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DIVORCE and RETREAT!
Advice for infallibilists: DIVORCE & RETREAT! Article (Published Version) Booth, Anthony Robert (2018) Advice for infallibilists: DIVORCE & RETREAT! Synthese, 195 (9). pp. 3773-3789. ISSN 0039-7857 This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/68117/ This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published version. Copyright and reuse: Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University. Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk Synthese DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1421-0 S.I. : EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION Advice for Infallibilists: DIVORCE and RETREAT! Anthony Robert Booth1 Received: 1 April 2016 / Accepted: 28 April 2017 © The Author(s) 2017. -
Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples
grazer philosophische studien 95 (2018) 475-499 brill.com/gps Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples Alex Davies University of Tartu [email protected] Abstract Infallibilism is commonly rejected because it is apparently subject to easy counter- examples. The author describes a strategy that infallibilists can use to resist this ob- jection. Because the sentences used in the counter-examples to express evidence and belief are context-sensitive, the infallibilist can insist that such counter-examples trade on a vacillation between different readings of these sentences. The author describes what difficulties await those who try to produce counter-examples against which the proposed strategy is ineffective. Keywords context-sensitivity – counter-examples – entailment – infallibilism 1 The Example Based Objection Infallibilism about evidence-based belief is the following thesis: Infallibilism A knows that P on the basis of evidence E only if E entails P.1 1 I restrict attention to evidence-based belief because I don’t want infallibilism to turn out false simply because there’s such a thing as knowledge that is not based on evidence. Defenders of infallibilism (more or less so understood) include Bonjour (2010), Dodd (2011), Ledding- ton (forthcoming), McDowell (1982), and Travis (2005). Unlike the others, Bonjour and Dodd both defend infallibilism and either argue (in the case of (Dodd, 2007)) or grant (in the case of (Bonjour, ibid)) that infallibilism implies scepticism. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/18756735-000054Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 09:56:17AM via free access <UN> 476 Alex Davies Infallibilism is the kind of philosophical thesis that undergraduates have to be taught out of believing—in the first instance, untutored intuition tends to be in its favour. -
Problems for Infinitism Keith Wynroe University of Cambridge
Res Cogitans Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 3 6-4-2014 Problems for Infinitism Keith Wynroe University of Cambridge Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Wynroe, Keith (2014) "Problems for Infinitism," Res Cogitans: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1095 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CommonKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Res Cogitans by an authorized administrator of CommonKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Res Cogitans (2014) 5:10-15 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans Problems for Infinitism Keith Wynroe University of Cambridge Published online: 4 June 2014 © Keith Wynroe 2014 Abstract Infinitism in epistemic justification is the thesis that the structure of justification consists in infinite, non- repeating series. Although superficially an implausible position, it is capable of presenting strong arguments in its favour, and has been growing in popularity. After briefly introducing the concept and the motivations for it, I will present a common objection (the finite minds problem) as well as a powerful reply which couches Infinitism in dispositional terms. I will then attempt to undermine this counter- objection by drawing parallels between it and the problems raised against semantic dispositionalism by Kripke’s exegesis of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. I One of the most obvious responses to infinitism is the finite minds objection. The objection itself if extremely simple, but its ramifications are rather complex. Given the assumption that we are in fact finite creatures (with finite minds), and given that propositional justification consists in infinite non-repeating chains, it follows that we can never have doxastic justification for any proposition whatsoever. -
Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism
PENULTIMATE DRAFT – PLEASE CITE THE PUBLISHED VERSION To appear in: Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues, Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds.), Springer. Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism Fabio Sterpetti Sapienza University of Rome. Department of Philosophy [email protected] Abstract. Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver- age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting debate has arisen with regard to which is the more adequate epistemological interpretation of PEM. Indeed, Hohwy main- tains that given that PEM supports an inferential view of perception and cogni- tion, PEM has to be considered as conveying an internalist epistemological per- spective. Contrary to this view, Clark maintains that it would be incorrect to in- terpret in such a way the indirectness of the link between the world and our in- ner model of it, and that PEM may well be combined with an externalist epis- temological perspective. The aim of this paper is to assess those two opposite interpretations of PEM. Moreover, it will be suggested that Hohwy’s position may be considerably strengthened by adopting Carlo Cellucci’s view on knowledge (2013). Keywords: Prediction error minimization; Scientific realism; Analytic method; Perception; Epistemology; Knowledge; Infinitism; Naturalism; Heuristic view. -
Epistemology
Epistemology Lecture 9: Naturalism Dr. Ioannis Votsis (NCH) [email protected] www.votsis.org Chapter I: Naturalism in Epistemology Where things stand • Last week we looked at the debate surrounding local and global versions of scepticism. • This week we consider an entirely new way of doing epistemology, viz. naturalism or as it is sometimes called ‘naturalised epistemology’. 3 An alternative to foundationalism • The expression ‘naturalised epistemology’ was coined by Quine (1969). • Quine offers this view as an alternative to traditional epistemology and in particular to its preoccupation with (empiricist) foundationalism. • What is empiricist foundationalism? Simple form: Statements are inferentially justified by basic empirical statements, the latter being non-inferentially justified by experience. Embellished form: Even the meaning of statements is determined by experience. This is the so-called ‘verificationist principle’: • Quine thinks that, as a project, empiricist foundationalism has failed because it hasn’t lived up to its promise to reduce everything thus. 4 Replacement naturalism • Quine urges the abandonment of epistemology and the adopting of psychology (and other relevant sciences) in its stead: “The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?” (1969, p. 75). “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject.” (p. 82) • This view has come to be known as ‘replacement naturalism’ or ‘eliminative naturalism’. -
Epistemology Reading List
Epistemology Reading List I. Books Majors and Minors Read: 1. Lehrer, Theory of Knouledge z. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knouledge Majors Only Read: 3. Harman,Thought 4. Foley, Theory of Epistemic Rationality II. Articles Starced readings arefor majors and minors, unst{trred readings in this section 'arefor majors only. Overview *Pryor, J. zoor. "Highlights of Recent Epistemology," British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science, 52:95-124 Justification *Alston, William P. 1985. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," Monist 68 "Goldman, Alvin. tg79."What is Justified Belief?" In Justification and Knowledge, ed. G.S. Pappas, 1-23. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Steup, M. r988."The Deontic Conception of Epistemic Justification," Philosophical Studies S3: 65-84. Feldman & Conee. 198b. "Evidentialism," Philosophical Studies 48: t5-34. Foundationalisrn & Coherentism BonJour, L. t978. "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" American Philosophical Quarterly , 1b . 1: 1- 13 . " BonJour , L. tggg . "The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism, " in Blacktuell Guide to Epistemology, ed. Greco & Sosa, 117-742. * Klein, P. zoo4. "Infinitism is the Solution to the Regress Problem," in ContempororA Debates in Epistemology, ed. Sosa, E. and Steup, M. Blackwell. (Ian Euans hcs written a long expositional paper on Klein's uiews, so contact him if you'd like a copy.) Epistemic Circularity "Van Cleve, James. rg7g. "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle," Philosophical Reuietu 8B : 55-9r. Knowledge & Warrant "Gettier, E. 1963. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 2J: r2r-123. Goldman, A. t967. "Causal Theory of Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 64: 357-372. "Lehrer & Paxson. 1969. "Knowledge: Undefeated, Justified, True Belief," Journal of Philosophy, 66: 225-257. -
Epistemology in the Churches of Christ: an Analysis and Critique of Thomas B
Abilene Christian University Digital Commons @ ACU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Electronic Theses and Dissertations Summer 7-2016 Epistemology in the Churches of Christ: An Analysis and Critique of Thomas B. Warren Derek Estes Abilene Christian University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.acu.edu/etd Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Estes, Derek, "Epistemology in the Churches of Christ: An Analysis and Critique of Thomas B. Warren" (2016). Digital Commons @ ACU, Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 42. This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Digital Commons @ ACU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ ACU. ABSTRACT This thesis seeks to understand at least one prevalent religious epistemology in the Churches of Christ by exploring the work of Thomas B. Warren. To accomplish this goal, I first offer a descriptive analysis of Warren’s theory of knowledge followed by an assessment of its strong and weak points. Ultimately finding his epistemology unsatisfying, I conclude the thesis by highlighting recent developments in religious epistemology that might point the way forward in accounting for knowledge of God in a theologically and philosophically robust way. Epistemology in the Churches of Christ: An Analysis and Critique of Thomas B. Warren A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Graduate School of Theology Abilene Christian University In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements of the Degree Master of Arts In Theology By Derek Estes July 2016 To my dad, who exemplifies diligent and disciplined work satisfied with nothing short of excellence. -
Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck
Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy 2006 Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck Jason Baehr Loyola Marymount University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac Part of the Epistemology Commons Recommended Citation Baehr, Jason. "Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck." Metaphilosophy 37 (2006), 728-36. Print. This Article - pre-print is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This is not a final draft. Please cite only the journal version, published in Metaphilosophy 37 (2006). Epistemic Luck. By Duncan Pritchard. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Pp. xii + 290. Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck is a wide-ranging, nicely written, and generally masterful treatment of the concept of epistemic luck and its relevance to contemporary epistemology. Its central focus is what Pritchard calls the “epistemic luck platitude,” which is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. This claim is widely (if largely uncritically) accepted among epistemologists; and yet an unqualified endorsement of it is problematic, for there are many putative instances of knowledge in which an agent’s reaching the truth is in some sense a matter of luck (e.g., the archeologist who “happens” upon an important find or the detective who stumbles across a critical clue). Pritchard’s aim is to clarify the sense in which knowledge excludes luck and to consider the resulting implications for the theory of knowledge. -
Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity".Tex; 8/02/2009; 18:27; P.1 2 Podlaskowski and Smith
This is the authors' version of the following article: Podlaskowski, A. and J. Smith. (2011). “Infinitism And Epistemic Normativity." Synthese, 178 (3), pp. 515{527. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com. More specifically: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-009-9654-1?LI=true Infinitism And Epistemic Normativity ∗ Adam C. Podlaskowski and Joshua A. Smith Fairmont State University and Central Michigan University February 8, 2009 Abstract. Klein's account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds' objection. Keywords: infinitism, epistemic responsibility, normativity, regress problem, Klein Epistemically responsible agents face the difficult task of accepting only justified beliefs. As Peter Klein points out, taking seriously our epistemic responsibilities quickly leads to an infinite regress, since any belief is justified only if it is based on good reasons, and the beliefs serving as reasons also stand in need of justification, as do those be- liefs serving as reasons, and so on (2007a, p. 5). This difficulty, the regress problem, threatens the possibility of an agent meeting any of her epistemic responsibilities. ∗ Thanks to George Pappas, Bob Stecker, Gary Fuller, Matt Katz, Rob Noggle, Mark Shelton, and Nicholaos Jones for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Thanks to Bill Melanson and Aaron Cotnoir for helpful discussions. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. -
REP Knowledge
Knowledge, Concept of Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Michael Hannon University of Nottingham Keywords: knowledge; ignorance; justification; scepticism Article Summary The word ‘know’ is exceptional for a number of reasons. It is one of the 10 most commonly used verbs in English, alongside basic verbs like ‘be,’ ‘do,’ ‘say,’ ‘have,’ and ‘go.’ It is also the most frequently used term in epistemic evaluation: we speak of ‘knowing’ far more often than we speak of ‘justification,’ ‘reliability,’ ‘understanding,’ ‘wisdom,’ and other intellectual traits or epistemic properties. Perhaps most strikingly, the word ‘know’ allegedly has a meaning-equivalent in every human language. Unlike almost every other word in English, linguists have identified ‘know’ as one of a very small number of words that are culturally universal (Goddard 2010). These facts suggest that knowledge is deeply important to human life. Knowledge has also held a central place in epistemology. Indeed, the word ‘epistemology’ comes from the Greek word epistêmê, which is often translated as ‘knowledge.’ This is not to say that epistemologists are only interested in knowledge. They also investigate epistemic virtues like open- mindedness and intellectual humility, as well as properties of belief like being rational and justified (among many other things). Still, the enterprise of epistemology has largely been an investigation into the nature, significance, sources, and extent of human knowledge. But what is knowledge? Why do we value it? How is it acquired? And how much of it do we have? In the late 20th century, one of the central questions asked by epistemologists was: When does a true belief count as knowledge? It was widely assumed that knowledge is a form of true belief plus some additional requirement(s), such as justification or reliability. -
A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism December 13, 2013
Reason & Explanation: A defense of explanatory coherentism Ted L. Poston University of South Alabama December 13, 2013 ii Contents Preface vii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 A brief history of coherentism . 2 1.2 Two traditional objections to coherentism . 7 1.2.1 The Input Objection . 7 1.2.2 Alternative Systems Objection . 9 1.3 Overview . 11 2 Epistemic Conservatism 17 2.1 The anti-conservative probability argument . 19 2.2 Conservative Justification & Warranted Assertion . 26 2.3 Conservatism & Autobiographical Epistemology . 28 2.4 The `Extra Boost' and Conversion objections . 32 2.4.1 The \Extra Boost" Objection . 32 2.4.2 Conversion objections . 33 2.5 Conservatism & the perspectival character of justification . 35 2.5.1 The argument from perspective . 36 2.5.2 Two challenges . 38 2.6 Conclusion . 40 3 Reasons without first philosophy 41 3.1 The Basic Reasons Dilemma . 42 3.1.1 The First Horn . 42 3.1.2 The Second Horn . 44 3.2 The argument against first philosophy . 45 3.2.1 The nature of basic reasons . 45 3.2.2 No First Philosophy . 48 3.3 Framework Reasons . 51 iii iv CONTENTS 3.4 Weak foundationalism & framework reasons . 56 3.5 Bergmann on foundationalism and epistemic circularity . 58 3.6 Conclusion . 62 4 Explanation & Justification 63 4.1 Explanation & its virtues . 64 4.1.1 Three arguments for primitiveness . 67 4.1.2 The virtues of explanation . 73 4.2 An explanationist theory of justification . 78 4.2.1 The goal . 78 4.2.2 The Ex-J account . 79 4.2.3 Ex-J & Mentalism . -
The Case for Infallibilism
The Case for Infallibilism Julien Dutant* * University of Geneva, Switzerland: [email protected] http://julien.dutant.free.fr/ Abstract. Infallibilism is the claim that knowledge requires that one satisfies some infalli- bility condition. I spell out three distinct such conditions: epistemic, evidential and modal infallibility. Epistemic infallibility turns out to be simply a consequence of epis- temic closure, and is not infallibilist in any relevant sense. Evidential infallibilism is unwarranted but it is not an satisfactory characterization of the infallibilist intuition. Modal infallibility, by contrast, captures the core infallibilist intuition, and I argue that it is required to solve the Gettier problem and account for lottery cases. Finally, I discuss whether modal infallibilism has sceptical consequences and argue that it is an open ques- tion whose answer depends on one’s account of alethic possibility. 1 Introduction Infallibilism is the claim that knowledge requires that one satisfies some infallibility condition. Although the term and its opposite, “fallibilism”, are often used in the epistemology literature, they are rarely carefully defined. In fact, they have received such a variety of meanings that one finds such contradictory statements as the follow- ing: “Fallibilism is virtually endorsed by all epistemologists”1 “Epistemologists whose substantive theories of warrant differ dramatically seem to believe that the Gettier Problem can be solved only if a belief cannot be at once warranted and false, which is [infallibilism]. Such is the standard view.”2 Faced with such statements, one is tempted to dismiss any discussion about infal- libilism as a merely terminological dispute. However, I will argue here that there is a non-trivial infallibility condition that best captures the core infallibilist intuition, and that knowledge is subject to such a condition.