Infallibilism, Fallibilism and Closure: Brains in Vats and Mein Herr on Maps

Chapter 7 Infallibilism, Fallibilism and Closure: Brains in Vats and Mein Herr on Maps

J.R. Cameron

Abstract

Starting point: a performative version of a fallibilist reliabilism: crediting N with knowing that p is endorsing N’s belief that p as rational and hence as correct, within an epistemic community’s practice which determines standards of rationality and takes achieving it as ensuring correctness reliably—regularly though not infallibly: it re- quires us to regard a rational belief as correct unless we have grounds for doubt. Aim: to assess from this position infallibilism based on Closure arguments, particularly of the brain-in-a-vat kind. Findings: These are invalid by our ordinary epistemic standards; and they depend on a presupposition-of-a-practice type of entailment rather than a content-entailment. Conclusion: these arguments must be seen as attacking our epistemic practice as a whole, not individual knowledge attributions. Response: but that fallibilist practice is appropriate, given the belief-reality gap (cf. the map-reality gap) and the belief-evidence gap: these gaps make absolute certainty—logical impossibility of error, as sought by BiV arguments—unattainable.

1 A Fallibilist Analysis of Knowledge Attributions

1.1 An Apparent Mismatch between Our Epistemic Theory and Our Actual Practice There seems to be a major discrepancy between our theoretical understanding of what it takes to know something and our actual practice in attributing knowledge. Nominally, we take knowing to require the elimination of any pos- sible doubt, accepting the slogan “If you know, you can’t be wrong”—call this “S1”—where the “can’t” here is read in an absolute, infallibilist sense. But in our actual practice, we do credit others or ourselves with knowing things in kinds of cases where we are aware that the basis for the belief in question does not absolutely guarantee its correctness. For example, we regularly credit someone with knowing something on the basis of what they see, even though experience tells us that even someone with good vision looking carefully in good viewing conditions can occasionally

108 Cameron be misled. Only if there is some reason in a particular case for doubting the evidence of their eyes—some reason for thinking this may be one of the occa- sional aberrant cases—will we feel justified in not attributing knowledge. The alternative slogan “No doubting without some reason for doubting”—call this “S2”—seems to capture our actual, fallibilist, practice.

1.2 A Quasi-Performative and Fallibilist Analysis of Knowledge-Attributions Some (see e.g. Unger 1975, Ch. 2, § 9; Stroud 1984, Ch. 2, esp. p. 57; Prichard & Ranalli 2013, §2) have maintained that S1, read in the infallibilist way, is part of our ordinary understanding about knowing, and then go on to wrestle with the sceptical implications which this carries. In an article published in the mid-1990’s (Cameron 1997) I tried to resolve the apparent discrepancy by defending a fallibilist view, accepting S2 as equal- ly part of our ordinary understanding, and arguing that S1 is to be read in a weaker, less-than-infallibilist way. I want in this paper, having summarized that view, to relate it to closure arguments and offer arguments in direct support of fallibilism. The defence was based on a quasi-performative or achievement-attribution account what we do when we attribute knowledge to someone or claim it for ourselves: if I say, e.g., that Harriet knows that horses are herbivores I am not just making a factual statement (e.g., about a justified true belief she has), but rather am

(1) attributing to Harrriet a belief that horses are herbivores (the factual part) (2) endorsing this belief as held by her on a rational basis and (3) further endorsing the belief as being, in consequence of its rationality, correct.1

I’m crediting her with having, through epistemic effort (e.g., reliance on a source known to be reliable, appropriate rational reflection, &c), achieved the desirable epistemic status of “having got it right.” Note in this “reliable-and- hence-correct belief” (“RhCB”) analysis the stress on attribution of success to the agent, and also the important connecting “hence” (this inter alia blocks pos- sible Gettier-type counter-examples to the justified true belief (jtb) analysis). The epistemic status attributed here is a social status, defined by the epistemic community. That community provides the agreed standards of rationality

1 I borrowed the term ‘endorsing’ from Duncan-Jones (1964).