The Condemnation of Jansenism by George E. Tiffany At the University Of Louvain the teaching of Michael de Bay, usually called Baius, on grace, free will and predestination, which had previously been condemned by Pope Pius V in 1567, had keen defenders.1 It remained, however, for Cornelius Jansenius, Professor of Scripture at Louvain and subsequently Bishop of Ypres, to develop the doctrines of Baius to such an extent that they became ever connected with his name. Jansenius had contempt for the scholastic theologians and believed that the true doctrine on grace could be found only in the writings of St. Augustine. He claimed that St. Augustine had so perfected the doctrine of grace that nothing could be added to it; that the theologians could only explain St. Augustine's teaching. This is what Jansenius proceeded to do. Consequently, after studying St. Augustine, Jansenius wrote on grace and free will in a book, which he called Augustinus in memory of the Great Doctor whose doctrine he thought he was correctly interpreting. Jansenius taught, as did Baius, that supernatural grace was part of the very essence of man. Hence, when grace was lost due to original sin, the nature of man was essentially impaired. If man's nature, then, is essentially corrupt, the will is no longer master of its decisions. Its freedom is only freedom from external violence, not freedom from necessity.2 The will is then incapable of doing good and cannot resist the grace of God.3 It must always obey the strongest impression or, what Jansenius calls, the "delectatio victrix". This means that we must act according to that which gives us most pleasure.4 Jansenius took this doctrine from St. Augustine, but the sense of St. Augustine as seen from the context is this: if we put our happiness in virtue or vice, then virtue or vice will be the ruler of our lives. Due to his theory of knowledge by divine illumination, St. Augustine emphasized to a great extent the part of the will in knowledge. Accordingly, illumination and the consequent delectation affected the will in the process of knowledge. Jansenius overemphasized this. He took the words of St. Augustine to mean that the will is hovering between two attractions and that the stronger is always victorious and draws the assent of the will. According to Catholic theology, the primary object toward which the will is attracted is the bonum in genere, it is not attracted necessarily by the better or the stronger good. According to Jansenius, fallen man cannot help sinning continually. This is because he is deprived of grace.5 He claims that God refuses to give grace to some people among whom are sinners and infidels, and that those to whom God does give grace cannot resist it.6 In other words, Jansenius denies the doctrine of sufficient grace.7 Grace, in the teaching of Jansenius, necessitates the consent of the will. Thus man sins because he lacks grace and consequently his damnation is not due to his own free will but to the predestination of God who refuses to give him the grace sufficient to be saved. A consequence of this teaching is that Christ did not die for all men and does not wish all men to be saved.8 This is a logical conclusion from the teachings of Jansenius for, if Christ did die for all men, he would have merited grace for all. But, if this were true, then all would be saved since grace is irresistible. But, since in our state of corrupt nature, all do not get grace, then Christ could not have died for those who have not received grace. Jansenius claimed, as did Wyclif, Luther and Calvin before him, that his teaching was that of St. Augustine. It is not too difficult to understand how he could claim this especially before the contrary was pointed out to him. St. Augustine did not have the precision of expression and theological terminology of the scholastic theologians. In order to emphasize his point against the Pelagians, St. Augustine placed great stress on certain points to the exclusion of others. Sometimes his language can be interpreted in a sense other than that which he meant to convey. Jansenius was too much a representative of the scholastic tradition to approach a theological treatise of the fifth century with an effort to understand the manner in which theology was written at that time. He thus approached St. Augustine as if he were a theologian of the late Middle Ages. For instance, when St. Augustine says that the will is incapable of performing good without the aid of God, he means that the will cannot perform a supernaturally good act without such aid.9 From this Jansenius concluded that the will was essentially deficient and could perform no good work whatever without the aid of grace. Contrary to the interpretation of Jansenius, St. Augustine did not deny free will as a knowledge of the context of his writings should indicate.10 Throughout his works, however, St. Augustine constantly insists that we can do nothing without God. This is true, for man according to his very nature as a creature depends upon the conserving power of God for his existence and activity. 11 Finally, Jansenius claims that his denial of the universal salvific will of God is also derived from the teaching of St. Augustine. In view of the teaching of St. Augustine, however, it is difficult to see how such a claim could be justly made. Jansenius denies that God wills all men to be saved,12 St. Augustine teaches the contrary: God will have all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth but not in such a way as to take away that freedom of will, by the good or evil use of which every man is most justly judged.13 II In the year 1648 Fr. Veron, a Jesuit, published an attack upon the entire system of Jansenius in a work entitled Le Baillon des Jansenistes (The Silencing of the Jansenists). Since this book unequivocally identified Jansenistic doctrine with Calvinism, Antoine Arnauld and his Jansenistic followers had the book brought in July 1648 to the Sorbonne for examination. Such a move was intended to lead to a definite vindication of Jansenism. In fact, it led precisely to the final condemnation of Jansenism in a higher court than the Sorbonne.14 At this time Nicolas Cornet, Syndic of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris, stated that it was impossible to pass judgment upon Fr. Veron's work without first having examined the Augustinus of Jansenius.15 This was the origin of the famous Seven Propositions of Cornet which were to be examined and reported on by the Theological Faculty of the Sorbonne. The first five are familiar as the famous Five Propositions of Jansenism; the sixth, that the actions of infidels are sins, is the twenty-fifth of the condemned errors of Baius; the seventh, that the Church formerly taught the insufficiency of attrition for sacramental absolution.16 The Five Propositions, supposed to have been taken from the Augustinus, are as follows: 1. Some commandments of God are impossible even for the just for the grace which would make them possible is lacking. 2. In the state of fallen nature we can never resist an interior grace. 3. To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature a man does not need freedom from necessity; freedom from coercion suffices. 4. The Semi-Pelagians taught the necessity of interior prevenient grace for every action even for the beginning of faith; they were heretics forasmuch as they considered grace to be such that the human will can either cooperate with it or refuse to do so. 5. It is a Semi-Pelagian error to assert that Christ died and shed His blood for all men.17 Due to a dispute among the members of the Theological Faculty of the Sorbonne, action was not taken on these propositions until September 1649. At that time, however, the Five Propositions were discussed and censured in spite of the opposition of the Parliament of Paris and the Jansenistic members of the Faculty. In spite of the opposition of Arnauld,18 the condemnation of the Faculty was sent to Rome by Bagno, the Papal Nuncio to France, for an authoritative confirmation by the Holy See.19 In Rome little notice was at first taken of the censure of the propositions. Jansenist historians claim that this was due to the Dominicans who suspected that their theological opponents, the Jesuits, were behind the opposition to Jansenism.20 Much can be said for this opinion for the Dominicans had not forgotten the dispute, de auxiliis, with the Jesuits concerning efficacious grace. On that occasion they had failed to get a papal condemnation of the Jesuit opinion on efficacious grace. There were also other reasons on the part of the Holy See itself, which hindered immediate action. It was feared that a condemnation of the Five Propositions would prejudice the Dominican teaching on grace. Such a condemnation could be interpreted by the Jansenists as also applying to the opinions of the Dominican school of theology. In view of the fact that Pope Paul V in 1607 forbade any further discussion concerning the controversial question of grace, Pope Innocent X was reluctant to take definite action lest that dispute should again arise.21 Finally, the pope was extremely anxious to avoid a Gallican Schism in France which could be occasioned by such a condemnation.