E PERlE E OF A LIFETI E People, Personalities and Leaders in the First World War
Edited by John Crawford, David Littlewood & James Watson
\
MASSEY~· UNIVERSITY PRESS MASSEY ~ ~~~~~RSITY j ~ I CONTENTS
First published in 2016 by Massey University Press Introduction David Littlewood 8 Massey University Press, Private Bag 102904 North Shore Mail Centre, Auckland 0745, New Zealand www.masseypress.ac.nz II HIGH COMMAND EXPERIENCES II
Text copyright © individual authors as credited, 2016 CHAPTERl Images copyright as credited 1915: The Search for Solutions Hew Strachan Design by Kate Barraclough 14 Cover photograph by Ish Doney, showing diaries from the First World War, courtesy of Alexander Turnbull Library CHAPTER2
The moral right of the authors, illustrators and photographers The Road Not Taken: Churchill, Kitchener and Alexandretta has been asserted James Watson 32 All rights reserved. Except as provided by the Copyright Act 1994, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or CHAPTER3 introduced into a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or Ottoman Third Corps in Crisis: Esat Pasha by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording Mesut Uyar or otherwise) without the prior written permission of both the 43 copyright owner(s) and the publisher.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the National II SOLDIERS' EXPERIENCES • Library of New Zealand CHAPTER4 Printed and bound in New Zealand by Printlink The New Zealand Soldier of the First World War 1914-15: Johnny Enzed ISBN: 978-0-99413-001-3 GlynHarper EISBN: 978-o-99413-254-3 62
New Zealand MASSEY DEFENCE UNIVERSITY W. H. OLIVER HUMANITIES FORCE CHAPTERS RESEARCH ACADEMY A Prince of Riflemen: Jesse Wallingford at Gallipoli John Crawford \ This volume of the First World War Centenary History was made possible by the generous 83 support of theW. H. Oliver Humanities Research Academy of Massey University, the New Zealand Defence Force and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. CHAPTER6 CHAPTER 12 A Leader in the Making: Major Lindsay Inglis Kiwis Rising: New Zealanders and the War in the Air Nathalie Philippe Simon Moody 102 194
CHAPTER13 •IMPERIAL EXPERIENCES • 'As for Sacrifice .. .':The Royal Naval Motor Boat Patrol Peter Dennerly CHAPTER 7 211 'The Finest Type of Coloured Men': Indians' and New Zealanders' Encounters on Gallipoli Peter Stanley ·EXPERIENCES BEHIND 120 THE FRONT LINE •
CHAPTERS CHAPTER 14 Neither Natural-born British Subjects Nor Aliens: Chronicler of the Front Line: Clutha Nantes Mackenzie Indians in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force Carolyn Carr Michael Roche and Sita Venkateswar 232 138 CHAPTER15 CHAPTER 9 Sketching New Zealand's War: Hero of Fiji as a Soldier of France: Ratu Sukuna William Blomfield and the New Zealand Observer He1ene Goiran Steven Loveridge 153 249
CHAPTER 16 ·EXPERIENCES IN THE AIR AND AT SEA • 'God is on Our Side': Chaplain Colonel (William) John Aldred Luxford CHAPTER 10 Zane Kidd From Artilleryman to Airman: Keith Park 268 Adam Claasen 166 Endnotes 291 Contributors 336 CHAPTER 11 '\J Acknowledgements 341 'Pretty Small Potatoes': John Slessor in Darfur and on Index 342 the Western Front Katherine Moody 183 overthrown following the appearance of a British fleet at Constantinople was CHAPTER 3 certainly not absurd, given the recent history of such governments, though nor was it as inevitable as he made out. The problem was that a way through formidable defences had to be negotiated in the Dardanelles before the fleet reached Constantinople, and the difficulties posed by this were never properly investigated before the campaign was launched and the British Empire's reputation committed by Churchill. Whether success at Alexandretta would have overthrown the Ottoman government cannot be guaranteed either, but it certainly would have inflicted a crushing strategic defeat on that government by transforming the military OTTOMAN THIRD situation in the Levant and Mesopotamia. The loss of most of the Ottoman Empire's remaining territory, and in particular of control over Islam's three CORPS IN CRISIS holiest sites- Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem- would likely have spelled an end to the existing government in Constantinople. In addition to the horrendous Esat Pasha human and material costs of Gallipoli for the Entente, and not least New Zealand, we need to factor in the opportunity cost of the cancelled landing at Alexandretta that the safe pessimist Kitchener had favoured. 23 MESUT UYAR
or most contemporary observers, veterans and modern scholars, the turning point of the Gallipoli campaign was, undoubtedly, the 25 April landings at Anzac, Helles and Kumkale. Speculation about opportunities lost and 'what ifs' still haunt the literature. Therefore, it is no surprise that so \ many books and articles have been published about the landings and the roles played by various Allied and Ottoman commanders. However, we still know very little about some key players, chief amongst them the Ottoman Third Army Corps commander, Brigadier General Esat Pasha. Although the word 'forgotten' is used with unnecessary frequency in association with various military events or personalities, in this instance it is the best adjective to describe the lack of current scholarship on Esat Pasha. Esat Pasha was the operational commander of all Ottoman Army units defending the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April. In addition, he was well known and respected within Ottoman military circles. He was the hero of Janina's defence during the Balkan wars, and also a famous military intellectual and army trainer. Not only was he acting commander-in-chief of the Ottoman military during the First World War, but also most of the field-level officers,
42 E X P E R I E N C E 0 F A L I F E T I M E 43 including Mustafa Kemal (Atati.irk), were his former students. So his absence within the English and Turkish literature is very surprising. In comparison, we know a great deal about the role played by major figures like Mustafa Kemal and Liman von Sanders, or even some minor figures like ~efik Aker. This chapter focuses on Esat Pasha on 25 April1915, because doing so helps us understand not only the Ottoman war machine, its strengths and failures, but also the army corps' structural problems during the First World War.
sat Pasha's personality and military background, while complex, were not extraordinary at the time.' He was born in Janina (now Ioannina in Greece) in 1862, the scion of an aristocratic family, and entered Kuleli Military High School in 1880. 2 Although he was very clever and had a good education, he failed in his first year because of h!l; poor Turkish language skills. At that time the medium of communication in Janina was Greek, even for Muslims, so he had to work hard to speak fluent Turkish. From the beginning, Esat Pasha was serious about the military profession, and did not take this failure lightly. It taught him a life-long lesson not to underestimate anything. He worked hard and graduated at the top of his class from the Imperial Military Academy in 1887. His military education continued at the General Staff College, and he again graduated at the top of his class, in 1890, whereupon he was selected for practical training in Germany, spending four years in different Alsatian and Prussian units and headquarters. He made full use of this chance and, instead of simply enjoying his stay, worked even harder, learning to speak German fluently, albeit with a thick Schwabisch accent. His Schwabisch (Swabian) German was a matter of continuous annoyance to German officers, and even Kaiser Wilhelm II once complained about it. 3 Upon Esat Pasha's return to the Ottoman Empire in 1894, he was assigned to the General Staff Intelligence Division. Although a bright staff officer, he apparently disliked working at the general staff, and preferred to transfer to the c less prestigious position of a professorship at the Imperial Military Academy. .~ c He shortly became the dean of academics and stayed in this position, except ~ for a brief interval, until1906. He excelled in this demanding but essentially b career-stopping job, and gained the honorific title of 'teacher of the teachers' ~ ::J (hocalann hocasl). Although a demanding and rigorous teacher, Esat Pasha's u0 enlightened approach to military education was instrumental in gaining the Brigadier General Esat Pasha, painted by Wilhelm Victor Krausz. respect of young Ottoman officers. Most of the high- and medium-ranking
OTTOMAN THIRD CORPS IN CRISIS 45 .....------
officers of the First World War were his previous students.4 he was assigned one idiosyncratic staff job after another. His sturdiness and Esat Pasha had a late introduction to the realities of the Ottoman Army unquestioning loyalty finally paid off when he was assigned commander of during the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897. He was chief of staff of the 1" Infantry the 5th Division in Gallipoli in December 1910, and then of the Second Army Division, which was attached to the independent Janina Army Corps. While the Corps in Tekirdag (Rodosto) three monJ;hs later. He spent barely a year in this Ottoman Army enjoyed easy victories on the main front, Thessaly, the Janina position before being assigned to his hometown, Janina, to command the 23'd Corps faced all of the army's structural problems. An unexpected Greek assault Division. He did not complain, but went to all these postings loyally and tried on 18 April dislocated the corps and caused the defeat of the 2nd Division in his best under intense political pressure and a lack of job security. As it turned Louros. Although the Ottoman units regained confidence and recaptured the out, all these assignments gave him military expertise regarding Gallipoli and lost ground in two weeks, their commanders learnt about the unreliability of the surrounding area. local recruits and the natural advantages the Greeks had in this region. Esat While Esat Pasha was shifted from one role to another, the political Pasha, being a native, gained valuable experience that would give him a big changes provided opportunities for the new military leadership to implement advantage later on.5 radical reforms. The new chief of the general staff, Ahmed izzet Pasha, initiated Surprisingly, in an army in which personality and connections rather than a fundamental reorganisation in 1910, the pillar of which was the triangular professional expertise were valued, his achievements in military education division concept. This involved replacing the well-established square division gained the attention of Sultan Abdtilhamid II and his Ottoman and German structure (two brigades each with two regiments) with a division composed military advisers. Esat Pasha was promoted to major general in 1901 and of three regiments each with three battalions, which eliminated both brigade lieutenant general in 1906. One year later he became acting commander headquarters and a regiment. Although the number of regiments was reduced, of the Third Army in Salonika. Most probably his strong sense of duty and combat strength was preserved by the addition of an organic field artillery unquestioned loyalty played an important role in this assignment. regiment, machine-gun companies and a better command-and-control system. From the perspectives of career and military socialisation in the Ottoman This was an innovation born out of discussions in Germany around 1900, but Army, Esat Pasha lacked two important qualifications. As a junior officer he had not military conservatism prevented the German Army from practising this idea served with the counter-insurgency units in Macedonia or in the predominantly until1915. Interestingly, the concept strongly influenced some Ottoman officers Arab provinces. This meant that he had practically no unconventional warfare who were receiving practical training in German units at that time. experience, which, although it was to be an advantage during both the Balkan The introduction of triangular divisions started a chain reaction. The wars and the First World War, was a big shortcoming at this stage. Secondly, he Ottoman Army previously had not had an army corps echelon, with the term stayed away from politics and all of the secret organisations conspiring against 'army corps' being used for two or three divisional groups without standing the Sultan's authoritarian regime, even though his brother Vehib (Ka~i) was corps staff and corps units. Therefore, not only were the field armies bulky and one of the ringleaders of the Committee of Union and Progress {CUP, ittihad ve clumsy, but they were also incapable of providing command, control, combat Terakki). The Third Army was the nerve centre of the CUP, which was conspiring support and combat service support to their divisions. Much-needed army corps to de-throne Abdtilhamid and restore constitutional monarchy. Contrary to the headquarters were established (also triangular, and each with three divisions Sultan's expectation, Esat Pasha remained aloof from government efforts to and additional support units) on 8 January 1911. The new corps headquarters combat and prosecute partisan officers. Not surprisingly, he was sacked and would get its personnel and corps units from the abolished brigade echelon placed under surveillance a year later. and field armies.6 Although the conspirators successfully carried out their much-anticipated Regrettably, based in part on the half-digested theory, neither Ahmed rebellion and forced the Sultan to accept their demands, Esat Pasha did not izzet Pasha nor his fellow general staff officers paid enough attention to receive any benefit. He was treated as a functionary of the old regime, and was personnel, doctrinal, firepower and technical issues. Organisational issues unfairly demoted to brigadier general. Unlike the other high-ranking generals, - such as how to man new staff positions, combat support and combat he did not either resign or flatter the CUP leadership. Accordingly, for two years service support systems; writing new operational and tactical doctrines;
46 EXPERIENCE OF A LIFETIME OTTOMAN THIRD CORPS IN CRISIS 47 - creating communication lines; assigning responsibilities; and acquiring attacks for three more months behind the fortifications of Janina. Ultimately, new weapon systems - received neither the attention nor the funds they lack of provisions, ever-increasing casualty numbers and a rebellious civilian deserved. Moreover, this radical transformation needed time to settle, and population decided Esat Pasha's fate. He surrendered to Greek Crown Prince the Ottoman Empire was seriously lacking time. The Italian-Ottoman War of Konstantin on 6 March 1913. When Esat Pasha began surrender negotiations in 1911 and the Balkan wars caught the Ottoman Army in a state of anarchy, with Greek, Konstantin, highly embarrassed, asked him to speak in French due to his units desperately floundering to catch up with deadlines and mobilisation. own inadequate Greek. 10 The officers, who were unfamiliar with the triangular division concept, were Esat Pasha gained an insight into modern warfare in this campaign, neither capable of establishing command and control and communication coming to realise the importance of defence and the problems of a poorly lines nor able to adjust combat support and combat service support units prepared offensive. He also developed his cautious approach to combat. He accordingly. Consequently, the triangular concept became the linchpin of the believed that lives were expendable only for essential and concrete results. Balkan defeats.7 He learnt the importance of leadership under very demanding conditions in which the discipline of the whole army simply collapsed. The Ottoman Army was experiencing serious birth pains, and partisan officers had destroyed all he First Balkan War began in October 1912, and saw the countries of the vestiges of obedience and loyalty. In most cases, the army was not an army any Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia) attack the more, but rather a horde. The defence of Janina was one of the few bright spots Ottoman Empire's European territories. After the mobilisation decree, in this otherwise disastrous and humiliating episode. Esat Pasha became the Esat Pasha was assigned to command the newly activated independent Janina hero of millions while still a prisoner of war. It was the brightest moment of his Army Corps. He was instructed to defend Janina province at all costs, with military career. two divisions (the 23rd and Janina Reserve Division), the Janina fortress and The defeat was so great that it profoundly depressed the officer corps, various small border and gendarmerie units under his command. Although the forcing them to discuss publicly their concerns about the apparent weakness Ottoman public and military entered the war with high expectations, Esat Pasha of the army, its obvious incapacity to defend the empire, and the range of was pessimistic. He knew that the Greek Army had an enormous advantage. potential scenarios it faced. One outcome of this soul-searching was that The Christian population was actively asking for Greek occupation, whereas the officers published their experiences and thoughts, and every publication Muslim Albanians preferred to wait and see without committing themselves. immediately led to new discussions and publications.11 Not surprisingly, the personnel and logistical mobilisation went badly. 8 Esat Pasha followed these discussions closely, but rather than sharing his Under these adverse conditions, Esat Pasha organised his limited forces well experiences and thoughts with the public, he wrote detailed reports and even and, instead of waiting for the enemy at the fortress, devised an active defence handed his memoirs to the Ministry of War. He returned from captivity in plan to make use of geography. He kept the Greek Epirus Army at bay for a December 1913. He did not receive any credit for his heroic defence of Janina, month with constant counter-attacks, while improving the weak fortifications and barely saved himself from a large-scale purge. Enver Pasha, the new ofJanina.9 Unfortunately, Ottoman armies suffered humiliating defeats in other minister of war and chief of the general staff, believed that the coming war theatres, and the Greek Army captured Salonika easily, thereby reinforcing would be a young man's war; as a consequence many high -ranking officers were the Epirus Army. Against all odds, Esat Pasha achieved a remarkable fighting purged from the military under the pretext of incompetence or old age. Others retreat, which lasted two months, towards Janina. In the meantime he skilfully were assigned to prestigious, but essentially meaningless, positions away from drew divisions and regiments from the disintegrating Ottoman Western Army. any military influence. Esat Pasha, somehow, managed to get assigned to the Despite combat casualties and increasing numbers of desertions, he quadrupled Third Army Corps, which had been moved to Tekirdag. 12 his manpower from 5500 to 25,500 - an amazing achievement during the The Third Corps was the only corps that emerged from the war more or less worst chaos the empire had experienced. With no hope of further relief forces, intact and with very good conduct. But Esat Pasha was quick to discover that he and with increasing unrest within the local population, he withstood Greek still needed to address numerous issues. His staff was weak and dysfunctional,
48 EXPERIENCE OF A LIFETIME OTTOMAN THIRD CORPS IN CRISIS 49 -- and his chief of staff, German Lieutenant Colonel Perrinet von Thauvenay, was including Mustafa Kemal. But the general staff once again intervened and neither a particularly competent staff officer nor gifted with great intelligence. exchanged two regiments (55th and 56th) of this brand-new division with others Moreover, von Thauvenay's relations with his Ottoman colleagues were strained (72nct and 77th) from Syria. Esat Pasha stoically accepted these orders and raised at best, and his tendency towards alcoholism caused embarrassment within the new units from scratch.'5 German Military Mission. Despite this, Esat Pasha tried to make use of him and Esat Pasha's record of preparing his corps for war becomes clearer when other problematic individuals. Esat Pasha was a demanding commander, but he the performances of the other units are taken into account. The Third Corps also believed in giving second chances. Unfortunately, von Thauvenay did not was the only corps that completed its mobilisation on time, and the only corps grasp his second chance effectively and had to be transferred. His replacement, that successfully activated combat service support units, including supply Lieutenant Colonel Fahrettin, was also not known for his intellect but was loyal trains.'6 Previous conflicts had established a pattern in which the empire's and hardworking. Most importantly for Esat Pasha, Fahrettin had very good enemies tried to force the Dardanelles Straits in order to dictate terms to relations with almost all of the divisional and regimental commanders, most of the Ottoman government. The general staff identified the most vulnerable whom had been his classmates or were acquaintances.13 parts of the empire as its capital, Constantinople, and the straits. Therefore, Esat Pasha brought personal qualities to the role of corps commander according to the mobilisation plan, the Third Corps was tasked with reinforcing which made him very popular with the officers and men. His style of command the Gallipoli Peninsula and Asian coastline against a possible enemy landing. was different from the rest: he thought his job was to lead and train, not push The Dardanelles Fortified Zone Command was in charge of the naval defence and punish. Although no general was prepared for the tactical realities of the and preparations against landings. As a result of this arrangement, only the First World War, Esat Pasha had learnt by experience the deadly combination 9th Division was initially placed under the command of the fortified zone of fortification, barbed wire, machine guns and artillery. Old-style frontal and deployed to perform its task. The Third Corps remained on high alert to attacks were futile against prepared defence lines. Furthermore, such attacks reinforce the defence of Tekirdag until the proclamation of war. Esat Pasha led to unnecessary casualties, which were harmful to morale. quickly moved his headquarters and units to the Dardanelles.'7 Esat Pasha disseminated the lessons of the Balkan wars to his officers Defending the peninsula proved to be Esat Pasha's greatest professional and soldiers, who were anxious to learn. Above all, he was an excellent judge challenge. Nevertheless, he enthusiastically got into planning. Cevat Bey, of men. He did not hesitate to spend time in identifying, encouraging and commander of the fortified zone, and his staff were very bitter about promoting able officers. Similarly, he dismissed those who were of no use. At relinquishing the responsibility of defending against landings, and saw the the same time he had to cope with a good deal of improvisation as a result of division oflabour as detrimental to the integrity of the plan. For over a century acute shortages of pretty much everything. Esat Pasha paid special attention the Dardanelles region had been under the control of the fortress artillery to every logistical and administrative problem, and conducted frequent branch, and it had defended the straits against Italian naval attacks during the inspections, popping up anywhere at any time. By the power of example he Ottoman-Italian War of 1911. Although a composite army corps was activated to achieved remarkable results.'4 defend the Gallipoli Peninsula during the Balkan wars of 1912-13, the fortified Regrettably, his success turned into his nemesis. The general staff tended zone command continued its supremacy. This time, however, the enemy did to use the Third Corps as a kind of depot for rapid-reaction forces or stopgap not attack from the sea but from the land, which caused radical changes to the measures. When, in the Arabian Peninsula, Ibn Saud ofNajd threatened security defence plan. It was not surprising therefore that they regarded themselves as around Basra province, a crack battalion from the 26th Regiment was hurriedly the real military owner of this defence. dispatched. It was supposed to be a temporary mission, but the battalion never Esat Pasha approached the problem diplomatically. After several meetings returned. Most damagingly, during the early days of the mobilisation the whole with the staff of the fortified zone command, he approved the old defence plan, gth Division was reassigned to Syria. Esat Pasha activated the 19th Division from in which all units placed their main bodies near the possible landing sites and the depot regiments in record time. He managed to convince the Ministry kept small reserves in the interior. The fortified zone command expected the of War to assign young but bright general staff officers to man this division, main attacks to come at the southern tip of the peninsula (Cape Helles) and
50 EXPERIENCE OF A LIFETIME OTTOMAN THIRD CORPS IN CRISIS 51 Kabate, because only these two areas posed an immediate danger to the strait's defences. Unfortunately, the fortifications were mostly unfinished, due to shortages of materials and manpower.'8 The fortified zone command successfully defended the straits against the British-French armada with the help of German advisers on 18 March 1915. Nevertheless, instead of enjoying the victory, the Ottoman high command was frightened by the increased prospect of an amphibious operation, and decided to deploy more units and activate the Fifth Army to take command. Liman von Sanders was assigned to command the Fifth Army on 26 March.'9 After a brief inspection, von Sanders disregarded the advice of the fortified zone command and disbanded the old defence system. He categorically rejected the Ottoman plan and its assumptions as unsuitable for defence against modern amphibious warfare. Von Sanders declared that units would place an observation and screening force overseeing the beaches and maintain the main bodies as mobile reserves. Moreover, he identified the Bolayrr (Bulair) region, Be§ige, and possibly Saros, as the probable main landing sites. He distributed all of his troops in two-division groupings around this defence area. Moreover, he granted no initiative to corps and division commanders. His operational order contained strict clauses that severely restricted any move without his personal authorisation.zo While von Sanders had a high regard for Turkish soldiers, he had a very low regard for the Turkish officer corps. He regarded them as unreliable, and poor in the field of applied military sciences. He rarely relied on his Turkish subordinates and refused to alter his orders even under severe circumstances; he preferred to see the conditions with his own eyes before making any adjustments. Moreover, although he had great respect for Esat Pasha, he saw the corps as a simple postbox, basically an unnecessary and duplicating link between him and the divisions. He treated Weber, Fifteenth Corps' commanding general, more harshly and sacked him later. Although coercion and fear were essential elements of the command culture of the. time, the Ottoman officers hated the brute application of c discipline by a foreign general. Von Sanders simply lacked the tact to keep 0 ~ coercion implicit. His command style and the drastic changes he initiated 0 u were instrumental in creating confusion and widespread hostility.21 l'l ·~ So, just a month before the 25 April landings, there were complicated 0. ·"'0 and volatile relations between the commanding officers. This incendiary ~ atmosphere damaged the decision-making process and undermined faith in <( the defence concept. At this time the presence of Esat Pasha became crucial; Lieutenant General Lim an von Sanders, commander of the Ottoman Fifth Army.
52 E X P E R I E N C E 0 F A L I F E T I M E he not only managed to build working relations with von Sanders, but was also (Auftragstalaik) system, an important principle of which is to never hesitate to able to retain his subordinates' respect and obedience. act in the case of a command void. Therefore, Halil Sami and Mustafa Kemal both decided to take the initiative, but they acted completely differently. Halil Sami was the commander whose regiments had confronted the enemy landings uring the early hours of 25 April, the first warnings of an impending at Helles and Anzac. Unable to figure out the enemy's intentions, and confused landing reached the command centres. Initially, Halil Sami, by conflicting reports of landings and enemy sightings, he let his subordinate commander of the 9th Division, evaluated the sightings as a mere commanders react to the developing situation, and only asked that Mustafa naval demonstration and did not react. However, when the actual landings Kemal send one of his battalions to reinforce his battalion at Anzac. materialised, messages from frontline units began to choke the communication Twenty-seventh Regiment commander ~efik (Aker), whose 2nd Battalion lines. Thanks to the initial inaction and misreading of the situation, only four was facing the Anzac landings, decided to move against this landing after platoons were at Anzac Cove and a battalion at Helles to face the first waves getting authorisation from Halil Sami. Mustafa Kemal also identified the Anzac of the landing.22 In an increasing state of emergency, Fifth Army headquarters landing as the most dangerous; instead of sending the requested battalion, he had almost no first-hand sense of where the actual landings were. Von Sanders, decided to move with a whole regiment. He alerted his other two regiments and who had already been fixed on Bolay1r and Saros, confidently rushed to the rushed towards Anzac, without getting authorisation from his superiors. The Bolay1r fortifications, leaving most of his staffbehind.23 other regiment commanders of the 9th Division coordinated their actions and Esat Pasha, in contrast, took his time and patiently evaluated the moved against the landings around Helles. 26 increasingly urgent reports so that he could determine the real landing sites When Esat Pasha arrived at his new command post - after losing nearly and respond accordingly. After discussing the situation with his division half a day - he discovered that his subordinates had already committed commanders and staff, he came to the conclusion that his worst fears had themselves. It was a surprise, but not a big one. He was an ardent believer in been realised and that the enemy's main effort must be at Anzac or Helles. 24 mission command, and he sincerely believed that his division and regiment Esat Pasha's task was not easy: he had to manage von Sanders, who mistrusted commanders would have a better understanding of the tactical situations in Ottoman officers, and also his independent-minded subordinates, so that there their areas. So instead of intervening, he decided to monitor his subordinates would be no infighting. Instead of giving clear orders to Halil Sami and Mustafa closely and intervene when necessary by establishing an effective grip over Kemal, the 9th and 19th Division commanders respectively, however, he decided them. For example, on his arrival he discovered that Mustafa Kemal had to go to Bolay1r. This was his first big mistake. mistakenly ordered the 72nd Regiment to Kumtepe, based on a misleading Esat Pasha needed the ability and courage to influence or even force von report of enemy landing. He immediately recognised that there was no landing Sanders to respond to the realities on the ground, but his senses of loyalty and at Kumtepe and ordered the regiment back. 27 Esat Pasha informed von Sanders obedience to his superior made him reluctant to confront von Sanders. Instead, about developments, persuaded him to continue the defence as it was, and he expressed his opinion politely and asked for the release of the 19th Division asked for reinforcements.28 and heavy artillery. Von Sanders was unreceptive to any polite advice at this Then came his second big mistake: underestimating the danger posed stage; dangerously overconfident about the superiority of his own defence plan, at Helles. Mustafa Kemal's decision to commit his division at Anzac, and he refused to comprehend the gravity of the situation. He continued to wait for continuous reports coming from this region, overshadowed the real threat there. a main landing at Bolay1r for two more days- well after the Allied plans were In contrast, Halil Sami was paralysed and had lost touch with his subordinates. laid bare - and dismissed all the other landings as elements of an elaborate In most cases he let them do what they wanted; in the rare cases when he ruse. Esat Pasha only managed to get permission to move his headquarters to made a decision, it turned out to be completely wrong, as in the case of his Maltepe by the sea. 25 infamous order of withdrawal from Kirte (Krithia) two days later. Fortunately The Ottoman officers were not accustomed to detailed and restrictive for the Ottoman side, his subordinates decided to ignore most of his orders and operational orders. They had been trained under the German mission command kept their ground. Most damagingly, Halil Sami sent misleading reports to Esat
54 EXPERIENCE OF A LIFETIME OTTOMAN THIRD CORPS IN CRISIS 55 Pasha, giving him a false picture about the situation at Helles. 29 Thanks to this confusion at the 9th Division and Third Corps headquarters, General Ian Hamilton achieved one of his main aims in diverting the Ottoman Fifth Army reserve, the 19th Division, away from Helles. However, most of the officers of the 25th and 26 1h Regiments acted energetically and coordinated their operations without divisional oversight. They combined or divided the units according to the developing situation, while British command failures and lack of drive assisted them greatly.30 Mustafa Kemal and ~efik were the outstanding frontline commanders of the day. Instead of trying to figure out the real situation from scraps of delayed and often misleading information, they rushed towards the area of the greatest danger. They not only used their initiative well beyond the limits, but they also acted decisively. Both proved good combat leaders, displaying personal courage under fire, and inspiring their soldiers when most were heading towards certain deaths. Esat Pasha certainly remained in the shadow of these towering figures on 25April. The Ottoman reactions to the initial landings and follow-on counter attacks proved that this war was a young man's war. Esat Pasha was the best example of his generation, but )le discovered to his dismay the horrific casualty numbers. His beloved corps was broken into pieces under the enemy fire and he felt helpless. He simply could not find the strength to issue orders that would certainly create more casualties for small or no gains. He had found himselfliving in the wrong era and fighting the wrong war. In direct contrast, Mustafa Kemal was almost emotionally immune to the loss of life for a great cause; he shared few illusions of attack without much bloodshed. If Esat Pasha had a fault as a leader, it was perhaps a lack of drive and ruthless determination. Additionally, he simply did not have the instinct of the gambler, an indispensable trait of any great captain. Esat Pasha was assigned to the command of the Northern Group in the following days. He played important roles throughout the campaign, but Esat Pasha (seated) and staff at his Field Command Post near Kemalyeri (Scrubby Knoll). remained a facilitator between von Sanders and the division commanders. In the August Offensive he preferred to let Mustafa Kemal perform tactical command and instead take charge of the main and rear command posts. Although Esat Pasha's photograph frequently appeared in newspapers and magazines and he once again became a household name, Enver Pasha did not assign him to active combat command positions after the campaign. He became commander of the First Army in Istanbul and performed largely protocol duties, such as general in charge of the official visits of the German Kaiser and Austro-Hungarian
56 EXPERIENCE OF A LIFETIME f lJc' Emperor, and training recruits for other field armies. He was awarded several them of the necessity of worrying about incoming units, about the supply of decorations and sent to Germany as a guest of honour, but until the summer ammunition and food, about making detailed reports and returns, and about of 1918 he was kept in Istanbul. At the beginning of June 1918, he was assigned all the other crucial but time-consuming 'donkey work', thereby allowing them Third Army commander at the Caucasus front, but it was a very late assignment to focus on operational issues and problems. This flexible attitude, based on and he only briefly took part in operations before the end of the war. trust, was vital for eventual success. When Esat Pasha understood that he would not be assigned to positions of Thirdly, the Third Corps functioned better than the Allied units thanks to influence during the Armistice period, he retired from the military. Although the innovative triangular corps system and the bitter experiences of the Balkan bitter at the treatment he had received, he stayed away from politics and wars. Esat Pasha had trained and prepared his corps better than any other. dedicated himself to his family and to writing his memoirs. His unpublished Although he did not deal with the command crisis correctly at the beginning, memoirs provide detailed personal insights and thoughts, as well as his subordinates took the initiative and acted decisively. The mission command numerous documents that give rare inside looks into the Ottoman army corps. system that did not work well during the Balkan wars actually worked quite Unfortunately the entries for 25 April are relatively short. He glossed over the well on 25 April. unpleasant parts of the day, and highlighted evidence that would advance the Last but not least, we need to recognise the human factor in command impression that he had played a positive role. He died peacefully away from and control, and avoid the temptation to romanticise the past. Further study public attention in 1952. is required not only of key individuals, but of whole groups of general officers. Esat Pasha is undoubtedly a fascinating figure in his own right, and he played important roles. Regrettably, he has received little recognition or serious hat can we learn from the Ottoman Army's crisis in command in study, and is, today, rarely remembered for his role at Gallipoli. His memoir, April1915? First of all, this was a crisis that affected armies on both which is very detailed and contains a great deal of documentation, remains W sides. The old army corps system founded during the Napoleonic unpublished. His story certainly deserves better treatment. wars simply did not work under modern conditions. The Ottoman Army was not immune, but no western contemporary observers or modern scholars have noticed the issues that plagued the Third Corps on 25 April. Why? The answer lies in how Ottoman military history has been treated by scholars and the public. Scholars treat Ottoman military history as sui generis rather than as a part of global military history; they do not examine it as they examine western militaries. Contemporary military observers regarded the Ottoman Army not as a regular army, but as a horde. Consequently they did not expect it to have problems similar to their own. Instead, they tried to find answers in the presence of some unusual Ottoman commanders - either von Sanders or Mustafa Kemal in this example - or to blame their mistakes. Regrettably, modern scholarship is yet to discard this old paradigm. Secondly, at this stage of the war there was no understanding or doctrine assigning the responsibilities for directing combat to main, tactical and rear headquarters. Esat Pasha became the first Ottoman general to recognise this division of labour by transforming his staff into main and rear headquarters, officially recognising Mustafa Kemal and Halil Sami as the commanders in charge of tactical headquarters on 25 April. By doing so, he effectively relieved
58 EXPERIENCE OF A LIFETIME OTTOMAN THIRD CORPS IN CRISIS 59 appealed, unsuccessfully, to the foreign secretary against a decision by the local is a great deal of evidence, some of it presented in the article, that British decision high commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley. George H. Cassar, Kitchener: Architect of makers viewed possession of Alexandretta as greatly in the interests of the Empire, Victory (London, William Kimber, 1977), p. 30. none has been presented so far to show that the prospect of the French sharing in 10 Correspondence: Churchill to Clementine Churchill, 28 July 1914, CD, 5, 1989. an expedition to Alexandretta led the War Council to switch the point of attack to 11 Cassar, op. cit., pp. 175-6. the Dardanelles. 12 The 'drunken swabs' incident is referred to in Philip Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist (London, Arrow Books, 1961), pp. 133-4, and was quoted in Cassar, CHAPTER 3 op. cit., p. 95. However, another biographer more recently declared that the story 1 Biographical information about Esat Pasha is compiled from: Erkan Defteri, vol. 2, 'has no contemporary source': John Pollock, Kitchener (London, Robinson, 2002), no. 207, Turkish General Staff College Archives; Unpublished Memoir: Esat Biilkat, p.126. vol. 1; Hamdi Ertuna, Balkan Harbi'nde Yanya Savunmasz ve Esat Pa§a (Ankara, 13 Tom Curran, 'Who Was Responsible for the Dardanelles Naval Fiasco?', Australian Genelkurmay Bastmevi, 1983), pp. 139-52. Journal of Politics and History, vol. 57, no. 1, 2011, pp. 25-7. 2 Esat Pasha was younger than Ian Hamilton (1853) and Liman von Sanders (1855), 14 Meeting of the War Council: Secretary's Notes, 24 February 1915, CD, 6, p. 559. but a few years older than William Birdwood (1865) and Aylmer Hunter-Weston 15 Admiral Sir William James, A Great Seaman: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry (1864). F. Oliver G.C.B, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., L.L.D. (London, H. F. & G. Witherby, 1956), p. 144. 3 Hans Kannengiesser, Campaign in Gallipoli, trans. C. J.P. Ball (London, Hutchinson, 16 Curran, op. cit., p. 20. 1928), p. 85. 17 Quoted in David Dilks, Churchill and Company: Allies and Rivals in War and Peace 4 Harpokulu Tarihr;esi 1834-1945 (Ankara, Harpokulu Matbaasi, 1945), pp. 28-32. (London, I. B. Taurus, 2012), p. 69. 5 Selim Sun, 1897 Osmanlz-Yunan Harbi (Ankara, Genelkurmay Bas1mevi, 1965), pp. 18 Meeting of the War Council: Secretary's Notes, 8 January 1915, CD, 6, p. 394. 218-24; Colmar von der Goltz, Osmanlz-Yunan Harbi, trans. Yakub ~evki (izmir, 19 Correspondence: Churchill to Asquith, 31 December 1914, CD, 6, p. 346. It is a little Akademi Kitabevi, 2001), pp. 228-60. unclear what Churchill meant by the reference to Antwerp, given that Kitchener 6 Re§at Hall!, Balkan Harbi (1912-1913), vol. 1 (Ankara, Genelkurmay Bas1mevi, 1993), had supported the first lord's bid to hold the city. pp. 93-100; Ahmed izzet, Feryadzm, vol. 1 (Istanbul, Nehir Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 20 For the significance of Cyprus for military intelligence, see Andrekos Varnava, 57-62. 'British Military Intelligence in Cyprus During the Great War', War in History, vol. 7 Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913 19, no. 3, 2012, pp. 353-78. (Westport, Praeger, 2003), pp. 27-33, 331-8. 21 Marshal von Hindenburg, Out of My Life, trans. F. A. Holt (London, Cassell, 8 RaifYa§ar and Hilseyin Kabasakal, Ballwn Harbi (1912-1913), Garp Ordusu Yunan 1920), pp. 294-5. Hindenburg also obliquely referred to the Armenians' lack of Cephessi Harelwtz, vol. 3 (Ankara, Genelkurmay Bas1mevi, 1993), pp. 76-88, enthusiasm for the Ottoman Empire, and remarked that 'England had no reason to 399-401; Ertuna, op. cit., pp. 63-70. fear that in pushing east from the Gulf of Alexandretta she would be treading on a 9 Ya§ar and Kabasakal, op. cit., pp. 403-517; Ertuna, op. cit., pp. 71-83; Hellenic Army hornets' nest. There were no hornets.' General Staff, A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 (Athens, Army 22 Michael Shelden, Young Titan: The Making of Winston Churchill (London, Simon & History Directorate Publication, 1998), pp. 151-79. Schuster, 2013), p. 324. 10 Ya§ar and Kabasakal, op. cit., pp. 518-671; Ertuna, op. cit., pp. 83-133; Hellenic Army 23 In a recent article, Andrekos Varnava has stated that 'the obvious conclusion is that General Staff, op. cit., pp. 179-99. the British did not pursue the Alexandretta landing as they did not want a joint 11 Mesut Uyar, 'Osmanl! Askeri Ronesans1: Balkan Bozgunu ile Yilzle§mek', Tilrkiye operation with the French because of the imperial ambitions of both in the region': Gunliigu, no. 110, 2012, pp. 65-72. Andrekos Varnava, 'Imperialism First, the War Second: The British, an Armenian 12 Biilkat, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 3. Legion, and Deliberations on Where to Attack the Ottoman Empire, November 1914- 13 Ibid., pp. 3-11, 15-19; Biilkat, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 164-5, 190-1. April1915', Historical Research, vol. 87, no. 237,2014, at p. 554. However, while there 14 Biilkat, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 20-159; Fahrettin Altay, 10 Yzl Sava§ ve Sonrasz (1912-1922)
294 E X P E R I E N C E 0 F A L I F E T I M E ENDNOTES 295 ------
(Istanbul, insel Yaymlan, 1970), pp. 8o-1. (Auckland, Exisle, 2015).
15 Btilkat, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 45-50; Altay, op. cit., pp. 81-2. 2 Richard Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918 16 Cerna! Akbay, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, vol. 1 (Ankara, Genelkurmay (London, Harper Perennial, 2004). Bastmevi, 1970), pp.171-6. 3 Max Hastings, book review for the Daily Mail, May 2004, quoted on HarperCollins 17 Btilkat, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 357-8. UK web page, accessed 6 August 2014, http://www.harpercollins.co.uk/ 18 Ibid., pp. 361-8, 374-5; Halis Ataksor, (:anakkale Raporu (Istanbul, Tima§ Yaymlan, titles/9780007383481/tommy-epub-text-only-edition-prof-richard-holmes. 2008), pp. 54-105; Altay, op. cit., pp. 83-4; Mustafa Kemal (Atatilrk), Anburnu 4 Hew Strachan, 'Introduction', in Hew Strachan (ed.), The Oxford fllustrated History Muharebeleri Raporu (Ankara, Genelkurmay Bastmevi, 2011), pp. 7-9; ~efik Ake,r. of the First World War (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 10. (:anakkale- Anburnu Sava$lan ve 27. Alay (Istanbul, Askeri Matbaa, 1935), pp. 5 Holmes op. cit., p. xvi. 11-14; Muhterem Sara! and others, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi: (:anal 296 E X P E R I E N C E 0 F A L I F E T I M E E N D N 0 T E S 297