Contents PROOF

Home , Drums of Fu Manchu, Frederic Harrison

PROOF

Contents

List of Figures vii

Acknowledgements viii

Notes on Contributors ix

1 Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents: Evil, Barbarism and Empire 1 Tom Crook, Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe

Part I Metropolitan Evils

2 Evil in Question: The Victorian Social and the Politics of Prostitution, 1830–1900 33 Tom Crook

3 Terror, Spectacle and the Press: Anarchist Outrage in Edwardian England 54 David Speicher

4 ‘And I am the God of Destruction!’: Fu Manchu and the Construction of Asiatic Evil in the Novels of Arthur Sarsﬁeld Ward, 1912–1939 73 Antony Taylor

Part II Imperial Evils

5 The Politics of Italianism: Reynolds’s Newspaper,theIndian Mutiny, and the Radical Critique of Liberal Imperialism in Mid-Victorian Britain 99 Eugenio F. Biagini

6 The Victorian Lexicon of Evil: Frederic Harrison, the Positivists and the Language of International Politics 126 H.S. Jones

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Part III Geopolitics of Evil

7 Evil, Liberalism and the Imperial Designs of the Catholic Church, 1867–1905 147 Bertrand Taithe

8 ‘Now I have seen evil, and I cannot be silent about it’: Arnold J. Toynbee and his Encounters with Atrocity, 1915–1923 172 Rebecca Gill

9 Atrocity Narratives and Inter-Imperial Rivalry: Britain, Germany and the Treatment of ‘Native Races’, 1904–1939 201 Christina Twomey

Part IV Agents of Evil

10 Conrad’s Horror: Heart of Darkness and the Imaginary of Power 229 Thomas Osborne

11 The Lives of Others: The Defeat of Evil or the Evil of Defeat? 246 Scott McCracken

12 Islam, Violence and the New Barbarism 267 Tim Jacoby

Index 283

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There are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpreta- tion of phenomena ...1 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil.

Good and evil, Nietzsche stressed in his aphorisms of 1886, were the obsolete moral legacies of more credulous times. Yet, for many of his nineteenth-century contemporaries, good and evil remained forces of great power and vitality. Often transposed on to notions of civilisation and barbarism, good and evil were thought to be at restless work in the world: in the movements of history; in the rise and fall of empires; in the cosmopolitan cities of an ever-shrinking globe. We have only to recall George W. Bush’s evocation of an ‘axis of evil’ in the wake of 9/11 to observe that the antithesis of good and evil still enjoys considerable currency.2 Then, as now, languages of evil and barbarism were put to work in relation to all manner of threats, both at home and abroad. It made for an abundant discourse, capable of manifold applications and variations, not least because it intersected with considerations of race, class, imperial geopolitics and religion, among others. To be sure, these applications and variations were often crude. As Nietzsche argued, part of the attraction of the binary opposition ‘good and evil’ lies in its ability to impose order on a complex world of power and struggle. Morality always has its uses.3 It can demonise, dramatise and caricature. Above all perhaps, it can provide a sense of purpose, narrative and meaning. In this respect, moral binaries themselves are a function of power and should be interrogated accordingly (as Nietzsche himself attempted in his Genealogy of Morals). Yet, as the historical record suggests, binaries of this sort were not always taken

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-1 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF 2 Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents for granted; not everyone was part of Europe’s unthinking ‘moral herd’. Rather, good and evil, barbarism and civilisation, were also the subject of critical interrogation and subtle exploration. In fact, when unravelled, as they frequently were, claims to moral superiority, a civilising mission, or victory over forces of evil could offer glimpses of more disturbing possibilities – of the allure of evil, its governmental ‘necessity’ and even the capacity for barbarism within all, no matter how civilised.4 The chapters contained in this book seek to recover the richness of this discourse in the context of nineteenth-century Western Europe through to the present. ‘Genocide’, ‘totalitarianism’, ‘mass warfare’: these are among the immediate historiographical coordinates that spring to mind in the context of European modernity. An immense labour has gone into investigating and conceptualising all three. The aim of this book, however, is not to contribute to this scholarship as such. Rather, the aim is to begin the task of generating a new set of historiographical coordinates, ones which set established preoccupations within a more expansive interpretive framework. These coordinates are threefold: political, in terms of the discourses and practices of liberal governance; historiographical, in terms of moving beyond philosophical and empirical approaches to evil and barbarism; and chronological, in terms of various assumptions regarding human agency, free will and time that emerged in the wake of the Enlightenment. This introduction considers these elements in turn, dedicating dis- crete sections to each. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasising at the outset that the book assumes that evil has a history and is a historical phenomenon, a history which includes the shifting use of key terms to grasp and problematise evil: ‘civilisation’, ‘terrorism’, ‘Islamism’ and ‘culture’, among others with immediate resonance. A further section will thus introduce the shifting application of terms and the increasingly globalised public sphere in which they circulated. As will be apparent throughout this book, evil and barbarism have been – and continue to be – subject to discursive mediation and the complex interplay of ideas and interests, principles and prejudices. Evil raises all sorts of tricky ontological questions, so it will be useful to be clear as to what is at stake here. It could be, as various philosophers have argued in recent years, that evil possesses a kind of constitutive inscrutability, an irreducibly non-representable character, which might be considered universal.5 But even if ultimately elusive, it is also true that some attempt is always made to put evil into discourse. As such, evil emerges in speciﬁc historical scenarios, replete with their own particular idioms and media, and assumptions about moral agency and

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-2 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF Tom Crook, Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe 3 the workings of society and government, as we shall see. Furthermore, evil can serve political and cultural ends, shoring up governmental projects, as much as conceptions of ‘national character’, among other possibilities.6 It can indeed be put to use, and in all manner of ways. This is not the same as saying that evil is merely in the eye of the beholder; nor is it to affirm glibly that the devil may appear in many guises. Rather, it is to assert not only that evil must be put into discourse, but also that this discourse can be deployed strategically, with given circumstances and aims in mind, and that evil is capable of being invoked in multiple ways, from the cynical to the naïve. Evil in fact has never been the preserve of theologians or philosophers, as this book demonstrates. The chapters collected here show that, with varying degrees of sophistication, evil has been – and continues to be – bound up with fears of anarchy, terrorism and immigration, forebodings of tyranny and colonial abuse, and encounters with extreme violence and exploitation. As the introduction will set out, various themes cut across the chapters, but the editors have also chosen to group them into four further thematic and broadly chronological parts. Entitled ‘Metropolitan Evils’, the first part is concerned with evils associated with cities, especially London, as commented on and propagated in various forms of discourse, from pamphlet literature and social investigations to pulp fiction and tabloid journalism. Crook explores the subject of Victorian prostitution, often referred to as the ‘great social evil’, and examines how it was contested in terms of different assumptions regarding the agency of prostitutes and the efficacy of state intervention. Speicher’s chapter reconstructs press reaction to an ‘anarchist outrage’ which took place in Edwardian London, while Taylor’s chapter examines depictions of Asiatic evil in the pulp fiction villainy of Fu Manchu during the early twentieth century. Both chapters demonstrate how popular perceptions of evil and barbarism tapped into powerful currents of anxiety regarding immigration and the presence within the capital of foreign ‘aliens’ and ‘exotic’ cultures. The part that follows, entitled ‘Imperial Evils’, is devoted to radical critiques of the evils and atrocities arising from British foreign policy and colonial rule. Biagini’s chapter examines the anti-imperialism of a popular post-Chartist weekly, Reynolds’s News, while Jones examines the work of the leading English positivist thinker, Frederic Harrison, and his critique of imperial evils and what he termed ‘terrorism’. Both chapters demonstrate that the civilising rationale of ‘liberal imperialism’ was far from hegemonic. They also demonstrate how, for radicals at least, corruption abroad was always profoundly entangled with corruption at

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-3 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF 4 Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents home: British claims to civilisation were at best fragile, at worst offen- sive. The radicals who subscribed to Reynolds’s News viewed themselves as part of a universal democratic fraternity, whose own struggles for freedom mirrored those of colonial subaltern subjects. Similarly, as Jones stresses, for Harrison the moral integrity of foreign and colonial policy ultimately reflected the moral integrity of the metropole. The next part, ‘Geopolitics of Evil’, focuses on the mobilisation of evil and atrocity in the context of war and imperial rivalry. Taithe pays particular attention to the Catholic Church’s embrace of the cause of anti-slavery in Africa in order to renew its engagement with the world abroad, and with the politics of liberalism at home. Gill and Twomey look at specific instances in which allegations of atrocities were mobilised for ‘just’ wars in the early twentieth century. Gill’s chapter looks at the work of Arnold J. Toynbee and how evidence of Greek atrocities in the 1919–1923 conflict between Greek forces and Turkish nationalists forced him to reconsider the nature of civilisation. Twomey’s chapter examines how, in the First World War and after, British authorities used evidence of colonial atrocities in South-West Africa to bolster their propaganda against the German state. Once again, these chapters recover some sense of the politics of evil and the multiple uses to which atrocity and barbarity can be put to both enhance and undermine civilisational and imperial hierarchies. The final part, ‘Agents of Evil’, is concerned with extremes of violence and attempts to understand and represent its origins and the agency of its perpetrators. Osborne offers a critical analysis of a text often regarded as the epitome of literary reflection on the nature of evil, Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, demonstrating how Conrad overcame some of the simplistic conflations of evil and barbarity described elsewhere in the book. McCracken similarly problematises Manichean oppositions, exploring how the complex legacy of totalitarian evil figures in the medium of film, in particular Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck’s The Lives of Others. The final chapter by Jacoby examines recent attempts to understand Islamic terrorism via a new investment in the explana- tory power of culture, understood in this context as a kind of objective, determining force, something which precludes political understandings of violence and extremism. Edited volumes rarely exhaust their subject matter and this is true of the present book. The domain of concerns, projects and forms of discourse it seeks to explore is a vast and complicated one. Yet, as noted above, the book aims to open up new avenues of inquiry and to encour- age a shift in the kinds of questions asked of the past and the present.

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In our ‘post-9/11 world’ there is certainly a need for better, more thor- ough histories of present concerns and languages. But beyond this, there is also a need to embrace, as this book does, the abundance of ways in which evil and barbarism have ﬁgured within broadly liberal regimes such as Britain and France – indeed, regimes which, historically speaking, routinely laid claim to being at the forefront of progress and civilisation.

Evil, totalitarianism and liberalism

In terms of thinking about European modernity as a whole, the dominant preoccupation among philosophers and writers has been with the evils committed by totalitarian states, principally Nazi Germany. For both the public at large and the scholarly community, the Holo- caust represents the very apotheosis of ‘modern evil’.7 The likes of Albert Camus and Hannah Arendt, writing in the middle of the twentieth century, as well as contemporary philosophers such as Zygmunt Bauman, have all sought to understand the relationship of modernity and evil through the prism of the Holocaust and its historical genealogy.8 Arguably, it has come to function, in a wholly perverse and negative way, as a kind of inverted moral benchmark against which modern liberal democracies measure themselves and their own ethical conduct.9 This focus on totalitarianism is itself in need of explanation. Part of the answer surely lies in the ideological conflict that arose in the wake of the Second World War, which was as much about liberal democracy versus totalitarianism as it was about capitalism versus communism.10 One consequence, however, has been to neglect the ways in which evil and barbarism have functioned and figured in liberal regimes since the nineteenth century. Of course, there has been no neglect per se of atrocities committed by liberal states. To refer only to the mid-Victorian British Empire, incidents such as the ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 1857 and the ‘Morant Bay rebellion’ of 1865 have been well documented.11 Nonetheless, in terms of modernity as a whole, there remains a strong tendency to associate evil and barbarism with what Eric Hobsbawm calls the ‘age of extremes’, and in particular the actions and ambitions of totalitarian states.12 This book aims to make up for this neglect and it advocates a shift of focus towards liberal societies and polities, in this instance principally imperial Britain, but also imperial France and post-re- unification Germany. One benefit is that it allows invocations of evil and barbarism – including their invocation in relation to terrorism,

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-5 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF 6 Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents imperialism and totalitarianism – to be set within a richer, more expansive historical context. In particular, it helps to recover an earlier discourse of evil and barbarism, which, by turns and degrees, was Christian, imperial, racial, social-scientific and civilisational. It is precisely this discourse which has enjoyed a revival in recent years: indeed, in some forms, such as the ‘new barbarism thesis’ examined by Jacoby in this book, it has lost none of the prejudices of the old. The terms ‘liberal’ and ‘liberalism’ are capacious and slippery, now as much as in the past. They are, without doubt, very much part of the shifting historical lexicon which is briefly dwelt upon in the final section of this introduction. In recent years, the term ‘liberal’ has been used to refer to a broad culture of governance, an ethos of rule, and a form of ‘governmentality’, as distinct from a specific party ideology or philosophical programme.13 Recent scholarship is also more inclined to emphasise the ‘positive’ aspects of liberalism (or ‘liberal rationality’), and the way it is based upon normative models of conduct and citizenship, and as such has resort to regulation and coercion.14 This dimension has been especially to the fore in accounts which examine ‘liberal imperialism’ or ‘imperial liberalism’. In Liberalism and Empire, Uday Singh Mehta examines the thought of James Mill and J.S. Mill in order to tease out the violent agenda of liberalism. According to Mehta, liberalism contains an intrinsic imperialistic ‘urge’, something derived from the ‘universalising’ epistemology which underpins it. Rather than respect cultural difference, liberalism, on the basis of this epistemology, seeks instead to reduce it to a common (but in reality only Western) human core.15 A richer sense of imperial liberalism emerges from Jennifer Pitts’s A Turn to Empire.16 Like Mehta, Pitts is keen to stress the aggressive imperial stance of liberal thinkers such as J.S. Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, both of whom were confident of the ability of European states to civilise, using force if necessary, non- European societies like India and Algeria. (‘Despotism’, wrote Mill, in On Liberty, ‘is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with bar- barians, provided the end be their improvement’.17) Yet, in contrast to Mehta, Pitts argues that there is no single logic or urge intrinsic to liberalism: ‘liberalism does not lead ineluctably either to imperialism or anti-imperialism’.18 Here she points to an earlier generation of liberal thinkers, such as Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith and Benjamin Con- stant, all of whom were critical of European imperialism and entertained a relatively pluralistic worldview. Once again, much depends on what we mean by ‘liberal’ and ‘liberalism’. Certainly, when understood as a distinct ideology, there is no denying that liberalism might be very pro-imperial; and to this extent,

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-6 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF Tom Crook, Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe 7 that it might excuse the violence of colonial rule. However, when viewed as a broad culture of governance – as a form of society and polity which, among other aspects, thrives on the free play of people, goods and ideas – still more richness and complexity emerge. To the liberal sceptics acknowledged by Pitts, we can add the myriad other voices that were critical of empire. In their chapters, Biagini and Jones examine how two variants of Victorian radicalism sought to critique the morality of the British Empire; and to these political perspectives we can also add the perspectives of authors such as Conrad (as examined in this book by Osborne) and historians such as Toynbee (as examined by Gill). All adherents of liberalism, of whatever particular cast or national variation, maintained a commitment to a robust and reflective public sphere; and this public sphere contained a range of critical voices, advanced in a diversity of forms. On the domestic front, the morality of the state was also subject to fierce criticism, as Crook’s chapter demonstrates with respect to prostitution and the coercive regime of the Contagious Diseases Acts launched during the 1860s: both at home and abroad, the state’s capacity to either commit or endorse evil was always under scrutiny. Equally, however, this same public sphere hosted myriad voices which were critical of liberal society and an all too tolerant, laissez-faire state. As Speicher’s chapter shows, the spectre of anarchist terrorism in Edwardian England led to calls for the abandonment of Britain’s traditional status as a safe haven for refugees and for the introduction of firearms within the general police force. More broadly, of course, the public sphere was also a space of crude racial and religious demonisation: a space, that is, where celebrations of British civilisation over and against countless barbarian ‘others’ could flourish and prosper. Is there a liberal way of relating to evil and barbarism? This book offers no general assessments of this sort. Rather, the chapters offer case studies of particular instances and scenarios where evil and barbarism have been invoked, depicted and debated. It is evidently the case, as post-colonial scholars in particular argue, that liberal societies are not quite as liberal as they suppose: they do indeed rely on force and often incoherent ideas of civilisational superiority. Many of the chapters provide evidence of this. But, at the same time, as is also apparent in this book, liberal societies afford spaces for dissent and critique, so that evil and barbarism are always under scrutiny, always being ques- tioned. It is perhaps here, if anywhere, that we might locate a certain kind of liberalism: that is, in the sheer range of perspectives which at any one time compete, sometimes stridently, for the attention of the public.

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Philosophical and empirical approaches to evil

Existing approaches to the history of evil and barbarism have only in part captured this abundance. Excluding the sizeable literature on totalitarianism and evil, two approaches might be highlighted. One is a philosophical approach to the history of evil, as exempliﬁed by the work of Susan Neiman, Richard Bernstein and Peter Dews.19 Here the concern is with key texts and moments, and how canonical European thinkers – Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, among others – grappled with evil in relation to human agency and the workings of the world. Particular attention has been paid to how the legacy of the Enlightenment, in the form of providential Deism, was either rejected or refashioned, however problematically. It is an approach strong on ideas, but invariably weak on how, if at all, they informed popular culture and particular military, political and imperial struggles. The other approach is more empirical and seeks to examine instances of ‘state violence’, especially instances of genocide and imperial abuse. Notable examples include examinations of the atrocities committed by King Leopold II’s regime in the African Congo,20 the German army in South-West Africa (Namibia) in 1905 and Belgium in 1914,21 as well as the atrocities perpetrated within the Ottoman Empire.22 Compared to the intellectual approach noted above, this approach provides more of an embedded account of evil, relating instances of state violence to rationalities of domination, geopolitical rivalries and the murderous possibilities opened up by governmental ‘modernization’. There is, for example, considerable debate over the question of German ‘excep- tionalism’ versus a more diffuse ‘culture of destruction’ ranging across European states and their empires.23 Attention has also focused on particular ‘modalities’ of state violence, and in some cases on retrospective indictments for atrocities, following the premise established by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin’s unpublished world survey of genocides.24 Yet little attention has been paid to contemporary commentators and their own understandings of the atrocities they confronted, or of how concepts of evil and barbarism were mobilised by these states and their critics. While this book shares the empirical sensibilities of these historians – that is, it assumes representations of evil and barbarism are always embedded in speciﬁc contexts, each with their own peculiar political and governmental dynamics – it also assumes a disposition which might be called cultural to the extent that it is concerned with how evil and barbarism have been discussed, represented and problema- tised by a range of historical actors.25 In some chapters, for instance

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-8 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF Tom Crook, Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe 9 those by Osborne, Jacoby and Speicher, the focus is on contemporary understandings of origins and causes. In others, such as those by Taithe, McCracken, Biagini and Taylor, the concern is primarily with how evil and barbarism have been depicted and narrated. In this way, though the purview of this book at times coincides with the empirical case studies noted above, it departs from historians’ pre-ordained exemplars of evil, with attention directed instead to how evil is encountered in given circumstances via particular idioms and representational forms. This interpretive disposition receives varied expression and is animated by a desire to engage different forms of discourse, from the straightforwardly political and governmental to the more literary and popular. In this regard, it is an approach which bears affinities to the one Neiman adopts in her philosophical meditation on the history of evil, where she encourages readers to recognise its abundant nature. Neiman makes two points: first, that conceptions of evil change over time and are historically variable (including the idea that it might be reduced to questions of moral agency); and secondly, that evil assumes a number of forms, from acts of violence to banal actions of routine administration. A good example of the former, she suggests, is the attacks of 9/11; a good example of the latter is Adolf Eichmann.26 For these reasons, Neiman does not believe that ‘evil has an essence which stays constant through its appearances’. ‘Our understanding of evil’, she states, ‘has changed sharply over time. Attempts to capture the forms of evil within a single formula risk becoming one-sided or trivial. Neither Osama bin Laden nor Adolf Eichmann is uniquely paradig- matic, and an account of evil cut solely to fit one or the other will leave out something we ignore at our peril.’27 Neiman thus refuses to offer a universal definition or theory of evil. What she offers instead is an approach to evil based on the recognition that it assumes multiple forms and can be grasped from various perspectives, including a historical one. Bernstein develops a similar approach in his philosophical history of evil. As he argues in the conclusion of Radical Evil, interrogating evil is an ongoing, open-ended process: there can never be one theory or account of what evil is. Like Neiman, he urges us to recognise both the plural and the historical nature of evil. We must accept that ‘there is an irreducible plurality of evils’, while also acknowledging ‘that new forms of evil emerge in differing historical circumstances’.28 For Neiman and Bernstein, then, we should acknowledge the protean nature of evil and adopt an interpretive ethos open to its myriad, and sometimes unexpected, forms.

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This book shares this ethos, but as mentioned it does so with respect to various media, moving beyond the philosophical tomes of canonical thinkers. None of the protagonists discussed in this book, such as Frederic Harrison, George Reynolds, W.R. Greg, Archbishop Lavigerie, Arnold J. Toynbee and Joseph Conrad, proffered coherent philosophical treatises, nor did they make any claim to do so. Yet they engaged directly, and often indirectly, with ideas of evil in moral philosophy, as well as with older notions of sin in theology. Some explicitly made reference to evil as the expression of a transcendental power, while others considered evil in its social context; or again, some strategically mobilised concepts of evil, while others relied on more mundane meanings of the term to make sense of horror or indignation. These figures reflected, or were the (sometimes unwitting) vehicles of, central questions regarding morality, human agency and the meaning of civilisation. In so doing, the individuals who feature in this book used the terms ‘evil’ and ‘barbarism’ in reference to both the individual and the col- lective. Invocations of ‘free will’ frequently mixed with invocations of psychological or social ‘laws’ that were thought to determine, or at least influence, the exercise of this will. As the chapters make clear, in certain circumstances, such laws might exonerate perpetrators of abuse. In other contexts, however, especially where such laws were thought to stem from race, civilisational hierarchies or the determining effects of cultural background, an apparent proclivity to evil might justify intervention, conquest or policies of segregation. This is evident, for example, in notions of Islamism, as explored in very different contexts by Taithe and Jacoby. Nevertheless, equations of evil and barbarism were far from straightforward. Notions of evil and barbarism might be used synonymously, as when British and American propagandists deployed notions of an innate barbarism to portray the ‘evil Hun’ and his ally, the ‘evil Turk’, during the First World War.29 However, for critics of foreign or imperial policy, such as Frederic Harrison, the editors of Reynolds’s News, Arnold J. Toynbee and Joseph Conrad, evil was located less in the innate barbarism of Oriental or subaltern subjects, and more in the calcu- lated abuse of state power by supposedly civilised European countries. In attempting to understand foul deeds and exploitation, these commentators did not refer to original sin, but rather to the corruption of the moral sense by the nefarious appeal of greed, domination or extreme nationalism – or, in Conrad’s case, the fascination with the sublime ‘heart of darkness’ that existed in an imagined ‘dark continent’.30 But

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-10 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF Tom Crook, Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe 11 equally, this was not necessarily a corruption of an unsullied human nature that tended always towards the civilised or the good. As Toynbee intimated in his enquiry into the perpetration of atrocity by seemingly ‘civilised’ men, human beings had deep-seated propensities for violence and cruelty.

Modernity and evil (i): Sin and free will

In what ways might this discourse be regarded as modern? The term ‘evil’ has a strong religious resonance and as such seems somehow un-modern, part of an older way of thinking about the world. As the theologian Gil Bailie writes, ‘the very word evil seems to stick in the throats of most of our rationalist commentators ...It seems to [harken] back to a benighted age of superstition.’31 Yet discussions of evil need not be un-modern simply by virtue of making reference to it, and this is true of even simplistic rhetoric. In his analysis of Bush’s post-9/11 ‘God talk’, for example, the historian Bruce Lincoln notes its simplistic, ‘folksy’ nature; but as he argues, it also contained a series of assumptions that are demonstrably modern, including a progressive conception of history which, he suggests, might be regarded as ‘Hegelian, but without the dialectic, and with America, not Prussia, in history’s starring role.’32 One aspect of the modernity examined here resides in the propensity of most of those featured in this book to discuss evil in purely human terms, with a corresponding absence of any sustained investment in the idea of original sin.33 This reﬂected wider intellectual and theological currents. As the likes of Neiman and Bernstein argue, it was Immanuel Kant who ﬁrst systematically outlined what is now a commonplace of humanist morality: namely, that evil can be related to the exercise of moral choice.34 What Kant termed ‘radical evil’ was not a particular evil act as such. Rather, as he explained in his 1793 work Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, it derived from the ‘corruption of the will’, adding: ‘The human being must make or have made himself into whatever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil. The two [qualities] must be an effect of his free power of choice. For otherwise they could not be imputed to him, and, consequently, he could neither be morally good nor evil.’35 Kant’s contribution to moral philosophy was a complex one, and it owed a great debt to earlier thinkers, not least Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But in very general terms it marked a break with both traditional Christian and deistic forms of thought about human evil: that is, not only with the Platonic-Augustinian ontology of the medieval and early

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-11 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF 12 Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents modern periods, which viewed man as innately sinful and evil; but also with the so-called ‘optimism’ of early Enlightenment thinkers, such as Gottfried Leibniz, who had sought to rationalise the evils of man according to laws contained within Nature as designed by an all-powerful and benign God. As the philosopher Marcel Gauchet sums up, post-Kant, ‘Evil was no longer primarily a characteristic of reality, and only secon- darily a personal action; it tended to be attributed to individual choice. Human moral freedom causes evil, as clearly seen by its designation as the will to evil.’36 The nineteenth-century abounded with celebrations of ‘moral character’ and the powers of the will.37 Samuel Smiles’s best-selling Self- Help, first published in 1859, is representative of a widely cherished attachment to the principle of individual responsibility. ‘Energy of will’, he wrote, ‘may be defined to be the very central power of character in a man – in a word, it is the Man himself. It gives impulse to his every action, and soul to every effort.’38 But what in retrospect we might view as secular manifestations of thinking about free will, at the time cohab- ited and combined not only with older forms of theological thinking, but also with the newer variants offered by the myriad Christian revival- ist movements of Western Europe. While it is no doubt possible, as Boyd Hilton has argued, to distinguish between ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ strands of early and mid-nineteenth-century British evangelicalism, it was nonetheless distinguished by an ongoing reliance on concepts of atonement, original sin and eternal damnation.39 Yet there were also important shifts of theological tone and conception. Historians have noted that the nineteenth century witnessed, on the whole, a greater and more widely shared emphasis on a theology of love and compassion in both the Anglican and Catholic faiths, and a corresponding dwindling of references to predestination.40 At the same time, within Non-conformist denominations the rise of ‘liberal theology’ tended to present evil as something to be overcome through moral rectitude, faith in God’s love and personal service, rather than through reference to original sin.41 Major political figures such as William Gladstone and Archbishop Lavigerie were steeped in both traditions, and there is a tension throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries between traditional and liberal theological modes of thinking about evil and culpability. Once again, we are presented with myriad mixtures and tensions. Per- haps, as Charles Taylor has recently argued in A Secular Age,whatis modern here is not necessarily the content of particular positions regarding matters of morality, evil and God. Rather, it is the fact that, since the

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-12 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF Tom Crook, Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe 13 nineteenth century, such positions have come to be considered just that: intricate matters of personal choice, subscription and investigation, rather than of unquestioned adherence, as enforced by time-honoured institutions such as the Anglican and Catholic churches.42 We now live in a world where spiritual worldviews abound, and where people’s views on matters like evil and human nature can change over time, depending on their personal education and life experience. The example of Toynbee is instructive here, and he might be added to the many instances of personal belief and spiritual development explored by Taylor. While Toynbee explained the atrocities he witnessed in 1921 in secular, psychological terms, referring to the subconscious animal within all, his cognisance of evil shifted following a religious awakening in mid-life after the suicide of his eldest son in 1939. Though he never followed his wife, Rosalind, into the Catholic Church, he would spend much time at the monastery at Ampleforth, ultimately adopting a liberal ‘broad church’ theology. Reﬂecting in his memoirs, written in the 1960s, on his earlier apprehension of atrocity in Anatolia, he now chose to characterise his inquiry into the dynamic forces of human nature less in psychological and more in spiritual terms:

My study of the genocide that had been committed in Turkey in 1915 brought home to me the reality of Original Sin. Human nature has in it an inherent vein of abominable wickedness; but then it also has in it an inherent vein of lovable goodness too. Every human soul is a battleﬁeld on which these two irreconcilable spiritual forces are perpetually contending for mastery.43

Modernity and evil (ii): Science, history and civilisation

References to original sin, then, were by no means eclipsed. In fact, they could ﬁnd new leases of life, even among those who had earlier rejected them, as the case of Toynbee suggests. Yet invocations of original sin persisted amidst a proliferation of contending perspectives, some of them theological, others of a more humanistic sort, premised on the invocation of moral free will. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the idea of original sin, however, came with the advent of modern utopianism, which spawned various incarnations during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially among radicals and socialists. Reinhart Koselleck sees Louis-Sébastien Mercier’s The Year 2440, published in 1770, as the ﬁrst modern utopian text.44 As he elaborates, it represented a vision of what was then still a novel idea, ‘perfectibility’. The term was

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first coined by Rousseau and referred to the possibility of overcoming all evil and imperfection through the grand march of human progress and endeavour. Man was not intrinsically flawed or sinful. On the contrary, through his adherence to necessary laws of historical development, he might raise himself to a state of faultless, harmonious society. Yet, as reference to necessary laws suggests, man’s freedom – and thus his capacity to overcome evil – remained in question. In particular, it was argued that evil was not the product of individual will, or even original sin, but of impersonal forces and laws acting in the world. The key development was the emergence of the human sciences during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the discovery that the will was condi- tioned by the numerous ‘systems’ – social, physiological and psychological, for example – in which it was embedded.45 Only in part was man a self-directing agent; he was also governed by a range of ‘forces’, ‘laws’ and ‘conditions’. What Gauchet terms the ‘inculpation’ of the modern subject in relation to evil thus occurred at roughly the same time as his or her ‘exoneration’.46 Absolute moral autonomy, of the sort demanded by Kantian ethics, was rendered entirely problematic. Neiman’s book, Evil in Modern Thought, makes a similar point. Post-Kant, evil continued to raise questions of a cosmological sort – questions, that is, to do with the intelligibility of the universe as a whole – and this was precisely because human agency could not be isolated from the workings of the world and the interrelated realms of society and nature.47 Herein resides another element of modernity. After Pierre Manent and Michel Foucault, it can be said to constitute the other half of a modern dyad in which man is at once elevated as a subject of moral free will, yet also positioned as an object of scientific laws and various conditions, circumstances and inherited characteristics.48 As the chapters collected in this book attest, while a greater emphasis may have been placed on individual agency, this was always in tension with views which ventured in the other direction: views, that is, which sought to understand evil and barbarism with reference to social conditions, racial character, cultural and religious background, among other features, of which the individual or group was the effect or instance, rather than the cause or agent as such. Some were free to rise above their barbaric instincts and habits, while others were not: they might be slaves to their surroundings and beliefs, or the ‘backward’ societies in which they lived. The question of free will remains a matter of intense debate today and it was just as fiercely contested during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.49 One of the most notable debates was prompted by the publication in 1857 of Thomas Henry Buckle’s History of Civilization in

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England. The book caused a sensation across Europe, principally because it suggested that free will was nothing but a fiction – a ‘metaphysical dogma’, as Buckle put it.50 Buckle’s account aspired to be a ‘scientific history’ and it drew on the insights of a range of emerging disciplines, including economics, geology and statistics. Its central question was: ‘Are the actions of men, and therefore of societies, governed by fixed laws, or are they the result either of chance or superfluous influence?’51 Buckle was convinced of the former proposition. He was especially impressed by the work of the Belgian statistician, Adolphe Quetelet, who had earlier demonstrated that evil acts such as murder were, sta- tistically speaking, regular, law-governed phenomena, subject to little variation over time. Though it appeared only two years before Smiles’s Self-Help, the message of Buckle’s History could hardly have been more different. The debate over Buckle’s ‘statistical fatalism’ soon passed, though not without significant commentary in countries such as Britain and Germany.52 Buckle’s views were extreme, even for a time obsessed by statistics and the possibility of a positivist science of society. But for all its eccentricity, Buckle’s work represented an exemplary instance of what, by the mid-nineteenth century, had become a widely diffused perspective within European thought: namely a ‘civilisational perspective’ premised on the notion that human societies evolve through a series of developmental stages. Like so many of his contemporaries, Buckle was convinced that Europe (and especially England) was in the van of a global process of progress and improvement.53 Civilisation forms another key point of reference for many of the actors that feature in this book. As with the idea of utopia, it registered the assumption that evil and barbarism were historical variables suscep- tible to human government over time. Yet, if utopian thought found no favour among Europe’s governing elites, where it was often dismissed as dangerous and ‘un-Godly’, this was not true of the civilisational perspective, which was often fused with a sense that the universe more generally was governed by divinely inspired laws of development. In 1828, the French historian François Guizot wrote that for ‘a long period, and in many countries, the word civilisation has been in use’, further remark- ing that the ‘idea of progress, of development, appears to me the fundamental idea contained in the word’.54 In the same work, entitled History of Civilization in Europe, he also stated that Europe was the priv- ileged site of civilisation on account of its special place within God’s providential plan: ‘it [European civilisation] progresses according to the intentions of God. This is the rational account of its superiority.’55

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According to Norbert Elias, ‘the first literary evidence of the evolution of the verb civiliser into the concept civilisation’ can be found in the mid- eighteenth-century work of the French Physiocrat Mirabeau, for whom it meant the ‘softening of manners, urbanity, politeness, and a dissemi- nation of knowledge such that propriety is established in place of laws of detail’.56 Similar understandings developed within the Scottish Enlight- enment, where the terms ‘civilisation’, ‘civilised’ and ‘civility’ were used to distinguish Europeans from the ‘primitive’, ‘rude’ and ‘barbarous’ peoples of other parts of the globe. In 1751, David Hume wrote of ‘the great superiority of civilised Europeans above barbarous Indians’; Adam Ferguson opened his 1767 work, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, with reference to the ‘progress’ of the human species from a state of ‘rudeness to civilisation’.57 These were still relatively rudimentary for- mulations of the civilisational perspective, but during the nineteenth century the ‘conjectural’ accounts developed by the likes of Ferguson hardened into more empirical, scientific approaches, as pioneered by emerging disciplines such as anthropology.58 An early example is James Mill’s History of British India, published in 1818. While he admitted it was not easy to ‘describe the characteristics of the different stages of social progress’, an ‘accurate comparison’ of all their ‘great circumstances’ meant that ‘a scale of civilisation’ could be formed, ‘on which the relative position of nations may be accurately marked’.59 Once again, we should affirm the modernity of this kind of discourse while also noting that it was by no means entirely secular. Civilisa- tion normally implied Christian civilisation. More generally, as James Livingston’s recent survey suggests, throughout the nineteenth century theologians proved remarkably adept at reconciling the existence of God with the troubling, evolutionary vistas radicalised by books such as Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859).60 Theodicy remained an innovative aspect of theological thought, giving rise to many variants, including Christian Darwinism. But nor was civilisational discourse necessarily sophisticated. The scientific concept of race might have had less currency than is often assumed, as Peter Mandler has argued, yet when associated with the concept of civilisation, as well as emerging ideas of culture, entirely vulgar understandings of the inequalities of man might ensue.61 The ‘scientific’ views of Arthur de Gobineau or Paul Broca in France may have had a limited and elitist audience, but among the population at large the apparent racial and civilisational superiority of Europe seemed to be endlessly confirmed by its relative military strength.62 Racist, euro-centric understandings of a ‘white man’s burden’ – a phrase coined by Rudyard Kipling in 1899 – were certainly part of the civilisational perspective, at all levels.

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Equally, however, it was also a supple discourse, capable of significant variation. While it was common during the nineteenth century to assume that civilisation was a singular phenomenon, it was also possible to understand civilisation as a plural, regional phenomenon. Raymond Williams notes that the first use of civilisation in the plural was by the French philosopher Pierre-Simon Ballanche in 1819, but adds that it became common only in the 1860s, when reference might be made to the historic civilisations of India, Egypt, Mexico, China, Greece and Assyria, among others.63 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this plural perspective was further developed by the likes of Max Weber, whose work combined comparative civilisational analysis with a critical appraisal of Western ‘rationality’. In the inter- war years, the comparative study of civilisations continued to prosper, although it now comprised a more focused attention on the dynamics underpinning their ‘rise and fall’. Along with Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1918/1922), ambitious, multi-volume studies included Pitirim Sorokin’s Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937–41), and Elias’s The Civilizing Process (1939).64 Yet, by the middle decades of the twentieth century, the civilisational confidence of the Victorian period had been fundamentally challenged. The First and Second World Wars profoundly undermined hopes of unlimited human progress. A similar loss of confidence had affected the idea of the rational Western subject. Building on the insights of Nietzsche and Gustave Le Bon, Sigmund Freud sought to illuminate the ‘unconscious’ drives and desires that at once animated and undermined the individual subject. Just as disturbing was Freud’s suggestion that what we like to call civilisation is in fact premised on the repres- sion of our basic instincts, the result of which is endemic neurosis and anxiety.65 The cumulative result was that both Western civilisation and the civilised Western self appeared to be fragile constructs. As Roger Griffin has demonstrated, the Nazis’ utopian quest for a ‘new man’ and the inauguration of a ‘new age’ was partly born of these very anxieties.66 In the years that followed the Nazi defeat, the idea of a specific form of ‘totalitarian evil’ began to take root, initiating the association of modernity, evil and the ‘age of extremes’ still apparent in current scholarship.

Shifting terminologies

As the above discussion suggests, much of the language and many of the concepts used today stretch back to the time of the Enlightenment. Compared to its traditional formulation during the medieval and early

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-17 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF 18 Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents modern periods, the transition to modernity might be said to involve a threefold reappraisal of the problem of evil: an individualisation of evil based around the idea of moral will and willpower; a parallel exoneration of the subject with reference to various laws and conditions thought to determine, or at least influence, the exercise of this will; and finally, a temporalisation of evil as a variable which might be overcome and abolished through the progression of historical time. Yet this did not amount to a secularisation of evil, its pinning down, so to speak, under the auspices of secular reason; quite the contrary in fact. On the one hand – and apart from the ongoing vitality of theological forms of thought – Christian discourse of various denominations continued to inform an eclectic array of reform movements and governmental projects. As Crook’s chapter demonstrates, there was considerable opposition on the part of Protestant evangelicals to the idea that prostitution was a necessary evil. Another example is furnished by Taithe’s chapter, which explores how the Catholic Church of late nineteenth-century France developed a combative stance both on the domestic front, in a struggle against secular materialism, and on the foreign front, in a struggle against Islamism and its associated practices. Here Catholicism helped to give moral meaning to the ‘scramble for Africa’, while also engaging with liberal forces at home. On the other hand, evil continued to probe and aggravate the limits of rational representation. The problem of representing evil has been extensively discussed in relation to the Holocaust, but it is evident elsewhere.67 The chapters by Osborne and McCracken offer insights into the ability of evil to elude straightforward moral critique. Osborne, for instance, dwells on the unspeakable emptiness from which evil seems to emerge in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, while McCracken examines the complex dialectics of good and evil, victory and defeat, in Bertolt Brecht’s poetry and in the film The Lives of Others. Both chapters attest to the ongoing allure of evil within liberal modernity, exposing the limits of what is sometimes termed ‘liberal rationality’.68 These empirical and representational complexities are intensified further by the differential meaning and application of terms such as ‘barbarism’ and ‘civilisation’. Such terms in fact have often been invested with multiple – and at times conflicting – qualities. A case in point is provided by the terms ‘civilisation’ and ‘culture’, whose meaning and use continue to evolve today, as Jacoby’s chapter in this book demonstrates. But historically they have also been understood very differently, depending on national context. In Britain and France, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the term ‘civilisation’

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-18 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF Tom Crook, Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe 19 was used in a twofold manner. Principally, it referred to the historical attainment of knowledge, manners, technology and wealth. However, as noted above, it was also used in a pluralistic fashion to refer to the different civilisations of the world, each with their own peculiar habits, languages and so forth. At the same time, the term ‘culture’ was coming to be used in a more holistic sense to describe a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, or humanity in general; and in this respect, it might come close to the British and French understanding of civilisation in the second sense just noted. One of the first major applications of the term in its holistic sense came in 1871 with the publication of Primitive Cul- ture by the English anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor. The opening line of the book made clear that Tylor viewed the terms ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ as synonymous: ‘Culture or civilisation, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.’69 According to Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Tylor’s formulation represents the ‘birth of the scientific concept’ of culture as developed by anthropologists and ethno- graphers, and more recently Anglophone disciplines such as cultural studies.70 In Germany, by contrast, there developed a pronounced contrast between culture (‘Kultur’) on the one hand and civilisation (‘Zivilisation’) on the other. By and large, the former referred to achieve- ments of a mental, moral and artistic sort, whereas the latter referred to economic and technological developments. Furthermore, culture and civilisation were thought to be antithetical. The former connoted the organic growth of the moral and aesthetic sensibilities of a given individual or people; the latter connoted something mechanical and contrived. Kant drew on the antithesis in his Ideas on a Universal History from the Point of View of a Citizen of the World (1784), and it later featured in Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1918/1922).71 One aspect of Spengler’s sweeping diagnosis was that the West was undergo- ing a crisis caused by the triumph of civilisation over culture. ‘Culture and Civilization’, he wrote, ‘the living body of a soul and the mummy of it ...Culture-man lives inwards, civilization-man lives outwards in space amongst bodies and “facts”.’72 Other crucial terms might be mentioned whose meaning emerged only slowly or was subject to change. The term ‘imperialism’, for instance, was first used in Britain during the mid-Victorian period to refer the Second French Empire (1852–70) and the despotic rule of

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Napoleon III over his own people. Only in the 1860s and 1870s did it come to refer to policies of foreign conquest, though there was still much confusion over its precise meaning.73 But even when the meaning of terms was relatively fixed, there might be considerable difficulty in applying them consistently or universally. During the nineteenth century a number of countries, including Russia, China, British India and the Ottoman Empire – as well as Ireland in the case of Britain – fell awk- wardly between the two poles of the civilised and the barbarian; and the same counties would continue to pose similar conceptual problems during the twentieth century. Whether or not a country deserved to be considered within the pale of civilisation was a matter of much dis- pute: as the chapter by Jones suggests, Frederic Harrison excluded Russia, was doubtful about the Ottoman Empire and was thoroughly critical of Britain’s civilised credentials. One reason these terms proved so unstable was because they circulated in a public sphere characterised by increasingly sophisticated forms of global communication.74 The expansion of the press, together with the development of the telegraph and international news agencies, such as Reuters (established in 1851), ensured that new meanings of old words, as well as neologisms, could travel quickly, from country to country, where invariably their use was subject to further modification. But it also entailed two other consequences, both of which are apparent in this book. First, it meant that reports of military and imperial evils were subject to immediate and intense debate, especially in the press, but also in pamphlet literature and national parliaments. To be sure, governments did attempt to impose censorship in times of war, but it often proved ineffective, with major conflicts such as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and 1871 receiving unprecedented media coverage and giving rise to circulation battles between press barons.75 The existence of an increasingly commercial, global and networked public sphere thus enabled the ongoing generation of scandals regarding the ethical conduct of the state, both at war and when in charge of colonial subjects.76 The operation of this field of reference at the popular level is amply borne out by Biagini’s chapter, which examines the radical weekly Reynolds’s News, and its reaction to stories of military abuse in India and China. Yet, as Twomey’s chapter demonstrates, it also operated at more offi- cial state levels, where ostensibly sober government blue books could work as vehicles for ‘atrocity narratives’ detailing murder and violence in German-controlled South-West Africa. Secondly, it enabled domestic populations to be understood in terms of dominant images of barbaric ‘others’ and invading foreign forces.

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In Britain, Victorian social investigators such as Henry Mayhew and William Booth drew parallels between the ‘savage’ tribes of Africa and the groups of itinerant workers who dwelt in the poorest districts of England. Mayhew drew on the work of the British anthropologist James Cowles Prichard, while Booth took his inspiration – and his title – from a work published by the explorer Henry M. Stanley entitled In Darkest Africa.77 At the same time, the immigrant poor might be further understood with reference to their racial and cultural inheritance. Taylor’s chapter demonstrates how Orientalist fantasies of a ‘yellow peril’ arising in the East were directly used to demonise London’s Chinese community. In a similar vein, Speicher’s chapter shows how anarchist incidents were seen as a kind of foreign import, undertaken by conspiratorial ‘aliens’ steeped in subversive ideas drawn from the continent. Above all, however, the instability of terms such as ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’ was a product of their intense politicisation and their circulation within myriad groups competing for power and influence. Social reform movements, domestic and foreign missionaries, state and military elites, political parties, activists and writers – all operated with discourses of evil and very particular understandings of civilisation, barbarism and human agency. ‘Evil’ and ‘barbarism’ were just as much terms of dissent and radicalism as they were terms of government and theological orthodoxy. Certainly there were no settled or fixed equations between good and civilisation on the one hand, and barbarism and evil on the other. For the radicals examined here this was manifestly not the case, and the same critical posture was shared, at times, by writers and scholars. As Osborne shows, Conrad’s deeply ambiguous HeartofDark- ness blurred any equation of primitive barbarism with evil and Western civilisation with good. Another example is Toynbee’s oeuvre, which, as Gill argues, reveals a journey from the clear polarities of propaganda work to the murkier conclusions arising from first-hand experience of violence, something which shook his confidence in the innate superiority of Western civilisation and the rationality of ‘civilised man’ – and with them the benevolence of liberal interventionism.

Towards new histories of liberal civilisation

The politicisation of these terms continued long into the twentieth century. Each side in the Cold War attributed evil characteristics to the other.78 Equally, internal critiques of Western powers, such as the American opposition to the war in Vietnam, mobilised concepts of evil. Yet the use of this terminology was often branded ‘liberal’, in the

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-21 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF 22 Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents pejorative meaning of the word in the United States, where it has been used by conservatives since the 1950s to refer to a lack of patriotism.79 In the post-Cold War era, however, it is precisely the conservative pro- ponents of a new realpolitik who have revived notions of evil, culture and civilisation. In 2002, in one of his many pronouncements on the ‘war on terror’, George W. Bush stated: ‘We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name.’80 Subsequently, on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, he invoked the possibility of a plurality of civilisations, only to affirm the opposite, declaring: ‘This struggle has been called a clash of civilisations. In truth it is a struggle for civilisation.’81 Evidently political concerns and racial prejudices continue to inform our understandings of evil and barbarism. Yet, tempting though it is, we should not forget that today’s public sphere is just as vibrant as the old, and the use of such language has not passed without critical comment from journalists and scholars. In The Abuse of Evil,Richard Bernstein has proposed that what we are faced with today is not a ‘clash of civilisations’ but a ‘clash of mentalities’. On one side, he argues, we have religious fundamentalists like Bush and Osama bin Laden, who are drawn to moral absolutes and simplistic dichotomies. On the other, there are those of a more critical persuasion, who recognise that questions of evil and barbarism are always and intrinsically complex and historically situated.82 This book shares this critical ethos and affirms the need to engage with both the past and the present, and the relations of the two. Research- ing evil and barbarism across a range of scenarios and cultural forms is to open up to scholarly scrutiny a great baggage of received ideas and noxious concepts that still occupy an important part of Western political debate. Yet much work remains to be done on this front. As the opening section of this introduction noted, the aim of this book is to open, rather than resolve, a new set of questions concerning the interrelations of three principal elements: liberalism and liberal cultures of governance; the governmental assumptions and possibilities of modernity; and the discursive mediation and contestation of evil and barbarism. In fact, the new historiographical coordinates proposed by this book open up a vast range of questions, just a few of which might be mentioned here. The book brings together examples of various levels of cultural author- ity, from the canonical and learned to the popular and journalistic, as well as different forms of expression (the cinematic, novelistic, political, and so on). But how, and to what extent, did these various levels and

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-22 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF Tom Crook, Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe 23 forms come to share the same temporal and spatial framework? In this respect, useful work might be done on how modern technology and modern communication systems – the steam press, railways, electrical telegraphy, radio and cinema, for example – both enabled and struc- tured the emergence of a globalized moral imagination. The rapid – and today almost instantaneous – transmission of information relating to atrocities committed abroad, as well as stories and features regarding foreign ‘others’, is a key facet of global modernity. Yet quite how this new logistical infrastructure transformed perceptions of good and evil and the moral sensibilities of Western civilisation remains a question worthy of further scrutiny. A further issue relates to the rationality of liberal governance and the problems posed by evil in terms of the formation and cogency of liberal ideals. Evil is a moral phenomenon, but it also raises epistemological problems: or rather, problems where the two combine, so that human agency and morality become difficult to rationalise. The psychological problematic of the ‘unconscious’ is one instance of this: that within the gloomy depths of the self there lurks an enigmatic desire for evil and violence is an obvious affront to liberal notions of rational citizenship. But what of those actions which, while judged necessary for the security of liberal society, are also judged beyond liberal society, antithetical to its core moral values and its purportedly civilised way of life? Pertinent examples include the use of torture and the establishment and maintenance of concentration camps. It is here we confront what might be termed the political unconscious of liberal governance, and those actions and agents, often shrouded in secrecy, which raise the spectre of hidden forces and evil, organised conspiracies. The history of state secrecy is well-documented, of course, whilst much has been written on literary explorations of conspiratorial subcultures, especially around the turn of the twentieth century.83 Yet we still lack accounts that aim, quite pointedly, to deal with the struggles endured by liberal states to rationalise their own moral transgressions – their systematic reliance on illiberal actions and agents – and how these struggles stimulated and stirred the public imagination. A final issue that might be mentioned concerns the existence within liberal societies of moral critique and self-doubt alongside affirmations of moral superiority. The question here is of the relation of the two: or rather, and more precisely, of how self-denunciation also doubles as a means of self-exculpation. As has been noted, this book seeks to embrace the abundant nature of modern representations of evil and barbarism, which at any one time might range from the subtle and the critical on

June 16, 2011 18:36 MAC/VIL Page-23 9780230_241275_02_cha01 PROOF 24 Liberal Civilisation and Its Discontents the one hand, to the crude and the chauvinistic on the other. Liberal societies, of course, tolerate and even welcome the exchange of multiple perspectives, including those that are critical of the often excessive actions carried out in defence of liberal values. But what is the function of this moral indignation with (and within) liberalism – to what extent, that is, does it function as a means not only of disrupting a sense of moral superiority, but also of refreshing and reasserting this sense of superiority, so that liberal regimes can engage once more in acts of geopolitical and military conquest? Otherwise put, it could be that we need to develop a more critical appraisal of the role of moral and political critique, and how it helps to demonise foreign cultures apparently innately averse to democratic debate and contestation.

Notes

1. F.W. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil [1886, trans. R.J. Hollingdale] (London, 1990), p. 96. 2. G.W. Bush, State of Union Address, 21 Jan. 2002. The phrase was often reiterated in subsequent speeches. 3. See especially F.W. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals [1887, trans. D. Smith] (Oxford, 1996). 4. On the breakdown of the ‘civilisation/barbarism’ distinction, see, for example, W. Anderson, ‘The Trespass Speaks: White Masculinity and Colonial Breakdown’, American Historical Review 102 (1997), pp. 1343–70; C. Forth ‘La civilization and its Discontents: Modernity, Manhood and the Body in the Early Third Republic’, in C. Forth and B. Taithe (eds.), French Masculinities: History, Culture and Politics (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 85–102; A.L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930 (Palo Alto, CA, 1997); K. Grant, A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884–1926 (London, 2005); and C. Hirshﬁeld, ‘Liberal Women’s Organizations and the Boer War Concentration Camp Controversy’, Albion 14 (1982), pp. 27–49. 5. See A. Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil [1998, trans. P. Hallward] (London, 2002); R.J. Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation (Cambridge, 2002); S. Neiman, Evil: An Alternative History of Philosophy (with a New Preface) (Princeton, NJ, 2004); J. Baudrillard, The Intel- ligence of Evil; or, The Lucidity Pact [2004, trans. C. Turner] (Oxford, 2005); and T. Eagleton, On Evil (New Haven, CT, 2010). 6. On ideas of ‘national character’, see G. Varouxakis, Mill on Nationality (London, 2002); P. Mandler, The English National Character: The History of an Idea from Edmund Burke to Tony Blair (New Haven, CT, 2008). 7. S. Friedlander (ed.), Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution” (Cambridge, MA, 1992); D. Herzog, ‘Pleasure and Evil: Christianity and the Sexualisation of Holocaust Memory’, in J. Petropoulos and J.K. Roth (eds.), Gray Zones: Ambiguity and Compromise in the Holocaust and its Aftermath (New York, 2005), pp. 128–47.

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8. A. Camus, La Peste (Paris, 1947); H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1950); H. Arendt, On Violence (New York, 1970); and Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge, 1989). 9. A. Badiou, The Century [2005, trans. A. Toscano] (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 3–5. See also P. Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York, 2000); H. Slim, ‘Not Philanthropy but Rights: The Proper Politicisation of Humanitarian Philosophy’, International Journal of Human Rights 6 (2002), pp. 1–22. 10. The concept of ‘totalitarianism’ changed over the course of the mid- twentieth century, only later becoming invested with notions of evil. See S. Žižek, Did Someone Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion (London, 2002); M. Geyer and S. Fitzpatrick (eds.), Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared (Cambridge, 2008). 11. See, for instance, B. Pati (ed.), The 1857 Rebellion (Oxford, 2007); R. Mukherjee, ‘ “Satan Let Loose upon Earth”: The Kanpur Massacres in India and the Revolt of 1857’, Past and Present 128 (1990), pp. 178–89; and C. Hall, White, Male and Middle Class: Explorations in Feminism and History (London, 1992); C. Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867 (Oxford, 2002). 12. E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London, 1994). This is not to suggest that twentieth-century totalitarian regimes have a monopoly over acts of gross and systematic brutality. 13. Among other works which have sought to develop a broader understanding of liberalism, see J. Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (New Haven, CT, 1993); N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Politi- cal Thought (Cambridge, 1999); L.M.E. Goodlad, Victorian Literature and the Victorian State: Character and Governance in a Liberal Society (Baltimore, 2003); P. Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City (London, 2003); and W.C. Lubenow, ‘Mediating “the Chaos of Incident” and “the Cosmos of Sentiment”: Liberalism in Britain, 1815–1914’, Journal of British Studies 47 (2008), pp. 492–508; and S. Gunn and J. Vernon (eds.), The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in Imperial Britain (Berkeley, CA, 2011). 14. See especially Joyce, Rule of Freedom and Goodlad, Victorian Literature. 15. U. Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago, 1999), p. 20. 16. J. Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, NJ, 2005). 17. J.S. Mill, On Liberty [1859] (London, 1860), p. 6. 18. Pitts, A Turn to Empire,p.4. 19. Bernstein, Radical Evil; Neiman, Evil; and P. Dews, The Idea of Evil (Oxford, 2008). See also J.F. Kelly, The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition: From the Book of Job to Modern Genetics (Collegeville, MN, 2001). 20. N. Ascherson, The King Incorporated: Leopold the Second and the Congo (London, 1963); A. Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghosts: A Story of Greed, Ter- ror and Heroism (2nd edn., New York, 2007); M. Dumoulin, Léopold II de la Controverse à l’histoire (Brussels, 2001); M. Ewans, European Atrocity, African Catastrophe: Leopold II, the Congo Free State and its Aftermath (London, 2002). 21. K. Mackenzie, ‘Some British Reactions to German Colonial Methods, 1885– 1907’, The Historical Journal 17 (1974), pp. 165–75; A. Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 1856–1918 (Oxford, 2004); J. Zimmerer and J. Zeller

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(eds.), Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904– 1908 and its Aftermath [trans. E.J. Neather] (London, 2008); J. Horne and A. Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, CT, 2001). 22. J. Laycock, Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity and Intervention (Manchester, 2009); D. Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford, 2007). 23. A. Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War (Oxford, 2007); I.V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY, 2005). 24. On the history of the study of genocide, see A.D. Moses, ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History’, in A.D. Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New York, 2008), pp. 3–54. See also B. Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven, CT, 2007). 25. Cultural history remains a varied sub-field of historiography, of course. See P. Burke, What is Cultural History? (Oxford, 2008). It is used here in a broad sense to denote the shared preoccupation with how evil and barbarism have been, and continue to be, articulated and represented in various media. 26. Here she is also invoking, of course, Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York, 1963). 27. Neiman, Evil, p. xiii. 28. Bernstein, Radical Evil, pp. 226–7. 29. C.M. Kingsbury, For Home and Country: World War One Propaganda on the Home Front (Lincoln, NE, 2010), ch. 5. 30. On the notion of Africa as a ‘dark continent’, see P. Brantlinger, ‘Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the “Dark Continent” ’, Critical Inquiry 12 (1985), pp. 166–203 and W. Atkinson, ‘Bound in “Blackwood’s”: The Imperialism of “The Heart of Darkness” in Its Immediate Context’, Twentieth Century Literature 50 (2004), pp. 368–93. 31. G. Bailie, ‘Two Thousand Years and No New God’, in P. Cicovacki (ed.), Destined for Evil? The Twentieth-Century Responses (Rochester, 2005), p. 20. 32. B. Lincoln, ‘Bush’s God Talk’, in H. de Vries and L.E. Sullivan (eds.), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York, 2006), p. 275. 33. For a broad survey of the idea of original sin, see A. Jacobs, Original Sin: A Cultural History (New York, 2008). 34. See especially Bernstein, Radical Evil,ch.1. 35. Quoted in R. Jeffery, ‘Evil and the Problem of Responsibility’, in R. Jeffery (ed.), Confronting Evil in International Relations: Ethical Responses to Problems of Moral Agency (Basingstoke, 2008), p. 23. 36. M. Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion [1985, trans. O. Burge] (Princeton, 1997), pp. 167–8. 37. On the development of notions of ‘character’, see S. Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850–1930 (Cambridge, 1991), ch. 5, where he also notes the ‘unreflective Kantianism’ of Victorian morality. 38. S. Smiles, Self-Help; with Illustrations of Character, Conduct and Perseverance [1859] (London, 1866), p. 224. 39. B. Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1785–1865 (Oxford, 1986), passim.

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40. K. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background and History (London, 1972); G. Rowell, Hell and the Victorians: A Study of the Nineteenth-Century Controversies Concerning Eternal Punishment and the Future Life (Oxford, 1974); R. Gibson, ‘Hellﬁre and Damnation in Nineteenth- Century France’, Catholic Historical Review 74 (1988), pp. 383–402. 41. The matter, however, retained considerable variability, depending on sec- tarian position and the relative inﬂuence of Calvinist dogma. The Quakers’ increasing abandonment of biblical literalism and revival of the concept of the ‘inward light’ is just one example of the depreciating hold of predestination in the nineteenth century. T.P. Kennedy, British Quakerism, 1860–1920: The Transformation of a Religious Community (Oxford, 2001). 42. C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA, 2007). See especially Part III, ‘The Nova Effect’. 43. A.J. Toynbee, Acquaintances (Oxford, 1967), p. 242. 44. R. Koselleck, ‘The Temporalization of Utopia’, in R. Koselleck (ed.), The Prac- tice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts [trans. T.S. Presner et al.] (Stanford, CA, 2002), pp. 84–99. On modern utopianism more generally, see K. Kumar, Utopianism (Milton Keynes, 1990) and B. Baczko, Utopian Lights: The Evolution of the Idea of Social Progress [1978, trans. J.L. Greenberg] (New York, 1989). 45. Useful overviews include R. Smith, The Fontana History of the Human Sciences (London, 1997) and P. Wagner, A History and Theory of the Social Sciences: Not All That is Solid Melts into Air (London, 2001). 46. Gauchet, Disenchantment of the World, p. 168. 47. See especially the summary she provides of this book in S. Neiman, ‘What’s the Problem of Evil?’, in M.P. Lara (ed.), Rethinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives (Berkeley, CA, 2001), pp. 27–45. 48. M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences [1966, trans. A. Sheridan] (London, 2001); P. Manent, TheCityofMan[trans. M.A. LePain] (Princeton, NJ, 1998). Both works argue that Man assumes a ‘dual status’ within modernity, becoming both a subject and an object of knowledge and power. 49. See, for instance, J.A. Harris, Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy (Oxford, 2005); L.S. Jacyna, ‘The Phys- iology of Mind, the Unity of Nature, and the Moral Order in Victorian Thought’, British Journal for the History of Science 14 (1981), pp. 109–32; J.C. Livingston, Religious Thought in the Victorian Age: Challenges and Reconceptions (London, 2007), ch. 6. 50. H.T. Buckle, History of Civilization in England [1857] (London, 1861), p. 18. 51. Ibid., p. 8. 52. Discussions of the debate prompted by Buckle’s History can be found in T.M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900 (Princeton, NJ, 1986), ch. 6 and I. Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge, 1990), chs. 14 and 15. 53. Recent works on the ‘civilisational perspective’ include B. Mazlish, Civiliza- tion and its Contents (Stanford, CA, 2004) and B. Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago, 2009). 54. F. Guizot, The History of Civilization in Europe [trans. William Hazlitt] [1828] (London, 1997), pp. 14 and 16. 55. Ibid., p. 32.

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56. N. Elias, The Civilizing Process, Volumes I and II [1939] (Oxford, 2000), pp. 33–4. As Elias argues, from the very beginning the concept was used as a means of drawing distinctions, initially by those within courtly, aristocratic society: ‘Concepts such as politesse or civilité had, before the concept civilization was formed and established, practically the same function as the new concept: to express the self-image of the European upper class in relation to others whom its members considered simpler or more primitive.’ 57. D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London, 1751), p. 45; A. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767] (New Brunswick, NJ, 1995), p. 1. 58. On the development of anthropology, see J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge, 1974). 59. J. Mill, The History of British India [1818] (London, 1826), pp. 138–9. 60. See especially Livingston, Religious Thought,ch.5. 61. P. Mandler, ‘ “Race” and “Nation” in Mid-Victorian Thought’, in S. Collini, R. Whatmore and B. Young (eds.), History, Religion and Culture: British Intel- lectual History, 1750–1950 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 224–44; and P. Mandler, ‘The Problem with Cultural History’, Social and Cultural History 1 (2003), pp. 94–117. 62. On the views of Gobineau and others, see M.D. Biddiss, Father of Racist Ide- ology: The Social and Political Thought of Count Gobineau (London, 1970); G. Blue, ‘Gobineau on China, the “Yellow Peril”, and the Critique of Modernity’, Journal of World History 10 (1999), pp. 93–107; A. Bullard, Exile to Paradise: Savagery and Civilisation in Paris and the South Pacific (Stanford, CA, 2000); and E. Sibeud, Une Science impériale pour l’Afrique? La construction des savoirs africanistes en France, 1878–1930 (Paris, 2002). 63. R. Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London, 1983), p. 59. In his Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853/55), Gobineau adopted a plural usage. Gobineau outlined ten ‘great human civilisations’: Indian, Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek, Chinese, Italian, Germanic as well as the ‘three civilisations of America, the Alleghanian, the Mexican and the Peruvian’. See A. de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races [trans. A. Collins] [1853/55] (London, 1915), pp. 211–12. 64. A useful overview of the historiographical and sociological tradition of ‘civilisational analysis’ can be found in E.A. Tiryakian, ‘The Civilization of Modernity and the Modernity of Civilization’, International Sociology 16 (2001), pp. 277–92. 65. See S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents [1930, trans. D. McLintock] (London, 2004). 66. R. Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (Basingstoke, 2007). 67. See in particular Friedlander, Probing the Limits of Representation. 68. On ‘liberal rationality’, see A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government (London, 1996); and Joyce, Rule of Freedom. 69. E.B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art and Custom (London, 1871), p. 1. 70. A.L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, MA, 1952), p. 147.

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71. Elias, The Civilizing Process,p.9. 72. O. Spengler, TheDeclineoftheWest[1918/22] (Oxford, 1991), p. 182. 73. R. Koebner and H.D. Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and Signiﬁcance of a Political Word, 1840–1960 (Cambridge, 1964); D.S. Bell, ‘Empire and Inter- national Relations in Victorian Political Thought’, The Historical Journal 49 (2006), p. 282. 74. Historians have recently made use of the metaphor of ‘network’ to capture this growing communicational sophistication. See A. Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain (London, 2001) and S.J. Potter, News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press System, 1876–1922 (Oxford, 2003). 75. Both the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War are thought to represent something of a watershed in terms of war journalism and the press coverage of armed conﬂict. See L. Brown, Victorian News and Newspapers (Oxford, 1985), ch. 10 and R.T. Stearn, ‘War Correspondents and Colonial War, c. 1870–1900’, in J.M. MacKenzie (ed.), Popular Imperialism and the Military, 1850–1950 (Manchester, 1992), pp. 139–61. 76. See, for instance, B. Taithe, The Killer Trail: A Colonial Scandal at the Heart of Africa (Oxford, 2009); N.B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (Cambridge, MA, 2007); and A. Crozier, ‘Sensationalis- ing Africa: British Medical Impressions of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1890–1939’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35 (2007), pp. 393–415. 77. H. Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor, Volume One (London, 1861), pp. 1–3; General [William] Booth, In Darkest England, and the Way Out (London, 1890), ch. 1. 78. W.L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945–61 (New York, 1998); P.M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy (Edinburgh, 1999); T. Shaw, Hollywood’s Cold War (Edinburgh, 2007). 79. A.L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers: From F.D.R. to Bush (2nd edn., Oxford, 1992); H.W. Brands, The Strange Death of American Liberalism (New Haven, CT, 2002). 80. G.W. Bush, We Will Prevail: George W. Bush on War, Terrorism and Freedom (New York, 2003), p. 161. 81. White House press release dated 11 Sep. 2006. Cited in E. Neumayer and T. Plümper, ‘International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations’, British Journal of Political Studies 39 (2009), p. 711. 82. R.J. Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11 (Cambridge, 2005), pp. vii–ix. See also T. Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (London, 2002). 83. See for instance B. Porter, The Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch Before the First World War (London, 1987); D. Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1988 (Oxford, 1998); D. French, ‘Spy Fever in Britain, 1900–1915’, The Historical Journal 21 (1978), pp. 355–70; N. Hiley, ‘Decoding German Spies: British Spy Fic- tion, 1908–18’, Intelligence and National Security 5 (1990), pp. 55–79; and A. Wisnicki, Conspiracy, Revolution and Terrorism: From Victorian Fiction to the Late Victorian Novel (New York, 2008).

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Index

A atrocities (1915–1916), 173, 176, Abd’Al Qadir, E., 150, 154 179, 180, 185 Syrian exile, 154 Arrow War (1856–1860), 102–7 Achebe, C., 231–3 Ashcroft, J., 275 Acton, W., 44–5 atrocity Adorno, T., 243 and German conduct in South-West Afghan Wars (1878–1880), 133 Africa, 202–7, 209 Al Qa’eda, 274 and German conduct in the First Algeria, 149, 271 World War (1914–1918), 176, alleged anthropophagy, 152 177, 208, 219 land ownership, 151 and Belgian Congo, 177, 208 under military rule (Bureaux and British Parliamentary Blue Arabes), 150–1, 154 Books, 201, 202–3, 212 Algerian colonists, 150 atrocity and wartime propaganda, Algerian famine (1865–1869), 173, 184, 206, 217–18, 196 148 atrocity narratives, 202, 212, 219–20 Algerian politics, 149, 151–2 ‘Bulgarian atrocities’ (1876), 126, Algiers, 148–9 129, 176 alterity, 2, 18, 152, 267–79 explanations of perpetration, 174–9, anarchism, 55–8 180, 181–3, 191–3 Anglican Church, The, 13, 22, 36, Greek conduct in Graeco-Turkish 46–7, 62, 116 War (1919–1922), 173–4, 175, Angora (Ankara), 173 178 Anrahamian, E., 273 Ottoman atrocities against Anti-Aggression League, 128, 129 Armenians (1896), 112 anti-clerical politics, 116, 153, 155, Ottoman conduct in the First World 165 War, 173, 176, 179, 180, 185 anti-semitism, 57–60, 69, 276 Ottoman conduct in Graeco-Turkish Anti-Slavery Society, 161 War (1919–1922), 175, 180, Anti-Slavery and Aborigines’ 190 Protection Society, 208, 215 Augustine, Saint, 42 Anstey, T. C. (MP), 103 Austin, J., 131 anthropology, 16, 19, 21, 276 Apocalypse Now, 240 B Aquinas, T., 42 Bailie, G., 11 Ardrey, R., 269–70 Bakunin, M., 56 Arendt, H., 5, 232, 235 Balfour, A., 202 banality of evil, 244 Balibar, É, 273, 276–7, 279 Armenia the ‘new culturalism’, 273 and the Treaty of Sèvres, 173 Ballanche, P.-S., 17 and self-determination, 186 Balkan wars, 267 atrocities (1896), 112 Barash, D., 270

283

June 15, 2011 12:23 MAC/VIL Page-283 9780230_241275_14_ind01 PROOF 284 Index barbarism Svendborg poem, 254, 256 and international law, 127–8 Verfremdungseffekt (alienation), ‘barbarian yoke’, 126 253–4 ‘civilisation’/‘barbarism’ antithesis, Bright, J., 104 1, 13–15, 18, 99, 114, 117, British Empire, 5, 76, 89, 127–9, 126–7, 192, 234–5, 267–8 136–8, 207–8, 241 Ottoman ‘barbarism’, 8, 126, British imperialism 176 criticism of, 107, 116–17, 129, viewed by Frederic Harrison, 126, 136–8, 216 129 Brook, P., 249 ‘new barbarism thesis’, 267–8, 273, Brown, K., 262 274, 277–8 Brousse, P., 56 and terrorism, 55–6, 132–5 Buchan, J., 75 Bauman, Z., 5 Buckle, H. T., 14–15 Bawer, B., 274 Buckley, W. F., 248 Becker, W., 248 Bulgaria, 117, 126, 129, 176 Good Bye Lenin, 248, 261 Bush, G. W., 1, 11, 22, 273 Beesly, E. S., 130, 136 Buxton, N. (MP)., 211 Beethoven, L. van, 251 Buxton, V., 211 Belgian Congo, 177, 208 Berlin Congo conference C (1884–1885), 213 Caﬁero, C., 56 Congo Reform Association, 207 Cameron, V. L., 156 Benjamin, W., 252, 255–7 Camus, A., 5 Bentham, J., 6, 133, 134 Canada, 271 Berghe, P. van den, 270 Carlyle, T., 100 Bernstein, R., 8, 9, 11, 22 Casement, R., 161 biological determinism, 268–72 Catholic Church, 147–65 Blair, T., 273 model villages, 153, 166 Blake, W., 246, 262 Catholic clergy, 148 Songs of Experience, 246 apostolic freedom, 152 Songs of Innocence, 262 Cecil, Lord R., 212 Dialectic of innocence and Chamberlain, H. S., 276 experience, 246 Chakravarty, G., 105 Bloch, M., 191–2 Chartism, 100 Boer War (1899–1902), 117, 128, 133, China 177, 207, 208, 243 and the British Empire, 20, 76, 78, Booth, C., 57 81–2, 91, 105 Booth, W., 21, 57, 58 and the ‘yellow peril’, 21, 73, 89, 91, Botswana, 273 275 Brecht, B., 247, 249, 251–8, 264 Chinatown, 83–9 Ermattungstaktik (tactics of Christianity attrition), 256 and civilisation, 6, 16, 90, 102, ‘The Good Person of Setzuan’, 105–6, 109, 127, 149–50, 153, 252–3, 257 176–8, 183, 187, 194 ‘The Mask of Evil’, 247 and Islam, 127, 149–55, 172, ‘In Praise of the Dialectic’, 255 175–8 ‘In Remembrance of Marie A.’, and sin, 11–13, 37–8 252–4, 256 and theology, 12–13, 36–7, 45

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see also Anglican Church, The; culture, 268–79 Catholic Church; and ‘civilisation’, 18–19 Non-conformity Cunningham, H., 103 Christie, A., 76, 83 Curzon, Lord, 176, 183, 191, 197 Churchill, W., 64, 68 CIA, 274 D civilisation Dante Alighieri, 246 and capacity for evil, 127 Darwin, C., 16 and culture, 18–19, 268–79 de Tocqueville, A., 6, 101 and international law, 127, 135–6 defeat the ‘civilisational perspective’, experience of, 246–9, 254, 259 15–17 etymology of, 254–5 meaning of ‘civilisation’, 15–17, 19 degeneracy, 57, 82–4, 86, 89, 270 Toynbee’s theory of, 182, 188, 191, Deism, 8 194 determinism, 14–15, 160, 268 ‘clash of civilisations’, 22, 153, 273–4 devil, the, 3, 36, 39, 79, 89, 160, 234, Clogg, R., 183, 184 236–7, 246, 263 Cobden, R., 103, 104, 105 Dews, P., 8 Cold War, 21, 249, 259–62 Dickens, C., 74, 249 Colonial Office (British), 202, 208, Disraeli, B., 106, 124, 129, 176, 210–12, 214, 217 183 Donnersmarck, F. H. Von, 246–66 Colonial Office (German), 216 The Lives of Others, 246–66 Comité de Salut Public, 249 Wiesler, G., 248, 251, 257, 261–2, Committee of Union and Progress 264 (CUP), 179, 180, 185, 190, 197 Hempf, 250, 262–3 communism, 5, 87, 91, 246–66 Dreyman, 250–1, 258, 261–2, 264 see also totalitarianism Christa-Maria, 250, 261–2 Comte, A., 127, 130, 131 Dostoevsky, F., 56 Congo Free State, 161–2, 229 Doyle, A. C., 75, 76 Conrad, J., 161, 229–45 Duffield, M., 268, 277 Typhoon and other Stories, 241 Durham, E., 172, 175 The Secret Agent, 243 Heart of Darkness, 161, 229–45 E desubjectification, 239–42 Eagleton, T., 267–8 Eldorado Exploring Expedition, 235 East African plantation economy, 156 Kurtz, 231–2, 236–9 East End (London), 58–68, 74, 83–5 Marlow, 229, 238–9 East Germany (DDR), 248–9, 252, 257, ‘the horror, the horror’, 231, 236 262–3 morality, 238 Ostalgie, 248, 258–60, 263 psychology, 239 Workers uprising (1953), 253 scepticism, 240 East India Company, 107 Society for the Prevention of Savage ‘Eastern Question’ Customs, 236–7 and Gladstone’s Midlothian Cornewall Lewis, G., 137 Campaign, 129 Constant, B., 6 and Toynbee, 185 Contagious Diseases Acts, 45–50 and the Turkish Nationalists, 190 criminology, 57 Disraeli’s pro-Ottomanism, 129 Cuba, 250 Eastern Question Association, 128

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Écoles d’Orient, society of, 153 Freud, S., 17, 237 Egypt, 17, 79–80, 117, 149, 182 Freudian theory, 181, 191–2, 195, Eichmann, A., 9 261 El Mokrani revolt, 150 Froude,J.A.,137 El Salvador, 271 Elias, N., 16, 17 G Eliot, T. S., 235 Gallican-Ultramuntane debate, 148–9 Eliphinstone, Lord, 103 Gaselee, Sir S., 219 Enlightenment, The, 11–17 Gauchet, M., 12, 14 Estonia, 271 George, L., 173, 174, 175, 182, 183, eugenics, 270, 275 185, 187 evangelicalism, 12, 18, 36–41, 102, genocide, 8, 13, 197, 219–20 104, 160 Gilpin, C. (MP), 112 evil Gladstone, W. E., 104, 117, 129, 176, approaches to, 8–11 177, 183 and free will, 11–13, 15 Good and Evil, 1, 236, 262–3 and modernity, 11–17 Gorges, E. H. M., 211 as conceived by Frederic Harrison, Governor Eyre, 115–17, 124, 128, 132, 126, 129, 132 136 ‘radical evil’ (Kant), 11 Grass, G., 259, 262 necessary evil, 37, 44–5, 186–7 Ein Weites Feld (Too Far Afield), 259, Evil Empire, 250 262 Greg, W. R., 27, 43–4 Griffin, R., 17 F Grosfoguel, R., 277–8 Fabian Society, 256 Guizot, F., 15 Fanon, F., 276 Far East, 79–80, 112 H fascisms, 237, 243, 258 Haggard, H. R., 75 Ferguson, A., 16 Harrison, F., Figes, O., 262 and ‘evil’ of British imperialism, First World War, 10, 128, 202, 206–8 129, 133, 135, 136–8 fin-de-siècle and International Law, 131–2, 139 culture of, 55–8 and patriotism, 137–8 Foucault, M., 14, 230, 239 and views on ‘terrorism’, 129, 132, Foreign Office (British), 184, 201, 202, 135, 136 208, 211, 212, 213, 218 critic of Governor Eyre, 128, 132, 136 Political Intelligence Department Order and Progress, 138 (PID), 173, 185, 196 republicanism, 137–8 Franco-Prussian War (1870), 20, 147 Hannibal, 256 Frederick II of Prussia, 256 Hausmannisation, 149 Freeman, E. A., 126, 135 Hegel, G. W. F., 8, 11 free will, 11–13, 15 ‘Herero Rebellion’ (1904–1905), 203, French Revolution, 249 209 French Second Empire (1852–1870), Hetherington, H., 100 151 Hilton, B., 12 Arab kingdom policy, 151–2 Hitler, A., 255–6 French Third Republic (1870–1940), Holocaust, The, 5, 18 148 Horne, J., 176

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Houndsditch Affair, 58–61 Kaufman, R., 254 Huntington, S., 273–4 Kautsky, K., 256 Kemal, M. (Atatürk), 173, 180, 182, I 183, 187, 189, 195, 199 Imperialism Kent, C., 128 and liberalism, 6–7, 103–6 Kipling, R., 16 meaning of the term, 19–20 Koselleck, R., 13, 247–8 Indian Mutiny, see Sepoy Mutiny Kossler, R., 206 (1857) Kramar, A., 176 international law, 131, 135 Kruger, J., 205 Ireland, 20, 57, 103, 115–17 Kundnani, A., 270 Irish Land Bill, 117 Irish rebellion, 1798, 1848, 113 L suspension of Habeas Corpus, 115, Laden, O. bin, 9, 22 117 Lao-Tzu, 256 Irish Republican Brotherhood, 57 Laqueur, W., 54 Islam Lausanne Convention (1923), 191 alleged threat of, 273–4 Lavigerie, C. M. A., 147–65 Islamic identities, 268 death (1892), 164 proselysitising, 154 Le Bon, G., 17 Shi’ite, 276 Le Queux, W., 57 Suﬁ, 150–1, 154 League of Nations, 188, 217 Tijamiyya, 153–4 Lebanon massacres (1860), 153, Wahhabi, 276 154 Islamism, 10, 18, 148, 150–1, 155, Lemkin, R., 8 158, 167, 273–4 Lenin, 251, 258 fear of pan-Islamism, 186 Leo XIII, Pope, 148–9, 162, 166 social ‘evil’ of, 153, 162 Jubilee (1888), 161 Islamophobia, 150–65, 273–8 Encyclical, 161–2 Libertas, 163 J Leopold II, King of the Belgians, Jackson, R., 278 161–2 Jamaica see also Congo Free State Jamaica Committee, 128 Leroy-Beaulieu, P., 147, 155 Morant Bay rebellion, 115, 122, 124, liberal theology, 12 128, 132, 135, 136 liberalism James, H., 56 meaning of the term, 6–7 Jameson, F., 262 and imperialism, 6–7, 103–6 Jews the Liberal party, 46, 49, 60 Jewish immigration, 57 Lindh, J. W., 275 Jewish ‘threat’, 59–60 Livingstone, D., 155 Jihad, 150, 154, 276 Lloyd’s Weekly, 107 Jones, E., 102, 107, 112 Locke, J., 103 Joubert, L., 161 London bombing, July 2005, 54, Jung, C., 197 273 London, J., 58 K Lorimer, D. A., 115 Kabylia, Kabyl myth, 150, 166 Lorimer, J., 127, 135 Kant, I., 8, 11–12, 19 Louis, R. W., 202, 206

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Lovett, W., 100 Non-conformity, 12, 36, 107, 130 Luxembourg, R., 256 Noothout, J., 206

M O MacMahon, M. P. de, 132, 148 Oborski, L., 101 Mahdi, 150 Ollivier, É., 151 Maine, Sir H., 131, 132 ‘optimism’, 12 Malthusianism, 267 ‘Orientalism’, 79, 100, 111, 112, Mamdani, M., 267 148–50, 158, 267 Mandeville, B., 37, 42, 45 original sin, 11–13 Manent, P., 14 Orwell, G., 262 Marx, K., 101, 107, 264 1984, 249 Maurice, F. S., 102 Ottoman Empire, 8, 20, 126, 129, 153 Mayhew, H., 21, 43 British policy towards, 126 Mazzini, G., 100–1, 107 ‘barbarism’ of, 8, 126, 176 McCarthyism, 253 campaign against, 153, 176 Mehta, U. Singh, 6 melodrama, 249 P Metropolitan Police, 55, 58, 66, 67 Paine, T., 108 Miall, E. (MP), 112 Palmerston, Lord, 104 Mill, J., 6, 16, 103 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 215 Mill, J. S., 6, 48, 100, 106, 120, 124, Parry, J., 103 127, 130, 131–2 Paz, R., 274 Miller, J. J., 248 Percy, Lord E., 212, 213 Milton, J., 246 Peterson, S., 273 Missionaries of Africa, society of Phillips, M., 274–5 (White Fathers), 150 Positivism, 127–8 Morley, J., 128 International Policy, 130 Morel, E. D., 161, 177 London Positivist Society, 130 Multiculturalism (retreat from), 267 Potter, T. B., 115 Mungiu, C., 260–1 pragmatism, 50 4 Months, 3 Weeks and 2 Days, Prévost-Paradol, L., 147 260–1 Pritchard, Lieut-Col. Stanley Markham, 209 N prostitution, 33–51, 249, 261 Naipaul, V., 274 as ‘great social evil’, 33, 39, 45, 50 Namibia, see South-West Africa as necessary evil, 37–45 national self-determination, 100, 115, and evangelicalism, 39–41 186–7, 190, 199 and social investigation, 36–9 Nazism, 252 and the Contagious Diseases Acts, Near East, 175, 182, 194 see Contagious Diseases Acts Neiman, S., 8, 9, 11, 14 Protestant anti-slavery campaigners, Nena Sahib, 114 160–1 New York, 268, 273 Prussia, 20, 128, 132, 147 ‘new imperialism’, 117 Punch (book cover), 161 Newman, J. H., 126 Nietzsche, F. W., 1, 8, 17, 236 Q the overman, 238 Quetelet, A., 15 9/11, 2001, 1, 5, 9, 50, 268, 273 Quintus, F., 256

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R Sepoy Mutiny (1857), 5, 101, 103, racism, 231–2, 270–9 105–7, 111, 179 Ralliement, 149, 164 sexual violence, 105, 179, 180, 203 Toast of Algiers (12 November Shaftesbury, Lord, 102, 104, 109 1890), 164 Sherry, N., 229 Reagan, R., 250 Sidgwick, H., 130 Reid, R., 275 Siege of Sidney Street, 64–8 Revolutions of 1848, 100, 108 Slavery, 156 Revolutions of 1830–1833, 100 American, 114 Reynolds, E. (‘Gracchus’), 101, 108, Anti-slavery congress (1889–1890), 109, 110–11, 115 162, 213 Reynolds, G. W. M., 101, 108 campaign against, 156–65 Rinn, L., 154 and German colonial practices, 203 Reynold’s Newspaper, 100, 102, 107 slave traders, 158 defence of Boer Republics, 117 slave trading, 148, 153, 156, 160 coverage of Arrow War, 104–5 in Brazil, 158, 161 criticism of British imperialism, 107, in Congo, 160–2 116–17 in the Middle East, 160 criticism of Governor Eyre, 115–17, of Chinese in South Africa, 116 124 Smiles, S., 12, 15 on race and democracy, 112–15 Smith, A., 6 opposition to Sudan expedition, 117 Smuts, General Jan, 207, 215 pro-Sepoy stance, 108–12 Smyrna (Izmir), 173, 178, 179, 180, sympathy for Fenians, 116–17 186, 187, 196, 197 Robespierre, M. de, 249 social Darwinism, 149 Robin, R., 258 see also biological determinism Rohmer, S., see Ward, A. S., Somit, A., 273 Romania (under Nicolae Ceau¸sescu), Soviet Union, 252, 259 259–60 Spencer, H., 128 Rousseau, J.-J., 8, 11, 14 Spengler, O., 17, 19 Russell, W., 106 Spurgeon,C.H.,102 Russia, 20, 61, 68, 113, 115, 128, 129, social sciences, 13–17 137, 209, 262 and social investigation, 38–9 and free will, 15 S South-West Africa, 8, 201–20 Sagemean, M., 274 Stalinism, 239, 252, 262–3 Said, E., 100, 112 Stanley, H. M., 156 Saint Sulpice Stasi (Ministerium für church, 158, 161 Staatsichersheit), 248, 251, 257, Seminary, 148 261–2, 264 Saint-Just, L. de, 249 state surveillance, 248, 251, 257, Sartre, J.-P., 276–7 261–2, 264, 276 Schapper, C., 101 statistics and statistical reasoning, 15, Schivelbusch, W., 239, 260 35, 38–9, 49 Scott, C. P., 183 Stead, W. T., 158, 177 Second Opium War, see Arrow War stoicism, 239–40 (1856–1860) Sub-Saharan Africa, 151, 267, 269 Second World War, 17, 202, 252 Swiney, C. F., 275

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T United States of America, 252, 275 Tait, W., 39 utopianism, 13, 17, 40, 50, 258 Talbot,J.B.,38 Tanzania, 158 V Taylor, C., 12 Varouxakis, G., 128 terrorism, 129, 132–6, 273–8 Vanhanen, T., 270–1 and anarchism, 55–8 Vatican council (1870), 149 meaning of the term, 132–6 Venizelos, E., 173, 182, 183, 195 Tippu Tip, 156, 157, 161 Virginity, Virgin Mary, 250 The Manchester Guardian, 104, 173, Vogler, M., 128 183 von Trotha, General L., 203 The Northern Star, 100–1 Voss, M., 257 The Times, 104, 106, 208 theodicy, 11–12, 16 W totalitarianism, 5–6, 239, 248, 262 Walkowitz, J., 249 see also communism; Nazism Wallace, E., 75, 76 Touré, S., 150 Ward, A. S., Townsend, M. E., 206 Brood of the Witch Queen,80 Toynbee, A. J., Dope, 81, 86 A Study of History, 174, 194, 195 The Devil Doctor, 82, 86 Koraes Chair, King’s College The Drums of Fu Manchu,91 London, 172, 183, 184 The Mask of Fu Manchu,82 Rosalind (wife), 184 The Mystery of Dr Fu Manchu, 73, 78, Royal Institute of International 82, 88, 91 Affairs, 193, 199 and ‘Orientalism’, 79 Survey of International Affairs, 174 Wardlaw, R., 37, 38, 40 The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks, Watt, I., 230 185 Watts, C., 242 theory of civilisation, 182, 188, 191, Weekly Times, 106 194 Webb, K., 271–2 The Western Question, 174, 179, 180, Weber, M., 17, 237 189 Weivorka, A., 220 Trevelyan, Sir C., 106 Wells,H.G.,230 Treaty of Sèvres (1920), 173, 191 Wendepunkt, 250 Trollope, A., 74 Wilberforce, S. (Bishop of Oxford), 109 Troutbeck, J., 217–18 Williams, R., 17 Tuastad, D., 267 Wilson, President W., 210, 215 Tunisia, 165 Wong, J., 103 Tylor, E. B., 19 X U xenophobia, 272–3 Uganda, 161 Umar Tal, El H., 150 Y Universal Negro Improvement Yared, G., 252 Association, 214 US Z Civil War, 158 Zanzibar, 156, 158 war on drugs, 275 Žižek, S., 263

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