared that his government promoted vast advances in education, housing, and economic development. The Nicaragua government, in concert with the United States, also periodically published brief pamphlets exhorting its achievements. In 1966 Adelanto en Nicaragua: 5 Años de la Alianza Para el Progresso
(Advancement in Nicaragua: 5 Years of the Alliance of Progress) showed pictures of progress accompanied by short explanations that attempted to portray the nation as a place under total transformation.504
Even with impressive per capita growth rates of 4 percent annually during the
1960s, the economic gains did not reach most Nicaraguans.505 The Somoza family channeled Alliance for Progress funds to build up Nicaragua’s export capacity, particularly in the beef market. An increase in cattle production coupled with the rise of fast food chains in the United States allowed Nicaraguan beef exports to grow exponentially; from $3 million in 1960 to $44.5 million by 1973.506 Yet, the bounty of this growth stayed at the top. The Somozas controlled the only plants able to export
504 René Schick, Nicaragua y la Alianza Para el Progreso, Managua, August 1963, Ubicación Física, 352.238 N583ab, IHNCA; Adelanto en Nicaragua: 5 Años de la Alianza Para el Progresso in Nicaragua, 1961-1966, 1966. Ubicación Física, 341.759 C574, IHNCA. 505 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 158. 506 Rose Spalding, Capitalists and Revolution in Nicaragua: Opposition and Accommodation, 1979-1993 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 38. 223 Nicaraguan beef. Furthermore, calls for land redistribution went largely ignored; only a little over one thousand campesinos benefited from the regime’s agrarian reform.507
In reality, the Nicaraguan government, in concert with local elites, hindered any reform movements. Foreign observers also noted that the Somoza government’s lack of an economic policy created a very difficult situation. The Colombian ambassador in
Managua wrote back to Bogotá that both the disordered nature of the Nicaraguan bureaucracy and the unwillingness to push economic reform hampered any significant improvements. Even with foreign aid, like the kind given through the Alliance for
Progress, there was very little local support among leaders for change. The absence of tax reform, or even a willingness to discuss the issue, starkly represented the lack of progress. Bankers, industrialists, and those with much capital protested any changes to the tax system. Without meaningful changes the Alliance for Progress did not have any chance of success.508 Such unwillingness to implement reform made arguments by groups such as the FSLN gain more popularity and threatened to stifle any U.S. efforts at winning over Nicaragua’s students and peasant populations.
The Somozas’ disingenuous stance on issues relating to reform was not lost on
USIA officials in the field who wrote that “convincing students to take a positive approach, however, is easier said than done and we have no easy task ahead—as long as the Somoza regime is in power, we will more or less get tarred with the same brush since the U.S. is consistently blamed for supporting the regime.”509 Debates at the binational
507 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 158. 508 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Nicaragua, Asunto: Envío Informe Económico, 31 de Enero 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 652, AGNCOL. 509 “Assessment Report,” March 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 224 center in Managua between Nicaraguan students and U.S. officials often revolved around the role of the Guardia Nacional, with students arguing that it had too much power.510 When Ambassador Brown himself received questions from young political leaders as to why the United States did not do more to support efforts to replace Somoza, his response likely disappointed. He told them that Nicaragua was their country and “they would have to do all the heavy lifting.”511 For his part, Somoza Debayle consistently argued that any unrest from teachers or peasants was tied to a larger Castro conspiracy.
This excuse served him well at times with U.S. policymakers who were overly anxious about the possibility of another Cuba. The truth of the matter was that opposition to the
Somozas in the 1960s was unorganized and usually revolved around specific local grievances. The most organized protests occurred on particular dates. Pro-Castro signs could be seen in the capital city on May 1, 1962, International Worker’s Day. These types of rallies were made up of workers in Managua upset with factory conditions with little participation from other segments of society.512 Somoza used these sorts of occurrences to distract attention from his dictatorial rule and declare that Nicaragua faced a burgeoning threat from Fidel Castro. Other Latin American nations understood the danger of such a stance as Somoza was only fueling opposition in Nicaragua. The
Colombian Foreign Ministry recognized that the Somoza government needed to make significant reforms when it wrote that “in order to respond to the dangers in the
Americas, governments must create conditions that allow people to solve economic and
510 Oral History, Richard Melton, January 27, 1977, FAOC. 511 Ibid. 512 Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Nicaragua, Asunto: Informe Sobre Communism, 9 de Mayo 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 652, AGNCOL. 225 social problems: Nicaragua, rather than resorting to police tactics, needs a clear national policy that will defeat support of chaos and anarchy.”513
Image 21: Nicaraguan dictator Luis Somoza.
Conclusion
The contrasting outcomes in Costa Rica and Nicaragua illustrate just how important local conditions were for U.S. public diplomacy efforts. In Costa Rica the newly appointed Ambassador Raymond Telles used his energetic personable style to cultivate a close relationship with top government officials and important business leaders. This type of person-to-person diplomacy was critical in helping the USIA gain a foothold in local institutions such as one of country’s major newspapers in La Nacion. At
513 Memorandum, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia a Embajada en Nicaragua, 29 de Mayo, 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 652, AGNCOL. 226 the same time, television programs, radio broadcasts, and pamphlet distribution were all utilized to promote the U.S. message of economic growth through peaceful change.
Most importantly, Costa Rica had leaders willing to initiate social reform. Conservatives and liberals pushed Alliance for Progress programs and succeeded in creating a competent internal bureaucracy to administer reforms. The U.S. message was viewed alongside tangible changes. Costa Ricans not only heard about democracy, social reform, and an anti-Castro vision, they were able to see results. Free and fair elections coupled with economic growth aided the U.S. image among local Costa Ricans. The culmination of the public diplomatic effort occurred when President Kennedy visited San José and addressed several large crowds; local citizens were able to put a face to the emerging reform agenda.
While the administration succeeded in improving the level of U.S. outreach in
Nicaragua, the goal of building “a Wall of Dedicated Men” to isolate Cuba proved easier said than done. The history of U.S. interventionism and the Somoza regime’s complete lack of accountability to its citizenry added to the difficulty of winning over the people.
The mounting challenge to the family dynasty by the FSLN, which would finally erupt during the late 1970s, was already apparent as early as 1961. The refusal of Luis Somoza
Debayle to push real concrete social and economic change in Nicaragua hampered the
USIA message. Promoting democracy and social progress in a country where one family dominated political and economic life was a demanding task. Students and campesinos were less concerned about threats emanating from Havana than they were about the corruption and brutality coming from Managua. The USIA sought to work around the
Somoza government and distance itself whenever possible. While they earned some 227 success, public diplomacy functions best when it is aligned with local leadership.
Earning good relations with students and administrators at the National University in
León demonstrated what close personal contacts could achieve. Reaching out to campesinos and “market women” also provided the United States with a window into key segments of Nicaraguan society. However, as long as corruption and anti-democratic elements ran the country, selling a credible vision of peaceful democratic change was improbable. Yet, it would be too simple to put all of the failures on the political dynamics in Nicaragua. At times, U.S. public diplomacy failed to adequately convey the importance of democracy, both to the public and political leaders. Students, peasants, and laborers in Nicaragua were given enough propaganda to know that Fidel Castro, in the eyes of Washington, was a threat, but just what the United States really stood for remained an open question. Firm support of the Somoza family dynasty impeded the U.S. message of democratic and social reform. Such a contradiction allowed a movement such as the FSLN to thrive and ultimately triumph.
228 Chapter 5: Trying to make Peaceful Revolution Possible: Promoting Democracy
in Venezuela and Colombia
At a speech commemorating the 2nd anniversary of the Alliance for Progress in
March 1962, John Kennedy challenged Latin American leaders to embrace change. He declared that “those who possess wealth and power in poor nations must accept their own responsibilities. They must lead the fight for those basic reforms which alone can preserve the fabric of their societies. Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”514 As a result of large industrial bases, rising middle classes, and recent transitions to democratic government, U.S. leaders viewed
Venezuela and Colombia as potential prime examples for the entire region of what
Washington-led development could accomplish.515 At the same time, the fear of losing either country as an ally in the war against Fidel Castro became unthinkable in
Washington. For his part, Castro wanted to increase Cuban influence in South America, even making Venezuela his first foreign trip after taking power in Havana.
Making peaceful revolution possible was the central goal of U.S. foreign policy in
Venezuela and Colombia during the early 1960s. In order to achieve the objective of neutralizing Fidel Castro’s appeal and winning over public opinion, public diplomacy became the cornerstone of the U.S. approach. Rather than occupying a secondary position behind more traditional foreign policy approaches such as military assistance or state-to- state relations, information programs occupied a dominant role in the Kennedy administration’s policy towards the two countries.
514 “Address on the first Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress,” March 13, 1962, APP. 515 The combined populations of Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua in 1963 were just over 9 million, which barely eclipsed that of Venezuela. Colombia alone had 16 million inhabitants. These statistics are from Population Statistics, available from populstat. 229 The vast opportunities for change in Venezuela and Colombia centered on the fact that they shared a similar past. Military rule ended in both nations in 1958 and liberal reformers Rómulo Betancourt and Alberto Lleras Camargo gained power in Caracas and
Bogotá, respectively, through elections. These men became champions of the Alliance for
Progress and cultivated a close relationship with the Kennedy administration. When John
Kennedy told aide Richard Goodwin that “Latin America’s not like Asia or Africa…We can really accomplish something there,” he was most assuredly referring to countries like
Venezuela and Colombia.516 Emerging democracies with socially minded reformers in power had all of the ingredients for modern liberal societies.
In Venezuela the United States implemented a public diplomacy strategy focused on cultural exchange, influencing key segments of society such as students, teachers, labor, campesinos, and supporting the Betancourt government. U.S. officials argued that failure in Venezuela would open the door to revolt in all of South America. Kennedy and
Betancourt talked regularly over the phone on a direct line from the White House to the
Venezuelan leader’s office at Miraflores. As a sign of Venezuela’s growing importance,
Kennedy dispatched Teodoro Mosoco, the first coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, as the U.S ambassador to Caracas. Along with high-level diplomatic moves, cultural exchanges and USIA information output greatly increased. Most notably, William
Faulkner made a two-week trip to Venezuela in 1961 where he received an award from the Ministerio de Educación (Ministry of Education).
Regarding Colombia, Alberto Lleras Camargo’s administration stood as the standard for what Washington envisioned for all of Latin America. Adolf Berle grouped
516 Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need is Love, 65; Richard Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice from the Sixties (New York: Little Brown Company, 1988), 148 230 Lleras Camargo in with other Latin American leaders he referred to as the
“democratic progressive ‘New Deal’ movement.”517 As in Venezuela, students, labor, media, and campesinos became primary target groups. An important distinction in
Colombia included its demographic makeup. Several major urban areas had dense populations, which made it easier to disseminate information. Large binational centers in
Bogotá, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Cali, Cartagena, Medellin, and Popayan received increased attention during the Kennedy years. The existence of these population centers allowed the USIA to have several “bases” within Colombia. In order to reach these audiences, the agency invested many resources in producing films covering Colombia’s path to development and the necessity of democracy. To aid in the dissemination of movies, the agency made extensive use of mobile film viewing units. These vehicles traveled frequently to barrios, screening USIA materials for an untold number of
Colombians.
Ultimately, historian Stephen Rabe’s contention that “President Kennedy and his advisors valued stability and anticommunism over the rule of law in Latin America,” does not stand up when examining U.S. information operations in Venezuela and
Colombia.518 The promotion of democracy stood at the core of U.S. public diplomacy in both nations. Though the United States developed a vibrant anti-Castro program, officials spent more time focused on harnessing emerging democratic projects and making them an example for the entire region. It was no coincidence that Kennedy traveled to both
Caracas and Bogotá. Whereas despots and dictators stymied many of the U.S. goals in
517 Richard Gott, Guerilla Movements in Latin America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 133-134. 518 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 124. 231 Central America, fertile ground existed in Venezuela and Colombia for the possibility of peaceful revolutions.
Venezuela
As the birthplace of Latin American independence hero Simón Bolivar,
Venezuela had a long tradition of revolutionary upheaval and political change. While decades of caudillo rule characterized much of the country’s early history, the immediate post-World War II period witnessed a democratic movement. Following the end of military rule in 1945, a Revolutionary Government Junta, formed by members of the political party Acción Democratica (Democratic Action, AD), took power. Led by
Rómulo Betancourt, a former communist whose politics moved to the center by the late
1940s, Adecos implemented a liberal reform agenda. Its policies included a tax levied on the powerful oil industry as well as more political freedoms for labor unions. In 1945 only a little over 250 organized unions existed but that number increased to over 1,000 just three years later. As a result, workers became a key constituency of AD’s political program.
Betancourt also proved to be a strong proponent of democratic rule. He pushed for a presidential election in 1947 and refused to run himself since the newly crafted
Venezuelan constitution barred members of the ruling junta from participating in the first contest. That decision helped earn him the title of “The Father of Venezuelan
Democracy.” AD’s candidate, novelist and poet Rómulo Gallegos, won with over 70 percent of the vote. Even with such large support the party drew the ire of many
Venezuelans. As Anthropologist Fernando Coronil writes, “The expanding influence of the state and the use of its ample resources in a number of areas, however, created fears 232 that AD was monopolizing political power.”519 When AD pushed for a revamped education system that allowed public school teachers to be involved with private school education, parents, students, and the Catholic Church protested. Very quickly, the party withdrew the proposal and the Ministro de Educación (Minister of Education) resigned.
Accepting that they moved too quickly proved to be an exception, not the rule.520 In the majority of cases, AD pushed forward with consolidating power and implementing their program regardless of alienating important interest groups.
Image 22: Map of Venezuela.
519 Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 136. 520 Ibid, 136. 233 Such a combative ruling style ultimately produced widespread disaffection.
When Gallegos refused to allow the armed forces a more pronounced role in government affairs the military stepped in. Somewhat surprisingly, little resistance materialized as attempts by loyal AD supporters to generate a nationwide workers strike failed and
Betancourt quickly sought asylum within the Colombian embassy as Gallegos found himself under arrest. One Venezuelan succinctly summed up the events, “The government fell without a shot, without serious resistance, without massive protest in the streets, in the midst of a terrifying solitude, before a country that turned its indifferent back to everything that happened.”521 Betancourt resolved, from exile, that AD would return to power and continue reforming Venezuela. The brief interlude of democracy,
1945-1948, became known as El Trienio Adeco.
In the midst of the military intervention General Marcos Pérez Jiménez took power and later, in 1953, further consolidated control through a fraudulent election. He repressed any government opposition at universities, imprisoned political opponents, and drastically curtailed the rights of labor unions. At the same time, the military government embarked on a modernization program. The administration initiated major infrastructure projects and upgraded transportation systems, though it made few efforts to improve healthcare, education, and housing.522 Those closely allied with the Pérez Jiménez government made millions, while the vast majority of Venezuelans saw little progress in their everyday lives.
521 Coronil, Magical State, 143 522 Michael Tarver and Julia Frederick, The History of Venezuela (Wesport, CT: Greenwod Press, 2005), 98. 234 The United States gave Pérez Jiménez extensive support for his stern anticommunist stance and his government’s capacity to provide stability. U.S. officials worried about losing a strategic supply of oil if Venezuela became too chaotic.523
Throughout the 1950s Washington supplied over $30 million in credits for military hardware to Pérez Jiménez’s government. In October 1954 President Eisenhower awarded the Venezuelan leader the Legion of Merit, the highest U.S. award given to a foreigner. The dictator received praise for his “energy and firmness of purpose.”524Time
Magazine put Pérez Jiménez on its cover in 1955 and called him the “Skipper of the
Dreamboat,” alluding to Venezuela’s newfound prosperity.525 The tranquil façade propelled by the general’s allies and unquestioning stories such as Time’s proved to be false by the late 1950s as another military overthrow ousted Jiménez. Leaders from prominent Venezuelan political parties, with the support of the military, met and agreed to support a return to democracy. The Punto Fijo Pact, named after the home where the meetings took place, sought to institute a system of informal coalition governments. The parties agreed to hold a free and fair election in December 1958.
Rómulo Betancourt, now back in Venezuela, won with 49 percent of the vote.526
Adhering to the spirit of Punto Fijo, Betancourt appointed to his cabinet men from several political parties, business leaders, and members of the military. He immediately sought to fulfill promises to adhere to democratic rule and implement a reform agenda.
Yet, Betancourt’s approach differed greatly from the more confrontational stance he
523 Stephen Rabe, The Road to OPEC: U.S. Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 120. 524 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 39. 525 “Skipper of the Dreamboat,” Time Magazine, February 1955. 526 Judith Ewell, Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe’s Hemisphere to Petroleum’s Empire (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 166. 235 adopted during the 1940s. AD now sought to create a modern and more equitable society while not alienating important sectors of society. Betancourt worked in close cooperation with military leaders, the Catholic Church, and prominent oilmen. The military received new equipment, and its leaders had a voice in the administration.
Church activities earned government subsidies while Betancourt dismissed any discussions about nationalization of the oil industry. An agrarian reform law passed in
1960 stood at the center of his efforts. Betancourt signed the law in a field surrounding
Carabobo, Venezuela, the site of a crucial battle during the Latin American independence movement in the nineteenth century. Thousands of peasants gathered for the signing ceremony.527 Over several years, this plan distributed state owned land to over 200,000 families. However, the land reform measure passed in 1960 significantly differed from the previous attempt at redistribution during the Trienio. While AD had previously alienated large landholders, the 1960 law included centralized control and state compensation for anyone who had their land redistributed.528
Concerning foreign relations, Betancourt had a history, albeit brief, with Fidel
Castro. The young Cuban leader visited Caracas in January 1959, only weeks after
Batista’s overthrow. During that trip Betancourt initially lavished praise on Fidel, remarking that he “is a continental figure and his struggle as guerilla…only has precedent in those who liberated Cuba a little more than fifty years ago.” Yet, after hearing a public speech by Castro, Betancourt believed him to be too belligerent. He later remarked that
“the speech of the Cuban was more than an error, a provocation. He launched a virulent
527 John Duncan Powell, Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 109. 528 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 102. 236 diatribe against the armed forces of Latin America and little less than asked the firing squad for their officers.” The two leaders met briefly during the visit and discussed the future of U.S.-Latin American relations but agreed on nothing substantial. Castro pushed for economic assistance from Venezuela but Betancourt demurred.529
Image 23: Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt.
While Caracas initially sought cooperation with Havana, Cuban rhetoric made that difficult. In 1960 Che Guevara publicly scolded Betancourt and told students that
Venezuela did not have a true democracy. Less than two months later, Comandante
Rolando Cubela, a member of Cuba’s revolutionary government, again publicly rebuked the Venezuelan government. In both cases, Venezuela’s ambassador in Havana registered
529 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 541-542. 237 a protest of the comments as interventions into internal Venezuelan matters.530 By
1961 Betancourt’s patience with Cuba’s verbal assaults and support for guerilla movements ran out. The president broke relations with the revolutionary government, telling the Venezuelan Congress that Castro had no respect for “public freedoms and human dignity.”531
From Faulkner to Jackie
For the Kennedy administration Venezuela occupied an important position not eclipsed by any other Latin American nation. In the summer of 1961 USIA officials wrote that Venezuela stood as “the key Latin American nation in the struggle between democracy and communism.”532 Because of its vast oil wealth and burgeoning democracy the country offered many opportunities to become a modern and stable nation.
Yet, at the same time, reports indicated that over half of the population remained illiterate. For Venezuela to become an example for the rest of the hemisphere of what a capitalist-liberal-democracy could be, its social and political freedoms had to be shared by all. President Kennedy found a reliable ally and steadfast supporter of the Alliance for
Progress in Rómulo Betancourt. He consistently sought out the Venezuelan president’s thoughts on important inter-American issues and said publicly of Betancourt that he had
“all that we admire in a political leader.”533 The United States allotted $200 million in
530 “Memorandum, Embajada de Venezuela en Havana a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” 8 de Agosto 1960, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959-1969, MINREX; “Memorandum, Embajada de Venezuela en Havana a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba,” 31 de Octubre 1960, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959-1969, MINREX. 531 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 544. 532 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 533 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 99-101. 238 Alliance for Progress funds during the 1960s and strongly supported Venezuela gaining another $200 million from international organizations.534
Information agency programs based in Caracas attempted to influence
“Venezuelans, especially intellectuals and leaders in the fields of education and labor.”535
U.S. officials used the term “intellectuals” interchangeably with “opinion molders,” as both referred to individuals who had influence in the country. Local newspapers, radio stations, and television outlets received U.S. sponsored “Foreign Briefs en Espanol,” published on a monthly basis. Pamphlets attempting to explain U.S. foreign policy, as well as copies of President Kennedy’s inaugural and first State of the Union speech were also made available.536 The USIA hoped “to expand the image of the president and, through him, increase local understanding of the United States.” Promoting the Alliance for Progress became a major theme as the U.S. printed 30,000 pamphlets exclusively designed to sell the program. One million people watched President Kennedy deliver an
Alliance for Progress themed speech via television. Another 500,000 Venezuelans saw the president through mobile film units. Economic development messages broadcast in motion picture houses and during local television shows reached thousands more.537 In just a short time period, the USIA inundated Venezuelans with a pro-U.S. message.
One of the most effective methods of connecting with opinion molders, as well as the general public, included cultural exchanges involving prominent U.S. individuals. In
1961 noted author William Faulkner visited Caracas for a two-week stay after being
534 Giglio and Rabe, Debating the Kennedy Presidency, 51. 535 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 536 “Venezuela Country Plan FY-1962,” July 13, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 537 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 239 invited by the North American Association of Venezuela (NAAV). U.S. citizens living in Venezuela comprised this group and worked closely with the USIA. In fact, several USIA officers sat on the board of the NAAV and actively sought that he be invited.538 Once word reached Washington that the group extended an invitation, the
State Department offered their complete support to Faulkner during his trip. The decision to invite Faulkner most likely stemmed from the writer’s increasing influence among
Latin American literary figures. Regional authors such as Argentinean Luis Borges,
Colombian Gabriel García Márquez, Mexican Carlos Fuentes, and Peruvian Mario
Vargas Llosa greatly admired Faulkner’s writings. Moreover, by the 1960s Latin
American literature experienced a “boom” period.539
During his two-week stay, Faulkner delivered a speech at the Ministry of
Education, met with former President Gallegos and current President Betancourt, received an award, attended a Venezuelan music production, and visited the Venezuelan-
American center in Maracaibo on the coast.540 While the State Department believed it vitally important that such a popular author accepted a role in cultural diplomacy,
Faulkner did not. In a January 1961 personal letter he wrote that “the State Dept is sending me to Venezuela, unless by that time the new administration will have created an actual foreign policy, so that they won’t need to make these frantic desperate cries for help to amateurs like me who don’t want to go, to go to places like Iceland and Japan and
Venezuela to try and save what scraps we can.”541 Nevertheless, Faulkner trekked south
538 Ibid. 539 Deborah Cohn, The Latin American Literary Boom and U.S. Nationalism during the Cold War (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012). 540 Ibid, 123. 541 Lisa Hickman, William Faulkner and Joan Williams: The Romance of Two Writers (McFarland & Company: Jefferson, NC, 2006), 188-189. 240 in April 1961, and U.S policymakers viewed the trip as highly successful. After being presented with the Order of Andrés Bello, the most prestigious honor in Venezuela given to a civilian, Faulkner spoke about the desire of the artist as wanting to leave something durable and lasting behind. He concluded his remarks by stating that “I have received here in Venezuela the official accolade which says in effect, your dedication was not spent in vain.”542 A local periodical, El Universal, published his words the next day.
Entertainers at the Teatro Municipal (Municipal Theater) treated Faulkner to
“Danzas Venezuela,” a traditional music and dance production. The writer came away very impressed. He stated that “I saw the spirit & history of Venezuela caught and held for a moment in a bright and happy warm moment of grace and skill and happiness.”543
At the Venezuelan-American center in Maracaibo he received a bust of Don Quixote, carved by noted Venezuelan artist Marcelino Peña. Faulkner claimed to have read Miguel de Cervantes’s story at least once a year, “like other people read the bible.”544 When he shipped the sculpture back to Oxford, Mississippi, Faulkner attached a personal note to handle it with care as it “belonged to a very important person.”545 Ultimately, the USIA reported that “Mr. Faulkner materially extended the cultural relations of the United States with Venezuela. He charmed the people with his courtliness, integrity and courage. He captured headlines for weeks…USIS [A] mobilized to achieve the greatest possible propaganda mileage from the visit and, through Mr. Faulkner, increased the cultural
542 Louis Daniel Brodsky, William Faulkner, Life Glimpses (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), Appendix C. 543 Ibid, Appendix C. 544 Manuel Broncano, “Reading Faulkner in Spain, Reading Spain in Faulkner,” in Global Faulkner, Annette Trefzer and Ann Abadie, eds. (Oxford: University Press of Mississippi, 2009), 100. 545 Ibid, 100. 241 status of the United States.”546 Hugh Jencks, a State Department official and
Faulkner’s translator during the trip, echoed those sentiments when he prepared a report in 1962. He wrote that "the cultural leaders of Venezuela…tend to agree with the
Communist tenet that the United States is grossly materialistic, with no cultural achievements. To bring a literary figure of the stature of Faulkner to Venezuela was an effective refutation of this view.”547
Though a successful visit, more popular visitors soon eclipsed Faulkner’s trip a few months later when Air Force One touched down at Caracas’s Maiquetía International
Airport in December 1961. President Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy immediately received a warm welcome. Not everyone thought the trip a good idea though; the Secret Service worried about the delegation’s safety. Their reservations resulted from the reception given to Richard Nixon in 1958. Administration press assistant Sue Vogelsinger stated that “there was more than a little concern on the part of the Secret Service that something could indeed happen.”548 Aide Richard Goodwin cabled to Caracas in the weeks preceding the visit that perhaps all Catholic priests should include a message to their congregations pleading that the U.S. delegation be treated well.
Goodwin emphasized that Kennedy would not only be the first sitting president to visit
Venezuela, but also the first Catholic U.S. president.549 The church had no issues in aiding the Betancourt government or the United States. In fact, just a few months earlier,
546 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 547 Helen Oakley, “William Faulkner and the Cold War: The Politics of Cultural Marketing,” in Look Away! The U.S. South in New World Studies, eds. Jon Smith and Deborah Cohn (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 413. 548 Barbara Leaming, Mrs. Kennedy: The Missing History of the Kennedy Years (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 169. 549 Edward Martin, Kennedy and Latin America (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 360. 242 when Jose Humberto Quintero delivered his first mass after being appointed Cardinal, he dedicated it to telling his parishioners to oppose the regime of Fidel Castro. Quintero warned that revolutionary Cuba stood as a threat to all of Latin America. Parishes throughout Caracas read his message in May 1961 and El Nacional subsequently published his words. The Colombian ambassador to Venezuela cabled back to Bogotá that such a public declaration certainly “enhanced the position of President
Betancourt.”550
As the trip moved closer El Nacional ran numerous ads by prominent businesses welcoming the Kennedys along with articles lauding the U.S. president.551 Even with such public declarations of support for the visit, Venezuelan security forces worried about the possibility of another international incident. Chief of Security Dr. Carlos
Andrez Perez pledged to Kennedy aides, in pre-trip meetings, that the “president will be safe in Venezuela. I have taken the necessary steps.”552 Those steps included jailing thousands of anti-Betancourt and anti-U.S. political actors and stationing 20,000
Venezuelan soldiers in downtown Caracas. The individuals jailed included all major
Communist Party leaders and pro-Castro sympathizers. Betancourt later recalled that the imprisoned men received comfortable quarters with television sets and gained release immediately following the visit.553 A presidential message from Betancourt on December
12 reiterated that while Richard Nixon received “cold courtesy” in 1958, President
Kennedy’s new approach to Latin America deserved the people’s respect.554
550 “Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Venezuela a Bogotá,” 8 de Mayo 1961, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 820, Orden Numero 156, AGNCOL. 551 “Kennedy está en la Senda Política de Roosevelt,” El Nacional, 15 de Diciembre 1961, p. 34 552 Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), 167. 553 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 554. 554 Martin, Kennedy and Latin America, 360. 243 Upon landing it became immediately clear that the visit would not be like
Nixon’s. Maria Teresa Gianetta, a five-year-old who just months before received medical treatment sponsored by U.S. citizens living in Caracas, handed Jacqueline Kennedy flowers as she disembarked the plane.555 Very quickly the large crowd gathered for the arrival pushed closer to the rope line and Mrs. Kennedy quietly said aloud that “now we get the rotten eggs.” A young woman walking alongside her replied “No, Mrs. Kennedy, there will be no rotten eggs.” After a brief introduction, the First Lady realized President
Betancourt’s daughter Virginia had made the remark.556
During a short speech at the airport President Kennedy touched on a recurring theme in his inter-American policy, tying developmental programs to a past president fondly remembered in Latin America. He declared that “we are, in my country, committed in the 1960's to seeing the work which was so effectively begun in the 1930's in the Good Neighbor policy--to see it come to fruition in a whole series of free societies stretching from the north to the south…inhabited by free people who are gradually increasing their standard of living, educating their children, housing their families, finding work for their people and security for their old age.”557 JFK also spoke to the central crux of his administration’s goals for Latin America. By equating freedom with increased economic standards the president highlighted a central theme in modernization theory: development, over time, will produce stable democratic regimes. While speaking to embassy officials later that day, Kennedy explicitly discussed the stakes in trying to help improve the lives of Latin Americans, “Unless the United States is able to identify
555 Jacqueline, Si!, Boston Globe, December 17, p. 1. 556 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 554. 557 “Remarks Upon Arrival at Maiquetia Airport, Caracas, Venezuela,” December 16, 1961, APP. 244 itself with this cause successfully, then all of our great efforts for freedom are going to be of no avail.”558
The itinerary called for a motorcade through downtown to another airport and then a helicopter ride out of Caracas. Thousands lined up on the streets to welcome the
U.S. leader. Betancourt decided to roll down his window and shake hands with members of the crowd. Before long, he saw President Kennedy do the same.559 The excursion to a housing project and agrarian reform site located 50 miles outside of the capital allowed for an opportunity to reach an immensely important target group; campesinos. As Marine
One headed west the city streets disappeared and the Venezuelan countryside, an area that the United States hoped to transform, came into view for President Kennedy. The delegation arrived at a small village undergoing a $12 million dollar housing initiative funded by the AFP. There, Kennedy personally handed out housing deeds as Jackie and
President Betancourt shook the hands of Venezuelan well-wishers.560 At times,
Betancourt signaled for soldiers to stand down and allow the crowds to get close.
At the next stop, La Morita, a large billboard with both Betancourt and Kennedy’s picture greeted the delegation. In his remarks JFK again referenced FDR and lauded
President Betancourt as an example of good democratic leadership, “We today share the realization which President Roosevelt expressed in 1944, when he said that ‘true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence.’" He continued that “this program is at the heart of the Alianza para el Progreso, for no real progress is possible unless the benefits of increased prosperity are shared by the people
558 “Remarks to the Staff at the American Embassy in Caracas,” December 16, 1961, APP. 559 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 555. 560 Forging the Alliance-President Kennedy visits Venezuela and Colombia, December 1961, United States Government Agencies, Accession Number 1A, JFKL. 245 themselves.”561 JFK also officiated at an agrarian reform ceremony where he handed out land titles to over 80 Venezuelan families, shaking the hands of campesinos as they approached the wooden platform set up in a farming field. The highlight of the event, for many, took place when the president introduced the First Lady to deliver some brief remarks.562 In fluent Spanish Jackie declared that no father or mother could achieve true happiness until they know that their children have a bright future, “This must be for all, not for just a fortunate few.”563 Local stations broadcast the event throughout Venezuela and when she finished speaking the crowd erupted in applause.
Image 24: President Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy in La Morita,
Venezuela, 1961.
561 “Remarks at the La Morita Resettlement Project Near Caracas,” December 16, 1961, APP. 562 “Kennedy en La Morita: Eliminar las Tiranías es el Objectivo del Interamericanismo,” El Nacional, 17 de Diciembre 1961, p. 26. 563Jackie Delights Caracas, The Miami News, December 17, 1961, p. 1; It’s Jackie Si! As Caracas Salutes JFK, The Miami News, December 17,1961, p. 11. 246 The next day the New York Times wrote that “Mrs. Kennedy Speaks in
Spanish: Words Gets Biggest Cheer of Husband’s Venezuelan Trip.”564 The Miami News headline read that “Jackie Delights Caracas.” Another related story in that paper began
“It’s Jackie Si! As Caracas Salutes JFK.”565 Historian Stephen Rabe dismissed the event as a “photo opportunity,” a line of argumentation that fits nicely with a U.S.-centered view and completely ignores what the Kennedy’s presence meant for Venezuelans. 566 In reality, their appearance ranked as a public diplomacy coup. The crowd at La Morita echoed the positive U.S. news coverage with men, women, and children holding both
U.S. and Venezuelan flags cheering President Kennedy and the First Lady on their way back to the helicopter.567
While the Kennedy administration succeeded to a large degree in making the president’s trip a public diplomacy victory, they also made time for high level talks. On the evening of December 16 the presidents held bilateral discussions at Los Nunez,
Venezuela’s presidential residency. There, Kennedy had a lengthy discussion with
Betancourt regarding Fidel Castro’s Cuba. The United States hoped to earn OAS support in the very near future for sanctions against the island and JFK wanted to know where
Venezuela stood. The administration could not have been more welcoming of
Betancourt’s point of view. Not only did he agree completely with sanctioning Cuba, he had already begun the process of diplomatically pressuring Ecuador, Mexico, and
Argentina to do so as well. The Venezuelan leader also prodded Kennedy not to embark
564 “Mrs. Kennedy Speaks in Spanish: Words Gets Biggest Cheer of Husband’s Venezuelan Trip,” New York Times, December 17, 1961, p. 36. 565It’s Jackie Si! As Caracas Salutes JFK, The Miami News, December 17,1961, p. 11. 566 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 101. 567 Forging the Alliance-President Kennedy visits Venezuela and Colombia, December 1961, United States Government Agencies, Accession Number 1A, JFKL. 247 on any unilateral actions, akin to the Bay of Pigs. Aides in the meeting reported that
“at this point President Betancourt observed that any unilateral action against Cuba would destroy the inter-American system.” Part of Betancourt’s calculation likely stemmed from the reaction inside Venezuela from the U.S. led failed attempt to oust Castro. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion students led “extraordinary and massive” anti- imperialism protests throughout the country. The event also led influential leftist leaders in Caracas to take a more active role in better organizing support for Havana from within
Venezuela.568 Betancourt explained that the anti-Castro movement inside Cuba still needed to be supported and that Venezuela would do so “within its resources.”569
Lost on historians of inter-American relations, at times, is the fervor that reformers in Latin America during the 1960s had for upending dictatorships and supporting democracies. Much like José Figueres in Costa Rica, Betancourt had a democratic vision for the region, one that would not compromise with dictators as the
United States historically did. When coups later occurred in Guatemala and Honduras during 1963, Betancourt became one of the most outspoken critics of the United States for recognizing military regimes.570 President Kennedy’s last public event in Venezuela occurred on Sunday morning December 17. As it happened, that day was the 131st anniversary of Simón Bolívar’s death and JFK placed a wreath at the tomb of
Venezuela’s national hero. Once again, large crowds gathered to catch a glimpse of the
568 “Solidaridad del Pueblo en Relacion con la Agresion Imperialista de Cuba,” 24 de Abril 1961, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959-1969, MINREX; “Informe sobre los Comites de Defensa de la Revolucion,” 12 de Diciembre 1961, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959-1969, MINREX. 569 “Memorandum of Conversation, Conference Between President Kennedy and Venezuelan President Betancourt—Cuban Problem—OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting,” December 16, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 271-274. 570 Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution, 140. 248 U.S. leader.571 After a few brief remarks at the airport the U.S. delegation boarded their plane bound for Bogotá, Colombia.
Labeling John Kennedy’s time in Venezuela a success might be an understatement. From the masses that lined downtown Caracas to the campesinos at La
Morita, the very Venezuelans that the USIA hoped to influence had an opportunity to see the leader they had read so much about. First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy became the optimum U.S. weapon. Mrs. Kennedy already had experience representing the United
States abroad from when she accompanied her husband to Paris and Vienna for high- level meetings the prior summer. The response Jackie generated among Parisians led
President Kennedy to remark during a press luncheon that “I do not think it altogether inappropriate to introduce myself to this audience. I am the man who accompanied
Jacqueline Kennedy to Paris, and I have enjoyed it.”572 In Venezuela Jackie’s use of the
Spanish language and ability to connect with both government officials and average citizens greatly aided in perceptions of the United States. Newsreel footage showed her being greeted with hugs and kisses by kindergarteners on a visit to the Don Simon School in Caracas.573 These types of images served as excellent counterpoints to arguments that
Washington only had an imperial agenda for Latin America.
Moreover, critically important to any public diplomacy success is buttressing it with tangible diplomatic achievements. Very early in his administration Kennedy wagered that Betancourt could be an ally worthy of support. Helping cast him as a true
571 Forging the Alliance-President Kennedy visits Venezuela and Colombia, December 1961, United States Government Agencies, Accession Number 1A, JFKL. 572 Larry Sabato, The Kennedy Half-Century: The Presidency, Assassination, and Lasting Legacy of John F. Kennedy (Bloomsbury: New York, 2013), 88. 573 “Oyó Aguinaldos en el Jardin de Infancia ‘Don Simón,’” El Nacional, 17 de Diciembre 1961, p. 34. 249 reformer who offered a very different vision of change for Latin America than Fidel
Castro, one more focused on reform, proved critical to Washington. The USIA reported that President Kennedy’s “visit dramatically spotlighted the nation’s democratically oriented social progress.”574 Occurring less than a year after Kennedy’s inauguration, the trip helped cement a close personal relationship between Kennedy and the Venezuelan leader.
The Leaders of Tomorrow
The December 1961 visit also provided JFK with an opportunity to hear firsthand about Betancourt’s commitment to promoting reform. In particular, the Venezuelan government under his leadership committed a vast amount of resources to the education system. Expenditures immediately increased under AD rule. Whereas the military dictatorship allocated 4 percent of the national budget to education in its last year in power (1958), Betancourt spent 10 percent.575 The increase allowed for more school construction, which in turn permitted more elementary aged children to receive basic schooling. A little over 750,000 students received primary education in 1958, a number that increased to over 1.3 million by 1963. Rural areas saw significant changes. Prior to
AD rule those living in more isolated areas of Venezuela lacked basic infrastructure and numerous age groups held classes together. Betancourt initiated a concept known as the
Rural School Nucleus (RNC). A central school in the countryside took charge of neighboring learning units and a director would visit each school on a regular basis. Such
574 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 575 Mark Hanson, Educational Reform and Administrative Development: The Cases of Colombia and Venezuela (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1986), 158; “Country Plan Submission,” June 21, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 250 an approach fit nicely in the Kennedy administration’s vision for the Alliance for
Progress. By 1961 thirty-eight RNCs operated in the countryside.576
Reforms focused not only on aid or new infrastructure, but also included new personnel dedicated to elevating education in Venezuelan society. Dr. Leandro Mora, a minister during AD’s first ruling period in the 1940s, became head of education. Mora was a disciple of Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa, an original founder of AD and staunch proponent of educational reform.577 Author of El Maestro Como Líder (The Teacher as
Leader), Prieto argued that an inclusive education system with teachers playing a pronounced role in community development had to be an aspect of all democratic societies.578 His ideas regarding education infused Betancourt’s reforms. For their part, the USIA sought to cultivate a working relationship with education leaders. Agency officials noted that Mora personally helped in carrying out programs.
Unlike other Latin American countries, where local governments could be more of a hindrance, leaders in Caracas consistently aided the USIA. As a result, an active
USIA program matched Venezuelan government’s efforts in the field of education.
Influencing both teachers and students became a top priority for the USIA during the
Kennedy years. Perhaps the most effective method of reaching educators was through the
USIA’s monthly educational publication Carta Pedagógica (Education Letter). Labeled a soft sell by agency members the magazine discussed “fundamental democratic attitudes about national education.” Teachers received thousands of copies, with the expectation
576 Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution, 253. 577 Ibid, 248 578 Elsa Fuenmayor, Deicy López, Alida Oberto, Marilyn Quevedo, Rafael Piña, and Marielys Talavera, “Descripción de las Ideas Pedagógicas de Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa,” Revista Científica Electrónica de Ciencias Humanas, Fundación Unamuno-Venezuela, 2009, 73-74, available from revista. 251 that they would impart the knowledge gained to students in the classroom. The publication also provided teaching techniques for classes that ranged from kindergarten to high school, while at the same time promoting U.S. democratic values.579 One issue included an essay contest titled “What Abraham Lincoln Means to Me.” Several pages detailed Lincoln’s life and Venezuelan teachers used the publication as a guide to their lesson plan covering the iconic president’s rise from an Illinois congressman to President of the United States. Sections covered Lincoln’s famous debates along with his time as a lawyer and politician. Each depiction contained a short message, always discussing his dedication to learning, fairness, democracy, and human rights. One last section, “The
Words of Lincoln,” included quotations on democracy such as “our defense relies on the preservation of the spirit that conceptualizes freedom as the heritage of all men, everywhere, all over the world.” U.S. officials hoped to make Lincoln not just a figure of
U.S. history, but one whose words translated to the present. U.S. officials believed
Lincoln’s life story could serve as a powerful message for the young people of an emerging democracy. Over 400 students submitted essays of no more than 2,000 words on a particular aspect of Lincoln’s life.580
The circulation of Carta Pedagógica rose steadily during the early 1960s, reaching over 30,000.581 Giving the newsletter a “Venezuelan” feel aided in the periodical’s popularity. A local editor, Carmen Rivas, became director of the publication.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Education aided in dispersing copies as did the Institute for
579 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 580 Ibid. 581 “Venezuela Country Plan FY-1962,” July 13, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 252 Professional Development of Educators (IPDE). The ministry had access to all national schools while the IPDE helped supervise over 15,000 teachers in training. The agency reported that subscribers felt that the publication was “written by Venezuelans for
Venezuelans.”582
Aside from publications, a teacher training program also became an important
USIA program. In 1961 alone, twenty Venezuelan school teachers received scholarships to attend a Teacher Development Workshop in Puerto Rico. Education Minister Dr. Mora personally helped select Venezuelan teachers to participate in the workshop.583 Agency officials wrote that “to a limited degree we took a direct role in training Venezuelan primary and secondary school teachers.” By 1962 sixty-five Venezuelan teachers participated in workshops sponsored by the USIA. The agency made clear its goal for teachers in an assessment, “Our ultimate objective is to influence tomorrow’s opinion leaders during the formative years of their educational training by influencing the trainers.”584
While the Kennedy administration focused on teachers, the USIA also began to aggressively attempt to directly shape student opinions of the U.S. through exchange programs. Students had the reputation as being very susceptible to Castro’s influence. In fact, USIA officials in Caracas concluded that during Kennedy’s first year in office that
“students took the lead…and agitated endlessly for Venezuelan alignment with Castro’s
582 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 583 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 584 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 253 Cuba.”585 The USIA centered most of its attention on Caracas’s two major universities, Central and Catholic. Central received targeting due to a large student population and ambiguous stance towards communism. Agency officials believed that both the director of the school of economics and the school of journalism at Central held communist sympathies. As a result, students studying economics and journalism earned first priority to participate in student exchange programs. Seven seniors from Central’s journalism school traveled to the United States while fourteen economic students, along with two professors, participated in a seminar held at the University of Michigan. The seminar quickly grew in reputation as students began competing during their freshman year in hopes of getting selected when they reached upper class status.586
Another group singled out for exchanges included athletes, specifically baseball players. Six players from Central University studied and played in the United States during an exchange. The agency concluded that upon return the players argued in favor of the United States. As athletes their apolitical status made them even better conduits for the U.S. message as politically minded students tended to mute their favorable opinions of the United States for fear of losing political capital, the USIA reported that “baseball players couldn’t care less.” An interesting conclusion made by the agency explained that
“their stature as campus heroes makes the six baseball players influential spokesman for the United States.” While the USIA promoted sending Venezuelan students to the United
States, they also encouraged U.S. students and professors to study and teach in Caracas.
Politically knowledgeable students received invitations and collaborated with U.S. officials in Venezuela. They sponsored events and “with Embassy assistance, they hosted
585 Ibid. 586 Ibid. 254 several functions exclusively for students that were diplomatic coups.” Regarding professors, the agency placed a U.S. journalism professor at Catholic University in hopes of combating the communist influences at Central. Reports indicated that the United
States “achieved a significant entrée in the only important education center set up to teach the fundamentals of democratic journalism.”587 In essence, educational exchanges became an avenue in which to shape a new generation of Venezuelans.
Winning over the Workers
A third important group that U.S. public diplomacy in Venezuela sought to influence included labor unions. The USIA believed that “Fidelismo cast a definite shadow over the Venezuelan labor scene” by 1962 and agency operations sought to build up democratic elements within labor groups.588 Castro’s influence among workers did not come as a surprise given his repeated denunciations of corporate power and capitalist exploitation. President Betancourt, along with the United States, sought the removal of any extremist elements in the labor union hierarchy. As political parties held firm control of labor unions, USIA efforts thus focused on members tied to AD, the Comité de
Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Political Electoral Independent
Organization Committee, COPIE), and Union Democratica Republicana (Democratic
Republican Union, URD), the main political parties.589
The primary issue confronting unions in Venezuela included the inexperience among their members. Labor leaders understood that they needed more training to understand fundamentals surrounding workers rights and how to operate in a democratic
587 Ibid. 588 Ibid. 589 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 255 system. The lack of knowledge regarding labor procedures owed much to the limited growth of unions during the military dictatorship. One high-level union member stated that “we were born on January 23, 1958 [the day the dictatorship fell].”590 The USIA reported that “the same technical and material void that plagues the teaching profession, obstructs legitimate union leaders.” In one instance, after U.S. officials donated a large collection of books to AD’s party headquarters, local officials stated that the collection was the first non-communist labor literature they had ever received.591
Expanding the reading material for Venezuelan laborers became a top priority for
U.S. public diplomacy in Venezuela. The USIA turned to Labor Attaché Irving Tragen, a labor lawyer with extensive experience in Latin America. Following graduation in 1945 he received advice from the dean at the University of California-Berkley Law School to apply for a traveling fellowship to Chile in order to study comparative law. Tragen recalled that his mentor declared “Look, you can either go into the back room of a law firm, or you can develop a specialty in your own way.”592 Following time in Chile he spent several years in Mexico City and then a three-year stay in Washington with the
Latin American section of the World Health Organization. From 1953 to 1960 he worked for USAID as a labor officer in El Salvador, Chile, and Peru. By the early 1960s he focused exclusively on helping transform Venezuela’s labor unions. Tragen became the chief agency employee in charge of writing and selecting articles to be placed in Boletin
Laboral (Labor Bulletin) and Carta Obrera (Worker’s Newsletter). He also wrote
590 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 591 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 592 Jon Jefferson, “Our Man in Latin America,” Transcript, published by the University of California- Berkley School of Law, spring 2011, vol. 43, no. 1, pages 22-29, available from Berkeley Law. 256 Negociando el Contrato Colectivo (Collective Bargaining Agreement). The USIA printed 5,000 copies of the publication. These pamphlets circulated throughout Venezuela to labor union members and leaders. Boletin Laboral, published weekly, had an overtly anti-Castro tinge and circulated on a mass basis. The USIA argued that “among the rank and file it attempts to disseminate program material over as wide a cross section as is physically and financially possible.”593 It consistently contained stories “on the true nature of Castroism” and certain articles found their way into local newspapers. Radio broadcasts, sponsored by AD, also used Tragen’s articles as a main source for information so much so that the broadcaster complained one week when his copy did not reach him in time and he lacked material for his program.594
Carta Obrera, published twice a month, offered more nuance and less overt propaganda. It became “overwhelmingly accepted by labor leaders as a working manual in union movement fundamentals.” Based primarily on articles designed specifically for labor union leaders, its subscription list reached 20,000 by 1962.595 Fifteen-hundred copies went directly to the headquarters of the Confederación de Trabajadores de
Venezuela (Confederation of Workers of Venezuela, CTV). These copies contained the
CTV emblem alongside the seal of the United States. The labor organization sent them throughout the country to members. Unions requested large quantities of the publication so that their workers would get access to articles and put the information into practice.
Reports indicated that workers utilized techniques outlined in Carta Obrera to take
593 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 594 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA; “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 595 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 257 power through elections, and one such instance occurred in the important industrial center of Valencia.596
Labor exchange programs also became more frequent. José González Navarro, president of the CTV, and Luis Tovar, head of Fedepetrol, a powerful petroleum workers union, received partial grants to travel to the United States and study U.S. labor union methods. Also, to further establish ties with Venezuela’s labor force, the USIA created its first labor information center, the Centro Obrero Urdaneta (Workers Center). Opened in a working class neighborhood in Maracaibo, the center offered classes in English and showed weekly films. Fetrazulia, a state federation of 67 unions enthusiastically supported the center, offering the USIA more clout in northwestern Venezuela.597 Other measures implemented included the use of mobile film units to show labor union movies.
By the end of 1961, units screened movies to over 175 labor groups and sent an additional 300 titles to various organizations.598
Though the USIA admitted the difficulties in assessing just how much influence the agency had in shaping the Venezuelan labor movement, it became clear that the U.S. post provided “a vital fountain for material needed by non-communist elements in the struggle for control of the Venezuelan labor movement.”599 Furthermore, the use of a seasoned FSO like Irving Tragen and the arrival of another Labor Information Officer during the summer of 1962 illustrated the importance given to reaching workers. One measure of success included the fact that by the end of that year an AD-COPIE faction,
596 Ibid. 597 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 598 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 30, 1961, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 599 Ibid. 258 primarily composed of moderate elements, won almost 80 percent of the union elections held, at times replacing positions formerly belonging to Castro sympathizers.600
Image 25: An AFL-CIO publication for Latin America sponsored by the USIA.
Venezuela’s Internal Strife
Even with the attention, aid, and resources that Washington allocated to
Venezuela, internal political realities threatened to halt economic and democratic progress. By the spring of 1962 leftist guerillas launched assaults on Caracas and other major cities. Led by the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), founded by disaffected members of AD, MIR gained inspiration from revolutionary Cuba. Members of the group hoped to engulf Venezuela in a guerilla war and topple the Betancourt
600 “Assessment Report for Venezuela,” January 17, 1962, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954- 1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 259 government.601 Oil pipelines and department stores became targets as bombings and political assassinations occurred more frequently. 602
The Betancourt government looked to Havana as the primary source for much of the unrest, believing that Cuba viewed a victory in Venezuela as greatly aiding the prospects for revolutionary change in the Caribbean. Radio Havana regularly broadcast anti-Betancourt messages into Caracas and surrounding areas.603 Reporting back home regarding the unrest in October 1962, Colombia’s Ambassador to Venezuela referenced a report published in the paper El Mundo. The article stated that Caracas remained a key target in an escalating Washington-Havana Cold War. The memo also outlined how revolutionary elements in Venezuela continued, “day by day,” convincing “restless” students to join their cause and head to the countryside. The cable concluded that there existed no doubt that anti-democratic forces wished to implement a campaign of social disorder, thus the democratic forces of the region must be prepared to counter their offensive.604 Reports back to Havana from Cuban representatives in Caracas portrayed the guerilla forces within Venezuela as a “great power” and if guided correctly, could play a decisive role in blunting U.S. designs on the region.605
601 Michael Tarver, Venezuelan Insurgency, 1960-1968: A Successful Failure (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation, 2001), 67-68. 602 Peter Calvert, “Venezuela: The FALN-FLN,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, eds. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007), 169-170. 603 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 104; Fidel Castro publicly labeled Betancourt a puppet of the United States and the Alliance for Progress “a policy of domination, exploitation, and retreat.” In his view, Betancourt was a progressive, “the most reactionary, backward, and prehistoric people in Latin America.” For this speech refer to Fidel Castro, “Speech to Women’s Conference,” January 16, 1963, Havana, Cuba. LANIC. 604 “Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Venezuela a Bogotá ,” 3 de Octubre 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones, Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 822, Orden Numero 167, AGNCOL. 605 “Estado del Movimiento de Solidaridad,” 6 de Septiembre 1962, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959- 1969, MINREX. 260 During a February 1963 state visit to Washington, Betancourt pressed
Kennedy for more military assistance to combat the insurgency; he particularly wanted helicopters that the Venezuelan military could use in the countryside. Such a request fit well within the parameters of Washington’s relationship with Caracas. In fact, between
1961 and 1965 Venezuela’s military received over $60 million in credits for both hardware and training. By the fall of 1963, just before Venezuela’s presidential election,
Kennedy sent more military equipment.606 Shortly after the visit JFK also questioned the
CIA as to what intelligence it had on Castro’s activities in Venezuela. The president wrote to Langley that “it is obvious that the Communists in Venezuela support Castro.
Do we have any information that could be presented in a public forum, such as the OAS, that would indicate that the link between the anti-Betancourt terrorists and Castro is direct?”607 By November, some hard evidence existed. Immediately prior to the election, a large cache of weapons purported to originate in Cuba washed up along Venezuela’s coast line.608 That same month, the magazine Bohemia Libre Venezolana published a multi-page expose on the history, tactics, and strategy employed by leftist guerillas. The article argued that Venezuelan guerillas implemented a “guerra larga” (long war) approach, similar to what transpired in Cuba.609 Along with launching a counter- offensive, Betancourt suspended constitutional guarantees and prohibited the MIR and the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (Communist Party of Venezuela, PCV) from participating in the political process. These moves proved controversial, but Betancourt
606 “Venezuela Country Team Meeting,” October 11, 1963, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs- Office of East Coast Affairs, RG 59, Box 9, Entry # 224, NARA. 607 Ibid, 107. 608 Domínguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution, 28. 609 “Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Venezuela a Bogotá,” 25 de Noviembre 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 822, Orden Numero 173, AGNCOL. 261 argued that the Venezuelan constitution of 1961 gave the president broad powers.610
The Supreme Council of National Defense divided the country into four military zones and Betancourt ordered the armed forces to hold nothing back in countering insurgents.611
These actions only intensified guerilla activities and by 1963 communist and other revolutionary groups formed a coalition known as the Fuerzas Armadas de
Liberación Nacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation, FALN). The goal became to continue urban fighting while increasing a guerilla presence in the countryside. Moses
Molierio, a young Castro-sympathizing Venezuelan, summed up the thoughts of many anti-government elements when he stated that “we saw that while our leaders had been talking about revolution for thirty years, in Cuba the revolution triumphed in the years of fighting; while Rómulo Betancourt had been talking about agrarian reform for thirty years, and governed twice without doing anything about it, in Cuba a far-reaching reform was taking place.”612
As the election neared, the FALN called for a general strike and announced that they would shoot anyone who showed up to vote. Betancourt’s harsh tactics had forced such desperate measures. The FALN also instituted the “kill-a-cop-a-day” program where police officers became open targets. The policy of overt terrorism completely backfired as many of the officers lived in local barrios and family members witnessed their deaths.
Such brutality earned the FALN no popularity.613 Talton Ray, who headed a non-profit
610Benjamin Keen and Keith Haynes, A History of Latin America: Independence to the Present, vol. 2, 9th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2013), 500; “Memorandum, Embajada de Colombia en Venezuela a Bogotá,” 24 de Enero 1961. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 820, Orden Numero 154, AGNCOL. 611 Ewell, Venezuela, A Century of Change, 132. 612 Peter Winn, Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 539-540. 613 Peter Calvert, “Venezuela: FALN-FLN,” 177. 262 community development program in Venezuela, wrote that “when the FALN ambushed a train just outside of Caracas in September 1963 and machine-gunned to death four national guardsmen—all the sons of poor families—the disgust was especially strong, because for a barrio youth, it was a sign of social advancement to launch a career with the national guard.”614 Government fears that Venezuelans would sit out the 1963 election due to the violence proved unfounded as 90 percent of voters participated.
Moreover, the Betancourt supported, and AD backed candidate, Raúl Leoni won election.615 Democracy triumphed while pro-Castro guerillas regrouped.
Documents from Cuba’s Foreign Ministry illustrate the extent to which the Castro regime misjudged the FALN’s popularity. Cuban officials in Caracaras cabled back to
Havana that the group would soon recover since their support among young people and those opposed to Betancourt could sustain them.616 In reality, the FALN’s popularity significantly diminished in the wake of their violent pre-election attacks. As Robert
Alexander writes, “Although guerilla efforts continued during the Leoni period, the backbone of the violence campaign had been broken.”
The Betancourt government’s response certainly aided in curtailing the ability of
FALN guerillas to conduct operations, and the group’s resort to outright violence created little sympathy, but what prevented a majority of Venezuelans from joining the anti-
Betancourt movement? A persuasive argument can be made that Betancourt’s reforms coupled with the U.S. public diplomacy onslaught created an atmosphere where a Cuban-
614 Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela, 495. 615 Ibid, 496. 616 “El Proceso Electoral Venezolano de 1 de Diciembre de 1963,” 13 de Marzo 1964, America Latina, Venezuela, 1959-1969, MINREX.
263 inspired guerilla insurrection could not take hold. More to the point, the U.S. information offensive, led by the USIA and aided by President Kennedy’s personal visit to the country, buttressed the concrete actions by Betancourt. Though U.S. outreach could never convince the most hard-line anti-government elements, it could affect the majority of people on the fence as to whether or not to support Venezuela’s attempts at reform. A key to success included implementing operations that supported President Betancourt’s vision and simultaneously urging Venezuelans to have faith in their government. Teodoro
Petkoff, a former Venezuelan guerilla fighter, recalled that many advocates of revolution underestimated Betancourt’s popularity. Once during a debate with a worker, Petkoff critiqued Betancourt’s supposed reform agenda, only to have the worker tell him that “if
Betancourt says its right, it must be right”617 Ultimately, the Cuban-inspired alternative did not look as promising to labor union members, campesinos, and urban intellectuals who came to view the Betancourt-U.S. model of reform as more alluring. Lacking support from those key groups, a leftist guerilla insurgency, either in the countryside or cities, held little chance of succeeding.
Colombia
The dramatic political unrest experienced in Colombia during the post-1945 period rivaled that of any other Latin American nation. Dating back to the late 19th century the country had a democratic tradition coupled with bouts of political violence.
During the Thousand Days War, which occurred from 1899 to 1902, seventy thousand
Colombians perished. Fearing that conservative leadership, which took power in the mid-
1890s, might freeze them out of the political process, liberals took up arms. The conflict
617 Ibid, 496. 264 aided in setting the dangerous precedent of “political exclusion as a catalyst for armed conflict.”618 By the 1940s, the differences between the two parties became more hardened. Liberals desired a weakened Catholic Church, land redistribution, and universal suffrage. Conservatives, in many instances, sought to protect the rights of the ruling class and keep the Catholic Church as a powerful political actor.
Political dominance by the Liberal Party, which held the presidency for sixteen years (1930-1946), exacerbated the situation even more. When conservative Mariano
Ospina Pérez won election in 1946, many on the political left feared a return to exclusionary politics. Pérez supported landed elites and sought to implement a conservative agenda. Professor Mario A. Murillo argues that “Ospina and the conservative leadership, with the support of the Catholic Church hierarchy and the military, launched a campaign of brutal repression against the liberal bases, particularly in the countryside.”619 These decisions, along with other longstanding political grievances, led members of the Liberal Party to leave the government in March 1948.620
At the same time, many Colombians coalesced around a populist leader from the Bogotá slums named Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Utilizing mass mobilization, Gaitán became a hero to many. He articulated a vision of the “political country” and the “national country,” the former encompassing those in power while the latter containing the workers and the
618 Michael LaRosa and Germán Mejía, Colombia: A Concise Contemporary History (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), 80. 619 Mario Murillo, Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization (Toronto: Hushion House, 2004), 46. 620 John Dugas, “The Conservative Party and the Crisis of Political Legitimacy in Colombia,” in Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Kevin J. Middlebrook (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 85. 265 many people excluded by the ruling classes.621 Though a member of the Liberal
Party, he had enemies across the entire political spectrum. As Colombians grew tired of political violence—14,000 people lost their lives in 1947 alone—Gaitán’s campaign for the presidential election of 1950 gained traction.622 In April 1948 Gaitán was shot to death in the heart of Bogotá. Uncertainty still surrounds his murder as Colombian authorities quickly captured and subsequently killed the assassin. The popular leader’s death ignited Colombia and led to the Bogotázo, intense rioting in the capital that killed
5,000. In the aftermath of the assassination Colombia entered a period known as La
Violencia.623 From the cities to the countryside, political conflict between liberal supporters and conservative backers resulted in the deaths of close to 200,000
Colombians.624
When conservative leader Laureano Gómez, who took power through a 1950 election, struggled to achieve stability, the Colombian military finally acted. In June
1953, with the support of both liberals and conservatives, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed the presidency.625 The military man initially earned high marks for his ability to manage the violence. He launched raids in the countryside and gave amnesty to guerillas that laid down their arms; most took up the offer though some members of the Colombian
Communist Party refused. Following a 1954 popular election, where he earned
621 Richard Sharpless, Gaitán of Colombia: A Political Biography (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978), 105. 622 James Henderson, Modernization in Colombia: The Laureano Gómez Years, 1889-1965 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 303. 623 For more on the assassination refer to Herbert Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). For more on this the late 1940s and early 1950s refer to Mary Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946– 1953 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); James Henderson, When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985). 624 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 74. 625 Jorge Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1989), 93. 266 widespread support, Rojas Pinilla began to implement a reform agenda. “Peace,
Justice, and Liberty” became his motto. He created the Secretariado Nacional de
Asistencia Social (National Social Welfare Agency) and pushed for a law giving women the right to vote. Unfortunately, Rojas Pinilla could not contain his authoritarian tendencies. When newspapers criticized the government he shut down El Espectador and
El Tiempo, both popular national periodicals. In the view of many Colombians, Rojas
Pinilla had no plans to give up power. The military leader quickly sought to eliminate
Colombia’s two party system by creating a “Third Force.” He instituted a new national workers union and political committee in the hopes of uniting disparate factions behind his vision. Students and other mainstream political actors came out against these moves.
They viewed the general as creating a mechanism for his own perpetual rule.626
Image 26: Map of Colombia.
626 Ibid, 94. 267 The Rise of Lleras Camargo
By 1956 liberal and conservative leaders came together in hopes of ending military rule. Alberto Lleras Camargo, a former ambassador to the United States and head of the OAS represented the liberal wing while former president Laureano Gómez led the conservative delegation. Both men agreed that political violence needed to cease and failure to do so threatened Colombia’s future prospects for democracy. They came to an agreement for shared governance that called for liberals and conservatives to each have equal representation in all official bodies. The presidency would rotate from each party every four years for a minimum period of sixteen years.627 The agreement became known as the National Front and Colombians soon moved against the Rojas Pinilla regime in May 1957 with a general strike. Recognizing that he had lost the support of the people, Rojas Pinilla resigned and a plebiscite to vote on the National Front’s referendum took place. Ninety-five percent of voters agreed to the National Front program and soon thereafter, in 1958, liberal leader Alberto Lleras Camargo received over 2 million votes earning him the presidency.628 Because of his background, Lleras seemed an ideal choice to lead Colombia’s transition from an unstable nation to a modernizing democracy. A former foreign minister, ambassador to the United States, and Secretary General of the
OAS, he held a keen understanding of how to achieve a working relationship with leaders in Washington. Moreover, his political moderation earned him support from all segments of Colombian society. Scholar Robert Dix wrote that “if the National Front was the
627 John Armstrong Crow, The Epic of Latin America, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 783. 628 Gonzalo Sánchez and Donny Meertens, Bandits, Peasants, and Politics: The Case of "La Violencia" in Colombia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 156. This book was originally published as Bandoleros, Gamonales y Campesinos: El Caso de la Violencia en Colombia (Bogotá : El Ancora Editores, 1983). 268 construction of a modernizing elite, Alberto Lleras Camargo was a true son of such an elite; if it was a product of moderation, fair play, and an evolving tendency to give the opposition its due, Lleras epitomized that spirit.”629
The Lleras Camargo government quickly moved to restructure Colombia. It established the Comisión de Planeación (Planning Commission) and the Consejo
Nacional de Política Económica y Planeación (National Council of Economic Policy and
Planning) to better coordinate national projects. These organizations proved critical in helping chart new programs in the fields of infrastructure, agriculture, and education. Per the National Front agreement, education received 10 percent of the national budget.630 At the same time, the Lleras Camargo administration restricted imports and controlled prices and wages. At the end of his first year in office Colombia had a favorable balance of trade that reached $86 million, the best in twenty years.631 In 1961, Law 135 attempted to address land reform in the countryside. The Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria
(Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute) sought to give ownership to small farmers and distribute land on a more equitable basis.
For its part, the United States welcomed a return to stability. U.S.-Colombian relations had been close following World War II, particularly after Colombia became the only Latin American country to send troops during the Korean War.632 The Eisenhower administration reported that Lleras Camargo’s election signified a “solid avance” in the
629 Robert Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 159. 630 Steven Taylor, Voting Amid Violence: Electoral Democracy in Colombia (Lebanon, NH: Northeastern University Press, 2009), 46. 631 John Martz, The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 78. 632 Bradley Coleman’s Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939- 1960 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2008), has an entire chapter on the Korean War and the Americas, chapter 3. 269 region and in 1960 he received a formal invitation to the White House.633 Upon meeting the Colombian President at Washington’s National Airport, Eisenhower lauded
Lleras Camargo as a true democratic reformer. “We have seen how your efforts have resulted, and we are indeed admiring and most respectful of those accomplishments,”
Eisenhower declared.634 The visit included a state dinner, a party with New York business leaders hosted by Nelson Rockefeller, a speech at the National Press Club
(NPC), and an address to a joint session of congress.635 While speaking to U.S. representatives, Lleras Camargo called for economic aid and a U.S. led development program to help in stemming the rise of political extremism. The New York Times reported that “a lean, thoughtful looking man of 54 years…addressed Congress in slow, soft spoken English,” as he implored the United States “to purchase a decisive stake in the material civilization of the West.”636
Lleras Camargo’s vision for Colombia included creating a new class, what has been termed the “professional middle class.” He frequently contacted community development expert and Southern Illinois Professor Richard Poston concerning
Colombia’s reform agenda. Poston, who would later become the Peace Corps head in
Colombia, argued that the country’s middling class contained an “anti-human
633 “Special Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council,” November 26, 1958. FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. V, 53. 634 “Remarks of Welcome to President Lleras Camargo of Colombia at the Washington National Airport,” April 5, 1960, APP. 635 Stephen Randall, Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 216-217; Bert Ruiz, The Colombian Civil War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2001), 106-107. 636 “Colombian Urges Rise in Latin Aid,” New York Times, April 7, 1960, p. 1. 270 consciousness.”637 Members of the middle strata simultaneously disdained the working class and peasantry while aspiring to emulate elites. Such a reality did not create
“productive relationships” among any of Colombia’s social classes. Lleras Camargo agreed and strongly believed that community development along with a bettering of social relations remained imperative for a burgeoning democracy. He wrote to Poston that his goals included making the professional middle class a “center of attraction.” It would become a “humanistic force” bent on achieving social harmony.638 New government agencies and reform programs began to attract young professionals by the early 1960s, the exact people Lleras wanted to aid in the transformation of Colombia.
Rather than disparaging the peasantry, these new bureaucrats would give the poor a voice while also bridging the wide gap between the elites in society and the lower classes. It would be the responsibility of middle class professionals to educate elites on the necessity of aiding the poor and the landless.
Colombia and the Cuban Revolution
Colombia’s new leader also had little sympathy for Fidel Castro’s vision. Only a year after the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista the Foreign Ministry in Havana received notification that Lleras Camargo’s views on the revolution could best be classified as
“negative.”639 Moreover, he stood ready and willing to confront revolutionary violence influenced by Cuba. Lleras Camargo’s worries stemmed from reports received by
Colombia’s Servicio de Inteligencia (Intelligence Service) that anti-government forces,
637 Ricardo López, “Conscriptions of Democracy: The Formation of a Professional Middle Class in Bogotá during the 1950s and Early 1960s,” in The Making of the Middle Class: Toward a Transnational History, eds. Ricardo López and Barbara Weinstein (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 175. 638 Ricardo López, A Beautiful Class, an Irresistible Democracy: The Historical Formation of the Middle Class in Bogotá, 1955-1965 (PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 2008), 52-54. 639 “Informe sobre Colombia, Actividades contra Cuba, Politicas,” 11 de Noviembre 1960, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 271 inspired by and sympathetic to Cuba, planned operations as early as 1960. One briefing memo recounted a notable gathering. At the behest of Cuba’s ambassador to
Colombia, members of the Comité Colombiano Pro Ayuda a la Revolución Cubana
(CCRC, Colombian Committee in Support of the Cuban Revolution) held meetings in downtown Bogotá. These kinds of events led the Colombian government to believe that
Castro had his sights set on Colombia. The newspaper El Siglo buttressed this intelligence when it reported that numerous Colombians traveled to Cuba and studied guerilla tactics.640
Furthermore, in short order numerous pro-Castro groups originated in Colombia.
As early as July 1959 a group called “Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana,” (ARC, Friends of the Cuban Revolution) began to organize in Bogotá. Their leader, Carlos Tovar, sent several messages to Fidel Castro detailing the amount of “enthusiastic” support that existed in Colombia for the Cuban Revolution.641 The ARC’s platform included supporting Castro’s agrarian reform and policies against U.S. owned energy and telephone companies.642 The Comité Colombiano Pro Defensa a la Revolución Cubana
(Colombian Committee for the Defense of the Cuban Revolution) soon began to publish
640 “Memorando, Servicio de Intelligencia Colombiana a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,” 26 de Abril 1960, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Diplomatica y Consular, Transferencia 8, Problema Cubano en Latinoamerica, Caja 184, AGNCOL; “Platforma Revolucionaria Llevan los 525 Delegados de Colombia,” El Siglo, 26 de Julio 1960. 641 “Memorandum from the Cuban Embassy in Bogotá, Antonio Prisco Porto (Encargado de Negocios) to Raul Roa (Ministro de Estado, La Habana),” 14 de Julio 1959, Expediente 2, Legajo 1, Despacho de Ministro, fechas 26 de Enero-28 de Diciembre 1959, fondo, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, AGNC; “Memorandum from Dr. Juan Portela, Jefe de Despacho to Doctor Juan Orta, Director General, Jefe de Despacho, Oficinas del Primer Ministro,” 20 de Julio 1959, Expediente 2, Legajo 1, Despacho de Ministro, fechas 26 de Enero-28 de Diciembre 1959, fondo, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, AGNC. 642 Primer Congreso Continental Anti-Imperialista de Los Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana, Comite Preparatorio,” 17 de Agosto 1960, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 272 “informative bulletins” exhorting Colombians to support Castro’s movement and combat “yanqui aggression.”643
By 1961 another group, the Comite Colombiano de Defensa de la
Revolución Cubana (CCDRC, Colombian Committee in Defense of the Cuban
Revolution), comprised of workers, students, and leftist political leaders, became active.
The CCDRC implemented its own public diplomacy program. The publication arm of the organization distributed copies of Cuba’s Agrarian Reform Law and Che Guevara’s anti-
Alliance for Progress speech in Uruguay. They also played a large role in helping distribute anti-U.S. pamphlets in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.
A priority of the CCDRC became to help in the organization of more pro- revolution groups.644 The Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Construccion de Cundinmarca (Union of Workers of the Construction Industry of Cundinmarca) soon participated in CCDRC rallies and decried any potential decision by the Lleras Camargo government to break relations with Cuba, arguing that such a move would be against the wishes of the Colombian people.645 University students in the city of Medellin also pledged their support for Cuba and expressed the need for a similar process of revolutionary change to be undertaken in Colombia. The group vowed to fight for Castro
643 “Boletin Informativo,” Comité Colombiano Pro Defensa a la Revolución, 5 de Noviembre 1960, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 644 Proyecto de Plan de Trabajo para Seis Meses del Comite de Defensa de la Revolución Cubana 16 de Octubre 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX; “Memorandum para Embajada de Cuba en Colombia a la Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en Havana,” 29 de Abril 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 645 “Memorandum para Embajada de Cuba en Colombia a la Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en Havana, Departmento de Asuntos Latinoamericanos,” 16 de Febrero 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 273 and offered their “blood” to defend the island.646 In the countryside the Sindicato
Agricola de Rafael Reyes (Agricultural Union of Rafael Reyes), named in honor of a former Colombian president from the early twentieth century who focused on workers rights, called for the organization of workers and campesinos in order to ignite another
Cuban Revolution.647
By the end of 1961 the Castro government in Havana received a detailed list of organizations in Colombia dedicated to defending the revolution and seeking its expansion. These organizations were spread throughout the country and included members from all social classes. Colombian intellectuals, students, urban workers, and campesinos all banded together in order to highlight their support for the revolutionary change underway in Cuba.648
In order to combat any attempts at subversion, officials in Bogotá soon began tracking citizens who traveled to Cuba. These classified reports, issued by the Ministerio de Guerra (Ministry of War), included detailed background information on each individual.649 As guerilla violence in the Colombian countryside increased, Lleras
Camargo took further steps. He implemented a Campana de Cedulcation (Campaign of
Identification). The administration admitted that while identification served as an important measure for voting purposes and other civil services, it could also be a vital component of combating escalating violence. In essence, the program attempted to
646 “Memorandum por Embajada de Cuba en Colombia, Declaración de Solidaridad Juvenil,” 12 de Abril 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 647 “Memorandum para Embajada de Cuba en Colombia a la Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en Havana, Departmento de Asuntos Latinoamericanos,” 4 de Marzo 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 648 “Embajada de Cuba en Colombia Informe Sobre los Comites de Defensa de la Revolución,” 12 de Diciembre 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 649 “Personalidad de los Colombianos que Intentaban Viajar a Cuba,” 1962, Ministerio de Gobierno, Despacho Ministro, Caja 34, Carpeta 292, AGNCOL. 274 decrease violence by keeping better track of subversive elements.650 Historians often differ over the extent to which Latin American governments implemented anti-Castro, or anti-communist measures on their own, or whether Washington pushed them to do so.
Internal Colombian documents illustrate that the government in Bogotá took seriously the threat of guerilla violence and did not need prodding from the United States to enact measures aimed at routing out subversive elements. Members of the Colombian government went as far to compare their internal situation to events taking place in
Vietnam. In both instances, the Foreign Ministry argued that guerillas hoped to bring about political change through violence.651
Image 27: Downtown Bogotá, Colombia, 1961.
650 “Boletin, Que la Cedula de Ciudadania es un Instrumento para Combatir la Violencia Afirman los Altos Nandos Militares,” 11 de Octubre 1962, Ministerio de Educación, Secretaria General, Caja 332, Carpeta 4, AGNCOL. 651 Informe Político de Abril, El Problema de Vietn-Nam, 21 de Mayo 21 1962, Presidencia la Republica, Caja 332, Carpeta 2, AGNCOL. 275 Colombia and the New Frontier
Lleras Camargo’s willingness to confront pro-Cuban elements and his vision for
Colombia earned much praise from the Kennedy administration. In fact, his hopes for a new class in Colombia closely mirrored what Arthur Schlesinger argued for in March
1961, just a few months after President Kennedy’s inauguration. Schlesinger wrote a detailed memorandum regarding U.S. policy in Latin America. “The most favorable means from the US viewpoint,” Schlesinger asserted, “would be the middle-class revolution where the processes of economic modernization carry the new urban middle class into power and produce the problem for US policy is to do what it can to hasten the middle-class revolution.”652 Kennedy embraced Lleras Camargo’s vision of progress through economic advancement and the Colombian leader became viewed by many in the administration as among the most progressive leaders in Latin America. The belief in
Washington that a real reformer held power in Colombia equaled the Lleras Camargo government’s feeling that the new leadership in the United States paid much more attention to inter-American issues. Colombia’s Ambassador to the United States, Carlos
Sans de Santamaria, reported home that changes at the State Department could have a positive effect on U.S. standing in the region. He focused particularly on the appointment of Arturo Morales Carrión as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.653
Moreover, the Colombian Foreign Ministry ultimately concluded that the United States sought to combat Castro’s propaganda campaign in Latin America and that the Cuban
652 “The Current Crisis in Latin America,” March 1961, National Security Files, Regional Security, Box 215, JFKL. 653 Reorganización del Departamento d Estado,” 2 de Febrero 1961, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 368, AGNCOL. 276 situation remained a high priority.654 Lleras Camargo curried even more favor in
Washington when he publicly rebuked the Castro regime in the spring of 1961 by stating that Havana needed to respect the rights of its own citizens and embrace the inter-
American system.655
As a result of a growing mutual respect, the Kennedy administration included a visit to Colombia on the president’s itinerary immediately after he left Caracas in
December 1961. In the days before arrival, editorials, news articles, and welcome messages appeared all over the pages of Colombia’s El Tiempo.656 Lleras Camargo also took the step of formally breaking relations with Castro’s Cuba. Arriving in Bogotá the
U.S. delegation once again received a warm welcome as they made their way through the city. The front page of the New York Times the next day read that “500,000 in Bogotá
Greet President on Alliance Tour.”657 Press Secretary Pierre Salinger reported that the assembled crowd eclipsed the number of onlookers who later gathered for Kennedy in
Ireland and Germany. The president’s opening remarks touched on the history of close
U.S.-Colombian cooperation, mentioning the ties formed during the war in Korea. He also referenced a theme that would be repeatedly touched on in all of his public remarks in Colombia—shared democratic ideals.658 The president declared that “we are opposed to tyranny of any kind. We are for the social justice for our people, because we recognize
654 “Kennedy y Castro,” 8 de Febrero 1961, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Transferencia 8, Caja 368, AGNCOL. 655 “Memorando,” 13 de Marzo 1961, Presidencia de la Republica, Secretaria General, Caja 23, Carpeta 1, AGNCOL. 656 “Bogotá se volcará mañana para recibir a los Kennedy,” El Tiempo, 16 de Diciembre 1961, p. 1; “El Pensamiento Político de John Kennedy,” El Tiempo, 16 de Diciembre 1961, p. 8; “Belleza en la Casa Blanca, Jaqueline Kennedy,” El Tiempo, 17 de Diciembre 1961, p.10. 657 “500,000 in Bogotá Greet President on Alliance Tour,” New York Times, December 18, 1961, pg. 1; Colombian papers estimated a little higher, “600.000 Aclamaron a los Kennedy,” El Tiempo, 18 de Diciembre 1961, p. 1 658 “Kennedy preciso en Bogotá Alcance de la Alianza Para el Progreso,” El Tiempo, 18 de Diciembre 1961, p. 1 277 that we cannot have freedom unless all of our people have an equal opportunity to the advantages of a productive life—homes, education--work. These are the things to which the Alliance for Progress--the Alianza para el Progreso-is committed.”659
Image 28: The Kennedy motorcade in Bogotá.
President Lleras Camargo met his U.S. counterpart at the airport and the leaders motorcaded past thousands of onlookers. As they viewed the throngs of waving
Colombians Lleras Camargo asked Kennedy “do you know why those workers and campesinos are cheering you…It’s because they believe you are on their side.”660 The two leaders arrived at Ciudad Techo, a barrio located several miles away. The Colombian government hoped to make the small neighborhood a symbol for the Alliance for
659 “Remarks Upon Arrival at El Dorado Airport, Bogotá, Colombia,” December 17, 1961, APP. 660 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 267. 278 Progress in Bogotá by spending millions and building over 12,000 houses to give shelter to over 80,000 Colombians.661 In a scene similar to that in La Morita, Venezuela, some of Latin America’s poorest citizens surrounded President Kennedy as he offered the aid of the United States. He opened his remarks by re-stating the words spoken by Lleras
Camargo during his trip to Washington in 1960. “I do hope," the Colombian president said in Washington, "that as we come to understand our reciprocal problems better, by virtue of our same faith in our democratic system and in the creative power of liberty . . . we shall go on shaping in this part of the world a better dwelling place for men.”662
Again, the democratic theme remained front and center. After attending mass, Presidents
Kennedy and Lleras Camargo retired to a private meeting while Jacqueline Kennedy made a public appearance at a local children’s hospital. Thousands of Colombians, waving U.S. flags, lined the twenty-block ride for the First Lady, from the presidential palace to the hospital.663
During his dinner address at the San Carlos Palace, Kennedy delivered a poignant and candid message. Perhaps he knew this would be his last major public pronouncement of the trip because he held nothing back. He apologized for past U.S. transgressions in the region, admitting that Washington did not always have a complete understanding of local realities. He spoke of the revolutionary aims of the Alliance for Progress and again referred to the need for democracy: “For our real progress has not come about through violence or tyranny, but under the guidance of democratic leaders who realized the great
661 “Programa de Vivienda en Techo,” Papers of Alberto Lleras Camargo, Programa de la Visita del Presidente de Estado Unidos, John F. Kennedy a Colombia, Diciembre de 1961, Carpeta 38, BLAA. 662 “Remarks at the Techo Housing Project in Bogotá ,” December 17, 1961, APP. 663“Colombians Hail Mrs. Kennedy; Crowds, 10 Deep, Line Streets,” New York Times, December 18, 1961, p. 14; “President’s Schedule,” December 1961. National Security Files, Trips and Conferences, Box 235, JFKL; “U.S. Ambassador to the Secretary of State,” December 18, 1961 (no. 419). National Security Files, Trips and Conferences, Box 235, JFKL. 279 capacity of free society for peaceful change--men such as Franklin Roosevelt in my own country and your distinguished President in your country.”664 The speech also addressed the other path to development, an obvious reference to Castro’s Cuba as those who “come with banners proclaiming that they have new doctrines; that history is on their side. But, in reality, they bring a doctrine which is as old as the Pharaohs of Egypt, and like the Pharaohs of Egypt, doomed by history. They promise free elections, and free speech, and freedom of religion. But once power is achieved, elections are eliminated, speech is stifled, and the worship of God is prohibited.” Though speaking to Colombia’s elites, Kennedy concluded by discussing the need to go beyond the corridors of power and reach the masses,
But I also want to talk to those beyond this dinner table, and beyond this room, and this old house. And that message is for the millions of people in a thousand cities and villages throughout the mountains and lands of our hemisphere. To all of them-to the workers, to the campesinos on the farms, to the women who toil each day for the welfare of their children--to all we bring a message of hope. Every day, every hour, in my country and in this country, and in all the countries of this hemisphere dedicated men and women are struggling to bring nearer the day when all have more to eat, and a decent roof over their heads, and schools for their children--when all will have a better and more abundant life to accompany that human dignity to which all men are entitled, and that love of freedom to which all of us are committed by our inheritance and our desire. And tonight, here in this old city, I pledge to you the commitment of the United States of America, to that great cause.665
From polls conducted by the USIA it appeared that the visit had the desired effect of stimulating awareness of the Kennedy administration’s commitment to Latin America. It should be noted that a USIA public opinion poll conducted just prior to Kennedy’s trip already demonstrated high levels of awareness regarding the Alliance for Progress in
Bogotá. Out of the 400 people surveyed 71 percent had heard of the program, with 45
664 “Address at a Dinner at the San Carlos Palace in Bogotá ,” December 17, 1961, APP. 665 Ibid. 280 percent believing that significant progress could be achieved. Importantly, at least from Washington’s perspective, over 75 percent of respondents believed that the United
States hoped to better Colombia’s future. Surveyors argued that “it is clear that considerable awareness and favorable reaction toward the Alianza can be anticipated among Bogotá residents as a whole.”666 Another poll, conducted immediately following the visit showed an increase in the number of those aware of the AFP. Almost 90 percent of respondents now knew of the Alliance. More importantly, 85 percent believed that the
Colombian government should support the program. Knowledge of the trip itself also registered high numbers, with over 95 percent of those questioned mindful that Kennedy visited their country. Newspapers, radio, and television served as the primary conduits for publicizing the trip. Seventy three percent come away with a “very favorable” view of
Kennedy.667 The poll did not include all good news for the United States. When asked who bore the majority of the cost for the Alliance only 14 percent said that Colombia held primary responsibility. Though true that U.S. capital had a pivotal role in the program, the report stated that “the problem continues of exaggerated conceptions of the extent of U.S. contributions to the Alianza as versus self-help.”668
Along with increasing knowledge of the Alliance and improving the U.S. image in Bogotá, President Kennedy’s appearance helped give a boost to a lagging public diplomacy operation. The 1960 USIA Country Plan reported that “USIS is operating at an absolute minimum both in terms of personnel and funds. This country plan is being
666 “Public Opinion for the Alliance for Progress in Bogotá and other Latin American Cities,” December 1961, GRUSIA, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, 1955-1962, RG 306, Entry 1010, Box 2, NARA. 667 “The Impact of President Kennedy’s Visit Upon Attitudes Toward the Alianza in Bogotá ,” January 1962, GRUSIA, Office of Research and Media Reaction, Special Reports, 1953-1997, RG 306, Entry P 160, Box 18, NARA. 668 Ibid. 281 reduced considerably in the number of projects because it was found last year that it is impossible to carry out a wide range of activities, however desirable they may be, with positive effectiveness.”669 The assessment reflected a lack of attention from the White
House and the United States Congress’s unwillingness to robustly support the USIA. In
1958 the House of Representatives initially slashed the agency budget from $144 million to $106 million, only to have the Senate tack on another $15 million decrease. President
Eisenhower wrote an angry letter to Lyndon Johnson, Chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, who led the upper chamber’s efforts. The White House intervention helped a little, as the USIA budget for 1958 decreased to $96 million.670 In
1961, Edward R. Murrow’s USIA requested a substantial increase, primarily for more operations in Latin America and Africa. Though it did not get the total amount wanted, the $134 million approved by Congress was a substantial gain from the Eisenhower years.671
The additional money allowed for more specific programs in Colombia. PAO
Keith Adamson noted that while a lack of funds significantly hampered any USIA activities outside of the immediate Bogotá area in the past, the agency now planned for new programs in Colombia’s other major urban centers. These included cities such as
Cali, Medellin, Barranquilla, and Cartagena. University students, barrio groups, intellectuals, campesinos, and the military became prime target groups.672 Each of these
669 “Colombia Country Plan FY-1960,” August 6, 1959, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 670 Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 516. 671 “Group Cuts Fund Asked For USIA: Spending Questioned Department Fund Cut,” Washington Post, May 30, 1961, p. A6; McPherson, Yankee No! 126. 672 “Bogotá Country Plan,” October 31, 1961, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 282 held importance in the view of the USIA. The agency cast students as the future leaders and claimed that they “wield an extraordinary influence throughout Colombia as the ‘communicators’ of ideas.” Barrio dwellers represented the “average man” while intellectuals offered a way to reach the “general public.” As the largest segment of the population, campesinos earned particular attention. Not only did they represent a substantial bloc of the population, they controlled vitally important agriculture and economic lifelines in Colombia. The final group, military members, held the key in many respects as to whether or not democracy would last. Many Latin American militaries viewed their role as being more than just providing security for the people; they were the upholders of the constitution. The United States needed to persuade the Colombian military to take an apolitical stance.673 Also, one of the armed forces most fertile recruiting areas included rural populations. By impacting military members, the agency might also be reaching their family members back home.
In order to reach these groups the USIA focused on distributing materials in a broad manner. Given Colombia’s size and demographic makeup, U.S. information programs sought to reach as many target groups as possible, rather than just focusing efforts on individual priority audiences. Book and pamphlet distribution increased as students, military members, and literate campesinos all desired more materials. The
Universidad Nacional (National University) established two new reading rooms by 1962 to support these efforts. The USIA even made arrangements with a student group that had fourteen chapters located throughout the country to distribute materials.674 Binational centers proved to be one of the most useful tools for reaching a wide swath of the
673 Ibid. 674 Ibid. 283 population. At least eight centers became dedicated to improving U.S-Colombian relations. Large offices located in Bogotá, Medellin, Cali, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla, and Cartagena offered English classes, cultural events, and community action programs.
In Cartagena, taxi drivers became particularly interested in English classes as they came into close contact with many U.S. tourists disembarking their cruise ships in the coastal city.675 The Medellin center gained inroads into labor unions through a music program as a choral group based in a local factory made use of the center for practice sessions.676 The center in Bucaramanga took on added significance as it became the only cultural center available to citizens in the city of 200,000. Reports documented that “the center’s patronage extends through all strata. From the prominent businessmen and municipal figures who form the Board, all the way to the campesino of La Victoria…BNC
Bucaramanga has contact in greater or lesser degree with all groups, educational, intellectual, cultural, labor, and press.”677 The only BNC that did not measure up was in
Cali. USIA officials put the poor performance on a weak board of directors and inadequate offices. Even so, the USIA argued that closing the center would indicate a lack of interest on the part of the United States.
Abandoning a presence in the Valle de Cauca district, which Cali occupied, greatly concerned information officers on the ground. Colombia’s entryway to the Pacific
Ocean, along with the majority of the country’s ports operated there. Moreover, groups in the Valle de Cauca region, such as the Comite Unidad de Obrero-Campesino del
675 “Evaluation of Binational Centers (Cartagena,) March 27, 1963, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 676 Ibid. 677 “Evaluation of Binational Centers (Bucaramanga,) March 27, 1963, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 284 Municipio de Pradera (United Committee of Workers-Peasants in the town of
Pradera), became active supporters of the Cuban Revolution and argued that Fidel Castro and his revolution represented all of the people in the Americas.678 While the Cali BNC did not measure up, progress in that critical region did materialize. U.S. operations received a substantial enhancement when local citizens established the Asociación
Popular Alianza Para El Progreso (People’s Association Alliance for Progress) in
1963.679 The group set out to assist government efforts in advancing the development program. Moreover, Kennedy administration outreach to labor unions produced a tangible success in late 1962 when a major union, the Labores de Federacion Sindical de
Trabajadores es Libres del Valle (Free Workers Union of the Valle) denounced Fidel
Castro’s regime as being against democracy. The Union included workers from heavily populated Cali.680
A further medium utilized by BNC’s and mobile viewing units included film. A color documentary of the Kennedy visit became popular as well as the anti-Castro movie
“The Revolution Betrayed.” Also, La Tierra Prometida (The Promised Land), a short animated film on Cuba’s economic failures received airplay.681 In order to maximize the use of film the USIA enlisted director James Blue, a filmmaker discovered by the agency at Cannes, France in 1961. Blue screened “The Oliver Tree of Justice,” a film about the
678 “Memorandum para Embajada de Cuba en Colombia a la Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en Havana,” 27 de Enero 1961, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 679 Acta de Fundacion, Asociacion Popular Alianza Para El Progreso, 6 de Enero 1963, Ministerio de Gobierno, Despacho Ministro, Caja 37, Carpeta 317, AGNCOL. 680 “Informes General de Labores de la Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores es Libres del Valle,” 20 de Diciembre, 1962, Ministerio de Educación, Secretaria General, Caja 332, Carpeta 4, AGNCOL. 681 “Country Plan Submission,” June 21, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA; Memorandum from USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson to Brig. General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations, The Pentagon, July 20, 1962, ed. Jon Elliston, Psywar on Cuba: The Declassification History of Anti-Castro Propaganda (New York: Ocean Press, 1999), 108. 285 French-Algerian War, when George Stevens approached him with an offer to produce short pictures on the Alliance for Progress in Latin America.682 Shortly thereafter, Blue and fellow filmmaker Steven Larner went to Bogotá. They returned with enough footage for three brief ten-minute films. A Letter from Colombia, Evil Wind Out, and The School at Rincon Santo formed what became known as the “Colombian Trilogy.”683 All three films depicted progress in rural areas of Colombia. A Letter from Colombia, focused on community action and the need for cooperation. Evil Wind Out not only examined public health but also highlighted the need for modernity. In the film a village appeared where children died on a regular basis due to inadequate healthcare. Locals depended on a type of “witchdoctor” who told the ill to place a piece of white paper on their nose to let the
“evil wind out.” The screen then cuts away to a doctor from the city who came to treat the sick, but locals demurred since no one in the village believed that “a stranger had come to help them.” Finally, a young boy with a deficient diet seeks help and is injected with medicine. The next day the healed child becomes an example to all villagers of the good that modernity can bring. The film portrays a public health center being constructed in the village and the narrator declares that “this is part of the immense public health program throughout Colombia—a part of the Alliance for Progress: designed to help
Latin American countries to help their people, and to help those people to help themselves to a better life.”684
682 Daniel Eagan, America’s Film Legacy: The Authoritative Guide to the Landmark Movie in the National Film Registry (London: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 608. 683 Tony Shaw, Hollywood’s Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007), 179. 684 “Evil Wind Out, English Script,” November 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Office of Research, Country Project File, 1951-1964, RG 306, Box 111, Entry 1015, ARC ID 1065787, NARA. 286 The School at Rincon Santo centered on the building of a school in a remote part of Colombia. For years the people of this tiny village lived isolated from the rest of the country. The locals did not own the land they worked and the majority could not read or write. The narrator softly states that though these people “learned to live without asking, but they always wanted a school.” The movie shows a local woman, while dressing one of her children, stating that “I want a school to instruct my sons so that they can do more in the future. So that they can be whatever they wish.” During a village meeting a Colombian official tells the residents of Rincon Santo that the government will provide the materials but the people will have to build the school. The villagers set out to construct a road so materials could reach them and clear a lot for the building. The supplies arrive and the people go to work, finishing the project in just a few months. The final minutes of the film show the children on their first day learning the alphabet as smiling parents watched from the windows, seeing a sight they once thought impossible, their children in a school. The narrator declares that “this is part of the spirit of the
Alliance for Progress.”685 When recounting making the film Blue stated that “it was a wonderful experience; they [the USIA] gave me carte blanche. The theme is people helping themselves to progress. There’s one film in this group where I brought everything out of the existing materials. It’s called ‘The School at Rincon Santo,’ and it is the most successful of the three films.”686
The agency reported that “The School at Rincon Santo” became widely popular in
Colombia, so much so that the USIA commissioned a study to determine if it would be
685 “The School At Rincon Santo, English Script,” September 28, 1962, GRUSIA, Office of Research, Country Project File, 1951-1964, RG 306, Box 111, Entry 1015, ARC ID 1065787, NARA. 686 Jennifer Horne, “Experiments in Propaganda: Reintroducing James Blue's Colombia Trilogy,” The Moving Image, v.9 (1), 2009, 194. 287 useful in other countries.687 Surveys conducted in several Venezuelan cities demonstrated the film’s usefulness. Two sets of moviegoers in Caracas, 1000 in total, received tickets through a raffle. One set (500) viewed the USIA production and the other set (500) watched a non-related project. Following the screenings moviegoers received questions regarding the Alliance for Progress and U.S. actions in the region. Reports indicated that those who viewed The School at Rincon Santo came away with more of an understanding regarding the Alliance for Progress, “76 percent of the viewers said afterward that they heard of the Alliance for Progress, 15 percent fewer–61 percent–of the non-viewers had such information. Nearly twice as many viewers as non-viewers (39 percent to 23 percent) gave the specific name, Alliance for Progress, from memory.”688
Reports indicated that 72 percent of those who saw the film “approved” of the Alliance for Progress while only 54 percent of those who did not see the film approved. Once again though, the burden for the Alliance for Progress to succeed fell on the United
States. Filmgoers came away thinking that the Washington bore most of the responsibility for the economic program’s cost.689
Through James Blue’s “Colombian trilogy,” film became a useful public diplomacy tool for the USIA. While movies allowed for key target groups to be reached, more importantly, works by James Blue brought the realities that existed in the
Colombian countryside into the cities. One of the most pressing issues in the push for modernity and democracy revolved around making sure the upper-classes understood the
687 “Research of Alliance Film-School at Rincon Santo,” February 2, 1964, GRUSIA, Office of Research, Country Project File, 1951-1964, Box 111, Entry 1015, ARC ID 1065787, NARA; “The School at Rincon Santo Impact of USIA Documentary Film in Venezuela,” July 1964, GRUSIA, Office of Research, Country Project File, 1951-1964, Box 111, Entry 1015, ARC ID 106578, NARA. 688 “Research of Alliance Film-School at Rincon Santo,” February 2, 1964, GRUSIA, Office of Research, Country Project File, 1951-1964, Box 111, Entry 1015, ARC ID 1065787, NARA. 689 Ibid. 288 dilemmas that campesinos faced on a daily basis. The three films gave attention to the need for community action along with giving a face to the problem of crippling poverty.
Furthermore, the films cast the United States as an ally in the struggle for economic progress.
Democracy Upheld
As in Venezuela, guerilla violence in Colombia became more organized and more of a threat to stability. Another common characteristic between the two countries is that democracy held during the 1960s. When conservative leader Guillermo León Valencia took over the presidency from President Lleras Camargo in August 1962, Washington breathed a sigh of relief. Colombian officials reported that U.S. press accounts greatly favored the election’s outcome as the National Front agreement from 1958 held.690
Kennedy and León Valencia exchanged letters reaffirming both their dedication to democracy and that the new Colombian leader should soon travel to Washington for meetings.691 León Valencia further endeared himself to the United States when during his inaugural address he eloquently eulogized two peace corps volunteers who died in a
Colombian airplane accident a few months prior to his election. He stated that “I render homage with admiration, gratitude and love to the members of the Peace Corps who died in the terrible airplane crash…they came…to understand us, to help us…to suffer our misfortunes and dangers.”692 Most importantly, León Valencia continued promoting the
Alliance for Progress and the Lleras Camargo administration’s program of public
690 “Editorial Sobre las Elecciones Presidenciales,” 11 de Mayo 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Embajada de Colombia en Estados Unidos, Transferencia 8, Caja 369, AGNCOL. 691 Colombia: General, 1962-1963, Digital Identifier, JFKPOF-114-002, JFKL; “Toasts of the President and President-Elect Valencia of Colombia,” June 25, 1962, APP. 692 Scott Stossel, Sarge: The Life and Times of Sargent Shriver (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2004), chapter 20; Hoffman, All You Need is Love, 121-123. 289 investments.693 At the same time, during his post-presidency Lleras Camargo continued to have an international presence by giving speeches pushing for continued support of the Kennedy administration.694 Unfortunately, for all of León Valencia’s positive qualities he was not as charismatic or determined as Lleras Camargo to push for robust reform. One Colombian economist wrote that León Valencia remained “not particularly interested in economics, just at a time when the inherited situation called for a chief executive with an appetite for financial matters.”695
Further issues occurred as Colombia’s economy entered a difficult period by the mid-1960s. Declining coffee prices coupled with a steep rise in the cost of living created an unstable atmosphere. The Colombian government viewed the situation as a crisis that affected all aspects of economic development.696 Moreover, as guerilla groups became better organized in the countryside, more economic and political unrest became a reality.
Certain parts of the country, primarily rural areas with little to no state presence, became known as “independent republics.” Guerilla groups established control in these areas. The
United States greatly assisted Bogotá in attempting to bring the guerillas under control.
Several U.S. survey teams conducted assessments and their recommendations included implementing a program of counter-insurgency. Havana also continued its involvement with guerilla groups. Cuban officials in Bogotá conducted interviews with anti-
693 “Memorando,Revisión Plan de Inversiones Públicas 1963-1966 y Elaboración Proyecto Presupuesto 1964,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Depsacho Ministro (undated), Transferencia 8, Caja 21, AGNCOL. 694 “Palabras de Alberto Lleras Camargo sobre los beneficios de la Alianza y los peligros de que la hundan los burócratas,” Febrero 1963 (New Orleans), Papers of Alberto Lleras Camargo, Documentos Correspondencia y Discursos de Alberto Lleras sobre la Alianza para el Progresso, Carpeta 42, BLAA. 695 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 156; Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Foreign trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia (National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1976), 23-25. 696 “Los Problemas de la Planeación Colombiana en la Actualidad, 1962,” Presidencia de la Republica, Secretaria General (undated), Caja 330, Carpeta 2, AGNCOL; Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 160. 290 government guerillas in Colombia and passed their views onto leaders back home.
Reports argued that a “crisis” had engulfed Colombia. The memorandum focused in part on León Valencia’s dependence on the Pentagon to combat guerillas and highlighted that such heavy involvement helped stoke anti-U.S. sentiment.697
By 1964 the Colombian government sought to eradicate the independent zones and sent 3,500 soldiers to Marquetalia, a remote enclave with no state presence. A bloody battle ensued and while the government came away with a military victory, the belief in armed struggle intensified among the remaining bands of guerillas.698 After the
Marquetalia incident guerillas began to operate under the banner of one name, the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).699 Led by Manuel Marulanda, nicknamed Tirofijo (sureshot), the FARC’s membership came from the peasant class.700
It is critical to understand that the Cold War did not create the FARC, nor did the group originate as a result of Havana’s machinations. While FARC leaders certainly drew lessons from Castro’s victory, the group’s beginnings dated back to the political battles of the 1940s and 1950s.701 Even with a government sponsored counter-insurgency campaign
697 “Entrevista con Carlos Romero, Secretario de Organizacion de la Juventud Comunista de Colombia,” 19 de Agosto 1964, A. Latina, Colombia, Ordinario, 1901-1967, MINREX. 698 Dennis Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter-insurgency Efforts in Colombia 1959-1965,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1995), 304-327; Russell Crandall, Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO, 2002), 60-62. 699 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia, 98-99. 700 Nazih Richani, “Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War System and the Privatisation of Counterinsurgency in Colombia,” in The Long War - Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States, eds. Mark Berger and Douglas Borer (New York: Routledge, 2013), 218; Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 23-25. 701 Marc Chernick, “Negotiating Peace amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia,” in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1999), 197; Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 94-95. 291 the FARC continued its anti-government crusade for decades. The origins of the
FARC could be viewed as a sign that U.S. attempts to cultivate public opinion in
Colombia failed. Yet, their membership never grew beyond several thousand soldiers, as the vast majority of citizens followed the democratic path. In the end, while periodic political violence remained in Colombia, elections became a mainstay in political life from 1958 to the present.
Image 29: Presidents Kennedy, Lleras Camargo, and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy
participate in a housing ceremony just outside Bogotá.
292 Conclusion
Through a close examination of public diplomacy in Venezuela and Colombia it becomes clear that the promotion of democracy and modernization dominated the
Kennedy administration’s approach to Latin America. Through nurturing and promoting reformist leaders, Kennedy pushed forward his aim of economic progress, political freedom, and anti-Castroism. In Venezuela, USIA efforts to influence labor, students, teachers, and intellectuals paid dividends as the country embraced democracy. Moreover, cultural exchanges, such as William Faulkner’s visit, provided Venezuelans with more cultural knowledge regarding the United States. Finally, leaders such as Rómulo
Betancourt welcomed Washington’s efforts and attempted to modernize and democratize.
Even though Venezuela never reached the annual growth rate of 2.5 percent envisioned by the Alliance for Progress, and the reforms carried out by the Betancourt government did not lead to universal education or the end of poverty, the government did make significant gains.702 A constitutional system emerged and Betancourt reformed important sectors of the economy. The Venezuelan leader also combated Fidel Castro’s revolutionary ambitions. Colombia followed a similar path. The administration of Alberto
Lleras Camargo achieved many successes in improving education, housing, and healthcare. Colombians who had never once stepped foot in a doctor’s office or schoolhouse now had the hope of a better future. As in Venezuela, Colombia’s economic growth never came close to Alliance for Progress objectives. Also, combating guerillas in the countryside significantly hampered any reform efforts by the mid-1960s. Yet, leaders in Bogotá did earn significant achievements.
702 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 108. 293 When measuring success by statistics, it is difficult to label the Kennedy administration’s efforts as successful. Yet, by focusing solely on the data, much is lost.
Historian David Sheinin gives the example of a Colombian man who became a “child of the Alliance for Progress.” Though born into poverty, Antonio López’s (a pseudonym) father improved his family’s socioeconomic status through Alliance for Progress programs. So much so that the family moved to a better neighborhood and young
Antonio received an education at a school funded by the Alliance for Progress. That education allowed him to secure a well-paying job and middle-class life in Cartagena.703
Though anecdotal, Antonio’s story mirrors the path taken by many in Venezuela and
Colombia. It is simplistic to examine a program such as the Alliance for Progress only through a statistical lens. At its core, the program sought to advance the lives of Latin
Americans and instill a sense of hope in each person. The USIA, through diplomatic visits, outreach to the public, and binational centers and mobile film units, made sure that
Venezuelans and Colombians knew about the U.S. commitment to ushering in fundamental changes.
Moreover, U.S. public diplomacy efforts in Venezuela and Colombia are often overshadowed in historical works that focus more on U.S. support for Latin American militaries. For example, Stephen Rabe devotes significant attention to the increases that took place in funding for military hardware, deployment of U.S. soldiers to advise in counterinsurgency tactics, and Washington’s willingness to support internal security measures implemented by local leaders. He writes that “Kennedy administration officials set as their primary goal for Latin America the defeat of communism. They believed that
703 David Sheinin, H-Diplo Roundtable Review Jeffrey Taffet Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007). Volume XI, No. 20 (2010), 14-15 294 their internal security policies contributed to that success.”704 Rabe correctly assesses large-scale U.S. support, sometimes in hard currency other times in the form of small military training teams.705 Yet, while the United States certainly did increase support for
Venezuelan and Colombian militaries, many more resources were made available for the economic progress, democracy promotion, and public diplomacy campaigns.
The president’s and first lady’s 1961 trip stands as a prime example of non-military support given by Kennedy White House to both nations. The increased understanding and goodwill generated from the trip greatly aided U.S. diplomatic initiatives. Moreover, in
Venezuela the addition of another labor specialist in Irving Tragen allowed for more contacts to be made with a critical target group. Caracas received hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States for developmental projects that sought to reach average citizens. In stark contrast, aid to the Venezuelan military only averaged twelve million per year from 1961 to 1965.706 In Colombia, increased budget expenditures that helped promote several binational centers throughout the country. Furthermore, the United States
Food for Peace program that donated thirty five million dollars worth of surplus agriculture products to Colombia and it became the first Latin American country to receive Peace Corps volunteers. The attention given, and resources allocated, on the public diplomacy was far more substantial than U.S. military aid to Colombia. In fact, the
United States only sent six million dollars in military aid in 1962 and a little over eight million in 1963. As Historian Michael LaRosa and Colombian scholar Germán Mejía
704 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 147. 705 Sean Walsh, “Military Assistance Advisory Group,” in Encyclopedia of U.S. Military Interventions in Latin America, vol. 2, ed. Alan McPherson (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 408. 706 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 105. 295 note, “U.S. military spending in Colombia was far less significant than social and development spending.”707
By partnering with leaders such as Betancourt and Lleras Camargo the United
States sided with true reformers. Through President Kennedy’s triumphant visits to
Caracas and Bogotá the administration bolstered USIA efforts and created much goodwill. Where the Kennedy administration fell short included making sure that the leaders and citizens in Caracas and Bogotá viewed the Alliance for Progress as a partnership. Too often, the United States held the responsibility for achieving progress.
As numerous USIA opinion polls demonstrated, Venezuelans and Colombians believed that success hinged on Washington’s actions. As a result, some elites failed to take seriously the calls for reform and proved unwilling to let go of their grip on political and economic power. A second shortcoming included overselling. Ardently believing that
Venezuela and Colombia could be showcases for U.S.-led modernization, the USIA held nothing back in promoting the Alliance for Progress and other U.S. ideals. Such an approach worked well when deeds matched up with words, but when economic development lagged, disenchantment with Washington could develop.
Ultimately, the Kennedy administration cultivated a much improved image of the
United States in Venezuela and Colombia. The fundamental success of U.S. public diplomacy is that it provided an alternative to the Cuban model. Coupled with
Venezuelan and Colombian reformers, the United States put forward a powerful and sustained message regarding the benefits of U.S.-led development. These actions played a
707 LaRosa and Mejía, Colombia, 208. 296 direct role in helping many in the region accept Washington’s vision of reform, rather than Havana’s dream of revolution.
297 Chapter 6: No More “Zonians”: The Panamanian Challenge to U.S. Power and
Image
In 1903 President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched U.S. warships to help support
Panama’s independence from Colombia. TR also had an additional goal: he wanted newly independent Panamanians to support construction of a trans-oceanic waterway through their country. The U.S. leader argued that “the people of the United States and the people of the Isthmus and the rest of mankind will all be the better because we dig the
Panama Canal and keep order in its neighborhood.”708 Even after his presidency TR continued defending his actions, writing to his successor, “I have always felt that the one thing for which I deserved most credit in my entire administration was seizing the psychological moment to get complete control of Panama.”709 Ultimately, the canal fundamentally altered global trade while simultaneously offering Panama vast opportunities. At the same time, the strategic waterway posed a paradox for
Panamanians. It allowed for economic development at a time when all other Central
American nations lacked basic infrastructure. Yet, it also served as a stark and constant reminder of U.S. power. The canal, and the competing visions U.S. policymakers and
Panamanians held for it, shaped a very complicated bilateral relationship throughout the
20th century.
By the 1960s Panamanian desires for complete control of the shipping channel reached a fever pitch. Violent protests in 1959 and 1964, both in response to the large
U.S. presence, seriously hindered all U.S. public diplomacy efforts. The USIA had to
708 Bonham Richardson, The Caribbean in the Wider World, 1492-1992: A Regional Geography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 81. 709 Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt: The Days of Armageddon, 1900-1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 179. 298 operate in an increasingly difficult environment. No other issue in U.S.-Panama relations could be separated from whether or not the United States would modify the treaty governing the canal. Washington faced a grave dilemma as U.S. policymakers had no desire to cede any authority, but faced growing pressure from Panama City. The increasingly anti-U.S. attitude among Panamanians produced the USIA’s most pressing issue.
While leaders in Washington, including Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon
B. Johnson, believed that winning over the Panamanian public needed to be a top priority, persuading the country to accept a sustained U.S. presence was no easy task. At the same time, often U.S. policymakers failed to appreciate the indigenous nature of
Panamanian grievances and looked to outside sources as the primary reason for continued anti-U.S. sentiment and unrest. Just as in Guatemala and Honduras, the United States saw
Castro’s fingerprints. White House officials were not alone their fears of Castro gaining influence in Panama. Prominent congressional leaders such as Daniel Flood and Strom
Thurmond repeatedly criticized any proposals that granted Panama concessions. Flood consistently posited that acquiescing to demands only aided revolutionary Cuba. The manner in which U.S. foreign policy focused so intently on Castro, particularly in
Panama, where it appeared rather obvious that local conditions were more to blame for unrest than Havana, speaks to the centrality of Cuba in the minds of policymakers when they viewed events in Latin America.
In its attempts to convince Panamanian that U.S. control of the canal served everyone’s best interests, USIA primary target groups became business leaders, students, campesinos, and journalists. The Kennedy administration approached Panama with a 299 willingness to listen to grievances, but a lack of motivation to endorse a change in canal ownership. Domestic politics always made Kennedy seek to put off any serious discussions until after the 1964 presidential election. Lyndon Johnson had no choice but to confront the issue as only a few months following JFK’s death he faced instability in
Panama. A massive student protest in January 1964 quickly escalated into a general uprising throughout the country. A main catalyst for the unrest included tensions between
Panamanians and U.S. citizens living in the Canal Zone. In the wake of widespread violence the Panamanian government pushed even harder for negotiations to reconsider the status of the canal and gain a new treaty. In fact, Panamanian leaders used public unrest as a way of keeping U.S. policymakers on their heels and forcing new negotiations. President Roberto Chiari stoked anti-U.S. sentiment during the 1964 riots and then castigated Washington for failing to take Panama’s grievances seriously. Now, facing the threat of continued violence, the United States reluctantly agreed to new talks.
These discussions ultimately, after more than a decade, guaranteed Panama control of the canal.
The story of U.S. public diplomacy in Panama during the 1960s is instructive for it clearly illustrates how events on the ground can both shape the U.S. image among local populations and cause a recalibration of policy in Washington. As an example, the 1964 riots must be viewed as a breaking point in U.S.-Panamanian relations, particularly for
Panama. While acrimonious debates by U.S. policymakers, citizens, and representatives continued in the months and years following January 1964, the USIA struggled to implement a cohesive public diplomacy strategy as Panamanians clamored for more respect. Washington’s reluctance to fully engage in new negotiations meant U.S. public 300 diplomacy attempted to sell Panamanians on the benefits and necessity of U.S. control at a time when only a new treaty could assuage Panamanian desires. When
Lyndon Johnson was finally ready to publicly endorse significant changes, the Vietnam
War severely hampered his ability to gain any domestic support for concessions.
Moreover, by the end of the 1960s the USIA had to contend with new charismatic leadership in Panama City as General Omar Torrijos took power. An ardent nationalist,
Torrijos fundamentally changed the dynamics of U.S.-Panamanian negotiations. His ability to attract supporters, and shrewd diplomatic skills, helped Panama earn a new treaty by 1977.
Ultimately, U.S. psychological efforts proved unsuccessful in Panama as the result of a flawed strategy. Due to Washington’s inflexibility, a continued focus on the
Castro threat, and the U.S. public’s recalcitrance, the USIA could not promote a message that signaled an openness for real change. In the end, both the Johnson administration and the U.S. public failed for too long to fully comprehend the emotional importance of the
1964 riots. From that time forward there existed no public diplomacy strategy that could alleviate Panamanian wishes for a new treaty.
The Panamanian Context
By the early 1900s, with the Panama Canal completely operational, the United
States controlled what became known as the Canal Zone. The zone, stretching over 550 miles from Panama City to Colon, connected the waterway from the Pacific Ocean to the
Caribbean Sea. One of the most important areas included Balboa, the administrative capital located in Panama City. Thousands of U.S. soldiers, civilians, and families resided there. Restaurants, schools, churches, police stations, and recreational facilities made the 301 area feel like a city within a city.710 Historian Michael Donoghue described the zone as “constituting a population of over fifty thousand administrators, technicians, canal workers, soldiers, and their dependents, plus nine thousand workers who lived on the other side of the line, the enclave constituted one of the largest U.S. overseas communities from World War II through 1979.”711 For their reluctance to venture outside of the U.S. controlled area, citizens residing in Balboa earned the nickname “zonians.”
Political unrest revolving around the canal originated soon after its opening. The
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, signed in 1903, gave the United States the right to “employ armed forces for the safety or protection of the Canal.”712 It did so twice during the 1920s as Panamanians grew upset at Washington’s unwillingness to renegotiate the parameters of the agreement. Along with the right of intervention, the treaty gave the United States sovereignty over the Canal Zone.713 During the 1930s Panamanian grievances intensified, which led to the creation of the Partido Panameñista (PP), a political bloc founded in response to growing U.S. influence. President Franklin Roosevelt concluded that
Panamanian nationalism would not diminish without some U.S. concessions and opened up talks with the government. In the Hull-Alfaro Treaty of 1936 the United States renounced the right to intervention, increased the annual annuity to $430,000, and
710 Thomas O’Brien, Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalizations (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 85. 711 Michael Donoghue, Borderland on the Isthmus: Race, Culture, and the Struggle for the Canal Zone (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 4. 712 “Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty),” November 18, 1903, available from the Avalon Project. 713 Brian Loveman, No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 110. 302 recognized Panama’s sovereignty over the Isthmus by referring to the Canal Zone as
Panamanian territory under the jurisdiction of the United States.714
The outbreak of World War II created a sense of urgency among U.S. policymakers about the security of the canal. Fears of Nazi machinations in the Western
Hemisphere increased defense official’s wishes for more land in Panama.715 Yet, due to the 1936 treaty the United States now had to receive permission from the Panamanian government before making any moves to acquire land. Leaders in Panama City viewed the situation as a prime opportunity to extract more concessions. The situation grew more contentious when Arnulfo Arias, a member of the PP, became president in 1940. Arias refused all requests unless Washington met his demands. He wanted major economic aid, a law stating that U.S. military police would only be allowed to use billy clubs outside of the zone, and assurances that the United States would provide labor to build an oil pipeline in Panama. The Roosevelt administration grew irate at such demands. One official wrote that “the present conditions are considered dangerous to the security of the canal and it is believed that they should be corrected as soon as possible. A local revolution to throw out the crooked pro-Axis officialdom would be preferable to intervention by U.S. forces.”716 In March 1941 U.S. forces seized the additional lands they wanted and a few months later a military coup ousted Arias. Washington negotiated the terms of the recently acquired areas with the new government and agreed to vacate the additions immediately after the war concluded. However, when World War II ended
714 Orlando Pérez, “Panama: Nationalism and the Challenge to Canal Security,” in Latin America during World War II, eds. Leonard and Bratzel, 56-57. 715 Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans in Latin American in World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82. 716 Orlando Pérez, “Panama: Nationalism and the Challenge to Canal Security,” in Latin America during World War II, eds. Leonard and Bratzel, 56-57. 303 the United States sought talks with Panama to remain in the newly occupied areas.
Anti-U.S. Panamanian protesters quickly responded. Widespread demonstrations and threats of more unrest caused local legislators to unanimously reject any proposal that allowed a greater U.S. presence. The United States vacated the lands a few months later.
Preventing lawmakers from approving the measure proved to be an important event, for it illustrated how organized Panamanian protests could challenge U.S. plans.
By the 1950s Panamanian nationalism remained a potent force and where one stood on the canal issue determined their political prospects. When José Antonio Remón
Cantera of the Coalición Patriótica Nacional (National Patriotic Coalition, CPN), a nationalist-conservative party, became president in 1953 he immediately declared that he would travel to Washington and renegotiate the canal treaty. Remón Cantera campaigned on the platform of “neither millions nor alms, we want justice.”717 The Eisenhower administration proved willing to re-examine the canal issue. Historian J. Michael Hogan writes that Eisenhower “was among those convinced that competition for the hearts and minds of Latin America demanded a new American approach in Panama.”718 Following an October 1953 meeting a joint statement declared that Eisenhower “assured the
President of the Republic of Panama that all of the points which the representatives of
Panama desire to raise would receive the most sympathetic consideration in the light of the especially close relations existing between the two countries. In view of the nature of the special bonds between the two countries he has expressed the desire of the United
717 Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America Took, Built, Ran, and Ultimately Gave Away the Panama Canal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 230. 718 J. Michael Hogan, The Panama Canal in American politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 69. 304 States to continue to cooperate in the development of Panama’s national economy.”719
Those words were soon followed with action as the Remón-Eisenhower Treaty in 1955 raised Panama’s annual annuity from $430,000 to $1.93 million, ceded back several areas of land to the Panamanian government, and called for the United States to construct a bridge over the canal.720
Image 30: Map of Panama.
However, the treaty did not succeed in mollifying all grievances regarding the canal. In many respects the primary issue concerned national pride. Panamanians believed that the presence of the United States in their country on such a large scale remained unacceptable. When several Panamanian students entered the Canal Zone in
1959 to plant their national flag for Independence Day celebrations, a full riot occurred.
719 “Joint Statement by the President and President Remon Cantera of Panama,” October 1, 1953, APP. 720 Maurer and Yu, The Big Ditch, 231. 305 Local Guardia Nacional (National Guard, GN) forces along with U.S. soldiers confronted the students and wounded over 100.721 The violence provoked action from
Washington. Only a few months before leaving office, President Eisenhower made a symbolic, but important gesture. He ordered that the Panamanian flag be flown alongside the U.S. flag in the Canal Zone.722
Castro, Chiari, and Kennedy Confront Panama
United States control of the canal became an easy target for Cuba’s Fidel Castro.
Twice in a matter of weeks in 1960 he publicly derided Washington for its actions.
During the Declaration of Havana he stated that the people of revolutionary Cuba condemn “the overt and criminal intervention exerted by North American imperialism for more than a century over all the nations of Latin America which…have lost, through the voracity of Yankee imperialism…vital strategic centers, such as the Panama Canal.”723
Castro also mentioned the canal as an example of U.S. aggression during a long speech at the United Nations (UN).724 Fearing Cuba gaining popularity in Panama, Kennedy desired to improve the U.S. image. On the public diplomacy front the administration had much work to do. The 1959 riots prevented the USIA from engaging in normal information activities. Local newspaper editorials and radio broadcasts became
721 Robert Harding II, Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 44. 722 Editorial Note, Panama, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. V, 908; Arie Kacowics, Peaceful Territorial Change (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 198; For a brief history of the flag issue refer to “The Flag Issue,” Panama Canal Spillway, January 27, 1964, BRC. 723 The Havana Declaration, September 2, 1960, Castro Speech Database, LANIC. 724 “Fidel Castro Address at the United Nations,” September 26, 1960, Castro Speech Database, LANIC. 306 particularly harsh towards Washington, so much so that agency officials even stopped attempting to get pro-U.S. messages in the news or on the airwaves.725
Though Kennedy brought a new spirit and energy to the White House, the most pressing issue in U.S.-Panama relations continued to be the status of the canal. While
U.S. diplomats on the ground in Panama held the position that a new round of negotiations should be considered, State Department officials in Washington initially demurred.726 A change in Panamanian leadership created even more arguments in favor of reassessing the U.S. posture. Though a member of the established oligarchy, Roberto
Chiari cast himself as a liberal reformer and ran on the slogan of “it’s time for a change” during the 1960 election.727 Once in power he pushed development projects and reforms that would create a more equitable society. Historian Robert Harding writes that Chiari
“recognized Panama for the time bomb that it was.”728
The new Panamanian government quickly earned Kennedy administration support for its stance on the Alliance for Progress and Cuba. Chiari fully embraced
Washington’s modernization agenda, and with assistance from the USAID undertook new school construction projects and other social improvement programs.729 Chiari also earned U.S. backing for his government’s stance towards Cuba. The administration became one of the more outspoken critics of Havana’s calls for region-wide revolution
725 “Country Assessment Report,” January 29, 1960, GRUSIA, Foreign Service Despatches, 1954-1965, RG 306, Entry 1047, Box 5, NARA. 726 Oral History, Edward Clark, April 29, 1992, FAOC. 727 Michael Conniff, “Panama Since 1903,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America: 1930 to the Present, vol. 7, ed. Leslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 632. 728 Robert Harding, The History of Panama (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Press, 2006), 58. 729 “Asunto: Disposiciones general de las especificaciones que están siendo usadas en el Programa Construcciones Escolares, Republica de Panama, Presidencia,” Nota No. 309, 13 de Marzo 1963, Memoria 1963, MREPAN; El Programa de Desarrollo Economico y Social de Panama del Presentación Ciudadano President de la Republica de Panama Roberto Chiari, Junio 1963, BNP. 307 and Fidel Castro’s support of such actions. In fact, reports indicated that Panama became one of the first countries targeted by individuals receiving guerilla training in
Cuba shortly after Castro took power in 1959. Panama’s GN caught around 80 men,
Panamanians and Cubans, attempting to enter the country along the coast. Castro denied that his government had anything to do with such “irresponsible” actions, but that assertion did not quell worries in Panama City.730 Only a few months later the newspaper
El Dia’s headline stated “Nueva Invasion: Se Informa Preparan Desde Cuba (New
Invasion: Reports Indicate from Cuba).” The El Dia report received private confirmation when Panama’s Ambassador in Havana cabled home that two sources corroborated to him that Che Guevara became personally involved in the planning.731 Soon thereafter, like other Latin American countries such as Colombia, Panama began tracking its citizens who sought to visit Havana.732
The Chiari government quickly concluded that Cuba remained deeply committed to supporting revolutions in the region and that Panama stood as a prime target. Panamanian Foreign Minister Galileo Solís wrote to his counterpart in Guatemala that the people “must open their eyes to the grave and imminent danger at the door.”733
The increasing organization of pro-Cuba groups in Panama, including the Comité Pro
Defensa de la Revolución (Committee in Defense of the Revolution) became particularly worrisome. The Cuban Foreign Ministry took note of the committee and diplomats
730 Georgie Anne Geyer, Guerilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 215; “Declaraciones de Fidel,” 28 de Abril 1959, Revolución, p. 13; R. Hart Phillips, “Castro Deplores Panama Landing,” April 28, 1959, New York Times. 731 “Memorandum, Embajada de Panama en Habana, Cuba a Ministro Relaciones Exteriores,” 16 de Noviembre 1959, Embajada de Panama en Cuba, vol. 30, MREPAN. 732 “Memorandum, Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores a Ministro de la Presidencia,” 7 de Marzo 1963, Embajada de Panama en Cuba, vol. 30, MREPAN. 733 “Memorandum, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores (Panama) a Ministro de la Relaciones (Guatemala),” 21 de Marzo 1961, Embajada de Panama en Cuba, vol. 28, MREPAN. 308 representing Havana attended local rallies in Panama.734 When Chiari broke relations with the island in December 1961 the Panamanian government made clear its disgust with Castro’s vocal support of insurrection, describing it as one of the reasons for the break.735 Moreover, in private conversations with U.S. officials, leaders in Panama City consistently pushed Washington for a tougher stance against Cuba. Finance Minister
Gilberto Arias prodded the United States to impose harsh economic sanctions and seek consultations specifically with Central American and Caribbean nations. He reasoned that these countries might be more willing to initiate the most severe sanctions against Cuba since they bore the brunt of Castro’s actions.736
Image 31: President Kennedy and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari meet at the
White House, 1962.
734 “Memorandum, Embajada de Cuba en Panama a Ministro Relaciones Exteriores,” Asuntos Latino- Americanos, 7 de Abril 1960, America Lat., Panama, 1903-1976, Ordinario, MINREX. 735 “Memorandum, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores (Panama) a Embajador de Mexico,” 14 de Diciembre 1961, Embajada de Panama en Cuba, vol. 30, MREPAN. 736 “Memorandum, Gilbert Arias (Panama Finance Minister) a George Smathers (U.S. Senator, Florida), re: Cuban Crisis,” 17 de Septiembre 1962, vol. 31, MREPAN. 309 Chiari used his status as an anti-Castro crusader to pressure President
Kennedy to open up talks over the canal. He initially sent word to JFK through David
Samudio, head of his National Planning Commission. While attending a finance conference in Honduras, Samudio told U.S. Ambassador Charles Burrows that Chiari sought a fundamental revision of the canal’s status. Though the new Panamanian president still wanted the U.S. to have operational control, he desired a larger annuity.
Most important, Chiari wanted an entirely new treaty to be negotiated.737 In response,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk cabled to the Panamanian Embassy that Chiari needed to be discouraged “from sending a letter requesting treaty negotiations.” In September 1961, while on an economic mission to Washington, Chiari’s brother personally delivered a letter to Kennedy in the Oval Office that did in fact request new talks.738 JFK immediately sent word to Rusk that an National Security Council Working Group should study the issue, writing that “it seems to me we should take a careful look at this problem with a view to analyzing what our basic interests are in the Canal Zone, what concessions we could make, and on what terms we could reasonably expect to get a long-term settlement.”739 The president also sent Chiari a public letter. JFK wrote that “my
Government recognizes that differences will inevitably arise between even the friendliest nations, and believes that these differences must be discussed thoroughly and frankly, in order to clarify the interests and attitudes of both parties.”740 The letter received attention
737 “Telegram from the Embassy in Honduras to the Department of State,” July 22, 1961, FRUS, 1961- 1963, vol. XII, 810. 738 William Jorden, Panama Odyssey (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 31. 739 “National Security Memorandum No. 95 (Memorandum for The Secretary of State),” September 15, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 815. 740 “Letter to President Chiari of Panama Concerning the Canal,” November 15, 1961, APP. 310 in the United States and played very well among the Panamanian public.741 The USIA characterized the year 1961 as one of “rising expectations.” An agency country assessment commented on Kennedy’s reply and affirmed that it “fired the imagination of all concerned in that at last Panama may receive some recognition from an administration that they feel truly understands and respects what Panama considers to be its true and just claims.”742 Washington hoped that Kennedy’s conciliatory words, coupled with the launching of the Alliance for Progress, would discourage anti-U.S. activities.
It should be noted that improvements in U.S.-Panamanian relations on the public diplomacy front began before Kennedy took office. In the fall of 1960 President
Eisenhower overhauled several elements of the U.S. country team in Panama City by naming Joseph Farland the new ambassador and Theodore Bogart head of the Army’s
Caribbean Command. Both men had specific instructions to improve the U.S. image.
They quickly launched Operación Amistad (Operation Friendship) and by the time JFK took the oath of office the plan was fully in place. Farland served as the only Republican political appointee Kennedy kept in an ambassadorial role. Though he had no connection to the president or the Democratic Party, Farland had relationships in Panama. The
Panamanian government and citizens pressured the new administration for him to remain.743 Farland endeared himself to campesinos by traveling to far-flung areas of
Panama and stopping at their homes for visits. He also earned the respect of government leaders by having a more conciliatory approach to local grievances. He pushed
741 Jules Dubois, “Kennedy OK’s New Panama Talks: Alternate Sea Route Level Studied,” November 14, 1961, Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 5. 742 “Country Assessment Report,” February 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 743 Oral History, Ambassador Joseph Farland, July 24, 1968, JFKL. 311 Eisenhower on the flag issue and strongly believed that a void existed “in the
Department of State towards…Latin Americans and Latin American problems.” He believed that “Foggy Bottom thinks in cold Anglo-Saxon logic towards people who do not feel that way.”744 The USIA noted that Farland’s “friendly, hearty and vigorous personality, plus his democratic approach and sensitivity to ‘Latino’ reactions has created a warm mass appeal at a personal level in all segments of the Panamanian public.”745
Major General Bogart also launched his own personal campaign to improve the
U.S. military’s image in Panama. He hosted a jazz festival that included over 100 musicians and a thousand spectators. Basketball and volleyball games between U.S. military personnel and students from the University of Panama took place. The United
States held postgame parties and provided free transportation for students and fans.
Bogart also established tours of the University of Panama for U.S. soldiers.746 One of the most popular programs became a joint radio venture between the military and the USIA known as the “Court of Miracles.” A Panamanian priest, Father Laburu, received calls from locals in need of assistance and made available funds provided by personal donations from Bogart’s Caribbean Command. The show made no attempt to hide where the money came from and USIA officials viewed the “Court of Miracles” as having an immeasurable impact on the improvement of the U.S. image. All of these operations were done in hopes that more interactions would generate friendlier relations and create goodwill. The USIA reported that Bogart’s outreach “continues to be a vital force in the improvement of relations, and USIS [A] is proud to have collaborated intensively with
744 Ibid. 745 “Country Assessment Report,” February 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 746 “Operation Friendship,” October 3, 1960, Time Magazine, p. 38. 312 the PAO of the military and the Canal Zone furthering this worth-while project.”747
Even Cuban officials recognized the change in the Washington’s posture. Ambassador
José Cabrera Vila cabled back to Havana that Farland and Bogart worked judiciously to improve the U.S. image. The Cuban representative also noted though, that all improvements remained tenuous and many Panamanians still wished for complete sovereignty over the canal.748
The Kennedy administration continued the Farland-Bogart approach and sought more inroads with campesinos, media outlets, and students. The USIA made sure that radio and film found their way to the interior of Panama to reach sometimes neglected audiences. Direct newscasts of VOA material became popular on Panamanian radio stations, while rural areas soon began to request more USIA materials. Officials at Radio
David in rural Chiriquí Province wrote to the agency that
We wish to express our sincere appreciation by this letter for the news service and other materials which reaches us nearly daily from your office. We consider that this news service is of great interest for our community since it has the up-to-date news of the world of enormous value and significance….we wish to inform you that our radio station…would be most pleased to receive more of your programs, especially those which would assist us in our anti-communist campaign.749
Regarding television, mobile film units became widely popular and opened up “new audiences for exploitation.” Acting PAO Edward Fogler described the Panamanian campesino population’s appetite for films as “insatiable.” Often, a mix of pro-U.S. and anti-Castro films received airplay. Fogler further argued that the USIA in Panama City
747 “Country Assessment Report,” February 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 748 “Memorandum, Embajada de Cuba en Panama a Ministro Relaciones Exteriores,” 23 de Septiembre 1960, America Lat., Panama, 1903-1976, Ordinario, MINREX. 749 “Country Assessment Report,” February 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 313 could devote all of its efforts just to films in rural areas and not be able to meet demand.750
While mobile units helped the USIA reach audiences well outside Panama City, relations with Panamanian newspapers remained tenuous. Most editors worried that publishing any even faintly pro-U.S. articles or editorials would alienate their readership.
To remedy the strained relationship agency officers attempted to cultivate personal connections with editors, reporters, and commentators. By 1962 this charm campaign showed signs of success as the Sindicato de Periodistas de Panama (Union of
Panamanian Journalists, SPP) invited a USIA Information Officer to be an honorary member. Such an invitation would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier.
Outreach to prominent Panamanian columnists also took place. One such instance involved ardent nationalist Gil Tejeria, a noted literary figure whose 1962 book Pueblos
Perdidos earned him Panama’s top literary award. Tejeria had a column that appeared in
El Dia and El Tiempo. Over time USIA officers felt comfortable enough to “drop in” at
Tejeria’s home to discuss his upcoming editorials. They reported that “frank” discussions took place and credited their efforts for Tejeria’s columns that implored Panamanians not to blame Washington for all of their ills. Another consequence of the improvement in
USIA-Panamanian media relations included the placement of articles and pictures regarding the Alliance for Progress. USAID frequently complained that local media did not give enough publicity to their operations, but following sustained USIA outreach, development projects received much more coverage.751
750 Ibid. 751 Ibid. 314 Students posed the greatest challenge for the U.S. image as the status of the canal remained a constant issue on campuses. The USIA attempted to improve its influence among young people through the binational center and by gaining a foothold at universities. One of the primary challenges included the sheer number of students who viewed the canal as the primary issue defining their generation. Though leftist student leaders dominated campus groups and were stridently anti-U.S., many young
Panamanians still held a favorable view of the United States. The problem was that anti-
U.S. groups constantly emphasized the Canal Zone issue, an area of agreement among all on campus.752 U.S. Political Officer David Simcox recalled that Panama remained “a single issue country… the old order was beginning to change then, and a new middle class was emerging in Panama that was even more nationalistic and more determined to take the reins of government into its own hands.”753 In fact, difficulties reaching students dated back to the 1959 flag dispute. Following that episode few Panamanian students chose to study in the United States. Most importantly, no U.S. agency even attempted to implement any policy or education program with University of Panama students.
Officials believed that given the campus’s strident anti-U.S. stance, no reason existed even to try. Moreover, while funds became available for student education exchange trips, very often no locals wanted the open spots.754 The State Department ultimately concluded that the “greatest problem in communicating with students in Panama is that the university is the center of nationalist feelings on Canal Zone issues,” and as long as
752 “Memorandum, University Student picture in Central America and Panama,” September 16, 1963, GRDOS, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Officer of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, Box 6, NARA. 753 Oral History, David Simcox, August 26, 1993, FAOC. 754 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program for FY 1961 (Panama),” October 3, 1961, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 315 new discussions are put on hold “the degree to which we can gain reliable or wholehearted support among students is limited.”755 As a result, none of the USIA’s student initiatives succeeded as even campus leaders sympathetic to the United States stood as nationalists first and preferred not to associate with the USIA or agency materials. It appeared that until Washington made real concessions, Panamanian students remained an unreachable target group.
While the United States focused attention on improving public diplomacy, top officials remained reluctant to take seriously Panamanian wishes for new talks. All of
Roberto Chiari’s appeals for formal discussions went unanswered. In early 1962
Undersecretary of State George Ball, while in Panama City, cautioned Chiari that the
United States wanted a detailed study of canal operations before any discussions over a new treaty could occur. The Panamanian leader responded by asking how a new study would be any different from previous ones?756 One of the primary reasons for Chiari’s growing impatience is that he feared unrest as students went back to campus in May. He sent word to U.S. officials that Panama had “key student groups that are controlled by the extreme left and any further delay would give them an opportunity to stir up problems for the present state of harmonious friendship between the United States and Panama.”757
For all of his protests, Chiari did receive an invitation from the administration for a June meeting in Washington. While in the United States he took a tough stance against
755 “Discussion of plans to counter communist subversion of Latin American youth,” January 30, 1962, GRDOS, RG 59, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Officer of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, Box 5, NARA. 756 “Memorandum of Conversation,” January, 19, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 818. 757 “Memorandum from the President’s Press Secretary (Salinger) to President Kennedy,” March 12, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 821. 316 Cuban “acts of aggression” and pleaded for new negotiations regarding the canal.758
Chiari pressed his case personally with JFK, insisting that further delay in starting new talks risked fraying U.S.-Panamanian relations. He described the growing angst among local Panamanians who worked in the Canal Zone but received less pay than their U.S. civilian counterparts.759 Foreign Minister Galileo Solis made the point that Chiari could not go back to Panama without an agreement to open up negotiations. Kennedy countered that such an agreement would not be possible and “repeated his belief that we should see what matters could be settled over the next 12 months.” JFK also argued that “1964,
1965, or 1966 would be a better time” to reassess the treaty.760 From that point forward it became clear the Kennedy administration would not acquiesce to any new talks until after the 1964 presidential election.
Image 32: Former U.S. administration building in the Panama Canal Zone.
758 “Los Panameños Pelearan por la Democracia y la Defenderan Contra la Agresion Extranjera, Afrima Chiari,” 16 de Junio 1962, El Panamá América (reproduced in Loterìa, Junio 1962); Eduardo Ritter Aislán, “Nueva Negociaciones,” 19 de Junio 1962, El Dia (reproduced in Loterìa, Junio 1962). 759 “Declaracion Conjunta Formulado Por los Presidentes Chiari-Kennedy, Expedida en Casa Blanca,” 13 de Junio 1963, Bilaterales Estados Unidos, Chiari-Kennedy, No. 68, MREPAN. 760 “Memorandum of Conversation,” June 12, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XII, 833-837. 317 Washington’s refusal to engage in discussions did not deter the Panamanian government from continuing to press the United States on the canal issue. In fact, Foreign
Minister Solís became even more outspoken. During a forum on regional economic integration held in Panama he declared that his country’s “peculiarities” put it in a distinct position to be a leader. Rather than being just another nation in Latin America,
Panama should be at the front. Solís predicated his remarks on Panama having more control of the canal and a obtaining a better return on its profits.761 A few months later he continued his campaign for new talks during an April 1963 meeting with Secretary of
State Dean Rusk in Washington. He explained that the Chiari government needed
“sufficient success” in diplomacy so the Panamanian public could be kept under control until a real agreement could be reached.762 Solís spoke more bluntly several months later at the UN. He argued that it was time for the “myth” to cease that Panama greatly benefited from the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.763
For all of the issues between the Kennedy and Chiari governments, a February
1963 Los Angeles Times report highlighted positive steps in U.S.-Panamanian relations.
The first lines of the article stated that “until a year ago the streets of Panama City echoed with cries of ‘go home, gringo.”764 The piece credited both General Bogart’s efforts and
U.S. information activities for the betterment of relations. Another sign of progress included a late 1963 agreement between Kennedy and Chiari to jointly fly both countries
761 “Extracto del Debate Informal que Tuvo Lugar en la Sesion Celebrada por la Asociacion de Ejecutivos de Empresa,” 5 de Febrero 1963, Informe, Parte Expositiva 1963, MREPAN. 762 “Memorandum Confidencial,” 24 de Abril 1963, Informe, Parte Expositiva 1964, MREPAN. 763 “Discurso Pronunciado por el Excelentisimo Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Panama Dr. Galileo Solís,” 25 de Septiembre 1963, Informe, Parte Expositiva 1963, MREPAN. 764 George Natanson, “U.S. Friendship Project Working in Panama,” February 17, 1963, Los Angeles Times, p.22. 318 flags at fourteen designated areas in the Canal Zone.765 While the improvements served as accomplishments, particularly when considering the state of affairs after the
1959 riots, the gains remained tenuous. The USIA reported that “it will be most difficult to overcome the disillusion, disappointment and subsequent deterioration of prestige for the United States in Panama if the political hopes and expectations generated…do not result in some fruitful advantage to Panama.”766
From JFK to LBJ
The death of John Kennedy in November 1963, only a few months after the Los
Angeles Times story, had a great effect on U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.
Kennedy’s Catholicism, youth, and interest in the region made him a revered figure in the
Americas. Joseph Tulchin posited that Kennedy “had captured the imagination and the heart of people rich and poor, old and young, from Mexico to the Southern Cone.”767 The assassination and Kennedy’s legacy received widespread coverage in Panama. An editorial in the periodical Panama America cast him as “a hero of our time” and “voice of reform.” Commentators at Critica wrote that JFK’s death served as a “significant regression for the walk towards liberty and human dignity.”768 Panama’s National
Assembly dedicated a day to the memory of the fallen president while national organizations such as the SPP issued resolutions in JFK’s honor.769 In Colon, the Instituto
765 Michael Donoghue, “Rape and Murder in the Canal Zone: Cultural Conflict and the US Military Presence in Panama, 1955-1956,” in Decentering America, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (New York: Berghanh Books, 2007), 298. 766 “Country Assessment Report,” February 1, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 767 Tulchin, “The Promise of Progress, 211. 768 “UN HEROE DE NUESTRO TIEMPO,” Panama America, 23 de Noviembre, 1963; “HA MUERTO UN ESTADISTA,” Critica, 23 de Noviembre 1963. 769 “El O. Legislativo lamenta muerte del Pdte. Kennedy,” Panama America, 23 de Noviembre 1963; “Organizaciones Nacionale Lamentan Muerte de Kennedy,” Panama America, 23 de Noviembre 1963. 319 Cultural Panameño-Norteamericano (Panamanian-American Cultural Institute) held a tribute honoring Kennedy and the popular newspaper La Hora declared that “America lost a friend.”770 La Estrella had the most poignant headline, as it stated that “we have all lost something with the death of John Kennedy.”771 El Dia asked several Panamanians how the country should honor the fallen leader? One woman, Maria Teresa de Herrea, argued that building a monument or naming an entire community after him would be most fitting.772 Finally, remembrance ceremonies continued to occur even a year after
Kennedy’s death. The Diocese of Chitré, a town located several hundred miles outside of
Panama City, held a memorial mass in his honor.773
The USIA took on a large role in promoting Lyndon Johnson immediately following the assassination. The agency published and distributed half a million pamphlets in Spanish introducing him to Latin Americans.774 When LBJ addressed a joint session of Congress on November 27 the VOA simultaneously translated the speech into
Spanish. Also, a short film, Let Us Continue, went into circulation. Although many citizens in the region did not know much about Lyndon Johnson, the new president believed he had a close affinity with them because he taught Mexican-Americans in
Texas. Tulchin maintained that Johnson believed his teaching days led him to understand
“Mexicans and, by extension, all Latin Americans, and that he owed the poor of Latin
America a special obligation.”775
770 “Homenaje a la memoria de Kennedy se tributará en el Inst. Cultural,” La Estrella, 5 de Diciembre 1963; “América Pierde un Amigo,” La Hora, 26 de Noviembre 1963. 771 “Todos hemos perdido algo con la muerte de John F. Kennedy,” La Estrella, 3 de Diciembre 1963. 772 “Panama Responde!” El Dia, 28 de Noviembre 1963. 773 “Chitré, La Voz Diocesana,” Noviembre 29 de 1964, Government Agencies, USIA, Box 2, Misc. 1963- 1964 8/58/D/5/8, JFKL. 774 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 228. 775 Tulchin, “The Promise of Progress, 224. 320 Only a few days after the assassination President Johnson met with Latin
American delegates attending Kennedy’s funeral. His talking points, provided by Latin
Americanists at the State Department, encouraged LBJ to make clear that his commitment to improving hemispheric relations remained as strong as his predecessors.776 Johnson heeded their advice, declaring to the assembled group that “I reaffirm the pledge…to improve and strengthen the role of the United States in the Alliance for Progress. President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress in this very room. Inspired by his memory, and in that same spirit, we will carry on the job. Let the Alliance for Progress be his living memorial.”777
The new president sought continuity in the initial days after the assassination.
Historian George Herring contends that “sensitive to the charges that he lacked experience in foreign policy and determined to maintain continuity with Kennedy’s policies, LBJ retained and relied heavily on his predecessor’s advisers.”778 He declined
USIA Director Edward Murrow’s resignation letter, who by that time had lung cancer, and also retained notable figures such as McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara.
Johnson did make a significant adjustment with the appointment of Thomas Mann as
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Alliance for Progress
Coordinator. Before the decision became official, Arthur Schlesinger wrote to Johnson pleading that he not select Mann for such an important post. In Schlesinger’s view, Mann
776 “Suggested Speaking Points for President Johnson’s Use in Addressing Delegates from the American Republics Attending President Kennedy’s Funeral,” November 23, 1963, GRDOS, Bureau of Inter- American Affairs-Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961-1963, Record Group 59, Entry A1 3149, Box 1, NARA. 777 “Remarks on the Alliance for Progress to Representatives of the Countries of Latin America,” November 26, 1963, APP. 778 George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 730. 321 did not understand the dynamics in contemporary Latin American politics and would not be a proponent of social reforms.779 Johnson disregarded the recommendation and confided to one journalist that Mann stood as “a shy, quiet, progressive fellow…Schlesinger…and some of these other fellows are not too happy about this…this doesn’t mean we’re going to give up on any of our idealism. We still believe you’ve got to have land reform and increased taxes. We want to build houses and we want to build schools.”780
Mann’s background with the State Department included posts in Uruguay,
Venezuela, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico. He had also been assigned to important
Washington desks such as the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs during the Eisenhower years.781 He placed anti-communism and the protection of U.S. investments in Latin America as top priorities. Mann’s reasoning revolved around his extensive experience in the region. He once remarked that that the United States operated under “an illusion of omnipotence.” Many policymakers believed that since Western
Europe had been successfully rebuilt, “It’s going to work in Latin America.”782 His approach became known as the Mann Doctrine and some historians view his appointment as the end of the United States soft power approach in the region.783 In reality, Lyndon
779 Thomas Tunstall Allcock, “Becoming ‘Mr. Latin America’: Thomas C. Mann Reconsidered,” Diplomatic History, published online September 14, 2013, 18. 780 Randall Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 496. 781 “Mann for the Job,” December 27, 1963, Time Magazine, p. 14-15;William McClenahan Jr. and William Becker, Eisenhower and the Cold War Economy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 213; 782 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 150-151; Gilderhus, The Second Century, 175. 783 Arthur Schlesinger adamantly believed that Mann’s appointment signaled a complete change in approach. For more on Schlesinger refer to Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 630-631 and Jeff Shesol, Mutual Contempt: Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and the Feud that Defined a Decade (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 156; Thomas Allcock’s article, “Becoming Mr. Latin America,’” portrays Mann as a pragmatist and “a hard-working and 322 Johnson carried an idealism similar to JFK’s in his views towards inter-American affairs. He adamantly supported the Peace Corps and believed that the United States held a vested interested in advancing Latin American development. More than personnel changes or a modification in ideological worldview, events precluded LBJ from establishing any sort of coherent hemispheric policy. From his first days as president he went from crisis to crisis in Latin America, and then “Vietnam swallowed up Johnson’s energies.”784
The 9th of January
Less than two months into his presidency Johnson faced his first foreign crisis as Panama City erupted. A flag dispute again served as the spark. Under orders from
Canal Zone Governor Robert Fleming Jr., Balboa High School (BHS) did not fly either the U.S. or Panamanian flag. U.S. students, viewing the order as an injustice, ignored the command and hoisted up “old glory” on the school’s flagpole in early January. Hundreds of students, and even some adults, showed up to see the raising. Several people stayed overnight just to make sure that zone policemen did not take the flag away. Local students at Panama’s National Institute High School (IN), located near the zone, decided to confront their counterparts at BHS and raise the Panamanian flag. As Alan McPherson explains, through excellent oral histories, officials at IN encouraged students and even
“gave them permission to use the revered 1947 Panamanian flag to lead their march to
BHS.”785 On January 9 IN students approached the BHS flagpole, at that point
talented Foreign Service officer who pursued the U.S. national interest as he saw it, but also possessed a genuine desire to assist Latin American economic and political development.” 784 Alan McPherson, “Latin America,” in A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson, ed. Mitchell Lerner (UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2012), 387. 785 McPherson, Yankee No! 95. 323 surrounded by zonian students, and demanded that Panama’s flag be put up as well. A fight ensued and during the fracas the Panamanian flag was torn.786 Accounts of the melee soon reached Panama City, as radio broadcasts spread the word, and protests occurred. The United States Army worked to establish order in the zone and reported that the situation would not escalate. They were wrong.787
While walking to a movie theater that evening, 20-year-old Panamanian student
Ascanio Arosemana stopped to watch protesters and help the injured. A stray bullet from a zone policeman hit the young man and he died at the scene. Again, radio served to incite Panamanians. Broadcasts referred to the zone police as “assassins,” and as word of
Arosemana’s death spread, Panama City exploded.788 Thirty thousand Panamanians took to the streets as rioters set fire to Chase Manhattan Bank and the USIA library.789 They also burned cars with the letter Z at the front of their license plate, as the Z denoted those who lived within the Canal Zone.790 In response, U.S. troops stationed in the zone combated rioters and fighting raged for several days. When the shooting finally stopped,
28 people lay dead, including 4 U.S. soldiers. Though several Panamanian deaths owed more to internal looting and were not due to U.S. actions, local politicians blamed the
United States and zonians for all of the deaths.791
The Panamanian government immediately attempted to use the violence as a way to secure new negotiations over the canal, even stoking the fires. GN soldiers
786 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 61. 787 “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation,” January 10, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 770. 788 Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 46-47. 789 Harding, The History of Panama, 59. 790 Oral History, Clyde Taylor, January 24, 1996, FAOC. 791 McPherson, Yankee No! 97; for a complete account of the events refer to “Report on the Events in Panama, January 9-12, 1964, Prepared by the Investigating Committee appointed by the International Commission of Jurists,” BRC. 324 received orders not to immediately disperse the violent crowds.792 Panamanian leaders cast the dead as heroes and the United States as an imperialist aggressor. Chiari even posed with the torn flag for newspaper photographers and January 9th became known as Martyr’s Day in Panama. The Panamanian President told LBJ during a phone conversation, while the fighting raged, that Panama needed a new treaty because the current situation demonstrated “a source of dissatisfaction which has recently or just now exploded into violence which we are witnessing.”793 Foreign Minister Solís wrote to
Dean Rusk describing U.S. forces as “inhumane” and castigated the United States for their “acts of aggression”794
Image 33: Balboa High School in the former Panama Canal Zone. The Ascanio
Arosemana monument is center.
792 McPherson, Yankee No! 97. 793 “Transcript of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Panamanian President Chiari,” January 10, 1964. FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 779. 794 “Solís a Rusk,” 10 de Enero 1964, Informe, Parte Expositiva 1964, MREPAN. 325 Most importantly, Chiari heeded the advice of Education Minister Manuel
Solís Palma, the most politically left member of his cabinet, and broke diplomatic relations with the United States.795 Such a drastic action came as a surprise to many who believed the move threatened Panama’s economy. Chiari’s decision can best be understood as a way both to placate his domestic audience and push the United States to the negotiating table. He most certainly had the upcoming May presidential election on his mind, particularly since he could not stand for reelection because of term limits and hoped that his party could maintain power through candidate Marco Robles. Chiari needed to be seen as taking a hard stance towards the United States. The USIA reported to headquarters that while the agency would not be taking a side in the election, “We will undoubtedly get caught in the crossfire.”796 When President Johnson sent Thomas Mann to Panama for consultations with President Chiari, the Panamanian leader made it publicly known that relations would not be restored until new negotiations began.797
White House discussions during and immediately following the riots centered on how best to prevent more unrest, and whether or not Castro’s Cuba had any role in provoking the violence.798 Dean Rusk publicly blamed Fidel, stating during a television interview on January 12 that “undoubtedly Castro and agents of Castro…have taken a direct hand in this one way or another.”799 The Cuban government responded harshly by publicly arguing that the “brutal aggression” of the United States and its “economic
795 McPherson, Yankee No! 97-104. 796 “Director’s Staff Meeting,” April 27, 1964, GRUSIA, RG 306, Office of the Director/Executive Secretariat, Staff Meeting Notes, 1953-1965, Box 3, NARA. 797 “Memorandum of Conversation,” Panama City, Panama, January 13, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 793. 798 “Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell,” January 10, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 775; “Memorandum of Conference With the President,” January 13, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 798. 799 Michael Pakenham, “Rusk blames Castro for Panama Riots,” January 13, 1964, Chicago Tribune. 326 exploitation” of Panama solely caused the unrest.800 On the ground in Panama City it became apparent that Havana had played no role. One embassy official recounted years later that the Panamanians involved in the riot “were expressing their rage at the social inequality of conditions in the slums adjacent to the Canal Zone. So it's hard to say that the riot was conceived and directed by Castro communists. In fact I never felt that way.”801
Newspaper accounts and radio broadcasts in Panama, received by the White
House from the USIA, illustrated high levels of unrest in the days following the initial outbreak of violence. La Estrella supported the government’s decision to break relations with the United States while El Critica demanded that a new treaty be implemented. One local radio station reported that the Panamanian City Council voted to change the name of Fourth of July Avenue to the Avenue of Martyrs and Shaler Triangle to Plaza of the
Flags. Radio Aeropuerto broadcast that all zonians needed to be expelled. Other reports cast the Canal Zone as a “house of privilege” and labeled those residing there as “a thorn not only embedded in the national territory but in the hearts of all of us.” Finally, Radio
Havana broadcast to Panama City that a “decisive moment” was upon the country and citizens had to see who stood in favor of national sovereignty and who wanted a continuation of “yankee imperialism.”802 The Washington Post reported that the U.S. took a “lashing” in global public opinion. Basing its story on a USIA report, the paper
800 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Cuba, Declaracion del Gobierno Revolucionario de Cuba Refutando las Falsas Imputaciones del Secretario de Estado de Estados Unidos de America – Sobre la Supuesta Intervencion Cubana en los Sucesos de Panama,” 14 de Enero 1964, America Lat., Panama, 1903-1976, Ordinario, MINREX. 801 Oral History, David Simcox, August 26, 1993, FAOC. 802 “Memorandum from Thomas Sorensen (USIA Deputy Director) to Malcolm Kilduff (Assistant Press Secretary to the President), Daily Reaction Report,” January 17, 1964, National Security Files, USIA Records, Box 73, LBJL. 327 noted negative responses to Washington’s role in the violence from Latin America,
Western Europe, and Asia.803 As a result, on January 14, less than a week after the riots began, LBJ and his advisers came to the conclusion that serious revisions in the U.S. approach to Panama were necessary. Yet, they remained reluctant to publicly endorse such a move as Johnson feared the domestic backlash for acquiescing in Panama’s demands and did not want to set a precedent. The president confided to Mann that “I sure don’t want to imply that I’m goin’ to sit down and talk to ’em about changes that I’ll make in the treaties and revise the whole thing, and all they got to do is burn the USIS
[A], Embassy, and then we come in—hat in hand—and say come on boys, we’ll let you write your ticket.” Mann responded that “we've agreed, as I said earlier, that there are no preconditions. We're not committing ourselves to any treaty revisions.”804
Assessing internal deliberations among U.S. officials is particularly useful for understanding both Washington’s response to the initial outbreak of violence and the mindset of U.S. policymakers when dealing with Latin American unrest during the
1960s. During a January 10 phone conversation with Senator Richard Russell, LBJ showed an understanding of the local nature of the violence while the senator continually mentioned Castro’s involvement. Russell even argued that any White House statement should make note that Panamanian anger was “inspired-right after Castro came into power.”805 One day later, U.S. officials, including Thomas Mann, White House advisor
Ralph Dungan, and Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance, met with President Chiari in
803 “U.S. Takes Lashing in World's Opinion On Panama Affair,” January 16, 1964, Washington Post, p. A7. 804 “Telephone Conversation Among President Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann), and Ralph Dungan of the National Security Council Staff,” January 14, 1964, FRUS, 1964- 1968, vol. XXXI, 803. 805 “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell,” January 10, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 775. 328 Panama City. While Chiari focused on the roots of the violence being grounded in anger over zonians and the flag issue, U.S. officials initiated discussions on Cuba. Chiari listened as Mann informed him that “Castro agents in Panama were as great a danger to
Panama as they are to the US government.”806 In their final meeting with Chiari and
Foreign Minister Solis, the Mann delegation informed the Panamanian leader that U.S. intelligence determined that “Castroites…have penetrated high positions in his
Government and among them were advisors to the President himself,” and that “Castro would soon be trying to introduce arms into Panama.” Chiari “made no comment.”807
When top Johnson administration officials, including those just returned from
Panama City, met late into the night on January 13 they discussed rumors of a possible coup against Chiari. LBJ quickly wanted to know if the United States had any proof of
Castro’s involvement in stirring the unrest. Secretary Vance argued evidence did exist while CIA Director John McCone stated that “one of our informants had told us last
August that there would be trouble in Panama in January, that Panama was Castro’s number one priority target, and that Castro had agreed to send arms to revolutionary elements in Panama.”808 Vance even went public with his concerns, telling the reporters that individuals trained in Cuba were responsible for “measurably” increasing the unrest.809
806 “Telegram From the U.S. Southern Command to the Department of State,” January 11, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 782. 807 “Memorandum of Conversation,” January 13, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 794. 808 “Memorandum of Conference With the President,” January 13, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 798. 809 Jack Raymond, Vance Links Panama Riots to Reds Trained in Cuba,” January 15, 1964, New York Times, p.1. 329 Vance continued stoking the fears of Cuban involvement when he wrote to
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor requesting Pentagon plans for two possible contingencies, including
1. The present Government of Panama requests U.S. military assistance to prevent its overthrow by Communist/Castro oriented political groupings. 2. A Communist/Castro oriented government has seized power in Panama and a decision is made by the U.S. to intervene for the purpose of replacing it with a government friendly to the interests of the U.S.810
By this point, late January, LBJ remained conflicted. When discussing a possible public statement regarding the canal issue with Senator Russell, the issue of Cuban involvement once again surfaced. Johnson read out loud a rather conciliatory statement, noting that the actions of U.S. students helped instigate the conflict. Russell reacted by stating that “well,
I guess that’s all right, if you feel like you’ve got to issue a statement.” When questions concerning Cuba arose after LBJ said that Castro would not gain from the unrest, Russell declared that “I wish to hell he’d-Castro’d seize it. Then, maybe, dammit, those people in the State Department and these weepin’ sob sisters all over the country would let us go in there and protect our rights. I wish old Castro would seize it.” Johnson argued that his comments originated among only himself and advisors, not anyone at State. He also lamented the attitude that many U.S. diplomats held regarding Panama. Castigating former Ambassador McFarland as some “who just sold out to the Panamanians a hundred percent. Came back and denounced everybody… he’s one hundred percent Panamanian, and he was just raisin’ hell about what the Zonists were doing.” Yet, Johnson did acknowledge that there is some merit to their side-not in violence, not in shootin’ people.” When Russell argued that the United States still had public opinion on their side,
810 “Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor),” January 22, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 808. 330 Johnson’s voice rose and he countered that we are hurtin’, Dick. We’re hurtin’ in the hemisphere and we’re hurtin’ in the world. That damn propaganda is all against us, and it’s just everywhere.”811 Other members of congress were just as focused on Cuba. As historian H.W. Brands writes, “The commentary the Panama affair provoked in Congress warned Johnson against anything hinting of capitulation to Chiari and Panama rioters.
The Senate…rang with charges that the violence was the work of Castro and his henchmen.”812
While Johnson continued to receive reports of possible Cuban involvement, CIA head McCone confided to Secretary of State Rusk that he “could not understand the reluctance on the part of the President and Rusk to admit participation of Castro
Communists in the Panama situation."813 LBJ’s reluctance likely stemmed from the reality that no real evidence existed linking Castro to the unrest in Panama. Moreover,
Montana Democratic Senator Mike Mansfield’s recommendation on a response to the
Panama crisis, requested by president, included avoiding “boxing ourselves in at home against change through the fanning of our own emotions by crediting Castro and
Communism too heavily for a difficulty which existed long before either had any significance in this Hemisphere and which will undoubtedly continue to plague us after both cease to have much meaning.”814 In instance after instance, U.S. military leaders, diplomats, and intelligence officials saw Castro’s fingerprints all over the Panamanian
811 “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell, January 22, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 810. 812 H.W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 37. 813 “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs (Mann),” February 3, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 824. 814 “Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson,” FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, 819-820. 331 riots. Mansfield appears to be among the few individuals with Johnson’s ear who implored the president not to make Panama part of the larger conflict with Cuba.
In essence, by early 1964 two schools of thought dominated debates as to how the
United States should handle the Panamanian situation. National Security Adviser
McGeorge Bundy pushed for a more uncompromising stance. He cautioned LBJ that no concessions should be even discussed until Chiari agreed to resume relations. Bundy also decried LBJ’s prospective choice for new ambassador to Panama, Jack Vaughn, as an individual who sided more with Panamanians than he did zonians.815 Johnson friend and
Republican Senator from Georgia Richard Russell was consistently more blunt in his assessment to LBJ. Once remarking that “those people down there have had a chip on their shoulders for a long time…We brought them out of the jungles where they were hiding thinking that old Cortez was still trying to get them for slaves.”816 The other view came from Senator Mansfield who urged the president to begin a process of compromise in order to avert “violent revolution” in Panama. Mansfield even wrote that in the near future the president should make clear a U.S. willingness to discuss “Panamanian titular sovereignty in the Zone.”817 As for domestic public opinion in the United States, it sided with Bundy and a tougher position towards Panamanians. Over 50 percent of those polled by Gallup stated that the United States should stand “firm” while only 9 percent believed
815 “Memorandum for the president,” February 25, 1964, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Box 1, LBJL. 816 Richard Lentz and Karla Gower, The Opinions of Mankind: Racial Issues, Press, and Propaganda in the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2010), 49. 817 “Senator Mike Mansfield to the president,” January 31, 1964, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Box 1, LBJL. 332 that any concessions should be made.818 Moreover, a Washington Post poll found that
85 percent of U.S. citizens opposed any concessions being made to Panama.819
Image 34: President Lyndon Johnson (seated at his desk) convenes a meeting in the Oval
Office concerning the Panama riots, 1964.
While high-level diplomatic maneuverings took place, all U.S. public diplomacy operations in Panama came to a halt during the crisis. Along with the damage done to the USIA library building, rioters stole valuable equipment, and burned the book collection. These actions caused over a hundred thousand dollars worth of damage.820 At
818 “Most of People Favor 'Firm' Policy on Panama,” February 12, 1964, Washington Post, p. A17. 819 David Shreve, The Presidential Recordings: Lyndon B. Johnson, Towards the Great Society, February 1, 1964-May 31, 1964, eds. David Shreve and Robert David Johnson (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 69. 820 “Attacks on USIS [A] Libraries from November 1, 1963 thru June 30, 1967,” RG 296, USIA, Box 1, LBJL; Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 51. 333 the USIA weekly directors meeting in Washington with area heads the situation in
Panama stood front and center. The agency received word by January 20 that “USIA operations have practically ceased in Panama.”821 In fact, the majority of agency officials left the country.822
Ultimately, diplomatic exchanges continued for several months until April 3 when formal relations were reestablished and the United States agreed to start open- ended talks.823 The Panamanian government praised the decision. Galileo Solís, speaking publicly only a few days after the announcement for new discussions, commended the
United States and the Alliance for Progress.824 The 1964 riots and the diplomacy that ensued fundamentally altered the U.S.-Panama relationship. Panamanian politicians helped foment the unrest and then used the ensuing violence for diplomatic gains, while
Lyndon Johnson finally recognized that the United States had to seriously reassess the
Panama Canal treaty.
Picking up the Pieces
Soon after the violence ended in Panama, LBJ finally accepted Edward R.
Murrow’s resignation as USIA Director during an emotional telephone conversation.
Murrow’s voice quivered as he thanked the president for his kind words.825 Johnson chose Carl Rowan, a former journalist, Assistant Secretary of State, and Ambassador to
821 “Director’s Staff Meeting,” January 20, 1964, GRUSIA, RG 306, Office of the Director/Executive Secretariat, Staff Meeting Notes, 1953-1965, Box 3, NARA. 822 “Director’s Staff Meeting,” February 3, 1964, 1964, GRUSIA, RG 306, Office of the Director/Executive Secretariat, Staff Meeting Notes, 1953-1965, Box 3, NARA. 823 “Remarks following the Signing of a Joint Declaration with Panama,” April 3, 1964, APP. 824 “Discurso Pronunciado por el Excelencia el Dr. Galileo Solís, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, en la Cuarta Sesión Plenaria de la Quinta Asamblea de Gobernadores del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo,” 16 de Abril 1964, Informe, Parte Expositiva 1964, MREPAN. 825 “President Johnson and Edward R. Murrow,” January 20, 1964, Miller Center Presidential Recordings Program, available from the Miller Center. 334 Finland, as the new head of the agency. With his confirmation Rowan became the highest ranking African-American in the United States government. Johnson based his decision to select Rowan not only on the former ambassador’s foreign policy experiences, but also on domestic priorities. LBJ told a confidant that “I want a nigrah in the cabinet but I haven’t got a place.”826 Rowan’s quick wit and personable style helped him win many allies within the USIA. One popular story concerned a day when Rowan was working in his yard when a white passerby pulled over and asked “hey, boy. How much do you charge to cut the grass?” Rowan responded, “Well the lady of the house lets me sleep with her.”827 To earn the trust of USIA officials he made himself readily available, even establishing a weekly bowling night at a desegregated alley.
Aside from earning trust from old agency hands, Rowan needed to get the USIA operable in Panama City again. Restarting agency programs proved to be no easy task as the Panamanian government took the view that U.S. media, in coordination with the
USIA, had conducted a campaign to increase anti-Panamanian sentiment in the United
States.828 Though U.S. law prevented the USIA from providing domestic information, some in the Panamanian government wrongly believed the agency did just that. It soon became clear that the country program in Panama needed to undergo serious revisions.
Rowan, along with other USIA Latin American specialists, wanted a seasoned officer and
Spanish speaker to be immediately reassigned as many personnel had left during the
826 Nicholas Cull, “The Man in Murrow’s Shoes: Carl Rowan as director of USIA,” in War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-2003, eds. David Welch and Mark Connelly (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2005), 184. 827 Wilson Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Renner, 2004), 97-98. 828 “La Opinión Publica en Estados Unidos,” Informe, Parte Expositiva, 1964, MREPAN. 335 riots.829 Harry Kendall, a veteran with previous postings in Caracas and Madrid, arrived less than three months after the 1964 riots. He spent his first few weeks meeting with influential Panamanian media leaders and other U.S. officials. He also received an important history lesson from the head of the USIA in Panama Carl Davis. It struck
Kendall as odd that the Panamanians who greeted Davis like “a long lost brother” happened to be the same people who ran such negative stories on the United States during the January riots. Davis explained the love-hate relationship many had with the
United States. While enjoying the modernity and economic benefits that such a close relationship with Washington brought, many Panamanians had nothing but disdain for zonians. Locals always made a distinction between a zonian and other U.S. citizens living in Panama.
While the USIA hoped to erase “the zonian concept” in post-riot Panama, that goal proved difficult. In attempting to negate the negative image of U.S. citizens living inside the Canal Zone the USIA initiated sport programs and pushed for more student exchanges. U.S. officials believed it vital that Americans living in the Canal Zone branch become a bigger part of Panamanian society. Public diplomacy practitioners concluded that any improvements in relations between U.S. citizens living in the zone and everyday
Panamanians seemed as the best way to prevent any more widespread violence. Zonians received encouragement to attend events at the binational center and interact with
Panamanians.830 Yet, many zonians had no interest with becoming a part of Panamanian society. Kendall would later write that these individuals “acted as though the Republic of
829 “Director’s Staff Meeting,” April 6, 1964, GRUSIA, RG 306, Office of the Director/Executive Secretariat, Staff Meeting Notes, 1953-1965, Box 3, NARA. 830 “Country Plan-Panama,” July 28,1966, GRUSIA, Subject Files, 1953-1967. RG 306, Entry A1, Box 56, NARA. 336 Panama didn’t exist, spoke no Spanish at all, never bothered to learn. Some had never set foot inside Panama and looked down their noses at Panamanian citizens.”831
The privileges zonians enjoyed was most upsetting for locals. They had higher salaries, access to the best facilities, and lived in a fortified “emerald city.” These types of descriptions became common among Foreign Service Officers stationed in Panama.
Stephen Bosworth, a Consular Officer, described zonians as “an extraordinarily inward looking lot,” while Rotation Officer Donald McConville commented that the majority
“tended to look down on Panamanians, tended to stay in the Zone itself, and then there were those that used to brag about the fact that they almost never went into Panama itself.”832
By the fall of 1964 USIA operations resumed at full capacity. The agency’s library reopened in September with a new name based on the first presidents of both
Panama and the United States, the Biblioteca Amador-Washington (Amador-Washington
Library). Most importantly, USIA requests for additional staff fell on sympathetic ears in the United States and the country quickly had double the staff usually allotted for a country its size. The approval of additional resources occurred thanks in part to Lyndon
Johnson’s continued attention to the Panamanian situation. LBJ even earned the nickname from the State Department as the “Desk Officer” for Panama. In December
1964 Johnson greatly aided U.S. information operations when he publicly declared that the United States stood ready to initiate negotiations with the goal of a brand new treaty
831 Harry Kendall, A Farm Boy in the Foreign Service: Telling America’s Story to the World (Berkeley, CA: Kendall Publications, 2003), 141. 832 Oral History, Stephen Bosworth, February 24, 2003, FAOC; Oral History, Donald McConville, February 12, 2001, FAOC. 337 regarding the canal. LBJ’s decision reflects that to a certain degree, he agreed more with Senator Mansfield than other hard-liners.
Two days before the announcement, during a White House meeting with
Panamanian diplomats, Johnson declared that “I have been working on Panama lately.
We are going to come out with a statement that you like very much.”833 LBJ’s pronouncement received positive coverage throughout the region. From Mexico to Chile
Latin American newspapers produced numerous stories favorable to the United States.834
Johnson’s declaration in support of new negotiations, something Panamanians clamored for, also included a line meant as a warning aimed directly at leaders in Panama City.
LBJ stated that “the United States should press forward with Panama and other interested governments, in plans and preparations for a sea level canal.”835 The wording “other interested governments” hit a nerve in Panama. As Alan McPherson writes, Panamanians now “faced the possibility of running an obsolete waterway abandoned by the great shipping lines, who would use the bigger, faster, still U.S.-run sea-level canal, possibly located in another country.”836
The option of a brand new waterway became a U.S. diplomatic stick. The individuals responsible for negotiating the U.S. position, Sterling Cottrell and Robert
Newbegin, never missed an opportunity to tell their Panamanian counterparts that the
United States had interest in pursuing a new canal. In some meetings they even discussed
833 “Memorandum, Misión Especial de Panama en Washington a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Panama,” 16 de Diciembre 1964, Memoria, 2-1, 1968, MREPAN. 834 “USIA Memorandum for the President, Daily Reaction Report,” December 21, 1964, National Security Files, USIA Records, Box 73, LBJL. 835 “Remarks on the Decision To Build a Sea Level Canal and To Negotiate a New Treaty With Panama,” December 18, 1964, APP. 836 McPherson, Yankee No! 115. 338 routes based in other countries.837 At one particular gathering they told Foreign
Minister Solís that with a “new sea level canal, there is no need for a canal zone.”838
While Panamanians approved of dissolving the zone, they wanted to make sure that any new project be based in Panama. The U.S. approach altered the strategy of the new
Panamanian government of Marco Robles, winner of the 1964 presidential election. In stark contrast with Chiari, Robles sought to tamp down Panamanian anger concerning the canal, particularly after the December U.S. announcement. While Robles desired to make sure that any new negotiations gave Panama complete sovereignty, his government worried about the possibility of a new canal not located in Panama. One Panamanian government official candidly admitted that Robles could not permit widespread anti-U.S. demonstrations, fearing that such acts could push Washington to find another canal suitor.839 When a few hundred students protested in early 1965 by burning a U.S. flag and a copy of the 1903 canal treaty, Robles personally spoke to them from the presidential palace balcony. He agreed with the students that any new treaty needed to completely abrogate the 1903 one, but did not encourage any hostility towards the United States.840
The newfound Panamanian strategy of working with Washington while attempting to ease tensions locally had a great effect on U.S. public diplomacy.
The USIA reported that LBJ’s statement would help ease anti-American sentiment in Panama and give the U.S. credibility.841 The agency’s mission became to
837 “Opcion Para Construir el Canal a Nivel,” Memoria, 2-1, 1968, MREPAN. 838 “Memorandum, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores Dr. Galileo Solís a Embajador Especial de Panama Jorge Illueca,”2 de Julio 1964, Memoria, 2-1, 1968, MREPAN. 839 Paul Kennedy, “Panama Expects New Canal, Too: Whole Nation Insists There Is No Other Solution, Giant's Poker Game,” December 27, 1964, New York Times, p. 26. 840 “Students in Panama Protest Canal Act,” January 12, 1965, New York Times, p. 14. 841 “Country Assessment Report-Panama,” February 11, 1966, GRUSIA, Subject Files, 1953-1967, RG 306, Entry A1, Box 56, NARA. 339 sell Panamanians on the point that any new agreement includes the United States maintaining operating control of the canal for the foreseeable future. One of the major impediments to public diplomacy included the lack of collaboration now available with major Panamanian newspapers. Periodicals La Estrella and El Dia helped fuel the 1964 unrest with pronounced anti-U.S. editorials, and the newspapers continued to be unwilling to have openly friendly relations with any arm of the U.S. government. Since influential columnists refused to write anything that could be construed in any way as pro-U.S., the USIA focused more on direct outreach.842
Rather than utilizing local journalists, the agency looked to film and television as mediums with which to get out its message in post-1964 Panama. Officials worked to increase the number of films shown in Panamanian schools that focused on the canal.
Each film mentioned the U.S. summer jobs program that exclusively hired Panamanian teenagers to work at the canal. The program proved to be a smart inclusion as it offered something tangible to youths looking to fill time during the summer, and gave U.S. public diplomacy a connection between words and deeds. Officials hoped that these types of programs could persuade “target audiences that Panama’s best interests are served by the present partnership in the Canal enterprise.”843 To reach that goal, the USIA also published pamphlets and films highlighting the canal’s importance to the overall economic health of Panama. Television also served as a viable conduit to reach young
Panamanians about the value of self-help, modernization, and responsible student leadership. The twenty-six part miniseries Nuestro Barrio (Our Neighborhood), already popular in other Latin American countries, became a mainstay in Panama by 1965. The
842 Ibid. 843 Ibid. 340 show depicted the plight of several characters and promoted the value of self-help. In the tradition of the U.S. series Peyton Place, Nuestro Barrio became one of the USIA’s most successful ventures. The agency created, produced, and paid for the program.
Scenes depicted Latin Americans pursuing modernity and student leadership. In one episode members of the community argued that it is the government’s responsibility to build a clinic, but a young man rises to give powerful speech on the need for individuals to take the lead and improve their own lives.844 The Washington Post noticed the program’s success as one article began by describing the show’s characters and asking
“will Alejandro Valdivia be able to raise the funds for the clinic so desperately needed by his impoverished patients? Or will his enemy, the spade-bearded oligarch Carlos
Villamayor, thwart the idealistic young doctor’s schemes? And what of Villamayor’s beautiful daughter Laura? How will she choose between devotion to her father and love for Alejandro?”845
Aside from an increase in the number of television programs and films shown, post-1964 riot public diplomacy sought to achieve two key objectives. The first goal included casting the U.S. military presence in a positive light. A second aim concerned outreach to Panamanians through cultural exchanges. Following the 1959 flag dispute the
United States worked tirelessly to implement a comprehensive network of exchanges with local students, broadcasters, health workers, and journalists. By 1962-63 the USIA had established such programs. Yet, the violence of January 1964 disrupted exchange programs.
844 Ibid. 845 Josh Goshko, “A Latin Audience For USIA Drama,” August 4, 1966, The Washington Post, p. A20. 341 In order to have an impact on local views regarding the sizeable U.S. military force in Panama, the USIA sought to highlight close cooperation between the
U.S. Army and Panama’s GN.846 Building on the prior work by General Bogart the USIA again wanted to portray collaboration as a necessary and worthwhile venture. U.S. officials reasoned that Panamanians might take a different view of U.S. soldiers if they associated them with the GN. Also, Washington knew that if more unrest occurred then the GN stood in the best position to quell any more instability. U.S. officials reasoned that it was better to have a secure working relationship with them. Moreover, by the
1960s the GN operated as a powerful political force in Panama with thousands of soldiers.847 The USIA reported that “in order to promote the image of the military as a working partner in nation building, civic action projects, fully coordinated with USIS
[A], will be encouraged. Similar encouragement will be given to civic action projects involving cooperation with Panama’s National Guard.”848 USIA Director Carl Rowan particularly hoped that the military in Panama could play a decisive role in the country’s development. After reading a speech given by the State Department’s Director of
Intelligence and Research Thomas Hughes at the Conference of Latin American Armed
Forces in the Canal Zone, Rowan wrote that “it is certainly essential for the officer corps of Latin America to realize that they cannot keep the lid on the seething discontent that exists in so many countries without provoking the very violent destructive reaction that they are trying to avoid. It is equally vital that they realize the necessity of their taking the
846 “Country Plan-Panama,” July 28, 1966, GRUSIA, Subject Files, 1953-1967, RG 306, Entry A1, Box 56, NARA. 847 Thomas Pearcy, The History of Central America (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Press, 2006), 132. 848 “Country Plan-Panama,” July 28, 1966, GRUSIA, Subject Files, 1953-1967, RG 306, Entry A1, Box 56, NARA. 342 lead in removing the serious social and economic injustice that is so apparent.” He ordered copies of Hughes’s address for all USIA posts.849 Military civic action programs in Panama mirrored other ventures in the region. These actions increased throughout all of Latin America during the Johnson years. The construction of roads, clinics, and other facilities stretched from Central America to the Southern Cone. The Pentagon reported in
1965 that civic action “helped give local military forces a sense of mission, a greater interest in the welfare of their countries and a better relationship with the civil population.”850
While making inroads among military members proved important, gaining the favor of students and working-class Panamanians continued to be a top priority. For years the State Department and USIA attempted to implement a vibrant program of educational and cultural exchange in Panama. Foreign leader grants were made available to
Panamanians in the fields of journalism, radio, economics, education, and social welfare during the early 1960s. The program consistently attracted a high number of applications.
851 Influential Panamanians participated in exchanges. Alejandro Chú Borbúa, a news reporter from Colón, wrote favorably on the need for more exchanges after spending time in Washington D.C. Pioneering radioman Ramón Pereira also visited the United States under the auspices of a State Department grant.852 Policymakers wanted these types of interactions to generate a better understanding among Panamanians “who will make up the cadres of technicians needed to carry out the programs of the Alliance for
849 Thomas Hughes, Speaking Up and Speaking Out (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Press, 2013), 13-31. 850 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 22. 851 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program for FY 1962 (Panama),” October 2, 1962, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 852 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program for FY 1961 (Panama),” CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. October 3, 1961; Holmes Alexander, “On the Political Front,” The Reading Eagle, February 7, 1965, p. 6. 343 Progress.”853 The programs also reached ordinary Panamanians such as Eusebia de
Hernández, a woman from an impoverished town in Panama. She obtained a grant to participate in a social welfare and public health project. During a month-long stay in the
United States she participated in a community development seminar. State Department officials reported that “Mrs. Hernández in spite of the extreme poverty of her background and very limited formal education, brought dignity, intelligence and leadership to the group.”854 Upon her return Eusebia aided in the development of a chapel, school, and health facilities for her community. When Ramón Pereira heard of her story Eusebia received an invitation to speak on local Radio Mía. More educated Panamanian women often received funds to attend seminars and lectures in the United States on the role of an informed citizenry. One USIA report detailed that such exchanges “resulted in the organization of an enthusiastic and active Union de Ciudadanas de Panama [Citizens
Union of Panama], which has initiated activities patterned on those of the League of
Women Voters, and expects to play an important educational role in connection with the upcoming presidential election.”855
While U.S. diplomats hoped that the cultural diplomacy program in Panama developed in the early 1960s could continue to help alleviate tensions in U.S.-
Panamanian relations, the January 9th riots completely upended all of the successful exchange programs. The State Department cancelled an upcoming administration seminar in Puerto Rico, a teachers workshop in the United States, and programs coordinated by
853 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program for FY 1962 (Panama),” October 2, 1962, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 854 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program for FY 1961 (Panama),” October 3, 1961, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 855 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program (Panama),” September 5, 1963, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 344 the OAS sponsored Inter-American Cultural Council.856 In addition to the terminated programs, the USIA had to contend with a tightening budget for its overall exchange program. In the months that followed the riots Ambassador Vaughn, along with members of USAID and USIA, noted the lack of support from Washington regarding cultural exchanges. While the Johnson administration allocated additional staff for Panama City, it failed to increase funding for cultural diplomacy. In fact, a significant budget reduction in the Panamanian exchange program elicited a harsh response from U.S. public diplomacy practitioners on the ground in Panama City. The officials argued that the
January violence, coupled with the lack of funding for student outreach, made for an unsustainable situation. Cultural Affairs Officer Charles Meyer wrote that “the importance of the roles played by secondary school and university students during the
January disturbances cannot be over-emphasized and it is imperative that the Post be given grants for FY-65 and 66 to enable it to work more closely with these two groups and to establish an American ‘presence’ at the University of Panama.”857 It seems hard to understand why the Johnson administration would decrease resources for workshops, seminars, and exchanges that proved popular, but a primary reason included the escalating U.S. war in Vietnam. As Nicholas Cull writes, “The war engaged the USIA at every level and justified the highest budgets in the agency’s history.”858 While increased funds became a reality, Washington dedicated the monies to the conflict in Southeast
Asia.
856 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program (Panama),” September 29, 1964, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 857 Ibid. 858 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 256. 345 Though a large-scale grant program could not be achieved, Ambassador
Jack Vaughn personally labored to make sure that cultural exchange took place even with inadequate funding. He allowed local students to study at the Canal Zone College located in Panama City. In doing so, students came into contact with zonians on a regular basis.
USAID funds helped eleven Panamanians take courses and Vaughn personally advocated that the program earn approval for subsequent years.859 He also worked to get at least at least a few Panamanian students education grants to study in the United States. For years,
U.S. officials believed the campus too radical for any type of outreach to have much effect. In the wake of the 1964 riots, the university could not be ignored. The United
States based decisions regarding which students to select on leadership qualities, class year, and opinion of U.S. policies. The State Department did not want only young people who already had a favorable opinion; they also wanted to influence those who did not.
Moreover, Vaughn helped reestablish Panamanian participation in regional development workshops. Several high level Panamanian educators received grants to a social studies seminar in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in 1965. The State Department reported a successful trip and that “most important, [individuals] returned with a clear understanding of how advanced Panama is in comparison to other Central American countries.”860 Such positive views tied in directly with Washington’s goal of making Panamanians understand the benefits of the current canal agreement. Finally, in 1966 eight student leaders from the University of Panama received travel grants and were subsequently
859 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program (Panama) – July 1964-June 1965,” October 11, 1965, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 860 Ibid 346 invited to the USIA binational center in Panama City to speak publicly about their impressions of the United States.
Utilizing the binational center became paramount to USIA goals. On the ground in Panama City officials worked tirelessly to make U.S. sponsored events popular again.
The center became integral in influencing Panamanian students, the target audience the
USIA believed was most important in Panama. In the 1966 Country Plan, officials argued that high school education “leaves its indelible traces. Hardly ever does an uneducated, self taught leader rise to prominence.”861 For the USIA, students constituted a major population group “both because of their current political influence and because of their potential future leadership.”862 To alter student perceptions of the United States, the agency assigned a Student Affairs Officer (SAO) to the binational center to establish contacts with students and shape perceptions towards the United States The agency clearly defined the SAO’s role, “His purpose would be first to become accepted and then, as possible and appropriate, advance his personal contacts into instruments of influence in line with directives.” Along with reaching students at the binational centers, officials also wanted to provide “United States or democratically oriented textbooks into the
National University.”863 The agency reported that less than two years after the riots the binational center “resumed its former position as one of the country’s leading social and cultural organizations.”864 However, even with some gains, the USIA failed to meet one of its most critical public diplomacy goals in post-1964 Panama. Policymakers
861 “Country Plan-Panama,” July 28, 1966, GRUSIA, Subject Files, 1953-1967. RG 306, Entry A1, Box 56, NARA. 862 Ibid. 863 Ibid. 864 “Country Assessment Report-Panama,” February 11, 1966, GRUSIA, Subject Files, 1953-1967. RG 306, Entry A1, Box 56, NARA. 347 desperately wanted to get a U.S. professor at the University of Panama, but fearing that such a move might cause an uproar, the agency did not make an attempt.865 Officials ultimately sponsored a U.S. professor at the much less populated University of Santa
Maria la Antigua.866 The inability to place a faculty member on a prominent campus starkly illustrated that the United States still had much work to do regarding its image with Panamanian students.
Assuring Panamanians that “Castro-communism is a threat to Panama’s well being” continued to be a USIA goal post-1964.867 The April riots had created a certain level of instability, something U.S. policymakers feared Castro would take advantage of.
To sell the anti-Castro message in Panama, Cuban exiles distributed USIA materials.
Also, the VOA increased its programming and added shows such as Cita con Cuba
(Rendezvous with Cuba) and Carcel de Agua (Water Jail). Cita featured “broadcast news…and vitriolic commentary” mostly by Cuban exiles.868 One listener recounted that though he could sympathize with the radio hosts, the “exaggerations, inaccuracies and redundant rhetoric only confused and discouraged…it was like reminding someone lost in the desert that he was dying of thirst.”869 By the late 1960s and into the early 1970s many public diplomacy officials believed that the show’s overdramatic nature had run its
865 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report (Panama),” September 12, 1966, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 866 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report (Panama),” August 21, 1967, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 867 Ibid. 868 Howard Frederick and Bruce Drushel, “Telling the Truth: Voice of America, Radio Marti and the Radio War against Cuba,” in Mass Media and the Caribbean, eds. Stuart Surlin and Walter Soderlund (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1990), 362. 869 Ron Lippert Jones, Spy Bate: Memoirs of a Covert Agent (North Charleston: Booksurge, 2003), 71. Ron Jones, a Canadian pilot, claims to have been a contractor working for the CIA flying weapons into Cuba during the 1960s on regular flights. After being apprehended by the Castro government he spent ten years in a Cuban prison. While the CIA does not acknowledge his service, Canadian diplomats have. For more on Jones story refer to Harry Sterling, “It was time to end the U.S. spurning Cuba,” December 18, 2014, Calgary Herald. 348 course. The USIA finally admitted that the program was “ham-handed” and
“increasingly irrelevant to Cuban realities.”870
Domestic Realities and the Rise of Omar Torrijos
Though U.S. public diplomacy did make some inroads in post-January 1964
Panama, obstacles still remained to improving the U.S. image. No matter how many concessions Washington made, control of the canal and the number of zonians living in
Panama was not going change in the near future. The reasons for changes not being immediately forthcoming were twofold. First, Panama did not have the technical expertise or ability to operate the canal on its own. Panamanian leaders understood they lacked experience and never did ask for complete operational control. They only wanted a new agreement that granted Panama greater influence. Second, President Johnson recognized that any change to the status quo would elicit a domestic political backlash.
Therefore, he had to proceed cautiously. In fact, when President Eisenhower offered modest concessions to Panama in the late 1950s, Pennsylvania Representative Daniel
Flood asserted that he should be impeached.871 Johnson knew how a conciliatory attitude could be viewed in the on Capital Hill and in the rest of the United States.
By 1967 the drafts of a new treaty were complete. The agreement called for an increase in compensation, the possibility of a sea-level canal to be built in Panama, a new board of governors to oversee the Canal Zone composed of five U.S. citizens and four
Panamanians, a renaming of the Canal Zone to the Canal Area, a return of lands surrounding the zone to Panama, and a treaty expiration date of 1999. When details of the
870 Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 401; Walsh, An Air War with Cuba, 34; Oral History, Dr. Dorothy Dillon, May 10, 1988, FAOC. 871 Sheldon Spear, Daniel J. Flood: The Congressional Career of an Economic Savior and Cold War Nationalist (Cranbury, NJ: Rosemont Publishing and Printing Corp. 2009), 40. 349 proposed treaty became public, critics on both sides made their opinions known.
Congressman Flood, a man one former Eisenhower aide referred to as the “all time nut on the subject of Panama,” declared that “I am so mad that I could spit.”872 He implored his colleagues not to accept such a misguided treaty. Flood also declared that if the United
States left the canal then Panama would “become another Cuba.”873 Republican South
Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond led the charge in the upper chamber, later calling
Johnson’s actions “the greatest give-away since god gave man the world for his dominion.”874 The Chicago Tribune published an editorial eviscerating the Johnson administration for “surrendering” in Panama and concluded that “the stage is set for communist strangulation of the great sea arteries which contribute so much to American strategic mobility.”875 The editorial also made note of possible Cuban gains in Panama as a result of U.S. withdrawal. In Panama, negative reactions also occurred. Several hundred students burned a U.S. flag and carried signs reading “Sovereignty or Revolution.”
President Robles’s political opposition predicted that Panama’s National Assembly would not approve the treaty.876
The Robles government’s refusal to publicly discuss the text of the agreement outraged Panamanian political leaders even more. The lack of candor by the administration only fueled rumors.877 Moreover, Robles had recently placed his support behind David Samudio for president in the 1968 election. Samudio, the Minister of
872 McPherson, Yankee No! 93; William Kashatus, Dapper Dan Flood: The Controversial Life of a Congressional Power Broker (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2010), 235-236. 873 “Surrender in Panama,” Chicago Tribune, June 28, 1967, p. 12. 874 Joseph Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America (New York: Hill & Wang, 2012), 260. 875 “Surrender in Panama,” Chicago Tribune, June 28, 1967, p. 12. 876 Chester Manly, “Tribune Bares Canal Pact: Panama Nationalists See Rejection,” Chicago Tribune, July 7, 1967, p. 1. 877 Henry Giniger, “Treaty Protests Begin in Panama: Regime Refuses to Disclose Texts of Pacts on Canal,” July 7, 1967, New York Times, p. 9. 350 Finance, pushed for a tax on Panamanian cement and sugar companies, which alienated powerful business interests. As a result, Robles had no allies, either among the popular classes or within Panamanian elites. Only Lyndon Johnson matched his unpopularity, who by the late 1960s held little political capital due to rising opposition to the war in Vietnam. Thus, the 1967 treaty went nowhere as neither the United States nor
Panama submitted it to their respective legislative bodies.
Amidst such political turmoil the USIA continued to push forward with its public diplomacy agenda. The agency had a new leader as Carl Rowan had resigned his post during the summer of 1965. Leonard Marks, a Johnson ally and lawyer from Texas, took over the USIA and oversaw a massive expansion of activities in Vietnam.878 With
Washington focused on Southeast Asia, public diplomacy practitioners in Panama City continued their program of selling the need for close U.S.-Panamanian relations.
Enrollments of Panamanian students at the binational center increased by February 1967 and U.S. officials helped in the establishment of a student council at the center.879 The agency also devoted many resources to promoting an “impact program.” Construction and other development projects, both in rural and urban areas, received heightened attention so Panamanians could see the tangible “impact” U.S. aid had in the country.880
To increase USIA involvement outside Panama City a new binational center opened in the rural city of David. Located in Chiriquí province, an area known for having pro-
Castro sympathizers, the center allowed for a greater USIA presence in Panama.881
878 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 253-257. 879 “Panama Highlights,” February 2, 1967, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 115, NARA; “Panama Highlights,” April 6, 1967, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 115, NARA. 880 “Panama Highlights,” May 5, 1967, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 115, NARA. 881 “Memorandum for Director Marks,” June 23, 1967, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 115, NARA; “Panama Highlights,” July 5, 1967, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 115, NARA. 351 As the 1968 Panamanian election approached, U.S. policymakers braced for more possible unrest. Former president and nationalist leader Arnulfo Arias benefited from Robles’s decreased popularity and defeated Samudio in the 1968 presidential election by just over 40,000 votes.882 Arias formed a coalition made up of mostly disgruntled former Robles supporters to win the presidency once again. The victory of such a controversial figure did not lessen U.S. outreach. The USIA heavily publicized the appointment of a new USAID director and placed numerous stories regarding a massive
U.S. loan for a new Panama City water system during the summer of 1968.883 While in the period that immediately following Arias’s election the agency reported a period of relative calm, that placidity proved short-lived.884 After being sworn in on October 1,
Arias decided to seek the replacement of powerful GN commanders, which generated a military coup. From the unrest that defined Panamanian politics from the campaign thru
October 1968 emerged General Omar Torrijos.
For the next decade Torrijos dominated Panamanian political life, gaining the title of “Supreme Leader of the Panamanian Revolution.” His governing philosophy can best be described as leftist-nationalist. New legislation promoting land reform, labor, healthcare, and education passed. Torrijos also made clear his stance towards negotiations with the United States when he declared that “I don’t want to go into history,
I want to go into the Canal Zone.”885
882 “Memorandum for Director Marks,” May 31, 1968, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 115, NARA. 883 “Panama Highlights,” August 19, 1968, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 115, NARA. 884 “Panama Highlights,” September 3, 1968, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 115, NARA. 885 Maurer and Yu, The Big Ditch, 255. 352
Image 35: Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos.
While U.S. cultural diplomacy officers in Panama reported that with Torrijos’s authoritative leadership students lost much authority and did not have a voice within the new government, their analysis failed to incorporate the new Panamanian leader’s status among young people. It was Torrijos who spoke for students and had their full support.
He differed greatly in that regard from his predecessors. Whereas Roberto Chiari sought to manipulate student attitudes and stoke unrest for gain at the negotiating table, and
Roberto Robles tried his best to temper student radicalism, Torrijos had the clout among student groups to control them. He earned their respect primarily due to his non-elite background, unlike Chiari and Robles. Torrijos came from a poor rural family and most of his adult experiences involved the military. Moreover, his charisma and strident nationalism allowed for a personal connection with students. Historian Michael Conniff 353 described Torrijos as “an inspired improviser with a great capacity for booze and small talk.”886 Also, he labored intensively to make sure campus leaders remained supportive, constantly meeting with protest groups and listening to their speeches for hours on end. He did everything he could to make sure Panama stood in the best negotiating position, once telling a U.S. diplomat that “there is a large group of people, however, whose mission is to see to it there is no agreement. They live off this problem.”887 Soon after his power grab, U.S. embassy officials wrote that his “personal philosophy can be felt in every field of human activity in Panama and in Panamanian relations with the United States, particularly with regard to Canal Treaty negotiations.”888
Torrijos also proved adept at challenging Washington’s policy towards the isolation of Cuba. While he told U.S. officials that a Panama City-Havana alliance did not make sense, he used backchannels to reach the Castro government and push a different policy. He sent word through Japanese diplomats as early as 1971 that Cuba remained an important ally in his perspective, though Panama had to proceed “prudently” as canal negotiations continued.889 Castro’s government reciprocated the interest, for by the late 1960s, as Thomas Leonard writes, “Castro needed more friends, especially in the hemisphere.”890 For the Panamanian leader, being seen as a ally of Fidel Castro was certain to placate leftist elements inside Panama and consolidate power even more. A closer relationship with Cuba would also demonstrate to the United States, the world, and
886 Michael Conniff, Panama and the United States: the End of the Alliance, 3rd ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012), 127. 887 Tom Long, “Putting the Canal on the Map: Panamanian Agenda-Setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings,” Diplomatic History vol. 38, 2 (April 2014), 454. 888 “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report,” September 22, 1970 2, CU, Group XV, Box 319, UAR. 889 “Despacho de Ministro, Embajada de Cuba en Japon,” 17 de Agosto 1971, America Lat., Panama, 1903- 1976, Ordinario, MINREX. 890 Thomas Leonard, Fidel Castro: A Biography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 684. 354 Panamanian nationalists Torrijos’s resolve to rule a truly independent country. When
U.S. Ambassador to Panama William Jorden told the dictator that any move towards normalizing relations with Cuba would be frowned upon by Washington “Torrijos took a long drink of scotch,” and replied “your people have to understand that we are independent, that we have minds of our own, and that we can go in more than one direction. The only kind of friends worth having are those that stand on their own feet, not those who kneel before you to your face, and curse you behind your back.”891
Cuban officials respected Torrijos’ and took the view that any steps that moved
Panama City and Havana closer to formal relations should be viewed as positive.892 In
1974 the Panamanian general made his move and formally recognized revolutionary
Cuba. Castro hailed the decision as “a truly historic step.”893 Close ties were quickly developed not only economically, but also in the field of security. José Luis Padrón, a personal friend of Castro and top Cuban intelligence officer made his way to Panama
City to work with the government there.894 Only two years following formal recognition,
Torrijos journeyed to Havana, receiving a raucous welcome.895 The Cuban embrace of
Torrijos reflected a larger shift in Havana’s foreign policy by the end of the 1960s.
Seeking allies, and as an admittance that widespread change was not soon on the horizon,
Castro welcomed different paths to revolution. He even came to admire the
891 Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 259. 892 Posiciones Del Gobierno Panameño Sobre Las Relaciones Con Cuba,” 18 de Septiembre 1973, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, MINREX. 893 “Panamanian Newsmen Interview Fidel Castro,” August 26, 1974, Castro Speech Database, LANIC 894 William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 179. 895 “Panama’s Leader Hailed in Havana,” January 10, 1976, New York Times, p.5. 355 nationalization policies and social reforms of the military dictatorship in Peru, praising its leader Juan Velasco Alverado as “a man of the left.”896
While an improvement in relations with Cuba was a goal of Omar Torrijos, the canal remained his top priority. By the end of the 1960s any U.S. strategy, whether based on economic aid or propaganda, would not dissuade Torrijos. In attempting to gain a new treaty from Washington he internationalized the issue rather than pushing for protests and demonstrations. The strategy involved utilizing the UN Security Council and applying global pressure on the United States to make concessions.897 Such an approach led to the
Torrijos government placing less of a focus on galvanizing Panamanians against the
United States, and more time on winning worldwide support for a new treaty. Torrijos proved skillful at riling up Panamanians but controlling the anger. During one rally that brought 200,000 people to downtown Panama City, just a few miles from U.S. troops on alert in the zone, Torrijos declared that “our enemies want us to go to the Canal Zone today, but we are not going there. I’m not going to be a hero with other people’s blood.
When everything fails, Omar Torrijos will say let’s go, and Omar will lead you.”898 After less than a decade in power Torrijos had his prize in the 1977 Carter-Torrijos Treaty, which abrogated the 1903 agreement and gave Panama complete control of the canal by the year 2000.899
896 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 26. 897 Long, “Putting the Canal on the Map,” 437. 898 “Panama’s Leader Warns on Canal: A Time May Soon Come to Fight, He Tells 200,000,” October 12, 1971, New York Times, p. 6. 899 “Panama's Man Of the Moment: Omar Torrijos Herrera,” September 7, 1977, New York Times, p. 15. 356 Conclusion
Throughout the 1960s Panamanian leaders implemented a strategy with the clear goal of earning a new canal treaty. For their part, U.S. policymakers consistently sought to defer any questions surrounding new negotiations. John Kennedy even went as far as to tell Roberto Chiari that no reevaluation of the agreement should be discussed until after the next U.S. presidential election. Following the 1964 riots it became apparent that some revisions were immediately necessary. The Chiari government used local grievances as leverage, constantly warning Washington that more violence would occur without new negotiations. Though LBJ hoped to continue avoiding any serious discussions regarding the canal, he had no choice but to make concessions. The Texan’s willingness to open up new talks earned him some favor in Panama, but Panamanians wanted more. Yet, the Johnson administration’s initial focus on proving a Castro link, demonstrated by the numerous memoranda, meetings, and conversations on the subject, highlighted a complete disregard for realities on the ground. U.S. diplomats, intelligence officers, and military officials appeared to be preconditioned to see a Castro-link in any unrest in Latin America.
In the end, Washington’s inability to foster any sort of agreement acceptable to
Panamanians, coupled with internal political realities in Panama City, led to the ascension of Omar Torrijos. When the general took power in 1968 he immediately harnessed the rising popular fervor and created a “coalition of the rural poor, students, teachers, soldiers, and bankers.”900 As noted inter-American historian Lester Langley writes,
Torrijos “inspired Panamanians of all social levels with is nationalistic bluster, and jarred
900 Maurer and Yu, The Big Ditch, 328. 357 a succession of U.S. presidents with his seemingly iron-willed determination to crack the alliance forged by the 1903 canal treaty… he supported…a new labor code favoring unions, income redistribution, rural development, agrarian reform, public health, and housing, which earned him the title of populist. Castro praised him. So did John
Wayne.”901 Torrijos proved to be a pragmatic leader, pushing a strategy of international engagement rather than mob violence. He reasoned that with enough global pressure the
United States would have no choice but to bend to Panamanian wishes. Torrijos also demonstrated a shrewd ability to get just what he wanted out of both Washington and
Havana. Following his untimely death during a plane crash in 1981 diplomats from around the world gathered to pay their final respects. When a journalist asked a U.S. government official attending the funeral for some final thoughts on the general, he responded that “Torijjos was beginning to come around to see things in Central America as we do.” Only a moment later, Havana’s lead delegate Vice President Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez commented that Panama’s fallen leader’s position on the same region
“continued to coincide with those of the Cuban Government.”902
The USIA continuously dealt with instability and a hostile atmosphere in Panama throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. Though many efforts were made to make inroads with target groups, particularly students, U.S. public diplomacy failed to win over many Panamanians. Regarding students, even the moderates on campus, or those with positive views of the United States, sided with ardent nationalists on the canal issue.
Students came to view zonians as an affront to Panama’s sovereignty. They led the way
901 Lester Langley, The Americas in the Modern Age (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 238. 902 Robert Pastor, Exiting The Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America And the Caribbean, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 15. 358 during the January riots and truly believed that they could force changes in
Washington’s position. Even groups that tended to have more experience in the United
States and understood the historic ties between Panama and the U.S., such as journalists, hesitated to voice any pro-U.S. opinions. Panamanian nationalism remained too potent a force post-1964.
Moreover, the continued focus on anti-Castroism in USIA operations after 1964 proved completely counterproductive. The failure to appreciate the indigenous nature of
Panamanian anger severely hampered any U.S. public diplomacy. LBJ later recalled that in his view, based on contemporaneous reports, that “Fidel Castro, working closely with the Panamanian Communism Party, had been sending guns, money, and agents into
Panama…We expected the canal and the zone to become special targets.”903 The irony of the entire episode is that Washington’s focus on Havana’s involvement where none existed played a role, in part, to the rise of an individual willing to recognize revolutionary Cuba. Ultimately, while successive U.S. Presidents, including Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson believed that a concerted public diplomacy effort needed to be made, all failed to fully appreciate the animosity felt by Panamanians regarding the canal treaty. Fernando Elata, one of Panama’s Foreign Ministers during the 1960s, summed up the situation when he told Ambassador Jack Vaughn that “we’ve been a good mistress, very faithful, always ready for love when you needed us. But now we’re getting old. We need a place to stay, some nice clothes, maybe somebody to cook for us. You know, we don’t want the big house. We don’t want you to leave your wife. We just want something
903 Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 145. 359 for old times’ sake.”904 All of the anti-Castro television shows, radio programs, and pamphlets could not alter the fact that Panamanians wanted a new treaty. The Johnson administration would have been well served to take the view of Deputy Chief of Mission in Panama Edward Clark. He recalled that “the Canal was it, forget about the rest of it.”905
904 Harry McPherson, A Political Education: A Washington Memoir (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 223. 905 Oral History, Edward Clark, April 29, 1992, FAOC. 360 Chapter 7: The Dominican Crisis and the Militarization of Public Diplomacy
On Sunday evening, May 2, 1965 President Lyndon Johnson delivered a television address to the American people on a crisis in the Dominican Republic (DR). A solemn LBJ declared that “there are times in the affairs of nations when great principles are tested in an ordeal of conflict and danger. This is such a time for the American nations. At stake are the lives of thousands, the liberty of a nation, and the principles and the values of all the American Republics. That is why the hopes and the concern of this entire hemisphere are, on this Sabbath-Sunday, focused on the Dominican Republic.”
Only a day or so before brief remarks, Johnson ordered over 20,000 U.S. soldiers to the
DR. LBJ declared that his decision to send troops was necessary to protect U.S. citizens in the country and help restore order. A military coup in 1963 and a subsequent counter- coup in late April of 1965 threatened to push the DR into a civil conflict.
The intervention also sought to forestall any Castro machinations, as the Johnson administration worried that Cuba would take advantage of the unrest to increase its influence in the capital of Santo Domingo. While the U.S. intervention was first and foremost a military operation, President Johnson personally requested USIA assistance.
He ordered Director Carl Rowan to send an agency team even before all U.S. troops landed. As the deployment was the first overt U.S. military action in Latin America since the 1920s, policymakers worried about accusations of a return to gunboat diplomacy. The agency’s tasks included selling the motivations for military action, not only to
Dominicans, but all Latin Americans.
The case of the Dominican Republic holds differences with other countries under study in this dissertation. The post-1945 wave of democracy did not only miss the DR, 361 but dictator Rafael Trujillo’s iron grip only tightened as he held power for over three decades. Though other dictators existed throughout Latin America, none matched Rafael
Trujillo. He proved to be a different kind of strongman. His brutal and uncompromising approach touched all elements of life in the DR. Time Magazine once labeled him the
“dictatingest dictator who ever dictated.”906 Also making the Dominican distinct was geography. Unlike other Central and South American nations, the Dominican Republic was located right next to Cuba. Such close proximity fostered a strong connection between Castro’s Cuba and leftist Dominican intellectuals. Moreover, geography also influenced the U.S. hopes for the DR in ways that it did not with respect to other Latin
American countries. After the fall of Trujillo the Kennedy administration hoped that the
Dominican could serve as a “showcase for democracy” right next door to Fidel Castro.907
By creating a modern and liberal society other Caribbean nations would have a counter example to revolutionary Cuba.
Yet, there were some similarities to countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua. Dire poverty always worried U.S. policymakers that Cuban inroads could be made. Moreover, Fidel Castro consistently targeted Trujillo and the DR. Dominican exiles used Cuba as a base of operations soon after Castro took power to launch an expedition against the dictator and the Cuban leader never missed an opportunity to publicly rebuke Trujillo. In March 1959 he boasted, to over 300,000 Cubans, that he wanted to “lead the fight to overthrow the Trujillo regime.”908 The speech was noticeable
906 Thomas Paterson et al, American Foreign Relations: A History, Vol. 2: Since 1896, 7th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage, 2010), 163. 907 Joan Hoff, A Faustian Foreign Policy: From Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush, Dreams of Perfectibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 116; Oral History, Alexander Watson, October 29, 1967, FAOC. 908 “300,000 Hear Castro Blast At Trujillo,” March 12, 1959, Castro Speech Database, LANIC. 362 as it took place in the city of Santiago in Oriente Province, the same area the war against Fulgencio Batista began. Santiago was also the largest Cuban city closest to the
DR. Finally, Fidel Castro and Trujillo held a deep personal hatred for one another. Castro even briefly trained with Dominican exiles in Cuba for a planned invasion of the DR in
1947. For his part, Trujillo consistently supported attempts to oust Castro.909
The 1965 U.S. deployment of troops led to a more pronounced role for the USIA in the DR, while at the same time increasing the agency’s value in the eyes of the
Johnson administration. Prior to that time the agency struggled to gain a foothold in the country due to rampant political instability. Within a five-year period, 1961-1965, there were three government coups in Santo Domingo. Furthermore, the Trujillo regime completely retarded political, economic, and social life in the DR. Many Dominicans only knew life under one ruler. When assassins killed the generalissimo in 1961, a
“psychological vacuum” existed. Thus, the political realities in the DR prevented U.S. information officials from implementing any widespread and organized public diplomacy campaigns prior to the intervention.
To a large degree, the USIA performed well during the Dominican crisis of 1965.
The agency team assigned to operate in the country quickly produced radio broadcasts and pamphlets. They also made sure that Johnson’s speeches reached local citizens via television. Moreover, the USIA provided LBJ with daily psychological status report. In addition, towards the end of the intervention officials transitioned to having a prominent role in fostering a 1966 democratic election in the DR. USIA officials worked to make
909 Eric Roorda, “Dominican Republic,” in Encyclopedia of the Cold War, ed. Ruud Van Dijk (New York: Routledge, 2008), 266; Lillian Guerra, Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance, 1959-1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 77. 363 sure all Dominicans voted and through their efforts became closely associated with electing a new leader in the DR. While public diplomacy operations in the Dominican helped explain U.S. actions to Dominicans, USIA efforts also cast the agency in a new light back home. The ease with which civilian public diplomacy practitioners and military members worked together inspired a newfound appreciation among Washington policymakers for psychological operations in a combat zone. Here again the Dominican case serves as an outlier when compared to other U.S. propaganda operations throughout
Latin America as the USIA’s performance during the spring and summer of 1965 greatly influenced U.S. foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. Ultimately, LBJ’s use of the
USIA during the Dominican crisis foreshadowed U.S. propaganda in Vietnam.
The Rise of a Dictator
Rafael Trujillo ranks among the most long running dictators in Latin America during the 20th century. Only Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay and Fidel Castro in Cuba held power longer. Trujillo’s rise owed largely to the Dominican Republic’s record of political instability and history of U.S. interventionism. The years spent fighting for independence from Spain during the latter half of the 19th century made life in the DR chaotic. Following the fall of a seventeen-year dictatorship in 1899, the country’s economy teetered on the brink of complete collapse. Leaders in Santo Domingo came close to defaulting on debts owed to European powers as Germany, Belgium, Spain, and
Italy threatened intervention.910 The possibility of foreign intervention into the Western
Hemisphere elicited a response from Washington, as Theodore Roosevelt feared a challenge in the U.S. sphere of influence. In 1905 the United States reached an agreement
910 G. Pope Atkins and Larman Wilson, The Dominican Republic and the United States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1998), 42. 364 with the DR. U.S. officials took charge of collecting Dominican customs revenues and distributed 55 percent to European collectors.911 The dollar also became the standard currency in the DR and a small contingent of U.S. Marines arrived in Santo Domingo to protect U.S. collectors. These actions did very little to create an atmosphere of stability as collecting revenues proved difficult. By 1916 the competition for power and influence among Dominican military strongmen threatened to engulf the entire country in a civil war. In May President Woodrow Wilson ordered more marines to the DR, and by
November a full military occupation was put into effect. Historian Alan McPherson writes that “U.S. officials…took over the Dominican Republic because of seemingly intractable political problems.”912 Dominicans resisted the foreign intrusion further complicating U.S. plans. After eight years Washington had had enough and withdrew forces in 1924. Only a few months prior to the departure of the last marines, an election put Dominican General Horacio Vásquez in power. The United States also left behind the
DR’s first professionally trained security force in the Guardia Nacional Dominicana
(Dominican National Guard, DNC). The organization quickly became a key institution in helping maintain stability in the country.
Viewing the military as a means of social advancement, Rafael Trujillo joined the
DNC in 1918. He worked hard to impress his U.S. advisers and by the occupation’s end he had been promoted to a top position within the DNC. Though Vásquez initially governed as a proponent of personal freedoms and economic development, his administration became increasingly authoritarian. He pushed for a constitutional change
911 Valentina Peguero, The Militarization of Culture in the Dominican Republic, from the Captains General to General Trujillo (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 20. 912 Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 36. 365 that would allow his presidency to continue unabated, while also arming political allies in preparation for possible conflict against his opposition.913 By the end of the
1920s internal political strife, coupled with declining export prices due to the Great
Depression, placed the government in a fragile state. Seeing an opportunity Dominican politician Rafael Estrella Ureña conspired with Trujillo to overthrow the government.
When the coup began Trujillo ordered the military to remain with Estrella, thus preventing Vásquez from keeping power. Unfortunately for Estrella, only three months after the initial February 1930 overthrow, Trujillo took power for himself and won a corrupt election.914 In twelve years, 1918 to 1930, Rafael Trujillo went from being a newly conscripted soldier in the DNC to the President of the Dominican Republic.
Image 36: Map of the Dominican Republic.
913 Richard Lee Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History (Stanford: CA, Stanford University Press, 2003), 80. 914 Lauren Derby, The Dictator’s Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era of Trujillo (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 20. 366 During his inauguration Trujillo displayed the preposterousness his 30-year rule embodied. A sash draped across his chest stated Dios y Trujillo (God and Trujillo).
That phrase later expanded to Dios en el cielo y Trujillo en la tierra (God in Heaven and
Trujillo on Earth). Those words became his regime’s official motto.915 Very quickly the dictator dominated political, economic, and cultural life in the DR. In 1936 Santo
Domingo took the new name of Ciudad Trujillo (Trujillo City). The highest peak in the country became known Pico Trujillo (Mount Trujillo). Moreover, his family took control of milk, beef, tobacco, salt, and sugar industries, allowing the dictator to amass a personal fortune in the hundreds of millions of dollars.916 Ultimately, it is estimated that he had over 1,000 monuments to himself erected in the DR. One of his more outrageous undertakings occurred in December 1955 when he held the National Fair of Peace and
Brotherhood of the Free World. The event cost $50 million in a country where the yearly income averaged $240 dollars. During the festivities he had his daughter Angelita crowned “Queen.”
Such extravagance and disregard for the average citizen was made possible by the use of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (Military Intelligence Service, SIM) and coordinated propaganda campaigns. The SIM tracked any dissenters while Trujillo made sure to earn the support of key constituencies.917 He made frequent visits to the countryside and implemented programs that gave peasants more access to land. For these efforts Trujillo’s office received letters from poor farmers lauding the dictator as “our
915 Javier Galván, Latin American Dictators of the 20th Century: The Lives and Regimes of 15 Rulers (Jefferson: NC, McFarland & Company, 2013), 50. 916 Teresa Meade, A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present (Malden, MA: Wiley- Blackwell, 2010), 221-222 917 Galván, Latin American Dictators of the 20th Century, 51. 367 spiritual leader” and “true father.”918 He also gave prominent intellectuals, such as historians and writers, important positions in the government as a means to keep urbanites placated. These individuals served the administration by casting Dominican history as a “series of tragedies” and showing how Trujillo was the savior.919 The composers of Merengue, the popular Dominican music style, dedicated countless songs to the dictator. In 1960 the four-volume Antología de la música de la Era de Trujillo
(Anthology of Music in the Trujillo Era) contained 300 merengues dedicated to the strongman. Song lyrics included fe en Trujillo (faith in Trujillo) and Trujillo es grande e inmortal (Trujillo is great and immortal).920 While much of this praise originated out of fear, the regime did deliver on economic development. Improvements in communications, roadways, and other infrastructure took place. Trujillo often defended his governing style. During a 1950 speech to delegates gathered for the Thirteenth Pan-
American Sanitary Conference he characterized true democracy as being about action and stability while touting his administration’s gains in social welfare and economic development.921 Even so, many Dominicans continued to live in dire poverty with no political freedoms.
Though the United States State Department came to view Trujillo as “a kind of
Frankenstein, brought to life by the marines,” he earned Washington’s support.922 The
918 Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 187. 919 Pedro San Miguel, “An Island in the Mirror: The Dominican Republic and Haiti,” in The Caribbean: A History of the Region and Its Peoples, ed. Stephan Palmié and Francisco A. Scarano (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 555-556. 920 Paul Austerlitz, Merengue: Dominican Music and Dominican Identity (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997), 60. 921 Rafael L. Trujillo Molina, “A Dictator Extols Democracy,” in Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America, ed. Hugh Hamill (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 218-233. 922 Eric Paul Roorda, “The Cult of the Airplane among U.S. Military Men and Dominicans during the U.S. Occupation and the Trujillo Regime,” in Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the History of U.S.-Latin 368 Franklin Roosevelt administration embraced the dictator, as waging World War II took precedence over eschewing local tyrants. The DR became the first Latin American country to declare war on the Axis powers and Washington showered the Trujillo government with military and economic aid. U.S. Navy ships regularly called at the port of Ciudad Trujillo. Ultimately, as historian Eric Roorda notes, “Trujillo’s Dominican
Republic was one of the less savory members of the coalition formed to defeat fascism around the world, and its participation, like that of Stalin’s Soviet Union, undercut the black-and-white, good-vs.-evil construction of the war that its proponents, then and now, have offered.”923
Image 37: Pro-Trujillo propaganda in the Dominican Republic.
American Relations, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 286. 923 Eric Paul Roorda, “The Dominican Republic: The Axis, the Allies, and the Trujillo Dictatorship,” in Latin America during World War II, eds. Thomas Leonard and John Bratzel; the most complete treatment of U.S. relations with the Dominican Republic during the FDR administration is by far Eric Paul Roorda’s The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998). 369 The wave of democracy that swept through post-1945 Latin America completely bypassed the DR. While citizens in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala gained experience living in a democratic society, Trujillo’s grip on power persisted as the dictator proved to be a shrewd propagandist. He often sent bulletins, in English, to the
United States. The Dominican Embassy in Washington made sure the pamphlets received wide distribution. One in particular, titled “Rehabilitation Program of the Dominican
Republic,” promoted the gains his government made in agriculture, public health, and education.924 It was not until the mid-1950s that strains in the U.S.-Dominican relationship began to threaten his control. Trujillo’s increasingly sadistic behavior– rumors increased that he enjoyed throwing dissenters into a shark tank–coupled with his brazen attitude towards the United States left him few allies in Washington.925 In 1956 reports surfaced that Trujillo had ordered the murder of Jesús Galíndez, a Spanish writer critical of the regime who lived in New York City at the time. The story went that
Dominican agents flew from the DR to New York and then kidnapped Galíndez, returning him to Ciudad Trujillo. The chartered plane’s pilot happened to be a U.S. citizen named Charles Murphy. He subsequently disappeared. Murphy’s home state senator, Wayne Morse of Oregon, eventually concluded that the Trujillo regime was responsible for the plot.926 When President Eisenhower received a question regarding the
Galíndez affair he expressed shock that such an action might have occurred in the United
States.927 Trujillo further infuriated the administration when he began to ship weapons to
924 “Memorandum por Dr. Luis Thomen, Embajador de la República Dominicana en Washington,” 19 de Agosto 1953, Fondo Presidencia, Fechas Extremas 1953-1979, Embajada Dominican en Estados Unidos de America, código 30110, AGNDR. 925 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 63. 926 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 154. 927 “The President’s News Conference,” April 25, 1956, APP. 370 Fulgencio Batista after the United States issued an arms embargo against the Cuban dictator in 1958. By 1960 officials in Washington made the decision that Trujillo needed to go. President Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations with the DR and covert links with
Dominican dissidents began.
Trujillo’s Fall and the Psychological Vacuum in the Dominican Republic
Once in office, John Kennedy continued to seek Trujillo’s downfall. After U.S. emissaries failed to convince the dictator to give up power and leave the island peacefully, the Kennedy administration supported more assertive measures. On May 30,
1961, anti-Trujillo Dominicans riddled the dictator’s car with bullets from CIA supplied weapons as he traveled to visit his young mistress.928 His death left a massive void in all aspects of Dominican life. While the Kennedy administration hoped to modernize the country, the state of affairs in the DR offered more challenges than opportunities. Only a month after the assassination the USIA submitted a country plan and thoughts on the current state of Dominican affairs. Malcolm McLean, the acting PAO, identified five key areas agency officials had to consider for the “psychological framework of the
Dominican Republic” in a post-Trujillo era. They included the dawn of information freedom, knowledge regarding democracy, attitudes towards Castro/Communism, anti-
Americanism, and desires for vengeance. It should be noted that McLean’s observations were some of the first reports from Santo Domingo in many years. Due to Washington’s reluctance to be closely associated with a figure like Trujillo, and because of the dictator not allowing any uncontrolled information flow, the USIA lacked a strong presence in the
DR during the 1950s. Also, as a result of the 1960 diplomatic break there was no U.S.
928 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area of the World, 39. 371 Embassy staff in the country for at least an entire year. McLean characterized
Dominican society as basically ignorant. He wrote that “the thirty-one years of dictatorship have warped and beclouded the minds of many in this country.” The majority of citizens, with the exception of political leaders and business elites, lacked any exposure to the U.S. ideas. Such a deficiency of knowledge regarding the basic elements of political, social, and cultural life in the United States set the Dominican Republic apart from most other countries in Latin America. None experienced such a controlling and maniacal dictatorship. Even the Somozas in Nicaragua paled in comparison to Trujillo’s brutality and authoritarianism. Most important, few Dominicans had knowledge regarding how a representative government functioned. If the United States hoped to create a modern liberal society, an overarching goal in U.S. foreign policy towards the region, then a concerted effort to generate a democratic attitude needed to be implemented. Regarding possible Cuban influence, Trujillo’s ousting opened up the possibility for new political leaders to emerge. The USIA cautioned that efforts had to be made to prevent Cuban ideological influence from gaining traction. At the same time, containing ant-Americanism proved critical as many Dominicans still harbored ill feelings towards the United States for previous interventions and support of the Trujillo regime.
One of the foremost issues, before any sort of democratic awakening could occur, included fostering a period of reconciliation among Dominicans and allowing them to come to terms with the end of the Trujillo dictatorship. On almost a daily basis streets, schools, and other important landmarks were being renamed. Most prominently, Cuidad
Trujillo reverted back to Santo Domingo. Also, many Trujillo dictatorship collaborators 372 remained in the DR. These included family members of the slain dictator and other politicians aligned with the regime. McLean wrote that emotions remained high, particularly for young people who wanted reprisals against those who supported
Trujillo’s reign. The primary fear in Washington became that such desires for recriminations would bring even more instability, and possibly allow Castro’s Cuba a foothold. Such fears did have a basis considering that Havana allowed several hundred
Dominicans to use Cuba as a base to plan an overthrow of Trujillo in 1959.929 Moreover,
Fidel Castro repeatedly blasted the Dominican leader and had previously openly spoken of the need for his overthrow.930 It was not too much of a stretch to imagine that Havana would seek a role in a post-Trujillo DR.
Noticeably absent from the USIA reports in was much mention of the Alliance for
Progress. Though development continued to be an important component of U.S. policy towards a post-Trujillo DR, getting remnants of the old regime out of power took precedence. U.S. intelligence officials concluded that ridding the island of the family became “an obsession” for Dominicans. JFK sent emissaries to inform the dictator’s two brothers, Hector and Arismendia, and son Ramfis, that it was time to go. When the family demurred, the United States stationed warships off the coast and fighter jets “buzzed” the capital. Shortly thereafter, all three men left the island.931
Though Joaquín Balaguer, a Trujillo ally and ceremonial president, remained in power, many Dominicans did not view him as a suitable successor. When Balaguer delivered an inaugural address in 1960 he devoted parts of his speech to heaping praise
929 Leonard, Fidel Castro, 54. 930 “Castro Continues to Assail Dictators,” January 25, 1959, Castro Speech Database, LANIC; “300,000 Hear Castro Blast At Trujillo,” March 12, 1959, Castro Speech Database, LANIC. 931 Reeves, President Kennedy, 266-267. 373 on Trujillo, “The government under the leadership of Generalissimo…has done everything possible to direct such progressive development towards the ideal of a democracy that is compatible with our character and our potential in the social and economic fields.”932 Such acclaim generated much opposition from those Dominicans who wanted a fresh start. In December 1961, bowing to internal and external pressures,
Balaguer allowed the formation of a seven member Council of State (COS) to oversee the country for one year until a scheduled election.
By July 1961 the USIA officially revived its programs and from that point the agency sought to demonstrate that the United States hoped to work with the COS towards stable democratic government. Another goal included illustrating that the Castro
“menace” had to be contained. Though the USIA hoped to establish a more immediate presence through the creation of several binational centers, a national teaching seminar, and an essay contest for students, by the fall of 1961 many of those formal goals had yet to be accomplished. One particular achievement did include the creation of an information center in downtown Santo Domingo. Prior to moving the USIA worked out of a house in a residential neighborhood. A central location allowed for more people to make use of the center. Aside from the new building the agency opted for a more informal role, which included relying on local collaborators to disseminate information.
Such an approach showed that officials recognized the inherent difficulties of working in a country that still had frequent riots, vandalism of U.S. facilities, and nationwide
932 “Inaugural Address delivered by Dr. Joaquin Balaguer, President of the Dominican Republic,” August 3, 1960, Ciudad Trujillo, signature 865.44B171i, AGNDR. 374 strikes.933 While the COS brought about relative political stability, economic and social strife remained.
By early 1962 U.S. public diplomacy maintained a strong presence through pamphlets, comic books, radio, film, and newspapers. Fifty thousand copies of the anti-
Castro series El Despertar (The Awakening) were made available along with 50,000 copies of La Tracion (The Treachery). Labor pamphlets, consisting primarily of AFL-
CIO publications, gained a widespread readership among union members and leaders. All of these publications relied on the armed forces, priests, school administrators, teachers, adult study groups, and professional organizations for distribution. However, the most effective mechanism in the DR for information output remained radio and television.
While the USIA was initially unsuccessful in establishing relationships with Dominican radio stations, by January 1962 agency materials received regular airplay. The agency reported that “as fast as we could schedule them, all of our anti-communist radio dramas became the hottest item we…offered.” Popular programs such as La Garra Escondida
(The Hidden Hand), El Testigo (The Witness), Tres Villalobos (Three Villalobos), and La
Trampa (The Trap) received airtime on all of Santo Domingo’s stations. Tres Villalobos told the story of three brothers fighting the Castro government in Cuba and became popular throughout Latin America. Along with radio the USIA developed relationships with television broadcasters. Close collusion allowed for critical placement of agency films. Dawn of a New Day, a movie highlighting communist infiltration tactics in labor unions appeared, as did the overtly-themed Castro film Your Neighbor with a Beard.
933 “USIA Country Assessment (Dominican Republic),” March 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 375 Another anti-Cuba film, The Revolution Betrayed, became well liked. One COS member’s wife asked if it could be “repeated every night for an entire week.”934
However, once again, when viewing U.S. pamphlets, radio programs, and film output, support for the Alliance for Progress proved noticeably absent. The lack of a focus on modernization became a symptom of the larger U.S. approach to the DR.
Historian Jeffrey Taffet argues that the implementation of the economic program in the
DR focused more on fostering the creation of government institutions. He writes that the
Alliance for Progress “became a way to help create effective systems rather than to influence their existing systems.” Washington focused its aid allocation to the island with an eye on political change rather than economic development. In essence, the Alliance for
Progress became a tool with which to prod leaders in the DR to follow Washington. If they established good governance and stability, more aid would be offered. Within a week of a restoration of diplomatic relations after Trujillo’s death, U.S. diplomat Teodoro
Mosoco arrived in the DR with a check for $11.5 million, with an additional $11.5 million to be allocated in the future. A May 1962 Department of State directive reiterated that additional monies should only be forthcoming if the COS continued on a democratic path.935 Such an approach may seem out of character since the administration dispersed aid to authoritarian governments in other Latin American nations, but Kennedy administration officials viewed the Dominican case differently. As historian Jeffrey
Taffet deftly illustrates, threating the withholding of aid allowed Washington the means with which to influence all political developments in a country trying to create basic
934 “USIA Country Assessment (Dominican Republic),” March 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA; Nick Cullather, Managing Nationalism: United States National Security Council Documents on the Philippines, 1953-1960 (Philippines: New Day Publishers, 1992), 59. 935 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 129. 376 government institutions.936 Such a strategy meant that public diplomacy concerning the Alliance for Progress did not center on the prospects for widespread economic development.937 Leadership in Washington supported this approach. When Murrow forwarded President Kennedy a USIA survey of Dominican attitudes in May 1962, he noted that the United States had a high level of popularity, particularly Kennedy personally. Yet, the USIA director was quick to argue that such feelings might be fleeting if the United States failed to deliver. Better to not raise unattainable expectations in a country still experiencing such turmoil.938
In the spring of 1962 the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo cabled to Washington that the feeling towards the United States continued to improve and that the COS remained comprised of moderate actors who could maintain control.939 That assessment might quickly change as the country prepared for political campaigns and its first democratic election since 1924. From the outset it appeared that intellectual Juan Bosch stood as the frontrunner in the 1962 presidential contest. He returned to the DR only months following Trujillo’s death after decades in exile and had a charisma unmatched by any other political figure on the island. His Partido Revolucionario
Dominicano (Dominican Revolutionary Party, PRD) gained support from students and the lower classes of society. Bosch’s political philosophy revolved around “democratic leftism,” and he based his campaign on the need for land reform and the nationalization of foreign businesses. His well-known opposition to the dictatorship also earned him
936 Ibid, 129-133. 937 “USIA Country Assessment (Dominican Republic),” March 2, 1962, GRUSIA, Country Plans, RG 306, Entry UD-WW 389, Box 110, NARA. 938 “Public Opinion Study Dominican Republic,” November-December 1962, folder DR 6202, entry 1015, box 24, Project Files, 1951-1964, RG 306, NARA. 939 “Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State,” March 4, 1962, FRUS, vol. XII, 696-698. 377 much support. One of his private letters to Trujillo, written just months before the dictator’s death, made its way to the pages of La Nacion only days before the 1962 election. Bosch wrote that the suppression of the Dominican people would not last forever and that a new political philosophy would emerge, based on a “morality” that could satisfy the “hunger for freedom.” He also posited that in this new system, men like
Rafael Trujillo will find “no air.”940
In late December Bosch won a solid victory with over 640,000 votes out of a million cast, and became the first post-Trujillo president of the DR. Even with support from students, workers, and intellectuals, however, he still lacked backing from powerful
Dominican leaders. While he defeated the Unión Cívica Nacional (National Civic Union,
UCN) candidate in the election, the UCN still represented influential economic actors in the sugar industry. Moreover, elements of the military did not support Bosch. Since
Trujillo’s downfall General Antonio Imbert had increased the size of the Dominican police force and made sure that those members remained loyal only to him. The lack of a unified government made for a tenuous political reality in the DR.
In early January 1963 Bosch visited with President Kennedy in the Oval Office.
There the new Dominican leader praised the Alliance for Progress and hoped that the
United States would continue to assist the DR in its march towards reform. Kennedy obliged and Washington pumped aid into the country. However, though Bosch’s government received large amounts of Alliance funds, U.S. policymakers never warmed to his administration. U.S. Ambassador to the DR John Bartlow Martin, who had arrived in Santo Domingo in March 1962, questioned Bosch’s abilities only days after the
940 “Documentos Para la Historia, Un Articulo y Una Carta de Juan Bosch 1929 y 1961,” Carta de Juan Bosch al Dictador Trujillo, 27 de Febrero 1961, Signatura 923.1U541, AGNDR. 378 meeting at the White House. While noting that a democratic election was a good step,
Martin wrote that “our real problem is the PRD and Bosch himself. We do not know nearly enough about them.”941 The ambassador went on to muse that it was possible
Bosch had been a “deep-cover” communist for years and that his government would ultimately fail. Martin continued that the United States needed to
hang onto the military…And of course we do all the nice things to build for the future and strengthen democratic institutions…all by way of going over the head of the government to the people themselves, to align ourselves with them. We should, of course, support Bosch until he goes wrong. We should help him lead, should never impede, his advance into his own revolutionary new frontier. We should hope he goes straight, and takes the people with him, and us too.942
Over the next several months Bosch consistently irritated Martin and other leaders in
Washington. He moved quickly on his reform agenda, which antagonized Dominican business elites. He infuriated the military by allowing communists to operate freely. He even welcomed pro-Castro Dominican exile Maximo López Molina back to the island.
Bosch reasoned that it was better to allow such groups and individuals to be in the open, rather than driving “them to the mountains to wage guerilla war.”943
The combination of Bosch’s perceived weakness on the Castro issue, coupled with his reform agenda, caused much unease among leaders in Washington. Under
Secretary of State George Ball commented that “I have rarely met a man so unrealistic, arrogant, and erratic…I thought him incapable of running even a small social club, much less a country in turmoil. He did not seem to me a Communist, as some were asserting, but merely a muddled-headed, anti-American, pedant committed to unattainable social
941 “Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State,” January 13, 1963, FRUS, vol. XII, 727. 942 Ibid. 943 Langley, America and the Americas, 222. 379 reforms.”944 Vice President Johnson noted that the administration hoped that “Bosch would be able to do for his people what President Romulo Betancourt had done for
Venezuela after the dictatorship had been overthrown there. But Bosch was no
Betancourt.”945 In early September Cuban officials received a report that Bosch would most likely not last in power much longer as both the United States and elements of the
Dominican military stood against him.946 Only weeks later the armed forces in Santo
Domingo deposed Bosch and established a military triumvirate. Though the Kennedy administration played no role in the overthrow, it remained well known that Bosch did not have many friends in Washington. In order to demonstrate Washington’s disapproval of military interventionism in the region, JFK immediately severed diplomatic relations and withheld recognition of the new ruling junta. Thus, all USIA and other U.S. government agency activities ceased. These moves were quickly questioned in
Washington as the State Department argued that aid needed to continue so the Dominican people would not suffer. Foggy Bottom eventually won the debate.
LBJ and the DR
In the wake of the Bosch overthrow, and the subsequent Kennedy assassination, events which occurred only months apart, Lyndon Johnson’s administration sought to buttress the new government in the DR. LBJ’s primary Latin American advisor, Thomas
Mann, argued that the United States needed to take into account practical considerations, as opposed to worrying so much about the moral implications of backing a military
944 H.W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism, 50. 945 Russell Crandall, Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 51. 946 “Entrevista Efectuada con el Compañero Dominicano Ylander Selic, Invitado a los Actos del 26 de Julio en Nuestro Pais,” 9 de Septiembre 1963, Dominicana Rep. A. Latina, 1962-1993, Ordinario, MINREX. 380 sponsored government. Mann reasoned that support of the junta could help lead the country down the path to democracy. The administration took as a positive signed the triumvirate’s announcement that elections would take place in 1965.947 The new U.S.
Ambassador in Santo Domingo, W. Tapley Bennett, also urged LBJ to offer full support.
Loans were made available and the administration attempted to cultivate a relationship with triumvirate leader Donald Reid Cabral. A businessman and lawyer, Reid Cabral immediately accepted the U.S. aid and other international monies to stabilize the DR’s economy. He then turned to the International Monetary Fund and guaranteed that his administration would address the Dominican Republic’s balance-of-payments problem.
The new government also embraced the Alliance for Progress. Monies granted by the United States helped fund agricultural improvements, school construction, and educational trips for university students. The Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (National
Housing Institute) built over 200 houses on land previously used by the Trujillo family.948
The local commission on Alliance for Progress programs also undertook a massive U.S. supported project known as Operación Confianza (Operation Confidence).949 The large- scale plan to earn foreign investment demonstrated both Reid Cabral’s belief in business and his government’s devotion to following the Washington line.
Yet, the government’s most pressing issues were not economic, but rather political. Both Juan Bosch and Joaquin Balaguer, Trujillo’s former ally, sought to gain influence in the DR even while they lived in exile. Bosch continued to argue that he was
947 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 134. 948 “Alianza Para el Progreso en República Dominicana, Información Quincenal,” 15 de May 1964, Signatura 1561BIB1, AGNDR; “Alianza Para el Progreso en República Dominicana, Información Quincenal,” 15 de Junio 1964, Signatura 1561BIB1, AGNDR. 949 Proyecto Operación Confianza: Para Inversiones Masivas Inmediatas Bajo Garantias Internacionales,” Febrero de 1964, Signatura 330B796p, AGNDR. 381 the legitimate constitutional president. He maintained support among large swaths of
Dominican society.950 In late April 1965 military officers in favor of reinstalling Bosch as president attempted an overthrow of the Reid Cabral government. They were quickly joined by pro-Bosch civilians and took control in parts of Santo Domingo’s downtown.
Other military leaders, those against Bosch’s return, and more sympathetic to Balaguer staged a counterattack. The DR stood on the edge of outright civil war.951 Historian Alan
McPherson writes that “within days, Bosch’s followers held downtown Santo Domingo while Balaguer’s sympathizers surrounded the city.”952 Pro-Balaguer right-wing military elements became known as the loyalists. Their leaders included General Antonio Imbert and General Elias Wessin y Wessin. Pro-Bosch forces had prominent political leader
Molina Ureña and Colonel Francisco Caamaño in charge. They became known as the rebels or constitutionalistas (constitutionalists). Rafael Fafa Taveras, a fighter on the rebel side, recalled that the constitutionalists came from a broad cross section of
Dominican actors that included groups such as Armas para el Pueblo (Arms for the
People), Constitución del 1963 (Constitution of 1963), Regreso del Presidente Bosch
(Return of President Juan Bosch), Abajo el Triunvirato (Down with the Triumvirate), and members of the more pro-Castro Movimiento 14 de Junio (June 14 Movement, IJ4).953
These disparate groups put aside their political and ideological differences to battle the loyalists.
950 Ibid, 136; Jonathan Hartlyn, The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 88. 951 Atkins and Wilson, The Dominican Republic and the United States, 133. 952 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 63. 953 Rafael Fafa Taveras, Testimonio de Abril (Santo Domingo: Ediciones Bloque Socialista, 1982), 44, Signatura 972.93054T233t, AGNDR. 382 Leaders in the United States, along with U.S. policymakers in the DR, were caught off guard by the unfolding events. In fact, Ambassador Bennett was stateside visiting family when the violence started. Johnson kept in regular contact with Thomas
Mann as soon as word of unrest reached Washington. Their conversations illustrate the confusion over who was in control in Santo Domingo, and just how the United States should approach the situation. The only clarity in these early discussions is that Johnson resolved U.S. policy would be the prevention of Juan Bosch’s return to power. LBJ declared to Mann that “we are going to have to really set up that government down there, run it and stabilize it some way or another. This Bosch is no good.”954
On April 27, Ambassador Bennett, now back in Santo Domingo, met with rebel leaders. Dominican accounts of the gathering argue that the constitutionalists stood ready to seek negotiations with the loyalists. Fearing that General Wessin would soon launch a major offensive from the San Isidro base and reclaim downtown Santo Domingo, many rebel fighters believed a mediated settlement stood as their best course of action. Yet,
Dominicans viewed Bennett’s attitude as dismissive and his reported insistence that the rebels immediately “capitulate” enraged some in attendance. Constitutionalist Chief of
Security Luis Lajara recalled that Bennett declared, “Before you launched the revolution, you should have known you couldn’t win it. Now it’s too late. You started this, and you’re responsible for everything that’s happened. You hold in your hands the key. Go see Wessin yourselves. You are finished.”955 Some of the rebels had tears in their eyes as
954 “Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson,” April 26, 1965, FRUS, Volume XXXII, 62; Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson,” April 27, 1965, FRUS, Volume XXXII, 63-66. 955 McPherson, Yankee No! 134. 383 they listened to Bennett’s admonishment. Even though these men recognized their precarious position, they did not appreciate being scolded by the U.S. Ambassador. In essence, Bennett significantly wounded the pride of those Dominicans seeking Juan
Bosch’s return and possibly helped propel the conflict forward. While the political representatives of the constitutionalists, including Molina Ureña, sought asylum after the meeting, Colonel Caamaño resolved to continue fighting. His forces now confronted the loyalists “with near-suicidal resolve.”956 After stopping General Wessin’s tanks from crossing the Duarte Bridge leading to downtown, the rebels established their base in a small section of Santo Domingo known as Ciudad Nueva.
Though the situation still remained quite fluid, President Johnson wasted little time before ordering several hundred U.S. Marines to the island in order to evacuate U.S. citizens. LBJ released a statement on April 28 that stated, in part, “I have ordered the
Secretary of Defense to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country.”957 Within only a few days, as he feared continued unrest, LBJ ordered over 20,000 U.S. troops to land in the DR.958
Johnson’s decision to send U.S. forces to the Dominican Republic was predicated on his fears of “another Cuba.” In a television appearance shortly after making the decision to deploy soldiers, the president stated that “the American nations cannot, must
956 Ibid, 136. 957 “Statement by the President Upon Ordering Troops Into the Dominican Republic,” April 28, 1965, APP. 958 Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 112; Gilderhus, The Second Century, 192; For one of the first original studies of the intervention refer to Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978; This book was recently released in an updated edition titled La Esperanza Desgarrada: La Rebelión Dominicana de 1965 y la Invasión Norteamericana (Santo Domingo: Editora Búho, 2012). 384 not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the
Western Hemisphere.” He singled out Castro by declaring that “Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, joined the revolution.”959 Years later Johnson recalled that during the Dominican situation “just beyond the horizon lay Cuba and Castro. The Communist leader in Havana was always alert to any exploitable weakness among his neighbors.”960
While Johnson explicitly accused the Cuban leader of training and aiding subversives in the Dominican, the evidence of Castro’s involvement remains rather thin.
In an attempt to prove a link to Castro, the Johnson administration released a list of fifty- three men who were alleged Castro-sympathizers involved in the Dominican uprising.
The list was quickly increased to fifty-eight and then seventy-seven. After reporters did a little investigating, it appeared that some of the men on the list were in prison the entire time, while other names were duplicated. In fact, six of the names were not even in the
Dominican Republic at the time of the intervention and the name of a respected twenty- six year veteran of the Dominican Supreme Court found its way onto the list.961 Johnson himself also misstated information. When speaking to reporters he made the claim that
“some, 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off, and six
Latin American embassies were violated and fired upon over a period of four days before we went in.”962 Not a single report, private or public, ever substantiated those claims.
959 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in the Dominican Republic,” May 2, 1965. APP. 960 Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 188. 961 H.W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism, 59. 962 Robert Dallek, Lyndon Johnson: Portrait of a President (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 216. 385
Image 38: President Johnson during a meeting on the Dominican crisis, 1965.
Within the past decade scholar Russell Crandall, relying almost solely on U.S. sources, attempted to justify Johnson’s claims by asking “what could have transpired had the United States not intervened?”963 His work, Gunboat Democracy, argues in favor of the U.S. intervention on the grounds that policymakers had legitimate reasons to see a
Castro-Dominican connection. Yet, documents from the Foreign Ministry in Havana put to rest the debate over possible Cuban involvement. While the Castro government continually paid close attention to events in the DR, the only revolutionary group it had contact with was the 1J4.964 While members of the group supported Cuba and its leaders with intelligence regarding anti-Castro elements operating within the DR, they never
963 Crandall, Gunboat Democracy, 37. 964 “Entrevista Efectuada con el Compañero Dominicano Ylander Selic, Invitado a los Actos del 26 de Julio en Nuestro Pais,” 9 de Septiembre 1963, Dominicana Rep. A. Latina, 1962-1993, Ordinario, MINREX. 386 became an organized political body.965 Moreover, in September 1963 Cuba received notice that though they had the support of 1J4 members, the Dominican group had not publicly endorsed Castro’s Second Declaration of Havana address where he called for action by Latin American revolutionaries.966 While members of the 1J4 participated in the April 1965 unrest, they never adequately organized, and almost immediately pledged loyalty to more moderate forces.967 Most importantly, officials in Havana received reports that the initial uprising was not part of any revolutionary strategy, but propelled by individuals who sought Juan Bosch’s return to power.968 Though Castro had a relationship with the Dominican intellectual dating back several decades, numerous reports received by the Cuban government held that Bosch represented only the interests of his own class and was “an agent of imperialism.”969 It seems more than unlikely that the Castro regime would send weaponry, men, or any resources to support an uprising aimed at reinstalling Bosch.
Lyndon Johnson was not without contemporary critics regarding the heavily inflated Castro threat to the Dominican Republic. Democratic Senator from Arkansas J.
William Fulbright, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, publicly stated that the administration injured U.S. standing in Latin America. He declared that “in their apprehension to [let] the Dominican Republic become another Cuba, some of our
965 “Informe Semanal de República Dominicana, del 23 al 29 de Mayo de 1962, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en Habana,” Dominicana Rep. A. Latina, 1962-1993, Ordinario, MINREX. 966 “Entrevista Efectuada con el Compañero Dominicano Ylander Selic, Invitado a los Actos del 26 de Julio en Nuestro Pais,” 9 de Septiembre 1963, Dominicana Rep. A. Latina, 1962-1993, Ordinario, MINREX. 967 Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 35. 968 “Razones del Movimiento Constitucionalista del 24 de Abril de 1965 en la República Dominicana,” 24 de Mayo 1965, Dominicana Rep. A. Latina, 1962-1993, Ordinario, MINREX. 969 “Entrevista Efectuada con el Compañero Dominicano Ylander Selic, Invitado a los Actos del 26 de Julio en Nuestro Pais,” 9 de Septiembre 1963, Dominicana Rep. A. Latina, 1962-1993, Ordinario, MINREX; In 1947, while a young man Fidel Castro briefly joined a group of Dominican exiles residing in Cuba who planned on attempting to overthrow Trujillo. Juan Bosch was among these men. For the Bosch-Castro connection refer to Quirk, Fidel Castro, 23-24. 387 officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some communist support.”970 In contrast to Crandall, some scholars have been critical of
President Johnson’s decision to intervene. Alan McPherson contended that “the White
House – and Johnson especially…exaggerated the danger of Castro-trained and Castro- directed forces from outside the Dominican Republic.”971 Johnson presidential biographer
Vaughn Bornet wrote that “the event [Dominican intervention] left scars and bad memories among Latin American specialists and among democratic Socialists in the hemisphere.”972
Criticisms of Johnson’s overstated fears of Cuban influence during the Dominican crisis are well-placed, and historians have produced fine works regarding the U.S. intervention. However, scholars have failed to adequately study the psychological aspects of the conflict. As U.S. troops began reaching the island it became clear that the incursion created anti-U.S. sentiment in both the DR and the entire region. Constitutionalist fighter
Teresa Espaillat recounted that the U.S. action transformed what had previously been an internal takeover of power into a “patriotic war.”973 On May 1 LBJ received a briefing from the USIA concerning Latin American reaction to the landing of U.S. marines. It stated that newspaper reports regarding Washington took on an “increasingly critical vein.”974 As the primary U.S. antagonist in the region, Havana did not sit idly by. Rather than aiding rebel fighters, internal Cuban documents show that the Castro government
970 Brands, The Wages of Globalism, 60. 971 McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles, 63. Also see: Alan McPherson, “Misled by Himself: What the Johnson Tapes Reveal about the Dominican Intervention of 1965,” The Latin American Studies Association, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2003), 127-146 972 Vaughn Bornet, The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1983), 177. 973 Teresa Espaillat, Abril en Mis Recuerdos: Testimonio de una Combatiente (Santo Domingo: Cocolo Editorial, 2002), 13. 974 “Memorandum for the President, Daily Reaction Report,” May 1, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 388 developed a diplomatic approach. Foreign Minister Raúl Roa received instructions to repeatedly take up the intervention with the United Nations (UN) to condemn
Washington for its actions.975 The Cuban diplomat announced to the UN that Havana planned a special meeting of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans to discuss acts of
“Yankee imperialism.”976 For his part, Fidel publicly denied any Cuban involvement and denounced the United States, declaring that
We all know the events taking place in Santo Domingo…Few things have unmasked the cynicism and criminality of Yankee imperialism more. On very few occasions can that which the people say be said with more hate and more indignation: Out with Yankee imperialism! The shameless manner of acting, the contempt for international opinion, for international laws, for agreements, not only for the laws that are of obligatory compliance for all countries, but even for those commitments contracted by the U.S. Government itself with its allies.977
With such stinging critiques sure to continue, USIA Director Carl Rowan implored the president to take seriously the need for psychological operations. He wrote to the president that “we shall have to devote considerable effort to providing evidence that our actions are to protect the short-range and long-range well-being of the people of the
Dominican Republic and the rest of Latin America.”978 Rowan’s pleas worked as White
House meetings early in the crisis demonstrate Johnson’s desire to implement a robust public diplomacy campaign in the DR. National Security advisor McGeorge Bundy reported to other administration officials that LBJ was “keen” to get an information
975 “Memorandum, Raúl Roa (Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba) a U Thant (Sectretario General de la Organización de Naciones Unidas,” 30 de Abril 1965, Dominicana Rep. A. Latina, 1962-1993, Ordinario, MINREX; “Intervención del Delgado de Cuba, Dr. Fernando Alvarez Tabío en la Sesión del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas,” 6 de Mayo 1965, Dominicana Rep. A. Latina, 1962-1993, Ordinario, MINREX. 976 Drew Middleton, “Havana Will Call Anti U.S. Meeting, Cuban Tells U.N.” October 16, 1965, New York Times, p. 1. 977 “Cuba Denies a Role in Dominican Revolt,” May 5, 1966, New York Times, p. 14; “Castro Assails U.S. Action in Dominican Republic,” May 2, 1965, Castro Speech Database, LANIC. 978 “Memorandum from the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson,” May 2, 1965, FRUS, vol. XXXII, 122. 389 program running at “top speed.”979 In a decision that illustrated his understanding of the necessity for U.S. policy to be explained to both locals and regional allies, LBJ ordered a team of USIA operators to Santo Domingo ready to implement a vast information campaign in support of the United States military. Johnson also wanted
“psychological situation reports from the USIA,” to be updated several times a day.980
Carl Rowan soon dispatched several public diplomacy officers to the DR and reported that the team would recommend “actions and statements that we [USIA] might take to win greater support among Dominicans and Latin Americans in general.”981 To lead the effort the agency looked to Hewson Ryan, who had extensive experience in Latin
America. Ryan recalled that “I was pulled out…one Saturday morning and sent packing to the Dominican Republic, where I became the senior USIA man.”982 Rowan also labored to make sure that VOA broadcasts originating in the United States made their way into the DR via satellites in North Carolina and Florida. He reported to the president that the five central elements each VOA broadcast had included the humanitarian mission of U.S. troops, respect for the inter-American system, need for democratic governance, suspicion that Castroites are involved in the Dominican unrest, and the “impartial nature” of U.S. troops.983
By May 3, only two days after Rowan dispatched personnel, LBJ received his initial briefing based on USIA activities on the ground in the DR. From Hewson Ryan’s
979 “Memorandum for the Record-Meeting on the Dominican Republic,” May 2, 1965, FRUS, vol. XXXII, 117. 980 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 241. 981 “Memorandum for the President, May 1, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America- Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 982 Oral History, Hewson Ryan, April 27, 1988, FAOC. 983 “Memorandum for the President, May 2, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America- Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 390 first report, it became apparent that U.S. public diplomacy focused on two central aspects; distribution of posters and leaflets and control of the radio airwaves. To assist in the overall U.S. propaganda strategy the military assigned the 1st Psychological Warfare
Battalion (Psywar Battalion). Ryan held operational command and utilized U.S. military aircraft to conduct the USIA’s initial leaflet distribution, which included 13,000 copies of
President Johnson’s public remarks that the United States did not seek an “oppressive” regime in the DR, but a government for the people.984 Early drops also took place in rebel-controlled areas in Ciudad Nueva. Ten thousand color copies of a leaflet stressing the peaceful objectives of U.S. troops fell into the constitutionalist stronghold.985 By May
5 Ryan noted that leaflet placement expanded to include the Dominican countryside. One set of articles focused on explaining why U.S. troops were in the DR, while another covered the humanitarian efforts of the United States. Ryan wrote that “its main thrust is to show that the troops have come as friends of the people.”986 A particular set of posters published in the DR, titled El Presidente Johnson Aboga por la Paz, la Justicia Social y un Gobierno Libre (President Johnson Appeals for Peace, Social Justice, and a Freely-
Elected Government) included LBJ’s photo and quotes defending U.S. actions. The poster was quickly seen throughout Santo Domingo.987
984 “Oral History Hewson Ryan, April 27, 1988, FAOC; Memorandum for the President, May 3, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL; “En Pro de la Libertad: Declaraciones del Presidente Johnson sobre la República Dominicana, 2 de May 1965, Signatura 865.44E561, AGNDR. 985 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report on Dominican Republic,” May 4, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 986 “Memorandum for the President, May 5, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America- Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 987 “Memorandum for the President, Daily Reaction Report,” May 1, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 391
Image 39: U.S. soldiers hand out USIA materials to local Dominicans in Santo Domingo.
Portraying the United States military as a force for good became critically important to the USIA. One White House adviser wrote to the president that making known the aid component of the intervention could “cause a great wave of pro-American feeling throughout the island—and possibly throughout the Hemisphere itself—for instead of firing guns the Marines are distributing food and clothing to people who are desperately in need of both.”988 Johnson continually stressed the charitable efforts by
U.S. soldiers, stating in early June that “we have now distributed more than 9 million pounds of food, and distribution continues at a rate of half a million pounds per day.”989
988 McPherson, Yankee No! 156. 989 Statement by the President, Office of the White House Press Secretary,” June 1, 1965, Papers of Carl Rowan, Subgroup III, Public Service Records, series 5, USIA Director Files, Dominican Republic Policy, 1965, box 3, OCA. 392 Also, while the USIA succeeded at flooding the DR with pro-U.S. messages, the agency also dedicated thousands of printed pages to warning Dominicans that Castro’s
Cuba sought inroads in Santo Domingo for their communist movement.990 Airdrops even listed the names of supposed communists involved on the rebel side and who received training in Cuba.
A second critical component of USIA operations in the DR included the battle for the airwaves. With the assistance of the Psywar Battalion, U.S. propaganda efforts already had two medium wave radio stations working by May 3.991 The agency broadcast news and information concerning how Dominicans could obtain food and medical supplies. Also, the USIA dedicated several minutes of airtime to promoting “Operation
Families,” a program that sought to get Dominicans in touch with family members
“separated by the crisis.”992 Peace Corps volunteers worked phone lines in order to help
Dominicans get their messages out. Though they repeatedly attempted to jam the rebel radio station operating out of Ciudad Nueva, U.S. officials could not get Caamaño’s forces off the airwaves. LBJ received an intelligence update from director Rowan that reported “what I expressed fear of in…my situation report of this morning has become a reality. [Hewson] Ryan has just alerted me that Radio Santo Domingo is on the air and in rebel control. The announcer is Luis Acosta Tejeda, a known supporter of the rebels.”993
990 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report, Santo Domingo-Noon,” May 7, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 991 “Memorandum for the President, May 3, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America- Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 992 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 242. 993 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report – 2:30 pm,” May 5, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 393
Image 40: U.S. forces distributing a newspaper in Santo Domingo.
While the rebels had control of the airwaves and territory in Ciudad Nueva, U.S. forces quickly cut off their ability to freely move around Santo Domingo. Soldiers led by
General Bruce Palmer created the International Security Zone and effectively “locked 80 percent of Constitutionalists between [Ciudad Nueva] and the Caribbean, thus allowing
Wessin to make brutal sweeps of the rest of the city and rout out the other 20 percent.”994
Colonel Caamaño’s men had no choice but to stay trapped in the heart of downtown
Santo Domingo while the United States and loyalist leaders worked on a political solution. Such a reality allowed the USIA psychological advantage regarding printed propaganda. The agency, in tandem with the U.S. military, created the periodical Voice of the International Security Zone. The Psywar team quickly produced thousands of copies
994 McPherson, Yankee No! 145. 394 of the Spanish language newspaper and distributed them throughout Santo
Domingo.995 The paper became the highest circulated publication in Dominican history.996
The radio war ultimately became central to U.S. efforts in establishing a new interim government in Santo Domingo amidst the chaos. In an attempt to calm the situation and find a workable agreement LBJ turned to “Kennedy liberals” John Bartlow
Martin, Ellsworth Bunker, and Adolf Berle. These men flew into Santo Domingo and held meetings with leaders from both the loyalists and constitutionalists. Martin quickly pushed for Antonio Imbert Barrera to be named interim president. Known as a national hero for his role in the assassination of Trujillo in 1961, Imbert took power on May 7 as head of the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR). Yet, even with a new provisional government, the rebels continued their radio campaign. President Johnson’s
May 9 USIA report stated that “Radio Santo Domingo, which continues to be a major psychological problem, has begun violent attacks on the new Imbert government.
Jamming attempts which forced Radio Santo Domingo to change its frequency at least once and to interrupt its broadcasts for some periods, have not silenced what Ambassador
Bennett characterizes as the Rebels’ chief weapon.”997 Only two days later LBJ learned that through their radio program the “Rebels continue to hold the psychological initiative in Santo Domingo.”998 Such news could not have been heartening as more than a week into the U.S. intervention psychological efforts had yet to gain the upper hand.
995 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report, Santo Domingo – 5:00 pm,” May 11, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 996 McPherson, Yankee No! 154. 997 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report, Santo Domingo – 3:00 pm,” May 9, 1965, National Securit Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 998 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report, Santo Domingo – 5:00 pm,” May 11, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 395 Ambassador Bennett argued that the GNR suffered from a constant barrage of
“propaganda spewing forth from Radio Santo Domingo,” while one CIA officer reported to Langley that “the difference in Santo Domingo lies in that radio station. If the rebels continue their propaganda they will take over the entire country. The radio must be silenced.”999
It would not be until May 18 that the United States turned a corner in the radio war. Director Rowan wrote to the president that
The battle of the airwaves continues as hot as the battle of the bullets in Santo Domingo, but once again the stations controlled by the USIA team are dominant throughout the county. The rebels’ output has been reduced to a weak signal, apparently from makeshift facilities, which can be heard only sporadically – and then only in a small area of the Capital. Meanwhile Ryan reported that his team put another 5,000-watt Army mobile transmitter on the air yesterday. This means that our psychological team now controls directly four stations in Santo Domingo, with several stations in the Santiago area also relaying our broadcasts.1000
A primary reason for the enhancement of psychological operations in the DR included close cooperation between the military and USIA. Hewson Ryan understood that the agency could not make much of a difference on their own, and demanded more military assets for the United States public diplomacy campaign. Shortly after arriving on May 2
Ryan wrote to Rowan that the lack of adequate resources was “seriously handicapping…output.”1001 While Ryan and other officials initially worked out of the home of a resident PAO in makeshift conditions, once the U.S. military’s Psywar
Battalion arrived the propaganda effort gained more focus and organization.1002 The military brought “mobile printing presses, mobile broadcasting facilities, a loudspeaker
999 Lawrence Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 114-131. 1000 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report-Dominican Republic,” May 18, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 1001 Yates, Powerpack, 136. 1002 Cull, The United States Information Agency and the Cold War, 241. 396 capability to broadcast from trucks and from the two C-47s, and ultimately, heavy, mobile printing equipment.”1003 Such equipment and resources allowed the USIA to gain an advantage over Colonel Caamaño’s increasingly depleted forces isolated within
Ciudad Nueva.
Transition to the OAS and the Hope for Elections
While the Johnson administration worked hard to implement a wide-ranging public diplomacy campaign in the DR, the president also sought to obtain an inter-
American security force to act as peacekeepers. In doing so, LBJ hoped to “Latin
Americanize” the U.S. intervention. Initially, gaining support seemed unlikely. One U.S. diplomat at the UN predicted that “they’ll be stoning U.S. Embassies all over.” He proved correct as protests took place in every Latin American capital, as well as in major cities around the world including Tokyo, Paris, and Toronto.1004 Almost immediately after deploying U.S. forces Johnson issued a statement calling for regional cooperation.
He stated that “the wisdom, the statesmanship, and the ability to act decisively of the
OAS are critical to the hopes of peoples in every land of this continent.”1005 In an attempt to tamp down anti-U.S. demonstrations, and in order to foster a coalition, Johnson sent a respected U.S. diplomat to Latin America to push the administration’s position. On May
2 LBJ announced that Averell Harriman would make his way to the region to tell leaders
“the truth, and to warn them that joint action is necessary.”1006 Harriman, a veteran foreign policy hand, visited eight countries. The administration hoped that prominent
1003 Ibid, 137. 1004 McPherson, Yankee No! 138 1005 “Statement by the President, Office of the White House Press Secretary,” April 30, 1965, Papers of Carl Rowan, Subgroup III, Public Service Records, series 5, USIA Director Files, Dominican Republic Policy, 1965, box 3, OCA. 1006 “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in the Dominican Republic,” May 2, 1965, APP. 397 regional powers such as Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and Chile would offer troops. When Harriman arrived at the airport in Brasilia a U.S. official handed him a note that stated, “Don’t push too hard. The door is open.”1007 The Brazilian military regime, in power since March 1964, proved more than willing to supply troops.
Harriman encountered more difficulties in Bogotá and Santiago, where local leaders privately supported LBJ, but hesitated to publicly endorse Washington’s intervention.1008
The special envoy reported to the president that “by and large…we have real staunch friends in Latin America. Many of them can’t express themselves openly, but do, nevertheless, support us.”1009 Johnson felt confident enough to push a proposal for an inter-American peace force. On May 6 the OAS convened to decide on the measure.
Washington needed two-thirds of the member states, or fourteen votes, to approve the plan. Although Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru voted no, the United States secured the two-thirds majority it needed.1010 Less than a week later the administration had an initial report on the status of Latin American contributions to a peacekeeping force in the DR. Though many nations voted in support of sending troops, the vast majority of
U.S. allies decided against contributing their own forces.1011 Ultimately, six countries provided resources to what became the OAS Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Brazil sent an infantry battalion along with a marine company. Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Paraguay each gave a rifle company. Costa Rica sent military police while El Salvador
1007 “Telegram From the Embassy Office in Brasilia to the Department of State.” May 4, 1965, FRUS, vol. XXXII, 117. 1008 Oral History, Averell Harriman, June 16, 1969, FAOC. 1009 McPherson, Yankee No! 150. 1010 “OAS Votes to Police Dominican Republic,” May 6, 1965, Chicago Tribune. 1011 Atkins and Wilson, The Dominican Republic and the United States, 138. 398 provided several staff officers.1012 While the Johnson administration did not exactly garner a robust regional coalition–only about 1,500 Latin American soldiers served in total– OAS support for the intervention proved important as it helped cast the intervention as more of a regional action.1013 Cuba, who by this point was no longer a member of the organization, condemned any inter-American force as an “American Holy
Alliance.”1014
When OAS forces established their presence in Santo Domingo by the end of
May, U.S. public diplomacy practitioners welcomed the multilateral force. Director
Rowan reported to the president that “operations continue in high gear as does the general
USIA efforts to explain our Dominican actions and policies in the rest of Latin America and the world.”1015 News report and other outreach stopped being solely from the United
States and took on an inter-American tone. The USIA helped promote a new radio station, the Voice of the OAS. As Nicholas Cull notes, the agency “then began to offload the rest of its information work, including its newspaper, into OAS hands, albeit with the
USIS [A] providing technical support.”1016 LBJ received word on May 25 that the OAS stood ready to take control of main radio stations in Santo Domingo.1017 When later recounting what issues arose among the U.S. and their allies regarding information output, public diplomacy practitioner Allen Hansen recalled that “none at the time, and not on the working level, no problems at all. We had the same objective. We wanted the
1012 Bruce Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean: the Dominican Crisis of 1965 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1989), 72. 1013 Rabe, The Killing Zone, 101. 1014 “O.A.S. Scored by Cubans,” May 27, 1965, New York Times, p. 14. 1015 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report, Santo Domingo--5:00 PM,” 25 May 1965. GRDOS, Records relating to the Dominican Republic, RG 59, Entry 5279, Box 1, NARA. 1016 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 244. 1017 “Memorandum for the President, Psychological Situation Report –Santo Domingo – 5:00 pm,” May 15, 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Latin America-Dominican Republic, Box 49, LBJL. 399 OAS to be really responsible for this. We thought they were the ones that should be— of course, that took the heat off of the United States.”1018
As the occupation wore on U.S. diplomats frantically sought a negotiated settlement between loyalists and constitutionalists. Johnson ordered McGeorge Bundy to lead the talks in Santo Domingo and the United States soon sought a “Constitutionalism- without-Bosch formula.”1019 As rebel forces in Ciudad Nueva exhausted much of their supplies, and loyalist forces tired of continued unrest, talks produced an agreement by late August 1965. Héctor García-Godoy, a former member of both the Trujillo and Bosch governments, was chosen to lead a new provisional government. U.S. representative to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, developed a close relationship with García-Godoy and counseled the Dominican leader on how to restore democratic order. Both loyalist and constitutionalist factions agreed to the new government on the grounds that the majority of foreign military forces would redeploy from the DR and elections would take place in the near future. The political solution in the DR during the fall of 1965 led to a new phase in USIA’s operations. While the agency had previously sought to earn support for the intervention, U.S. public diplomacy now focused on preparing the country for a democratic election set to take place in June 1966.
On September 25 Juan Bosch returned to the DR from exile in Puerto Rico. Only a few weeks earlier, in a letter to a friend in Venezuela, the former president made no mention of a return and even wrote that the situation in the DR would probably not
1018 Oral History, Allen Hansen, March 8, 1988, FAOC. 1019 Giancarlo Soler Torrijos, In the Shadow of the United States: Democracy and Regional Order in the Latin Caribbean (Boca Raton, FL: Brown Walker Press, 2008), 72. 400 change for quite some time.1020 In any case, he returned home and addressed thousands in downtown Santo Domingo on the two-year anniversary of his overthrow.
The ousted leader gave an impassioned anti-U.S. and anti-IAPF speech.1021 One reporter on hand for the rally recorded that Bosch appeared “bouncy, charged up, eyes alight and for two solid hours seemingly transported on the waves of his own oratory, which was almost 100% anti-U.S.”1022 The defiant stance taken by Bosch owed directly to his resentment of U.S. interventionism. He later wrote that Washington only sent troops to
Santo Domingo in 1965 out of “economic reasons” driven by an imperialist urge for
“penetration and global domination.”1023 Bosch’s opponent for the presidential contest would be former Trujillo ally Joaquín Balaguer. Though leaders in Washington remained overjoyed that Santo Domingo did not descend into absolute chaos during the summer of
1965, the prospect of a Bosch led DR did not sit well with the Johnson administration.
Image 41: Dominican leader Juan Bosch.
1020 “Carta de Juan Bosch a Julio César Martínez,” 28 de Agosto 1965, in Santo Domingo: Desde Trujillo Hasta la Revolucion de Abril, Signatura 972.93053M386s, AGNDR. 1021 Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, 109. 1022 Miguel Acoca, “…An Angry Bosch Back from Exile,” October 8, 1965, Life Magazine, 46b. 1023 Juan Bosch, “República Dominicana: Causas de Intervención Militar Norteamericana de 1965” (Santo Domingo: Alfa & Omega, 1985), 16, Signatura 972.93054B742c, AGNDR. 401 By early 1966 the USIA centered its efforts in Santo Domingo on improving the U.S. image in the country and promoting democracy. The agency reported that immediately following the intervention local “communists and ultranationalists leveled broadsides against our government’s policy.”1024 To combat such feelings, the USIA re- opened the binational center and soon had the number of enrollees at an all time high.
Attention throughout the country quickly turned to the presidential campaign which pitted two well-known political actors against one another. Bosch ran on the PRD ticket while Balaguer represented the Reformist Party. Continued threats of violence caused
Bosch to campaign from his house through press interviews and radio commentaries.1025
In contrast, his opponent appeared in person promoting a vision of economic growth, peace, and order.1026 In a January 1966 speech, titled El Reformismo (Reformism),
Balaguer laid out his vision for progress through “profound reform.” He stated that unlike elements of the extreme left, he would promote social and economic change but refuse to provoke unrest. His presidency would be a “revolution without blood.”1027 The Johnson administration never wavered in its hopes of a Balaguer victory, but did not publicly admit a preferred outcome. In fact, the first words of one memo from National Security
Advisor Walt Rostow to LBJ stated that “let me be clear, I don’t want Bosch.”1028 An early May 1966 election analysis produced by the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo gave
LBJ cause for concern. While both candidates continued to defend their pasts, Balaguer
1024 “Country Assessment Report-Dominican Republic,” 25 April 1966, GRUSIA, Subject Files, 1953- 1967, RG 306, Entry A1, Box 56, NARA. 1025 “Bosch ‘Campaigning’ at Home,” May 16, 1966, New York Times, p. 14. 1026 Atkins and Wilson, The Dominican Republic and the United States, 142-143. 1027 “El Reformismo, Filosofia Politica de la Revolucion sin Sangre,” 26 de Enero 1966, Signatura 324.2B171r, AGNDR. 1028 5239 “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President,” May 3, 1966, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 7, LBJL. 402 for his trujillismo and Bosch regarding his possible communismo, Bosch stood as the
“man to beat.” Even though he did not campaign in person, diplomats reported that
“Bosch’s campaign is more aggressive and zealous.” The PRD also had more organization and campaign funds.1029
Essential to a Balaguer victory, in the eyes of policymakers in Washington, was high voter turnout. While Bosch had vast support in Santo Domingo, neighborhoods that surrounded the capital city tended to favor Balaguer. Yet, if those citizens did not vote,
Bosch’s path to victory seemed assured. Moreover, in a country where many did not understand the basics of voting, and even more did not believe that a free election could occur, making sure enough Dominicans showed up at the polls remained highly problematic. In an attempt to spur a high turnout, the USIA sought to “stimulate an interest in, and desire for, democratic processes.”1030 The PAO in Santo Domingo reported in spring 1966 that a high level of democratic fervor was in the city and that “a get-out-the-vote campaign, with heavy USIA involvement, is under way.”1031 The agency distributed over 375,000 cartoon pamphlets explaining the virtues and necessity of democracy along with color posters around Santo Domingo.1032 One set of prints, titled
“Los 9 Puntos del Buen Votante” (Nine Points for the Good Voter), became quite popular. The poster explained the fundamentals of voting. Different sections covered the need to study the candidates, participate in meetings, eschew violence, and beware of
1029 “Memorandum to Mr. Rostow,” May 9, 1966, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 7, LBJL. 1030 “Country Assessment Report-Dominican Republic,” 25 April 1966, GRUSIA, Subject Files, 1953- 1967, RG 306, Entry A1, Box 56, NARA. 1031 Ibid. 1032 “Memorandum for the President,” May 26, 1966, National Security Files, Agency File, USIA, Box 75, LBJL. 403 extremists.1033 When U.S. reporters saw the voting guides they pressed the USIA on its role in a foreign election. One news account reported that “USIA officials appeared slightly embarrassed when asked about the new election aids.” Agency leaders argued that the USIA “did not suggest that [Dominicans] vote for anyone or any group of candidates.”1034
Image 42: USIA cartoon distributed in the Dominican Republic prior to the 1966
election.
Regarding other pamphlets, Elecciones Libres (Free Elections) demonstrated the very basics of democratic governance including public debate, privacy of the voting box,
1033 Benjamin Welles, “U.S. Election Poster Works as Well in South Vietnam as It Does in the Dominican Republic,” September 27, 1966, New York Times, p. 18. 1034 “Clever USIA Signs Bring Out Big Vote,” October 4, 1966, The Milwaukee Journal, 5. 404 impartiality of vote counting, and election results. El Buen Ciudadano (The Good
Citizen) also focused on basics, covering how voting was every citizen’s right. One particular aspect of this cartoon included the argument that democracy treats everyone equally, both the farmer and the businessman.1035 Targeting more rural elements of
Dominican society proved important as Balaguer tended to have more supporters outside of the cities than Bosch. Such backing came largely from many farmers and peasants who had received subsidies from the Trujillo government.
The cartoon Los Apuros de Nerón (The Plight of Neron) told a more complicated story. It focused on the importance of every citizen participating in the election, and respecting the ultimate outcome. When two couples gathered to play dominoes, Antonio paid more attention to his radio broadcasts reporting a political campaign. His neighbor,
Ignacio, tells him to stop talking politics and focus on the game. An argument erupts over the importance of voting. Ignacio declares that a friend of his said that the country needs a revolution. Antonio, along with his talking dog Neron, states that revolutions bring nothing but violence. Ignacio grabs his wife María and quickly leaves. The reference to revolution is interesting since Juan Bosch ran on the “revolutionary party” ticket.1036
Placing that term in a negative connotation was likely no accident or oversight.
A few days later María, after being prodded by Antonio’s wife, pleads with
Ignacio to attend a political rally just to see what it is like. He takes a break from building a fence to block his yard from Antonio’s, and they head into town. Ignacio watches the
Partido Futurista (Party of the Future) candidate give an impassioned speech in favor of
1035 “Elecciones Libres and El Buen Ciudadano,” National Security Files, Agency File, USIA, Box 75, LBJL. 1036 “Los Apuros de Nerón,”National Security Files, Agency File, USIA, Box 75, LBJL. 405 changing the country and is overcome with excitement. He dedicates himself to the campaign. Antonio, who supports the Partido Grande (Great Party), sees Ignacio’s involvement in the campaign and is happy his neighbor decided to vote. When the couples see one another on election day, Antonio tells them all that the most important point of the election is that democracy is respected. The Partido Grande candidate wins and Ignacio is completely dejected. A passerby on the street asks why he is so sad.
Because “my party lost” he replies. The man explains that all citizens should be happy since the election was free and fair, now everyone must come together to move the country forward. Ignacio goes to Antonio’s house and embraces his friend.1037
Ultimately, Los Apuros de Nerón helped many Dominicans understand the electoral process through a well-told story. Allen Hansen, a USIA official stationed in Santo
Domingo at the time, recalled that
There had to be some kind of education training in the democratic processes so that Dominicans could learn what votes and elections are all about. So one of the things we did, we devised some cartoon fashion, very simple, about what you do when you vote and what happens when you vote, and the importance of voting and so forth. This campaign was actually very successful in the Dominican Republic.1038
By late May the White House received analysis that Balaguer’s prospects had improved.
He now had more funds and participated in rallies across the country. The enhanced position likely stemmed from covert CIA support the candidate received. As early as
December 1965, agency officials received orders that the president expected U.S. intelligence “to devote the necessary personnel and material resources in the Dominican
Republic required to win the presidential election for the candidate favored by the United
1037 Ibid. 1038 Oral History, Allen Hansen, March 8, 1988, FAOC 406 States Government…He [LBJ] wants to win the election, and he expects the Agency to arrange for this to happen.”1039 A group of covert officers, working within what was known as the 303 Committee, took charge in making sure the White House’s preferred candidate won the election.1040 In late April 1966 the 303 Committee received a recommendation from the Johnson administration to make funds available for Balaguer.
The report stated that “neither Balaguer nor any of his party leaders know very much about political organization or the conduct of presidential campaigns. This lack of experience combined with Balaguer’s relative lack of success in raising campaign funds from local sources have thus far impeded full exploitation of latent but widespread pro-
Balaguer sentiment.” The committee needed to be prepared “to inject additional funds into the campaign to ensure that Balaguer does not lose momentum at a critical point in the race because of shortage of cash.”1041
As Bosch continued his refusal to actively campaign, more and more Dominicans came around to the idea of a Balaguer resumption of power. Most importantly, voter turnout looked to be high. Embassy officials on the ground and policymakers in
Washington continued to believe that high voter turnout favored Balaguer.1042 Juan Bosch and his followers insisted that the Dominican army harassed supporters and negatively affected his chances. The presidential contender event threatened to pull out of the campaign only weeks before the election. He bitterly complained to U.S. and OAS
1039 “Memorandum from the Acting Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Fitzgerald),” December 29, 1965, FRUS, vol. XXXII, 358. 1040 “Editorial Notes,” FRUS, vol. XXXII, 357; Rabe, The Killing Zone, 102-103; McPherson, “Latin America,” in A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson, ed. Mitchell Lerner, 387. 1041 “Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee,” April 30, 1966, FRUS, FRUS, Volume XXXII, 403. 1042 “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President,” May 24, 1966, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 7, LBJL; “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President,” May 26, 1966, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 7, LBJL. 407 representatives that the contest was a farce. Only when the provisional government led by García-Godoy publicly guaranteed no more interference did Bosch agree to go through with his candidacy.1043 During a private three-hour meeting García-Godoy also received an assurance from Bosch that his party would accept the election’s outcome.1044
On June 2 at 9:30 a.m. Lyndon Johnson obtained his initial update on the previous day’s election in the DR. He received continuous reports and studied poll returns from
Santo Domingo as if it was a U.S. congressional race. The first briefing, sent from Walt
Rostow, stated that “on the basis of all the information we have, there are grounds for solid optimism.”1045 Two Santo Domingo dailies, Caribe and Listin, both had Balaguer leading by over 30,000 votes. The next update, received one hour later, had Balaguer winning 23 out of 27 provinces and leading overall with 57 percent of the vote to Bosch’s
41 percent.1046 At 12:25 P.M. reports indicated that out of over 400,000 total votes cast,
Balaguer had well over 50 percent.1047 The last updates received late in the day still reflected a commanding lead for the Johnson administration’s preferred candidate.1048
The next morning the New York Times ran with the headline “Balaguer Defeats Bosch in
Dominican Balloting.”1049 While admitting he believed that some voting irregularities
1043 “Bosch Withdraws Election Threat,” May 20, 1966, New York Times, p. 16. 1044 “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President, Dominican Situation” May 27, 1966, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 1 of 2 LBJL. 1045 “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President,” June 2, 1966, 9:30am, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 1 of 2 LBJL. 1046 “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President,” June 2, 1966, 10:30am, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 1 of 2 LBJL. 1047 “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President,” June 2, 1966, 12:25pm, National Security FIles, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 1 of 2 LBJL. 1048 5256, 5258 “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President,” June 2, 1966, 2:10pm, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 1 of 2 LBJL; “Memorandum, Walt Rostow to the President,” June 2, 1966, 4:45pm, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 1 of 2 LBJL. 1049 Paul Montgomery, “Balaguer Defeats Bosch in Dominican Ballloting,” June 3, 1966, New York Times, p. 1. 408 occurred, but not enough to affect the outcome, Juan Bosch soon officially conceded and declared he would lead “an honest, democratic opposition.”1050 In a glowing after- action report requested by LBJ, the State Department’s Bureau of Economic Affairs wrote that the United States achieved its objectives of protecting its own citizens, providing stability in the DR, creating a regional peace-keeping force, and aiding in a free and fair election. One passage concluded that “decisive results of the election are conclusive evidence that the timely action of the United States permitted rather than frustrated democratic expression of the will of the Dominican people.” The most important goal for the United States remained to help in creating a “sense of progress” among Dominicans.1051
The USIA quickly provided the White House with a breakdown of Latin
American editorial reaction to the election. The agency noted that a majority of regional periodicals were “overwhelmingly favorable” in their coverage. Moreover, numerous editorialists placed Bosch’s loss on his “failure to campaign throughout the country, and his lack of courage in refusing to leave his house, and, earlier, to return to the Dominican
Republic to lead the 1965 revolution.”1052 Other segments of the United States government also viewed the intervention as highly successful. In late June Ambassador
Bunker testified before the congressional subcommittee on Latin America regarding the intervention. He reported to the White House that his meeting was a “love feast.” Senator
Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania called U.S. actions “the most extraordinary diplomatic feat
1050 “Dr. Bosch concedes defeat,” June 15, 1966, The Age, Melbourne, Australia, p. 13. 1051 “Memorandum to the President, Dominican Republic,” June 17, 1966, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 2 of 2 LBJL. 1052 “Latin American Media Reaction to the DR Election,” June 16, 1966, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 2 of 2 LBJL. 409 in American diplomacy in this century.”1053 As leaders in Washington continued to congratulate themselves, the final forces from the IAPF redeployed from Santo Domingo in September, ending another chapter in U.S.-Dominican relations.1054 During the fighting the United States lost forty-four soldiers while Dominican causalities were over
2,000.
The electoral victory of Balaguer was not the end of Washington’s involvement in the DR, nor did it curtail Fidel Castro’s fiery rhetoric. During a 1967 speech in Havana before thousands, Castro listed grievances with U.S. foreign policy. He shouted that
“recently, they sent 40,000 soldiers equipped with the most modern weapons to intervene brazenly in the Dominican Republic.” In the same speech he also referred to Balaguer as
“the Trujillist imposed on the Dominican people by the Yankee bayonets.”1055 In order to continue preventing Cuban influence from gaining hold in a post-election DR, the United
States continued wholeheartedly supporting Balaguer. In April 1967 the U.S. Embassy in
Santo Domingo reported that
The future course of the Dominican Republic is of great importance to the United States for three inter-related reasons: (a) its strategic location in the Caribbean chain of islands which puts it on our geographic doorstep and very close to Communist Cuba; (b) the primitiveness and fragility of its political, economic, social and military institutions, which make for chronic instability and consequent vulnerability to extremism; and (c) the serious damage to our interests which would be caused by the assumption of power in another Caribbean country by forces inimical to us.1056
1053 “Memorandum to the President, Bunker’s Testimony Before the Senate Latin American Subcommittee” June 21, 1966, National Security Files, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 8, 2 of 2 LBJL. 1054 Paul Montgomery, “Nobody There Now but the Dominicans,” September 25, 1966, New York Times, p. 194. 1055 “Fidel Castro Speech at CDR Anniversary Rally,” September 29, 1967, Castro Speech Database, LANIC. 1056 “Country Analysis and Strategy Paper,” April 15, 1967, FRUS, Volume XXXII, 457. 410 The CIA continued its activities as well. U.S. intelligence officers pushed the possibility of helping fund moderate members of the Revolutionary Social Christian
Party (PRSC) at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. The operation was supposed to “insure the election of a moderate PRSC affiliated student group as the majority element in the Government of the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo, thereby encouraging and strengthening the progressive moderate faction within the
PRSC, and its stand for ‘constructive opposition.’” White House officials signed off on the plan, but threats of violence between student groups at the university caused U.S.
Ambassador John Crimmins to cancel the operation.1057 The CIA also continued seeking to influence Dominican national elections. At the beginning of 1968 the Johnson administration approved plans to continue aiding the PRSC by funding their candidates in upcoming municipal elections. Washington hoped a moderate victory could strengthen
Balaguer’s hold on power. Following voting during the summer CIA officials reported that “the covert passage of funds to the PRSC had its desired effect.” They concluded that
“the participation of a responsible opposition also served to make the victory of the PR
[SC] more generally acceptable and had the net effect of strengthening both President
Balaguer’s image and the democratic process in the Dominican Republic.”1058
1057 “Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee,” March 17, 1967, FRUS, Volume XXXII, 444. 1058 “Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee,” June 28, 1968, FRUS, Volume XXXII, 520. 411
Image 43: USIA publication distributed in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
Support in the form of overt aid also did not waver and continued on a large scale.
The United States spent $58.8 million in 1967 and $58.7 million in 1968 on economic programs in the DR.1059 On the public diplomacy front, Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon recommended that Washington focus on programs that give Dominicans “a sense of progress.” Rather than attempting to sell long-term developmental programs, the United States would be best served to highlight tangible progress that people could see for themselves. They needed to believe that “their children’s lives will be better than their own.” Improving electricity output was on the top of Solomon’s list as he approved a $9 million loan for a thermal power plant and monies
1059 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 143. 412 for transmission lines. Educational programs also received attention. The United
States spent millions over a five-year period to bring U.S. academics to Santo Domingo to “counter the strength of Communist faculty members.”1060 LBJ also approved a $12 million loan for the building of schools and training of secondary school teachers.
Conclusion
During his July 1966 inaugural address, Joaquín Balaguer submitted that the
Dominican Republic would be a nation of laws and called for complete unity. He specifically mentioned the need for better treatment of women and peasants. Importantly,
Balaguer also publicly supported a continued close relationship with Washington. For more than a decade, 1966-78, the Dominican Republic came under the rule of the former
Trujillo ally.
Ultimately, the 1965 United States intervention in the DR left a complicated legacy. It was the first overt U.S. military incursion in Latin America in over 30 years.
For some, images of soldiers coming ashore harkened back to the times of gunboat diplomacy. Recently, declassified documents portray an even more nefarious role played by the Johnson administration as they helped bankroll Balaguer’s 1966 campaign.
Furthermore, the use of military power in the Western Hemisphere foreshadowed an even larger U.S. military buildup as LBJ soon began his Americanization of the war in
Vietnam.
The intervention also left a lasting legacy for U.S. public diplomacy as it illustrated a new task for the USIA. During the Kennedy years the agency had dedicated the majority of its efforts to promoting the Alliance for Progress and building support for
1060 Ibid, 143. 413 U.S. containment of Fidel Castro. Those goals were difficult to accomplish in a country with such profound political and social turmoil as the DR. For most of Trujillo’s time in power, and particularly during the early 1960s, the USIA proved unable to establish any lasting presence in the DR.
When Lyndon Johnson turned to public diplomacy practitioners in 1965 to sell his intervention in the Dominican Republic, the agency took on a new role. It provided the president with up to date reports regarding propaganda operations. Moreover, USIA officials took on a pronounced role in a combat zone for the first time. Air drops of pamphlets, speeches, and posters occurred regularly during the first days of the intervention. More questionable actions, such as preventing domestic information flow in the DR by jamming rebel radio stations, also occurred. Hewson Ryan, the head of all psychological operations during the conflict, initially objected to such actions. While the
USIA veteran believed preventing information from being broadcast did not align with the agency’s mission, he quickly relented and performed with “vigor and skill.”1061
Perhaps more problematic, the agency helped put a presidential candidate into power.
Well-known in Washington and Santo Domingo was that high voter-turnout equaled a
Balaguer victory. U.S. public diplomacy worked tirelessly to make sure that Dominicans showed up at the polls. One USIA report in the wake of the 1966 election stated that the
Santo Domingo post “had helped with a highly successful get-out-and-vote campaign.”1062
Most importantly, as historian Nicholas Cull writes, “events had a wider significance for the USIA. Hewson Ryan’s efforts in the field had justified a leadership
1061 Yates, Powerpack, 136. 1062 Oral History, Earl Wilson, October 14, 1988, FAOC 414 role of civilian specialists in a psychological warfare situation. Ryan’s tactical success in the Dominican Republic justified the emerging role of the agency in South
Vietnam.”1063 By 1966 the USIA created the Joint United States Public Affairs Office in
Saigon to coordinate propaganda operations in Vietnam and Ryan headed to another war zone.1064 In essence, the USIA’s role in the Dominican intervention helped create a firm belief, perhaps a false one, that propaganda and public diplomacy efforts could be easily wedded to military operations. The militarization of psychological programs came at a steep cost, just as Vietnam consumed Lyndon Johnson, the war also absorbed vast USIA resources and personnel.
1063 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 244. 1064 For a detailed study of U.S. propaganda in Vietnam refer to Kodosky, Psychological Operations, American Style. 415 Conclusion
In March 2011 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while testifying before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared that “we are in an information war, and we’re losing that war.”1065 The top U.S. diplomat further lamented that since the fall of the Soviet Union funds for public diplomacy operations had been reduced significantly.
Only three years later, the United States was in a military and propaganda battle against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a radical fundamentalist group drawing supporters from the around the world. Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs Richard Stengel, while attending meetings in the Middle East with U.S.
Special Envoy General John Allen, declared to reporters that an “information coalition” was necessary to stem the appeal of ISIS.1066
The recent heightened attention to public diplomacy illustrates that attempting to reach foreign audiences has not diminished as a tool of promoting U.S. foreign policy goals around the world. As this dissertation demonstrates, public diplomacy became a critically important component in Washington’s war against Fidel Castro. Moreover, the issues confronting foreign U.S. policymakers today directly relate to the same questions being asked during the 1960s—what is our message? Can we earn support among regional allies? How can we reach the masses? Most important, the goal remains fundamentally the same—to win hearts and minds.
1065 Joby Warrick, “Clinton: U.S. losing global public-relations battle – to ‘Baywatch’ and wrestling,” March 3, 2011, Washington Post. 1066 “U.S. Urges Stronger fight Against ISIS Propaganda in Mideast,” October 27, 2014, CBS News, available from CBS News.
416 The origins of ISIS owed largely to the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the inability of Syria’s ruling Assad family to maintain political legitimacy. These important changes have given rise to a critical juncture in the history of U.S. foreign relations in the Middle East. In a similar fashion, the fall of dictators in Latin America during the late 1950s and the subsequent rise of revolutionary Cuba proved to be a watershed moment in U.S.-Latin American relations. In confronting the changing dynamics, and to counter revolutionary Cuba’s appeal, the United States implemented a comprehensive and coordinated public diplomacy campaign. Thus, scholars should recognize the centrality of propaganda in U.S.-Latin American relations during the 1960s.
It became an essential component of Washington’s approach, equal to, if not greater than, developmental aid and military assistance.
A Critical Decade
U.S. policymakers faced an uphill battle at the dawn of the 1960s. Growing mistrust of the “colossus to the north,” coupled with a youthful population desperate for change set the stage for region-wide revolution. Could the United States harness the aspirations of millions to follow Washington’s path? Or would Latin America go the way of Castro? Central to Washington’s public diplomacy efforts were Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. As this dissertation illustrates, presidential leadership was vital in advancing psychological operations in Latin America during the 1960s.
The Kennedy administration’s public diplomacy offensive commenced with a
July 1961 USIA memorandum from John McKnight to White House advisor Adolf Berle titled “An Expanded Propaganda Program in Latin America.” Written in the wake of the
Bay of Pigs disaster, the memo argued in favor of a large-scale increase in U.S. public 417 diplomacy throughout the region. Writing to Berle was a smart choice. A veteran of
World War II diplomacy, he remembered well Washington’s propaganda war against
Nazi Germany. Berle had even advocated to President Kennedy before the 1961 inauguration that psychological operations needed to be a centerpiece of the New
Frontier’s approach in Latin America. Ultimately, McKnight’s words reverberated from
Washington meeting rooms to the streets of Caracas and to the villages of Nicaragua. His call to action spurred a robust book program, comic series, and information operations specifically designed to sell the Alliance for Progress.
Image 44: John F. Kennedy arguably devoted more attention to Latin America
than any other U.S. president since 1945. 418 Along with a comprehensive strategy for Latin America, the USIA developed specific programs and operations for individual countries. Here, public diplomacy officials demonstrated a keen understanding of local customs. Policymakers often took into account the political, economic, and cultural differences that defined each nation. In
Guatemala and Honduras the USIA focused on students, teachers, laborers, and campesinos. While the Instituto Guatemalteco-Americano provided a window into the heart of life in Guatemala City, USIA officers on the ground worked tirelessly to promote the Alliance for Progress in the countryside. In Honduras, U.S. officials recognized the country’s dire economic situation, and fearing the possibility of Cuba gaining inroads, focused less on promoting the Alliance for Progress and more on anti-Castroism.
Catholic Church officials, media outlets, and Cuban exiles in the country aided in the distribution of pamphlets and comic books. The USIA devoted particular attention to the banana region surrounding the city of San Pedro Sula. There, pro-Castro sympathizers operated in large numbers. The USIA saturated this area in hopes of discouraging any support for Cuba.
While U.S. psychological operations did succeed in increasing output, officials in
Washington, including President Kennedy, failed to align with liberal leaders willing to reform key institutions and take on vested interests in both Guatemala City and
Tegucigalpa. The White House, along with USIA officials, mistakenly viewed individuals such as Juan Arévalo and Ramón Villeda Morales with too much skepticism.
While public diplomacy offered Kennedy the opportunity to place his administration on the side of liberal reform, the New Frontier could not overcome lingering doubts 419 regarding both Guatemala’s and Honduras’s capacity to forestall another Cuba. In the end they sided with right-wing dictatorships.
In Costa Rica and Nicaragua the United States faced a different set of opportunities and dilemmas. In San José the USIA welcomed the political domination of
“figueristas,” those who followed the party line of liberal reformer José Figueres. Not only was the Costa Rican leader a proponent of Washington led economic reform, he was also ardently anti-Castro. Through Figueres’s leadership, and his successors, Costa Rica embarked on large-scale development programs sponsored by the Alliance for Progress.
In many ways, the country became a prime example of what Washington envisioned for all Central American nations. In order to support the burgeoning political and economic developments President Kennedy visited the country in March 1963 for an inter-
American conference, and also delivered a rousing speech to students at San José’s largest university. Through leaders willing to adhere to the will of the people and push reform, U.S. public diplomacy benefited from having potent selling points.
In stark contrast, Nicaragua posed significant obstacles for U.S. propaganda.
Since the late 1930s the Somoza family had dominated all aspects of Nicaraguan life, and by the Kennedy era no signs existed that their grip on power would lessen. The USIA succeeded in inundating Managua, as well as the countryside, with anti-Castro propaganda, but struggled mightily to help foster an atmosphere conducive for democracy in a country where the Somoza dictatorship thrived. Key groups such as campesinos became targets of the USIA. The agency also relied on the Catholic Church, as they did in Honduras, to reach rural citizens. Following Catholic masses thousands of pamphlets highlighting Castro’s denial of religious freedom in Cuba received 420 distribution. Such actions aided in diminishing the likelihood of pro-Havana sentiment among rural Nicaraguans. Sandinista leader Carlos Fonseca even admitted a
“lack” of support for revolution among the peasantry during the 1960s.1067 However, the
USIA failed to articulate a clear vision for development and democracy in Nicaragua.
The reasons were twofold. First, the Somoza regime did very little to support any reform efforts, leaving U.S. officials reluctant to oppose the ruling government. Second,
Washington feared that too much pressure on the dictatorship could create instability, possibly inviting Cuban subversion. In many ways, the inability of U.S. public diplomacy to earn widespread support in Nicaragua highlighted the fundamental limits to propaganda. Without a viable working partner, winning over hearts and minds was all the more difficult.
While leaders in Managua stymied the many U.S. hopes for modernization and democracy, Washington found reliable partners in Caracas and Bogotá. The administration believed that by preventing an increase in Cuban influence, both
Venezuela and Colombia could be transformed to serve as models of liberal democracies for the rest of South America. The optimism policymakers in Washington had for change in Venezuela and Colombia stemmed from their similar histories. Both countries experienced the fall of dictatorships during the late 1950s, had moderate political leaders in power, embraced the Alliance for Progress, and were anti-Castro. In Venezuela,
Rómulo Betancourt sought to build up the economy through reforming education, industry, and defense. He also sought land redistribution. For his efforts he earned staunch support from John Kennedy and the USIA. In particular, the agency attempted to
1067 Manzar Foroohar, The Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 115-116. 421 reach teachers through the publication of Carta Pedagógica, a monthly newsletter that sold the value of a democratic education. U.S. officials also sponsored Venezuelan teachers participation in regional seminars. In addition, public diplomacy had an active role in fundamentally altering the Venezuelan labor scene. USIA materials became readily available and by the end of 1962 labor unions had elected a majority of moderate pro-U.S. leaders.
Image 45: USIA pro-Alliance for Progress pamphlet.
In Colombia, President Alberto Lleras Camargo proved to be an ideal leader in the eyes of the Kennedy administration. Through past experiences as Colombia’s
Ambassador to the OAS and United States he held a keen understanding of inter-
American relations. Moreover, Lleras Camargo’s vision of creating a “professional middle class” mirrored exactly what Kennedy liberals Arthur Schlesinger and Richard 422 Goodwin hoped for all of Latin America. Given Colombia’s demographics, the USIA focused on building up binational centers in heavily populated cities such as Bogotá,
Cali, and Cartagena. Such an approach allowed for widespread dissemination of U.S. propaganda among Colombian students, unions members, and intellectuals. USIA officials also relied on film as a medium to influence Colombians. Hollywood’s James
Blue produced the “Colombian Trilogy,” with one of the films being the popular “School at Rincon Santo.” The story of individuals helping build their children a schoolhouse was the exact message Washington wanted to send to regional allies. The U.S. vision for change included more opportunities for young people.
An illustration of just how important Venezuela and Colombia were to Kennedy came in December 1961, less than a year into his presidency, when he visited both countries. Though short in duration, the trip buttressed U.S. public diplomacy efforts as thousands gathered to cheer the U.S. leader and hear him speak. The trip also highlighted a central element of New Frontier diplomacy, the use of the First Lady. Jacqueline
Kennedy impressed Venezuelans and Colombians with her knowledge of Spanish and compassion towards the poor. Her public remarks focused on creating more equitable societies and she also spent time at a children’s hospital. No previous First Lady had played such a prominent role on the world stage while in office, and none has since.
While both countries experienced leftist guerilla violence during the 1960s, democracy proved durable. The Venezuelan and Colombian models became viable alternatives to
Havana’s path to revolution.
By the mid-1960s events in the region created two distinct crises in U.S.-Latin
American relations. For decades Panamanian anger towards the large U.S. presence in the 423 Canal Zone erupted in repeated protests. While numerous administration officials and congressional leaders tied Havana to stirring up emotions, anti-U.S. sentiment in Panama consistently revolved around the canal issue. The need among some in Washington to inject Fidel Castro into the Panamanian riots speaks to the initial unwillingness of U.S. officials to admit shortcomings in their approach to the canal. It was also an illustration of just how much influence revolutionary Cuba had on the mindset of U.S. policymakers.
Any unrest, riot, or anti-U.S. demonstration had to be instigated from Havana.
While the Cuban Revolution certainly had supporters within Panama, resentment towards the United States was already heightened over the canal issue. In short,
Panamanians did not need prodding from Fidel Castro or Radio Havana to take a stand against the large U.S. presence in their country. While the USIA established programs and operations in Panama City, and other more rural areas of the country, the agency always lacked the ability to gain influence on college campuses. Time after time
Panamanian youth led the way against the United States through protests and demonstrations. The 1964 riots were particularly worrisome in the eyes of Washington policymakers as Panamanian President Roberto Chiari broke diplomatic relations and demanded a new canal treaty. While the USIA continued promoting the status quo,
Panamanian desires for change did not cease. Minor concessions made by the Johnson administration improved relations to a certain extent, but post-1964 public diplomacy in
Panama demonstrated the stark limits of U.S. propaganda. By that point Panamanians wanted respect, concessions, and another agreement. Through the leadership of Omar
Torrijos, they finally earned a new treaty. 424 Much like Panama, the Dominican Republic offered distinct challenges for
U.S. psychological strategies. The rule of Rafael Trujillo completely hindered both political and social growth on the island. By the time of Trujillo’s death in 1961, the prospects for economic development through the Alliance for Progress looked bleak. The
USIA took into account this local reality and did not initiate a strategy focused on selling
John Kennedy’s signature initiative. At the same time, the rampant instability brought on by Trujillo’s ouster created an entirely new role for the USIA. In late April 1965, on the orders of President Johnson, agency director Carl Rowan dispatched a psychological team to the DR in order to sell a U.S. intervention. Such action illustrated the usefulness of USIA propaganda in a combat zone, presaging the high level of agency involvement in
Vietnam. Yet, U.S. public diplomacy also became tied to U.S. machinations in a foreign election, and with promoting a Castro-Dominican link that did not exist. Agency materials distributed in the DR incorrectly connected Fidel Castro with the constitutionalist rebel movement. While during the days of Edward R. Murrow, the USIA sought to present U.S. policies, “warts and all,” USIA officials in the DR failed to understand the possible consequences of being directly tied to a campaign of misinformation. In fact, the agency, as well as the CIA, also went on to aid in the election of Joaquín Balaguer during the 1966 presidential contest in the DR. These actions helped in achieving short-term goals, but also ran the risk of making the USIA just another appendage of U.S. imperialism in the eyes of Latin Americans, possibly preventing future relationships with regional officials from forming.
From support of liberal governments in Venezuela and Colombia, to attempting to win over Dominican hearts and minds in 1965, the United States waged a “psychological 425 offensive” in Latin America. This is not to say U.S. information programs were static, as a noticeable shift did occur in U.S. public diplomacy following the transition from
Kennedy to Johnson. While JFK implemented a vast public diplomacy program for Latin
America, Lyndon Johnson’s use of propaganda was more episodic. LBJ’s approach arose from several factors. First, while Johnson did not ignore Latin America, the region never occupied his interest the way it had Kennedy’s. Second, the burgeoning war in Vietnam consumed considerable presidential time and resources.
Towards a New Understanding
As a result of the opening of Latin American archives it is becoming increasingly clear that local conditions and aspirations drove hemispheric relations during the post-
1945 period.1068 With the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis, an obviously important event of the Cold War, Latin America remained a peripheral concern of the Soviet Union.
Moreover leaders in Washington, Tegucigalpa, Guatemala City, San José, Managua,
Caracas, Bogotá, Panama City, and Santo Domingo devoted their energies to confronting
Castro’s Cuba, not a threat from the Soviet Union. Moscow proved to be not only distant geographically, but also politically and culturally. Russian revolutionaries did not inspire guerilla groups in Latin America, but bearded ones from the island of Cuba did. On the
U.S. side, noticeably absent from the voluminous propaganda records examined for this dissertation is attention given to the Soviet Union’s designs for the region. The lack of focus on Moscow demonstrates the centrality of local issues in U.S.-Latin American
1068 Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States–Latin American Relations,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (2003). This article makes the argument in favor of including more Latin American agency the history of inter-American relations.
426 relations. Thus, this study of U.S. public diplomacy leads to a larger historiographical question—what impact did the Cold War have on Latin America?
The 2005 publication of Odd Arne Westad’s path breaking book The Global Cold
War emphasized the importance of taking a truly international approach to diplomatic history. The significance of Westad’s work was his ability to highlight how leaders from the United States and Soviet Union did not solely shape post-1945 developments, but actors from China, Vietnam, Iran, and Cuba also challenged the superpowers. His methodology offered a better understanding of how global connections can have a fundamental role on the international order. Historians have followed Westad’s lead, producing works highlighting the “global context of revolutionary change during the
Cold War era.”1069 Historian Jeremi Suri even wrote that “Cold War bipolarity was global in scope, and it affected not only relations with foreign societies, but also basic definitions of identity for newly emerging states which had to choose…which system to adopt.”1070 Scholars now often focus on the seeming interconnectedness of events in such far-flung places as Hanoi, the West Bank, Havana, and Léopoldville. Yet, such an approach often creates a lacuna regarding the importance of distinct local realities. When examining internal government documents in places such as Bogotá and San José, or reading about the issues confronting campesinos living outside Managua, one cannot help but ask did the Cold War matter to these individuals? More to the point, what was more
1069 Paul Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Movement, and the Making of the Post-Cold War World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9; Chamberlin draws connections from the PLO to Vietnam, Cuba, and Algeria. 1070 Jeremi Suri, “The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections,” Cold War History 6:3 (2006), 355. 427 important, the superpower struggle or local issues read in newspapers, heard through radio, and seen on television?
Hal Brands’s Latin America’s Cold War continues the Westad trend by arguing that a series of conflicts defined post-1945 inter-American relations. He writes that “the
Cuban Revolution exacerbated anti-Americanism and tercermundismo (“Third-
Worldism”) within Latin America [and] led to a precipitous escalation of superpower competition in the region.”1071 In his conclusion Brands notes that “conflict revolved around the emergence of the Third World, an event that generated recurring ideological ferment and social tension. The…final issue was the superpowers’ zero-sum struggle for ideological and strategic hegemony in the global south.”1072
However, the evidence to support tercermundismo and the superpower struggle as critically important components of U.S.-Latin American relations is rather thin. One can argue that a connection with the Third World mattered to Havana, but as for the rest of the region, local conditions proved paramount. Regarding the supposed escalating competition between the United States and Soviet Union, Moscow never developed a cohesive policy towards the region with the exception of Cuba. Even then, leaders from
Nikita Khrushchev to Leonid Brezhnev held misgivings regarding staunchly supporting
Fidel Castro as early as 1962.1073 Michelle Reeves’s recent dissertation, based on research in Moscow, supports the conclusion that the Soviets never developed, nor escalated, a coordinated foreign policy towards Latin America. She writes that “the weight of the
1071 Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, 3. 1072 Ibid, 255. 1073 James Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 25; Peter Shearman, “Gorbachev and the Restructuring of Soviet-Cuban Relations,” in Cuba After Thirty Years: Rectification and the Revolution, ed. Richard Gillespie (New York: Routledge, 2013), 66-71. 428 evidence available tends to show that, with the (admittedly significant) exception of the early Soviet-Cuban ‘honeymoon’ period and the missile crisis, Soviet policy toward
Latin America was largely cautious, pragmatic, and aimed more at cashing in on the policy blunders of successive U.S. administrations.”1074 Regarding the United States, superpower animosity did little to influence the issues facing Washington in the inter-
American system. Had there been no conflict with Moscow, Fidel Castro would still have been a nuisance determined to upend U.S. influence in the region.
In contrast with Brands’s interpretation, this dissertation argues that post-1945
Latin American political, social, and cultural developments should not be viewed through a global Cold War lens. Such an interpretation does not discount the attempts by countries such as Cuba to play a role on the world stage. For example, Fidel Castro worked judiciously to make Havana a key actor, as evident through hosting the 1966
Tricontinental Conference that brought delegates from other Latin American nations as well as Vietnam, Palestine, and Angola to Cuba. However, extrapolating from such events that tercermundismo played a major role in U.S.-Latin American relations is incorrect. When historians paint with such a broad brush, many of the most important elements of the local story are lost.
As a result, the Cold War should be viewed as a peripheral event in inter-
American relations. As historian Alan McPherson writes, “The Cold War was only one among a host of other…revolutionary processes occurring before, during, and after the
1074 Michelle Reeves, “Extracting the Eagle’s Talons: The Soviet Union in Cold War Latin America” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2014), 20-21. 429 years of the Cold War.”1075 The time period immediately following the Second World
War witnessed stark challenges from peasants, workers, and intellectuals, who desired a more democratic society, against the landed ruling classes throughout the region. These conflicts preceded the growing divide between Washington and Moscow following the defeat of Germany. Furthermore, the lack of Soviet involvement with the development of
Latin American communism, discussed in chapter 1, starkly highlighted the indigenous nature of leftist groups in the region. While the 1954 CIA intervention in Guatemala has usually been cast as the introduction of the Cold War to Latin America, a sharper understanding of that event again takes into account local realities. Jacobo Arbenz’s threat to Washington did not only stem from his attitude towards communists but owed more to his willingness to challenge U.S. economic interests and elite Guatemalan actors with close ties to the United States.
While the rise to power of Fidel Castro fundamentally altered the inter-American system, U.S. discontent with revolutionary Cuba originated before Castro established concrete ties with Moscow. In sum, it was not the Cold War that made the Cuban leader an adversary of the United States. Castro’s challenge to Washington’s dominant position in the Western Hemisphere created the conflict. While Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet
Union heightened U.S. antagonism toward Havana, fissures in U.S.-Cuban relations were already established. As scholars often focus on the importance of eras, historians need to reassess interpretations regarding periodization in U.S.-Latin American relations. The
Cuban Revolution must be viewed as a demarcating point. Almost every U.S. foreign
1075 Alan McPherson, “Afterword” in Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War, eds. Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio Morena (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 308. 430 policy decision regarding post-1959 Latin America was made with an eye on Havana.
Thus, rather than appropriating the term Cold War for what transpired in the Western
Hemisphere during the latter half of the twentieth century, a more fitting phrase would be the “Cuban Moment” in U.S.-Latin American relations.
The “Moment” included Havana demanding a role, be it large or small, in every major inter-American event from Castro’s ascension forward. From the rise and fall of
Salvador Allende in Chile, to the Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua, to the ascension of
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Cuba remained front and center in regional developments.1076 Yet, Havana’s approach did not remain static, but rather reflected the pragmatic nature of Fidel Castro’s foreign policy. As political scientist Jorge Domínguez writes, “Revolutionaries though they are, Cuban leaders are neither dogmatic nor stupid.”1077 In the immediate aftermath of the revolution Fidel Castro challenged the
United States through declarations, training of guerillas, and inspiring potential overthrows of Latin American governments.
Havana began an evolution in its role in the wider world as the 1960s progressed.
The willingness to offer unconditional support for revolutionaries and anti-U.S. instigators ceased. Instead, Fidel Castro accepted different paths to revolution and sought alliances with non-communists. Cuba’s openness to relations with Panama’s Omar
Torijjos confirms such an approach. Cuban intelligence officer Luis Fernández Oña recalled that by the end of the 1960s Cubans were more “revolutionaries of the heart and
1076 For Havana’s role in Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela refer to Harmer, Allende’s Chile; Pastor, Condemned to Repetition; Francisco Toro, “What Fidel taught Hugo: Cuba defined Chávez's career as much as Venezuela did,” The New Republic, March 5, 2013, available from New Republic. 1077 Domínguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution, 4. 431 thought.”1078 A further development in their foreign policy included attention to political developments in Africa.1079
Image 46: El Libertador Fidel Castro. The United States worried that similar scenes
would occur throughout Latin America following the Cuban Revolution.
While U.S. policymakers constantly feared Cuban machinations in Latin America during the 1960s, those worries were often misplaced. Though Fidel Castro continually called for more revolutions publicly, this dissertation demonstrates through Cuban
1078 Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 27. 1079 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 21-29; Tanya Harmer, “Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967–1975,” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 45, (February 2013), 61-89.
432 government documents, that Havana was mindful of political realities in neighboring countries. In instance after instance, the Cuban Foreign Ministry concluded that the conditions for radical change did not exist in the region. As a result, Castro’s tangible support for guerilla groups, going back to the early 1960s, always remained low. In sum, while Cuban foreign policy towards Latin America was revolutionary in rhetoric, it proved to be more pragmatic in practice.
Shifting Priorities
U.S. public diplomacy during the 1960s proved to be rather fluid as policymakers showed a willingness to craft strategies designed for specific countries and particular situations. Propaganda also followed the larger shifts in Washington’s overall approach to inter-American relations. By the end of the decade an obvious change occurred in
Washington’s battle for hearts and minds in Latin America. While U.S. policy during the
Kennedy years went away from selling the benefits of a free market ideology, by 1968
Washington reverted back to the Eisenhower era focus on markets and foreign investment.
USIA operations fundamentally changed as a result. Funding for Alliance for
Progress programs received reductions. Public diplomacy officials argued that the decreases could be viewed “as a lessening of U.S. interest in the Alliance.”1080 Their prognostications were correct. Bogotá’s El Tiempo quoted one Latin American leader stating that “there is an Alliance still, but there is no progress. At the end of 1968, we will tote up the balance sheet of continental frustrations.”1081 Some in the agency even
1080 “Effect of Termination or Curtailment of Aid Programs in Latin America,” January 17, 1968, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 100, NARA. 1081 Ibid. 433 recommended that the term Alliance for Progress stop being mentioned. They wrote that “the very title of the Alliance is now seen as a possible handicap. Although it has helped in the past by focusing attention on the problems of the area, it now has become a slogan that in many cases hurts rather than helps.”1082 Other USIA officials issued stark warnings regarding a lack of attention to the region. They argued that it could lead to
Latin Americans believing that they only have a choice “between grim resignation and radical solutions.”1083 Nevertheless, new programs dedicated to foreign investment received support. One operation sought to study how open Mexicans were to U.S. business investment, while U.S. officials in Colombia produced a 43-part television series titled “Private Investment-Public Profit.”1084
Looking Forward
Since October 1999, when the USIA ceased to exist, propaganda programs have fallen solely under the direction of the United States State Department. Critics of the move argue that since the restructuring information operations have lacked a clear mission. Yet, even as debates continue over the proper organizational structure of the apparatus implementing U.S. public diplomacy, reaching foreign audiences will most assuredly remain a diplomatic tool employed by the United States. As demonstrated by this dissertation, public diplomacy works best when aligned with a strong and forward- thinking local government. Yet, local conditions are not the sole determinant for success
1082 “Project Plan: Attitudes Towards Foreign Investment and American Business Enterprise in Mexico,” November 15, 1972, GRUSIA, Office of Research, Records of Research Projects, RG 306, Box 28, NARA; “Summary, Public Affairs Officers’ Conference, Bogotá, Colombia, October 9-10, 1968,” GRUSIA, RG 306, UD-2010 67, Box 107, NARA. 1083 “Policy and Program Issues: Priorities, Latin America,” November 19, 1968, GRUSIA, RG 306, UD- 2010 67, Box 107, NARA. 1084 “USIA Appropriations Authorization, Fiscal Year 1973: Hearing, Ninety-second Congress, Second Session, March 20, 21, and 23, 1972,” Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, 181. 434 or failure. The chances for objectives to be met often rely on Washington’s approach.
Believing that any unrest that occurred in Latin America had to Havana’s support or blessing often undermined U.S. propaganda initiatives.
In essence, the question confronting U.S. policymakers today mirrors the same questions that John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson faced—what do we have to offer as an alternative? During the 1960s the United States sought to sell a democratic vision of progress, all the while combating Havana’s calls for revolution. At times, U.S. public diplomacy focused too much on the Castro threat, and did not devote enough resources to the promotion of democracy. Also, a void often existed between U.S. acts and U.S. promises. The gap was not lost on Latin Americans, many who hoped Washington would reinforce its messages promoting democracy and modernization through concrete actions.
It appears that USIA Director Edward R. Murrow’s quotation from 1962 is just as relevant now as it was then “Our aim: to tell them why we do what we do. We are in pursuit of men’s minds and opinions. It is an elusive goal. You do not win them quickly or easily. Once won, they give you no commitment that they will stay won. They are people like you and me. They will change their minds as capriciously or as often as we do. They will judge as more by what we do than by what we say.”1085 As the United
States continues to navigate an increasingly fragile international order, Washington must rely on all tools of diplomacy. In current and future engagements with foreign publics,
U.S. public diplomacy must seek to match its words with deeds.
1085 “The United States Information Agency: A Commemoration,” 30, available from USIA. 435 Bibliography
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