Asia Report, Nr. 95: the State of Sectarianism in Pakistan

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Asia Report, Nr. 95: the State of Sectarianism in Pakistan THE STATE OF SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN Asia Report N°95 – 18 April 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE SECTARIAN LANDSCAPE................................................................................ 2 III. SECTARIAN RADICALISM........................................................................................ 5 A. DOMESTIC EXTREMISM AND INTERNATIONAL TERROR .........................................................5 B. SPREADING THE WORD: MADRASA AND MOSQUE.................................................................6 IV. STATE-SANCTIONED EXTREMISM ....................................................................... 7 A. SECTARIAN EXTREMISM AND THE STATE ..............................................................................7 B. ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM ........................................................................................7 1. The Munir Report ......................................................................................................8 2. Inching ahead.............................................................................................................9 3. Zia's Sunnism...........................................................................................................10 4. External actors and Pakistani sectarianism..............................................................11 5. Sectarianism and the challenges of civilian rule......................................................12 V. REIGN OF TERROR................................................................................................... 14 A. PUNJAB...............................................................................................................................14 1. Southern Punjab.......................................................................................................14 2. Central Punjab .........................................................................................................16 B. THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.............................................................................17 C. THE NORTHERN AREAS ......................................................................................................19 D. BALOCHISTAN.....................................................................................................................20 E. SINDH .................................................................................................................................21 VI. MUSHARRAF: RESPONDING TO SECTARIAN CHALLENGES ..................... 23 A. PRACTISING MODERATION..................................................................................................23 1. Enforcing the peace .................................................................................................23 2. The politics of sectarianism .....................................................................................24 3. Flawed laws and legal loopholes .............................................................................24 B. FOREIGN HANDS AND "AGENCIES" .....................................................................................28 C. ENGAGING THE CLERGY .....................................................................................................28 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF PAKISTAN ...................................................................................................................31 B. GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................32 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...........................................................................34 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ..................................................................35 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD MEMBERS........................................................................................37 Asia Report N°95 18 April 2005 THE STATE OF SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Sectarian conflict in Pakistan is the direct consequence and the leading figures of extremist Sunni organisations of state policies of Islamisation and marginalisation of are free to preach their jihadi ideologies. Leaders of secular democratic forces. Co-option and patronage of banned groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Sipahe religious parties by successive military governments have Sahaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed appear to enjoy virtual brought Pakistan to a point where religious extremism immunity from the law. They have gained new avenues threatens to erode the foundations of the state and to propagate their militant ideas since the chief patrons society. As President Pervez Musharraf is praised by the of jihad, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat- international community for his role in the war against i-Islami (JI), have acquired prominent and powerful terrorism, the frequency and viciousness of sectarian roles in Musharraf's political structure. terrorism continues to increase in his country. The Islamisation of laws and education, in particular, Instead of empowering liberal, democratic voices, the graphically illustrates the Sunni sectarian bias of the government has co-opted the religious right and Pakistani state. General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamic penal code, continues to rely on it to counter civilian opposition. By retained by General Musharraf, is derived entirely from depriving democratic forces of an even playing field classical Sunni-Hanafi orthodox sources. The same is and continuing to ignore the need for state policies that true of "Islamic" textbooks in public schools and would encourage and indeed reflect the country's colleges. The Shia minority -- and, in some cases, even religious diversity, the government has allowed the majority Sunni Barelvi sect -- is deeply resentful of religious extremist organisations and jihadi groups, and this orthodox Hanafi Sunni bias in state policies. Within the madrasas that provide them an endless stream of Sunnism itself, the competition for state patronage and a recruits, to flourish. It has failed to protect a vulnerable share in power has turned minor theological debates and judiciary and equip its law-enforcement agencies with cultural differences into unbridgeable, volatile sectarian the tools they need to eliminate sectarian terrorism. divisions. After decades of co-option by the civil-military establishment, Pakistan's puritanical clergy is attempting Constitutional provisions to "Islamise" laws, education to turn the country into a confessional state where the and culture, and official dissemination of a particular religious creed of a person is the sole marker of identity. brand of Islamic ideology, not only militate against Pakistan's religious diversity but also breed discrimination Except for a few showcase "reformed" madrasas, no against non-Muslim minorities. The political use of sign of change is visible. Because of the mullahs' Islam by the state promotes an aggressive competition political utility, the military-led government's proposed for official patronage between and within the many measures, from curriculum changes to a new registration variations of Sunni and Shia Islam, with the clerical elite law, have been dropped in the face of opposition by the of major sects and subsects striving to build up their MMA (Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal) and its madrasa political parties, raise jihadi militias, expand madrasa subsidiaries. Instead, financial and political incentives to networks and, as has happened on Musharraf's watch, the mullahs have raised their public profile and become part of government. Like all other Pakistani influence. The government's approach towards religious military governments, the Musharraf administration has extremism is epitomised by its deals with extremists in also weakened secular and democratic political forces. the tribal areas, concluded through JUI mediation after payment of bribes to militant leaders. Administrative and legal action against militant organisations has failed to dismantle a well-entrenched The anomalous constitutional status and political and widely spread terror infrastructure. All banned disenfranchisement of regions like the Federally extremist groups persist with new labels, although old Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northern names are also still in use. The jihadi media is flourishing, Areas have turned them into sanctuaries for sectarian The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan Crisis Group Asia Report N°95, 18 April 2005 Page ii and international terrorists and centres of the arms and (c) disband privately-run Sharia courts in the drugs trade. North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and take action against religious organisations Parallel legal and judicial systems, which exist in many operating them; parts of the country with the blessing of the state, undermine the rule of law. The reform of discriminatory (d) do not use zakat or other sources of laws and procedures has, at best, been cosmetic -- they government funding to finance the activities, remain open to abuse by religious fanatics. Bereft of educational or otherwise, of any sect; and independence, the judiciary is unable
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