- 30 - brid.gohead across the Metauro. On 25 .~ug one company occupied tho hamlet Pilone {S.154649) one kilometre south-east of Borge Lucrozia. (1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Message Log, Serials 14908, 14943, 25 Aug 44) 53. During the early evening of 25 Aug enemy shelling and mortaring •increased over the divisional area. (Ibid, Serials 14956-7-8-9, 25 Aug 44). The shelling was not, fiowever, on a scale sufficiently extensive or intensivo to suggest that tho enemy realized that a full-sco.le attacl{ was being mounted against him. Ho may have assumed that some redisposal of troops was taking place ( such as a relief of 2 Polcorps, which had had a long and hard fight up the coast), because more than three days had elapsed since the south side of the River Motauro had been cleared, and the only subsequent activity of the Polos had been active patrolling c.nd the establishment of a rninor bridgehead on the far side. Three days is sufficiently long for enemy agents to pick up information from Italian gossipers. For instance, H.C.R. reported on 24 Aug seeing reflections of a glass from the church tower at Mombaroccio (S.084673) (in onomy territory) and answering reflections from a church towek in our own urea at Montemaggiore. (Ib1d Serial 14885, 2~ Aug 44· ). Prisoners of war of 211 Gr taken' on 26 Aug statod thc.t they lmew that Co.nadians were opposite them on the evening of 25 f,ug two hours before the atto.ck went in. (Hist Sec filo Italy: 1944/1 Cd.n Corps/L/F, Docket I: • Intrep l, 1'730B hrs, 26 i.ug 44) 54. The weight of evidence which lator be co.me avc.ilable, however• points to tho fact that the enemy was not aware of the .',llied regrouping, and that tho Eighthiu'ln:f's offensive gained complete surprise (24/0ff Hist Skotch/1: Comments by Field Marshal Si:r Harold Alexander, 9 May 47) • .t.n exar.1ination of captured Germv.n War diaries confirms this fact (Italy 1944/Eighth Army7C/F, Dockot IIIt t.ttaek of Eighth Arnry: in Metauro Ri vor Area 25 26 Au 44, Information taken 3:'rom German War Diaries in Washington y Ca.pt teiger, Historical Section, D.N.D.). This reveals that when the attack of the Eighth Army begin, 76 Corps was already engaged in a withdrawal to the forefield of tho Gothic Line - a withdrawal that had boli sug3ested to Tenth Army Headquarters in an order issued on 20 Aug • ( (G.M.D.s. - 61437/7, f.ppx 437a to War Diary, A.O.K./10,

------·------·------k On 26 Aug morse flashes from a heliogr~ph were observed coming from tho church tower of Orciano (S.165559) • An investigation resulted in a raid on the tower and two Italians were captured in the act of hiding bineculars, maps and a mirror. 11 These two we:re presumably responsible for tho leakage of information on the night 25/26 Aug and for the direct hits on the command post of the Regiment below the church. 11 (17 Fd Regt R.C.A.) (1 Cdn Corp:3 Int Sv.mm.ary No. 95, 27 Aus 44). It should be notod that the War Diary of 17 Fd Regt for 26 and 27 Aug which mentions this incident suggests that it occurred at Montema~giore. Id: Information from War Di~ry Armed Forces High Command: The withdrawal of 10 Anny to the fore .. f'ield of the II Green-line 11 began on 22 Aug and was oarriod out according to plan. In order to free 5 Mount Div for tho :,lpine front, 76 Corps was taken back on 26 ::mg. - 31 -

20 l.tig 44 • . There aro no indications that tho Germans woro aware of: .D;:py ui;iu;,l°µdl build-up of tho forces of Eighth Army; tho di visiora merely roP,bj'.tod ho.rassing fire of a routine nature on their asse,;nbly positions and vehicle traffic. Not until tho afternoon of 26 L.ug .did the Chief of Staff, _Tenth i.rrrry, learn of the Canadian move to_.the t.driatic. General Won_tzoll hastily reported tho matter to Field Marshall Kossolrine;, and tho following telephone conversation ensued:

Wontz_ell: It scorns that it is going to bo qui to an affair on tho l.drio.tic coast. Tho English hnve Qppeared on tho tro~t of 7l Div c.nd at this very moment I havo received the report that the Canadians havo appeared at the joint botweon 1 Para and 71 Inf Div, Kossolrins: What is tho ·s1_tus.tion and what do you mako of it? .Wentzell: I fool tho.t we have boon lucky with our withdrawal stnco it preserved us fro~ being caught in tho DEtillory barrage. I oxpoct that he will follow with strong forces&

(G,M,D.S. - 61437/8, I.pp 572 to War Die.ry J:•• O.K. 10, 26 Lug)

,55. Tho German withdrawal to stronger positions may well have beon' inspired by the gone:z;,e.l si tu2c tion which confr_ontod tho Fuehrer, ...... for the Ge_rmo.ns wore ba:rd:-prossod in their central European strong- -· hold both in the west o.nd in tho eo.st. Tho so were greo,t days for tho_ arm~ bf the Lllios • . On 23 1.ug, Mr. f.nthony Edon, the British Fo:reign .$e,c_reta:ry, announced that tho French- For cos pf tho Interior had lfoo·raj;ed Pari-s, -even as the forces under General Eisenhower werQ pounding at the western gates. On 25 .:~ug, General De Gaulle . entered the French Cupi tal. On 25 ;,us Marseilles was liberated o.nd tho ;,.mer:l:can Seventh Lrmy was rea ching towards Grenoble. On 25 Aug the qb.pi tula tion of Ruraanio. wr,s 2.nnounced and on tho same do.y Russian patrols _crossed the frontiers of East Prussia. (Tho Times, 25-28 Aug 44) 25 Lug wp.s then a propitious day on which to launch tho us saul t 2.gainst the Gothic Line. · 56. The stage was now set for bo.ttle. Before °the action began a personal message from the Army Commo.nder was read to all tro..ops:. You have won great victories. To advance 220 miles from Cassino to Florence in three months i~ a notable achievement in the Eighth Lrmyts history. To eo.ch one of you in the Eighth 1-.rmy . and in the Desert Lir Force, rrry grateful thanks. Now we b\egin,.the last lap. Swiftly and secretly, once again, we have moved rie;ht across Italy an Army ·of immense strength and striking power - to break tho Gothic Line.

Victory in the coming battles means the beginning of the end for the German armies in Italy.

LEI' EVERY lliLN DO HIS UTMOST, AND AGAIN SUCCESS WILL BE OURS. GOOD LUCK TO YOU ALL. (W.D., G.S., H,Q. ·1 Cdn Corps, ·1,ugust 1944; Appx 43) - 32 - . Victocy would yield tontalizing, perhaps t:romondous,fruits. :'.hoo.d miFt lie the 11 bog1nning of the end for tho German urmies in Italy , a.hoed wore the Plains of Lombardy, o.nd perhaps the . · end of tho Eighth Army's long slugging up the morieiless b.ackbone of Italy - a trek begun on 3 Sep at the Straits of Messina and continued 11 not without dust und hoatt1 dUJ;>in6 a long yoar. Tho garland was at hand.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIVER METAURO BRIDGEHEL,D, 25/26 AUG

5?. 1 Cdn Inf Div again omorgod from anonymi~J when unit flanhos and divisional patches were put up in tho eaply evening of 25 Aug. Tho night was cloudless, warrt\o.nd unusually quiet; evon tho enomy 1 s guns were silent. The moon was just going down as tho four infantry battalions movod severally frora their battalion areas to the forming up places. Thence, between 2235 hours and 2315 hours, tho battalions crossed tho Motauro River quito according to their time schedule and to plan. No opposition was met; the water gap in the river was only a few yards wide and the water nowhere more than throe feet deep. By 2359 hours the assaulting companies had reported ~t their various chock points along Via Flaminia and were in reediness for the initiation of the artillery programme. The satisfying noiso of tho guns signalled the start of the infantry's advance to tho final bridgehead objectives, tho beginning o;f bridging operations by tho Engineers and the. opening of battle across tho entire Army front. The village of So.ltara (1163) was occupied at 0100 hours by the R.C.R. (W,D., R.c.R., 26 i.ug 44), and the high village of Serrungaria (0962). at 0355 hours by P.P.C.L,I. (W.D., P.P.C.L.r.~ 26 Aug 44) - both without opposition. The final bridgehead objectives of both 1 and 2 Cdn Inf Bdes were "snug" ey 0400 hours • . (1 Cdn Inf Bde: 11 0LIVE 11 ; Italy: 1944/l Cdo Corps/C/G: Map trr-.ce of positions for nigm"2'5/26 1mg 44). The enemy were conspicuous by their absence - only a handful of prisoners wero taken, sufficient to identify members of 71 Inf Div. According to theso, 71 Inf Div, knowing of tho impending operation, had withdrawn at 2300 hours 25 J...ug to a line in front of the i.rzilla River and Mombaroccio (0768) - tho lino was specified as running Isola Del Piano - Monte Della Morcia ~ Monte Della Mattera - Point 393, ( i.e., Convento Bea.to Santo)• (l Cdn Corps Int Summary No.94, 26 Aug 44). The artillery firo seems to have cauG):1.t tho enemy in tho open as he was withdrawing: · Artillery fire caught him on the move, however, and from reports from prisoners and visual evidence on the ground he sufferod very hoavy casualties.

11 11 ( 1 Cdn Inf Div: --0L:CVE ) These statements are, however, unsupported by evidence in war diaries of either infantry battalions or artillery regiments. 58. During the hours between midnight and fir~t light the unit pioneers continued to busy themselves with taping forward routes; the close support weapons ( other than some M. M.Gs. which had been man-handled across the .ri vor when the infantry companies crossed), the tanks of 21 Tk Bdo and the Seaforth of c. moved forward; · the Engineers worked on tho crossings. By 0535 hours tho scppers had eomplotod both crossings on 2 Cdn Inf Bde front, and by 0615 hours the two crossings on l Cdn Inf Bde front were ready. (l Cdn Inf Div: "OLIVE")• The leading tank oloments did not begin to cross the river untir"0600 hours• (Italy: 1944/21 Tk Bdo/C/F, Docket 2: 11 21 Tk Bde 11 11 Battle Report{ 25 Aug - 21 Sep 44 , hereinafter referred to as 21 Tk Bde: 11 0LIVE""J• Seaforth of c. wore in position behind L. Edmn R. 11 at 0615 hours. (1 Cdn Inf Div: "~ }. .. 33 -

59. On the right the Polos occupied Borgo Lucrezia and had troops along the Rivor Socco to tho boundary with 1 Cdn Inf Div, They had met with no opposition other thun shelling at their Ri vor .Motauro crossing plo.ce - after they had crossed. '2c6 Inf Div on tho left, and further inland, 4 Ind Inf Div, roportod no opposition to t."floir crossings of the Motauro. Fossornbr ono was not hold by the Germans o.nd 128 Bdc occupied tho town of Iv!ontofolcino without difficulty. (1 Cdn Corps Ops Message Log , Serials 545, 550, 26rug44). 1.11 vms in readiness for Phase 2 of tho divi·siono.l attack - 11 to udv;:i.nco t o F. Foglio. as rapidly as possiblo. 11 (W.D., G.s., H.Q • . 1 Cdn Corps, .·.. ugust 1944t Appx 31, 1 Cdn Corps Op Instr No. 22, 21 ;.ug 44) • Tho onomy hud withdrawn truo to form e.ftor his do laying action c.gainst tho Polos from 22 t o 25 f.ug , on tho lino of the Motauro River. Ho ho.d not yet b oon mot; ho must now bo ovortukon if not overrun.

THE BREJ.KOUT FROM THE METJ,URO RIVER BRIDGEHE/i.D 1 26-27 LUG

60. Orders woro issued by tho divisional co1Tuuander for l and 2 Cdn Inf Bdos to advance from tho bridgohoad positions at 0730 hours 26 Luc. Tho ir.1portanco of spood wus both stressed and roalizod, for tho sooner the River Foglia and the Gothic Lino could bo reached, tho r.101•0 likely wore our troops to overtake tho enemy 11 before: ho could properly man tho dofoncos • ( 1 Cdn Inf Div: 11 0LIVE ). To have 5 Cdn Armd Div available for tho attack against the Gothic Lino should it be put in on tho loft of 1 Cdn Inf Div (soe para 36), the Corps Commc.ndor ordered tho division to be3in to move forward at 1000 hours 26 1.ug to its f orward nssombly area betwoon tho River Cesena and the River Metauro. (W.D.f G.S., H.Q,. 1 Cdn Corps, J,ugust 1944: il.ppx 66, I!cssago 0-328J

61. Tho country o·vor which this, tho second phc..so of the advance, was t o.be made, was very hilly c..nd c onfusing to the men on the g:r-ound bocuuse of the numerous ridges c.nd poaks, wa_tor courses and tortiury roads. During tho next two dc.ys no li ttlo diffi'cul ty was oxporiencod in relating the mc.ps t o tho ·ground. For instecnce a P.1".C.L.I. cornpcmy ovor-shot its objoctive by more thc.n 1000 yards, and was out of the me.in battle ror 24 hours (27-28 Aug); the comrn£.nding ofricer or R,fl.R. and his Intelligence Orficor spent three unsuccessful hours trying to l ocate thoir forward c ompanies on tho afternoon or 26 /,ug; somo Seaforth of c. rorvmrd e lements wore straffed by one of our mm aircraft .tho sumo afternoon, - .fortu.rn:,.toly.without cc.sualties; there w2.s frequently confusion in reporting locc,tions end f eatures t.:,kon. ('N .Ds., P.P.C.L.I., So1:.i'orth of C., R.C.R., 26 and 27 J.ug 44; 1 Cdn Inf Div Ops IViessago Log, Serial 1506'7, dntod 26 .",u s 44) 62. 1 Cdn Inf Div was given as initial objectives Point 393 (Convento Beato Santo)., ll'lonto Della Mattera and Jt!onte s. Giovanni. (W.D., G.s., H.Q,, 1 Cdn Corps, Lugust 1944: f.ppx 66, Message 0-354). Tho intention wr.s .for 1 Cdn Inf Bdi:l t o udvance towr.rds tho convent, · with ,.1-s Highrs r.1c,king the main thrust on tho right and R. C,R. coming up to cloar the l eft; 2 Cdn Inf Bdo vms to e.dvance with Sea.forth of C. directed on Monte i.ltiero {086654) and Mon to De lla Ma. ttera. L. Eclmn R., who were to come up behind c,nd to the left of Seaforth of C., wore directed on Monte S • Giovanni. (Ibid) 63. Tho l eading battalions of the.brigades - 48 Highrs and Seaforth of c. - advanced steadlly during tho morning against very slight opposition. The supporting tanks were generally not able to lwep up with tho infantry bocauso of era tors o.nd demolitions. At mid-day shellini; increased. :.s the battalions closed in on the high foatures sc:rooning Mombo.roccio £1.nd overlooking the Arzilla - 34 ..

Ri vor vulley they encountered mortar o.nd me.chine-gun fire which wo.s intense thoush sporadic. 48 Highrs on tho right of the convent hill wore hold up by a strong point on high ground ut the bond of tho roud a 1000 yards north-west of tho for.ture. (W.D., 48 Highrs, 26 Aug 44) • .Seaforth of C, on the 2 Cdn Inf £lh. axis had po.ssed beyond Mon to 1.1 tiero and after c. short fire fight had by 1230 hours cleared and occupied Monte Delle. Mo.t tora. {W,D,, Seaforth of c., 26 1,ug 1944). From this do:r.iinant point one S.ec.forth company was sent north-co.st to try the defenders on tho convent hill. Four hundred yards from the top, intense smo.11 arr,is fire confirmed the sto.tomonts of severo.l prisoners captured at tho base that tho defenders were in company strensth. It was decided to mount an attack, which would have to await the arri vul of the tanks. Meanwhile tho R.C. R. compru1ios lco.p-frogc;ing forwo.rd between 48 Highrs and Seaforth of C. wore, b-y mid-afternoon, a mile south of Convonto Beato So.nte o.nd o.lso plo.nninG to attack this convent feature. It was docidod that they and not Seaforth of 1:, should tr.kc on tho task. Tho attack wont in aft or dark fc artillery concentrations on tho to.rget feature, Somo prisL were talcen and the romr.inder of tho enemy withdrew. By fir. light on 27 :.uc; all the R.C.R. compo.nies were concontrr,tod o. around the objective, (W,D., R .C,R., 26-27 Lug 41). Hr,st 8: who had boon in reserve behind R.C,R., and, incidentally, had suffered a score of casualties nt tho lunch hour by cunningly-t shelling of the battalion area, passed through 48 Highrs and roi one of its comp8.nios which had been cut off for several hours in area of tho road junctlon. 11 Dn Coy with a troop of Churchills fr, aB 11 Sqn 12 R.T.R-., who wore in support of tho bRttalion, did a rig, hook on the hill feature ( 0967) and after a sharp ongagor.iont, clear• it: Our cas wore light - ono kill ed and two or throe wounded. Enomy co.suo.lties - several ltillod and wounded, 6 PW 1 s , ( the tanks brouc;ht in a further 20), Enemy eqpt tc.kon - one 7 .5 cm. complete with vehicle, one 20 mm . S.P. (one other managed to disengage and escape) , ono half-track carrier, ono MC. (Hist Soc file Italy: 1941/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D, Docket m: 11H:1nt & P.E.R. - Tho Pursuit to tho Gothic Line") It was than last light and the tanks were wi thdro.wn, so 11D" Coy consolidated and the remainder of tho battalion moved forward and took up positions around the so.me fea. turo. ( Ibid)

64. On the loft flcmk of the di vision L, Edmn R.t directed on Monte S. Giovanni and Monte M2.rino, the l ower feature to tho north and due V1ost of Mombaroccio, o.chiovod a nice 'tactical surprise durinc; the evening of 26 Aug. The attack was unusual, too, in that tho battaHon com.'!1.ander had ini ti2.lly the opportunity of dir9.cting tha attack by direct observation. The b a ttalion had been advancing behind and to the left of Seaforth of C. Using Monte De;Lle. MG.ttora, now in Seaforth hands, us a start point and relying on tanks of 11 C11 Sqn 145 R.A.C . in hull- down positions on tho slopes of this hill for supporting fire, tho companies moved off o.t 1930 hours by a semi­ circular route along· the ridge. They thus cs.mo up behind Montes. Giovanni and took the hill without opposition. 1.droit uso was made of a detacbznent from the 3-inch mortar and the M.M.G. platoons. This dotachmont dashed forward in carriers to flush out an enemy O.P. They took two P.W. :;.nd a wireless set; after thi s, enemy shelling of Monte Della i\!attere. - which ho.d beon rather uncomfortable - ea.sod off. Two Soafortl1 companies then procoodcd to Monte Marino and cleared this featu1°e by midnight without casuo.lties t o themselves. • 35 -

Durint; the c.ttnck one coy of L. :';;d.r.1n R~ got in botwoon two coys of tho onomy catching thorn by surprise. Tho enemy v1oro o.wo.konod o.t tho point of 2. bo.yonot und mc.ny casuo.l tios were inflicted, Ps.w. to.ken, ond booty included horses, cs.rts, mo.ps ond 2. wireless sot, (Gibson: .£.P.. EJ:l.) 65. Thus by midnight 26/27 J.ug , 2,J: hours nftor tho action ho.d begun, the hills domino.ting Mor.1baroccio o.nd tho J;rzillo. River valley wore in our hands o.nd the inf2..ntry ho.d advanced on foot across ono ri vor o.nd nore than fi vo miles of hot, dusty and rugged country. Tho enemy was obviously vii thdro.wing as fast o.s he could and 10£1.Ving rearguard outposts in c,n o. tto1;ipt to gain th1e. Bo co.us o of tho notable work of tho Engineers in bridging r,nd road repair tho tanks of 21 Tk Bde wero o.t tho close of tho do.y forward ~Ii th the infantry. Fror.1 de.wn to dusk tho di visiono.l front had boon covorod by our aircrb.ft c.lmost continually, and mediun bombers had at'cuckod Pos2..ro, the outposts of tho Gothic Lino south of tho River Foglio. and had continued the process of softening u p tho Gothic Lino itself. (W,D,, G.s., H.Q,. 1 Cdn Corps, !.usust 1944: ,~ppx 51, Daily 1.ir Summary No, 1, 26 Lug 44). The night 26/27 i.ug was spent in consolide.tinc; pos:L tions ulroo.dy gain0d o.nd preparing for the continuod advance. Tho onomy continued his shelling and mortaring of the forward bc.ttalion o.reas. Tho Poles on the right bad not progressed as quickly as had l Cdn Inf Bdo, but o.t 2000 hours they were reported to have reached Monte Dolle Forche (1269), which they took ace.inst opposition. (1 Cdn Corps Ops Massage Log, Serial 646, 26 Lug 44) • 128 Bde of 46 Div, advancing over difficult country on the left of 2 Cdn Inf Bdo, mot reo.rguard actions as they neared Monte S. Croco. An att2.ck against ,.'. lower feature 1000 yards south of Monte s. Croce succeeded at 0500 hours 27 .tug, in clonring tho way to s. Croce itself. (Ib~, Seric.l 676, 27 l~ug {4)

66, During tho day, and the night of 26/27 Lug, there was much traffic and congestion on the divisional rout0s fron behind the Metauro to the forwo.rd bc,.tto.lion c.reas - ld tchen trucks, ration lorries, "F" echelons,. brigade headquarters, reserve battalions, field regiments, s.P, guns by r:1idnight ull of 1 Cdn Inf Div artillery was across tho River Mctauro (Ibid, Serial 662, 27 l,ug 44) medical uni ts - the whole agglomeration of tho usual heavy army traffic which follows in the wake of advancing infantr:;. This cavalcade raised great clouds of dust that enveloped the countryside in a grey pall. Doleys o.nd difficulties were occr.sioned because all traffie on the very narrow front had to pass over three undeveloped roads vhich were hilly, winding and in a generc.lly poor condition · me.de worse by crt:.'cers and demolitions. The Poles on the right, pleading necessity, began using for their supply and maintenance vehicles and reserve uni ts the road ( 11 H.tT 11 route) which was the £:rtery for 1 Cdn Inf Bde. ( This road WD.S in the corridor which ,%".s a 2 Pol Corps rosponsibili ty fer operc.tions only and was not ave.ilablo to them· f'or administrr.tion). The minor international wrangle which ensued was resolved when Headquarters l Cdn Corps ro6rularised tho use of tho road by Polcorps until 1000 hours of tho morning of 27 f, ug. (Ibid, So rial 258, 27 J.ug 44; 1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Moss ago Log, Seria!s 15068, 15147, 26 o.nd 27 Lug "·A rospocti voly)

67 • During tho afternoon of 26 Lug, when tho adv,mce was in full progress, two visitors arrived unhoralclod in the area of the forward echelon of 1 Cdn Bde immediately- oouth of tho River Ivletauro - Primo Minister Wins ton Churchill ( in sun holme t and tropical kit) and t.he Supreme Commander, General .P.loxander. J-,,rri ving in an open car the distinguished pair wero greeted by tho padre. When they asked after tho tactice.l picture, a sergeant was sent to GOt a combatant - 36 - officer, who 130.vo tho visitors o.n oxpl c,na tion of tho situ.ati on and pointed out forvmrd positions and. objecti vos. Tho visitors loft after 2.bout 20 minutes. nThe aroo. vms under mortar and nrty fire and forward cornpunios wore in contact onl y c.. fow thousand yards in front. 11 (vr.D., R.C.R., 26 Lug 44). Tho introp:l.d' Primo Minister and Gonor2.l i.loxandor did not, howovor, dri vo bo.ck. .·.. t 1700 hours they were reportod as being across th.o Ri vor Notauro c.t Sc.lt a ra (1163) • (1 Cdn Corps Ops !:iossaGO Lor; , Serial 629, 26 ;.ug 44) and thus forward of most of tho GlJ.ns .

THE FIGHTING 1.Gl.INST 1,RZILL.f. RIVER LINE - llWNTECICCklIDO, GINESTRETO 27-29 LUG

68. General Vokes approcio.tod that tho onony was fulline back to tho high eround in the area of Montociccardo behind tho River i~rzilla, but tlm t tho advo.nco to tbo Ri vor FoGlio. could be continued by tho loadinG brigades without mountinc o. full-scale attnck on this preliminary defensive position. Ho therefore ordered tho loading · brigade cor,1nandors to :,ush ahead on thoir own ini tiati vo to the River Fogli2. without respite, imd to avoid giving tho' enemy' a breathing spell. ( Ibid, Serial 681, 27 .'.ug 44). Ln Intelligonco report from 21 Tk Bde s tnto s:

:.11 indications show enemy havo wi thd.rawn over l.rzillt. into le.st defence positions before Gothic. P.W. reports show unit stron,c;ths much reduced, ~1oapons scarce but S.i, . ar.m sufficient.,.oner.1y norale bad and mc.ny deserters. (1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Massage Log, Serial 15196, 27 ;.ug 44) 69. The f.rzilla River provides a rou[;h ho.lf- way nark between the ?,!etc.uro and the Foglio.. I';; :.':.':1X\'.Jt'@i..._"l:y north-ea.st and perpendicular to tho Corps axis of a advance, in tho Polcorps arco. turning east and running to tho i.driatic just north of Fo.no. North of the river lies the feature which co.rrios l,!ontegaup.io on tho 5 Corps axis and the hill towns of Honteciccardo . s. fmgo l o o.nd Ginostreto in tho 11 left sector of 1 Cdn Corps lane, (Sec Mup B 11 ). In tho right sector the feature is less rui:,;e;od, slopin[; down to a saddle about 100 metres high, and then rising again into Mon to Belilla, which lies in the 11 Polish corridor 11 1:1onti•)ned above . Beyond tho crest the land slopes down to tho Foglia, but thoro is a small secondary ridge which skirts the flood plnin of the ri vcr and· along the north slope of which runs the lateral road south of tho Foglia lea.dine; to Pesa.roll,

70. The advance of 1 Cdn Inf Bdo proceeded steadily on 27 ~ug against generally very light resistance. R.C.R., who wore in occupa.. tion of tho con vent foo. ture, were ordered to advance through Mombaroccio ( 0768} end to cross the Ri vor Arzilla to Point 282 (06'70) a feature one mile eo.st of Montec:lccardo. Hast & P.E,R. on thoir right were also directed across .tho River .:.rzilla through Villo. Grande (0869) to Point 268 (0572), the dominating height of tho ground overlool{ing tho For;lia. Ri vor valley on 1 Cdn Inf Bdo I s front, R.C.R, reported at 1600 hours·having passod beyond und to tho south of Point 268 without ,op)osition. i~t 1800 hours the inter-brigade boundo.r:r was modified and Hontociccnrdo and the area in which R,C.R. woro then located wero mado exclusive to 1 Cdn Inf Bdc. R, C.R. tNirofore withdrew to the right c...11d into a reserve position. (1 Cdn 11 11 Inf Bde: 0LIVE ; and Vf.D,, R,C.R , , 27 i1u13 44). H2,st & P,E.R., who ----·-~------·-·------k Thore is a lateral road on ea.ch side of the Foglia Valley, the northern ono metalled, tho southern only 5ra.vel. .. 37 - hc.d po.ssod boyonc1 Villa Gro.ndo at noon, dclo.yod thoir o.dvo.nco o.cross tho Ri vor -~rzillu until tho supporting tanks - which woro huvinr; difficulty in 6ottins forYmrd because of tho gulleys and cr2. tors - c&uc;ht up vii th thc.1,1. In mid-afternoon tho to.nks o.rri vod c.nd tho batto.lion pushocl on; tho infc.ntry found tho rivor roudily passo.blo, but it vms r. difficul·t obsk,clc for the tanks, which woro hold up thorc clurine; tho remuindor of tho day. Lftor 1800 hours the loadinG cor,1pc.ny got to within 200 yards of their obje.ctivo (Point 268), a nd wore thus 500 yards oant of tho village of Ginestroto whon they wo re stoppocl. by hec.vy mo.chine ,3Un and mortar firo. Tho othor . comp,:mics moved up slowly behind, but thoy too wo r o forcod to stop. ;_ one-coupo.ny attoupt to move forward c.t 2100 hours wus unsuccessful. For tho rost of tl:.o nisht tho companies rer.minod. dug in beh1nt1 thG foaturo (Point 268), r1hile scout c.nd sniper plc.toons reconnoitred routes to tho forvmrd comp2.nio1J so that cc,suo.l ties could bo talrnn out and food brou,:,;ht up. · :_ brii:;ade plan was formulated for an attack a[:;ains-t this hill on tho f ollowing morning. (W.D., Rist & P.E.R., 27 ;.ue 1B; Hist Soc file Italy: 19·14/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D, Docket 3, .£E. .£~) 71. On 2 Cdn Inf Bde 1 s front, P.P.C.L,I., who hs.d mndo a nicht march to Monte :.ltioro (0865) advanced at first light on an axis to tho ri3ht of Mombaroccio. Beforo noon they had crossed tho f,rziJ.la River 2.r;ainst licht opposition 2.nd a t 1530 hours wore in occup::-.tion of Mon te Croci (0468) 1000 yards north-cast of the slightly hi5l1-er f::JD.ture of Mon te s. Ui·.riu (0368). This fluid advance, which involved several intormodiato objoctives, h ad fa,.ken them more than f our :r.1.ilos beyond Monte J.1 ticro ove r a hilly and confusing terrain - not un oasy task for the sw00.ting men on foot, even though the opposition wc.s slic:;ht. One coupany advancinc; on an objective oo.st of l\lonto Croci disappeared amons tho hills and wc.s not heard from for more thc.n 24 hoursiz. Tho comprrnios on Mento Croci, supported by tanks, cleared out several surrounding e nemy posts, inflicte d casualties 8.nd co llect0d bewildered prisoners. Enemy firo from the village o f Monte s. Maria, perched 800 yl,rds on the left of 11B" Coy, continued to ho.rrass tho compc.nios:

Mc.jor c.N. McDougall, o.c. 11 B11 Coy, being out of communication with. Bn H,Q.. t ool{ it upon himself to take this fea turo threa teninc our left flank. One platoon of 11 Bn Coy attack0d the village from the rear, covered by our M.M.Gs. from the risht with tho romcinder of uBn Coy. The village was occupied by a small for co of enemy vii th M,Gs. After inflicting casual tics on tho enemy, r.!onto S. Maria was reported snug at 1715 hours. Ho had no ca sualties for this att2:.ck... Later we .found that Monte s. Maria vias one of' the objectives of 120 Bde, 46 B:rit Div, who were still sorne distance to our left rear.

(W.D., P.P.c.L.I., 27 Lug •14 ) Lnothor P,I' ,C,L.I. company advanced from the area lilonte s. Croci towards Manto Carbone (0270), tho next main feature throe miles north of Monte S, Mariu, but wore stopped by sovere shelling at a lower foa turo 1000 yards from it, Lt midnir;ht tho company wi thdrow south a mile so as to conform with tho positions of the other companies. ( Ibid, 27 .".u g 14). 128 Belo, on tho extreme right of 46 Div bounda~had t r.ke n 1'.ionte Della Croce (0465) and Monte s. Bc.rtolo trot morning ae;o.inst no determined resistance (1 Cdn Inf

:il. i,t 2000 hours 28 Aue, this company returned to tho. battalion area aftor spending u difficult time a mile behind tho enemy lines, without any supporting arms or wiroloss conk.ct and under heavy onomy shellfire which resulted - a s reported in the War Diary - in four killed and oleven wounded. (W.D., P.P.c.L.I., 27 e.nd 28 Aug 44) - 38 -

Div Ops Uossago Log, Serial 15207, 27 Lue; ?4), and were t hus adequately s e curing tho l ert r oar: f'lo.nk of P . P .C.L.I.

72. There wo.s li ttlc signif'ico.nt f'orward movomont by the other two battalions of 2 Cdn I nf Bdo on 27 Lug, Seaf orth of C. scouts entered Mombo.r occio in the morning o.nd found that tho enemy had withdr2..wn. Tho companies c onsolidated tho area between this town and tho·River J,rzilla. L, Edmn R, movocl at 1 400 hours to consolida te tho ground acr oss the ri vor,. Thoy woro diroctod towards Montocicco.rdo, on which R. C.R. v10ro a lready advancing . It was fj_nally docidod that L. Edm.n R. should pass through R.C.R. and put in the a ttack. L plan wo.s l o.id. f or a two-company night assault against this tNm, wln.::l1 perched ;:-3,: n~tIJas :·bc7o so;.i.-levol and approached by a hair-bend ro2d, wo.s adl)lirably situated for defence. (W.D., L. Edmn R., 27 Aue; ,14) . Howe ve r, tho T.A.F., in close support of 1 c..ri.d 2 Edes he.cl bombed Montociccarclo heavily during tho afternoon, so that the attc.ckors might expect t o find tho enemy at loo.st shaken. (W.D., P, P .C.L.I. , 27 Lue; 44; l ·Cdn.Inf Div 11~11) .

73. '.I'he c.tta ck against Monto ci cc~,rdo had an o.uspicious beginnine; . The pl an called for n1.,; Coy t o enter the town f rom the right .fla nk, 11 B 11 Coy to secure the high ground u t Point 356 (047705) 300 yards to tho ri c;ht o.f tho r oad in to tho t own, an d 11 C 11 ·Coy to assist 111. 11 Ca:,r. Tho occup2.tion wc.s not ousily accomplished.

!. t approxima t oly 0130 hrs ( 28 Au g 44) 11 I..n Coy reached tho t own of Montcciccardo, sq. 0470 and ent ered it .from the right flank. No oppos ition was met, and it seemed tho town was ompty. 1:.bou t 10 minutes after tho arriva l of ":.° Coy 1 s forwc..rd platoon a company of Gormc.ns, marching in 3 1 s appear ed c.t tho ot her end o.f the main street, obviously c oming in to set up defences. With tho slight time margin we ho.d gained on arrival 11 t.'1 Coy had set up bren positions cover ing the street and had to a certain extent alreudy infiltrated into tho t own . The Gerra8.11 c olumn was ullowod t o march about hal f wo.y down tho street end than our two bron-5 unnors opened fire and inflicted approxim:.:.te ly 60 - 70 cc,suo.l tics on the marching men. Thq r om2.. indor v1ero routed und for a few minutes it o.ppeured as though a compl ete and spoody victory wo.s ours. Unfortlma t oly for 11!, 11 Coy n tank had boon .followint=; tho marching enemy and its appearance at tho end o.f tho stroot pr esented a r a the r di.f.ferent aspect t o tho picture. There must have boon c onsi dorubly more onor.iy than tho one · company n1~ a Coy encounte r ed, c.s, within u few minute s, they found themsel vos being engaged .from several points c.nd, throe.toned with tho continued approach of the t ank, tho remainder of tho compc.ny wi thdrow to the ridge just out of the t own. (W,D., L. Edmn R~, 28 Aug 44)

The tanks of 145 R.f• • C. arrived o.t 0700 hours, having boon comp l e tely stopped during the night by demolitions. Upon their a rriva l a now plan .for a second attack on the town was prepared. The Monastery tower on the loft e dge of Montoc1.ccardo 11 wc.s so obviously the O.P. 11 obs e rving our every move ( Ibid) that SoP. anti-tunll:: guns wo re called on to destroy it. Tnis"\vo.s done . Lt 1315 hours tho att a ck wont in supported closely by tanks . Tho onomy's niuohine. gun and-­ mortar fire was intense but by 1 100 hours the first plc.toon of 11D11 Coy had re8.ched the town and en to rod the :Mono..s tory garden. 39 -

Hore they found thomsolvos in tho centre of tho strongly built Boche positions, und forced their wuy into tho mont,stery building, whore they wore cut off by short ro.nge enemy f'ire. Lbout this time, it wc,s learne d at Tac HQ that the • one.story was n. f'ortross containing turmels capable of holding two enemy compo.nios and loading off with two exits to ground lo vol. The f'uct tmt the ground floor still ror,minod , enabled tho enemy to muko f'ull use of those avenues and hold his positions despite our most terrific bombarc'wnonts. Meanwhile, the tc.nks had been trying to climb the rather steep bank, and finding this impossible, swuns around to the loft to enter from a different point. In doing so, the leading Churchill tc.nk was hit at point-blunll: range by u fr.us tpc. trone ••• tho tanl{ battle captain was wounded c.nd tc.lwn PY✓ c.nd the t ank s ot o.blo.zo, :.s there wo.s no other route open for our t1cmlrn t o enter tho town, they vii thdrow to a point some 50 to 100 yards from tho wo.11 a nd 0ave fire support, bringing 2. 15-minuto dire ct sho ot on the Monastery building. When their fire was switched, the platoon of 11D11 Coy in tho building, who had survived the tank fire because of the strength of the building, fought their way out and rejoined the compc.ny, bringing their two wounded with th0m. 1!lhilo in tho courtyD.rd a nd Mono.story, they inflictod, ton ca sua l ties on t h o enemy. Here the battle

on thom. A final c.nd fi ttinG blow was dealt whon tho onomy, undoubtedly mistakins his own rotroc ting troops :for our att·o.ckin6 ones, one;o.god thorn with mortc,r firo . (W,D,, P,P,C.L, I., 28 ~ug 4:4)

Tho Pt•.tricias had boon tooinG up z.n attc.ck 0.go.inst i',Ionto Cc.rbone (0270), 3000 yo.rds north of Monte s. Mnrir,, This was cuncellod by the briGade comr.1G.ndcr at 1800 hours, when it wus learned that Ir R .c. of 5 Cdn .~;r,md Div v10ro to relieve P.~ ,C.L.I. :.ftor the occupation of Montocicco.rdo by L. Eclmn R, t~ Seo.forth of C. compc.ny passed throuGh to occupy tho town of S. :.n[;o lo ( 0371) o. mi le due west of Ginostreto. This was done without opposition or any sight of tho enemy. By 044:5 hours, 29 !.u0 , two Seo.forth of C. companies had occupied Ginostreto itself 2.nd reported it clear, (Hist Sec file Italy: 194~/2 Cdn Inf Bdo/C/D: 0 :;ccount of tho .:.ction of Seaforth 11 of c. from River Meto.uro to River r1arocchia ; VT.D,, Soc,forth of c., ~9.'.. ug ~). ' :r-can Inf"-Bc1o now controlled tho hei3hts which ovor­ lookod the outposts of the Gothic Line on the left sector of tho divisional front.

75, Tho fi,shtinc on tho ri[;ht in l Cdn Inf Bde's sector was heavJ during 28 .:'..uG• The situc.tion at midni13ht 27/28 Lug was as follows: Hast,:;:, P,E.R. were dug in f'c.cing Point 268, R,C.R. were in reserve behind the Rivor.i.rzilla in the area of s. Vito (0770), 48 Highrs hud moved on tho evening o.f 27 .i.ug behind Hast & P.E.R. The brigade comrllimder ordered 18 Highrs to advance during dc.rkness, passing to the right of Ho.st & P.E.R,, 0.nd to seize a low feature - Point 146 - 500 yards east of Point 268 on tho road out of Gincstreto, while H£>.st & P.E.R, attacked Point 268. J.t 0230 hours, 28 Aug, the leading compcmy of 48 Highrs desconded the slope tq the l.rzillc. Ri vor c.nd were henvily enea30d at tho crossing (071719) and unable to mo.ke further progress. The position did not inprove with daylight, f'or the leading company wees under observed c.nd intense small arms fire from three sides and pinned d own in the area.of u hamlet at the crossing. All compunies v10re subject to heavy morto.ring and shelling. The situation remained difficult rnd unple&so.nt during the day. It was later discovered that 48 Higbrs were opposing 4 Pnr2. Hect .::.nd that tho brie;ade c.xis wc.s on the boundc.ry between 1 P2.::-o. Div end 71 Div. (';;v.n., 48 Highrs, 28 s·~ug 44; l Cdn. Inf Div Int Summary No.83, 29 Aug 44). Our ovm and enemy r.rtill ery, mortar and small arms fire duelled all day. Tanks could not get forward until late afternoon, when, after a brigade "O" Group, an infantry-cum-tank attack was teed up to go in at 1830 hours. Eleven tanks of 12 R,T.R, were then available to support the attacking company, but before reaching the area of the village (072722) where the 48 Highrs company v1as positioned, one Churchill was knocked out by an enemy anti-tank gun, and one Churchill and two Shermans were ditched at the river bed south of the villnge. In the village itself, two more tanks were lmocked out. Of the five remaining tanks, one, the squadron commander's, r·emained in the village. ;'.t 1930 hours the company mov·ed forvis.rd in the wake of fo.ur i;anks, to two objectives - Point 146 and an adjacent hill slightly north-west across the ;r,oad, Point 162 (063724) • One more tank was knocked out and an infantry platoon decimated before Point 146 was reached. The right hand platoon commander arrived on Point 146 alone. He then joined the platoon on the left, collected the remainder of his own platoon and a two-platoon advance against Point 162 was begun. When they were almost on top of the objective our own artillery fire crone down on 1t. The Highlanders drew back until this fire was stopped. On resuming the advance the enemy were found to be a·cti ve again on Point 146 and Point 162. The attacking company W£\S now too few in numbers to renew the attack and so dug in south of the objectives. (W.D., 48 Highrs, 28 Aug 44) ------~-~---·------~--

- 41 -

76. The c.vaiL,ble tr.nks of 12 R.T.R. ho.d all been put in support of 48 Highrs c.s decided o..t the morning brigade 11 0 11 Group. They hc.d thus been to.ken awr:.y from Re.st & P.E.R,, but after the success of 48 Highrs c.t Point 146, were to support the Ho.st & P.E.R. evening attack on Point 268 by l'lc.nking fire. The battle report of 21 Tk Bde, which describes the attacks on Point 146 and Point 268 from the tank squadron I s point of view, sr:.ys of the hours subsequent to the 4.-8 Highrs' attc.ck on Point 146: From this time onwards throughout the night both infantry o.nd t:::.nks were cons tc.ntly engaged by German snipers, Fo.ustpLtronen, flame-throwers and anti-t1:mk guns. Hc.ysto.cks were fired qnd by the light of these spai::dc.u ( M,G. 34 or 42) fire wr:cs directed on our infantry c.nd tan~: cr·ew::i. One to.nk wc.s destroyed by a Dnd / Fc.ustpo.trone a fl<-'.me-thrower turned on to the evacuating crew. The fighting was'most bitter but by first light the inf£,ntry were established on Point 162 and Major CORNWELL who hud commanded his Squadron with great skill o.nd resolution withdrew the remaining to.nks which nere by then out of rumnunition, 11 11 covered by ;. Sqn c.nd a troop of M-10' s. This resistc,nce proved to bo the charE:cteristicc.lly determined def'ence which frequently precedes enemy withdrawal •• • tI.

11 11 (21 Tk Bde: ~ )

77. Meanwhile, s.t 0300 hours, :!Io.st & P.E.R. held ma.de an <1.ttempt to get to the top of Point 268, -The enemy were found to be in well-prepared positions and only slight progress wc.s made. ~t 1100 hours Rs.st & P.E,R. put in c.nother G.ttnck, this time supported by tr.nks. Enemy located in houses inunediately £,cross the !.rzillo. Ri vor were silenced, but further ::tdvo.nce was stopped by flunking fire from Ginestreto on 2 Cdn Inf Bde 1 s front. 11 No tan·k crossing over the Arzill2. could be found in the vicinity, 8.nd it became impossible to get tnnks or c.ddi tionr:cl infantry forward of the ri ver. 11 (1 Cdn Inf Bde: "OLIVE;'). In conjunction with the 48 Highrs 1 tttto.ck on Point 146 c.t 19'30 hours, I-Ic.st & P.E.R. and R.C.R. were ordered to move after d8.rk against Point 268 from the south-e2.st Rnd south-west respectively. Ho.st & P.E.R. v1ere to consolidate on Point 268, R.C.R. were to po.ss through c,nd capture successi vo low ridges due north of Ginestreto. (Ibid). Close support was to be provided by the tanks assigned to 48 Highrs, which wero to. turn loft after the success of 48 Highrs on Point 146. "·.rtillery prepar;:,_tory fire began at 1830 hours. This ws.s folloHed by the laying of a smolce screen and M. M.G. fire on neighbouring high ground. The infantry made little progress, for the opposition wz:.s intonse and the tanks were still engaged at Point 146. So Polnt 268 remained in enemy hands. 1'.fter 1830 hours the brigade front became relatively quiet. At 0330 hours the at to.ck wr.s renewed on both the right and left sectors. Enemy resistance was very slight. By 0430 hours 48 Highrs were occupying Point 146, He.st & P.E.R, Point 268 and R.C.R. had moved without opposition a mile along 11Bottlo route beyond Ginestreto. The enemy, instee.d of attempting to counter-c.ttack, had withdrawn to his next

'ii. War diaries o.nd butte.lion ::md brigade accounts' of this day's fighting on 1 Cd.n Inf Bde :front are curiously cluttered with 11 Pts11 at variance one vii th the other. Such points as Point 136, Point 146, Point 156, Point 150, etc., are mentioned. 1/50,000 maps show Point 146, P oint 268 8.nd Point 150. 1/25,000 maps show Point 146, Point 162 o.nd Point 257. In the narrative above a careful sorting und synthesis h£cs been made. - 42 -

line qf def'ence, . and . the Ri vor Foglio. lo.y uhead of 1 Bde. (l.:£!.9) '78.' Meanwhile, the Poles on the right had been making stea dy progress up to the Arzilla River, capturing Carignano ridge (1471) and Monte Giove (1770) on 27 J~µg. A patrol of H.C.R. along Route 16 entered the coastal town of Fano (2173) on the same day and found it unoccupied. Patrols on 28 Aug which crossed the River Arz111a and mado reconnaissance in the direction of Monte Belilla (0874) and the Fuga feature (1378) overlooking Pesaro and the valley of the River Foglia, discovered the enemy to be in force. It was. decided to mount a full brignde attack a t dawn on 29 Aug. (Flanking Formations: Polcorps). 1 Cdn Armd c. Regt (R.C.D.) were called forward on the right of 1 Cdn Inf Bde at 0400 hours on 28 Aug, with the object of seizing any o.dvo.ntage which weak onomy resistance might afford for a quick thrust along nHAT" route up to the Foglia River. One squndron advanced without contact to the Arzilla River, where they came under mortar fire, In spite of the fact that the vehicles were proof' against any but direct hits, this fire produced more delaying ef'fect than had previously been nnticipated. The reason lay . in the fact. tho. t the fire lengthened the time required for dismounted reconnaissance since the parties had to take cover frequently. 11 11 ( 1 Cdn Armd Car Regt: ~ )

It was not until the night 28/29 Lug that a crossing of the i~rzilla (o.t 090721) a :i;nile and a half west of the 48 Highrs I crossing was prepared ru1d the r e giment enabled to continue to the Foglia River. Nevertheless, during 28 i,ug, R.C.Ds. did plug a gap which existed 11 11 between 1 Cdn Inf Bde and the Poles. ( 1 Cdn Inf Bde: OLIVE ) • This was useful against the threat of o. counter-attack which was made known through divisional Intelligence sources at 2200 hours on 28 Aug. , It wal:l thought possible tha t 1 Para Div was concent!'a ti:ng a battalion west of Monte Bolilla for this purpose. The counter­ attack never cs.me in, and at 2400 hours the alarm was nullified. ( Ib:!d )fl

RELIEF OF l I.ND 2 CDN INF BDES, 29-30 AUG

79. In preparation for Phase 3 of the Corps Plan - the breaching . of the Gothic Line itself - the relief of 2 Cdn Inf Bde by 11 Cdn Inf Bde was ordered o.s early as 2015 hours, 27 ~ug, to be effected during .the evening of 28 .'\.ug. ( 1 Cdn Corps Ops Message Log, Serial 757, 27 /,ug 44). As has bee-n shown above, L. Edmn R, and Seaforth of c. were on that evening still heavily engaged at Monteciccardo. The relief was not completed until 0600 hou~s, 29 Aug. 2 Cdn Inf Bde then concentrated in the area of Monte ;·'.ltiero and went into di vision.al reserve. The relief of 1 Cdn Inf Bde was ordered for the night 29/30 Aug and the command passed e. t 0130 hours,. 30 Aug to 3 Cdn Inf Bde. (l Cdn Inf Div "OLIVE")

------·---·- ·- -- -· k It is doubtful, in view of the subsequent withdrawl of the enemy, that a counter-attack was projected by l Pe.re. Div. The evidence is slender. 1. pertinent entry in W.D., H.Q. R.C.A., 1 Cdn Inf Div, 28 Aug 44, reads: 11 2100 hrs. A series of cones involving fd, med, and Hy guns was fired into squares 0872 and 0873 where a bn of 1 Pc,ra Div was farming up for a counter-attack on the right flank of 1 Cdn Inf Bde. The information about the counter- ·a.ttack ·was picked up by wireless 'intercept and a counter thrust was driven off. 11 •· - 43 " so. During 29 :.ug and boforo th0 roliof bogc,n, 1 Cdn Inf Bde patrollod down to tho River Foglio.. Before noon c.n R.C.R. patrol to tho ri vor reported it fordo.blo to inf::mtry c.nd apparently suitable for trc,cks. Pci.trols were ordered to go out c,t 2100 hours during the tako.:.over process. This resulted in sorno confusion, o.s 3 Cdn Inf Bde had o.lso ordered patrols to go out during the soma poribd. It was possible to cancel all of the 1 Cdn Inf Bde patrols with ·the exception of one Ho.st I:. P,E.R. patrol, which wo.s already o.cross tho river c.nd could not be recalled. This patrol penetrated to tho k.t0ral ro ~d near Borgo S. !vlc,ria whore they encount0red no 11 11 enemy. (l Cdn Inf Bde: 0LIVE ), nFrom daylight on the whole brigade sector had been extremely quiet and there was 11 ttle or no shelling oven in the forward areas • 11 ( Ibid) • 3 Cdn Inf Bd,o Gp including 48 R,T,R. began to move from their reserve area at Cartoceto (0965) at 1600 hours. V/hee ls n:nd tracks moved by 11HAT'.' 11 11 ( the right hand} route n.nd marching personnel by BOTTLE ( tho centre) routo • Two compcmies each of Carlt & York R. ::..nd West i'l' ,S ,IL were lifted in 20 T, c. Vs. The brigade wa s not complete in the forwnrd area until a ftor midnight 29/30 Aug. R, 22e R. relie-;od R.C.R, in an urea one mile north-cast of Ginostreto (in square 0673); Cecrlt & York R. reli0v0.d He.st & P.E.R. on the left in an o.rea north of Ginestreto o.nd Vtrrst N.s.R. relieved 48 Highrs on tho wost slope of i1.1onte Belillo.. This latter r elief', involving o. shift to the right boundc.ry of the corps, wo.s delayed, so that 48 Highrs ca.mo under command of 3 Cdn Inf Bde until 1030 hours, 30 .\ug. Tho Polish c. ttack, which wo.s to go in on the morning of' 29 1.ug ( sco po.ro. 78 above) wo.s cancelled. Ins to2.d, an a ttnck on foa tures to the right was organi­ zed for 0900 hours. This attack wont in successfully ago.inst softened opposition, and at noon on 29 :_ug Monte Bolillc. wo.s occupied with li ttlo di.fficul ty. ( 1 Cdn Corps Ops Masse.go Log, Serial 842, 28 :.ug 44). Tho R,C,D. squadron which on the morning. of 29 Lug had finc,lly crossed tho Lrzilla River and pa trolled f'orward to the Foglia River va lley ( soe pura 78) was withdrawn in to r eserve on 30 J.ug, since the action 2.bout to begin ego.inst prepared defences did not afford suitable employment to c. reconnaisscnco regiment. 11 11 ( 1 Cdn Lrmd Car R0gt ~ _2~ ) 81. 5 Cdn :.rmd Div' s part in the Gothic Line bc.ttle ho.d b eon laid down by tho Corps Com.rnandor in 1 Cdn Corps I Operution Instruction No. 22 of 21 !,ug 44 . For phases 1 o.nd 2 of tho operation the armoured di vision wc.s to follow tho advance of 1 Cdn Inf Div under movement orders issued from time to time by H.Q,. 1 Cdn Cor ps, and for Phase 3 to o.ssist, if' neoded, in the forcing of tho Gothic Line, Depending· on the resistance encountered in those defences, 5 Cdn lcrmd Div might carry out tho left h.".lf of a two-divisiono.l attack towo.rd Rimini or be passed through to drive alone up Route 16, . (Corps: 11 11 11 11 0LIVE , l.ppx 1. ). Ls 1 Cdn Inf Div advanced from. tho Metauro towecrd the Gothic Linc, 5 Cdn Ar md Div moved tho 11 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (11 Cdn Inf' Bde with under command 4 P.L,D.G,, 5 Cdn Lrmd Rcgt, 1 Fd Sqn R.C.E., 98 Bty (S.P.), ~nd one troop of 17-pdr guns (towed) from 16 Bty 4 Cdn L.Tk Rogt R,C,E., and in support 17 Fd Regt R,C.L. and 24 Cdn Fd 1.mb) over tho Cesena River o.nd yp to a concentre.tion area wost of Monto Della Mattorv. (058668). They v.rri vod hore during tho afternoon of 28 i_ug and were ins·tructed to relieve tho bn ttul:i.ons of 2 Cdn Ip.f Bde who at that time were fighting for tho high ground of the s. l.ngelo Ginostreto f eature which overlooks tho north shore of the Foglia Valley. From this ridge the land slopes g6ncrcelly toward tho river but a lowor ridge, which contains tho towns of Castello (033738) ~ ]1!ontelabbc.te (027740) and i.psella ( 00772?), prevents observation. of the river be d itself, · 82, 2 Cdn Inf Bdo was delayed on the in termcdic. to ridge vihi ch includes Monteciccardo, where L, Edmn R. wore held up t:i,11 the night 28/29 t,ug before they could clear the area and h and over ,to 11 Cdn Inf Bde. . During th£. t night c. general en emy withdrawal took place ~ ·-·-· ...... --......

- 44 -

c.nd Porth R. actually roliovod Seo.forth of C. in tho torm o:f Ginostroto while C.B. Highrs took over from L. Edrnn R. in Monteciccardo itself. These rolie:fs took plc,co during tho early morning of 29 Lug and wore complete by 1030 hours. Tho rosorvo bntto.lion, Ir R.c., h.D.d mo.unwhilo relievod the P.P.C.L,I. around the town .of Monte S . Mc.rh~, which · they hud occupied during tho afternoon of the 27th o.lthough an attempt to push to the noxt :foe. turo on the north-wost,' non to Co.rbono, hc.d boo_n repulsed. 83, Tho gonerul rotirement of the 29th included tho uroo. of Mon to Co.rbone, o.nd the Ir R.C. woro o.blo to occupy it -during the v.ftc,rnoon c:n d send n comp~my forwo.rd to J;ps·ollo., which is si tuo.tod on tho mc,ip roc.d skirtin,e the south odgo of the Foglia :flats c.nd running north~oo.:::t to Poso.ro. Perth R. advo.hced from Ginestreto end sent patrols forvmrd tbroug!l. the arec.. Co.stello and Montelubbc.to into the flnts of tho Foglio.. Since the forward ridge on which these tovms o.r e si tua tod was under observation from the north bank, no c. t tempt wc.s mo.de during the day to occupy them with any forco of troops or c.rmour. (~·1.n., G,s., H.Q,, 5 Cdn Armd Div; Porth R., C.B. Highrs, Ir R.C.: 11 0LIVE1,. Tho C.B. Highrs o.lso o.dvo.nced c.nd occupied s. :_ngelo, reporting that by 1330 hours t._h.ey ru.,d three compo.nios 11 on the high ground oveI1looking the riverlt. 11 (c.B. Highrs: 11 01,IVE 11, p,l). i.t 1500 hours 'they sent out two infantry patrols ofthree scouts cc.ch~ who reconnoitred up to the Foglic,, found houses on the south bc.nk clo2.r c..nd crossed opposite MontelE-.bbe.to. The houses on tho immodio.to north b ank wero also found clear except for one wo.ndering Todeschi who was·.brought b u ck i:..s a prisoner. Tho pc.trols did not cross tho flats to tho northern laterc.l (the Urbino - Pesuro road) but returne d o.nd wore I10pla cod by nn R,C,E. reconnr-.issance party o.nd a pl£:toon of info.ntry, who were directed to check on mines and pbssiblo river crossings . L reconnv.issance p0.tr ol vnts also sont out by Perth R. at 2200 hours with similar · instructions. (Perth R., C.B. Highrs: "OLIVE"; W.D., c.B. Highrs, 29 ;,u g 44. Petrol r eports o.ppe::-.r as ·-PPX 9 there to.)

RECAPITULATION ·

84, During the first four days of Oporc,tion "OLIVE'" the di vision had crossed the Metauro Ri w,r, had o.dvanced more than t en miles, 8nd had forced the onenry to fall b a ck from the heights north of the .1.rzilla River into the Gothic Line beyond the Foglia. Tho adve.nce to the Foglia had not b een as rapid as had been optimistically expected whon tho o.ction began becauso of tho stubborn delaying c,ction fought by the enemy on 27 and 28 Lug o.t liionteciceardo and the :features east of Ginestreto r.nd bocauso, tho ground was di:f:ficul t :for wheel and track r.1ovemon t. The f ew roads had been mined and cratered, and· gulleys were fre quently n e.tura l obstE.cles which could

,tz .'.s stated above in pc.re. 74, a company of Seaforth of C. cla im to have entered s. j.ngel o . Their Vvnr Dio.ry gives tho time as 0830 hours, but C.B. Higbrs report all reliefs complete at 0430 hours and toll of setting up un O.P, on a ridge only 200 ynrds south of the town at 0700 hours. The advance o:f the C.B. Highrs mentioned in po.r a 79 took then to positions nlong a ridge a bout hnl:f a mile north-west of S. ,\ngolo, and it w::.:s from S .029723, tho l eft end of this ridge thE,t the petrols wont out to the Foglia Valley. No reference to the occupation of o:ny points :forward o:f the gener a l Ginestreto - 3 , i.ne e l o ridge, i.e., in Ca.s tollo, Montalubb a to or ;'_pse lla , appear in the "OLIVE" nc.rrc.ti vos or We.r Diaries of Perth R. or C.B. Hiwirs. The former s pec.k o:f ttthoroughly sea rch ing Ginestroto I on the 29th. ·. The narrc, tor wa.s · in town on l Sep and can testify to the thoroughness of tho socrch - there was nothing l oft 11 11 for him to liberato , (V!.D ., Seo.:forth of c., Perth R., o:nd c.B. Highrs, September 1944) - 45 .. not be crossed wi t..riout engineering work. Brigo.dior Co.ldor has mudo this comment: Tho brigade contra line - 11 BOTTLE 11 route .. we.a r, series of ver-y socond~r-y roads, connected up in places by tro.cks which hc~d to be bulldozed a cross fields.

11 11 ( 1 Cdn Inf Bde: ~ ) Inter-communication wus difficult. Viirelo.ss reception on brigade and bc.ttc.lion nets wo.s very limited - possibly owing to tho deep vo.lloys o.nd sharp high fec.tures, This resulted in slow po.ssing of infor111D.tion c.nd sometimes in poor liaison with armoured, urtillory and sapper units, which cc,used delays both in immedio.to planning end in the o.dvcnce. (Ibid; 1 Cdn Inf' Div Ops 1,1e sso.ge Log, Serials 15108, 15116, 1513~ !.ug, nnd 15379, 15391, 1 11 28 :.ug 44; l Cdn Inf Div Sigs: ~ ) 85. The role of artillery during this second phD.se, writes Brigadier Ziegler, C.R •.:_., 11 coulcl not bo cloo.rly defined by any set piece fire plan, c.nd control of fire was decentralized to some extent, in order tho. t continuous c.nd rapid support might c.lvmys be a vo.i lable as and when require d. 11 Fire plo. ns were numerous, spontcmoous c.nd simple. Those requiring c, hec,vicr weight of fire than could bo ndequately hc.ncllod by one regiment, or requiring the weight of 1.GRJ~ wore referred to mo. :.t times fire pl1:.ns requiring tho weie;ht of the whole divisiono.l artillery or more,· were drawn up c.nd controll0d f'rom my vehicle parked by tho side of the road. Sp0ccl. wc..s the essential factor throughout. Movement of guns required close considerc,tion. Gun ureas were g0noro.lly chonon fror,1 a study of aorial photographs. Immediutoly an urea was declareu safe for recce by my forward r eps c.t brigc,des , rccce parties wero dispatched. Movos were arranged through division. Generally regiments were moved complete o.nd wore located in their now positions in o. matter of from t wo to fivo hours.

11 11 (l Cdn Inf Div 1.rty: ~ ) The hilly n 2. tur0 of tho ground, which provided much too good observ2.tion for the enemy, and tho ebb and f'low of battle between 26 and 28 _'.ug, resulte d in sor.1e of the regiments being locate d in front line pos itions actually under enemy observation. (W.D., H.Q. R.C.J,., l Cdn Inf Div, 28 i.ug 44, and W.D., l Cdn Fd Regt, 26-28. ~· ug 44) . 86. Some of' tho problems of artillery moves under these conditions arc well illustrated by tho following account of' how, on 28 .~ug, 3 Cdn Fd Rcgt celegratod tho fifth anniv0rsary of its mobilization. ·on this do.y tho rogir.1cnt was supporting 2 Cdn Inf' Bde in the fight for the high ground around Monteciccardo. Lfter much c.do on the Div link it was finally decided we would move 1:.nd n t 0030 hrs 11 coc.so firing" was given. Scheduled time for the move was 0130 hrs, but due to the unusually bad atmospheric conditions everybody was out of' touch with rocco parties and 1st Cdn Fd Rogt, slatod to movo at 0100 hrs , could not f'ind out whether or not a position had boon found for them and nt 0110 hrs we received orders to move forthwith. The trop wus unevent­ ful enough but wo.r-11ke noises grew in volume o.s we - 46 -

approached the now a re'.J., .:1nd mounting tho fin(J.l hill bx,ought rir'lo flashes and IvIG tracer in view. Tho 2 IC, Major E.L, de Ponsior, greeted us with tho news that (e.) it wo.s 2. difficult position to .occupy, and (b) tho.t t:tio owno_rship ho.d still been in dispute when tho rocce arri vod nnd there hc:d boon some shelling c.nd mortaring of the o.reo. since. ·Itw·as certainly a difficult position, on the steep sides of o. vall~y with c,pproachos so poor tho.t despite ar.rivo.l at 0315 hrs, on;l.y RHQ and 19th Battery were compl etely off tho roo.d by dawn, c.nd RHQ. he.cl just pulled into a narrow roadway leading down the sido of the valley. The path to tho area ten to.ti voly selected for RHQ was too difficult to navigate during darkness. ·, . . I. Co.mo the do.wnt o.nd:with•it o.n uneasy and growing suspicion that Pt 384 (S ,,014'706) our Hflash covor11 was still in enemy hands,,. This was ro.picl.ly confirmed by Capt T.H., Montgomery, F.0,0. with tho Loyal Edmonton Reg-t, who sent down a rush for medium flro on llLEGGYiillLLYn code name for Pt 384 , o.nd announced in a ho.rriod voico that enemy tnnks and a superior number of infantry he·ld tho feature from the little town of l.fontociccardo on its sunnhit. Just ov0r 3000 yards mio.y, it completely dominated 19th Battery1 s posi Uon and tho entrances to the 77th and 92nd Battery areas, where their vehicles were creeping off,' the road c. few yards ~-.t o. time. Radi'o was still bad, s').nd it was only · after z,· delay and much rolo.ying thD. t the t a rget got through and ranging commenced. Meanwhile, Churchills of the 25th (Br) i'.rmd Bde (sic~ 21 Tk Bde) rolled down the road and across our front o.nd. wont into the o.ttacl{. It was a nightmo.rish scone from our point of view, and it reached som0thing of a climax i;1hon the Ldjutant, Co.pt J .G. :pavidson, sat beside S .8 [o. signo.ls truck') and pas sod corrections to asnist Capt Kontgomery to bring our rounds into his zone of obsorvo. tion. RHQ, could see tho rounds perfectly.

During the shoot, RHQ vehicles were moved one by one back up the hill, down a stretch of road on which the enemy had excellent obse rvation (as he did for miles) and into tho doubtful haven of u small grove 0ast of the highway which provided partial cover. 1.11 di.y long the battle for nLEGGYKELLY 11 continued w:i.th 3rd Cdn Fd Regt in the libachers. All day long the Hun clung to the town on its summit cmd tho t0.nks raged in its outsk:1.rts. The Sask L.I. dug in their i"I.Gs. behind RHQ and opened fire. Shortly after noon the Gorman guns ·· began work on our immediate area and thor'es.fter the appearance of a vehicle on the road near RHQ, entrance brought down a heavy crump. The general 1;.rea wc,s under o.lmost continuous bombardment. 19th Ba tte:rry, dug in o.nd comouflagod before down, escaped direct attention by ,1voiding all movement o.nd were not allowed to fi.re. · ( 1 Cc'in Inf Div: noLIVE") - 47 N

87. The air plo.n (sec po.ra 37 above) wus followed in gonoral but not Jn doto.il, und not on tho sco.le suggested in tho plun. However, un r.voro.ge of 450 sorties v.>ere flown ouch duy in support 11 11 of tho Eighth 1:rmy. (l Cdn Inf Div: 0LIVE ). Tho lurgest effort during tho period 26-29 i.ug wus an attack on Bergo s. M2-ria and Ostorio. Huovo when botwoen 1900 and 2000 hours of 27 _·.ug, 35 Spit­ firos, 30 Kittyhawlrn and 12 Mustangs dropped more than 100,000 lbs of bombs. (";!.D., G,s., H.Q,. 1 Cdn Corps :.ugust 1944: J.ppx 55, Daily 1\ir Summary No. 2, 27 1.ug 44). Oh tho night of 27/28 ::..ug, 124 medium and light bombers vJOrc across th.e lino of tho Ri vor Foglia continuing the 11 softoning up 11 process• On 29 :.ug more than 20 separate attacks wore made, in close support of tho division, on tho high ground and the spurs stretching south 8.nd wost from Tomba di P-esaro. 111.ltogothcr, the day was most successful and wo had begun to got down to smash ing tho actual Nebolwerfors and Hy mortars in tho lino itself • 11 (Ibidr 1,ppx 58, Daily .t.ir Summary No. 4, 29 i:..ug 14R) - 88. In contrast with our own offensive operations in tho air both on our immediate front and as far north as Rimini in support of the ;,.rmy offensi vc, there was a noticoablo lack of German air activity. Ono Junkers 87 was reported to have dropped fragmentation bombs on the night of 27 .:,.ug in 2 Pol Corps area (l Cdn Corps Ops Message Log, Sorial 798, dated 28 .·.ug 44), and on tho sruno ov,oning some incendiuFJ bombs were reported to have been dropped in tho ,.!etauro River valley north of Monte Maggiore without causing damage. (l Cdn Inf Div Ops Hessage Log, Seric,1 15230, 27 i .ug 14)

89. The enemy encountered thus fnr • 71 Inf Div and 4 Pe.ra Rogt wore under strength at the b0ginnin3 of tho action and their ranks had certainly been depleted by casualties, P.Ws., and deserters du:r>ing the last four days. Yet few, if any, reinforcements were apparently arriving. i. specimen of the information secured from P.W. of 71 Inf Div is as follows;

P. W. suys that on 27 ~·.us 1 Coy o'f· 171 Fus Bn was 50 strong and had throe or four LMGs; 2 Coy was 35 strong and had two LMGs; 3 Coy was 40 strong and had throe LMGs. 4 (Hy) Coy was 75 strong, has 1 (Hlv!G) Pl, one engineer pl and has lost its co. valry guns• On 29 Lug P. P .w. says 4 Coy has a strength pl of 40, two M.G. 42, l x 8.1 cm mortar; its engineer pl is fighting as infant!"J and has two Fe.ustpatrono • (1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No. 97, 30 J.ug 44) 90. From such information in Intelligence summaries issued during the period 26-30 J:ug it is apparent that the enemy opposed to the corps adVDnco le.eked equipment and had nco.d of reinforcements and largo do~es of morale-boosters of ono kind or another. The o.c,

N 1.n enemy o.cknowledgoment confirms the damage done by these sorties: From 27-29 Lug, raids by enemy twin-engined bomber formations struck the positions of the Green line in almost unbroken succession. The rosul t of this vias th.at a large number of the thickly laid mines before the main defence lino were ronder0d harraless. (24/Intorrogations/1 Pretzell, Germc.n Lecount of tho Battle of Rimfn~l)71 --- - 48 '"

211,- Gr 'Regt ·of '71 Div acldr¢sscd a mcsso.ge · on 22 !.t;g 44 11 To my Bravo Gronadi.ors", . couchecf in terms thr.t have boon frunilio.r·. in the mouths of senior comma·ndors from time immemo.rio.1. J. copy of this message was captured. It reaus in po.rt:

Difficult days are c\hoad. It is precisely against us that the enemy apir.:iarently viants to forco his break­ through, Even although 'his leadership is• poor his inf and tks aro still strong and numerous, I know that you, my Grenadiers, as always, will distinguish yourselves as the generally conceded best infantry in the Italian thoatre of war;. I know that our arty being tho best shots on ,the Sudfront, will do their utmost to stc.rid faithfully by us, Therefore, Greno.diers, tighten tho grip on your rifle and bazooka and you v1ill put it over~ I expect overwhelming results, Grenadiers, be assured, during those do.ys, Europe is watching .us. Exceed your duty, then you shall remain the pride of ·tho Wehrmacht . (1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No. 95, 27 i.ug 44) The Cdnadinn troops. from the River i\l!etauro to · the Foglia hnd had more- difficulty with the ground than with the infantry of 211 Regt, whom an impartial critic would hesitate to concede to be the 11 bost . ;ln tho I tulian , tho a tro of vfnr ~ 11 91. 'TI;lo second sontenco in tho abovo quotation i .s interesting as it suggests tha:t the enemy expected as early as 22 :mg that the J.lli0d broo.kthrough would bo made · on tho .',dr.iatic c.oast •. Thero is littl0 other 0vidonc0 to suggest such an expectation, and even as late as 30 J;ug he showod no signs of reinforcing t!lo i.dria tic soc tor with additional divisions. Either he wo.s not realizing in time that tho Eighth l.rmyts main [,tt~:ck wa;3 being· diroct.od along the _·.driatic coast, or he was los ing intorost in the Italian campaign and attempting to withdraw (1.., ?ious ho~o often c11,oo.mod abo~t by ,.llied · soldiers too long . immured in Ite,ly.). Or, us the G2 ( 1ntell1gonce) ·c,t Corps H.Q, suggested, 11 , •• hc raust have something up his sloev0 that we haven 1 t discovored, 11 (1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No. 97, 30 Aug 44). :.t any rate, the1 Gothic Line lay ahead and patrols to the Ri vor Foglia on 29 2.nd 30 :.ug wore already probing its out workst.

k .rh,e Germen Tenth Army account declares that interrogation of a captured Pole on 24 Aug gave the Army its first reliable confirma­ tion of the presence of British troops in the Adriatic, After the withdrawal on the night 25/26 .tug from the Ii advanced position of the Green Line 11 t.o the 11outpost area position of . the Gr.eon .Line 11 (about S. Angelo - Candelara) ; an .~rmy proposal for a further withdrawal of the le ft wing during the night of 27/28 J.:.ug into the Green Line itself was rejecte·d by O.K. W. C,-in-C. Italy did however make the concession of _mo ving 26 Pz Div, coming from the north-west, up to Tenth Army into the Forli - Cesena a rea. (Pretzell, German Account of ~~-Battle of_~r.i1_, p, 12) ----·---·· - - 49 -

PREPARATION FOR THE AS SAULT AGAINST THE GOTHIC LINE

92. While the first phase of Operation 11 0LIVE 11 was in progress, plans were s ti 11 being nutuwd fol:' c co-ordinntcd i.rmy attack on the Gothic Line, if that should be found necessary. It was expected at Eighth Army Headquarters that the assault would be launched only by the Polish and Canadian Corps, attacking simultaneously. Although these two formations had reached the line of the Foglia by 29 Aug, 5 Corps on that day was somewhat further behind owing to the greater distance it had to travel, the difficult nature of the country, and the very indifferent road and track system over which it had to move. Arrangements were made to supplement the existing complement of artillery available to the two attacking Corps - the artillery of 2 N.Z. Div and/or 4 Brit Inf Div was to join 1 Cdn Corps - and in addition naval bombardment was to be undertaken under H,Q. 1 Cdn Corps arrangements; the supporting naval forces were expected to amount by 1 Sep to two destroyers, each mounting four or six 4.7-inch guns, and one gun boat, mounting two six-inch guns. (Eighth Army - The Gothic Line and Romagna Battles, p.29) 93. On the Canadian Corps front information about ground and enemy defences was fairly adequate. The whole area from the Foglia to the River Conca had been under studv by the Mediterranean Air Interpretation Unit (lvI ,.A,I.U. (West)),~ from early Au.gust. By the third week of the month detailed air photo coverage of the Adriatic sector of the Gothic Line was being made available and numerous sorties were being flownxk. The photo coverage then being prepared included basic cover 20-inch (focal length), gridded cover 20-inch, Mo saics approximately 1/15, 000 , and an oblique 20-inch of the Gothic Line to 15 miles inland. (W.D., G.S, , H.Q. l Cdn Corps: Appx 129, "Statement of Air Photos and Maps 11 , · 18 Aug 44). Further information was obtained from Italian partisans, German deserters and recently captured maps and operational orders, (1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No . 94, 26 Aug 44). It was obvious that the key to the k Corresponding to A.P,I.S. in the North-west European Theatre. il A detailed "Preliminary Report on the Eastern Section of the Gothic Line 11 is contained in 1 Cdn Inf Div Int Summary No.78, 19 Aug 44, (See footnote to para 33 above). The report reveals careful study of air photographs by M.A.I.U. (West) officers but the writer makes several qualifications such as 11 althou~h no §ood recent photographic covel:' of FES/~O is available ••• and unfortunately, owing to lack of regular and. frequent photographic cover ••• 11 It would seem that the Eighth Army's interest in the Gothic Line was not centred on the Adriatic sector until quite late. It will be noted that the air photo coverage listed in the sentence below was -being prepared after 18 Aug, and -"target" dates for the r!;)ceipt of .this coverage ~ Corps Hef:1.dquarters varied from 20 Aug to 24 Aug and 11 later'. (W.D,, G,S., H. Q, . 1 Cdn Corps; Appx 29, 18 P.ug 44) - 50 -

coastal defences was the T;mbo. di Pes2ro fee1ture north of the Foglia whose peak is at Monteluro, It was equally apparent that the prepared defences were thickest on the banks of the Foglia. 94. From information supplied by Italirm partisans and correllated with information secured from other sources, it was possible to i'ssue defence overprints, of maps ( scale 1/25,000) and ·,, ''. .. tc 'forin. a -El:e·tailed trace of the Gothic Line defences on bbth , ·sides of the Foglia, (1 Cdn Corps Int Sumnw.ry No. 90, 21 Aug 44). South of the· ri:ver the lateral road Pesaro - Montolabbate was mine.d at the br:i,dge s ., · Ne i t;her the river nor its bed was a ·natural ·obstacle. ·. The river bed itself, consisting of gravel and stones, is wide, of the Sf.iJGRO River type, and there are only f.ew-bridges across it, but it ,is not a continuous tank obstacle, having only broken stretches of steep banks in places, uJ. though these increase westward, The river is fordable at several points, At present there is little water in the river, which should be easy for infantry to cross. (1 Cdn Inf Div Int Summary No, 78, 19 l.ug 44) The-main defences all ·1ay north of the river except for a heavy minefield at the loop (097806) one and one-half miles west of Pesaro, and for barbed wire ent&ngloments and & minefield circumscribing the town of Pesaro sou th of the railway, and the defences in Pesaro •itself, The defences north of the river on the f;J.ats were continuous for ten to twelve miles .inland from the sea :.and ran back to a depth of 1500 yards f rom the. river ·. · These · consisted principally of a minefield, o.n anti-tank di ten and farther back gun emplacements and •:flosi tions. The minefield was deep and possibly had barbed wire e_ntang".r ments. ( It Wii:s an arm of this f-ield which is referred to above as being in :the area 097806). That the minefi.el.d wa.s not haphazc.rd or slight is evident from the following desc.ription of one part of it: ·There is a thre-e mile stretch of mines running from just y.,est of lf. ONTECGHIO at R.999747 to the banks of the FOGLIA at R,973742. It has been in existence for at ·least three months and consists of over-lapping panels of mines approximately 50 feet- wide. There are between six and seven rows of mines in each panel approximately seven feet ·s. part, and the mines are seven to eight feet apart, . ( Ibi9-) All buildingl;i 'between the minefield and the river had been demolished or were prepared for demolition so as to clear the field of fire; Some . of the buildings or their rubble were thought to be machine-gun positions. 95. The anti-te.nk diL:1. was··about 14 feet wide nnd followed a nig-zag course immediat0ly south of the Pesaro - Montecchio lateral road, It was not continuous; a small gap existed in the area of the factory Sponza (0577) and a large one; more than a mile long, between Borgo s. i\lar.ia and Osteria Nuovo , Behind this latter gap the.. ground. rises ra.tb,er steeply , f'or:ni ng thus a natural obstacle for tanks. Unlike the anti- tank ditch of the Hitler Line, this ditch had been dug, not constructed by the t''.etonation of a series · of charges. - 51 -

96. Behind the anti-tank ditch and I'Oughly paI'allel with it . weI'e numeI'ous machine-gun, anti-tc_n~{ a nd field gun emplucements. Minor defensive positions aI'e of the usual type consisting mostly of c. me.chine-gun pit connected to a deep dug-out by a communication trench. They are sited either to cover the approaches to the F. FOGLIA from the south of r oads running north through the line itself. Most of the trench system in this area have been covered with earth and each has a dug-out built into it. The use of concrete in the construction of casemates and pillboxes seems to have been almost entirely confined to this sub-sector of the line. Approximately 20 casemates large enough to contain anti-tank guns or light field guns are placed out among the other defences and all of them cover the river, the anti-tank ditch or the minefield west of MONTECClUO. N~erous pillboxes of varying si?,es ranging _fr om the two ·to tbreewman type ..-t-o those capable ·or­ -eontaining light guns are seen along the __ entire length of this sub-sector, the majority of which also fire SDU-th_ ·to cover the anti-tank obstacles. (- Ibid).-- Besides Pesaro, key points on this Rub-sector of the line appear to be the important road junction one ,and one half miles west of the town ( 0980) and r,Iontecchio. Such, then was the general picture of the Foglia River defences of the Gothic Line o.s known prior to the Canadian attack. 97. As we have seen, the Corps Plo.n of attack against the Gothic Line had two alternatives. If progress up to the River Foglia were quick and the enemy were kept on the move, 1 Cdn Inf Div would move into the line without awaiting the arrival of 5 Cdn Armd Div. If on the other hand progress were slow and the enemy had time to make a stand, both divisions would make a planned and concert0d attack. The- alternative to be pursued was in doubt until 31 Aug;, and then ri. . compromise · plan was followed, On the night of 26/27 Aug, a message wns sent from Corps to Divisional Headquarters: "Any likelihood of reaching Foglio. by morning?" (1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Message Log, Serial 15124, 27 Aug 44). The answer' to this was: "Seems unlikely. 11 ( Ibid) • b. s has been shown above, that answer was confir'Ined by ·the dayls operations. At 1050 hours, 27 Aug, however, Corps Operational Instruction No. 24 was received at Divisional Headque~ters: 1 Cdn Inf Div will advance to the R FOO-LIL, gain crossings and seek out gaps in the Gothic Line. If possible break­ through the GOTHIC Line und exploit in the direction of TOMBl. DI PES/.RO S .0077. 5 Cdn Armd Div will complete cone north of R CESENl. prior to moving forward. No mo:ve before 270900 except recce parties on two-hour's notice to move, (Hist Sec file Italy: 1944/1 Cdn Corps/C/F, Docket II) It is therefore apparent that on that date the first alternative plan was to be operative. By evening of 27 Aug it was obvious tha t the task of getting over the ridge beyond River Arzilla was not to be achieved easily. The order for tha relief of 2 Cdn Inf Bde by 5 Cdn Armd ·Div was sent out on the same night. (1 Cdn Corps Ops Message Log, Serial 757, 27 Aug 44). Hence it would seem that now the second alternative was the plan to be followed: .. 52 -

As the -adv to F FOGLI/,. 1'10.s to.king much longer tho.n had been anticipated, . the ,G,o.c. 1 Cdn Corps rec.lized that the enemy might ho.ve time to occupy tho GOTHIC Line instr. He therefore issued a warning order to the effect tho.t 5 Cdn ,,rmd Div was to relieve 2 Cdn Inf Bde on t he night of 28/29 Aug and assume comd of ·t he sector on compl etion of tho relief. 5 Cdn Armd Div arty wo.s to revert to comd of 5 Cdn Armd Div ut 1000 hrs, 28. Aug. This would plo.ce the two divs in t he line in readiness :or set-.piece attack on the G QTHIC Line. (1 Cdn Corps: "~") 98, From 28 to 30. Aug_corps plc.nning assumed the necessity for making a set- piece attack~, The heavy fighting on 27 and 28 Aug wo.s still a para.mount fs.ctor in plsrnning, Though patrols on 29 and 30 Au g continued to b'ring in information of enemy inactivity, the enemy might be 11 playing poD:mm. ,; (J. Cdn Corps Int Swrunary No . 97, 30 Aug 44). Reliefs such o.s that of 1 o.nd 2 Cdn Inf Bdes were suggestive of a definite large-scale attack. The plan for o. full­ •sca l e assault was further verified by General Bi,.rns' request to the !,rrrry Cbmme.nder for o.ddi tiono.l artillery to bring his support up to twelve field regiments. This w::i.s pro:nised by Genero.l Leese. (W . D. , Lt-Gen Burns, 29 Aug 44) 99. It has been shown '.see po.ra 93) tho.tat Pesaro, the anchor of the Gothic Line in the Adri2.tic sector, the defences circumscribed the town but were heaviest south of it. It is, therefore, significo.nt fuo.t on the evening of 29 .\ug two troops of 12 Lancers (under command of Polc~rps) entered the city, They reported at 2130 hours that the on:y resistance they encountered was from v.n occasional sniper left behind, (1 Cdn Inf Di v Ops ', Message Log, Serial 1564G: 30 t.u[, 44). By noon of 30 Aug the city was reported clear up to the river. (Ib:i d, Serial 15642, 30 Aug 44) • Then an interesting si tuo.tion develope·n-::.~--tho enemy sent two companie s to re-take the city, . The fighting in the town lasted all. afternoon r.esul ting in losses on both sj_des. According to a statement by a · P , W. captured in PE-S:. .r~o , one battalion of 1 Para Regt had been given the ·cask of recapturing the town at all costs ••• At ubout 1700 hrs the Cavforce comd decided to. _withdraw the forces fighting in the town in order to avoid further losses, (:::'lanking For:'!lations :. Polcorps) It is pertinent to recall that in the general Army Plan Pesaro was to be by- passed, and to state that the holding of Pesaro was not part of 2 Pol Corps' plan . In the Posaro - Cattolica - Tcmba triangle .1 Para Div :was in a p,osi Uon that might well be isol ated to them should the Canadian-Polish n orthward drive reach Cattolica, (Pretzell, German Account of the Battle of Rimini, p , 14). 100, A strong air attack was laid on for the morning of 30 .Aug. ThirteE3n t e.rg'ets in the Go t hic Line vie r e actually engaged. Two were in Montecchio, whic,1 had not been so thoroughly demolished by the Germans as had Borgos. Ma ria and Osteria Nuovo, both of which had been levelled to provi~e fields of fire, Four more targets were on the lateral in f~ont of Point 131 east of k. In his personal diary, Lt,.Gen Burns speaks of this set- piece attack every day betwPen 27 and 30 Aug but does not set a date . "53 -

Bargo s·. Maria, o,nd the romaindor wore on tho high ground to the north, including Montoluro, Point 253 o.nd Monte Marrone, all of which will be referred to in la tor para.gr: _:ihs. (See Mo.p 11 C11 o.nd W.D., G.s., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps: Appx 61, Air Summary No ~ 5, , 30 Aug 44). The value of this bombing and its effect on tho operation are in some doubt. General Leese states: From dc.wn onwards we put down a very heavy air bombardment all along tho Gothic Line, Under cover of this our patrols pushed down tho forward slopes. There was very little shelling and no Spandau or morto.r fire. Some of the patrols penetrated the minefields and even tapped into the forward defences of the Gothic Line. It was obvious that the lino was not properly held. I therefore ordered the bombing to cease o.t mid-day, and forward di visions sent do,m strong detachments of infantry and tanks to seizo tho high ground North of the Gothic Line.&. (Leese: Gothic Line, p.5) 101, At 1000 hours on 30 Aug tho G.O.Cs. 1 Cdn Corps and 2 Pol Corps and the Chief of ~ltaff to General Leese held a conference at which details of the coming operation wore agreed upon. The attack was to be mounted on the night 1/2 Sep: . Cano.dian Corps will be ready to a tto.ck night '.".,/2 Sep. Polcorps will not be ready till night 2/3 Sep, but if necessary and essential Genero.1 f;,nders is ngreec,ble to attack night 1/2 Sep though not qui to reo.dy. ( 1 Cdn Corps Ops Mes sage Log, Serial 1070, 30 Aug 44) The start line for the Co.nadi ll.n Corps attack was the far bo.nk of the River Foglia - since po.trols by this time had established the fact that limited bridgeheads could be formed almost at will across the Foglia• While this confe1•ence wns in progress, further information had come in which led to the belief that no set-piece atto.ck would be necessary. ;_s lo.tor reported by the Canadian Corps Commander: On return to my H,Q, from the conference at 1000 hrs it was reported that the enemy was remarkably quiet. Later patrol reports.. indicated that the line was very lightly manned. Accordingly, orders were issued to both divs to push forw~rd with coys followed by bns and endeavour to effect a lodgement in the line while it was still unmanned. (W.D., Lt-Gen Burns, 30 Aug 44)

102. f.s has been shown above, the air bombQrdment north of the River Foglia was cancelled. The Corps order for the advance into · the Gothic Line was issu.ed a_t 1345 hours, 30 Aug, and reads in partr In order to determine the strength of the enemy in the Gothic Line the following will be carried out. ------1 Cdn------·-- Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div------will patrol -~--- k The cancollo.tion of uir operations with the exception of the exception of the Cabrank o.nd Rover David appears in the Operations Log of 1 Cdn Corps at 1215 hrs with the following _additional instructions: 11Acti ve patrolling to start then ( 1300 hrs) with a view to finding an easy way through to occupy any high ground or features North of the river which fmns feel they 11 are able to. ( 1 Cdn Corps Ops Message Log, Serial 1015, 30 Lug 44) - 54 -

vigorously throughout the hrs. of daylight today with a view to determining if the followingposns are occupied by the enemy: · · .

BORGO S, M./'JHA .S. 0377 68 OSTERIA NUOV.O s.021758 MONTECCHIO S, 009752

5 Cdn ,\.rmd Div being responsible for tho two latter plo.ces. 'l;he;se patrols will o.lso dotermire whether or not the line between ti1cso areas is lightly hold.

3hould results of the patrols indicate tho.t the lino is only lightly hold, both divs will send through strong fighting patrols, str equivalent to at least one bn per div secto1', Those po.trols will penetrate tho line and tho necessary gaps . and crossings through minefds and L tk ditches will be prepared. Should these patrols succeed in getting fwd without heavy opposition botl:;l divs will est a brhead night 30/3:t Lug ori tho general lino pt 131 S,040779 pt 157 S,026778 , C Bi,CCil'.NI C FLLCINI S .005764 C TRAMONTANA R,995755, These brheads will be ost so mat at first light both 1 Cdn Inf D:;;; ,.nd 5 Cdn /,rmd Div wfll bo able to udv · through them c.nd continue tho adv in their respocti ve div sectors. (Hist Sec file Italy: 1944/1 Cdn Corps/C/F, Docket II: Operation Instruction No. 25, 30 Aug 44)

103. The boundary between 1 Cdn Corps and 2 Pol Corps, which was not materially changed from the initial plan, included in 1 Cdn Corps area Borgo S. i\llo.ri8., Monteluro and Gro.daro. (0184) (1 Cdn Corps Ops Mossago Log, Serial 1070, 30 Aug 44). Both Polcorps and 5 Corps .. like 1 Cdn Corps - were pl::rnning to ad vr-.nce into tho ,Gothic Lino without a largo-scale formo.l att:::cck, in -an attempt· to got through before the German defences were properly- munned. Tho genorc.l pattern wo.s to _send small forces forward G.nd then to stop up these forces in quick succession, l.t the B.G.S 1 s, conference: o.t Corps Headquarters at 1800 hours, 30 J..ug, there wo.s much hope of ra.pid movement: "If me high ground i\1onteluro and Monte di Pesaro sic is gained tonight, it is tho intention to push on to R. Conco. 11 (Ibid, Serial 1057, dated 30 Lug .44) -

PLANS LIID PATROLS - .11 CDN INF BDE GP, 29-30 ,mG

104. On the strength of the reports by early patrols and other information available to higher formations, both C.B. Highrs and Perth R, were ordered to. stand to during mo night 29/30 l~ug, with a view to infil tro.ting :i.nto the Gothic Line positions during tho short hours of dc.rknoss. Full moon was due on 2 Sep, .so that tho patrols had good light until 0400 hoursn • . The .second group of k Official night was from 2012 to 0600 hours for that night and visibility was good, clouds belng light and high if any. (Vi.D., G.S., H.Q,. 1 Cdn Corps., .Lugust .1944: Appx 89, Int Summary, 26 Aug 44, MeteorolOgical chart) 55 ..

•. ~ , , , , .L ; ' . '!', ' .. . ' ,po.tr,,ols .werf3,' ·however, late returning. The Perth R, gt'oup ropoi0 tod niiries and· obstc.cles bn the roads which they would be using in thair approach to the lateral east of Montecchio itself, The C,B, Highrs -group .!:'lid µot return until 0500 hours, when dn.ylight wo.s n1re'.:1.dy strong, ano:' penetro. tion was abo.nC:.'.Jned in fo.vour of o.n c.sso.ul t wi tl:. ·run·· pre'purution on the night 2/3 Sep., ( Perth R. c.nd C .B, Hit:hrs; 11 11 0LIVE ; for details on the patrols; and 11 Cdn Inf Bde: 1:0LIVE 11 for n,ote ori plan of assault for 2/3 Sop) • Pu trols who cross"od the Montelabbc.te ·- .Montocchio roo.d and tho Montel ::tbbo. t e :.psella le. terc.l saw' no enemy nor came under any fire. They reported oner•:· obstacles on all roads c.pproaching the lo.tor::i.1-northern (:.1ontccchio - Pesaro) with the exceptfon of the one o.long which they rotul'.'ned. This bud apparently ·been l eft clear for the wi thd.rs,-ml of Germo...1'1 vehicles from the urea. Both patrols a lso reported enemy positions on Point 120, but these a ppeo.r ed to be unoccupied , (11 Cdn Inf Bdo, Perth R. and_C.B. Highrs: 11.QLIV~t; W,D ,, C.B. High.rs: i,ugust 1 9 <..hL Appx 9, Pa tr9l Reports)

105, Whether the Germans c.llowed these patro:.s to wend.er 2bout unmolested in hope s of better gr.me or were so .-:'.eep in thei r dug-. outs · to avoid, bombirig that they did not notice six scouts is r..a·0 d t o decide •. : '. Lf!> 'ha s . been noted above, Point 120 ho.d two air o. t ':c,cl-;:s during t;he· morning and the enemy mo.y ho.ve felt quite secure o.gainst infantry· at.tc.cks across the quite obvious bembline o '.!.'ho Lr por-1:·mt -thing ,•is ·tl:l::t t an attack was ordered for the afte;7::,oon of 30 l,.ug 44.:l:, .fhe plan.' c.~lled for Perth R, right to cv.pt;u:re :?oint 111 und oxp::. oic to Point.s 115 and 147 with C.B. Highrs directed similarly on 11 11 P.oints 120 and 136. (See Map C ). 4 P.L,D,G. Bn were to mop up e.n'd .lr .R,C. were in reserve . l Fd Sqn R,C , E. were to prepo.ro cros,sings_ for tanks nnd whee ls. Each forward butt a l ion wos t;o lend witJ:i:•. one ·company up to determine _the nature of the r esistance and prElpare:. t9. .lauric,h 'a battalion o.ttc,ck i f necessary. H Hour WD.S set --·: fqr 17_30 ii,_01:ll'.s and th_e Foglia Rive r was the start line. ( 11 Cdn \,Inf_ !!de: 11 0LIVE_II,~; p. 2; l Cdn Corps Ops Log~ Serial 1061, 30 Au g 44, 11 11 · ll Gdn Ip.f~Plan ,) . 1'6:~-•. ,,;. Lccord1rig .to inf~rmation later obtained from Germ::m sources, the initial penetration of the enemy 1 s outposts in the · i.d.ria.tic;. sector had co. used him considerable uneasiness, o.nd had · .for.'c.ed ··th~, Tenth Lrmy Commander to make further r edistribu+:;ion of. hf s . limited resource s. The 1/1/o.r Dir..ry of tho Armed Forces Hig.'-'l Comniand .revea ls tho.t on 29 ~·.ug the Fuehrer had at last authorized a wi-thdrawal into the 11 Green Lino". But tho move did not provide the Army Commander wt'th a dditiona l strength for: ll.lllong the reasons it was t aken into cons ideration that this would liberate other forces whjch could. be taken into the area of Venice and Istria to cops with possible l andings of the Allies in •these areas .

(1. ttack of Ei~th ,i.rmy in Metuuro River ~·.rea, 2.5/2?_ Au_E, .~4 ) . ------& Rather .exhaustive search of the documents avail able did not dis'.ci'o:Se any actual order for ·this important operation on ii.ny -l e·ye l below Corps Operc', t ion Instruction No .. 25 quotAd above ~· 11 Cdn Inf Bd.e. report sto. tes: 11 It v,o.s de cide d to a ttack forthwith on the previo·usly arranged plan . 11 (11 Co.n 11 Inf Bde? l'OLIVE , p . 2 ) .. The corps narrative states: 11 G,O. C, 5 Cdn i\.rmd"'i5Ivgave 11 Cdn Inf Bde the task of both estc.bJ.i shing 11 11 17 a nd breaking out of the bridgehead. (Corps: 0LI VE , p. -: ) , . • .. , .

- 56 •

107 • f. s to.ff officer of Headquo.rters Tenth :.rmy doscr;l.bes tho grave implications of the situ.s.tion o.nd the mee.sures taken to avert a crisisa The ·perietro.tion of tho Green line in the sector of 71 Inf Div came as a surprise to the .\rmy .- · :.s tho enemy picture appeared on 30 tug, 1 Cdn and 5 Brit Corps had driven c. wedge into the Green line with their strong inner wings, thus achieving a compara­ tively cheap initial success. Even though the enemy dispositions were not as yet determined in detail, it was assumed that he would advance with st°rong o.sso.u forces from the penetration area at oi thor side of Monteccio, by way of Tombo. and tho gerioro.l line Corian·o - Ricci one to Rimini. This line of attack not only coincided with the shortest lino to the main objective, by avoiding tho bulge between fosaro and Cattolica; but the nature of the terrain of.fered an opportunity for the commitment of strong tank forcos, Recognizing ths crisis represented by" the battle, and the grave operational consequences arising there fr for the l.dria tic wing, the l~rmy adopted tho following measures: 76 Corps received orders to narrow the penetration areo. by means ·of a counter-atto.ck by 26 Px Divk, and thereby prevent the enemy from pressin further northwards. For this reason it was important for the Corps to re-establish contact between 26 Pz anc 1 Para Di vs o. t all cos ts o.nd fonn a solid front. On the extreme left wing, the Corps had to conduct operations in such n way tho. t l Para Di,v w.ould not be outmanoeuvred by an enemy thrust through Tomba to Ricci one~ in the triangl.e Tomba ... Pesaro - Ca ttolic;<1-, which jutted out towards the south-east. 73 Corps.ltii was instructed to move 98 Inf Div via Cesena up to 76 Pz Corps in the ares south of Rimini, nnd to place it under command of this corps. The higher artillery commander attached to 76 Corps for the conduct of artillery operations had so to conduct his nrtillery operations, in close co-operation with the formations a 22 Flak Bde, of which, in the zone of 76 Corps, six lig and seven heavy battalions were committed for protectio of artillery positions against air attack, th~t enemy tank attacks across the Tomba area towards the north were dispersed in front of the artillery positions at latest. £ r equest was made to c.-in-c. Italy that 29 Pz Gren D~ be immediately pulled out from the left wing front of Fourteenth Lrrrry, and speedily transferred to the Cesena

At. 26 Pz Div had reinforced 76 Corps on 26 1.ug ( see footnote to para 91) kk 73 Special Service Corps was on the extr eme coast. It comprise 162 (Turk) Div, a badly hit guerilla forma tion 11 fit for defence only", and 98 Inf Div, similarly of low f:i,ghting value, in the Ravenna - Cesena - Cattolica are.a.- · (Pretzell, p.7) .... 57 -.

area •....Tho Lrrny put forwc.rd tho propos2.l that 29 Pz Gron Di:v bEt reple,ced by 334 Irif Div, which was ccimmi ttod in the right 1?ector of' tho :.rmy w1th 51 Mtn Corps. Li'ter this -request· hb.d been approved, 51 l\Itn Corps rocei ved instructions to speed up the relie f' movement 'by .noving .tpe. i'ighting elements of tho divisions in emergency motor transport. . (Protzell, German _\ccount of tho Bc,ttle of' Rimini, Pol4 108. Bof'ore describing the action to be conducted by 11 Cdn Inf Bdo it is nocessarrJ to have a clear picture of the ground into which 5 Cdn :.rmd Div were attc.cking. L lo,terr:G road ran on each side of the Foglia Vc.lloy, which at Afontocchio was o.bout a mile ~ v1ido. The 12,nd between these 1atorc,ls was flo.t flood plain with only the cover provided by vines an.d the fruit treos which hold up tho vines. All large'trees ho.d 900n cut down by the Germans and mines had been extensively sown throughout tho flats. An anti­ tank: ditch ran just south of the northern lc.teral from Montecc'hio oc:st to 0steric. Nuovo. West of Montocchio the stoop sides of tho valley mo.de an offoctivo tank obstaclo. North of tho lo.teral tho . . ground rose steeply into a series of brokon low hills, which f'ormod the irrogular fingers of the inebrio. ted star fish wh]. ch was the ivlontoluro -:- 'I'ombs. di ·Pe saro f'eo. ture. This obstacle, which rose to its highest point at i\'ionteluro ( 289 metres), lay across the a xis of l cdn· Corps o.nd was divided be t ween 1 cdn· ·rnf Div and 5 Cdn i,rmd Div for the -8.ssault. Monteluro itscli' was in the 1 Cdn Inf' Div lane but from this pe~ck south-west ran a ridge which stretched right across 5 -Div 1 s c·.dvanco into 5 Gorps area, to merge into tho Monte Gridolf'o 'featuro. From east to .wost o.long this ridge lay Point 253 .(008795); a strongly dug-in position, covering tho best roo.ds c.nd, Monte Mc.rrone (992772), o. lower and l oss strongly protected point. Tho town of Tomba di Pesaro rode the crest of a spur which ran north-v;est from end was commo.ndod by Point 253. · 109. From this cross ridge ( Point 253 to Monte Mecrrono) two minor ri9-ges ran down towards the Foglia River. The first of thoso loft the po.rent ridge at Point 253, ro.n south-wost for about a mile, then broke up into throe spurs which pushed down to tho northern later£1.l, c,11 east of Montecchio. The ea.stern most of' these spurs rari into the 1 Cdn Inf Div aroo. and onded at Borgos. Maria.- The central spur wees a minor one with its tip on the lo.toral between Borgo and 0storic, Nuovo. Tho right hand spur was longer and more irregular, reaching tho lateral just cast of' Montoccpio, Its· dominating features wore Points 147 (013759) and 115 ( 016760). Between these spurs ·wore the vo.lleys of seasonal . water courses which ran only for the removal of surface water and -woro dry at this time. Tho second minor ridge left the cross ridge r,bout a mile west of Mon.to Marrone and pushed west-south-west toward Montecchio. It. w.as narrow and steep-sided and culminated in c. sharp promontory over 100 metres hif;h which overlooked the lo.toral just west of the town. Its high point (006750) was 120 notros above sea level, and, that number b ecame-accepted as the name for the whole feature, which w2-s strongly fortified and had a field of fire of over 200 degrees, con1112anding tho flats and tho draws on either ·side, .. Point 120 lay so close to the 5 Corps boundary that an attack from the ].ef't ·.f.lank vms not considered by 5 Cdn l,rmd -Di v. .

110. :.lthough in this se,c.t~on of Ito.ly the rulo was that roo.ds climbed the ridges rather than i'ollowing the draws, the only good road in tho 5 Cdn Armd Div lane ran up the valley from Montecchio. :. very seconda.;rr.r track rem up the eastern spur, mentioned in the preceeding paragraph, practically due north but completely commanded by Point 120. This eminence was obviously the koy to the s i tua ti on. Once it was to.ken the left flank of the J 1/

- 58 -

division would. bo secure, an· excollont roo.d would be o.vailo.blo, o.nd the approc-.ches to Monte Marrone and even to Point 253 would be under observation and could bo covered by direct fire. But Point 120 could not be attacked frontally with armour: it was much too steep, its approc.ches were well covered by fire and tank · ··· - ~-- -· ~·-·•~- -- ~ 6bi1tn.cl0s flnd r:1ino·s and demolitions ho.d boon si tod with Prussion thoroughness. Although Brigadier I.s. Johnston, Commander 11 Cdn ' .Inf Bde Gp, in £m appreciation of tho brigade objocti vo hc.d , r0conm1anded a night at tack by inf an try ( W. D., H.Q,. 11 Gdn Inf Bdo, .,ugust 1944: l~ppx. 7), but the Corps CorrunD.ndor' s orders for brittgeheads to be established for both divisions to advance through at first light on tho 31st, resulted in tho task being o.ttompted in dc.ylight, four and a half hours after the cossatiiin of air bombardment, and without previous artillery preparation •

,~SSL.ULT OF PERTH R. f.ND C ,B. HIGHRS, 30 l\.UG 44

111. ,\t 1730 hours tho Perth R. sent 11 B 11 Coy over tho Foglia from their crossing in front of Montelabbate an·d up the road which skirts the east end of the landing field and reaches the northern lateral about 200 yards east of Montecchio. Their Rep-0rt on Operations states-: 11 We had been led to believe that the enemy had 11 withdrawn from the features behind Montecchio ,_ and tho advance was made with little attempt at concealment. The enemy taok no action Ull the loading platoon ho.d reached the lateral, when mortar, M.G. and rifle fire were brought to boar. This appoo.rod to come from the Unit objective, Point 111, (009755) on tho tip of the eastern spur, which was not more thun 300 yards north of the road. The enemy fire was so effective that neither manoeuvre nor return fire was possible. J,rtillery support which came in response to call was reported o.s ineffective, which well it might - 11 be against troops dug in on the slope of a ridge. (Perth R.: "OLIVE , p.1), The forward company was finally withdro.wn to the river w'fie're' a new plan was preparedM. ·

112. This time ilD 11 Coy vdth n,1. 11 Sqn of · 5 Cdn t.rmd Regt in' support advanced to the lateral as light faded. The armour had been delayed crossing the Foglia because of a sorious jam vihich developed when 3 Cdn Armd Reece Regt was allowed to enter the forward area and was given priority so as to be in position for a breakthrough, This was mistaken by the provost to mean priority over vehicles of 11 Cdn Inf Bde Gp and the supporting arms of c.B. Highrs and Ir R.c. were seriously delayed. However, spillover areas for the G.G.H,G, were found and

la. W.D., 17 Cdn Fd Regt R.c.J,., 30 Lug 44, reports only harassing fire tasks during the evening of the attack. 11 Cdn Fd Regt · R.C.1~. report a small fire plan for 11 Cdn Inf Bde at 1730 hours and harassing tasks.

kJl The 11 Cdn Inf Bde Operations Log for that afte:r'noon reports only a call for a D.F. task at scale 5 which appears to have been relayed via the wireless set of C.B. Highrs, the Perth R. set , having been destroyed and its operator killed when the enemy first opened fire, 1 Cdn Corps Operations Log for tho same day notes the same request and nttributes it to C.B. Highrs. - 59 -

for:ward .movement continued, The to.nks 1c.nd M-lOs crossing in the ·dc..rkness took the wrong route after crossing the river und were stopped in a minefield, from here they were able to support the attack with long range fire, but were unable to give intimuto supp~rt, Thoy wore hot extricated from this position until first light. · 11 11 ( 11 Cdn Inf Bde: _2~ , p,3) The Perth R. report on operations speaks chiefly of the activities of the infantry 11 supported11 by t.::.nks, so it may be assumed that the tanks did not reach the latorC'.l roc.d thut night. 5 Cdn :.rmd Regt report giving supporting fire from Casa Ciccolini (015747) about hc.lf o. mile south-wost of Montecchio, aiming directly at tho flc.\shos of enemy machine-guns not · only on Point 111, but on Point 115 on the right, 2.nd on Point 120 above Montecchio. The infantry wore again not molested until they reached the laterul, but this time they wero able to got c.head under covering fire and in the dusk of the summer evening. Point 111 was cloared and consolidr. ted by 2300 hours and tho troops hr,stily and wisely dug in, ( Perth R, and 5 Cdn Lrmd Regt: 11~ 11 )

113, . ir.t, 11 Coy ·now passed through "D 11 Coy and proceeded along tho northern slope of the feature to take Point 147 from tho rear. ;,1.G. positions there were all siti:::d to stop o.n s.ttuck .from the lo.teral or up the draw between Points 147 and 115, and any such attempt which would ha:ve· led into c. death trap, When 11 C11 Coy tried to get across this draw to tdco Point 115 tr..ey mot such hec.vy .fire th8:t they were forced to pull be.ck over the ridge c.nd dig in with 11 11 11:. 11 Coy. 11B 11 Coy hc.d meanwhile joined D Coy on Point 111 and tho whole lower spur wt,s firmly consolidc'.tod, Point 115 was finally to.ken by troops of the P.P.C.D,I. nt 1330 hours, 31 :_ug. (See 11 11 pnralrobolow) (Perth R.: 0LIVE ; 1 Cdn Corps Ops !1ioss2.ge Log, Serial 1130, 31 !,ug 44) • - 114, Moa:nWhile the C.B, High.rs wore having o. difficult time 11 11 trying to clear Point 120, Their loadin,r,, company, B 1 o.dvo.nced without intorforonce along tho routes taken by the patrols that morning, end one plo.toon was oven nllowod to got up on tho ridge above Montecchio before tho onomy acted, Thon v.utornc,tic .fire ~nd a shnrp countor-attc.ck drove the Highlanders back to tho 1•uins of Montocchio where they ley pinned for some time, 111. 11 Coy wo.s then brought forward and endeavoured to pass to the left of 11 B 11 Coy but crune under hco.vy cross fire on tho lateral road, · Hore o.gain it wc.s evident thc.t the German positions were supporting one another, for this company suffered casualties from M.G, fire from Point 111 which hr,d not yet been captured by the Perths. Smoko was brought down to stop this mutual support, and under its cover tho forward companies ·of C .B, High.rs wore wi thdravm to the north .bank of the Foglia whoro the rest of the battalion hud been concontrat<,d, about 1200 yards south-west of the town, From this base a two-company attack WHS launched at 0100 hours on the 31st co-ordinated with a. heavy fire progrrunmc le.id on tho ·feature by field ·a:rt1llcry, M-l•s, ta.nks, c.nd Vi ckors, 5 Cdn f.rmd Regt reported the. t owing to_ the bright moonlight thoy were able to continue thoir covering fire until the infantry were very closo to their objocti ve. But again fixed fire from o.utomectic wenpons mo.de the 1n tere.l ond tho slopes of Point 120 utterly untenable and 11 11 11 tho assaulting companies, 1- 11 and D , wore forced to \vithdr<-'.W to the firm bo..se on tho river, counting casualties of one officer o.nd - 62 othor r.anks - o.n oxponsivo evening. (C.B. Highrs and 5 Cdn Lrmd 11 Regt: 11 0LIV:E ) • The brigade oper::. tion to secure a br1dgehoo.d had been only partly successful. ;_1 tbough Perth R. had secured o. foothold on the forward slopos of the high ground north of Ostoria Nuovo, Montecchio wc.s to require further tre;.itmont at tho hands of 11 Cdn Inf Bdc.