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Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243

Selected Papers of Beijing Forum 2005 The One and the Many: A Classicist Reading ... and Its Role in the Modern WorldüAn Attempt on Modern Chinese Conservatism

Axel Schneider

Leiden University

ĀModern Chinese Conservatism”: A meaningful concept

When writing on modern Chinese conservatism one of the first challenges is to reflect upon what it means to do that. Can we take Chinese conservatism as our theme just like that? Aren’t we imposing a Western concept that only makes sense as part of the triad of Liberalism, Marxism and Conservatism in the context of 18th to 20th century Western intellectual and political history? Asking these questions is not an exercise in academic political correctness, but a necessary prerequisite for approaching the historical phenomenon of whathitherto especially in China but also in the West has been called modern Chinese conservatism. There are obvious reasons why using the concept of conservatism is at least worth a try. The term conservatismor what common dictionaries take for that, i.e. ֱᅜЏН or ᅜ៤ЏН-is being widely used in China. Hence, to engage with what this term means in China is not a futile exercise. Yet, to write about Chinese conservatism is not the same as to explorein the tradition of German Begriffsgeschichtewhat the meaning of the Chinese terms ֱᅜЏН or ᅜ៤ЏН is. iIt goes without saying that the analysis of what these Chinese terms mean has to be part of the application of the concept of conservatism to China. It is rather the attempt to apply a generic concept developed in research on Western history to a nonWestern historical phenomenonvery much as if a Chinese historian would apply the concept of kaozheng (㗗䆕) to understanding and classifying the Rankean emphasis on archival work for historical research. Why should that make any sense at all? There are two reasons why it not only can make some sense, but why we basically have to apply this concept andin the process of doing thatadapt it to the case under scrutiny. The most obvious reason is the simple historical fact that there are Chinese intellectuals such as Liang Ch’ich’ao or Wu Mi and others who have engaged with Western conservatism and allegedly have been influenced by it. They haveas their Western counterpartsopposed an intellectual current that has identified itself and has been described as the Chinese enlightenment. If we assume that the Chinese enlightenment bears any similarity with core characteristics of the Western enlightenment and if we assume that conservatism is basically an antiEnlightenment movement as analyzed by Isaiah Berlin,ii then the cautious and balanced application of the Western concept of conservatism that is open to the possible failure of this endeavor is not only justified, but is in fact crucial. However, considering the possibility of an influence of Western conservatism be it in a direct way via Western conservatives or be it via the similarity of the opposed enemybegs the question what that influenceiii of the West on modern Chinese history and especially of Western ideas on modern Chinese intellectual history could be; a question that has troubled historians for nearly a century. From the Āchallengeresponseāiv and “history and value”v models to the Āinner logic of Chinese historyāvi. and to Ādiscovering history in Chinaāvii various suggestions have been made. However, this question of how to do research on modern Chinese history, of how to evaluate Western influence on it, of what perspective to adopt is a question that can be quite misguiding.

1877-0428 © 2010 Beijing Forum. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2010.05.078 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7219

For one reason, because the answers brought forward more often than not suggest either the dominance of the “Western influence” or the “continuity of China’s tradition”. Not only that I would not know what “China’s tradition” refers to, the juxtaposition as such is misleading. Not so much because it suggests a ĀWestā and a ĀChinese traditionāthese hermetically closed concepts have been criticized and abandoned long ago, but because it insinuates a general model of Āinfluenceā that can be clearly identified and that is equally applicable across various fields of human interests, knowledge and activity. To me it seems to be much more plausible to assume that the patterns of encounter, reception, adaptation, rejection etc. not only vary over time, space, and type of activity, but also depending on personal, social, and political background of the protagonists involved. There is, however, a more important reason why the debates on the models of influence and cultural interaction have to be taken with caution. This reason is the underlying assumption that we, the observers, the researchers, can actually in a kind of disinterested, dislocated way freely choose among them. I am not arguing that we can not make informed choices between competing interpretations of an historical event or of a system of ideas, however, we all are situated within, thrown into specific historical and cultural locations that form and guide our perspectives.viii Rather thansay as a German sinologist trying to look at things Chinese from the inner perspective doing as if one could discard one’s cultural baggage, or as a present Taiwanese historian writing about these topics as if they would not come from and have implications for the here and now, why not turn the situation on its head and emphasize the 2005 German, Taiwanese or whatever perspective and thus disclose a way of looking at the world rather than hiding behind a seemingly objective or neutral posture? We still can try to take a glimpse from the inner perspectiveby, e.g. analyzing the concepts Chinese researchers use to make sense of their history and culture, yet we will always have to admit that this is at best an ideal goal and at worst a farreaching selfdeception. To research the phenomena that hitherto have been described as modern Chinese conservatism with the help of concepts of conservatism that are of Western origins is thus not only justified as argued above, it is in fact unavoidable and the success or failure of this endeavor depends on whether or not this is being done in a careful and balanced way. It is against the background of these methodological considerations that my ongoing research project on modern Chinese “conservatism” has to be read.

Towards a conceptual framework

What then is conservatism? Should we use this concept at all and if yes, how should we use it? Asking these questions we immediately face the thorny issue of how to deal with a plethora of more or less pejorative terms used to describe and/or attack people who speak in one way or the other in favor of traditional socio-political practices: reaction, conservatism, traditionalism, nativism, cultural nationalism etc. We can observe at least three ways of using the term Āconservatismā:

(a) “Conservative” is to identify this person as the target for attack; (b) as a descriptive term referring to positions that have been labeled by others (continuously over a longer period) as “conservative”, and (c) as an analytical term clearly defined in its own right.

On top of that, in studies of modern Chinese history the term is often used to refer to people

(a) who can neither be classified as “liberal” nor as “Marxist”, (b) who argue in one way or the other in favor of continuity with China’s tradition (however that’s defined in each respective case),ix or (c) who advocate a concept of change that emphasizes gradual change.x

The term conservatism in its daily usage is thus either polemical or descriptive and in any case only vaguely defined. Its application to China is further complicated by its Western background and identification with very concrete substantial claims of “conservatives” that very often only make sense in the context of British, German, French, US-American etc. history and tradition and its particular configurations. Any meaningful general concept of conservatism has thus to abstract from the concrete social, political and historical circumstances and focus on types of thinking. Only then will we be able to use it fruitfully in a cross-cultural comparison of modern intellectual phenomena that will also help us to discern basic philosophical and cultural differences.xi 7220 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243

Most generally speaking conservatism as a phenomenon of modern intellectual history is a specific philosophical and politicalxii position with regard to the question of the origins and substance of ultimate standards of human behavior, the nature of human beings and human society, and, last but not least, the nature of historical change (“history” in the modern sense) and its role in undermining any sort of absolute and eternal standards. xiii Conservatism clearly is a modern phenomenon, because it arose in the wake of the enlightenment challenge against the authority of tradition, i.e. against inherited, religiously or cosmologically grounded views on these matters, and thus had to organize and rationalize a defense against (some of) these challenges. Contrary to Mannheim, who juxtaposed one type of conservative thoughtxiv with the Enlightenment or natural law type of thought, I argue that we should distinguish at least two types of conservatism both of which arose in opposition to the Enlightenment:xv the classicist and a historicistxvi conservatism.xvii Both are opposed to key tenets of the Enlightenmentxviii such as the emphasis

a. on timeless, universal reason and the deduction of particulars from universal principles, b. on the natural sciences as the model for all sciences (mechanistic world view), c. on the general applicability of laws to history and society and hence the control of history and society, and particularly in the West- d. on popular sovereignty, human rights and equality.xix

Classicist conservatives do not object to the Enlightenment’s emphasis on universal standards, however, they oppose the specific standards the Enlightenment proposes, i.e. the assumption that all human beings are equally rational and that human beings can-based on reason and with the help of modern science-understand and thus ultimately control the world. Classicist conservatives argue that there exists a set of timeless and universal moral standards that although it can be apprehended, can not be altered and adjusted to human needs or desires. On the contrary, the human condition is defined by these standards.xx Time and again, classicists point out-in the West mostly referring to Greek philosophy-that the essence of these moral standards is to exert self-control, to restrain oneÿs desires rather than to pursue pleasure in a hedonistic or utilitarian way, is to value duty rather than to cherish rights, and is to act in such a way as to further the interests of the collective and not of the individual. However, these aims can not be enforced or ensured via some grand socio- political design-as those inspired by the Enlightenment thought they could. The utmost human beings can do, is to set up socio-political structures that are to a certain extent conducive to the realization of these standards. However, due to the limitations of the human mind and the inherent fallibility of human beings this is facing serious limitations and will time and again fail. The classicist conservatives thus share with the Enlightenment the emphasis on timeless, ahistorical principles that can be used to understand history, but which are not affected by the course of history itself. The historicist conservatives, in stark contrast to that, start out from the assumption that all human institutions are historically relative. They argue that universal standards such as those proclaimed by their classicist contemporaries or the Enlightenment philosophes may perhaps exist, however, due to the limits of human understanding and human moral faculties, they can not be apprehended and are hence ultimately irrelevant. Rather than trying to apprehend the Āun-apprehendableā, historicist conservatives argue that human beings have no choice but to rely on particular, historically grown traditions. They should inherit, continue and further develop tradition, i.e. the wisdom of the forefathers, and should not be blinded by the crooked fantasies of arrogant philosophes and their notion of timeless human reason that supposedly can control and improve the environment and human society. Opposing the Enlightenment, historicist conservatives hold historically grown, relative culture, language, and customs in high esteem. They contrast arcane and vigorous life, which can not be anticipated, with what they perceive as the empty, arid theories of the philosophes. For them being-the individual, contingent existence of the here and now-is the starting point from which to strive for knowledge and wisdom that converges towards the universal. Therefore they attack what they call the static way of thinking of the Enlightenment, which imagines the correct way of thinking as an “ought” independent of the historically grown “is”.xxi Eventually this type of conservatism, sharing with the romantic movement its passion for the individual and irrational, leads to a thorough historicization of all aspects of human life and thus makes an important contribution to the development of modern historical science and to the development of the philosophy of life of the late 19th century and later to existentialism. Quite different from romanticism, however, the historicist conservatives attempt to anchor the individual being in larger entities: tradition and society. Tradition is the historically grown, tested Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7221 wisdom of the forefathers on which one has to rely in order to cultivate a good society.xxii Society is seen as an organism that is not structured in a mechanical way as the sum of its parts, but as a totality that takes on qualities distinct from its individual elements, which thus only become understandable as parts of that totality.xxiii What both types of conservatism share is their stress on human fallibility, their doubts with regard to universal human reason, and their rejection of any notion of a necessary, linear historical progress. Besides, both types of conservatism assume in their political anthropology that considerable variation exists among human beings and that they thus either differ in their capacity to understand the classicist moral standards or in their capacity to live according to the inherited historical traditions as historicist conservatives request. They hence articulate a qualitative vision of freedom, rather than the quantitative, egalitarian view typical for the Enlightenment protagonists.xxiv It is obvious that the boundary between conservatism on the one hand and cultural or romantic nationalism on the other hand is sometimes hard to draw.xxv There are, however, some decisive difference to be found in the attitude towards the nation-state as a modernizing agent that establishes a modern educational system, transforms subjects into citizens, sets up a modern military and a modern infrastructure, and creates a modern economic system with an efficient tax system as its core. Nationalists of whatever sort emphasize the egalitarian, national community of compatriots. This community might be defined with reference to history and culture, which seems to be similar to historicist conservatism. However, the goal of all these efforts-to build a nation-state, a community of citizens compatriots, and a new collective national identity-is to modernize. Conservatives doubt this goal, because it either contradicts the universal ethical standards of the classicist conservatives or because it is not in line with the historicist conservatives’ attempts to carefully inherit and build on the wisdom of tradition. In other words: conservatives who turn to the state as the focus of collective identification and then accept or even support this state in pursuing a policy of political, social and economic modernization are no longer conservatives. In late-developing countries, which are under enormous pressure from modernized countries, xxvithe distinction between conservatism and nationalism is even more delicate. Because of the need to secure naked survival, it became necessary to pursue a policy of industrial-technical modernization. This in turn soon led to changes that went far beyond a purely Āindustrial-technicalā level. So, even committed conservatives in these countries were before long facing the choice of either sticking to their principles and thus facing the possibility of extinction or of making compromises and eventually having to give up core elements of their conservative ideology. As a result of this pressure, various forms of blending compromises occur that further complicate the distinction between conservatism and cultural or romantic nationalism, a phenomenon we can widely observe in modern Chinese intellectual history.xxvii

Research on modern Chinese conservatism

Western research on modern Chinese is-in comparison to research on Chinese liberalism, Marxism and other “non-conservative” intellectuals scarce. An indirect approach that has been quite influential for a long time is Levenson’s model of history and value, which-with regard to conservatives and traditionalists (the distinction is in fact not made in Levenson’s work)-posits that tradition can no longer rationally be defended; hence those who are nevertheless defending it do that out of an emotional attachment to history only.xxviii This model has been criticized for reducing the commitment to tradition to something not rationally justifiable and hence purely emotional, and for thus missing an important aspect of the thought of those considered to be conservative, because it can not really take them serious. No wonder that in Levenson’s work the conservatives are mentioned only in passing.xxix Another approach is to interpret modern Chinese conservatism as an exercise in intellectual camouflage for authoritarian rule.xxx Meißner analyses the thought of Chang Chün-mai and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and their role in the debate on science and metaphysics and comes to the conclusion that this debate was mainly a continuation of the age-old conflict between speculative Sung Neo-Confucianism and empirical Han-learning, a continuation which led to the reception of only those elements of Western thought that could be adapted and integrated into Chinese forms, in which process they were misinterpreted. Neo-Confucianism is-according to Meißner -a system of thought characterized by the assumption of an a priori Li (⧚), that denies diversity, assumes the existence of one unifying metaphysical principle as the basis for the polity, and can thus easily be used for authoritarian political ends. As is the case today in the PRC, this conservative way of reasoning only allows for a partial, that is, economic, modernization and is mainly apologetic. 7222 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243

This interpretation too ignores the possibility of sincere, rational commitment to traditional values, albeit with different implications. It is highly improbable that Chang Chün-mai’sxxxi and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s arguments were primarily of a political-apologetic nature. The later political career of Chang provides ample evidence for the fact that the simple equation of conservatism with authoritarianism is mistaken. Besides, leading cultural conservatives of the 1920s and 30s, such as Chang Shih-chao and Chang Ping-lin, were in favor of a federalist political system and opposed to a centralist, authoritarian state. A less narrow approach can be found in the only Western monographxxxii on Chinese conservatism in the 20th century by Guy Alitto. He sets out from the hypothesis that Chinese conservatism is characterized by the same attributes as everywhere else, the most important of which is a dualistic structure of thinking. Conservatives contrast ideas which they consider to be typically Western with a corresponding autochthonous Chinese idea such as e.g. matter and spirit or reason and intuition. Alitto traces the postulated global uniformity of conservatism back to a likewise uniform process of modernization, which the conservatives oppose. The main difference between the countries where modernization originated and late-comers is the fact that in the latter the modernization process was conceived of as being foreign and forced upon them. Therefore, culturally conservative and nationalist motives came to be blended, resulting in a latent contradiction between particularistic and universalistic points of view. Nationalist motives resulted in the extensive acceptance of foreign thought with the aim of strengthening the nation in the fight against imperialism, whereas culturally conservative motives emphasized the protection of the particular tradition in order to preserve cultural identity.xxxiii Although Alitto’s analysis of this contradiction and of the dualistic structures of conservative thinking does take into account some characteristics of Chinese conservatism, his theory is marred by its rigidity. In the Chinese case it is obvious that not all intellectuals of the Republican period that are considered to be conservative conceived of their culture as being particular and, therefore, did not embrace a dualistic world view xxxiv . Furthermore, this interpretation fails to consider the political and social motives and implications of the various conservative positions. In contrast to these studies, the articles published in Charlotte Furth’s The Limits of Change emphasize the heterogeneity of Chinese conservatism and pay attention to the intellectual convictions as well as to the political aims and implications of the conservative positions discussed. Furthermore, they tend to interpret the cultural continuities and discontinuities as the result of a long and complex process of reception of Western ideas and their interaction with autochthonous Chinese conceptions.xxxv According to these articles two different types of crises can be discerned: a crisis of identity expressed in the dichotomy of particularism and universalism; and a crisis of meaning that is related to what Charlotte Furth identifies as the separation of culture and politicsxxxvi and what Chang Hao addresses as a fundamental spiritual disorientation triggered by the demise of the old Confucian moral cosmology.xxxvii These two crises are by no means characteristic to conservatism, however, conservatives adopt specific strategies to deal with them. According to Charlotte Furth the separation of politics and culture is a way for cultural conservatives of the National Essence School to become politically progressive while trying to safeguard traditional Chinese culture or at least parts of it. Culturexxxviii-previously central to the emperor’s legitimacy now looses its cosmic quality and becomes a realm in its own interest and a focus of a new type of historically minded research. She argues that there were basically two types of modern Chinese conservatives: those as the National Essence School or the later nativists who emphasize China’s national, particular culture that no longer serves any direct political, legitimizing purpose, and the neo- traditionalist Confucians who emphasize that Confucianism is the core of China’s culture and is de facto of universal relevance. This second type emerges only after the May Fourth movement and strives to reintegrate culture and politics. During the 1920s and 30s it is philosophers such as Liang Shu-ming and Feng Yu-lan who represent this universalistic orientation, whereas particularistic nativism, stressing and sometimes idealizing China’s national culture, is exemplified by advocates of National Essence and by the Kuo-min-tang of the 1930s.xxxix The Hsüeh-heng group, established in 1922, around Liu Po-ming, Mei Kuang-ti, Wu Mi, and Liu I-cheng, seems to occupy a middle ground between these two types. This approach is very useful, because it situates the conservatives in a tension between two different yet connected crises that can be applied to modern Chinese intellectual history of the late 19th, early 20th century in general. It also aims at identifying different types of conservatives such as the National Essence School and the nativists, or the neo-traditional Confucians. However, especially with regard to the former the definition remains rather ambiguous and makes it difficult to differentiate between conservatives and cultural nationalists who are still pursuing the goal of quite far-reaching modernization. The reliance on China’s now nationalized culture, the Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7223 reference to its particular traditions and history can serve quite different purposes depending on the arguments brought forward to justify that and the context within which these arguments are made. In other words: to invariably interpret emphasis on national and/or cultural particularity as an attempt to address the crisis of identity and an expression of a separation of culture and politics as Charlotte Furth has phrased it, with culture here best understood as referring to the traditional moral cosmology of Heaven, is not convincing. This emphasis and the disintegration of the old cosmological and political vision did affect many modern Chinese intellectuals across all ideological camps. Emphasis on national particularity can be found among revolutionary nationalists and a separation of culture and politics can be found among liberals. Both reactions are-as I will argue and try to substantiate on the following pages by relying on my above mentioned definition of conservatism not typically conservative. Bearing in mind how I have defined conservatism and the state of the field as described above it is crucial to reassess allegedly conservative intellectuals and positions. What we have to look at in order to come to a better understanding and a clearer typology of conservatism is the way intellectuals justify ultimate moral and political values and tenets, and how these are related to history, i.e. to change in time.xl As cases I have selected two intellectuals-Wu Mi and Ch’en Yin-ch’eh-from the Hsüeh-heng group and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, who is often characterized as having turned conservative after his trip to Europe after World War I.

The Hsüeh-heng group: A general classificationxli

Founded in 1922 the Hsueh-heng became one of the most influential conservative journal of the 1920s and 30s. The Hsueh-heng itself can be roughly classified as consisting of three groups of intellectuals, who were united in their opposition to the New Culture Movement. The core group of syncretistic Neo-humanists consisted of Mei Kuang-ti, Wu Mi, Hu Hsien-su, and others, who focused on literature and literary criticism. Their basic arguments can be traced back to their student-days in the USA under the influence of Irving Babbitt, one of the leaders of American New Humanism.xlii Babbitt argued against the materialistic and utilitarian aspects of modernity and envisioned a universal humanistic civilization being a combination of the European classical tradition of Greek philosophy, Indian Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism. The scholars of this core group contended that the Chinese national essence can be found in the classical literature,xliii which has to be protected against modern materialism, romanticism and utilitarianism. But in contrast to many other conservatives of this period like Liang Shu-ming, they did not equate these Āismsā with the West, but rather emphasized the basic similarity of Chinese and Western classical civilization. Nowhere can we find a hint in their writings that they conceived of Confucianism as a Chinese remedy to the Western illness of modernity, but rather as one part of a classicist answer to the problems of modernity. They opposed the May Fourth Movement not because it advocated a new culture, but because of what they perceived as its romanticism and utilitarianism and, last but not least, its iconoclasm; in other words: the May Fourth Movement stood from their point of view for the wrong Ānew cultureā. They argued instead that the clear-cut juxtaposition of old and new, East and West is misleading,xliv traditional narrative and poetic forms.xlv The ideal culture was to be based on Confucianism and, simultaneously, to embody the principles of Neo- humanism. Only those foreign elements were to be adopted, which are of universal value and are adequatexlvi to Chinese culture. The task of the scholar-poet is to represent this humanistic culture and to lead society. Although Wu Mi and his colleagues seldom addressed questions of China’s future political organization, it is obvious that they opposed modern mass democracy as well as a return to traditional political forms, i.e. the restoration of a monarchy. Instead they preferred a highly elitist form of state with the Confucian scholar-poet at the top of the social and political hierarchy.xlvii The second group within the Hsüeh-heng camp, which later became known as the school of historical geography,xlviii consisted of scholars like Liu I-cheng, Miao Feng-lin, Cheng Ho-sheng, Chang Ch’i-yün and others, who had not studied in the West.xlix Mostly professional historians this group stood for a China-centered universalism. Although they agreed with most of the neo-humanistic principles of their above-mentioned colleagues, they did not participate in the dissemination of Babbitt’s ideas in China. They rather concentrated on the refutation of May-Fourth historiographyl and defended the traditional, ethical view of history. Despite this rather traditional approach to history they tried to realize their aims by using new forms and methods of historiography and were actively engaged in the reception of Western theories of historiography.li During the 1920s Liu I-cheng and Lu Mou-te published in the Hsüeh-heng in serialized form two of the first monographs on cultural history. Liu’s aim in writing his History of Chinese Culturelii was to analyze the exchange 7224 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 between China and foreign people throughout history in order to discover the “causality”liii of cultural change. He reached the conclusion that although China had several times been heavily exposed to foreign cultures it had always succeeded in assimilating these influences. According to Liu this was due to the particularity of its culture and national spirit, which he saw as embodied in the Confucian rites. But, as becomes abundantly clear in his History of Chinese Culture as well as in other articles, Liu assumed that China with its superior Confucian ethics will again take the lead over Western civilization or at least make significant contributions to the badly shaken materialistic culture of post-war Europe.liv A third type of intellectual loosely linked to the Hsüeh-heng group consisted of historians like Wang Kuo-wei, Ch’en Yin-ch’eh, T’ang Yung-t’ung and Chang Yin-lin, who were linked to the Hsüeh-heng rather loosely.lv They did publish a few articles in the Hsüeh-heng and although it is obvious that they shared some basic humanistic convictions of the Hsüeh-heng scholars, they never actively participated in the publication and editing process of the journal.lvi Whereas Wu Mi stressed the universal neo-humanistic civilization consisting of Western, Chinese and Indian elements, Liu I-cheng from the group of historical geography emphasized the particularity of Chinese culture, sometimes even implying that it is superior to Western culture. Ch’en and T’ang chose an intermediate position that can best be described as stressing cultural particularity and assuming that all cultures are-in terms of world culture- of equal standing, thus implying a universalistic perspective. This classification of the various groups with the Hsüeh-heng camp is nothing but a first step at analyzing their diverging conservative positions. Especially with regard to the first two groups many questions remain to be asked such as:

a. What exactly was their ideal of a universal civilization and how did it relate to China’s traditions? b. Did they proceed from the assumption of the equality of different civilizations sharing some core values, or did they envision one unified civilization? c. What were their concepts of historical change and how were these related to the eternal standards of universal civilization? d. What was the role of Chinese culture in universal civilization and how would it contribute to it or be incorporated into it?

In order to find answers to these questions I will in the following analyze Wu Mi’s vision of ethics, culture, and history.

Genesis of the question

Starting with research on the development of modern Chinese historiography and especially of the historiography and historical thinking of Ch’en Yin-ch’eh and Fu Ssu-nien, I ended up comparing their views with those of Leopold von Ranke, the famous German architect of “scientific history”, who allegedly was the model of both, Ch’en and Fu. The aim of this comparison was not so much to take one side in order to judge the other or to use the standards of modern Western historiography to evaluate how “advanced” modern Chinese historiography was at the time of Ch’en and Fu. The aim was rather to proceed from an admittedly modern Western perspective and see whether the application of some of the questions asked in the West about the typical modern, i.e. historical condition to Chinese historiography would make any sense and if yes what sense it would make. True, this inquiry remains within the confines of a modern Western perspective (which is the only one I have), but if done carefully it will unravel important differences. On the following pages I quote from a previous publication summarizing my findingslvii on the historiography of Ch’en Yin-ch’eh, Fu Ssu-nien and Ranke. The aim is to clarify, first, my point of departure with regard to central notions such as “modernity”, “historicity” and the “crisis of modernity”, and, second, to look at Ch’en’s and Fu’s historiography from that perspective.

The historiography of Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh, Fu Ssu-nien and Ranke

Key concepts: modernity, historicity By “modernity”lviii I refer to the ongoing process of historicization and, hence, relativization of norms and values once conceived as timeless and universal. In Europe this process has been characterized by a decline of Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7225 metaphysical and theological assumptions on the structure of the world and a concomitant decline of traditional assertions of ontological and epistemological coherence. The world was less and less conceived as one finite world, but rather turned into a meta-world, that was dissolved into a diversity of possible world viewslix -a term in itself symptomatic of the change that had taken place. Kant’s philosophy only was but a first step towards what Max Weber would later call “disenchantment”. In his epistemological turn Kant transferred the structures of the world into a priori structures of consciousness, thus preparing the ground for the ongoing process of decentering the world. However, history understood as the historicity and relativity of human existence not yet played any role-Kant’s world was still one world, even if turned epistemological. But not later than Hegel, history became the central issue and Western thought ever since has been characterized by various attempts at reconciling historical relativity with universal norms. However, Hegel’s view of history was not only based on the conviction that historical particulars had to be reconciled with a universal spirit, it also provided a teleological path of the articulation of the Spirit in world-history, thereby ultimately subordinating the individual to universal necessity. In the course of the decline of German idealism, his grand vision and the underlying premises of Enlightenment and Idealism were increasingly challenged. From Herder’s philosophy of individual cultures, to Ranke’s historicism, and to Dilthey’s view of history based on a philosophy of life. It was not until after World War One that these approaches were superseded, culminating in the growing awareness of an irreconcilable chasm between contingent facts and normative tenets. Heidegger, for example, refuted any attempt at defining a metaphysical absolute, declaring the historicity of human existence to be the only universal left.lx None of these philosophers and historians reestablished a universal teleology of history. Universal reason, the backbone of Enlightenment, was explicitly denied a dominant role in history and became itself historicized. Most of the historicist and hermeneutic approaches in fact opposed and replaced the Enlightenment idea of progress by the notion of “development” (German Entwicklung). Based on an analogy with individual organic growth, the idea of development did not entail a hierarchy based on the progressive realization of knowable norms.lxi In the light of these historical developments of reflecting on “historical development” I suggest to conceive of modernity as a phenomenon that can not be adequately characterized by a totalizing notion of the progress of reason or any other absolute.lxii Instead, I believe that it should be understood as marked by the intrinsic tension between attempts, on the one hand, at resurrecting some sort of philosophical, theological, historical, or scientific certainty, and, on the other hand, the consequences deriving from the verdict of Nietzsche, that God is dead and mankind is liberated from and condemned to live without firm metaphysical or theological foundation.lxiii Turning to China, however, it is striking first, how much our image of modern Chinese intellectual history has long been dominated either by May Fourth historiography or by state-official ideologies, and that, second, Chinese intellectuals opposed to these interpretations have been stigmatized as conservative or even as reactionary.lxiv Yet, taking into consideration that in Europe it were the very conservatives contributing in important ways to the clarification of the notion of historicity and the problem of modernity,See Mannheim, Karl, Konservatismus, Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Wissens ˷Conservatism, A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge˹ (Frankfurt/ Main: Suhrkamp), 1984. paying more attention to their Chinese counterparts will help us to arrive at a more balanced understanding of the relation between historicity, national particularity and the problem of universals. Given the fact that historically the writing of history in China had always enjoyed a higher status than in the West,lxv it is no wonder that historiography found itself at the center of modern debates, not only leading to a considerable reorientation of Chinese identity, but also to a growing awareness of the challenge posed by modernity. Already from the late Ch’ing onwards Western ideas began to influence the conceptions and eventually the very language by which Chinese intellectuals tried to cope with that challengelxvi. Though historiography initially had been heavily influenced by the evolutionary world view, lxvii already in the 1910s the situation had changed dramatically as various imported concepts of historiography together with indigenous traditions shaped a discourse that was very lively and pluralistic. Although both Chinese historians I discuss here have followed dissimilar methodologies and agendas of research, both have been described as having been influenced by Ranke.lxviii Therefore a comparison of their historiography will not only shed light on the processes of the adoption and appropriation of Western thought and its intermingling with indigenous approaches, but can additionally serve as an example of how Chinese historians tried to cope with the modern problem of historicity, the crisis of identity and the task to redefine China’s position in the world. 7226 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243

Ranke’s historiography Ranke usually comes to mind as the founder of empiricist research emphasizing the critical evaluation of archival material, and aiming at objective knowledge about the past. His often quoted slogan that the aim of research is to find out “wie es eigentlich gewesen” represents this image.lxix However, his methodology was nothing but a means to a higher end. The historicist Ranke argued against the enlightenment approach to history, castigating it as superimposing abstract theories on history, thereby violating its very individuality. Not philosophy, but theology was the basis of his view of history. He assumed that every epoch is characterized by its “particular tendency” and its “own ideal”. The aim of writing history thus was to elucidate the differences between the individual epochs, and to show how every epoch, although individual and incomparable, was the manifestation of God’s will. The methodological conclusion was to envision historical research as a basically hermeneutic project. The prerequisite attitude towards the object of research was to be one of “Mitgefühl”, that is “compassion” or “empathetic understanding”. The historian was to become aware of the individuality and the ideals of an epoch through intuition and spiritual contemplation.lxx But how can we make sense of these apparently self-contradictory demands to carry on disinterested, objective research and, at the same time, to contemplate the very individuality of history as the expression of divine providence? For Ranke, to be sure, this was not a contradiction. Understanding history as the always individual manifestation of God’s will, almost inevitably led him to the demand not to subdue a past to present, subjective needs of making sense of the past. On the contrary, meaning was to be found in the past and the only way to relate this meaning to one’s own present was through God. This understanding of the relation between historical particularity and the religious universal was his way of defending the particular, that is Germany, against what he perceived as the arrogance of universal enlightenment, that is the French revolution, without being forced into relativism. Yet, at the end of the nineteenth century, many German historians, already far removed from Ranke’s world view, had lost faith in divine providence. They either did-in a positivist manner-put more stress on the methodological aspects related to the treatment of primary sources or were looking for other ways of relating the historical to the universal as was the case with Dilthey’s philosophy of life.lxxi The historiography of Ch’en Yin-ch’eh and Fu Ssu-nien Turning to the reasons why Ch’en Yin-ch’eh and Fu Ssu-nien have been labeled the “Chinese Ranke” it is most interesting to note that both argue for a very different philosophical and methodological approach to history. Fu,lxxii a leader of the May Fourth Movement, was mainly oriented towards scientific positivism. He advocated a view of history as determined by geographic-climatic factors comparable to laws in the sciences, a view he applies to explain how the Chinese nation came into being.lxxiii Besides, Fu envisions history as characterized by the universal progress of mankind towards a rational, scientific mode of thought. He depicts Hsün-tzu and K’ao-cheng (㗗䆕) empiricism as precursors of scientific, rational thought, which thus loses its Western coloring and is being raised to universal status.lxxiv Referring to Rankelxxv and K’ao-cheng methodology he strongly argues against any kind of interpretation, and formulates the task of the historian as exclusively consisting of the verification and organization of the material, allowing the bare facts contained in the material to speak for themselves. Accordingly, he opposes the use of any kind of theory or view of history and fiercely condemns any involvement of the historian in politics.lxxvi This short summary reveals that in his case China’s history as a particular history was muted by subordinating it to universal laws. Thus he tries to establish a Chinese identity by fitting China into world history as determined by characteristics that are universal, but in fact are of Western origin. While he ventures to find precedents of the correct, scientific world view in Chinese history, he forsakes the very possibility to device an answer to the question of what is typically Chinese. Although Fu referred to Ranke only once it is not unlikely that he equated his approach with that of Ranke, namely the empiricist Ranke. The problem of how to define and protect one’s particularity without being trapped in relativism and historicity could hardly be resolved within the limits of this approach. In fact, Fu’s approach of subjugating China to universal laws that to a certain extent allow the prediction of its future, can be interpreted as implying the dehistoricization of China’s past. At the same time, however, Fu satisfied his nationalist agenda enacting China as an equal member in the world of nation-states, and was, contradicting his own methodological stipulations, again and again driven into political nationalistic actionlxxvii, a fact that was not only reflected in his Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7227 many journalistic publicationslxxviii and some methodological texts,lxxix but also in some of his historiographical writings of the 1930s.lxxx Ch’en Yin-ch’eh, in contrast to Fu, stressed cultural particularity assuming that all cultures are of equal status, thus implying a universalist perspective. His research was based on the assumption that Chinese history is characterized by the gradual development of its particular “national spirit” (min-tsu ching-shen, ⇥ᮣ㊒⼲). He identified the Confucian social ethics as its core (San kang wu ch’ang, ϝ㒆Ѩᐌ),lxxxi without hypostatizing it as an unchanging essence.lxxxii He focused on the ongoing exchange between China and foreign peoples, in order to show, that its national spirit has always been in the making by assimilating external influences.lxxxiii Ch’en claimed that only the receptivity to external stimulants had guaranteed the persistence of Chinese cultural identity by preserving its core, though in different historical manifestations. Any notion of an unchanging national essence contradicts this concept of continuity by change in the same way as the unqualified adoption of foreign ideas alien to the Chinese national spirit.lxxxiv What guarded him against cultural relativism was the notion of “the universality of abstract ideals” (ch’ou-hsiang li-hsiang chih t’ung-hsing, ᢑ䈵⧚ᛇП䗮ᗻ). Referring to Plato he recovers the lost universal ground not by proclaiming a humanistic Chinese civilization superior to the West (as e.g. Chang Chün-mai) or by referring to universal science (as e.g. Fu Ssu-nien), but by assuming the formal universality of human attachment to “abstract ideals”, which do vary from culture to culture and change in the course of history, but have to be protected in order to safeguard the identity of the respective culture.lxxxv Accordingly, the historian’s task is seen to consist in contributing to the recollection of the national spirit, an aim he has to achieve by adopting a historicist, hermeneutic methodology. His research should be based on the meticulous examination of historical sources, aiming at the “empathetic understanding” (t’ung-ch’ing chih liao- chieh, ৠᚙПњ㾷) of the historical manifestations of the national spirit. Then, and only then, may the historian venture to evaluate history from a present perspectivelxxxvi. The correlate of this was the demand, that the historian should stay aloof from politics. Because history is no longer the manifestation of absolute principles the historian looses his former, eminently political position to actualize the universal Tao through historiography. Ch’en thus dissolves the previous unity of knowledge and action and assigns the historian the new role of a mere guardian of historical memory and cultural identity.lxxxvii Ch’en’s view of history is thus a form of idealism, albeit qualified by his emphasis on the particular manifestations of abstract ideals. The specific contents of these ideals vary from culture to culture, manifesting themselves in different ways in history. Hence, the ideals and their corresponding culture can not be integrated into world history by general schemes of evolution or by means of universal norms as implied by Fu’s approachlxxxviii. It is Chinese history which speaks to Ch’en who thereby wants to establish an identity that can only be integrated into the larger world through respect for each culture’s commitment to its specific ideals. In Ch’en’s case it is much more difficult to assess Ranke’s influence. Though he never referred to Ranke later historians claimed to know of such an influence.lxxxix However, if we take into consideration that Ch’en had studied in Germany for many years it may well be justified to assume that he knew of Ranke and the tradition of German historicism.xc Ch’en’s position surely was closer to the hermeneutic Ranke who struggled with the problem of the relationship between the individual and the universal and who opposed any notion of teleological progress. But this should not mislead us to ignore some fundamental differences between Ch’en and Ranke. While Ranke had lived in a Christian world still comparatively at peace with its theological assumption of a divine providence and untroubled by the devastating experiences of the 20th century, Ch’en could not fall back on a Christian God for solace. At the same time he was-far more than Ranke confronted with far-reaching political, social, and cultural changes,xci bringing about the rapid decline of his Confucian world, a decline at least accelerated by a civilization more different from the Chinese world than France had ever been different from Germany. This may explain why Ch’en, comparable to European late historicism, tried to conceptualize a view of history capable of accommodating change without, however, necessarily leading to a breach of continuity and identity. He achieved this by means of a methodology that took historicity and culturality serious. It is true that he-as Ranke- conceived of meaning as immanent in history, but at the same time he acknowledges that this meaning is mediated by the observer. Comparable to Dilthey’s historical methodology, Ch’en seems to conceptualize historical meaning as the product of a dialogue between manifestations of past human endeavors and present interested perspectives, integrated under the umbrella of overarching and coherent ethical and cultural orientationsxcii. Deprived of any 7228 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 metaphysical foundation and opposed to a progressive universal Telos Ch’en embraced a view of history that left much more space for intercultural diversity and intracultural plurality. Two conclusions that can be drawn from this are important for the current context of reflecting on the question of the impact, influence of Western ideas on modern Chinese intellectual history. First, in the case of Ch’en and Fu we can find no evidence of a conscious and systematic reception of Ranke’s ideas. Fu referred to Ranke once; Ch’en never did. The influence might have been an indirect one or just a perception by their students and later researchers. However that might be, it becomes clear that the historical circumstances (much higher speed of change and the much more powerful threat China was facing) as well as the cultural and philosophical background (absence of any theistic notion of history-be it as “Heilsgeschichte” [redemptive history] or as pantheistic, yet in each case distinct, individual manifestation of God’s will in all epochs and across all cultures) were so different that a direct transposition of the “complete” Ranke-the evidential and the historicist, theological one-was not really an option. Second, a comparison of Fu and Ch’en has revealed that Ch’en-allegedly a conservative historian-developed much more explicit and conscious models of cultural interaction than Fu Ssu-nien. These models were based on the notion of historico-cultural particularity without, however, neglecting the question of universals and the relation between particularity and universality. These two conclusions directly led to two further questions: First, would the results be different in the case of a direct, explicit and conscious reception of Western thought? Second, can we observe similar strategies of dealing with the issues of particularity and universality, the question of cultural contact and exchange with other allegedly “conservative” intellectuals? In order to find answers to these questions I turned to Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s view of history and historiography and the influence of Neo-Kantianism on him. I analyzed it based on the assumption-that soon proved to be questionable- that he was not without reason considered by his contemporaries and later researchers to have turned somehow conservative during the final years of his life.

Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Neo-Kantianism

Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s early theory of historiography In 1898, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao participated in a reform movement, which tried to legitimize change by going back to a redefined Confucianism that, although now acquiring a distinctive evolutionary touch, was still characterized by a moral cosmology. World-history was perceived as proceeding in three phases leading to an end of history where the world would be united in the future Great Harmony of moral perfection. In 1902, after the failure of the reforms, Liang abandoned these Confucian pretensions and adopted a worldview firmly rooted in a nationalistic and evolutionary concept of history. In his famous text “New Historiography” he was highly critical of traditional Chinese historiography, accusing it of narrowly focusing on the fate of the ruling dynasty and disregarding the interests of state and society. Traditional historians only described facts, lacked a commitment to “basic principles” (ॳ⧚), and neglected causality. They were therefore not able to understand the course of history, to anticipate the future and to provide political guidance. Influenced by New Text scholarship and by Western concepts of historiography Liang, firmly rooting the writing of history in a nationalistic and social-Darwinist worldview, defined as the task of historiography to arouse national consciousness among the population.xciii He propagated an evolutionary view of history based on the principle of causalityxciv. The task of the historian is to uncover the causal relations that underlie the universal evolution of humankind in order to understand the historical origins of the present and to anticipate the futurexcv. In line with this view of history, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao sketched a scheme of periodization for Chinese history (ϞϪ, ЁϪ, 䖥Ϫ) that closely resembles Western examples and implicitly places China on the same level as the West.xcvi With regard to the important philosophical and methodological question of the relation between the “object” (ᅶ ԧ) and the “subject” (Џԧ) of historiography, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao aimed at the combination of both. Without the object, i.e. the historical data under scrutiny, historiography cannot proceed, however, the subject, i.e. the “philosophical principles” (૆⧚) in the souls of historians and of the readers are equally importantxcvii. Liang remained ambivalent about the exact hierarchy of the object and the subject especially with regard to the question of whether the “philosophical principles” are applied by the subject consequently changing as the subject develops-or whether they are immanent in history and just have to be discovered by the subject through research. Given his Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7229 repeated emphasis on “evolution” (䖯࣪) and “causality” (಴ᵰ) it is justified to assume that he conceptualized the relation of object (history) and subject (philosophical principles) at that time as basically a necessaryxcviii relationship. Meaning and coherence are not applied to history from an external, contemporary position, but are immanent in history. The recognizing subject is thus able to position itself in an identifiable, coherent, and predictable movement of history explaining the present and leading to the future.xcix Comparable to his teacher K’ang Yu-wei, Liang adhered to a view of history based on the belief in universal evolution. However, whereas K’ang knew the ultimate aim of this evolutionary process-the moral utopia of Ta-t’ung (໻ৠ) firmly rooted in a reinterpreted Chinese past, Liang emphasized the universal principle of evolution at the expense of particular Chinese history and culture. Yet, in spite of this concept Liang was unable to solve the problems he faced. Admittedly, China had in theory become a nation among equals, but it lagged considerably behind. No wonder that before long Liang started to reconsider his view of history and culture. In the first issue of the journal National Customsc (೑亢), published in February 1910. He emphasized cultural particularities, their change over time, and their relevance for the nation’s identity and survival.ci The development of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s historiography after 1919 However, in the meantime, the next generation of young students impatiently sought to discard the moribund tradition and to modernize along Western lines. Around 1920 this New Culture Movement argued for the reception of Western democracy and science, and wholeheartedly adopted the naturalist worldview. Liang played a significant role in the reaction against the iconoclastic May Fourth movement that culminated in the debates on the cultures of the East and the Westcii and on science and metaphysicsciii. After returning from his journey to Europe, Liang started to reconsider his views of culture and history. From 1919 to 1923, he published a series of influential articlesciv increasingly doubting the evolutionary view of history he had propagated before. He now characterized Eastern civilization as spiritual and criticizes Western civilization as materialistic and hence inferior. As had become manifest during World War I the West emphasized science and mankind’s rational faculties too much and seriously neglected the moral side of human life. However, Liang did not go so far as absolutely to condemn science, which he still considered important for the project of China’s modernizationcv. He was thus able to reaffirm China’s superiority without being forced to retreat to an obscurantist rejection of everything Western.cvi It goes without saying that the fundamental change in Liang’s view of the world considerably influenced his theory of historiography and culminated in his rejection of the social-Darwinist belief in evolutionary progress. His very influential treatise “Methods for the study of Chinese history”cvii (Ё೑ग़৆ⷨお⊩) published in autumn 1921 is a first step towards this reconsideration. This text is based on a series of lectures Liang Ch’i-ch’ao gave at Nan- k’ai University during which he obviously started to reconsider his view of history thus ending the sixth and last lecture contradicting the first one. The most prominent change concerns his increasing caution in assessing the role of causality in history. In the first chapter Liang basically reiterated his 1902 position that the aim of historical research is to uncover causal relations in history, to anticipate the future, and thus to be able to provide political guidance. However, already in this lecture Liang Ch’i-ch’ao did no longer mention the aim to discover “general precedents” (݀՟) in history, but defines the subject matter of historiography as human actions that are driven by emotions, reason and the human will. He thus implicitly acknowledged the role of subjective frameworks of meaning as one if not the moving force of history and seemed to move towards the negation of impersonal mechanisms of evolutioncviii. It is in the last chapter that Liang’s changed approach becomes fully explicit. He now defined the natural sciences as dealing with facts that are repetitive and completed, while history deals with singular and open-ended facts. Hence, the objects of the natural sciences are universal (᱂䘡) and transcend time and space, those of history are individual (Ͼᗻ), created by mankind (Ҏ㉏᠔䗴), and particular in time and spacecix . However, he still was not prepared to completely discard laws of causality in history:

It is strictly speaking probably impossible if not harmful to absolutely apply the law of causality to history. Why? Because history is created by human consciousness, which is extremely free and cannot be classified. Because the power of consciousness is not completely subject to the law of causality of physics or mathematics, the history created by it has to be of the same character [as the power of consciousness]. To force the law [of causality] upon history is a dead end street. Therefore I call it impossible. Forcedly applying this law [to history] in spite of that would lead to the loss of the true face [of history]. Therefore, I call it harmful. May we [therefore] not talk of cause and effect at all? No, definitely not. Not to speak of cause and effect would amount to being unable to discover a system amidst the [mass of] countless, manifold, and changing historical traces. The 7230 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 methods to create order would be exhausted. Not to speak of cause and effect would mean that we cannot take the past as a warning [example] and are unable to discern the future; the aim of historiography would be lost. Therefore we have to observe in a penetrating way causal relations, however, the law of causality we use, must be different from that of the natural sciences.cx

Whereas in the first chapter Liang still had defined the subject-matter of history as comprehensive in terms of time and space and hence dealing with things continuous, he now explicitly denied continuity in history and traced this back to the human psyche as basically free and unpredictable. He asked to isolate “historical characters” (ग़৆ ⱘҎḐ㗙) that represent their time. In his New Historiography of 1902, national heroes still had served as an exemplification of the nationalistic struggle as part of the universal and coherent process of evolution. In contrast, the “historical characters” of 1921 are the manifestation of historical individuality. In order to discover these “historical characters” the historian now has to “analyze” (ߚᵤ) and to intuitively “understand” (Ⳉ㾝) historical facts in order to obtain a vision of the past’s “entirety and living [character]” (ᭈϾ㗠⌏)cxi. Yet, the text ends leaving decisive questions unanswered. How does the historian come to an understanding of past individuality? Some reference to a hermeneutic methodology would have been necessary here to clarify Liang’s concepts. How does the recalling of past individuality lead to knowledge relevant for the present and the future? What is ultimately the role of causality in history? In other words: How does historical individuality allow for a vision of historical coherence that is necessary for the task of historiography to provide orientation and guidance for the present? It is obvious that in late 1921 Liang’s new views of history and theory of historiography were still developing. In December 1922 Liang further systematized his ideas in the text “What is culture”cxii (ҔМᰃ᭛࣪), explicitly referring to the neo-Kantian philosophy of values as developed by Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich Rickert. He defined the concept of “culture” by introducing the distinction between “individual achievements” (߿Ϯ) and “general achievements” ( ݅Ϯ). The “general achievements” constitute the sphere of culture, a concept he further circumscribed as those things that do not exist by nature and necessity, but depend on human norms that are based on the freedom of human will. Hence, culture is not determined by causality, but is the result of free human creation and imitationcxiii. In “Several important questions of studying cultural history”cxiv (ⷨお᭛࣪৆ⱘ޴Ͼ䞡㽕䯂乬) of December 1922 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao applied this concept of culture to the study of history and reiterated his 1921 definition of the subject matter of history as individual and particular in time and space. He again rejected causality, introduced instead the Buddhist inspired concept of “interdependence” (Ѧ㓬), and negated historical evolution, especially with regard to material progress that he described as highly dubious from a moral perspective. Yet, there still are two spheres where Liang assumed historical progress, i.e. the ideas of the equality and unity of mankind.cxv Though we find here the first seeds of a new approach, it took him another five years before he moved beyond naturalism and discarded causality. But did he develop a concept that achieved both, to recognize historical individuality and establish cultural identity, while still allowing for historical coherence, or did he renounce coherence and certainty altogether? A final elaboration of Liang’s views of history can be found in his “Addition to the methods for the study of Chinese history”cxvi (Ё೑ग़৆ⷨお⊩㸹㓪) of 1926/27. Here he defined the purpose of history as giving “new meaning” (ᮄᛣН) and “new value” (ᮄӋؐ) to the “true facts of the past” (䖛এⱘⳳџᅲ) in order to provide a “lively mirror” (⌏ࡼⱘ䌘ⲥ) for the people of the present. Even though he used the term “new meaning” it becomes obvious in his discussion of this concept that “meaning” is not applied to history from a present perspective, but has actually to be found in history as meaning intended by historical protagonists, as meaning immanent in history but previously misunderstood, and as meaning never recognized but now rediscoveredcxvii. In other words: Liang developed elements of a methodology that clearly includes hermeneutic factors ultimately aiming at understanding historical individuality. Based on this methodology of understandingcxviii past frameworks of meaning Liang proceeded to the next step of “newly evaluating facts of the past” (ᡞ䖛এⱘџᅲ䞡ᮄⱘԄӋ). He further distinguished between temporary and eternal values: Events of “temporary value” (ϔᯊⱘӋؐ) are those, which were valuable for a certain period of time in the past, but nowadays have lost their value. Events of “eternal value” (∌ЙⱘӋؐ) are those the value of which was not obvious in the past, but became apparent later as e.g. the value of late Ming anti-Manchuism for the eternal nationalistic activities of the Chinese nationcxix. It is these eternal values that provide coherence to history and connect the past with the present. They form the basis of the historian’s quest to render service to society by anchoring the present in a meaningful past and relating it to an envisioned and desirable futurecxx. Yet even in this Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7231 context, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao warned against subduing the parts to the whole and repeatedly reminded the historian of his task to understand the motivations of individual historical actors, who, on the basis of their “free will” (㞾⬅ᛣ ᖫ), are able to change the course of the whole. However, as if to make sure that he is not misunderstood as arguing for a conservative return to a Confucian view of history emphasizing the importance of morally upright sages or as supporting a relativistic “everybody his own historian”, he hastened to add that the historian should neither be blinded by traditional judgments handed down to the present, nor should he give in to his own prejudices.cxxi From these statements, it becomes apparent that he oscillated between his respect for particular history and identity, and the wish to envision a normative and universal core of history illuminating the path into a desirable future. Neo-Kantianism, coherence, and historical individuality To judge Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s late historiography with the yardstick of neo-Kantianism would be a meaningless and intrinsically Eurocentric endeavor. However, to compare his approach with the neo-Kantian attempt to overcome the relativistic implications of historicism as well as the epistemological naturalism of the mainstream of 19th century natural sciences is well justified. Not only that Liang Ch’i-ch’ao himself referred to Neo-Kantianism as one source of inspiration and kept using seemingly neo-Kantian vocabulary, he is on top of that, as I argue, facing the same dilemma as neo-Kantian thinkers in late 19th, early 20th century Europe: the dilemma of how to hold historical, and by implication cultural and national particularity and individuality in esteem, without becoming trapped in a paralyzing historical relativism that denies the coherence necessary in order to establish meaning, provide orientation, and allow for cross-cultural interaction. How to solve this dilemma after the demise of grand metaphysical and theological systems was the question that motivated the neo-Kantian philosophy of transcendental values. It was also the problem that Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was struggling with after he had abandoned his previous nationalistic, evolutionary view of history-a view of history that always ran the risk of relegating China to an inferior and backward place within a universal temporal trajectory. The core of the neo-Kantian philosophy of values was the conviction that nature, that the physical world including history is chaotic and meaningless. Departing from this tenet Neo-Kantianism criticized both the positivistic natural sciences for their belief in the ontic status of general laws in nature and historicist philosophies for their belief in the immanence of meaning in history, meaning that accordingly has “just” to be discovered through the right methodology. Arguing against these metaphysical postures, Neo-Kantianism went back to Kant’s transcendental philosophy and transformed it into a philosophy of transcendental values. These values have no basis in reality, they are unreal. In other words: they do not exist, but they are valid-sie sind nicht, aber sie gelten. Accordingly, Neo-Kantians rejected traditional ontology and wanted to replace it by an axiology of transcendental values. These transcendental values can be related in a purely theoretical way (theoretische Wertbeziehung) to the past, an operation through which meaning is attached to the historico-cultural reality that hence is transformed into a “carrier of structures of meaning” (Tr ger der Sinngebilde). This theoretical value-relation has to be clearly differentiated from the normative operation of “evaluation” (Wertung) based on one’s own convictions and hence serves as a bulwark against the perspectivism of a “everybody his own historian” type of historical theory as in pragmatism and the American New History approach. Simultaneously the theoretical value-relation rejects the relativism of historicism that finds always individual, ontic meaning in history thus defying historical coherence. However, the historico-cultural reality in itself remains meaningless and always individual unless it is actively related to transcendental values and hence invested with meaning. This transcendental approach also lead to a distinctive classification of the sciences. The difference between the “Naturwissenschaften” (natural sciences) and the “Kulturwissenschaften” (cultural sciences? Liberal arts?) is not based on the different ontic character of their respective subject-matters and the different research strategies they require (generalizing “Naturwissenschaften” versus individualizing “Geisteswissenschaften” as in Dilthey’s case), but on a different methodology of research (nomothetic “Naturwissenschaften” versus ideographic “Kulturwissenschaften”) that ultimately has a transcendental, i.e. unreal and not a factual foundation.cxxii If we compare this approach to Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s late historiography, it is not difficult to discern that Liang’s concept was quite different. Liang was still looking for immanent meaning and tried to provide coherence through eternal values. Nowhere do we find terminological hints at a transcendental concept of values. Values are described as eternal and sometimes depicted as transcending time and space, i.e. as transcendent, but definitely not as transcendental. Meaning is immanent and has to be found in history. In short: Value and meaning still are real! Liang might have been inspired by Rickert’s terminologycxxiii, but the concept he developed is clearly very different 7232 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 from Neo-Kantianism. This is also reflected in Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s distinction between the natural and the historico- cultural sciences. His way of distinguishing them is as with Dilthey based on their different subject matters and hence ultimately based on the separation of different types of reality; it is an ontological and not a transcendental and axiological distinction. However, instead of leaping to the easy conclusion that Liang Ch’i-ch’ao simply misunderstood Neo-Kantianism, it is much more meaningful and challenging to relate these incompatible approaches to the different philosophical and historical environment. Whereas the Neo-Kantians argued against what they perceived as residual metaphysics in the positions of the historicists and the natural sciences, and hence developed a non-metaphysical, transcendental solution to the problem of coherence and individuality, the question Liang tried to solve was quite different. He argued against the deterministic evolutionary teleology of his own early nationalism and the seemingly immoral positivism of the natural science as propagated by the May Fourth iconoclasts. Both his enemies tended to neglect the particular in history as a possible basis for historico-cultural identity and ultimately subordinated China to universal concepts of Western origin as the basis for meaning and coherence. The issue of metaphysics and its decline in 19th century Europe was just not his problem. If we, in addition to that, consider the historical-political context, it will become even more plausible why he could not allow for a breakdown of certainty. China in the 1920s was on the verge of collapse. For somebody who devoted his life to saving China, this was definitely not the right time to contemplate meaninglessness. This difference in the context explains the difference in the theories of culture and historiography brought forward. However, it is evident that Liang nonetheless was struggling with the same problem as the Neo-Kantians. His last attempt to find an answer was still marred by severe inconsistencies. On the one hand, he stressed the immanence of meaning in particular history as an expression of human free will and a basis for Chinese identity. On the other hand, he searched for universal coherence that integrates China into world-history, provides orientation in the present, and leads towards the future. He tried to bridge the gap through the concept of eternal values identified as nationalism; a nationalism, however, that remained and probably had to remain amazingly vague in order not to uncover the dilemma [end quote Liang Ch’i-ch’ao].

Towards a conceptual framework

This second example shows that even in a case of a direct reception the outcomes can be very different from the “original” and that it would be far too simple to attribute that to misunderstandings and/or a lack of knowledge and self-reflection. On top of that it clearly evinces that the classification of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao as “conservative” has to be revisited at least with regard to his commitment to “nationalism” -a political ideology implying actions such as state-building, enforcing a central, national educational system including the dissemination of modern political values such as democracy and citizenship-hardly the cornerstones of a “conservative” position. It remains to be explained, however, why with regard to his final years he nevertheless often is referred to as a “conservative”. By comparing his position with the “conservative” Ch’en Yin-ch’eh it becomes evident that it is their commitment to the historical and cultural particularity of China that they share. Yet, this position is also often identified in other contexts as “cultural nationalism”, a classification that further complicates the picture. It shows that although the coexistence of these two classifications can sometimes be attributed to an imprecise use of terms, it more likely is an indication of the fluid boundaries between the two concepts of (cultural) conservatism and (cultural) nationalism. It is thus three aspects that constitute a triangular horizon of inquiry for the following considerations. These three aspects are:

(a) The complicated relationship between arguments in favor of particularity and historical continuity as an expression of a historicist view of tradition, history, and culture, and arguments in favor of historical and cultural particularity as an expression of a political or psychological concern for national identity, (b) The complex relationship between arguments in favor of tradition due to normative, universalist considerations, and arguments in favor of a particular tradition due to the predominantly political or psychological needs to soothe the crisis of identity, and, last but not least (c) The intricate role played by ideas coming from the West and their reception in China in this double crisis of identity and meaning. Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7233

To rephrase this horizon of inquiry: it is the typically modern, tormenting question of the relationship between history understood as characterized by contingence and hence as particular (i.e. as historicity, see above) and ethics (philosophy) understood as a normative set of rules and principles of potentially universal and eternal status that- together with the question of how this relationship developed in modern Chinese intellectual history on the background of China’s long traditions and under the influence of new Western ideas-forms the core of my research on modern Chinese “conservatism”cxxiv. But why the so-called “conservatives”? Here again there are two reasons that are central for the clarification of the importance of modern Chinese “conservatism” for the inquiry into the questions outlined above:

(a) Modern Chinese “conservatism” as a philosophical, cultural, and political phenomenon has itself not only developed in close contact with Western ideas, but also has, or, at least tries to establish deep roots in Chinese traditionscxxv. Quite opposite to what one would expect, it is the very “conservatives” who earlier and more profound than many of their liberal or Marxist colleagues at that time engaged with Western ideas in ways very illuminating for the questions raised above. (b) More important, however, is Modern Chinese “conservatism” as a conscious philosophical, cultural, and political debate cxxviin which “conservatives” engaged directly and from very early on with the set of questions outlined above. We can find among “conservatives” implicit hints and elaborate explicit treatises concerning the questions of particularity, universality, cultural contact, reception of foreign ideas, the relationship between history and ethics, and the role of what can be called a culture of historical reference in normative debates.

However, before moving to the analysis of one group of “conservatives”, i.e. the Hsüeh-heng group, it becomes necessary to clarify how I define the concept of “conservatism”. I have hitherto been using this term only in quotation marks to indicate its purely descriptive character without considering its general analytical value or its usefulness in actual historical research.cxxvii

Wu Mi’s vision of ethics, culture and historycxxviii

The basis of Wu Mi’s view of culture, history and ethics is his metaphysics of the “one” (ϔ) and the “many” (໮) that is of Platonic origins -in fact Wu Mi’s knowledge of Platonism goes back to his days as student under Irving Babbitt. It forms the core of an argument that at first glance looks similar to Ch’en Yin-ch’eh’s view of history, whose vision I would classify as predominantly historicist, albeit with some classicist undertones. In fact, however, Wu Mi’s metaphysical vision is part of a predominantly classicist-conservative argument. In the early texts published in the Critical Review this argument remains implicit and at times formalistic, however, a closer look at texts published from 1926 on in the Literary supplement of the Ta-kung-pao (໻݀᡹᭛ᄺ ࡃߞ) and in the Critical Review (ᄺ㸵ᴖᖫ) shows that Wu Mi did concretize his ideas and developed a syncretistic, partly Confucian and partly neo-humanist (platonic) moral philosophy. It is striking that-at least as far as the terminology is concerned-Wu Mi’s metaphysics is heavily influenced by Western terms. He characterizes the realm of the “One” as absolute, eternal and universal, whereas the realm of the “Many” is described as relative, temporal, particular, and related to experience and illusion. He explicitly equates his juxtaposition with the platonic distinction between the realm of ideas and the realm of individual things, without, however, specifying that further. The differences between Wu Mi’s theory of the “One” and the “Many” and Plato’s theory of ideas, however, are apparent. Whereas in Plato’s philosophy the ability to apprehend the ideas is located in the immortal human soul that partakes in the realm of the divine, in Wu Mi’s case it is through (ethical) intuition that we become aware of the “One”. Wu Mi sometimes refers to the “soul”, however, he distances himself from the notion of its immortality. Besides, Wu Mi distinguishes between three cosmic realms: Heaven (໽), Man (Ҏ) and Matter (⠽). He identifies Heaven with the religious sphere, where the idea of the Good is located. Sometimes he equates this with God and refers to different religions. Out of this he seems to develop a notion of the equality of religions, which are all in their respective ways an expression of the One, the Good. In the realm of Man he locates ethics, and in the realm of Matter he locates the desires. This tripartite structure is similar and yet different from both, the Chinese traditional concept of Heaven, Man and Earth (໽Ҏഄ) and Plato’s theory of the three layers of the human soul, which consists of the Logistikon, i.e. reason, the Tymoeides, i.e. courage, and the Epitumetikon, i.e. desire. This tripartite structure of the human soul is laid out with the help of the 7234 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 metaphor of the chariot, where the two horses are the Tymoeides and the Epitumetikon, and the charioteer the Logistikon. It is the task of the charioteer to guide and direct the two horses and to make sure that courage, Tymoeides, gains the upper hand over the desires, the Epitumetikon, and the chariot is thus being guided in the right direction. This threefold distinction finds its parallel in the threefold structure of the polis as disclosed in the Politeia. It is the immortality of the soul that enables man to re-cognize the eternal, universal ideas and it is especially human reason (the Logistikon) that becomes aware of the Good, and not, as with Wu Mi, moral intuition. In other words: whereas with Plato the ideas and especially the idea of the Good can be apprehended by the soul, and here again especially by the rational faculty within the human soul, we find with Wu Mi a different concept: here it is Heaven where the Good is located, but it is in the second cosmic realm, the realm of Man where human beings through their moral intuition become aware of the One as the basis of all concrete ethical behavior and regulations. Another striking difference concerns the relationship between the One and the Many. In Plato’s philosophy the relationship between the ideas and the manifestations is unclear, however, a strong element of transcendence is obvious. In Wu Mi’s case the relationship seems to be as dualistic as with Plato, however we find no hint at a concept of transcendence. He speaks of the equal importance and “coexistence of the One and the Many” (ϔ໮ᑊᄬ) and builds on that a vision of historical change and cultural plurality (see below). Moving on to the concrete ethics as formulated by Wu, it is striking to see that while he developed a metaphysics that is a mixture of Confucian and Platonic elements with strong Western terminological overtones, in the area of ethics traditional Neo-Confucian concepts dominate, at times related to Western notions such as duties and rights. The key concepts are standard Neo-Confucian notions such as “humanness” (ҕ) identified as the “control of desires and the practice of rites” (ܟᏅ໡⼐), the Golden Mean (Ёᒌ), and of course the omnipresent “Three Bonds and Five Relationships” (ϝ㒆Ѩᐌ). What marks Wu Mi’s ethics out as distinctive during the 1920s and 1930s is not this standard view, but his claim that China can only be saved with the help of morality (“䘧ᖋᬥ೑”), i.e. only via its moral qualities will the nation be able to survive in the struggle against imperialist enemies. Whatever his notion of the role of ethics in the national struggle for survival, the substantial contents is again identified with and justified by reference to universal ethical standards exceeding national boundaries such as discipline, control of the desires, the awareness of human fallibility, and the obligation of the individual to a larger social collective (piety, duty). He links these standards up with and discusses them in the context of his treatises on Neo-Humanism and Irving Babbitt. Quite distinct from Ch’en Yin-ch’eh, T’ang Yung-t’ung, Liu I-cheng, Miao Feng-lin and other members of the Hsüeh-heng group, Wu Mi was not very interested in history and a theory of culture, i.e. his key interest was in literature and the role of literature in instilling the reader with ethical standards, and not so much in historical change, historicity and cultural differences. However, this does not mean that he did not care at all about this topics that occupied so many of his contemporaries. It is in the context of the tripartite horizon of inquiry that his metaphysics of the “One” and the “Many” acquire additional relevance, because Wu Mi uses this concept in order to clarify his ideas on history and cultural plurality. He identifies the “One” with “rituality” (⼐) and the “Many” with the plurality of particular “ceremonies” (Ҿ). The “ceremonies” can be and actually have to be changed and adapted to ever new circumstances, however, the “rituality” is fundamental, eternal, and should not be tampered with. Tampering with it would lead to a deracinating and dehumanizing critique of religion and ethics, exactly the kind of phenomenon Wu Mi identifies with the iconoclasm of the May Fourth movement. Any kind of change has to be anchored in and has to be a reflection of eternal ethical standards. Does this mean that the “Many”, the diverse manifestations are irrelevant? Definitely not: they form the basis of what is particular and Chinese, something Wu Mi clearly equates with Confucianism in its many manifestations.

Preliminary findings

From these first crude observations we can conclude that Wu Mi’s primary concern was not a crisis of identity, but rather a crisis of meaning with implications for political legitimacy and the question of social leadership. The issue of Chinese identity did concern him, but was clearly only of secondary importance. It also becomes evident that his reception of Neo-Humanism via Mathew Arnold, Paul Elmer Moore, and Irving Babbitt was systematic and yet strongly shaped by basic Confucian assumptions about the cosmos, man, and nature. However, it is also very likely that his Confucianism was equally influenced and partly transformed by his exposure to Neo-Humanism (ᕙ 㗗). A comparison with the view of history and cultural contact as expounded by Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh reveals that Wu Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7235

Mi is a classicist conservative who emphasizes the relevance of eternal, universal ethical standards for achieving a good life. Ch’en Yin-ch’eh in contrast seems to be much more interested in issues of national identity, admittedly still defined by reference to the Three Bonds and Five Relationships, but he never talks about their relevance for the rest of the world. The only hints that he might consider the Three Bonds and Five Relationships to be a particular expression of universal ethical standards can be found in his texts commemorating Wang Kuo-wei they remain rather ambiguous. What makes the Hsüeh-heng group such an interesting object of study is not only their intellectual position during the 1930s, but also the tremendous revival of interest in them during the 1990scxxix. Again we can find both motives back in the discussion: the crisis of identity and the crisis of meaning. Interestingly those in the debate who are responding more to the crisis of meaning, legitimacy and authority predominantly refer to Wu Mi, whereas those who claim more freedom for the intellectuals and academia heavily rely on Ch’en Yin-ch’eh. Both, however, share the concern for Chinese particularity: that China is different does not seem to be a bone of contention among them. What is contended is what makes China different and how it should relate to the world: on the basis of universal ethical values of basically Confucian background, or on the basis of a pluralistic notion of the equality of the unequal? What is equally important to note is that the nature of the debate of the 1930s as well as of the 1990s is one of a debate being conducted in a culture of historical reference, a tradition of inquiry that frames questions and looks for answers by consciously positioning oneself in a continuum of moral and historical inquiry-maybe there is still no real difference between the two. Tradition from this perspective is not so much this or that school of thinking or this and that interpretation of how things developed in the course of history, but it is rather the embodiment of a form of reflection and inquiry that not only values precedents and historical models, but even more important that values reflection on the past as a mode of a fundamentally philosophical and ethical endeavor. 7236 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243

References

iIt goes without saying that the analysis of what these Chinese terms mean has to be part of the application of the concept of conservatism to China. ii See Berlin, Isaiah, “The CounterEnlightenment”, in Berlin, Isaiah, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giraux, 1998, pp.243-268. iii The term “influence” in itself is a highly questionable term, at least the way it is being widely used. It implies a mechanical model of a force having an impact on a physical body. The highly complicated process of the encounter not just of different ideas (“ideas” here refers to a concrete body of propositions such as “history is a linear process”), but of different, conflicting philosophical, especially ontological assumptions can hardly be adequately grasped by such a notion. The interaction, mutual adaptation, rejection, intermingling and eventual subjugation of ideas from different backgrounds cannot be adequately interpreted with simple mechanistic models. iv Teng Ssu-yü, John K. Fairbank (ed.), China’s Response to the West: a Documentary Survey, 1839—1923, Cambridge/Mass., 1954. v See Levenson, Joseph R., Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China, Cambridge/Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953, 19702; Levenson, Joseph R., “‘History’ and ‘Value’: The Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China”, in Wright (Hg.), 19622, pp.146-194; and Levenson, Joseph R., Confucian China and its Modern Fate, 3 vols. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958—1965, 19722. vi Yü Yingshih vii Cohen, Paul A, Discovering History in China: American historical writing on the recent Chinese past, New York: Columbia UP, 1984. viii I on purpose avoid the word “limit”, because I rather would like to emphasize the positive, disclosing aspects of this “located-ness”. ix This attitude can also be found amongst nationalists such as the KMT of the 1930s, which should, however, not be classified as “conservative”, but rather as “cultural nationalism” or as “traditionalistic nationalism”, because the KMT was still very much a modernizing party. For the classification of the KMT of the 1930s as “conservative” see Wright, M.C., “From Revolution to Restauration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology”, in Far Eastern Quarterly 14 (1954/ 1955), pp.15-32. x Schwartz, Benjamin I., “Notes on Conservatism in General and in China in Particular”, in Furth (ed.) 1976, pp.3-21. xi Abstraction from concrete social etc. circumstances (see above) and conservative positions such as protection of specific social or religious institutions Modern Chinese conservatives have been influenced by Western models of conservatism, i.e. careful application of Western theories and models of conservatism does make some sense Social questions thus divorced from specific social conditions of European conservatism. Appears in China as expression A traditional style of life Expression of a traditional ontology and scholarship Expression of specific concepts of (political) leadership. Political anthropology Thus a political-ideological view and a intellectual his-tory/philosophical point of view (no simple equation between social interests and ideas). xii Politics here understood as practical philosophy, i.e. as the area of the application and implementation of basic philosophical and ethical tenets. xiii reference. xiv According to Mannheim the Enlightenment type of thinking can be summarized and contrasted with the conservative type of thinking as follows: Enlightenment/natural law approach Conservatism State of nature History or divine law Contract theory Community Popular sovereignty Qualitative concept of freedom set against Human rights the notion of equality Emphasis on abstract and universal reason (on theory). Emphasis history, life, and the Volk. Skeptical with regard to (Bourgeois, revolutionary) emphasis on thought. the epistemological and moral faculties of human beings. (Romantic, conservative) emphasis on being. Deduction of the particular from general principles (emphasis Irrationality and complexity of reality. To expand and on schemes, plans, projections). complete the particular out of history. General validity for all individuals(notion of equality) Emphasis on individuality. General applicability of laws to all historico-social phenomena. Notion of society as an organism, emphasis on qualitative, Model of the natural sciences. historically grown differences. Source of the historical “sciences” (Mechanistic, atomistic) construction of collectivities starting Idea of a totality that is more than the sum of its parts. The from individual entities. individual can only be understood as part of that totality. Static way of thinking. Correct way of thinking understood as Dynamic notion of reason. Initially conservatives juxtapose an “ought” independent of history. dynamic life and static reason, in the end reason itself is historicized. Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7237

See Mannheim, Karl, Strukturen des Denkens (Structures of Thinking), Frankfurt/ Main, 1980. Mannheim, Karl, über die Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis (On the Peculiarity of Perception in the Sociology of Culture), in: Mannheim 1980, pp.33-154. Mannheim, Karl, Konservatismus, Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Wissens (Conservatism, a Contribution to˄PTO˅the Sociology of Knowledge), Frankfurt/Main, 1984. Mannheim, Karl, Das konservative Denken. Soziologische Beiträge zum Werden des politisch-historischen Denkens in Deutschland (Conservative Thought. Sociological Contributions to the Development of Political-Historical Thought in Germany), in: Schumann 1984, pp.24- 75. For attempts to further develop and adapt Mannheim’s theory of conservatism see Martin Greiffenhagen, Das Dilemma des Konservatismus (The Dilemma of Conservatism), in: H.G. Schumann, Konservatismus (Conservatism), Cologne, 1974, pp.156-198. xv For an overview of different approaches to conservatism see Muller, Jerry Z., “What is Conservative Social and Political Thought?”, in: Muller, Jerry Z., Conservatism, An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present (Princeton: Princeton UP), 1997, pp.3-31; and Allen, David Y., “Modern Conservatism: The Problem of Definition”, in The Review of Politics 43:4 (Oct. 1981), pp.582-603. For overviews of American and German conservatism see Rossiter, Clinton Lawrence, Conservatism in America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 21982. For the origins of French conservatism see McMahon, Darrin M., Enemies of the Enlightenment. The French Counter- Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press), 2001. Epstein, Klaus, The Genesis of German Conservatism (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press), 1966. For a very thought-provoking overview of the history of conservatism see Kondylis, Panajotis, Konservativismus: geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang ˷Conservatism: Its Historical Substance and its Decline˹ (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta), 1986. Kondylis, Panajotis, Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus ˷The Enlightenment in the Context of Modern Rationalism˹ (München), 1986. xvi For an account of historicism see Carlo Antoni, Vom Historismus zur Soziologie (From Historicism to Sociology) (Trs.: W. Goetz), Stuttgart, n.d. (Orig. in Italian: Dallo storicismo alla sociologia, Firenze, 1940). For German historicism see J-rn Rüsen, Konfigurationen des Historismus, Studien zur deutschen Wissenschaftskultur (Configurations of Historicism. Studies on the German Culture of Science), Frankfurt/Main, 1993, pp.18-113 as well as F. Jaeger, J-rn Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus. Eine Einführung (History of Historicism: an Introduction), München, 1992. For earlier works on historicism see Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine überwindung (Historicism and its Overcoming), Berlin, 1924. Ernst Troeltsch, Die Krisis des Historismus (The Crisis of Historicism), Tübingen, 1932. Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (The Development of Historicism), München, 1965. xvii For my definition of conservatism I draw on Kekes, John, “What is Conservatism”, in Philosophy 72 (1997), pp.351-374. For a study of this type of conservatism in the US see McAllister, Ted, Revolt against modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and the search for a postliberal order (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas), 1995. xviii For a view of conservatism as a counter-enlightenment ideology see Berlin, Isaiah, “The Counter-Enlightenment”, in Berlin, Isaiah, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giraux), 1998, 243-268. xix It goes without saying that this list of positions will seldom be present in its entirety in the thought of one thinker. xx Those of the conservatives of this type who come from a strong religious background argue slightly different, because they do not anchor the human condition in universal moral standards, but in divine providence, in God’s will. For a recent attempt to establish conservatism neither relying on Greek philosophy nor on Christianity see Andreas Kinneging, Het conservatisme: Kritiek op de Verlichting en de Moderniteit (Conservatism: critique of Enlightenment and Modernity) under www.burkestichting. nl/content/nl/publicaties/ConservatismeModerniteit.pdf. xxi Reference xxii Although not classified as conservative there is some affinity between this position and Alisdair MacIntyre communitarianism, see his “The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural lecture”, in Review of Politics 52:3 (1990:Summer), pp.344-361. Compare also Evan Simpson, “Moral Conservatism”, in Review of Politics 49:1 (1987), pp.29-58. xxiii It is easy to understand how such a notion of society could later easily be grafted upon the state as the collective totality. xxiv Reference to Mannheim. xxv On cultural nationalism see Hutchinson, John, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (London: Allen and Unwin), 1987, and Hutchinson, John and Smith, Anthony D. (ed.) Nationalism. A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1994. xxvi This not only refers to countries in the so-called “third world” such as India, China etc., but in fact also to the early late-developing countries such as Germany, Italy, and Russia. See reference. xxvii Reference to distinction and China. xxviii Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate 3 vols. (Berkeley: publisher), 1958—1965. Joseph R. Levenson, “History” and “Value”: The Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China, in: Wright 19622, pp.146-194. xxix Reference to Mozartian historian, Furth, Schwartz etc. xxx See e.g. Werner Meißner, China zwischen nationalem “Sonderweg’und universaler Modernisierung.” Zur Rezeption westlichen Denkens in China (China between National ‘Sonderweg’ and Universal Modernization. On the Reception of Western Thought in China), Munich, 1994. xxxi Chang Chün-mai’s later commitment to a democratic government for China is only one example from many. See H.L. Boorman, R.C. Howard, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4 vols., New York and London, 1967, vol. 1, pp.30-33. xxxii Western in the sense of written by a Western scholar. It is, however, telling that this monograph has so far only been published in Chinese. xxxiii Guy S. Alitto, Theory of Cultural Conservatism (᭛࣪ᅜ៤Џ䆂䆎), T’ai-pei, 1986, pp.251-263. xxxiv This is more than obvious for the members of the Hsüeh-heng group like Wu Mi. On the other hand conservative intellectuals such as e.g. Chang Ping-lin embraced a view of culture emphasizing its particularity without making normative judgments with regard to its relative value vis-i-vis the West as postulated by Alitto. See Wang Young-tsu, “Universalistic and Pluralistic Views of Human Culture: K’ang Yu-wei and Chang Ping-lin”, in: Papers on Far Eastern History (Australia) No. 41, 1990, pp.97-108. xxxv Charlotte Furth (ed.), The Limits of Change. The subjects discussed in this volume have been developed further by Furth in Charlotte Furth, “Intellectual Change: from the Reform movement to the May Fourth movement, 1895—1920”, in Fairbank, John K. (ed.), The Cambridge History of China, Volume 12, Republican China 1912—1949, Part I (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1983, pp.322-405. 7238 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243

xxxvi Charlotte Furth, Culture and Politics in Modern Chinese Conservatism, in Furth (ed.) 1976, pp.22-53. xxxvii Chang Hao, “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China”, in Furth (ed.) 1976, pp.276-302. xxxviii Furth seems here to use the term culture in a double sense: in its pre-modern form referring to the moral cosmology of the Tianxia and the Mandate of Heaven that formed the heart of the emperor’s legitimacy, and with its modern meaning as a separate, historically constituted realm of particular beliefs, customs, and practices. xxxix Charlotte Furth, Culture and Politics. The second type of conservatives is analyzed e.g. by Chang Hao, “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China”, in Furth (ed.) 1976, pp.276-302, and Tu Wei-ming, “Hsiung Shih-li’s Quest for Authentic Existence”, in Furth (ed.) 1976, pp.242-275. xl For a detailed account of this relation in the context of modern Western intellectual history see below next chapter. xli Founded in 1922 the Xueheng zazhi became the most influential conservative journal of the 1920s and 1930s, continuing for eleven years until it ceased publication in 1933. The best summary of the intellectual positions of the Xueheng group can be found in Shen Sung-ch’iao ≜ᵒ ռ, Hsüeh-heng-p’ai yü wu-ssu hsin wen-hua yün-tung ᄺ㸵⌒ϢѨಯᮄ᭛࣪䖤ࡼ ˷The Hsüeh-heng group and the Opposition to the New Culture Movement during the May Fourth Movement˹(T’ai-pei, T’ai-ta wen-shih ts’ung-k’an), 1985. Other books include Richard B. Rosen, The National Heritage Opposition to the New Literature and New Culture Movements of China in the 1920s (Berkeley: University of California, unpublished dissertation, 1969), and Hou Jian, Irving Babbitt in China (State University of New York: unpublished dissertation, 1980). Kuo Ya- pei, The Crisis of Culture in Modern Chinese Conservatism: The Case of “The Critical Review” (unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison), 2002. Cheng Shih-ch’ü 䚥Ꮬ⏴, Tsai Ou-hua yü Kuo-ts’ui chih chien-Hsüeh-heng-p’ai wen-hua ssu-hsiang yen—chiu ೼ ⃻࣪Ϣ೑㊍П䯈——ᄺ㸵⌒᭛࣪ᗱᛇⷨお ˷Between Europeanization and National Essence-Research on the cultural thought of the Hsüeh- heng group˹ (Pei-ching: Shih-fan ta-hsüeh ch’u-pan-she), 2001. xlii Good summaries of American New Humanism can be found in David J. Hoeveler Jr., The New Humanism, A Critique of Modern America, 1900—1940 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), and Thomas R. Nevin, Irving Babbitt, An Intellectual Study (Chapel Hill/London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984). xliii For the historical genesis of this position see Lawrence A. Schneider, “National Essence and the New Intelligentsia”, in Furth (ed.), The Limits of Change, pp.57-89. xliv In this they are comparable to Tu Ya-ch’üan, the authors of the Kuo-ku tsa-chih ˷National Past˹ and post-1919 Chang Shih-chao. Tu Ya-ch’üuan is one of those, who is now in the context of New Kuo-hsüeh being discussed again. See Kao Li-k’o, “Tu Ya-ch’üan te Chung-hsi wen-hua-kuan” ˷Tu Ya-ch’üan’s View of Eastern and Western Culture˹, Erh-shih-i shih-chi 34 (April 1996), pp.53-62. Liu Jun-chung, “Tu Ya-ch’üan te wen-hua ssu-hsiang” ˷The Cultural Thought of Tu Ya-ch’üan˹, Ch’uan-t’ung wen-hua yü hsien-ta-hua 1994:2, pp.73-81. Wang Yüan-hua, “Tu Ya-ch’üan yü tung-hsi wen-hua wen-t’i lun-chan” ˷Tu Ya-ch’üan and the Debate on Eastern and Western Culture˹, Hsüeh-jen 5 (1993), pp.1-24. The most comprehensive study especially on Chang Shih-chao’s post-May Fourth reversal of his previous attitudes can be found in Shen Sung-ch’iao, “Wu-ssu shih-ch’i Chang Shih-chao te pao-shou ssu-hsiang” ˷The Conservative Thought because the new can not be conceived of as independent of the old, but is rather developing on the basis of what has been before. Any radical opposition against tradition must lead to a total deracination and, hence, cultural and social anomie. They consequently pleaded for a literature that expresses new contents within traditional forms (Wen-yen-wen and of Chang Shih-chao during the May Fourth Period˹, Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan chin-tai-shih yen- chiu-so chi-k’an ˷Bulletin of the Institute for History and Philology of the Academia Sinica˹ 15 hsia (December 1986), pp.163-250. For Chang’s influence on the New Culture Movement before 1919 see Timothy B. Weston, “The Formation and Positioning of the New Culture Community 1913-1917”, Modern China 24:3 (July 1998), pp.255-284. xlv Mei Guangdi, “Ping tichang xin wenhua zhe” ˷A Critique of Those in Favor of a New Culture˹, Xueheng 1 (January 1922), pp.1-8. Hu Xiansu, “Ping Hu Shi wushi nian lai Zhongguo zhi wenxue” ˷A Critique of Hu Shi’s Chinese Literature in The Past 50 Years˹, Xueheng 18 (June 1923), pp.1-26. Hu Xiansu, “Ping ‘Changshiji’” ˷A Critique of the Changshiji˹, Xueheng 1 (January 1922), pp.1-23. Wu Mi, “Lun jinri wenxue chuangzao zhi zhengfa” ˷On the Correct Method of Literary Creation in Present Times˹, Xueheng 15 (March 1923), pp.1-27. Wu Mi, “Shixue zonglun” ˷General Treatise of Poetics˹, Xueheng 9 (September 1922), pp.1-20. See Shen Songqiao, Xuehengpai, pp.152-157. xlvi What ultimately is “adequate” to Chinese culture, however, remained rather ambivalent throughout their writings. xlvii Mei Guangdi, “Humanism and Modern China”, The Bookman (June 1931), reprinted in Mei Guangdi wenlu ˷Writings of Mei Guangdi˹ (Taipei: Lianhe chuban zhongxin), 1968, pp.9-25. See Rosen, The National Heritage Opposition, pp.77-87. xlviii The most comprehensive study of this academic field of historical geography during the Republican period is Peng Minghui, Lishi dilixue yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue ˷Historical Geography and Modern Chinese Historiography˹ (Taibei: Dongda), 1995. xlix They published not only in the Xueheng zazhi, but also in journals like the Shidi xuebao ˷Historical Geography˹ (Nanjing, 11/1921 to 10/1926), Shixue yu dixue ˷Historiography and Geography˹ (Shanghai, 12/1926 onwards), and Shixue zazhi ˷Historiography˹ (Nanjing, 3/1929 to 4/1931). They had their institutional basis at the South-Eastern University in Nanjing, the later Central University, which developed into an antipode against the May-Fourth camp at Peking University. l That is the theories of the “doubters of antiquity” (Yigupai) led by Gu Jiegang, and Hu Shi’s movement “to order the national past” (Zhengli guogu). On the doubters of antiquity see Lawrence A. Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang and China’s New History, Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative Traditions, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, Peng Minghui, Yigu sixiang yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de fazhan ˷The Thought of the Doubters of Antiquity and the Development of Modern Chinese Historiography˹ (Taibei: Shangwu, 1991), Peng Minghui, “Gu Jiegang yu Zhongguo shixue xiandaihua de mengya—yi shiliaoxue wei zhongxin de tantao” ˷Gu Jiegang and the Sprouts of the Modernization of Chinese Historiography-an Investigation Focused on the Study of Historical Material˹, Guoshiguan guankan ˷Academia Historica Journal˹ 12 (June 1992), pp.9-24, and Wang Fansen, Gushibian yundong de xingqi, yi ge sixiangshi de fenxi ˷The Rise of the Movement to Discuss Chinese Ancient History, An Analysis in Intellectual History˹ (Taibei: Yunchen, 1987). On Hu Shi see Eber, Irene, “Hu Shih and Chinese History, The Problem of Cheng-li Kuo-ku”, Monumenta Serica XXVII (1968), pp.169-207, and Li Moying, Hu Shi and his Deweyan Reconstruction of Chinese History, Boston: Boston University, unpublished dissertation thesis, 1990. Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7239

li They tried to achieve this by translating and introducing Western books on the theory of history as for example Seignobos’introduction to the study of history (Langlois Ch.V., Seignobos Ch., Trs. by Li Sichun, Shixue yuanlun, French: Introduction aux études historiques, Shanghai: Shangwu, 1926), and Lamprecht’s concept of a history of world culture (Chen Xunci, “Lishi zhi shehui de jiazhi” ˷The Social Value of History˹, Shidi xuebao 1:2, 1921, pp.1-2.). For a list of their translations see Zhang Wenjian, “Xuehengpai de shixue yanjiu” ˷The Historical Studies of the Xueheng Group˹, Jindaishi yanjiu 1994:2 (June 1994), pp.37-38. lii Liu Yizheng, Zhongguo wenhuashi. liii Liu uses this term rather vaguely. It sometimes connotes a strict causality as implied in evolutionary scientism, but most of the time Liu refers by “causality” to mutual influence. His basic theoretical position was that history mostly is too pluralistic to be subject to strict causality. See Liu Yizheng, “Lishi zhi zhishi” ˷Historical Knowledge˹, Shidi xuebao 3:7 (May 1925), pp.19-21, reprinted in Liu Yizheng shixue lunwenji ˷Collection of Liu Yizheng’s Historiography˹ (Shanghai: Guji, 1991), pp.80-84. liv Liu Yizheng, “Zhongguo wenhua xibei zhi shangque” ˷Consideration of the Western Expansion of Chinese Culture˹, Xueheng 27 (March 1924), pp.1-7, reprinted in Liu Yizheng, Liu Yizheng shixue lunwen xuji ˷Second Collection of Liu Yizheng’s Historiography˹ (Shanghai: Guji, 1991), pp.224-230. lv For an analysis of Chen Yinke’s historiography see my Wahrheit und Geschichte. For a summary of my findings see my “Between Dao and History”, pp.54-73. On Wang see Joey Bonner, Wang Guowei, An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge/ Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), Hermann Kogelschatz, Wang Guowei und Schopenhauer: eine philosophische Begegnung. Wandlung des Selbstverst噀ndnisses der chinesischen Literatur unter dem Einfluß der klassischen deutschen Ästhetik ˷Wang Guowei and Schopenhauer: a Philosophical Encounter. Changes in the Self-image of Chinese Literature under the Influence of German Classical Aesthetics˹ (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1986), and Tu, Ching-i, Conservatism in a constructive form: the case of Wang Kuo-wei (1877—1927), in Monumenta Serica (1969), pp.188-214. No Western studies on Tang Yongtong and Zhang Yinlin are available yet. lvi Chen and Tang were linked to Wu Mi and Mei Guangdi because they studied together at Qinghua University and at Harvard and were introduced to Irving Babbitt by Mei Guangdi. lvii “Reconciling history with the nation?-Historicity, national particularity, and the question of universals”, in Historiography East and West vol.1 no. 1 (March 2003), pp.117-136. I prefer copying passages from the original text into this article rather than just referring to it, because, first, the article might not be available for everybody, and second, because not all passages from the original text are relevant for this article. lviii On the development of views of history and the problem of historicity in 19th and 20th century Europe see Bambach, Charles, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the crisis of historicism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1995. Barash, Jeffrey Andrew, Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff), 1988. For a reappraisal of the history and impact of historicism see Jaeger, Friedrich, Rüsen, Jörn, Geschichte des Historismus. Eine Einführung ˷History of Historicism. An Introduction˹ (München: C.H. Beck), 1992, and Rüsen, Jörn, Konfigurationen des Historismus, Studien zur deutschen Wissenschaftskultur ˷Configurations of Historicism. Studies on the German Culture of Science˹ (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp), 1993. lix The term “world views” aptly refers to the reflexivity of modern consciousness and hints at the cultural plurality and historical relativity which is so characteristic for modernity. On the modernity of “world views” see Heidegger, Martin, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes” ˷The Time of World View˹, in Heidegger, Martin, Holzwege (Frankfurt/ Main: Klostermann), 61980, pp.73-110. For a definition of the typical modern view of culture see Mannheim, Karl, “ ber die Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis” ˷On the Particularity of Cognition in the Sociology of Culture˹, in Mannheim, Karl, Strukturen des Denkens ˷Structures of Thought˹ (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp), 1980, pp.44-50. lx Barash 1988, esp. pp.21-23, 54-73. On Herder see Whitton, Brian J., “Herder’s Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community versus Cosmopolitan Rationalism”, in History & Theory 27:2 (1988), pp.146-168. On Dilthey see Riedel, Manfred, “Einleitung” ˷Introduction˹, in Dilthey, Wilhelm, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften ˷The Constitution of the Historical World in the Humanities˹ (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp), 51997, pp.9-80. lxi For the history of German historicism see Rüsen 1993, pp.18-113 as well as Jaeger, Rüsen 1992. lxii In the field of China research a recent example of an understanding and hence critique of modernity as the progress of reason by referring to Hegel’s philosophy of history can be found in Duara, Prasenjit, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. lxiii Nietzsche, Friedrich, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft 343 and Götzen-D噀mmerung, Die vier grossen Irrtümer 8. lxiv This is reflected in the scarcity of Western historiography on these intellectual. For the only monograph on one of these intellectuals see Alitto, Guy, The Last Confucian, Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1979, and Wen-hua shou-ch’eng chu-i lun ˷On Cultural Conservatism˹ (T’ai-pei: Shih-pao ch’u-pan kung-ssu), 1986. See also Furth, Charlotte (ed.), The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press), 1976. Conservative intellectuals like Tu Ya-ch’üan, post May Fourth Chang Shih-chao, Ch’en Huan-chang, the Hsüeh-heng-group including Wu Mi, Mei Kuang-ti, Liu I-cheng, Miao Feng-lin and others are still not very well known in the West and more often than not lumped together under the general term of conservatism. lxv Chevrier, Yves, “La servante-maîtresse: condition de la référence à l’histoire dans l’espace intellectuel chinois” ˷The Servant-mistress: the Condition of Reference to History in the Intellectual Space of China˹, in Extrême-Orient, extrême-occident, Cahiers de recherches comparatives IX, La reference à l’histoire, 1987, pp.117-144. lxvi Liu, Lydia H., Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity, China 1900—1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1995, Lippert, Wolfgang, Entstehung und Funktion einiger chinesischer marxistischer Termini: Der lexikalisch-begriffliche Aspekt der Rezeption des Marxismus in Japan und China ˷Evolution and Function of some Chinese Marxist Terms: the Lexical-Terminological Aspect of the Reception of Marxism in Japan and China˹, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979. 7240 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243

lxvii As was the case with Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s and Chang T’ai-yen’s early historiography. See Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Hsin shih-hsüeh” ˷New Historiography˹, in Hsin-min ts’ung-pao ˷New People’s Miscellany˹ 1, 3, 11, 14, 16, 20 (Tokyo, 1902), see Yin-ping-shih wen-chi ˷Collected Works of the Ice-Drinker’s Studio˹ (T’ai-pei, 1983, 3. ed.), IV/9, 1-11. For Chang T’ai-yen see Wang Fan-sen, Chang T’ai-yen te ssu-hsiang (1868—1919) chi ch’i tui ju-hsüeh ch’uan-t’ung te ch’ung-chi ˷The thought of Chang T’ai-yen and his attacks on the Confucian tradition (1868—1919)˹ (T’ai-pei, 1985), 189-199. Charlotte Furth, “The Sage as a Rebel: The Inner World of Chang Ping-lin” in Furth 1976 (ed.), 113-150. A detailed comparison of their respective views of history can be found in Schneider 1997, pp.68-82. lxviii On Fu Ssu-nien as a Chinese Ranke see Chang Chih-yüan, “Lan-k’o te sheng-p’ing yü chu-tso” ˷Ranke’s Life and his Writings˹, in Tzu-yu chung-kuo 7:12 (16.12.1952), 10-15, Sun T’ung-hsün, “T’an Fu Ssu-nien hsien-sheng te shih-hsüeh” ˷ On Fu Ssu-nien’s Historiography˹, in Li-shih yüeh-k’an 20 (1.1989), 10b, and Hsü Kuan-san, Hsin shih-hsüeh chiu-shih-nien, 1900—, 2 vols. ˷90 years of New Historiography˹, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 19892, I:206-207. On Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh as a Chinese Ranke see Wang Jung-tsu, Shih- chia Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh chuan ˷Biography of the Historian Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh˹, T’ai-pei: Lien-ching ch’u-pan-she, 1988, 53-57. lxix On this very influential empiricist image of Ranke and the extent to which it partially misrepresents Ranke’s historiography see Iggers, Georg G., “The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought”, in History and Theory 2 (1962), 17-40. On the similarly one- sided reception of Ranke in Japan see Tanaka, Stefan, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, and Mehl, Margaret, History and the State in Nineteenth-Century Japan, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. lxx Rüsen, Jörn, Konfigurationen des Historismus, Studien zur deutschen Wissenschaftskultur ˷Configurations of Historicism. Studies on the German Culture of Science˹, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1993, 18-134. lxxi Barash, Jeffery Andrew, Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, 54-74. lxxii On Fu Ssu-nien see Wang Fan-sen, Fu Ssu-nien: A Life in Chinese History and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University 2000, and Schneider, Axel, Wahrheit und Geschichte: Zwei chinesische Historiker auf der Suche nach einer modernen Identit噀t für China ˷Truth and History: Two Chinese Historians in Search of a Modern Identity for China˹, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997. lxxiii Fu Ssu-nien, “I Hsia tung-hsi shuo” ˷Theory of the I in the East and the Hsia in the West˹, in Chung-yen-yüan ch’ing-chu Ts’ai Yüan- p’ei hsien-sheng 65 sui lun-wen-chi, Li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so chi-k’an wai-p’ien 1:1 (January 1933), 1093-1134, see Fu Ssu-nien ch’üan-chi (henceforth: FSNCC) III, 822-894. lxxiv Fu Ssu-nien, Hsing-ming ku-hsün pien-cheng ˷Disputation and Vindication of the Ancient Glosses on ‘Nature’ and ‘Destiny’˹ 2 vols. (Shang-hai, 1940, 21947), see FSNCC II, 491-736. lxxv Fu Ssu-nien, “‘shih-liao yü shih-hsüeh’fa-k’an-tz’u” ˷Editorial to “Historical material and historiography”˹, in Li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu- so chi-k’an wai-pien 2, Shih-liao yü shih-hsüeh ˷Historical Material and Historiography˹ 1 (November 1945), see FSNCC IV, 1402-1404. lxxvi Fu Ssu-nien’s most important article on methodology is “Li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so kung-tso chic chih-ch’ü” ˷Working Intentions of the Institute for History and Philology˹, in Li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so chi-k’an ˷Bulletin of the Institute for History and Philology˹ 1:1 (October 1928), see FSNCC IV, 1301-1314. Other texts are “Liu Fu ‘ssu-sheng shih-yen-lu’ hsü” ˷Foreword to Liu Fu’s Record of Experiments concerning the Four Tones˹ (January 1923), see FSNCC III, 935-941. “Yü Ku Chieh-kang lun ku-shih shu” ˷Letter to Ku Chieh-kang discussing Ancient History˹, in Chung-shan ta-hsüeh yü-yen li-shih-hsüeh chou-k’an ˷Weekly Bulletin of the Institute for Philology and History of the Sun Yat-sen University˹ 2:13-14 (January 23 and 31, 1928), see FSNCC IV, 1521-1522. “Chan-kuo tzu-chia hsü-lun” ˷Systematic Discussion of the Philosophers of the Warring States˹ (1927—1928), see FSNCC II, 417-422. “Chung-shan ta-hsüeh yü-yen li- shih-hsüeh yen-chiu-so chou-k’an fa-k’an-tz’u” ˷Editorial of the Weekly Bulletin of the Institute for Philology and History of the Sun Yat-sen University˹, in Chung-shan ta-hsüeh yü-yen li-shih-hsüeh chou-k’an 1:1 (January 1, 1927), 1. “Shih-hsüeh fang-fa tao-lun” ˷Introduction to the Methods of Historiography˹ (n.p., about 1928), see FSNCC II, 335-392. Chung-hsi shih-hsüeh kuan-tien chih pien-ch’ien ˷The Change of Historiographical Points of View in China and the West˹, around 1928, published first in Tang-tai ˷Contemporary˹ 116 (December 1995), 64-71. “K’ao-ku-hsüeh te hsin fang-fa” ˷The new methods of archaeology˹, in Shih-hsüeh ˷Historiography˹ 1 (December 1930), 195-206, see FSNCC IV, 1337-1347. lxxvii See Schneider 1997, 33-56. lxxviii The texts are too numerous to be quoted here. Suffice is to refer to his participation in the debate on traditional Chinese medicine. See his Kuan-yü “kuo-i” wen-t’i te t’ao-lun ˷Discussion on the Problem of “National Medicine”˹ (August 27, 1934), see FSNCC VI, 2322-2329, and “So wei ‘kuo-i’” ˷The so-called ‘National Medicine’˹, in Ta-kung pao ˷The Impartial˹ (August 5, 1934), see FSNCC VI, 2299-2304. lxxix Fu Ssu-nien, “Hsien-t’an li-shih chiao-k’o-shu” ˷Idle Talk about Schoolbooks for History˹, in Chiao yü hsüeh ˷Teaching and Studying˹ 1:4 (October 1, 1935), see FSNCC IV, 1357-1372. lxxx Tung-pei shih-kang ˷Outline of the History of the Northeast˹, 1. volume, Fu Ssu-nien et. al. (Pei-p’ing, Institute for History and Philology of the Academia Sinica), 1932. For a detailed analysis of Fu Ssu-nien in comparison with other historiographical trends of the 1920s and 1930s see Schneider 1997, pp.146-176. lxxxi The San kang wu ch’ang (Three Bonds and Five Relationships) refer to the relationship between ruler and official, father and son, and husband and wife, and are the concrete expression of Confucian social ethics. lxxxii Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh, “Wang Kuan-t’ang hsien-sheng wan-tz’u ping hsü”. ˷Poem with Foreword commemorating Wang Kuan-t’ang (i.e. Wang Kuo-wei)˹ (Pei-p’ing, 1927), see Han-liu-t’ang chi, Yin-ch’üeh hsien-sheng shih-ts’un ˷Extant Poems from Mr. Yin-ch’üeh, Collection from the Hall of the Winter Willow˹, Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh wen-chi (henceforth: CYKWC) I:1, appendix II, 6-11. lxxxiii His most important historiographical works are his monographs on “medieval” Chinese history, see his, Sui-T’ang chih-tu yüan-yüan lüeh-lun-kao ˷Draft of a Brief Discussion of the Origins of the Institutional System of the Sui-and T’ang˹ (Ch’ung-ch’ing, 1944), see CYKWC II:4, 1-158, and T’ang-tai cheng-chih-shih shu-lun-kao ˷Draft of a Description and Discussion of the Political History of the T’ang Period) (Ch’ung-ch’ing, 1943), see CYKWC III:5, 1-159. 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lxxxiv The most prominent formulation of this methodology and his view of history can be found in Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh, “Feng Yu-lan Chung- kuo che-hsüeh-shih shen-ch’a pao-kao erh p’ien” ˷Two Reports on the Examination of Feng Yu-lan’s History of Chinese Philosophy˹ (1930 and 1933), see CYKWC II:3, 247-252. “Tu Ai chiang-nan fu” ˷Reading the Fu Mourning for the South˹, in Ch’ing-hua hsüeh-pao, Ch’ing-hua 30 chou-nien chi-nien-k’an ˷Ch’ing-hua Journal, Issue in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of Ch’ing-hua University˹ (July 1939), see CYKWC II:3, 209-217. “Ch’en Yüan his-yü-jen hua-hua k’ao hsü” ˷Foreword to Ch’en Yüan’s Investigation of the Sinificaton of the People of the Western Regions ˹ (February 1935), see CYKWC II:3, 238-239. “Ch’en Shu Liao-shih pu-chu hsü” ˷ Foreword to Ch’en Shu’s Supplementary Annotation of the History of the Liao˹ (November 19, 1942), see CYKWC II:3, 234-235. “Chih Min-tu hsüeh-shuo k’ao” ˷Investigation of the Teachings of Chih Min-tu˹, Li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so chi-k’an wai-pien ˷Extraordinary Issue of the Bulletin of the Institute for History and Philology of the Academia Sinica˹ 1:1 (January 1933), 1-18, see CYKWC I:2, 141-168. lxxxv Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh, “Wang Kuan-t’ang hsien-sheng wan-tz’u ping hsü”. ˷Poem with Foreword commemorating Wang Kuan-t’ang (i.e. Wang Kuo-wei)˹ (Pei-p’ing, 1927), see Han-liu-t’ang chi, Yin-ch’üeh hsien-sheng shih-ts’un ˷Extant Poems from Mr. Yin-ch’üeh, Collection from the Hall of the Winter Willow˹, see CYKWC I:1, appendix II, 6-11. lxxxvi Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh, “Feng Yu-lan Chung-kuo che-hsüeh-shih shen-ch’a pao-kao erh p’ien” ˷Two Reports on the Examination of Feng Yu-lan’s History of Chinese Philosophy˹ (1930 and 1933), see CYKWC II:3, 247-252. lxxxvii For a detailed analysis of Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh in comparison with other historiographical trends of the 1920s and 1930s see Schneider 1997, pp.126-146. lxxxviii This is not only manifest in Ch’en’s writings on history, but is also made clear in his writings on language, especially on the relationship between Chinese and foreign grammar, see his “Yü Liu Shu-ya chiao-shou lun kuo-wen shih-t’i shu” ˷Letter to Professor Liu Shu-ya Discussing the Questions for the Chinese Examinations˹, in Hsüeh-heng (Critical Review) 79 (1931), see CYKWC II:3, 221-228. lxxxix Wang Jung-tsu, Shih-chia Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh chuan ˷Biography of the Historian Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh˹ (T’ai-pei, 1988), 53-57. xc Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh studied in Germany from 1909 to 1911, and from 1921 to 1926, a time when the dilemma of late historicism became apparent and was widely discussed e.g. by Ernst Troeltsch and, with quite different conclusions, by Friedrich Meinecke. See Meinecke, Friedrich, Die Entstehung des Historismus ˷The Development of Historicism˹, (München: Oldenbourg), 1936. Troeltsch, Ernst, Der Historismus und seine Probleme ˷ Historicism and its Problems ˹ (Tübingen: Mohr), 1922. Troeltsch, Ernst, Der Historismus und seine überwindung ˷Historicism and its Overcoming˹ (Berlin: Heise), 1924. xci Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh’s opinion that Wang Kuo-wei’s objectives of protecting and continuing traditional Chinese culture were illusionary due to the overall social, economic and political change, and that this fact was the reason for his suicide, is evidence that Ch’en was quite aware of this dilemma of historicism. It is clear from Ch’en’s repeated affirmation of the values Wang was fighting for that this applies to Ch’en’s own situation as well. See Ch’en Yin-ch’üeh, “Wang Kuan-t’ang hsien-sheng wan-tz’u ping hsü”. ˷Poem with Foreword commemorating Wang Kuan-t’ang (i.e. Wang Kuo-wei)˹ (Pei-p’ing, 1927), see Han-liu-t’ang chi, Yin-ch’üeh hsien-sheng shih-ts’un ˷Extant Poems from Mr. Yin- ch’üeh, Collection from the Hall of the Winter Willow˹, see CYKWC I:1, appendix II, 6-11. xcii Barash 1988, Rüsen 1993. xciii Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Hsin shih-hsüeh”, in Hsin-min ts’ung-pao 1, 3, 11, 14, 16, 20 (1902), in YPSWC 4.9:1-11, especially 1-4. He explicitly refers to the New Text School and its political engagement, Ibid. 26-29. xciv Ibid. 7-8. xcv Ibid. 29-32. xcvi Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Chung-kuo-shih hsü-lun”, in Ch’ing-i-pao (September 3. and 13, 1901), in YPSWC 3.6:1-12, especially 11-12. xcvii Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Hsin shih-hsüeh” (1902), 10. xcviii I define a “necessary relationship” as assuming that the principles governing history are pre-given (be it as immanent or transcendent) and just have to be discovered. A “pluralistic relationship” refers to a situation where the historian has to apply different possible interpretations to history in order to judge their plausibility. In case of an “arbitrary relationship” everybody ends up being his own historian, because history is essentially meaningless and has to be invested with meaning from an always-changing present perspective. xcix Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne, “Shi” und “Lun”, Studien zur Methodologie der Historiographie in der VR China ˷“Shi” and “lun”. Studies on the methodology of historiography in the PRC˹ (Bochum, unpublished habilitation thesis, Ruhr-University Bochum), 1988, 153-158. c೑亢᡹. Established February 20, 1910 in Shang-hai. ci Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Shuo kuo-feng”, in Kuo-feng-pao 1 (20.2.1910), reprinted in YPSWC 9.2V:3-11. cii Alitto, Guy, The Last Confucian, Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press), 1979. ciii Kwok, D.W.T., Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900—1950 (New Haven, Yale University Press), 1965 and Furth, Charlotte, Ting, Wen- chiang, Science and China’s New Culture (Cambridge/Mass., Harvard University Press), 1970. civ See his “Ou-yu hsin-ying lu chieh-lu” (10-12.1919), reprinted in YPSWC 7.2:1-162, “K’o-hsüeh ching-shen yü tung-hsi wen-hua” (8.20.1922), speech held in Nan-t’ung, YPSWC 14.39:1-9, “Kuan-yü hsüan-hsüeh k’o-hsüeh lun-chan chih’chan-shih kuo-chi kung-fa’” (5.5.1923), reprinted in YPSWC 14.40:27-28, “Jen-sheng-kuan yü k’o-hsüeh” (5.23.1923), reprinted in YPSWC 14:40:21-27; see also Levenson 21970, 84-169. cv See Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “K’o-hsüeh ching-shen yü tung-hsi wen-hua” (8.20.1922), in YPSWC 14.39:1-9, especially 8-9. “Jen-sheng-kuan yü k’o-hsüeh” (5.23.1923), in YPSWC 14:40:21-27, especially 25, 2. paragraph. cvi Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Ou-yu hsin-ying lu chieh-lu” (10-12.1919), in YPSCC 7.2:1-162, especially 10-11. Levenson 19702, 84-169. cvii Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu-fa” (autumn 1921), in Kai-tsao 4:3-4 (11 and 12.1921), in Ch’ing-hua chou-k’an 26:11, 29:1, 29:2 (1921, 1.1922), in YPSCC 1.1:1-128. cviii Ibid. 1-7. cix Ibid. 111-113. 7242 Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243

cx Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu-fa” (autumn 1921), in Kai-tsao 4:3-4 (11 and 12.1921), in Ch’ing-hua chou-k’an 26:11, 29:1, 29:2 (1921, 1.1922), in YPSCC. 1.1:1-128. 111. He goes on to restrict the sphere of causality in history as including the material and physiological aspects of human life. cxi Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu-fa” (1921), 112-118. cxii Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Shen-mo shih wen-hua” (12.1.1922), in Ch’en-pao fu-k’an, in YPSWC 14.39:97-104. cxiii Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Shen-mo shih wen-hua” (12.1.1922), in Ch’en-pao fu-k’an, in YPSWC 14.39:97-104. cxiv Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Yen-chiu wen-hua-shih te chi ko chung-yao wen-t’i” (12.1922), in YPSWC 14.40:1-7. cxv Ibid. 3-5. cxvi Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu-fa pu-pien” (1926/1927), in YPSCC 1.1: 1-176. cxvii Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu-fa pu-pien” (1926/1927), in YPSCC 1.1: 5-9. cxviii A term he never uses. cxix Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu-fa pu-pien” (1926/1927), 9-10. cxx Hence he clearly rejects “science for the sake of science”, one of the cornerstones of e.g. the positivistic methodology of Fu Ssu-nien. cxxi Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu-fa pu-pien” (1926/1927), 21-23. cxxii See Makkreel, Rudolf A., “Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians: The Distinction of the Geisteswissenschaften and the Kulturwissenschaften”, in Journal of the History of Philosophy 1969:4, 423-440. cxxiii It stills remains to be researched on the basis of what possible Japanese or perhaps English translation Liang Ch’i-ch’ao came to knew about Neo-Kantianism. cxxiv For variations on this topic that go beyond the literature mentioned above (Barash, Bambach, Rüsen) see Bubner, Rüdiger, Geschichtsprozesse und Handlungsnormen. Untersuchungen zur praktischen Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp), 1984. cxxv See Wang Kuo-wei’s engagement with Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the role of American neo-humanism and especially of Irving Babbitt in the development of the Hsüeh-heng group, or Mou Tsung-san’s encounter with Kant as but a few examples. cxxvi Whether it can be characterized as a discourse as defined by Foucault is still in need of clarification. cxxvii See my doubts above concerning the classification of the final years of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao as “conservative”. cxxviii The following pages are work in progress and will be developed into a book chapter in the coming 4-6 months. The following Chinese secondary literature has been consulted: ᄺⱘ⦄ҷ䆴䞞੠䕀᦯, in T’ang-tuۦHan Hsing 䶽᯳, “Hsüeh-heng-p’ai tui ju-hsüeh te hsien-tai ch’üan-shih ho chuan-huan” ᄺ㸵⌒ᇍ hsüeh-k’an 19:76 (2003:2), 129-134. Cheng Shih-ch’ü 䚥Ꮬ⏴, “Lun Wu Mi te tao-te-kuan” 䆎ਇᅧⱘ䘧ᖋ㾖, in Pei-ching shih-fan ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 1996:6, 27-33. Shen Ching ≜䴰, “Chien-hsi ‘Hsüeh-heng’ p’ai te tao-te i-shih hsin-li” ㅔᵤljᄺ㸵NJ⌒ⱘ䘧ᖋᛣ䆚ᖗ⧚, in Su-chou chiao—yü hsüeh- yüan hsüeh-pao 20:1 (March 2003), 21-23, 39. The following primary sources of Wu Mi have been used: Wu Mi ਇᅧ, Chi-nien Pai-wu shih-jen Wu Fang-chi hsien-sheng 㑾ᗉⱑሟ䆫Ҏਇ㢇ঢ়ܜ⫳, in Ta-kung-pao wen-hsüeh fu-k’an 233, June 20, 1932. -Chung-hua min-tsu tsai k’ang-ti k’u-chan chung suo ying ch’ih chih xhsin-yang chi Ёढ⇥ᮣ೼ᡫᬠ㢺៬Ё᠔ᑨᣕПֵӄঞᗕᑺ, in Ta— kung-pao wen-hsüeh fu-k’an 213, 08-02-1932. —I to tsung-piao ϔ໮ᘏ㸼, in Ssu-hsiang yü shih-tai 46 (June 1, 1947), 6-8. .K’ung-chiao chih chia-chih ᄨᬭПӋؐ, in Kuo-wen chou-pao 3:40— ,K’ung-tzu chih chia-chih chi k’ung-chiao chih ching-i ᄨᄤПӋؐঞᄨᬭП㊒Н, in Ta-kung-pao wen-hsüeh fu-k’an, September 27— 1927. —Lun hsin wen-hua yün-tung 䆎ᮄ᭛࣪䖤ࡼ, in Hsüeh-heng 4, 1922. —Lun shih chih piao-chun 䆎џПᷛޚ, in Hsüeh-heng 56 (August 1926), 1-5. —P’ing Liang Shih-ch’iu te’Lang-man te yü ku-tien te’ 䆘ṕᅲ⾟ⱘlj⌾⓿ⱘϢস݌ⱘNJ, in Ta-kung-pao, 19-09-1927. —Po-cko-sen hsin chu: tao-te tsung-chiao chih liang yuan ᶣḐỂᮄ㨫˖䘧ᖋᅫᬭПϸ⑤, in Ta-kung-pao wen-hsüeh fu-k’an 227, May 9, 1932. —Ssu-hsiang yü kai-tsao ᗱᛇϢᬍ䗴, in Kuan-ch’a 1:7-9. —Tao-te chiu-kuo lun 䘧ᖋᬥ೑䆎, in Ta-kung-pao wen-hsüeh fu-k’an 214, February 15, 1932. —Wen-hsüeh yü jen-sheng ᭛ᄺϢҎ⫳ (Pei-ching: Ch’ing-hua ta-hsüeh ch’u-pan-she), 1993. —Wo chih jen-sheng-kuan ៥ПҎ⫳㾖, in Hsüeh-heng 16 (April 1923), 1-26. —Wu Mi shih-chi, k’ung-hsüan shih-hua ਇᅧ䆫䲚Τぎ䔽䆫䆱 (Chung-hua shu-chü), 1935. For the works on ethics by other members of the Hsüeh-heng group see: Miao Feng-lin 㓾޸ᵫ, Jen-tao-lun fa-fan Ҏ䘧䆎থ޵, in Hsüeh-heng 46, October 1925. Miao Feng-lin 㓾޸ᵫ, Ch’an-hsing 䯤ᗻ, in Hsüeh-heng 16, April 1923 Liu I-cheng ᷇䆦ᕕ, Fan-pen ডᴀ, in Hsüeh-heng 46, October 1925. Kuo Pin-ho 䛁᭠੠, K’ung-tzu yü ya-li-shih-to-te ᄨᄤϢѮ䞠຿໮ᖋ, in Kuo-feng pan-yüeh-k’an 1:3, 28-09-1932. Ching Ch’ang-chi ᱃ᯠᵕ, Hsin li-chih yün-tung tsou-I ᮄ⧚ᱎ䖤ࡼ䲣䆂, in Kuo-feng pan-yüeh-k’an 8:5.˄PTO˅ Kuo Pin-ho 䛁᭠੠, K’ung-tzu yü ya-li-shih-to-te ᄨᄤϢѮ䞠຿໮ᖋ, in Kuo-feng pan-yüeh-k’an 1:3, 28-09-1932. Kuo Pin-ho 䛁᭠੠, Tu .㸠, in Ssu-hsiang yü shih-tai 11, 1942ۦJu-hsing 䇏 Liu I-cheng ᷇䆦ᕕ, Cheng-cheng ℷᬓ, in Hsüeh-heng 44, August 1925. Liu I-cheng ᷇䆦ᕕ, Chung-kuo hsiang-chih chih shang-te chu-I Ё೑е⊏ПᇮᖋЏН, in Hsüeh-heng 17:1-11, 21, 36, May 1923 to December 12-1924, also in Liu I-cheng shih-hsüeh lun-wen hsüan-chi, pp.178-223. Axel Schneider / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7218–7243 7243

Liu I-cheng ᷇䆦ᕕ, Ming-lun ᯢӺ, in Hsüeh-heng 26 (February 1924), pp.1-5. Liu Po-ming ߬ⱑᯢ, Fei-tsung-chiao yün-tung p’ing-I 䴲ᅫᬭ䖤ࡼ䆘䆂, in Hsüeh-heng 6, June 1922. Shu-k’an chieh-shao кߞҟ㒡, in Ta-kung-pao wen-hsüeh fu-k’an 251, 24-12-1932. cxxix See my “Bridging the Gap: Attempts at Constructing a ‘New’ Historical-Cultural Identity in the PRC”, in East Asian History vol. 22 (Dec 2001), pp.129-144.