Tke Soviet Challenge

FOCUS ON

Seventh Annual Institute on United States Foreign Policy j>-- ir lll > z D HJ I I- z o H ¡í u S K D O) IU D - W > 3 FOCf/S ON D A> U < -> * o [L A. , LL [L uT « < ÜJ * X' O D OQ -I < O c _J o THE SOVIET O s — ir 2 ¿o' i 0 SITY OF O ü_ Z 0 CHALLENGE U. ni z h O OLD O UJ h en G) 2 h S D II) n. Z Z 0

SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY PREFACE

This booklet is the fourth ¡n the "Global Focus Series" published by the Institute for World Affairs Education, a series of publications, each designed to present in a single booklet a variety of viewpoints on an important foreign policy issue, to meet the need for greater public knowledge and understanding of intemational relations. These papers are based upon the proceedings of the Seventh Annual Institute on United States Foreign Policy held at The University of Wis- consin-Milwaukee on March 2, 1963. The foreign policy institute is held annually in Milwaukee and is sponsored by the Institute for World Affairs Education, The University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, the University Extensión División, World Affairs Council of Milwaukee, and League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, in association with a number of community civic and educational organizations. Cooperating groups included the American Association for the United Nations; American Association of University Women; Business and Professional Women's Clubs of Milwaukee; Governor's Committee on the United Nations; International Institute of Milwaukee County, Inc.; and United World Federalists-Midwest Región. The Program Planning Committee included Professor Donald R. Shea, co-chairman, and Mrs. Ralph H. Wenberg of the Institute for World Affairs Education; Professor V. Stanley Vardys of The University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee, Department of Political Science; David E. Beckwith, co-chairman, Walter B. Gerken, and Thomas N. Tuttle of the World Affairs Council of Milwaukee; and Mrs. W. G. Hyde and Mrs. Karl Bostrom, co-chairmen, of the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin. Local arrangements were by Mrs. Harry J. Rose and Mrs. William C. Lutzen for the Leagues of Women Voters in Milwaukee County. The booklet was edited and supervised for publication by Mrs. Ralph H. Wenberg of the Institute for World Affairs Education. Mrs. Orrin Helstad of The University of Wisconsin Extensión División collaborated in the editing. Conference pictures are by Isadore Knox of The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Photo Laboratory.

Donald R. Shea Director Institute for World Affairs Education ii CONTENTS

FOREWORD vi i

INTRODUCTION viü

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE SIXTIES: RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET CHALLENGE 1 Mose Harvey Soviet Affairs Specialist and Sénior Member Policy Planning Council United States Department of State

INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION 15 John Scott Special Assistant to the Publisher TIME, THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

THE SOVIET BLOC: IS THE MONOLITH CRACKING? 24 Marshall D. Shulman Research Associate Russian Research Center Harvard University

AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: A CRITIQUE 34 Fred Warner Neal Professor, International Relations and Government Claremont College

KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY: COEXISTENCE OR CONFLICT? 47 Philip E. Mosely Director, The European Institute Professor, International Relations Columbio University

PANEL DISCUSSION 62

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 69

RESOURCE MATERIALS 80

iii MOSE HARVEY is an officer ¡n the U. S. Foreign Service and currently a sénior member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State, with particular responsibiIity for the Council's work on the U.S.S.R. and the Communist bloc. He was educated at Emory University ¡n Atlanta and the University of California where he received a doc- tórate in 1937. He has served as Director of the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Director of Political Affairs in the National War College, Deputy Chief of the U. S. Mission in Helsinki, and Deputy U. S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. He is the author of numerous papers on Soviet affairs and has taught the sub¡ect at Emory University and Johns Hopkins University.

JOHN SCOTT is Special Assistant to the Pub- lisher of TIME, The Weekly Newsmagazine. He studied at The University of Wisconsin from 1929 to 1931 and at the Sorbonne in Paris from 1938 to 1939. While in Russia from 1932 to 1937 working in the Siberian steel milis, he married a Russian woman, María Dikareva. Mr. Scott was a ¡ournalist in Moscow, Paris, the Balkans, the Near East, Japan, and Berlín from 1938 to 1941, and for five years, 1943 to 1948, he was a war correspondent for TIME. He is the author of the following books: Behind the Urals, Dual for Europe, Europe and Revolution, Political Warfare, Democracy Is Not Enough, Ruble Diplomacy, and Crisis in Communist China.

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN is Research Associate at the Russian Research Center at Harvard Uni- versity and Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He holds an A.B. degree from the University of Michi- gan and A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Columbio University. He did field research in France, studying the operation of the French Communist party in relation to developments in Moscow. Pro- fessor Shulman served as an Information Officer of the U. S. Mission to the United Nations from 1948 to 1950 and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1950 to 1953. He is the author of numerous articles and books including the 1963 publication, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised, and was one of the two Consulting editors of the secondary school textbook, The Meaning of Com- munism, by William Miller. FRED WARNER NEAL ¡s Professor of International Relations and Government at the Claremont Grad- úate School, Claremont, California, and is head of the Gradúate School's program in International Relations. He has also taught at the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of Michigan, the University of Colorado, the Ecole des Sciences Politiques in Paris, the University of Lyon, and the University of Strasbourg. He was formerly Consultant on Russian Affairs in the Department of State. Professor Neal received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan and also studied at Harvard University, the University of Paris, and Karlova University in Prague. He is the author of War and Pea ce and Germany, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, Titoism in Action, and numerous articles on international politics and Eastern European affairs.

PHILIP E. MOSELY is Director of The European Institute and Professor of International Relations at Columbia University. He was formerly Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., and, prior to that. Director of The Russian Institute of Columbia University. He has also taught at Union College, Princeton University, and Cornell University. He received his A.B. degree from Harvard College in 1926 and his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University in 1933. During World War II, he served as an advisor of the Department of State and took part in other government activities. Professor Mosely is the author of numerous articles and books including Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839 and The Kremlin and World Politics. A 1963 publication, The Soviet Union, 1922-1962: A Foreign Affairs Reader, was edited by Professor Mosely. FOCUS ON THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

March 2, 1963 The University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee

8:45 a.m.—Registration: Kenwood Campus Main Auditorium, 3203 North Downer Avenue—Registration fee, $1.00 per person

9:20 a.m.— Welcome: Dr. Joseph G. Baier, Dean, College of Letters and Science, The University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee Presiding at the morning session: Leslie Paffrath, President, The Johnson Foundation, Racine

9:30 a.m. —Address: "U. S. Foreign Policy for the Sixties: Response to the Soviet Challenge" Mose Harvey, Soviet Affairs Specialist and Sénior Member, Policy Planning Council, U. S. Department of State

10:10 a.m.— Question Period

10:30 a.m .—Address: "Inside the Soviet Union" John Scott, Associate Editor, TIME Magazine, New York

11:00 a.m .-Address: "The Soviet Bloc: Is the Monolith Cracking?" Marshall D. Shulman, Research Associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; recent guest on "Meet the Press"; author of U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, numerous books and articles

11:30 a.m. — Question Period

12:00 p.m.— Box Luncheon: Pearse Hall, Room 4—$1.50 per person Presiding at the afternoon session: Thomas N. Tuttle, Chairman, World Affairs Council of Milwaukee

1:20 p.m. —Address: "Afnerican-Soviet Relations: A Critique" Fred Warner Neal, Professor, International Relations and Government, Claremont College, Claremont, California; author of Titoism in Action, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union, numerous books and articles

1:50 p.m. —Address: "Khrushchev's Foreign Policy: Coexistence or Conflict?" Philip Mosely, Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Director, Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York; author of The Kremlin and World Politics, numerous books and articles

2:20 p.m.— Panel Discussion by Program Participants Moderator: Mrs. Donald E. Clusen, Green Bay, President, League of Women Voters of Wisconsin

Question Period

3:30 p.m. —Adjoumment FOREWORD

This collection provides a unique opportunity from a single volume to gain information and insights ¡nto the panoramic problems of American-Soviet relations after the confrontaron in Cuba. It presents diverse views, from the "official" to "heretical," and allows an understanding not only of different proposals on how to meet the Soviet challenge but also assumptions on which these proposals are based. It is very important to have knowledge of both. An adopted policy depends so much on its underlying assumptions that it is only as good as these assumptions are correct. As the reader will discover, the different views on our policy toward the Soviet Union are derived from individual appraisals of the nature of the Soviet state, ideology, and power; from the conception of the structure of international conflicts; from the interpretation of our national interest and security; and from evaluation of the destructiveness of modern atomic war. This correlation between policy and assumption can be easily demonstrated from the writings published in this collection. Professor Neal, for example, feels justified to cali for an immediate detente with the Soviet Union because, contrary to the other discussants and indeed to most scholars of Soviet affairs, he assumes that the Soviet Union is not as aggressive as the Department of State thinks it is. Dr. Harvey's view that "we have not done too badly" in preserving independence of the free world is gently criticized by Professor Shulman who suggests that we should understand the conflict between ourselves and the Soviets in a triangular fashion and more appreciate the "transmutation" of the Soviet "revolutionary thrust." Mr. Scott's optimism that the grandchi Idren of the revolution will devour it the way the revolution previously devoured most of its makers is tempered by Professor Mosely's ¡udgment that so far the liberalizing tendencies in the Soviet society, however real and welcome, have not led to essential adjustments of the Communist dictatorship; the regime remains the same. Its foreign policy goal, too, has not changed, although the tactics have been altered. This does not create the necessary conditions, Professor Mosely explains, for an immediate detente with the Soviet Union.

This delightful discussion is presented to the reader in the hope that it will stimulate not only a demand for more information but, even more important, a desire to examine and understand the very foundations of our policy toward the Soviet challenger.

V. Stanley Vardys Assistant Professor of Political Science The University of Wisconsin—Mi Iwaukee

vii INTRODUCTION

LESLIE PAFFRATH PRESIDENT THE JOHNSON FOUNDATION

We begin a full day with a full auditorium. lt will be a doy of thought and discussion on tbe subject, "The Soviet Challenge." I commend each of you for tbe sense of citizensbip which has brought you here in pursuit of education on this vital topic. In addition, in your ñame, I take the liberty of expressing gratitude to Tbe University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, and the World Affairs Council of Milwaukee for their initiative in this enterprise.

To the campus of a great and growing university we bave come ¡rom our homes and our worksbops to focus on the nature of Communism in the Soviet Union; yet we know tbat this subject is an arch under which we pass every day of our lives without ever leaving our homes or our worksbops.

Adult and undergraduate groups who thought about it before World War broke out again in 1939 could read of and discuss the Soviet Union as an abstract condition. This the y did. We became wartime allies with the Soviet Union and tben partners in victory and occupation. However, in this context of partnership, we did not read far enough to discover the maxim: "Feed the wolf as much as you like, still he looks back to the forest," which in company with whistling shrimp, goats, and spades for burying oíd allies is from the lexicón of picturesque Russian aphorisms.

The Soviet challenge, a pbenomenon of our day, is marked especially by two characteristics. The challenge is relentless, and it is pervasive. lt is the blue steel of traditional arms replaced with invisible subversión. In Berlín, they yield on blockade and then erect a wall. They promise and reassure and then withdraw, with a proverb cast casually at us over the shoulder. HOW RELENTLESS IS THE CHALLENGE?

I commend for your thought the words of a Chínese Communist poet, quoted in a recent article by J. Edgar Hoover in the publication, Christianity Today. This is not a statement of faith by early Christian martyrs. It is expressed in the determined, aggressive spirit of Communism. "The enemy can only cut off our heads, He cannot shake our faith, For the doctrine we hold ¡s the truth of the universe."

HOW PERVASIVE IS THE SOVIET CHALLENGE?

It is New Hampshire and Wisconsin boys suddenly grown to manhood in combat on Porkchop Hill in Korea. It is the analysis of how well Johnny reads, in whatever community he Uves in the United States, and how much he comprehends when he does read. It is the white fear of a jet's roar inside and outside our homes during the time of the Cuban crisis. It is pervasive to the extent that it demands from each of us the search inward as we assess individual and national integrity.

Therefore, today, against the complex backdrop of reconnaissanee overflight and the concept of overkill, we meet to take an overview. We intend to do it rationally and with the help of an exceptionally able group of men. As thoughtful men, as witnesses of the current scene, these men qualify.

ix U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE SIXTIES: RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

MOSE HARVEY SOVIET AFFAIRS SPECIALIST AND SENIOR MEMBER POLICY PLANN1NG COUNCIL UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I should like first to express my great appreciation for the opportunity to be here. It is very good for a per son from the Department of State to have an opportunity to come to the heartland of our country and meet with a group like this. It is particularly good for me, since for more than twenty years I have operated primarily in the Washington milieu. It ¡s also a rare opportunity to have a chance to exchange views with the distin- guished nongovernmental specialists in the Soviet field whom you have assembled on this panel. I should like also to add my commendation to that spoken earlier to you that you are here. I feel a real sense of pride that so many of you have met to particípate in as formidable a program as has been planned for today. I think the point here is that foreign policy is everybody's business. In this one area we are all completely in the same boat. In the case of many matters of national concern, we as individuáis have the capability largely to take care of our own problems; but when it comes to foreign policy, our fate is beyond our individual ability to control. We all win together, or we all lose together. It is extremely ¡mportant, therefore, that we pool our thinking and get mutual benefit from each other. The subject assigned to me is "U. S. Foreign Policy for the Sixties: Response to the Soviet Challenge." The first thing that I want to say about this topic is that U. S. foreign policy in the sixties is not just a response to the Soviet challenge. This point is so obvious that you perhaps wonder why I mention it, and yet it is extremely ¡mportant. There was a time, I think, when our foreign policy was largely a matter of responding to the Soviet Union, and perhaps for too long a time. It is understandable that that was true. The Soviets had chosen, as it were, to declare war on us much to our surprise, and we had little choice

1 bul to concéntrate on meeting the various threats that they thrust forward against us. But ¡n recent years there has been a change. We are intent now on doing the things we have to do, on proceeding with the constructive tasks that Me before us—the tasks that are connected with building a viable free world, building a genuine community of free nations. We mean to pursue that task irrespective of what the Soviets may or may not do. We mean to go forward with our own plans, plans for partnership with Atlantic nations, plans for partnership with all the industrialized nations, and plans for partnership of developed countries with developing countries. If there never had been a Soviet Union, grave and difficult problems in the international sphere would still have existed for us. When the Soviet threat is gone, we shall continué to face such problems. We not only have a responsibility to meet those problems; it is one of our principal concerns these days. Yet it goes without saying that we cannot simply forget the Soviet problem. We cannot turn our attention to constructive tasks before us as if the Soviet Union were not there. One leading thinker in the Soviet field some years back wrote an article, which you may or may not have noticed, which more or less proposed that we do ¡ust that. The gist of his argument was that the Soviet problem was largely a problem of our own making. It occupied our attention because we insisted on concentrating our attention on it. If we could only bring ourselves to go about our own business, doing the things that need to be done in our own world and refusing to be diverted by Soviet noises, then those unnoted and unheard noises would cease to have meaning. The thought that crossed my mind as I read the article was that the author was advocating a policy of "ignorement" for what had been the previous policy of "containment." It sounded very in- viting, but would it be feasible?

THE CONTEST WE DARE NOT IGNORE

The contest that the Soviets have thrust upon us is an all-pervasive contest, and one which we daré not for a moment ignore. You can think of examples in the animal world which offer a parallel— the case of hungry wolves moving around the fire of a lonely camper. As long as the camper takes precautions, the wolves stay their distance. But let him drop his guard, let him become too preoccupied with various things he is doing around his camp, then almost certainly disaster would strike. That is, crudely, the situation we face today. While we should like nothing better than to be able to concéntrate all of our energies, all of our thoughts, all of our activities on building the kind of world we want, we cannot for a single minute afford to do that. We have to keep one eye

2 open always to the deadly problem posed by the Soviets. We have to maintain resources and capabilities to deal with it, and in times of stress, times of great danger, we have to be willing to drop everything else and concéntrate on this threat that is ever before us. We have used various terms to try to describe the nature of this contest. The one we most frequently use is "cold war." But actually there is no term that is adequately descriptive. We have here something that is unique in history. It is something that I hope will never occur again. It is a case where a group of leaders commanding a great power base and having supporters throughout the world have launched a total attack against us. There is no weapon they will not use if it promises hope of success. There is nothing they will not do to further their aim, as stated by Khrush- chev, to "bury" us. In connection with his statement, "We will bury you," Khrushchev has, of course, made palliative explanations to American correspondents and to others. He has said: "When I speak of this, I don't mean that we, the Soviet people, will bury you. I mean history will bury you. You're ¡ust on the wrong side of history, and inevitably time is going to dispose of you." But then Khrushchev has also said to his fellow Communists that he and they are obligated to help history. One of his favorite expressions these days is that while at one time history helped the Communists, now the Communists must help history. And so, while he speaks of burying us and, on the one hand, explains away the threat involved, on the other hand he makes clear that the threat is very real indeed. As one scans the horizon, sees the sweep, the intensity of this threat the Soviets have mounted against us, one finds that nothing has been left out. In every direction, from every side, challenges are thrust upon us. It is risky in this circumstance to break down the total challenge into various parts. I can stand here today and say that the Soviet challenge is in this area or in that area, and so on. I can tick off a number of things that seem for the moment to cover the subject. But tomorrow something that I had passed up may pop up. Thus, for example, if one focuses on a challenge "to win control of the developing countries," he may find himself unexpectedly facing a challenge of missiles in Cuba. So when we think of the challenge, and for convenience break it down into different parts, we have always to keep in mind the totality of the overall challenge. We cannot, above alI, say that the Soviets will do this, while they will not do that. We can say that it looks for the moment that they are concentrating on this, or for the moment they seem likely to avoid that, but we cannot say as a matter of general principie that the Soviet methods are these and are not those, because as sure as we do that, we shaII get caught.

3 THE THREAT IN THE MILITARY FIELD

Now, of the various a reas of challenge that the Soviets present to us, the most ¡mportant is, of course, in the military field. This is the most important because it involves our very survival. We cannot at any moment forget that a final trial of arms may come between us and the Soviets, between us and the Communist world. We can hope that this will not happen. But we never can be assured that it will not happen, and we have to be ready accordingly. I daré say that of those of us gathered here today, not one would say he thinks that the Soviets intend as a matter of deliberóte policy to make war. I think each would agree that the Soviets would much prefer to attain their ends without war. Yet I do not believe that any one of us would say that we, the American people, can be assured that there will be no war. It may be, and I think that we would all allow this, that the Soviets will, because of our neglect or because of a piece of luck on their part, get what they would consider to be a decisive advantage over us in a military way. I think each of us would be very hesitant to say that if this happened, if they got themselves into a position where they could estímate that they could strike a final blow against us and get away with it, they would not do it. So we always have this possibiiity: That the Soviets will think they have a decisive advantage and will deliberately resort to war as a result of that. Far more likely, however, is that war might come from a series of events not intended to produce that result. War might come as a result of a Soviet miscalculation of the firmness of our intention, and some of us worried about that possibility last October. It might also come in other ways: from an escalating situation; from a sheer accident; from a lunatic action by a Soviet ally such as Castro or Communist China. In any event, war simply cannot be ruled out as something "unthinkable." So of all the challenges of the Soviet Union, this is one that has to loom largest in our minds. We should not, of course, concéntrate on this danger to the exclusión of others. But we should never forget it as a very concrete possibility. It is, in consequence, the policy of our government to be fuIly ready for full-scale war at all times. Of all of our energies, most are going into this. Of all our expenditures, the overwhelming part is in order that we shall not be caught short if the great final test of arms comes. Our policy is, as you well know, to maintain a nuclear striking forcé of such strength that if it comes to war, we shall be able to destroy our enemy. At the same time, we are trying to do those things that will insure that, if it does

4 come to this, we ourselves shall survive. We know that we cannot survive without being greatly crippled, very much hurt; but we mean to do all we can to survive as a nation, to be able to carry on. As the Soviets push the arms race, we assume no choice but to act accordingly. As one or another possibility opens up in the scientific and technical field, our purpose is to stay with it to the end. We are not going to be caught short in capability to wage a nuclear war, and to wage it so successfully that at the least the evil which has faced us with such a war will be wiped out, and, we hope, also so successfully that we ourselves shall survive. In connection with maintaining this capability, a most important thing for all of us to keep in mind is that we require not only the hard- ware, the weapons, the means of delivery, the arsenal to cope with a nuclear war if it should come, but that we must also have the will to use what we have if that should become necessary. Whatever the capability we may have, if we lack the will to make use of it, the capability itself is completely meaningless. The Soviets, at least according to Khrushchev, have calculated that except in a direct showdown situation, we might well not have such a will. They have not calculated that if they should strike, or threaten, a total blow against us, we would fail to strike back. In fact, they appear to accept our resolution in this circumstance as a hard fact of life. But they have calculated that in situations where we were faced with something other than total defeat, of total extinction, we would perhaps decide not to use nuclear weapons—that we would reconcile ourselves to a "little loss" in preference to total war. Khrushchev has a line, with which I am sure you are familiar, that we would not daré to export (this is his way of putting it from his standpoint) "counter-revolution." In other words, he says that if the Soviets or the Communists commandeer or seize a particular position and face the United States with a fait accompli, we would not daré to risk our own destruction to offset that particular loss. I suspect that was in Khrushchev's mind last October. He thought that if he could establish a nuclear strike capability in Cuba, could face us with something already done, that we, rather than risking war, risking total nuclear destruction, would accept it. I suspect that he was very much surprised when his calculations turned out to be incorrect. This may have been the most important single result of that Cuban experience: that we demonstrated finally and clearly to the Soviets that when it carne to a vital interest of the United States, although not even connected with our homes for the moment, we would stand up and stare down the barrel of a nuclear gun. I think the Soviets were frightened when this happened. I hope that the effect will endure into the future. But the experience has a

5 lesson for us, too. It demónstrales that we must have the will to face up to total destruction, or our ability to deal out total destruction will be completely meaningless. We have to be willing at a given point to say that this thing which is ¡mportant to us, although perhaps of a distant land, is still so decisive for us that we will lay on the table our everything rather than to sacrifice it. Also, in this business of meeting the military threat, we have to have something bes ¡des nuclear weapons. In spite of the fact that we must be willing to use nuclear weapons, we should not and cannot get ourselves into a position where we have nothing to bring to bear in any situation but nuclear weapons. We cannot afford to be in a position where, when it comes to any and every threat to a U. S. interest, we shall either have to take a Ioss or risk everything to prevent it. In other words, we cannot afford to be in a position where we must place our every reliance in this struggle on our capability to wage nuclear war. We have to have conventional weapons and be prepared to use them where they seem likely to yield the results we want. Again, I think that this was a lesson of the Cuban crisis. When we learned that the Soviets had placed offensive missiles in Cuba, we did not say, "Get them out within such and such number of hours or we will bomb you." We did not have to say that. We were able to bring to bear on Cuba a massive conventional forcé, one with which the Soviets could not possibly deal in that particular area. That was sufficient. Now, insofar as it is humanly possible, it must be our policy to meet a threat with only such responses as are needed to deal with that particular threat. Whoever in this fateful conflict finds himself with no other choice than to lose ground or to stake everything on one final throw of the ¡ron dice is necessarily going to be at a sore disadvantage. The direct military challenge posed by the Soviets is, as I have said, but one of many. While it is the most serious in the sense that it could be final, it is not necessarily the most dangerous. We can reasonably hope that as long as we are fully prepared, the military threat will never be brought into actual play. The other challenges are quite different. They are being actively pressed on a variety of fronts. And these, if not met, might lead to our ultímate destruction as surely as would an un- countered military attack.

DEALING WITH THE INDIRECT ATTACK

One challenge with which it is particuiarly hard to deal is that of the so-called "wars of liberation." This Communist term, which, like so many others, perverts the meaning of words, refers to the use of various indirect, or at least disguised, means to capture free world countries or positions by

6 what amounts to stealth. The means can best be described as subversive, and may or may not even ¡nclude overt forcé, although they often do ¡n the form of guerrillas. Khrushchev and his associates have repeatedly avowed that they favor "wars of liberation," that they will use and support them, and that through them they expect minorities responsive to Communist influence or control to ¡ñipóse their will on majorities; that is, this is a device through which they expect to effect conquest of particular local areas. Now, what good would it do us if we maintained the best military forcé in the world, nuclear and conventional, if at the same time the Soviets conquered by indirection one after another the free world positions vital to our security? And that, literally, is the Soviet program. It is a program designed to achieve the fruits of war without involvement in war. If the Soviets can avoid it, they do not want war. Khrushchev says that he does not want even conventional war because it might get out of hand. But he does want conquest. The principal means upon which he is relying to achieve this conquest is this device of indirect attack, the "war of liberation." The United States government is today putting a great deal of emphasis on the development of capabilities on our own part and on the part of our friends to deal with these so-called "wars of liberation." In our armed forces, we are trying to learn about and to train our people in the techniques of indirect warfare, and we are helping others to do the same thing. We are maintaining forces which we can make available to our friends. If the Vietminh and the Chinese can give aid to the Viet Cong to wage indirect warfare in South Vietnam, we in our turn can do the same to aid the free Vietnamese to defend against it. And if the same situation should arise elsewhere, we would be equally willing to give aid to others. It is the settled policy of our government to maintain a real capability, and to make use of that capability, to defeat these "wars of liberation," to insure, in other words, that the Soviets shall not conquer indirectly what they daré not try to conquer directly.

THE CHALLENGE OF "CRISIS-MONGERING"

Another Soviet challenge which is designed to get the fruits of forcé without a direct use of forcé is what can properly be called the challenge of "crisis-mongering." Since the beginning of the cold war, the Soviets have made a more or less regular practice of using crises, artificially created crises, in order to secure advantages against us. Usually, of course, they create a crisis out of the clear sky and then try to use that crisis in a way that will, at a máximum, cause us to give up the position

7 or to grant a concession that would mark a net accretion to their strength and, at the same time, divert our energies. The best example of the crisis technique, of course, is Beriin. In the case of Berlin, we have a vital position backed up by certain rights. The Soviets create a crisis aimed at our position, at our rights, and tell us that we must agree to some sort of redefinition of our position and rights, that we must at the conference table give them something we now have. To back this up, they use varying degrees of military threat, not direct but suggestive. Berlin is but one example of "crisis-mongering." We must recognize, in all frankness, that sometimes in the past the Soviets, through utiliza- tion of this "crisis-mongering," have succeeded in making gains at our expense. Today we are highly resolved that this shall not happen again in the future. We know we cannot prevent the Communists from precipitating crises, but we are resolved that they are not going to get us to give them something for nothing through these crises. We are going to stand firm. If there is a military threat on their side, it will be met with a military posture on our side. If there is going to be any negotiation, it is going to be a negotiation in which their interests are put up against our interests. If there is to be any sort of agreement, it is going to be on the basis of really mutual concessions and not any one-way giveaway. Regarding this last, we must recognize that the Soviets sometimes are not so much interested in getting a piece of real estáte or achieving a particular gain as they are in diverting our attention and placing an over- load on us, or in otherwise forcing us to respond to their initiatives. We do not intend in the future to let the Soviets divert us from other tasks through such tactics. We have to meet crises when they occur. But we need to meet them only in those ways and only to the extent necessary to insure that the Soviets are not getting away with what they are trying to get away with, and that they are not, through this technique, getting something for nothing. Otherwise, we can, and intend to, go about our own business.

THE U.S.S.R. AND UNDERDEVELOPED COÜNTRIES

One extremely important area of challenge at the present time is, of course, connected with the underdeveloped countries. Here, as you well know, the Soviets are trying to do a number of things simultaneously. They all add up, of course, to an effort to undermine our influence, our position, in the underdeveloped countries and to persuade the peoples of those countries that their destiny is tied up with the Soviet system, with the Communist system. As Khrushchev says quite openly, they reason that if they can win the people of one underdeveloped country after

8 another to the Soviet way of thinking, if only gradually, well, in the end they will have brought about such a shift in the balance of power that their ultímate victory will be assured. In striving to win the underdeveloped countries, the Soviets do all they can to identify themselves with the wave of the future, with the idea of progress, and to identify Americans with opposition to progress. They have set for us here a rather neat trap. They know that, in the conflict they have forced upon us, our basic responsibility is to preserve a stable world order. We do not want the world brought down in ruins, either at once or piecemeal. The Soviets, on the other hand, are willing to play around with ruins because they reason that out of collapsed and chaotic social orders, they can build the type of system they want. Everywhere, of course, they have the advantage of the attacker, the destróyer, as against that of the preserver, and they know that, since our task is that of preserving, we are apt to tie ourselves with forces, with ideas, that are conservative. I mean conservative in the literal sense, that is, designed to conserve, to maintain stability, and so on. The Soviets seek to take advantage of this to paint us as defenders of the status quo, the oíd, the reactionary, simply for their own sake. Now you and I know quite well that this country has never favored maintenance of the status quo for its own sake. This country has never favored stagnation. Since the founding of the republic, our purpose has always been to accept changes as those changes would improve the lot of man in this country and outside. In all history there certainly has never been an example such as the example of this country when it comes to favoring constructive change. We intend that the Soviets shall not get away with picturing us in the opposite light. It has been our policy for some time to make clear in Latin America and in every región of the world that we Americans are for changes in society, changes in economic practices, and changes in political practices that will make it more nearly possible for the people of other countries to enjoy the privileges, the rights, and the opportunities we guarantee to our own people in the Dec- laration of Independence and the Constitution. Meanwhile, of course, we have in Soviet practices and in Soviet failures the best proof anyone could possibly want that the Soviets repre- sent not forward movement but reaction. Increasingly, I think, we are getting this message across. More important, people are increasingly learning the lesson for themselves. A particularly significant aspect of the Soviet effort to identify us with stagnation and themselves with change has to do with colonialism. The Soviets have claimed to be the most ardent champions of anti- colonialism. They have said that they are against colonialism, that they

9 want colonies wiped out; and they have said that we depend upon colonialism, favor ¡t, and advócate ¡t. They have done all they can to stig- matize the United States as the continuator of all the colonialist traditions of the past. Here again, it is in our power to demónstrate that the Soviets' argu- ments are false, that it is they and not we who seek to perpetúate colonialism in the modern world. I think our efforts are proving effective. We can draw satisfaction from the fact that out of the forty-odd countries that have become independent, not one has moved into Communist ranks. We can draw satisfaction from the fact that as time has passed an often ini- tially warm attitude toward the Soviets on the part of a newly independent country has cooled, while greater and greater friendliness has been shown for the United States. One part of the Soviet effort to win the underdeveloped countries is, of course, connected with trade and aid. The Soviets for some years, since 1955 especially, have been undertaking to help the underdeveloped countries cope with economic problems. I think that we can give ourselves a pat on the back over this. We lament often among ourselves that we respond to the Soviets, that we react to them. In this one instance, at least, they have reacted to us. We long since entered this field for positive purposes, and the Soviets saw the results and subsequently entered it themselves. One should not discount the dangers that are involved in the Soviet economic programs in underdeveloped countries. This is something to which we have to be alert. We must recognize that, if left alone, they may succeed in effecting important gains, that they may lead people down roads that are harmful for them, and henee harmful for us; we have to be sure that where there is a Soviet effort that seems likely to produce an undesirable result, we match it or offset it. However, we have no reasons to exaggerate the danger of Soviet efforts in the underdeveloped countries in the economic field or to mis¡udge our own potential. Here we have almost every conceivable advantage. We have far greater resources. We have experience. We do not have selfish motives. We do not seek to "take over." We can, therefore, be confident of the outeome. We worried at first that the Soviets through economic aid would be able simply "to take people over." We forgot that economic aid and trade are not automatic guarantees that people will become the pliant tools of granting nations. In fact, it seems to work in reverse. If you look around the world at the results of Soviet trade-and-aid programs, you will see that we are doing quite well here. We have, in fact, reason to believe that the Soviets right now are very much worried about the results of their effort and that they may be about to undertake an agonizing re- appraisal of their program. ECONOMIC COMPETITION

Another challenge that Khrushchev likes to talk much about ¡s economic competition—not economic competition ¡n underdeveloped countries but economic competition in building an effective economic system domestically. He has said repeatedly, and I do not know whether he believes it or not, that an ultímate Soviet triumph is insured through the "superiority" of the Soviet economic system, that the Soviets will demónstrate to all the people of the world that the way to economic strength, the way to economic well-being for the people, is through a socialist economy, the socialist system, as developed in the U.S.S.R. Here, I think we can be quite relaxed. If it should be true that Khrushchev intends, and his successors will follow him in this intention, to put principal reliance on economic competition in contesting with us, we do not have much to worry about. We should have no difficulty in keeping well ahead in both production and productivity indefinitely. So far, while the percentage gap between the Soviet economy and our economy has tended to grow narrower, the absolute gap has steadily widened. Where our gross national product exceeded theirs some years ago by only a hundred and fifty billion dollars, the difference is now cióse to three hundred billion dollars, and within the next eight or ten years it will probably exceed four hundred billion dollars. Unless we do something to ourselves, we should have no difficulty in achieving the most smashing success in economic competition. But even if the Soviets should prove able to match us in steel, match us in agricultural production, match us in other fields, how is that going to hurt? What advantage do we draw from impoverishment in the Soviet Union, or how will we lose if every muzhik comes to have two or even four pairs of shoes? If it were true that people followed the system that is economically most successful, obviously for the last thirty-odd years everybody in the world would be falling all over themselves to follow in the wake of the United States, because we have been economically supreme for a very long time. So while Khrushchev talks of economic competition, and at least pretends to place great reliance upon it, 1 think that this is one particular challenge with which we shall almost automatically be able to deal.

THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEST

There is one last challenge that I need to note here, and that is the one that has to with ideology. Now this is serious, of course. We cali it a contest for men's minds. Khrushchev himself calis it a contest for men's minds. The Soviets are undertaking to sell their peculiar ideology

11 to people throughout the world. Well, among every people there is, and appears nearly always to have been, a certain element, a certain fringe- to me it is a lunatic fringe-to whom something like Communism appeals. It seems to be impossible to devise ways and means of preventing Com- munism from having an attraction for this fringe. The appeal is an irrational one. Communism is—I am sure everyone here knows—extremely irrational. Communists cali their doctrine scientific. Well, it is anything but scientific. Any student of economics, any student of history, can punch holes all through the doctrine that Marx conceived and Lenin turned upside down. But rational argument cannot deal with an irrational appeal; the lunatic fringe is immune to such argument. This is one part of the problem: a certain number of people are pecul- iarily susceptible to Communism, and the very factor that makes them susceptible-that is a tendency toward unreasoning fanaticism-makes them particularly dangerous and difficult adherents. Another part of the problem is that the Soviets do not limit themselves to trying to sell strict Communist ideology. They are trying to influence people and to win them through utilizing all of these other challenges that I have reviewed with you. If they demónstrate their military capacity effectively, they utilize that. They associate themselves with all things progressive, and the United States with all things reactionary. If they make a specific gain somewhere, they utilize that. The weight of history is with them, they claim. They, of course, utilize their successes in economic development, and they distort those successes. They ignore, or hide, their failures and what they are not able to accomplish. So when it comes down to it, the ideological contest is not a contest wherein our greatest need is to disprove the validity of strict Communism as a system of thought. This frankly would be easy enough. The contest is one where we have to meet and answer the other challenges that the Soviets put forward. If we meet those challenges, we can be sure, I think, that the most the Communists will have in the future will be what they have had in the past, a very small group—a dangerous group, but small and without great influence—of fanatic believers, while the rest of the world will disdain them. Looking at it all together, I think that we can feel far more assurance in regard to our capability to deal with the Communists than we have sometimes allowed. I know that we become impatient, and understandably so, from time to time. But if one looks back over the last fifteen years, I think he will have to recognize that we have not done too badly. And I think that as we look forward to the next fifteen years we can do so with very great assurance. We can be confident, I would say, that the Commu- nists are unlikely to make any progress toward their stated aim to "bury" us.

12 What I am saying here is that we can meet these various Soviet challenges successfully. But is this alone enough? What does it add up to? I am saying that we can prevent the Communists from doing to us through their various activities and efforts what they want to do. We can retain our independence and preserve the independence of most of the people of the world. We can prevent the Communists from doing us or our friends in. But are we willing to go on indefinitely this way? Do we not have to seek something more? Should we be content to leave to our children and to their children a world divided, in a state of dread siege between two systems, always on the verge of disaster? I am sure that not one of us here feels that we should limit ourselves to this goal. We cannot be satisfied with ¡ust saving ourselves from the challenge that the Communists present to us. We cannot be satisfied with ¡ust insuring that we are not defeated. Some months back there was a great deal of debate about this subject; there was a lot of speculation around the country as to whether or not the State Department had a "no-win policy." (The State Department is the favored target in such matters.) The Secretary of State faced up to this charge directly. Last August, in an address before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he stated: "This global struggle will continué until freedom prevails. lt goes without saying that our purpose is to win. One hears now and then that we have a 'no-win' purpose or policies. This is simply not so. Of course we intend to win. And we are going to win. Our objective is a victory for all mankind." Well, then, that brings up an all-important question. How do we proceed from the one thing to the other? How do we move from saving ourselves to attaining a victory? We cannot make war, of course; we made a decisión a long time ago not to resort to war to destroy this evil that faces us. Certainly we cannot do it now. lt is against all of our principies, and it would bring about the very disasters we want to avoid. Nevertheless, I firmly believe we have no reason to despair. I believe we can be reasonably sure that if we continué to be alert to the various challenges the Communists thrust upon us and do the things we have to do to cope with them, and at the same time proceed with our own constructive tasks, the Communist world and not our world will break under the strain of the cold war. At the present time, much that is highly suggestive is going on in the Communist world. The remainder of your program today will be devoted to an examination of these developments. I shall not, therefore, attempt any ¡udgment at this stage. However, whatever conclusions we may reach in our later discussion as to whether or not a process of disintegration is presently under way in the Communist world, I still am confident, and I think all of us can be confident, that it

13 ¡s only a matter of time before it does set in. History, we can be sure, is on our side, not on the side of the Communists. If we but keep faith with ourselves and do the things we have to do, the Communist menace will turn out to be a passing phenomenon.

14 IN SI DE THE SOVIET UNION

JOHN SCOTT SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PUBLISHER TIME, THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

I went to the Soviet Union in 1932, as you have been told, and worked for awhile there in industry; and I should like to tell you, in opening my remarks, about a man whom I met in the city of Magnitogorsk, which is in the western part of Siberia, because through him I think I can make several points about the Soviet Union, its potential and its intention, better than I could with any historie generalizations or specifics. This man was a Tatar. His ñame was Kamal, and he carne from an obscure little Tatar community somewhere down in the central part of Soviet Central Asia. When he arrived in Magnitogorsk he had never seen an electric light, he had never seen a staircase, he had never seen a locomotive. He had seen a hammar but had never used a hammar. His only hammering had been to hammer tent stakes into the ground with a rock. He was illiterate. He spoke practically no Russian, only his native Tatar. The village from which he carne was a backward one, and people there believed that washing more frequently than once a year was not only dangerous to one's health but verged on the sacrilegious because it jeopardized the lives of those parasites whom they considered natural expressions of a man's personality. Kamal had many of these parasites, so for this and other reasons he was not one whom one would select as a cióse associate if there were much choice. Kamal wound up in a gang in which I was working, in response to an urgent request by the foreman of the gang for an electrician. But the foreman actually did not need an electrician. What he really needed was a man to sit in a booth where motor generators supplied direct current for electric welding, and there he was to watch an electric light bulb in the ceiling. When the bulb went out, as it did several times a day as a result of breakdowns in the powerhouse or on the line, he was to switch these motors off and then to switch them back on again when the power carne back. The foreman undertook to try to explain this to Kamal in sign language, since they had no language in common, and Kamal went to work.

15 The first day he got alI mixed up and burned out two of these motors. And during the first week or so he burned out severa I more. For a month he sat around in this booth gaping at these big instaliations, blast fur- naces, and open hearths with no comprehension at all of what was going on. He had come to Magnitogorsk to get a larger bread ration, which he had received, and that was the extent of his interest.

KAMAL GROWS

But then gradúally several things began to happen to Kamal. In the first place he began to learn the Russian language sort of by osmosis and contact with the people around him. In the second place he was persuaded to ¡oin an illiteracy group of which there were at that time hundreds in a city of 220,000, most of whose residents were illiterate. Kamal would be seen at work with a reader, laboriously spelling out the words with his lips, learning how to read. And as he learned to read and to speak the language of the area, Kamal suddenly became aware of many things which we in this country encounter at a very early age but with which Kamal in his early twenties had never come in contact. One thing he learned was that there was a country called the Soviet Union. Up until that point he had been aware of his district and his province, but the Soviet Union was beyond him. He became aware that there was something called a Five Year Plan, which I remember his explaining to me at one point in these words: "You see, I have no proper shoes (which was true), and here's all this expensive machinery which has been bought abroad. That machinery was bought with the leather that could have made my shoes. That is the Five Year Plan." It was not a bad definition in elementary economic terms. As Kamal learned more things, he became somewhat overbearing in intellectual terms. I remember one conversation, both of us speaking Russian, in which he undertook to explain to me what was going on in this town. You see, he had come a long way to get from his native village to Magnitogorsk. He had walked about three weeks, and he knew that on arrival he had been very ignorant. He had been told that I carne from America, which was much farther away, and he logically concluded that I must have been more ignorant than he had been when I got there. So he said, "Jack, let me tell you. Let me explain what's going on here. The idea is to get that red dirt up on the hill there and bring it down here and make pig iron out of it"—again not a bad definition of ferrous metal- lurgy in an elementary sense. After this point, Kamal rose very rapidly. I left the city in 1937, at which time he was going to night school studying about ergs and amperes and other complex things. He had become a fairly competent electrician. He could rewind an armature when necessary. He read magazines and newspapers. To be sure, they were politically tendentious, but his knowledge of the world and his way of personal life had changed more in five years in that city than had those of his Tatar antecedents since the days of Genghis Khan. Kamal had been picked up out of an almost premedieval community and dumped into a modern industrial city with the complex social and technical problems that one encounters in such a city. And he survived his rapid metamorphosis. Some of his friends did not. They died of typhus. They died in industrial accidents, which were frequent and often serious. They got tangled up with the secret pólice and got themselves shot or sent out into concentration camps, which at that time numbered in the hundreds and in which perhaps ten million Soviet citizens were con- fined under unpleasant circumstances, where the average life expectancy was substantially shorter than the average sentence. There were many hazards to which many succumbed. Most of the oíd leaders of the pre-Revolutionary days and even of the intelligentsia of the immediate post-Revolutionary days are gone; some of them emigrated, some of them died, a few are still around running the country; but most of the people in the country today are of this new generation.

YEARS OF ADVANCEMENT

I do not know what happened to Kamal personal ly. I did not see him again. He may not have survived the war, but I do know that in the twenty-five years that followed this experience of mine in meeting Kamal in Magnitogorsk the Soviet people learned to design, to manufacture, and to use modern tools and modern weapons. The developments they achieved in this time in a whole series of areas of human activity were very great. In education—two years ago the Soviet Union graduated 51,000 engineers. We graduated about 17,000. In qualitative terms, ours were probably better trained, but the numerical superiority is still interesting, although in the total manpower pool of engineers we still have more around than they have. In other fields of research and development in such different areas as space and plástic surgery, chemistry and agronomy, the Soviet Union has done quite a bit. During two months last year the Soviet Union produced more steel than we did. Our steel industry was working at roughly half capacity, and its was working at full capacity. But still, in absolute tonnage the Soviet Union had exceeded our production of steel. All of these achievements are impressive, and

17 all of them were the cause of anxiety and consternation and very impressive ¡n many parts of the world. But during the last several years, there have been some substantial setbacks. It has been my good fortune to revisit the Soviet Union during five of the past six years and to have a chance to talk with some of the people whom I had known twenty-five years ago and with new friends and new acquaintances, and I should like to mention some of the current problems and difficúlties with which the Soviet Union is involved.

STATE OF DECELERATION

Although it has maintained and today has a very impressive military potential both in conventional weapons and in the use of modern nuclear weapons and their delivery, the Soviet Union in other areas of economic activity is plagued by a number of serious problems. One generalized problem is the fact that its economy is undergoing what economists refer to as a state of deceleration. Having maintained a 7 per cent or better gross national product increase coefficient between the years 1950 and 1958 (and I should mention here that the Soviet Union does not usually use the term "Gross National Product"; it uses national income, but the proportionate figures are fairly accurate and a fairly good measure of reality), the average increase in the Soviet Union's GNP has dropped to something below 5 per cent. In agriculture, since 1938, there has been a state of virtual stagnation, and if one bears in mind that it has in the course of the years under Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Program plowed up an area of new land equivalent to the total plowed land of Cañada, an enormous area, one realizes that in the older sectors of Soviet agriculture it has suffered an absolute decrease both in yields and in agricultural productivity. In terms of such mundane considerations as monetary wages, the average Soviet industrial worker's wage today is ¡ust under 45 cents an hour,-and this is a reasonably good figure. It is true that Soviet workers spend less than American or Western European workers on rent, the reason largely being that the housing situation in the Soviet Union is such that for what they get the rent is reasonable, but few Western workers or anyone else would, if they had a choice, live in the extremely uncomfortable circumstances of Soviet housing. These problems have brought about a good deal of soul-searching inside the Soviet Union. They are complicated by administrative difficulties which I summarize in several different areas. One is that the Soviet people are not using very well the equipment and machinery that they manufacture. For example, the total machinery delivered but still

18 uninstalled because of the failure of the construction workers to finish the buildings in which the machinery was supposed to go or because local adm ¡nistrators over-ordered machinery just to be sure amounts to slightly greater than a total year's production of economic equipment. This is a very high and a very wasteful figure. In the production drive, from one dollar or one unit spent in industrial capital investment, the Soviet Union figure has gone down since 1958 by about 25 per cent, whereas in the United States in the same period of time there has been an increase of about 40 per cent. In another area of administrative difficulty—every year in the Soviet press, spring and fall, on the eve of the harvest or the planting campaign, there are spates of letters to the editor complaining about the lack of spare parts, keeping tractors and other agricultural equipment inoperative. An actual count made by Soviet Union statisticians indicates that the spare parts reserve, the spare parts inventory, for Soviet agricultural equipment is greater than that per unit of the United States, but it is not made available because in the economics of the collective farm or other unit-there being no profit motive, there being no interest valué placed on capital-people tend to order as much as they can get of any kind of spare parts and salt them away. It costs nothing in terms of carrying capital on their books. The result is that there are millions of cylinder heads lying around in collective farms, so that when one collective farm has a tractor which needs a cylinder head, it is impossible to get a new one rapidly, and letters are written to the editors. All of these difficulties are dealt with ad nauseam by Soviet leaders in the periodic plenums which take place in the Soviet Communist party. Khrushchev particularly rails at inefficiency and emphasizes the virtues of his repeated and rather zigzagging reorganization during the course of which first centralization takes place and then decentralization. There has been a great emphasis in the last severaI years on decentralization in terms of economic control; and the formation of the regional economic councils, each in charge of one of the 102 regional economic areas in the Soviet Union, was hailed as a measure of decentralization. On the other hand, in party terms, Khrushchev has seen fit to central- ize control, so that it has been doing one thing in one direction and at the same time making a counter move in another direction, leaving the economy of the Soviet Union still hamstrung by overcentralization. For example, 5,000 Ítems are now subject to planning by the state planning commission. It is more than were planned by the central state planning commission five years ago. All of these difficulties have led many people in many parts of the world to conclude that the Soviet economy is in serious difficulty, and if we can just arrange not to have a showdown, a

19 military showdown, ¡n the next several years, the infernal contradictions and complexes of the Soviet system are likely to bring about a collapse. They are likely to bury themselves through the failure of the Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev and his generation, to face the real issues in their attempt at tinkering with the economy, the real issue being the issue of economic freedom as a function of general freedom, as a part of what must be an effective way of life for human beings. I believe, however, that we would be ill-advised if we became complacent on the basis of these considerations which are true. The deceleration has taken place. The rate of growth of the Soviet economy this year and last year and the year before was not only much less than that of Japan, it was also less than that of the six Common Market nations in Western Europe; and if it were a little more than ours, it is only because, I rfegret to say, the growth rate in our economy is one of the lowest in the entire world.

NEW LEADERSHIP FOR THE U.S.S.R.

I believe that there are forces at work in the Soviet Union which are likely to produce what may in its day be called some sort of a "great leap." In spite of the limitations on the Soviet agricultural resources, that is, the Soviet Union's soil and climate, and in spite of its enormous size, the Soviet Union has the misfortune of having far less arable land with favorable climatic and soil conditions proportionately than has, let us say, the United States or even Cañada. The Soviet Union has an enormous amount of raw material, however, for a great move forward in terms of the Soviet economy; and I believe it possible and perhaps even likely that such moves will be taken as the present Soviet leaders now in their sixties or seventies die off and are replaced by others, younger men, whose attitude is more pragmatic, men who have been systematically educated, rather than men like the shrewd, brash, uneducated but very able Mr. Nikita himself. I had a chance during the last several trips to the Soviet Union to talk to some of these younger people, people in gradúate schools or in universities in four cities in the Soviet Union that I visited. And I believe that among these younger people today there is a brand new attitude beginning to develop, an attitude of both criticaI examination of their own society and a desire to utilize all the best of their education and the best of the experience of the rest of the world to improve the workings of the Soviet economy-an attitude conditioned, however, by the prolonged residence of that generation of Soviet citizens in a Soviet society where the terminology of Pravda is the terminology used generally by people, so that you have two contradictory positions. I should like to ¡Ilústrate this preconditioned attitude of theirs with two stories. The first is an apocryphal story about a capitalist cell which was functioning surreptitiously in Moscow. The members held periodic meetings at which little speeches were made by the older members of the group, and then the younger members would ask questions. At one of such meetings, one of the older members made a vibrant defense of free enterprise. When he got through, a young student got up somewhat timidly and said, "That's very interesting, but can you change human nature?" This illustrates, I believe, a reality factor in the thinking of this younger generation of Soviet citizens. They have been conditioned in the terminology and in the ideology of socialism. Whereas they are desperately trying today to change, to bring their attitudes up to date—they avidly read literature from other countries, they avidly listen to radio broadcasts from other countries-at the same time, they cannot quite get out of this, they cannot immediately get out of this constricting frame of reference that has been given them by a generation and a half of Soviet society. I should like to ¡Ilústrate the skepticism of these younger people with a story that I actually heard from a student ¡n the University of Moscow, and like many student stories in Europe it is a question-and- answer story. The question is: "What is the difference between Capital- ism and Communism?" The answer, "Under Capital i sm man exploits man. Under Communism it's ¡ust the opposite." Here is a student beginning to get an education. Here is the attitude of skepticism reflecting itself in what one might refer to as educational progress. I should like to teII another—not story but episode. My wife and I were very anxious to go to the theatre. We saw a very good V/inter's Tale in the Art Theatre in Moscow and a few days later Macbeth in a workers' club very cióse to the center of Leningrad. In both cases these per- formances were technically and artistically superb, the audiences were large and very responsive. Both of these plays, as you will remember, deal with violence so vindictive and unpleasant that the positive char- acters in them are driven to seek the support of foreign military organizations to get rid of their own pirates. In the case of Winter's Tale, the oíd king, during the course of the second act, undergoes what one might think of in the Soviet Union as a crisis of Bolshevik self-criticism and repents his shabby behaviour toward his wife; the war that seems implicit in the first act does not materialize; and in the third act everything ends happily. It is somewhat more logical and realistic than Macbeth, of course, wherein Macbeth's activities push Macduff down to England where he cooperates with a foreign army; they come back and take Scotland, and Macbeth is killed.

21 After the Macbeth performance, I had a chance to spend the rest of a fairly long evening with some gradúate students at the University of Leningrad, during the course of which I asked them (there were four or five, and this was in a public restaurant), "What does the play mean to you?" After a moment's consideration, one said, "Welí, to us, obviously, Macbeth was Stalin. Maybe Banquo was Nicholas, and Duncan perhaps was Kerensky." "Well," I said, "in that case, what is Macduff's English? Was it the Germans? Or might it still be? Or is it the Americans? Or perhaps even the Chínese?" This led to a violent discussion which lasted about an hour, regarding the relative merits of these three candidates for the invidious task of cooperating with the Soviet population in getting rid of its own tyrants if it were unable to do so more gracefuliy on its own. There was incidentally no unanimity in the choice of the candidate. But the fact that this discussion could go on—these were people in their early and mid-twenties—indicates to me an enormous and very salutary change which is likely to find reflection in the Soviet Union's economic and political future in the next generation. You can see it already in the articles and suggestions of Professor Lieberman at the University of Kharkov, who has been suggesting what in effect would be a market economy in the Soviet Union, a market Marxism, if you will. And I believe that through the exercise of radical reform but still within the context of Soviet power polítically and within the context of socialism in its broad sense—that is, the social control and operation of the means of production—such attitudes and activities as decollectivization and the use of the profit motive in Soviet industry and commerce (today being seriously discussed for the first time in such organs as Pravda) might well—and I even venture to say they probably will in the next generation, barring some cataclysmic event—lead to an improvement in the Soviet economy which we can iII afford to ignore. I should like to conclude these remarks with a sentence making use of my position as a ¡ournalist surrounded by these academic friends. You see, ¡ournalists-we do not have four volumes of Whitehead on Scientific Methods frowning down on us-are a good deal freer to engage in sweep- ing analyses and generalizations which may not always stand up under minute examination but at the same time have that virtue of leading to minute examination which produces better generalities and statements. This breed of Sovietologist or Kremlinologist that we have at long last produced and which tends sometimes to silt up in places like Palo Alto and Santa Monica and Cambridge is fond of tossing off phrases, one of which, and it is a pretty good one, is, "The revolution devours its children." And, indeed, an examination of the history of the Soviet

22 Union for the last generation indicatesa great deal of evidence to support this sentence. The revolution did devour its children. More than half of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union elected at the seventeenth party congress were either dead, executed, or had disappeared by the next party congress. The revolution devoured its children in large numbers. But on the basis of my limited acquaintance with some of these younger people in the Soviet Union today, I should like to offer the following as a supplementary sentence to the one that I ¡ust mentioned. "The grandchiIdren will devour the revolution."

23 THE SOVIET BLOC." IS THE MONOLITH CRACKING?

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN RESEARCH ASSOCIATE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER HARVARD UNIVERSITY

I think that one of the lessons of today's experience will be that, despite all the array of specialists and the list of credentials you have heard, there are limits of dependence you can put upon expertise in coming to your own conclusions in this field. You will not be able, I think, to end the day feeling either that we are up or we are down in this contest. You will have found a contradictory series of emphases among the speakers and even within the approaches of individual speakers. At the end of Mose Harvey's speech, I was ready to feel that we were in pretty good shape, that there really was not such a serious problem after all. John Scott raised hopes for long-term modification in Soviet society. The figure of his friend in Magnitogorsk is a vivid one, and it encourages one to think about long-term changes in Soviet society.

THE TRIANGULAR PICTURE

My inclination is to draw a picture for you which is not so much a bilateral one, as suggested by Mose Harvey, but rather a triangular one. It seems to me that the useful framework within which to look at Soviet policy and the problems within the Soviet bloc is this triangular one. It is not so much a question of the bilateral problem of the Soviet Union and ourselves, but the way in which each of us is grappling with a third point, a profoundly changing environment. This figure seems useful to me in taking the measure of the problems with which the Soviets are dealing and also in thinking constructively about our own problems. I am not nearly as sanguine as my friend Mose Harvey about what we are doing to grapple with these common problems. Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the problems with which the Soviets are wrestling at the present period is that, in a sense, they are manifestations of some of the same fundamental forces with which we find ourselves grappling.

24 I think that it can be said safely that one of the exciting things about the present period, about these weeks, in fact, is that there is a tense drama unfolding in the Soviet world. There are, as you must have seen from reading your newspapers, alternating suggestions from day to day of the shifting character of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Chínese. One day you will read reports about trends toward reconciliation, and the next day you will pick up a newspaper and read about a new blast from Peking or from Moscow. It is very difficult to know, even for profes- sionals who spend their full time followíng these things, how this trending is moving and in what direction it can be expected to move. On the one hand, both parties to this dispute are trying to achieve at least a formal reconciliation, which expresses their mutual conviction that a continuation of the dispute does not suit their interests, that it works to a mutual disadvantage. On the other hand, there are the reassertions of their oíd positíons, efforts to justify their positions, which exacerbóte the dispute one again. It makes it very difficult for them to consider their own real interests. There is, simultaneously, a critical experiment going on for the Soviet Union in the administration of its Eastern European empire, which ¡nvolves, also, a balance of consíderations. One aspect of this is the experiment in extending a degree of political autonomy to several areas in Eastern Europe. This is to achieve greater resílience in its control mechanism and more voluntary participation in the economy and in the political system, in order to have a more flexible coupling, a stronger, more durable kind of relationshíp than the brittle control system which grew up in previous years. This runs into difficult ¡es because of the unevenness of the materials with which the Soviets have to work in the several Eastern Euro- pean countries. They do not have in every country a Gomulka who can enlist a high degree of popular support and at the same time assure the Soviet Union of an ultímate fidelity to Soviet strategic interests. At the same time, the Soviets are engaged in synchronízing more tightly the economy and the economic planníng of these areas with the total economic complex. There ¡s a greater división of labor among the economies of the Eastern European countries and an ¡ntegration of the planning mechanism, so that bit by bit the entire area is beíng worked into a single complementary economic whole. This is difficult because the levels of productivity are very low, because the planning mechanisms are crude, and because the Soviets have not been able, or perhaps willing, to make the resources available that would assist these countries ¡n making the necessary transfers. Part of the ímpetus toward this synchro- nization comes now, seriously enough, from our own developments in Western Europe. One of the anticipatory effects, surely, of the Common

25 Market development has been a breath of new life ¡n COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), the ¡nstrument of coordination in East- ern Europe, and the encouragement of a higher degree of intervention by the Soviets, through COMECON, in the economies of the Eastern European countries. But this is a critical experiment indeed. It is unclear whether the Soviets will succeed in holding the area together politically without further incidents, such as those in 1953 and 1956, and whether they will succeed in raising the economic productivity of the area. Finally, there is the problem, related to the topic of whether the monolith is cracking, of the foreign Communist parties. Here, too, are evident the profound effects that the process of de-Stalinization within the Soviet Union, the forcé of nationalism in the world, and the level of economic prosperity in Western Europe have had upon the character of the foreign Communist party. In Western Europe, this is most notable and most interesting in the Italian Communist party, which has become one of the most exciting sectors to watch in the current period. This is due in part to the degree of independence, intellectual and organizational, within the Italian party and in part to the creativity, the prosperity, the sheer ebullience of the Italian society which has been fascinating for Soviet artists, writers, and film makers. In addition to being exciting, this has also ra ¡sed organizational and theoretical questions for the Communist movement of a kind that one would not have dared predict ten years ago. The point is that the level of productivity, and henee prosperity, in Italy is such that the Italian Com- munist party has been forced more and more essentially into a conservative position. It has not dared to oppose Italian entry into the Common Market. It has accepted the development of the Italian economy and adopted an essentially reformist policy. It has moved further and further away from a revolutionary, class warfare emphasis in its propaganda, and it has sought a greater influence through política! maneuver and working with other parties in an effort to influence the parliamentary situation in Italy. This is an-instructive thing to observe, and I shall return to it in a moment. What I want to suggest is that in each of these areas-the relations with the Chínese, the relations within the Eastern European bloc, and the developments within the foreign Communist parties, particularly the foreign Communist parties of the advanced industrial areas—one can see a process of adaptation in the Communist movement which has brought it a long way from its origin and which is changing its character.

ADAPTATION OF SOVIET POLICIES

One of the most interesting results of the Sino-Soviet dispute is that it has obliged the Soviets to articúlate the premises of its thinking in

26 ¡nternational strategy. The dispute has dramatized the gap that has grown between the present outlook of the Soviet Union and its former outlook, which was similar to the position now espoused by the Chínese. This situation illustrates, I think, what has been happening to the Soviet outlook over time. In one way of looking at the argument between the Chínese and the Soviets, taking it out of the esoteric language in which they conduct it, in terms such as "adventurism," "dogmatísm," "sectarianísm," "opportunism," the position that the Soviets are defending represents an adaptatíon of Soviet interests to the profoundly changing environment in the world. It is easy for us to forget that in the course of the last fifteen years or so, surely since the end of the war, the terrain of international politícs has changed radical ly. It has been necessary for Soviet policy, since it wishes to be effective, to adapt itself to these changes which are truly revolutionary, although not in the sense anticipated by the Soviet leaders at the outset of the Russian Revolution. That is, it is not a revolution coming from the impoverishment of the proletariat and from the increasing revolutionary pressure of a class-conscious working class. On the contrary, it has been a revolutionary movement developing out of changes in technology, both military and nonmilitary. It has been a revolutionary development growing out of a fairly adapted and mobile mixed economy of the sort that prevails in most Western European countries and in the advanced industrial countries generally, and this has had the effect not of a further impoverishment of the working classes, as was anticipated, but rather of a broader spread of a middle-class outlook and an indefinite postponement, at least for the present, of the kind of dynamism upon which the Soviets had counted for the spread of the revolutionary movement. In a sense, what the Soviets are talking about when they speak of "creative Marxism" or "peaceful coexistence" is a process of adaptation of their policies to these facts of life in the world, and I think that it is useful to separate a number of its different aspects.

RECOGNITION OF CHANGING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

First of all, the military aspect of this adaptation: The Soviets have shown a keen consciousness of the fact that changes in military technology have wrought profound changes in the relationship between war and politics, and they have been obliged to take this into account in their procurement policies and in their political policies. The Soviets, even before the end of the war, devoted great resources to research and development in the new military technology which they foresaw. Contrary to all impressions at that time, Stalin showed, in my ¡udgment, a keen appreciation of the

27 ¡mplications of these weapons and bent every effort to gain what they saw as a change in the balance of power at the earliest possible time. This great allocation of resources to the development of jet engines and swept- wing aircraft design, to rockets, and to nuclear explosives began to bear its fruít after the death of Stalin and began to be reflected in the Soviets' political outlook and to be expressed in such terms as a shifting balance of power. Along with this, the Soviet leadership has shown an increasing sobriety about the effects of general war and, in my judgment, a conservatism about the possibility of a general nuclear war. This conservatism in that field has not been matched in ¡udgments about the use of forcé in local situations, which they describe as wars of national liberation. Nei- ther has it limited their feeling about the importance of military capabilities for bringing about political changes in the world. For example, in an episode like Cuba, where the Soviets introduced their médium and interme- díate missile capabilities, the primary anticipation on the Soviet side, I believe, was that the presence of these weapons would have an effect upon our political altitudes, upon our policies, in the same way that the Soviets believe these intermedíate missiles have affected the political outlook of the Western European countries which have lived long within their range. This is a factor that is important to bear ¡n mind in our efforts to achieve some kind of stabilization in the military environment in our negotiations with the Soviet Union, in our efforts to reduce some of the hazards involved in the military plañe of this encounter. One of the difficulties, although not necessarily a final one, is the strong feeling of the Soviets that forcé is the backdrop of politics and that their military capabilities are necessary in order to bring about the process of change which they anticípate in the world. Their anticipation grows out of their expectations about the disintegration and decay of our own social system and its gradual replacement by other social systems closely resembling their own. There is, therefore, in the military sector of this problem, this recognition of the changing character of military technology. There is a sobriety, I think, about general nuclear war but still a developing sector of thought, just as in our own thought, about what this means in terms of political change, about where one can introduce some stabilization in the military environment, without, in the Soviet point of view, also stopping the process of change which the Soviets anticípate and which they believe is inevitable, inherent in the dynamics of our society.

28 THE CHANGING SOVIET ECONOMY

The second factor at which one needs to look in considering thisproc- ess of adaptation concerns developments within the Soviet system itself, the Soviet bloc, which I mentioned before, the Soviet economy which John Scott described so well, and in organizational problems arising within the Soviet Union in recent days. There have been profound reorganizations within the Soviet party in recent months, which have caused considerable disruption, shuffling of personnel, and a large degree of uncertainty about the establishment of new patterns of administration. Essentially, what is involved is a split in the party administration of the agricultural sector and the industrial sector of the economy and the development of two quite separóte lines of command within the party and the local Soviet. What has resulted is more intervention by the Communist party in the actual operation of the economy than before. Apart from the question of whether this will succeed in raising the productivity of the economy or not, there is the restraint this exercises on the Soviet decision-makers because of the dislocations involved and the need to establish new habits, new patterns, and new lines of communication. I think that the extent of this is perhaps much greater than is reflected in our own public discussion of Soviet developments. The improvising, the experimentation, the groping for new forms of administration reflect the process of adaptation to the advancing industrialization of the society—that society is becoming so much more urbanized and so much more complex to administer that planning, which seemed so simple at the outset, now becomes an incredibly complex operation; and that the dislocations, the faults in planning, the shortcomings, and the inability to coordinate the various aspects of the planning process become very serious difficulties for the Soviet adminis- trators. And so, one thing that needs to be taken into account in considering the state of the Soviet bloc as a whole and Soviet foreign policy is the way this process of adaptation is going on domestically.

ECONOMIC GROWTH OUTSIDE U.S.S.R.

The third major factor is the way in which Soviet appreciation has developed for the things that are going on in the advanced industrial parts of the world, in North America, in Western Europe, in Japan. The anticipations of the Soviets of a general crisis of capitalism, the "third general crisis of capitalism," according to the current Party Program, are based not so much on war, as were earlier general crises, but on the "inherent contradictions of capitalism," in Soviet language. Contrary to this expectation, we have witnessed in Western Europe an unprecedented

29 growth ¡n the economy, as John Scott suggested to you. The rate of growth ¡n Western Europe not only exceeds both Soviet anticipations and our own, but it is higher than the planned rates of growth for the Soviet economy itself, even if the current series of seven-year plans were to be fulfilled. This is a very difficult fact for the Soviets to digest for several reasons. It makes it very difficult to argüe that the non-Communist societies, the mixed economies, really are senescent, obsolescent, and about to collapse in decay. The integration process in Western Europe also raises difficulties for the Soviets from another point of view, in that among the contradictions that the Soviets have counted on are the competitive conflicts between the advanced industrial parts of the world and the anticipation that these countries would be engaged in conflicts for markets, for raw materials, and, in general, in their relations with each other. The Common Market, particularly if it continúes to develop in the way that has been projected for it, hopes to harmonize these economies as they develop and thus remove one of the major anticipated sources of conflict on which the Soviets have based their hopes. We know that we also are witnessing a tense drama in this period in Western Europe, and the question remains whether and when and in what way we shall be able to assist the Western Europeans in harmonizing their conflicting interests manifested within recent weeks. We can by no means take for granted the optimistic hopes that the continued growth of the Common Market, its enlargement to include Britain and the other European countries and, eventual ly, some form of an Atlantic partnership, will automatically progress in a favorable direction. Obviously, many difficulties lie ahead, but if, as we hope, we are successful in harmonizing these interests, then this also is likely to be a major factor in influencing the Soviet outlook. This, perhaps more than any other single factor, obliges the Soviet leadership to look at the reality of the outer world and see a noncorrespondence between that reality and their own anticipations, and this disparity is likely to have a continying effect on Soviet ¡deology. There has already been quite a bit of literature from the Soviet economists and Soviet political writers who are in the process of adapting their ideas about the dynamics of Western societies. The debate is carried on largely within the framework of a discussion of the changing character of capitalism in the modern era. But behind their phraseology lies a great sense of flux and challenge, of uncertainty about some of the fundamental assumptions of the Soviet idea and whether the changes it anticipates in the world are going to be borne out by the actual changes in these areas. CHANGES IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

Finally, the fourth factor ¡n this much too brief survey is the changes that have been taking place in the underdeveloped parts of the world and the way that Soviet leadership has viewed them. As you know, from the very beginning of their Revolution the Soviet leaders were sensitized to the possibility of these revolutionary developments in the underdeveloped parts of the world. They anticipated that there would be colonial revolutions and that these underdeveloped countries would sever their ties with the metropolitan countries, thereby weakening them. They also expected that the underdeveloped countries would come to a position of independence and would follow the Soviet model. It was anticipated that this would be a major source of strength in developing the Soviet bloc. Now the curious thing is that this revolutionary movement has indeed developed, but with a breathtaking speed that has caught the Soviets almost as much by surprise as it has us. Also, the degree of real independence, stubborn independence, which the leaders of these areas have developed, has tended to belie Soviet anticipations and has brought about a very interesting adaptation of Soviet policy toward these areas. The Soviets, particularly after 1954-1955, began to look at these emerging nations with a new eye, to see in neutralism a potentially advantageous factor. They envisioned a "zone of peace," which was to embrace these new countries in an attitude of positive neutralism and to effect a loose coalition with their own bloc in what they called the "anti-imperialist front," built around common negative positions-opposition to militarism, opposition to war, opposition to imperialism, opposition to the United States. Their hope was that this could lead, in effect, to a broad working majority in the United Nations under the guidance of the troika and to an effective bloc in international politics which would reduce the relative advantages of the Western bloc in relation to the Soviet Union. To this end, the Soviets increased their appeals to the leaders of these areas whom they described as the national bourgeois, Sukarno, Nasser, until recently Kassem, Sekou Toure, men who were not in their sense social revolutionaries but national revolutionaries. Their feeling was that if they could at this stage of development encourage these men to adopt an anti-Western position, this would be a favorable development for the present period. Soviet policy, therefore, developed essentially a short-térm outlook, which emphasized not so much a revolutionary policy or an effort to introduce social change in these areas or to bring these countries to social revolution on the Soviet model, but rather emphasized collaboration with the national leaders of these countries in order to influence their orientation in world politics. That is to say, in this sector,

31 Soviet concentration was essentially on international bloc politics and an effort to build a bloc of countries that would be securely anti-Western in their orientation. They felt that, in the short run, what was more important than gaining additional territories or additional raw materials or additional populations that needed to be fed and trained was the fatal weakening of the Western European countries. This would come about through the severing of their ties with these territories, their sources of raw material, their political support, their military bases, and their general support in international politics. So the Soviet concentration in this field was on the short-term goal of concentrating on international politics, and this is one of the problems that has been ra i sed in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chínese have argued that this is not a revolutionary polícy. This does not take advantage of revolutionary opportuníty and, in effect, dissipates the elan of the revolu- tíon. This tends over the long run, really, to sell out the whole revolutionary drive—this, taken together with the changes in the advanced industrial parts of the world, which also have not had revolutionary promise, and where the Soviets have also been addressing themselves to the leaders of these countries, to the bourgeois. You will have noticed that when Mikoyan or Khrushchev travels abroad to this country or to Britain, it is not to the working people that they are interested in talking; their meetings with labor leaders or socialist leaders on the whole have been disastrous from their point of view. It is to the businessmen that they are interested in talking and emphasizing themes of trade, of businesslike relations, of peace, of nationalism. They want to establish ties which will influence the orientation of these countries in order to weaken and fragment the Western bloc. From the Soviet point of view, the position of General DeGaulle in emphasizing national grandeur is what the Soviets would cali an objectively progressive factor in that it weakens the coherence of the Western al lies. And so, too, in relation to the advanced industrial countries, as in the case of the underdeveloped countries, the Soviets have been developing a short-term policy, which emphasizes changes in international politics and further postpones the efforts to bring about social change, in other words, further postpones the revolution. This is at the heart of the issues being debated by the Chínese and the Soviets. The Chínese argument across the board, in regard to military weapons, in regard to the relationship to the advanced industrial countries, in regard to the underdeveloped countries, has been, "This is not a revolutionary policy." And in a sense it is not, or, at least, it is not for the moment. The present short-term emphasis has been toward a manipulated, international politics kind of a policy and away from revolutionary policy ¡n the original sense. The Soviets reply that, given the contemporary conditions, this is the only safe and, indeed, the only effective way to carry out Soviet policy. Not by conducting war, but rather by bringing pressure to bear in order to accelerate changes in the world, by competing in political and economic terms, by developing their own economic base and productivity, will they assist the process of change in the world which they anticípate. The Soviets argüe with the Chínese that this is the only effective way to bring about this change. Soviet policy is to address their interests to the people of the underdeveloped parts of the world and to Western Europe, to encourage a closer relationship with the Soviet bloc (if possible, dependence) and to weaken the Western al liance. Only in this way, and not by a policy of direct revolution, do the Soviets feel that they can encourage the históricaI trends they anticípate. And this, in sum, is the policy which is defended in the ñame of "peaceful coexistence," essentially, a process of bringing about such changes in a way which does not increase the danger of general war, although it accepts the risk that is inherent in using mílitary capabilities as a source of political pressure. But it does not, I think, seriously accept the risk of general nuclear war as a real possibílity ¡n the present period.

ADAPTING OUR POLICIES TO CHANGES

In a sense, what has been happening in this period is that the character of the revolutionary thrust has been transmuted by this process of adaptation to the changes that have been taking place in the world. The crucial question for us, too, I think, is whether we can adapt our policies to these changes that have been taking place. I think we cannot be complacent. I do not think we can say that we have done so successful ly. I do not think that we show the slightest sign of beginníng to be aware of the character of this challenge. Over the long run, it seems to me, what is likely to be decisíve in this contest is whether the Soviet leaders or we more truly discern the underlying character of the changes in this period and more effectively adapt our policies to them.

33 AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: A CRITIQUE

FRED WARNER NEAL PROFESSOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GOVERNMENT CLAREMONTCOLLEGE

Since I am about to hold forth with some heretical views, I am reminded of a story about free speech in the Soviet Union, about the American who was trying to explain to a Russian how things work in this country. He said, You know, we have free speech. I could go right up to the White House and say, 'Down with Kennedy,' and nothing would happen to me." And the Russian said, "Well, I can do the same thing here." The American said, "You can?" "Surely. I can go right up to the Kremlin, and I can say, 'Down with Kennedy,' and nothing will happen • ii to me. Relations with the Soviet Union have always been troublesome, and, if the world lasts, probably they will continué to be. There are a number of reasons for this. The U.S.S.R. poses a new phenomenon. It is both a nation-state and the center of a world revolutionary movement. As such, consecrated as it is in both guises to the Communist world, it is a potentially disruptive forcé in a way that other states are not. Not only are its valúes and goals for the most part in opposition to our own, but its very nature tends to array it against the status quo of which contemporane- ously we are the prime defender. There is no question that the challenge facing us is great and that we have a hard ¡ob to do if we-ourselves and our ideals-are to survive.

ORIGINS OF COLD WAR

The origins of the cold war are complicated, and doubtless they can be traced back to the Bolshevik Revolution itself and the capitalist intervention at the time on up through Rapallo and Locarno and Munich and the Nazi-Soviet pact. There is a chicken-and-egg relationship about them which it is pointless to argüe here. Regardless of how it carne about, however, we are faced with it, and the problem is how to cope

34 with it in a way that will safeguard our country, the things in which we believe, and the peace. But in the new, post-World War II form, the cold war has become especially significant because the U.S.S.R. for the first time was in a position of world power and with the United States was one of the two superpowers. There was nothing either really novel or fatal about this even when it involved a confrontation of the two after the war because nations and ideologies had competed for world influence before. It was the atom bomb and its malformed offspring, the hydrogen bomb, that made what might have otherwise been merely a traditional power or ideological struggle into a thing involving the very fate of mankind. Whether the existence of the bomb would have led inevitably to the precarious situation in which we are now, we can never know. As you will recail, the Americans, in secrecy, had exploded atom bombs over Japan in a move that P. M. S. Blackett has called the first blow in the cold war.1 But the cold war had not, in August, 1945, involved nuclear competition. It may be that there was no way of keeping it from becoming such. The fact is, however, that our own policies had much to do with making it virtually inevitable, and I should like to suggest that these policies reflected a basicaliy isolationist and Calvinistic point of view of the world, a view that tends to reject unpleasant reality especially in regard to the Soviet Union. But whatever the source, we have a record of interpreting Soviet developments that is not exactly 100 per cent accurate. In fact, as a nation we have been wrong about almost every major development in Soviet history. We did not anticípate the Revolution. When it occurred, we did not think that it was going to be successful. When it succeeded, and there was a temporary reversión to capitalism, we thought that the Soviets had abandoned their policies, their ideas of socialism. When they joined the League of Nations, we felt that their interests were those of the Western democracies. When they made a pact with the Germans, we thought that they were like the Germán Nazis. When the Germans then invaded the Soviet Union, we thought that they could last only six weeks, but they lasted much longer than that. At the end of the war, we thought that they could not make a speedy recovery. When they made a speedy recovery, we thought that they did not have the know-how to build atom bombs, and so on. But to come back to the bomb, what we did at the end of World War II was simultaneously to center our policy on nuclear weapons on the one hand and to ignore the connection with this and the impact of this on the Soviet Union on the other hand. We were not without warning about the hazards of this course. Nearly every atomic scientist advised that we could not keep the atom

35 bomb a secret, that ¡t would be only a matter of time, a matter of a few years at most, until the Soviet Union had it. One nonscientist who felt the same was the great Republican statesman, Henry L. Stimson. Urging that we share the secret of nuclear arms with the U.S.S.R., Secretary Stimson advised President Truman, in September of 1945, that he considered "the problem of our satisfactory relations with the Russians as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of control of the bomb," Stimson wrote the President, "those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations and mutual confidence between her and us," he said, "could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb they became immediately emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continué to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase. It will inspire them to greater efforts in an all-out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit," wrote Stimson, "it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of cove- nant we may desperately need in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than any other, inasmuch as our objective must be to get the best kind of international barga in we can-one that has some chance of being kept and saving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever."2 And then this rare, wise, and prophetic American went on to say: "If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devastating military weapon to be assimilated into our pattern of international relations, it would be one thing. We could then follow the oíd custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority relying on international caution to pre- scribe the future use of the weapon as we did with gas. But I think," he said, "the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the oíd concepts. I think it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control—his moral power. If so, our method of approach to the Russians is a question of the most vital importance in the evolution of human progress."

BASES OF U. S. POLICY

Now, by no means do I intend to place the onus for all that followed on the shoulders of the United States. The hard, uncooperative, uncom-

36 promising posture of Stalinist Russia is well known. Soviet disregard for Western fears and sensibilities contributed enormously to the impasse. But we cannot understand what happened, I think, if we do not also see that the disregard of Secretary Stimson's advice at that time both reflected and produced a predominantly military orientation to the manner in which the United States proceeded to view the U.S.S.R. and the postwar world. This preoccupation with military factors greatly contributed, in my opinion, to a misreading of Soviet policies, to an exaggeration of Ameri- can capabilities, and to a disregard of the basic nature of the post- atomic-bomb world. Yet these have formed the bases of American policy. lt seems to me that this policy can be said to rest on three major assumptions: (1) the assumption that the Soviet Union is by nature militarily aggressive; (2) the assumption that the United States can maintain meaningful military superiority over the U.S.S.R.; and (3) the assumption that American security lies only in its military containment of the Soviet Union and Communism. Now, in my opinion, all three of these assumptions of our policy are invalid. Two of them are demonstrably invalid. First of all, containment has not contained. Not only has the Soviet Union waxed stronger, but the area dominated by or influenced by Communism has expanded. Like the Monitor in its classic Civil War battle with the Merrimac, Com- munism has simply slipped in under our guns. And security? Surely, no one can argüe that we would have more of this if thermonuclear war is waged against us; we cannot survive. And if we wage thermonuclear war against somebody else, we still cannot survive. The fact is that, in the thermonuclear age, wars among major powers cannot be won, and they cease to be a logical instrumentality for the furtherance of any national interest. But even the existence of uncontrolled thermonuclear weapons poses a constant and terrible threat whether anybody intends to use them or not. If one grants that man and his works are fallible, the danger of accident, human or mechanical, is such as to make a thermonuclear holocaust almost certa¡n if the arms race continúes. If all this be security, one can say that perhaps less of it would not be any worse. Second, the United States has not maintained meaningful military superiority over the U.S.S.R. I am not talking here about missile gaps and such. The gap is on one side and then on the other depending, perhaps, on whether one discusses this before or after a presidential election. But when a country acquires a certain thermonuclear bomb and delivery capacity, how much overkill the other side has is completely meaningless in terms of effective military superiority, and the Soviet Union has clearly acquired that capacity.3

37 !£>!. aiM Union, its'policies. it* proba- ble and possible courses of

actton[ It is for that reason

that the Seventh

titute on Lnite oiiey, ttj rntng Satur faet of the So ditorium o isiPlidom out of of Wisco

jmost Americans. ixn porgan

ly talks Theito

cus ©n the Soví?

nrooram has been

ét sponsoring

y the UWM's

Id Afíai

e •ffects our1 eiTe In some ways it is the remaining assumption that is the most important and troublesome of all, the assumption that the Soviet Union is by nature committed to military aggression to achieve its ends. Now, this is an article of faith in the United States, and, like articles of faith generally, it is often stated and seldom examined critically. Certainly the Soviet Union has no moral disposition to peace. Certainly it has on occasion used its military forces for purposes the world sees as aggressive. But none of this is to say that it is inevitably bent on military aggression, that this is its aim and goal. Two reasons are usually given for attributing to the U.S.S.R. an inevitable propensity for physical military aggression. One is Soviet Communist theory. The other is the establishment by the Red Army of a Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Let us examine these at this moment. First, Communist ideology: Few things are as much talked about and as little understood in the United States as this. Some of the misin- formation about it is deliberately spread by those who know better, but much of it results from ignorance and confusion, perhaps understandable in Western pragmatists over a very complicated theoretical construction. As we all know, Marxist theory both predicts and advocates the violent overthrow of capitalism, but neither Marx ñor his Soviet interpreters has seen this as coming by military forcé from outside. Indeed, Lenin, who was the father of modern Communist tactics, insisted that revolution could not be exported, and he warned that it should not even be attempted except when certain objective conditions obtained-a breakdown of the social fabric as a result of a long series of crises, the alienation of the masses from the leaders, and a great crisis or cataclysmic event of which war is the classic example. The early Bolsheviks wrongly thought that these conditions existed throughout the West and naively anticipated the early downfall of capitalism as a result. Engaged in a war which the capitalist countries brought to them, they first thought in military terms, but soon Lenin and later Stalin declared that capitalism was in a period of long-run stability in which it was both futile and thus practically wrong for even foreign Com- munists to attempt to make a revolution. Stalin, in fact, turned out to be one of the greatest discouragers of Communist revolution of all times. He looked askance at the Yugoslav Communists even during the war. Despite American misconceptions, he opposed the Greek Communists after the war, and he strongly advised the Chínese Communists not to go forward with their own revolution. Now, all this, of course, was a tactical position only. It is true that Stalin, in 1952, reversed this essentially defensive stand and ordered a Soviet foreign policy offensive, and, had it not been for the revisión of the

38 basic Soviet Marxist view on war, conceivably the U.S.S.R. might have come to take the type of stand, the menacing stand, which has now been adopted by Communist China. But the revisión, more about that in a moment, did take place. In any event, it seems to me that if there is a reason to fear an inevitable Soviet commitment to military aggression more than is the case with other states, one must look for it elsewhere than in the ideology.4 The second explanation on which rests the assumption of the inevitable danger of Soviet military aggression is the Soviet performance in Eastern Europe. I think that this assumption also is false. The Red Army occupied Eastern Europe as a part of its military operations against the Germans in a war brought by the Germans to Russia. While there they put the local Communists in power and kept them there, in most cases against the wishes of the inhabitants. The result was a Soviet hegemony in this area of enormous strategic-valué to them. It was in a sense political aggression but surely not military aggression in the sense that we are told there is a constant danger—¡n the sense that, in time of peace, country A will march its troops across the border into country B for the purpose of establishing its power. Ñor was Hungary military aggression in this sense. Here the Soviet Union was intervening militarily in an area where it already had power, to keep its power from being extinguished, not invading a country for the purpose of expanding its power. The cruel repression of the Hungarian uprising tells us a lot about Soviet moral valúes, but it by no means indicates any general commitment to physical military aggression in the sense that we fear it. Perhaps the example stretched farthest of all is the one usually cited as the clincher, the case of Czechoslovakia. There were no Soviet troops involved at all at the time of the coup d'état of the Czech Communists in February, 1948. The coup d'état was pulled off by the Czech Com- munists themselves, possibly with Soviet connivance, but with no Soviet military intervention whatsoever.5 None of this, of course, proves that the Soviet Union would not in the future commit physical military aggression. It merely proves that the reasons offered for fearing that the Soviets are committed inevitably to it are invalid. And yet it is this fear which, perhaps more than anything else, has led us into positions which viólate ¡mportant principies of international policy, which by their very nature appear to the Soviet Union as provocative and which have contributed to the present world crisis.

39 CORE INTERESTS

Perhaps the most ¡mportant principie of international politics is that every nation has certain interests which it considers so vital that if these interests are threatened the nation reacts as if its very existence is threatened. In the case of small or weak nations, these core interests may amount only to the territorial integrity of the state. In the case of large and powerful nations, these core interests extend to areas outside the state boundaries. Sometimes they are far-flung, but invariably they include adjacent areas. When these interests are ¡eopardized, a conflict situation inevitably results. To establish missile bases on the periphery of another country clearly jeopardizes its core interests. This was apparent in the Cuban situation. Here the United States reacted in the natural and traditional manner of a nation-state whose core interests were threatened. Yet American military bases on the borders of the Soviet Union have been threatening Soviet core interests in exactly the same manner for some time. No matter how defensive we know our bases are, what matters is how in the nature of things it must appear to the U.S.S.R. One does not have to accept their view, but it is imperative to understand it. I am reminded of the story about the two men and the barking dog, one man being very afraid and the other man saying, "Don't worry, you know barking dogs don't bite." The first man said, "Yes, I know that barking dogs don't bite, and you know that barking dogs don't bite, but the dog, does he know it?" This is the thing on which, I think, it is ¡mportant to focus. Our certainty that we do face ¡n all cases a danger of Soviet military aggression ¡s also responsible, I think, for the box of our policy on Germany and Berlín. Because we fear Soviet military aggression against Western Europe (of which I think there never has been the slightest indi- catión), we believe that a strong N.A.T.O. is vital. We realize that a strong N.A.T.O. without West Germany is ¡mpossible; therefore, we assisted in building up West Germany into the most formidable power in Europe, again oblivious of the impact of this not only on the Russians and the other Eastern Europeans but also on Western Europeans and the general international political situation. What this can lead to can be seen in the case of Berlin. Our insistence on having a reunified Germany in N.A.T.O. was sufficient to block Germán reunification, whether the Russians would ever have agreed to it otherwise or not. With the chances of reunification gone, our position in Berlin deep inside the East Germán state is not only untenable, but it has lost its diplomatic meaning. The Russians have not, in fact, officially demanded that we get out of Berlin. That we seem so persistently to think so stems, I believe,

40 from this fix that we have, that the Soviet Union is committed to military aggression, come what may. What the Russians really want is our recognition of the facts of the East Germán state and the Oder-Nei sse boundary with Poland. But we cannot give in on this, even though doing so could actually strengthen our position in Berlin, because of opposition from West Germany. We daré not oppose West Germany because of fear that it would cease to cooperate with N.A.T.O., and we must have N.A.T.O. because we fear Soviet military aggression.6

THERMONUCLEAR POLICY

Perhaps the most precarious of all our positions resulting from this fear concerns thermonuclear policy. Originally our policy was that of deterrent. Now this had a certain logic despite its great danger. The ¡dea was that if our deterrent and the Russians' deterrent could balance each other, there could be nuclear stability, and meanwhile conventional wars might be fought. The trouble was, of course, that the deterrent capabilities and capacities had a tendency to build up and to build up to a point where there was constantly greater danger that they would blow up. But in our case this tended to get out of hand. It led to what has been cal led counterforce. Now counterforce means in essence that your thermonuclear capacity is so much greater than your opponent's that you could knock him out in one blow, including his deterrent capacity. Thus, the opponent's deterrent capacity is in effect eliminated while you retain yours. Under such circumstances it is not unnatural that there comes a tendency to think of thermonuclear weapons not as as deterrents, as defensive, but as offensive. That is to say, the corol- lary of counterforce is willingness to initiate the use of thermonuclear weapons if need be. Under such circumstances it becomes very di ff i cu it, if not impossible, to negotiate without, in the words of Henry Stimson, "...this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip." The least danger here involved is a disinclination for the mutual compromises upon which real diplomatic negotiations rest and an urge to arrange a pax Americana, confident that resulting political conflicts will not burst into military ones. I do not believe that it is the intention of the American policymakers to act in this way. I simply say that given the policies they espouse, it is very difficult to avoid the psychology that may impel them in that direction. But, as I say, this is the least of the dangers. Much greater and much more certain is the Soviet response which, of course, will be to develop its own counterforce system. Even if they do not, Secretary McNamara has testified that we could not really destroy all Soviet retaliatory capacity.7 But the Russians can develop their own counterforce, and if the present nuclear diplomatic impasse continúes, they will surely feel impelled to. Then one of two things will happen. Either the whole thing will blow up, and us with it, or deterrence will simply be resumed at a new, a higher, and a more explosive level until somebody thinks up a new term for counterforce, and the march of the lemmings resumes all over again.

THE PRIME GOAL

The purpose of foreign policy is to bring security to the state and enhance the national interest of the state. It seems to me far from clear that the present state of affairs offers either security or enhancement of national interest. There is only one foreign policy goal today, I think, that is really meaningful, and that is disarmament; or to put it more accurately, no foreign policy can be meaningful unless it includes disarmament as a prime goal. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have verbally accepted disarmament as a goal, but disarmament can be achieved only on the basis of a mínimum of trust which cannot come about without a U. S.-Soviet détente, that is, a resolution of the major international disputes between the two countries. Whether we can ever achieve such a detente, one does not know, but one does know two things: first, there will never be a detente if we do not try to achieve it; and, second, the risks of not trying to achieve it are fantastically greater than the risk of trying. In examining whether a detente is in fact possible, attention must be paid to the major changes in Soviet foreign policies, in Soviet foreign policy attitudes, resulting from the twentieth congress of the Communist party in 1956. Prior to this time, Soviet views of the world were firmly based on the Marxist theory that war was the inevitable by-product of capitalism. War was caused by capitalísm according to the theory, and as long as capitalism existed anywhere in the world, there would be war. Since in this view a peaceful world was an impossibility, there was no use seeking a détente other than in the very short run, to say nothing of disarmament. But in 1956, Khrushchev enunciated what I think is the most significant revisión of Marxism since the Revolution. He declared that henceforth war is not inevitable, even if there is capitalism. The changed conditions of the world resulting from thermonuclear bombs and great Communist power now meant, he said, that war might be avoided. Indeed, the Soviet position was and is that not only could wars be avoided but that they must be avoided, not from any moral niceties or pacifist outlook but because no society could survive them any longer.

42 And Khrushchev concluded that a thermonuclear war would jeopardize the goal of a Communist world. Therefore, the oíd ¡dea that a major war might be utilized for Communism by being turned into a class war was ¡ettisoned. In short, what he was saying was that the dialectic could now work only by avoidance of major wars, and this meant the necessity of long-run agreements with capitalist countries. It is essentially this revisión of Marxist-Leninist theory that gave rise to the Soviet-Chinese dispute which now threatens to split the Communist world.8 All of this implied no cessation of the cold war, no end to nonmilitary competition with capitalism, no revisión in the ultímate goal of the Soviet Union of a Communist world; but it did mean a whole new view of the present world. And it greatly increased the chances of a Soviet- Western detente. Indeed, in 1959, it looked very much as though the detente might become a reality. It did not chiefly, I believe, because we were a prisoner of our basic assumptions about the Soviet Union and also because we were not willing to accept the Soviet terms. While the U.S.S.R. moved in several spheres to initiate compromises, three points in its view remained and remain uncompromisable. These are, first, the essential nature of the Soviet regime, that is, of the dictatorship, or, to put it another way, the closed society; second, Soviet core interests including primarily hegemony over Eastern Europe; and, third, Soviet assistance, though not necessarily military assistance, to revolutionary regimes in the underdeveloped areas. Here we have the difficulties posed by the dual nature of the Soviet Union. The trouble is that we were unable to accept either its prerequisites as a nation-state or prerequisites as the center of a revolutionary movement. We insisted on penetrating the closed societies in the form of the U-2 and on-site inspection for a nuclear test ban. We persisted in our challenge to Soviet core interests both by maintaining bases around the Soviet border and by not being able to settle the Berlín question. We maintained in effect that in Laos we had a right to intervene against new revolutionary governments but that the Soviet Union had no right to intervene for them. The first American attitude is being helped by technological developments in the form of little black boxes. The problem of bases remains an important one. There is no real chance of a detente leading to disarmament if the Soviet Union tries to maintain on our borders military paraphernalia capable of a defensive action, and there is no chance of a detente which could lead to disarmament as long as we persist in maintaining on their borders the same kind of paraphernalia capable of offensive action.

43 lt may be, however, although ¡t ¡s not clear, that this policy also is being modified, possibly because of the demonstraron in Cuba that two can play at the game of foreign bases in strategic areas. The problem of Germany remains a stickler. As long as the United States and West Germany and, therefore, all N.A.T.O. refuse to accept the territorial facts of Central Europe, there can be no stability here, But the problem is clearly solvable, at least theoretically, without ¡eopardizing Western Europe. So, I believe, is the problem involved in the underdeveloped areas although in some ways this is the most difficult of all. The problem is that the underdeveloped areas-the whole underdeveloped world—are in the throes of social revolution in one form or another. Rarely have these revolutionary movements been initiated by other than internal forces, and invariably their initial focus is nationaiist and not Communist. Given adequate nonmilitary assistance, most of them would not become Communist in any Soviet-oriented sense, ñor have they done so in Africa or the Near East. China, of course, poses a special problem, and very likely the future will see Chinese satellites in Asia ¡ust as there are Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. But there is nothing unnatural or fatal about this. Of course, it is important that the vast, underdeveloped areas should not all be arrayed against us. But the fact is that not all social revolutions produce Communist regimes, and not all Communist regimes are inevitably in league with the Soviet Union. There is no monolithic Communist world power, and the Soviet- Chinese split only underscores this fact. An obvious attempt at solution of the problem posed ir this context by the underdeveloped areas would be an agreement in which both the United States and the Soviet Union mutually forswear initiation of military intervention while leaving the arena open for economic aid, propaganda, and even subversión. If we could but see that the revolutions in these areas are coming no matter what we do, I see no reason why we could not support and thus endear ourselves to as many of them as the U.S.S.R. Khrushchev has indicated a willingness to accept such an arrangement; if we could take him up on it, it would not only remove an impediment to the necessary detente, it might even help our position with the underdeveloped countries. This could not be very much worse no matter what we do. But the important thing is the détente-to get on with it so that it will be possible to get on with disarmament-and history will not wait around for it. That it is not waiting for us can be seen clearly in the new French position, to say nothing of the Chinese. The splits in the two blocs have their good side. Khrushchev's persistence in adhering to his position on war and capitalism, even though it means a split in

44 the Communist movement, ¡s surely as ¡n earnest-as his sincerity. And DeGaulle's demonstration of the lack of Western unity should free the United States of the necessity of trying to maintain it in any negotiations with Moscow. But the ominous side of both the Communist and the Western intra- mural conflict is more important for it raises the specter of the so-cal led Nth country problem. Moreover, it is also ominous that unless such proliferation of atomic weapons is blocked by early disarmament agreements, thermonuclear bombs will soon be in the hands of the two nations which would openly challenge existing power relationships, China and Germany. For if France develops its own thermonuclear capacity, surely Germany will not be far behind, if indeed it does not get there first. If this happens, the chances of disarmament may well be reduced to zero. And if it is, so will the chances of mankind. We must not let this happen. To avoid it, both the Soviet Union and the United States must change some basic attitudes. There is little that we can do, I think, about Soviet attitudes except indirectly, but there is a great deal that we can do about our own. There has been very little, if any, debate in the United States since the war on the basic aspects of our foreign policy- very little real discussion. I find it very interesting that the able and forceful presentation of Mr. Harvey under the title "Foreign Policy for the Sixties" could equally well have been entitled "Foreign Policy for the Fifties." I congratúlate you ladies and gentlemen here on your contribution to the democratic process which alone will save us, if we can be saved, in providing an opportunity for high-level discussion. It is clear that if Wisconsin, if Milwaukee, were ever a part of isolationism in the United States, it is so no longer, and I congratúlate you on that, too.

FOOTNOTES

T. M. S. Blackett, Fear, War and the Bomb (New York. Whittlesey House, 1948), esp. chap. 10. 2Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 642-644. 3See, for example, Ralph E. Lapp, Kill and Overkill: The Strategy of Annihilation (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962), esp. pp. 39-47. 4For further discussion, see Fred Warner Neal, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union (Santa Barbara, California: Center for Study of Demo- cratic Institutions, 1961), esp. pp. 8-11 and 25-27.

45 sSee ínter alia Hugh Seton-Watson, The Eastern European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1950), pp. 179-190; and H. Gordon Skilling, "The Prague Overturn in 1948," Canadian Slavonic Papers, 19Ó0, pp. 88-114. 6See Neal, War and Peace and Germán y (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1962), esp. chaps. 5, 6, and 12. 7See interview with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara by Stewart Alsop, The Saturday Evening Post, December 1, 1962. "For statement of Soviet views, see The Attack Against "Dogmatists" and "Secretarians" (New York: American Committee for Liberation, 1961). KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY: COEXISTENCE OR CONFLICT?

PHILIP E. MOSELY DIRECTOR, THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTE PROFESSOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

As I have listened today, I have been much ¡mpressed by the various points of view that have been presented ¡n such a knowledgeable way, and I naturally welcome the opportunity to offer some comments of my own. At times it has been hard for me to sit still, for I have wondered occasionally if we were all talking about the same world. This feeling of perplexity over where we are reminds me of something that happened to me a few years ago, when I lost my way on a backroad in Maine. No longer trusting my intuition or wishful thinking, I stopped to ask the way of a farmer who was mending a fence beside the road. "How do I get to Portland from here?" The farmer thought a moment, scratched his head, and replied, "Well, if I was going to Portland, I wouldn't start from here." This is the dilemma of much of our thinking about foreign policy. We need to know not only where we should like to go, but also from where we are starting. It is not easy for Americans, or even for members of our panel, to agree on ¡ust where we are, and the problems involved in getting to the kind of world in which we should like to live are even more troubling. No one policy or set of policies is going to get us there, and that is why we, as responsible citizens, must examine and question all our policies. That is why we are here today. Outwardly at least, the Soviet leadership denies that it is troubled by any similar uncertainties or doubts. A recent and completely authoritative statement of its views is readily available in the Party Program that was adopted by the Communist party of the Soviet Union at its twenty-second congress, held in October, 1961. For a dynamic statement of purposes, this is a rather verbose document, with a good many obscure points in it, but it represents a codificaron of the party's views on the future of the

47 Soviet Union and of the entire world. If you have not done so, each of you should read this document, which is available in a number of excellent translations.

THE MEANING OF COEXISTENCE

In the Party Program, which is a statement of purposes and duties binding on Communists everywhere, you will find the current Soviet definition of "coexistence" between different social and political systems. The Program makes it clear again and again that the final outcome of a more or less prolonged period of "coexistence" will be and must be the triumph of Communism throughout the world and the disappearance of all other systems. This result is not merely the product of the automatic or "inevitable" operation of "the forces of History," but is a goal to which Communists everywhere must dedícate all their thought and all the ir efforts ¡n a dis- ciplined and monolithic endeavor. The Program, of course, shows not the slightest inclination to admit that non-Communist societies may continué to exist more than a few more years. Ñor does it suggest the slightest willingness to tolerate the continued existence of such societies one day longer than is absolutely necessary. The Program, as we can see, makes perfectly clear what the Soviet leadership means and does not mean when it preaches "coexistence." The universal claims of Communist ideology and the political ambitions of the Soviet leadership mean that we must accept and live with the Soviet definition of coexistence until such time as a presently unforesee- able evolution of Soviet society and the Communist power-system may erode the self-righteous certainties of Leninist dogma. Until that time we must look forward to a prolonged period of strenuous competition. In the course of coexisting and competing, we shall want to seek many partial agreements, but it would be Utopian to assume that we can sit down with the Soviet leaders and at one time or in one negotiation arrive at a complete settlement or a permanent detente. Soviet ambitions arise out of the nature of the regime, out of the firmly held ideology of its leaders, whose claim to rule is based on the assumption that, as the prophets and expounders of Marxism-Leninism, they possess the solé correct interpretation of the past, present, and future of all humanity. Until some self- doubts arise in their minds or those of their successors, they will feel impelled by their peculiar form of messianic ideocracy to spread their system wherever that can be accomplished without endangering the survival of its original homeland, the Soviet Union. Will the political arrogance of the Communist leaders be tempered with time and broadened experience? Are the significant changes that have

48 been taking place in Soviet society modifying the nature and tempering the universalist ambitions of the leaders? Or shall we be dealing, for an ín- definite future, with a regime, ambitious for world-wide domination, which it prefers to achieve by a wide range of relatively peaceful activities, backed by a tremendous concentration of strategic power?

CHANGES WITHIN SOVIET SOCIETY

I welcome, of course, the numerous changes that have been taking place in the Soviet Union over the past ten years. I have endeavored to measure them, however sketchily, in my five visits since 1956, and to com- pare them with what I observed during almost two years of residence in the early 1930's and also in a brief visit in the midst of World War II. I have been deeply pleased to see the Soviet people, after severaI decades of privation and a degree of wartime suffering that can hardly be imagined in the West, now enjoying a substantial and steady improvement in the supply of food, housing, clothing, household equipment, televisión sets, and so forth. In one respect, Chairman Khrushchev asserts emphatically, the Soviet Union will never attempt to catch up with the American standard of living; he opposes transforming Russia into an "automobile society," with its traffic ¡ams and parking problems. I have yet to meet a Soviet citizen who does not want a car, so it may be that Khrushchev's successors will decide that Russia will have to enter the automobile age after all! One of the happiest changes within the Soviet Union is the decline of fear as a part of the everyday way of life. Still, most of its citizens realize that the powers-that-be possess many means of punishing dissent or obstruction, including the power to exile people to remote regions of the country and to break off or destroy promising professional careers. On the whole, however, the brooding, depressing fear of former times has greatly diminished, but not the fear that it might be reimposed. Sometimes one feels as if people were tiptoeing around, wanting above all to avoid arousing the wrath of the "good" leader who has done so much to make life more satisfying in so many material and cultural aspects. Today, communication takes place not merely from the leader down to the led. In ruling a much more productive and complex system, Khrushchev and his followers show a certain sensitivity to popular moods, and especially to the half million or so executives who really administer the political, economic, and cultural life of the Soviet Union. Of course, even an absolute ruler like Haroun-al-Raschid found it useful to find out something about the feelings of his subjects. The question that concerns us, as Americans, is: Have the changes in Soviet life, of which I have time to mention only a few, limited in any way the ability of the party leadership

49 to use the great material and human resources of Russia for their own purposes? More specifically, have the universal desire for a better and richer life and the equally universal dread of a new war set any Iimits to the decisions of the small, self-appointed, and self-perpetuating ruling group? I do not see any such changes or limitations on that tremendous power, which remains monolithic, secretive, and ambitious. Such changes may occur some day, in some unforeseen way, but we cannot base present policies, offer present concessions, or sacrifice our present alliances merely in the hope that the people in the Soviet Union will somehow be able to impose on their leaders their own deep desire for peace abroad and a better life at home. In one very important respect, the Soviet leadership may conceivably become less subject to, or restrained by, the hopes and fears of its own people. As its nuclear-missile powergrows, it may be able, unless deterred by opposing forces, to pursue its political goals with less attention to the support or reluctance of its subjects. World War I and World War II were increasingly total wars, of long duration, in which the people at home were ¡ust as important as those who were engaged in direct combat. If a nuclear war ever carne about, it might well be decided in a few hours, without the great bulk of the people even knowing what had happened. Just "public opinion" or, perhaps we should say, public moods carry somewhat more weight in the Soviet Union now than in the past. Yet, the factor of morale, of endurance, may be of far less weight in determining whether the Soviet leaders may or may not feel able to press forward, at a higher level of risk, to achieve the supreme goal to which they now appear firmly committed by their monolithic ideology and their political ambitions. People often ask: How is it possible, forty-five years after the Soviet Revolution, that the people and the leaders are still motivated to accept great sacrifices and to run great risks because of a revolutionary ideology? Or do the Communist leaders merely use revolutionary slogans to camou- flage their national ambitions? Actually, this is, I believe, an unreal dichotomy. Of course, the genuine emotionai and revolutionary upsurge of the first Soviet years has long since died out at home, and Soviet life is rather subdued and humdrum. On the other hand, the faith that the Communist system will prevail throughout the world stirs a deep feeling of national or, rather, party pride, and this pride or, perhaps, this arrogance is exceedingly strong in the ranks of the party.' The power goals of today are even more dangerous than the revolutionary hopes of 1917, for they are backed by strategic, economic, and political power of great magnitude. In addition, that power is wielded by a few men, and ultimately by a single leader, as a centralized and integrated forcé, capable of secret and sudden action. F¡nally, that concen-

50 trated body of power is almost beyond our capacity to influence it, and it rejects any and all prospect of "coexistence of ideologies" as a betrayal of Leninism.

THE NUCLEAR EQUATION

The Soviet leaders have, unfortunately, not been willing to sacrifice one ¡ota of their real or supposed advantages ¡n order to move "coexistence" from the arena of propaganda to that of a political detente, and, of course, we on our side have also been extremely cautious in venturing onto this thin ice. The Kremlin has, however, been very sensitive to questions of the nuclear-strategic balance. If the Soviet leaders have acted or threatened so boldly, in Berlín, the Congo, and Cuba, at a time when America also has a vast nuclear-missile arsenal, we can imagine how they would act if they actually secured a clear-cut suprfemacy! At the present time the United States has a certain, hard-to-defíne degree of superiority in this crucial field, but it does not have supremacy, and it is dangerous for some of our citizens to demand that we act as ¡f we had supremacy. The Soviet Union has a tremendous arsenal of nuclear weapons, including bombs that are several times more powerful than any we have thought it worthwhile to develop, and it has a versatile and growing range of means of delivery. A nuclear war would lay waste the entire northern hemisphere, and there would be no "victor" in any traditional sense of the word. Following an exchange of nuclear destruction, the world would, of course, pick up the pieces and go on in one way or another, but it is doubtful that the rebuilt society would resemble anything we have known in modern times. Fortunately, Khrushchev, too, has come to recognize the dilemma of power that is too vast to be "useful." Yet there has been no slackening in the race for nuclear superiority just because nuclear power is still being used, and can be used, though at grave risk, to inflict political defeats on the other party to the contest. Each side in the race realizes that it might be forced to surrender basic national interests and purposes by threats that stop short of unleashing a nuclear war. Yet the line between nuclear threats and nuclear war is dangerously uncertain and undefined, and each side may have a quite different concept of what constitutes a vital national interest. The waging of a nuclear war is no longer a useful strategy for either of the two great powers; on the other hand, making nuclear threats and counterthreats remains the ultímate test of political staying power. The dilemma of a nuclear strategy was illustrated in the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962. When the Soviet leaders secretly established a

51 missile forcé cióse to American territory, the United States demanded its withdrawal and mobilized all of its great strategic power to back up that demand. During the crisis, each side was literally "looking down the mu?zle" of the other, and no one could say for sure that a nuclear war would not break out from one hour to the next. Because the American aims were moderate, because the Kremlin accepted the way out that was offered, many of our people have since become overcomplacent; many of them pro- claim now, after the immediate threat has been removed, that we should have demanded much, much more. On the contrary, nuclear power can be used only sparingly for political purposes, and those purposes must be recognized by both sides as ¡ustifying its use. The experience of October, 1962, should, I believe, convince both powers of the very limited useful- ness of nuclear might except for the central purpose of forestal!ing an evident threat to the national survival. The nuclear equation of power, which has been a changing and unstable one, may become more stable over the next decade and, therefore, may become somewhat more manageable than it is at present. If this occurs, it will be due to the emergence of more or less evenly balanced second- strike capabilities and, therefore, of a rough kind of nuclear parity. As the advantages of a first-strike strategy are greatly reduced, a period of nuclear stalemate may follow. In the past several years, the United States has moved more rapidly than the Soviet government to build a second- strike or delayed-response strength, and this was one factor in the U. S. relative strategic advantage at the time of the October, 1962, crisis. The prospective nuclear deadlock might, however, be broken by further technological breakthroughs, arising out of new scientific and technological advances. One such development, toward which both sides are working very hard, is in the field of antimissile defense. This new system will be immensely costly to develop and also to operate. Yet, if one side could knock down nearly all incoming missiles and the other could not, the nuclear balance would be broken. Another field, which requires much more careful thought than we have given it, is the problem of equipping our society to survive a nuclear exchange and to set about rebuilding. If one side has a strong prospect of survival and the other has made no preparations for this, the balance may be broken by surrender or destruction. "Civil defense," as it is wrongly called, may become a decisive factor of national strength in a prolonged period of nuclear stalemate. If one side should achieve a clear-cut supremacy over the other in the fields of attack, or of active or passive defense against attack, the world may be exposed to the risk that the superior side would use this period of advantage, perhaps a fleeting one, to destroy the other power center. This

52 is a most unpleasant possibility to face, but we must look at the entire spectrum of risks. In a sense, neither side has control today over the technology that it has developed, and the world runs a real risk that decisions may, at a time of crisis, pass from the realm of politics to that of technology. On the other hand, the technological arms race has one advantage. It makes it more difficult and costly year by year to acquire a nuclear capability. It thus makes nuclear proliferation a more manageable problem than it was expected to be.

PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL

There is a possibility that the emergence of stable second-strike mutual deterrence may provide a political opening for stabilizing the conflict. By the time each power has an assured second-strike capability of destroying the other, the possibility of negotiating and enforcing limitations on the arms race may seem much more attractive to both than it has so far. There may appear a "plateau of mutual terror" on which both sides can agree that "enough is enough" and that there is no need to pre- pare to kill each other a hundred times over when ten times over will suffice. Because this prospect of a political capping of the nuclear-missile gusher may lie ¡ust below the horizon, it is all the more important to con- tinué and intensify the East-West negotiations over a test ban, adequate inspection of disarmament agreements, nuclear-free zones, prevention of surprise attack, and so forth. These negotiations can help make sure that we are all talking about the same scientific, technological, strategic, and political data. They can make new crises somewhat more manageable, because each side will have a better notion of what the other is trying to say. Final ly, they may help edúcate intelligent neutrals in the insane wisdom of the nuclear-missile age. Perhaps only the neutrals will some day be able to persuade the nuclear powers to accept some system of arms control; perhaps they are the ones who will have to enforce any such system. This may seem wi Id ly optimistic in the light of our experience with the test-ban negotiations. Actually, seven years of negotiation have shown that a test ban is not so crucial as it once seemed, provided both sides are willing to take precautions to forestalI an excess of fallout. A test ban would have been a tremendous and inspiring political achieve- ment even two or three years ago. By now it is clear that it would have very little, if any, effect on the arms race. On the other hand, if it is not possible to reconcile the technological and political factors in order to achieve a test ban, it is even harder to see how we are going to make

53 headway with the enormously more complicated problems of effective and enforceable disarmament. How are we going to inspect ideas in the minds of men working in laboratories? With an effective control established over bombs and missiles, resources may be shifted to chemical and bacteriolog- ical warfare, which can be prepared in small and inconspicuous workshops. The improvement of aerial and on-the-ground inspection may lead to putting clandestine operations underground. Still, despite these discouraging prospects, which we cannot wish away or elimínate by any single act of "trust" or "good will," arms control is going to be crucial to the survival of modern civilization. We are doing to have to work at it at least one one-hundredth as hard as we are working on new weapons and defenses against them. One reason why progress is going to be slow is that Khrushchev believes, and has said repeatedly, that his system can outlast ours in an arms race. It is difficult to understand why he is so confident of this, and in practice he has uttered loud outcries of protest at the repeated stepping up of our side of the arms race since 1959. For example, in June, 1962, Khrushchev announced an overnight increase in the prices of meat and butter. These were, in fact, justified as an incentive to the collective farms to turn out more meat and dairy products; they served to correct a disincentive inherited from Stalin's days. However, the Soviet government pulled out all stops of its massive propaganda organ to persuade its people that the price increases were due entirely to a stepping-up of the U. S. arms budget. So far there are but few signs that the Soviet leaders have given any thought to where an unrestricted arms race may lead. Ñor do they seem fully up to date on the implications of the most modern types of strategic thinking. This is still another reason why we must press forward with all kinds of negotiations and discussions, formal and informal, on these problems so as to lessen the added risks of an unwanted disaster that may arise from too wide a gap in scientific and strategic thinking. In 1914, the general staff of each major European nation was convinced that any war would be a very short one and that it would be fought by the men already trained and with equipment already stockpiled. Of course, World War I turned into a long war of mutual exhaustion; it was fought by men who had not even been trained at its beginning; and it was won with equipment produced during the war or imported from overseas. Yet, in 1914, there was very little secrecy. Each side knew the numbers and equipment of thé other, the capacity of its railroads, the number of days required for mobilization of the strategic plans. Despite this almost complete knowledge of each other's strengths, weaknesses, and intentions, all the planning was useless because the political and psychological assumptions were wrong.

54 Today, strategic planning is a far more perilous task than in 1914. There have been several major technological revolutions since the end of World War II. Of the aircraft carrier and the heavy bomber, both of which played a decisive and largely unforeseen role in 1939-1945, one has been practically discarded, the other is being "phased out." For the first time, nations are basing their survival as great powers on tremendous stockpiles of weapons that have never been tried-and, we hope, never will be tried- in battle. The dangers of miscalculation, either strategic or political or both, are vastly increased by this development. The competition between the two major power centers is taking place at many levels. In the field of nuclear strategy, the Soviet Union has made great strides. Yet the Soviet leaders seem to have lost some of the confidence they had in 1956-1957 in their ability to outbuild U. S. strategic power and thereby to take over the domination of the world within a few years. Instead, since around 1958-1960, Khrushchev has been striving to use the very great Soviet nuclear-missile power to destroy the confidence of the United States in its own future and to shake the confidence of America's allies in its ability to stand up for their survival. If the Kremlin could undermine the political solidarity and confidence of the U. S.-led alliance system, American influence would shrink to within the national borders, and the rest of the world, with varying degrees of haste and humiliation, would have to come to terms with the new roles that the Soviet Union or Communist China might deign to assign them. The strong but moderate policy that the U. S. government adopted and held to in the missile crisis of 1962 went far to correct the vague and not so vague doubts that had been undermining confidence in America's might and its determination. On the other hand, the crisis also demonstrated how difficult it is to bring nuclear power to bear in a confrontaron of wills. It should also have dispelled any notion that nuclear threats are useful for any political purpose except that of assuring the national survival. For- tunately for both sides, and for peace, the Soviet leadership, unlike that of Communist China, has also come to the conclusion-or so it appears from numerous Soviet statements—that any large-scale conventional war would also escólate rapidly into nuclear war. In this respect, Soviet analyses seem to me more realistic than some recent Western exercises that conclude that a rather sharp and manageable line can be drawn between conventional and nuclear warfare, and that different ground rules can be laid down and enforced for each. Whether the Soviet leaders will be able to persuade Peking of the dangers of conventional and unconventional aggressions, at least at this unstable stage of the nuclear-missile balance, may determine the prospects for peace in the next years or even months.

55 THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

One of the great unknowns ¡n the present state of world politics ¡s the depth and the consequences of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Too many people, as I see it, have jumped to the conclusión that this quarrel, which has now burst the bounds of Communist decorum, is going to be of great benefit to the non-Communist world, that Soviet and Chínese Communist forces are going to líne up eye-to-eye along the two-thousand-mile frontier, that Moscow and Peking are going to neutralize or perhaps destroy each other, and that then all our problems will be solved without any risk or effort on our part. This, I believe, is a completely unrealistic scenario. Communist China does not have the means to attack the Soviet Union, which could destroy its sources of power in a few hours, even without the use of nuclear weapons. What is really going on is a struggle for dominance over the international Communist movement. Moscow and Peking are like two men pulling a wagón and quarreling over the road to choose. They are pulling the shaft this way and that, but they do not want to destroy the wagón. One main difference between the Moscow and the Peking centers of power lies in their differing estimates of the United States, its power and intentions. The Chínese Communists see that U. S. power is the only major obstacle that stands between them and the conquest of all of maín- land Asia. Sínce America and its allíes are not as strong in'numbers of conventional forces as China, the United States could stop any determined attack by Peking only by using or threatening to use its great nuclear power. The Soviet Union, the Chínese maíntaín, has enough or more than enough nuclear power to forcé the United States to give up the threat of nuclear retaliation, thus clearing the way for Communist China to overrun all of Asia. If the people of non-Communist Asia could once be convinced by Peking that the United States had no further interest or power to support their independence, they would, one by one and with varying degrees of haste, come to terms with the Chínese Communists. For those who might try to hold out, various small-scale incursíons by subversive forces, backed by the threat of Chínese invasión, would put an end to hopes and hesi- tations. The developments in Laos and South Vietnam have demonstrated, ¡n two rather different situatíons, the Communists' ability to carry on a persistent struggle, and símilarly endless conflicts could be launched ¡n other parts of Southeast Asia. There has been, many feel, a certain ambiguíty in Soviet policy toward Communist China's restless ambitions. As the Cuban missile crisis showed, it is to the Soviet advantage as well as ours not to let the bipolar confrontation degeneróte into nuclear war. On the other hand, many

56 observers believe, Peking might not be sorry to see both Russia and Amer- ica eliminated from the power balance for a decade or more. In that span of time. China could build its own Communist empire, to become the strongest power in most of the world. Perhaps the determined American reaction in the Cuban crisis has helped Khrushchev impress on Mao Tse- tung that, although the United States may be "in the long run a paper tiger," in the short run it is "a paper tiger with nuclear teeth." Whether Mao can be persuaded to change his view of the United States to a more realistic one and to moderate his ambitions is perhaps the central issue in the continuing quarrel between Moscow and Peking. The Soviet conduct in Laos since 1960 has a number of puzzling aspects. One possible interpretation of the Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement, in 1962, for "neutralizing" that landlocked country is that it wanted to help the North Vietnamese Communists take over Laos by using "salami tactics," rather than risk a dirpct challenge to U. S.-Thai interests in preventing that. Another view, not incompatible with the first, is that Moscow feared that any large-scale military showdown in Laos would bring in the Chínese Communist forces, thus establishing Chínese rather than Russian preponderance in both Laos and North Víetnam. By an extensión of this interpretation, Moscow may have been engaged in but- tressing Ho's regí me in North Vietnam as a Sovíet-supported buffer agaínst Peking's ambitions to move southward. These various interpretations suggest how difficult it is to arríve at a firm analysis of the implications of Sino-Soviet ¡ockeying for advantage within the Communist grouping of countries—we can no longer speak of a "bloc"—and along ¡ts periphery.

CUBA'S PLACE IN SOVIET STRATEGY

Cuba under Castro has been, on balance, a Soviet victory, and it is easy to understand American impatience with the establishment of a Com- munist political satellite within the Western Hemisphere. Many of our citizens urge strongly that we should and must use nuclear threats against the Soviet Union to compel Moscow to withdraw all its forces and technicians from Cuba and even to forcé the overthrow of the Castro regime. Nevertheless, there are some compensating advantages to U. S. policy from the presence of Soviet forces in Cuba, in addition to the obvious disadvantages. One advantage is that Soviet units have remained and, we hope, will remain in charge of the surface-to-air missiles. By tacit agreement these missiles are not being used against U. S. reconnaissance planes, and this situation permits our planes to carry out a cióse obser- varon of military activities in Cuba. If Castro could get his hands on these antiaircraft missiles, he would probably use them to shoot down our planes,

57 even at the risk of bringing on a fresh nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States or even a nuclear war. So far, Khrushchev has restrained Castro from such a rash course, and we hope he will continué to do so. The presence of foreign troops usually brings with it various degrees of disillusionment and irritation, and Soviet commanders, advisers, and technicians can be especially irritating in dealing with people who are not accustomed to Soviet ways of doing things. There have been reports of friction between Soviet "guests" and Cubans. The continuing presence of Soviet troops reminds all Latín American countries and parties that the acceptance of Soviet protection can turn any country into a military "colony," exploited for Soviet interests and exposed by the Soviet military presence to grave risks of devastation in the first phase of any nuclear war. The role of Soviet troops in Cuba gives greater unity to the Organization of American States and influences many left-of-center groups and parties to a cooler view of Castro. He now seems to many Latín Americans less of a "native revolutionary" and more of a Soviet stooge. Finally, even though Cuba has not fulfilled Castroite and Soviet hopes of becomíng a springboard for a series of Communist revolutions elsewhere in Latín America, it must be supported by Soviet economic assistance. And since the Soviet Union can receive little dírect benefit from imports of Cuban sugar and Havana cigars, the net outflow of Soviet resources is substantial. According to our best calculations, it cost Khrushchev something like $175 millíon in 1962, on balance, to keep Castro's economy afloat, and the unfavorable balance may rise to $450 million in 1963. It is also costing the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe a great deal, especially Czechoslo- vakia. There is no doubt that the very powerful Soviet economy can cope with the problem of rebuilding the Cuban economy, but that was not Khrushchev's purpose in taking Castro under his wing. As Soviet people realize that substantial resources are going into foreign aid programs, at the cost of postponing long-promised improvements in their own Spartan way of life, there is a great deal of grumbling and wry joking among them. None of this reaction represents any threat to Khrushchev, but it does run counter to his desire to have both power and popularity.

THE CHALLENGE TO U. S. POLICY

Even from this brief survey it is clear that Soviet policy has become much more subtle and complex than it was in Stalin's last years; along with that, the considerations that enter into policy decisions have also become more complex. Khrushchev must weigh carefully the limits to which he can go without bringing on a nuclear showdown, as he almost

58 did in October, 1962. He must weigh the rival claims and accusations of Peking against the hopes and fears of newly independent countries, some of which look to Moscow as a possible counterweight to China. All ¡n all, the world scene is at least as complex for Moscow as it ¡s for Washington, and one of ourjobs is to make Soviet decision-making ¡ust as difficult as possible. To meet the competition of a more varied and intelIigent Soviet challenge, we, too, are going to have to pursue a wide variety of policies, and sometimes they will be inconsistent with each other. Even while Khrushchev resorts to nuclear threats to shake the U. S. system of alliances—and we also resort to similar threats in kind-we must make every effort, through exchanges, books, cultural attractions, and other ways, to reach Soviet minds, especially at the more ¡nformed and responsible level. We must make it clear that we respect the many economic and scientific achievements of the Soviet people, as well as their literature and arts, even though we do not lik'e the Communist political system and its openly avowed purposes. We need to review our policies toward Communist China. If it is to the interest of the free world for China to assert a greater degree of independence from Soviet influence, then we should perhaps work for a "two-Chinas" solution, seating both Communist China and Nationalist China in the United Nations, and also relax our embargo against trade with mainland China. We shall need to keep under constant review our purposes and policies in Western Europe. The recovery and "leap forward" of Western Europe is a great success story for American policy, and we have now to accept the fact that Western Europe has ceased to be a poor cousin and is able, as we hoped it would be, to become a partner. There is no time left for me to discuss now the various economic and strategic arrangements through which an integrated Western Europe can help offset Russia's growing power. At the very least, however, we must examine these arrangements patiently with our allies and not throw away our political and moral capital in Western Europe by angry, petulant outbursts of pique. The newly independent countries constitute a third area in which the contest between Soviet purposes and American hopes will be fought out in many small and obscure engagements. Down to about 1960, Khrushchev was expecting to make quick, dramatic, and perhaps decisive gains in the developing countries. Since then, his appraisals have become a good bit more realistic, but his means of action are also growing year by year. When Castro swung Cuba to the Soviet camp, he gave a tremendous boost to Communist morale, and the Soviet Party Program of October, 1961, reflected Khrushchev's hope that many other Cubas would sprout across the map of Latín America, Africa, and Asia. He has deferred but has not abandoned those hopes. At present, Indonesia, Somalia, Ghana, and Brazil appear to be high on the Kremlin's list of political targets.

59 The Soviet government, like the American people, has been learning some new lessons from its experience with programs in the developing countries. It has learned that no one aid program, ñor even many suc- cessive aid programs, will turn a poor and weak people from its own purposes; that educating young people from such countries does not necessarily win their admiration or assure their support; that a people which is backward in its technical and administrative life can still uphold its national pride and will resent any direct effort to tell it how to think and act. Ever since the nineteenth party congress of 1952, Soviet leaders have proclaimed that the struggle for the triumph of Communism can be won in the developing countries. Yet, the outcome of the struggle is far from predetermined, and there are very great assets on the side of the free world. How can we best assert our national purpose of achieving a more stable world, in which nuclear confrontation is no longer a necessity, in which each nation can make its voice heard, and in which all peoples can develop their own human potentials to the best of their abilities? Clearly, in a world that is filled with paradoxes, we must also pursue contradictory policies. We must make every sacrifice in order to deter the use of Soviet nuclear power; we must also make greater efforts to bring the nuclear arms race under control. At a time when our alI¡es can add little to our strategic strength, we must cultívate their strength and encourage their unity, ¡ust because we cannot solve their problems for them by our nuclear power. We need to encourage stronger regional groupings in Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, and non-Communíst Asia so that these peoples can do more to preserve their independence and develop their resources, even if they tread on American toes in the process. In using the wide range of policy instruments that are available to us, we have a special responsibility to exercise more imagination and foresight, and we shall have to make many sacrifices. We cannot predict the outcome, for the contest stretches far into the future. We cannot assume that any one policy, one program, or one appropriation is going to solve our problems. There are some problems that we cannot solve, but only learn to live with them. In this contest, America has great advantages if we recognize and use them. It has the most productive economy in the world, and it supports its foreign policy out of its surpluses, not by sacrificing its necessities of life. America has great strategic power. Yet, it is regarded instinctively by most people, including most people behind the iron curtain, as basically peaceloving, uninterested in ruling or dominating other nations. Above all, the United States and most of its allies stand for a valué which the Soviet Union cannot offer: freedom, respect for human dignity, a belief in liberty

60 as the basic means by which people define their purposes and move to fulfill them by their own decisions. This great asset is one that no dictatorship can offer to its own people at home or to the newly awakened and ambitious peoples of three continents. The prospect before us is neither a comfortable ñor an easy one. It is fraught with dangers and sacrifices. There will be many disappointments and some defeats. The role that we have inherited in the spread of freedom is not going to win us much gratitude, certainly not in our generation. But it expresses the onward march of freedom to which our people have been dedicated since our nation was founded.

61 PANEL DISCUSSION

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

MODERATOR: MRS. DONALD E. CLUSEN President, League of Women Voters of Wisconsin

MRS. CLUSEN: It was interesting to hear one of our speakers say that they all knew each other, but in spite of this there was no collusion in the remarks they were going to make today. I think that that has been most amply demonstrated. We can certainly guarantee that there is no collusion in this panel presentation because they have no idea of what I am going to say, and I have no idea of what they are going to say. I am going to ask each of the gentlemen to ask one question of one of the other gentlemen who addressed you today, limiting the question in scope and the answer in brevity so that we can hopefully get around once. Mr. Harvey, it has been rather long since you had a chance to talk. Inasmuch as you were first this morning, and since you outlined the present State Department's policy in regard to our response to the Soviet challenge, I am going to give you the first opportunity of asking a question or making a comment on something that has been said about the State Department by the other speakers.

MR. HARVEY: I shall not take advantage of this to make another speech. I should like to ask Fred Neal a question that will, however, be suggestive of a speech. The question is this: In your ticking off of instances where we have been in error about the Soviet Union (and I assume that there are others beside myself who would quarrel with some of the instances you cited), I wonder if you do not feel that you have omitted some other cases where we have been wrong as a nation, at least for a period of time, and would you be willing to include the possibility that we were wrong most importantly when we misjudged what the Soviet system and objectives were about? You cited a very interesting statement from Secretary Stimson. Certainly, I agree with you that he

62 was one of our ablest statesmen, but that particular quotation could have reflected a concept of the Soviet Union which was not too realistic. I wonder if you do not perhaps feel that the biggest single mistake we made about the Soviet leaders lay in a failure to appreciate during the latter years of the war and perhaps even before the war that they were out to do us in? And if you should accept that as a mistake on our part, would you not have to allow that perhaps we should be more cautious in our dealing with them than you propose, that we should, say, not ¡ust assume good faith on their part in searching settlements on matters like nuclear disarmament, that we had better be very sure, before we make concessions to them, that they really are not up to that which the rest of us have assumed they are up to, that is, our destruction?

PROF. MOSELY: I agree with Mr. Harvey. During World War II, there was a widespread feeling in this country that, since we were engaged in a war that had been forced upon us and which we considered to be a ¡ust war, the Soviet Union, which was fighting on the same side with us, must likewise share the same goals for which we were fighting. This assumption was, I agree, a very serious misunderstanding of the Soviet purposes. I also feel that one of the factors that explains our deep postwar resent- ment of Soviet policies since 1945 has been the widespread feeling that somehow we had been "had" and a determination not to be "had" again. Because many of the words the Soviet leaders used in many wartime agreements and declarations were "good words," words we wanted to hear, we were all the more dismayed and indignant after the war to discover that these words meant something quite different to the Kremlin, compared with what they meant to us. I also agree that we must be very cautious in dealing with the Soviet Union and look at the various ways in which they may interpret any agreed-upon arrangements. On the other hand, we must recognize and study carefully the interests that the Soviet Union has as a state and as a peculiar type of party regime. It ¡s not realistic for us to demand that the Soviet leaders give up some of those interests ¡ust to win our approv- al. For example, however unjustified and cruel the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe may be and is, we may as well realize that our attacks against that domination are bound to evoke adverse reactions from the Soviet leaders. We often assume that our opinions are best and that other people ought to agree with them. Actually, there are many areas of the world which are not of primary interest to the United States and many questions in which our views will not be decisive. As far as making "concessions"

63 to the Soviet leadership and its ambitions, I would not make any concessions; there may, however, be problems in which both sides or many sides can make adjustments in order to keep those problems manageable. After all, the most vital interest of all mankind is to achieve a sounder basis for peace, or, at least, the avoidance of war, and if we can con- tribute to achieving that interest, we must be prepared to negotiate on many issues. In this sense, "concessions," at least mutual concessions, are a part of the continuing struggle for peace.

MRS. CLUSEN: Mr. Scott, some of the optimism which you expressed this morning in regard to the coming generation of Soviet leaders has been under fire by some of the other speakers. Would you like to reply or ask a question of another speaker?

MR. SCOTT: I want to make a brief minority statement and then ask a question. The minority statement is on the subject of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Not only do I think that it ¡s unlikely that the Soviet Union and Communist China are about to formúlate some sort of agreement amelio- rating the Sino-Soviet conflict, I think that for both the struggle against the other is rapidly becoming the most important single object of their attention and part of their policy. This does not mean that there might not be formulated some sort of temporary adjustment, but if this is the case, I think that the analogy between Napoleon and Alexander would still fit or that the agreements of September of 1939 between the Soviet Union and Germany would be a proper analogy. Such is the dynamism, such is the dynamics of schism, in revolutionary ideological movements like twentieth century Marxism or like Islam in the eighth century or Christendom in any one of several periods, that I think this conflict between the two is bound to assume major proportions. I hasten to add that I agree with at least one of my friends that we would be ill-advised to depend on the Sino-Soviet confl ict to help us solve immediate problems with either of these two nations-problems like Berlín or South Vietnam. Until the Chínese have nuclear weapons, it would be silly of them, ¡t would be irratíonal of them, to risk a nuclear war or a fighting war with the Soviet Union. I do not think that they will, but the struggle, I think, is the dominant fact'or for both. The question I want to ask is directed to Dr. Shulman. If, as Dr. Shulman stated, Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues view the actívities of General DeGaulle during recent weeks as salutary, progressíve expressions of DeGaulle's regional interests, why has the Soviet government

64 been so unmitigatingly hostile? Not only have the diplomatic notes delivered to France in that connection been hostile, but also numerous statements in the Soviet press, which would seem to be cutting the Soviet Union off from the possibility of supporting DeGaulle as a method of getting the Anglo-Saxons out of continental Europe, which is a military objective which one could quite easily believe to be a major one for the Soviet Union.

PROF. SHULMAN: From the middle of the war on, say, 1942 on, the Soviet leaders made clear their hopes that General DeGaulle would perform an important strategic function from their point of view, that he would prevent an anticipated Anglo-American bloc from obtaining a continental bridgehead. For that reason, in 1943, and especially in 1944 with the formalization of the France-Soviet agreement, there was an effort to encourage General DeGaulle because the Russians saw France as a bridge between East and West. This hope ran out essentially in 1947, when it became clear to the French that Soviet support for French objectives, particularly in the Ruhr, was merely verbal, and the Russians were obliged to recognize that French interests lay heavily with the West. Since that time, as General DeGaulle has been in and out of power, the Soviets have been caught in an ambiguous position. They have at various times supported General DeGaulle in the expectation, as I suggested, that he would perform this service for them, not intentionally, but because his conception of the national grandeur of France, essentially his strong nationalist position, would prevent the degree of integration in Western Europe and the degree of cohesion around American hegemony for which we were striving. This was clearly evident, for example, during the early stages of the Algerian war when the Soviets were very cautious about giving strong support to the Algerian Independence Movement, until they were forced to do so by the threat of the Chinese giving more m i I i - tant assistance. During the period, for example, of the defeat of E.D.C. (European Defense Community) in Europe, the Soviets and the French Communists were closely associated with extreme nationalist movements in France in a common effort to bring down the movement toward unification and a!Manee of Western Europe. From the point of view of French heavy industry, this unification movement would limit their freedom of action, and from the point of view of the Soviet Union, it would give the Americans a sol id military base in Western Europe. Now, in this most recent action, the Soviets have a dilemma. On the one hand they have recognized, and have said so, that General DeGaulle's position in denying British entry into the Common Market served an

65 objectively progressive function, but there are two other considerations that have diminished their ¡oy in this development. One is the fear that one of the consequences of the new Bonn-Paris Treaty may be to assist the West Germans toward the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability, and the severity of Soviet attacks both on Paris and on Bonn have been directed largely at this question of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons, especial ly to the West Germán government. This is a very serious consideration from the Soviet point of view. I think that it is not merely a manipulative point. I think that much that the Soviets have said about Germán militarism has been disproportionate to their actual concern, but I believe possible West Germán acquisition of a nuclear capability represents a genuine concern on their part. The second consideration is, I think, that they may have second thoughts about whether or not it is a good thing to deny British entry into the Common Market. They may share the view which many Europeans have had of British entry into the Common Market, that it would slow down the rate of políticaI integratíon in Western Europe and act as a counterweíght to the Germán dominance in Western Europe. It may be that they have reconsidered whether or not this action is beneficial over the long run, whether it may not result in a German-dominated Western Europe. These, I think, are the reasons why the Soviets have not exploited DeGaulle's position as much as they otherwise might have done.

MRS. CLUSEN: Mr. Neal, do you have any comments or questions of other members of the panel?

PROF. NEAL: I have a brief comment, and then I have a question to ask of Mr. Harvey. As Mr. Shulman indicated, in speaking of Soviet theories about Germany, the Soviet Union is such that it can be very genuinely, however mistakenly, afraid of the intentions and political-military activities of other powers. It seems to me that that is very true, and one of the problems is that we do not recognize this, and they tend not to recognize the fact that we have genuine fears about them. I recall once in about 1958, I think, when I was in Washington, I went to the White House to see a friend of mine who was not working on foreign policy problems. In the course of the conversation, he said, "Tell me, do the Russians really have fears about the United States, or is this something they just say to justify their dictatorship?" I said, "No, I think they really have fears."

66 I then went across Jackson Park up to the Soviet Embassy to see the charge d'affaires, an oíd friend of mine who had been a very júnior officer in the Soviet Foreign Service when I was in the State Department. In the course of our conversaron, he said, "The Americans aren't really afraid of the Soviet Union, are they? Isn't that ¡ust something they say to ¡ustify the armament expenditures and keep them from having a depres- sion?" I said, "No, I think they are really afraid." I was wondering if Mr. Harvey thought that that was a valid statement of the case, and if so, it did not mean that, in the interests of the things that we desire to get for our own well-being, this is the thing that has got to be constantly borne in mind and allowance for it made?

MR. HARVEY: Certainly, I think one of the problems we face right now is one of communication, and I have no *doubt that among the Russian people especially and perhaps also among the Russian leaders there are misunderstandings of us, that they really do not know what we are up to. They misread our actions and our statements and so on, and I think as Professor Mosely, as I gathered from his statement, that we ought to do all we can to improve communications. We ought to have exchanges; when there is any opportunity really to sit down and talk with good purpose, we should do that. I have no doubt again that perhaps sometimes we do not read the Russians as correctly as we should, and it is eminently possible that sometime there will come a break, and we may miss it because of our inability to understand them. I am really posing what to me is a very basic problem now. We are working on the assumption, in the faith, with reason, I think, that at some point the Russians are going to find this whole business of waging cold war too expensive and too unproductive, and will find the light not worth the candle. I do not believe for a moment that they are simply going to change their nature, but that because of the pressures, of the burdens, of carrying on this cold war, and without getting any results, and with our policy of denying them things, putting them into situations where they risk everything at almost any given moment, we shall begin to get a break. Now, I am like Professor Mosely. I see this as a very long-term process, and I think above everything else that we should not prematurely change our own policies; but I do think that we ought very often, and I think that this is such an occasion, look at the situation, see whether or not some of these things that are happening really do not have some far-reaching implications. If we do see something that we feel is concrete, I think that we should seize upon it; and here I would assure John Scott that he is not a minority of one in his interpretation of this thing

67 between the Soviet Union and China as something that may very well be decisive in its import.

PROF. MOSELY: I have a question for Mr. Shulman. He referred to the recent efforts of the Soviet Union to develop a new system of regional economic planning in order to bind the Communist-dominated satellites in East Central Europe tighter to itself. Last summer the U. S. Congress voted to take away from Poland and Yugoslavia the most-favored-nation trading rights which they had acquired after long negotiations with the United States, and after making concessions that we accepted as satisfactory. I want to ask Mr. Shulman whether he feels this new policy will have favorable effects for our side, or whether it is not helping the Soviet Union consolídate its dominance over East Central Europe?

PROF. SHULMAN: I feel strongly that the action of the Congress was of material assistance to the Soviet Union, lt was taken together with one other action, an anticipation of the development of the Common Market and its inability, at that time, to make provisíon for economic relations between Yugoslavia and Poland and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria and Western European markets and sources of raw materials. The anticipatory effect of that possible reduction of outlet has had a considerable effect in forcing both Yugoslavia and Poland more tightly into the Soviet economic embrace and has activated COMECON, the Soviet instrument of coordination. This has been strongly reinforced by the action of the Congress in cuttíng off these special economic relations with these countries. Our relations with these countries have clearly involved a balance of considerations—not all the considerations point in one direction—but it seems to me the means of keeping them in some sort of a midpoint, at least not forcing them tightly into the Soviet embrace, was of great valué to us, and it was a great tragedy that we lost it.

68 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION: What do you see as the short-run policy between the Soviet Union and Communist China? V/hat do you see os the long-run policy?

PROF. SHULMAN: In brief, and to be somewhat more categorical about this than I think is really warranted by the evidence, my own guess is that the Soviet Union and the Chínese are moving toward a formal reconciliation of their dispute despite the recent sharp pronouncements that have been coming out of China in particular. It seems to me that in the exchanges of the last few months there has been an increasingly defensive and scholastic tone and an effort at self-justification, somewhat within a defensive framework, that seems to plead for at least a formal reconciliation, as being necessary in their mutual interests. I say formal reconci liation. It would be quite possible from the statements of both parties to put together a statement about support of Marxism-Leninism and opposition to all forms of deviation to which both sides could sub- scribe. However, I gather that in the background of the active efforts that are now going on behind the scenes to come to an agreement on a formal statement there are a number of serious organizational problems and economic problems. One of them is the question of what to do about Yugoslavia. In the present period, the Chinese are insisting that one of the conditions for a reconciliation be a denunciation of the Yugoslavs by the Russians, which the Russians are clearly unwilling to make. The Soviets feel that the present degree of rapprochement that has been brought about between the Yugoslavs and themselves is in their interest, and they are not willing to sacrifice it. The other major issue in the background is the economic relation between the two countries. The Soviet trade with China has fallen to a very low figure, but it is still vital to the Chinese. The Soviets clearly feel that they have leverage on the Chinese, that the threat of further curtail- ment or promise of possible expansión of their assistance to or their trade with the Chinese may serve to bring about a change in the Chinese attitude. The Chinese so far have not been willing to yield to so material- istic a pressure. There is a third problem that deserves to be put on a par with these two, and that is organizational: which party should be dominant in which parts of the world. There are conflicts going on-quiet, desperóte conflicts-

69 within the Communist parties in many parts of the world, including Latin America, in which the militant wings of local parties are looking to China and the manipulative political wings essentially looking to Moscow for assistance and inspiration. Generally, the inspiration has come mainly from China, because it has suited the revolutionary temper of these movements, but the Soviets are in a much better position to provide practical assistance, and this has created an ambivalence in many parties. These issues remain to be resolved and are, at present, obstacles to formal reconciliation. My own guess is that some sort of an accommodation may be reached and that possibly a formal reconciliation will be achieved. As to the long-term relationship, I think that the elements of conflict in the relationship would still be very great and would not be likely to be resolved even by a formal reconci liation. There are conflicts on a number of different planes. There are conflicts of national interest; there are specific territorial points of conflict; there are problems in the economic relationship—the question of the extent to which the Soviets should assist the Chínese in their industrial development, which involves a drain on the Soviet Union of Ítems which are in short supply. There is the problem of the extent to which the Soviets should assist the Chínese in attaining a modern military capability both in nuclear explosives and in means of delivery. There are also the ideological questíons, to which I referred, which involve not only a general assessment of the state of the world at present but also strategy and tactics—how far to press revolutionary possibílities in various parts of the world and how far to take rísks in situations that ¡nvolve a military confrontaron. There are also the organizational problems connected with which party shall be dominant in which parts of the world. I think that those elements of conflict are likely to persist even if a temporary accommodation is reached and are likely to be a persistent restraint on the freedom of action of the Soviet leadership over a long period. Beyond that, I think, one cannot say. It seems to me that the longer-term projections that argüe that the Chínese population pressure and so on will drive the Soviets eventually into the Western camp or to seek a modus vivendi with the West are largely misleading. I believe that the sense of being back to back agaínst hostile surroundings creates a common bond which ¡s likely to persist despite these differences to which I referred.

QUESTION: What can we as United States citizens do to assist the long- term win goal of the United States?

70 MR. HARVEY: I think that I could only repeat here some remarks the President made in an interview he had ¡ust before the year ended, in which he praised the American people for what they had done, the sacrifices they had made, the fact that they had been will¡ng to give up much of what they would like to have in order to carry on this struggle. He spoke with obviously great sincerity about the real accomplishments of the American people up to the present, and I think that that is the answer for the future. If, in my earlier statement, I ended on a note of optimism, that optimism was based on the assumption that we shall elect to continué to do the things that we have to do, and that, of course, comes down to saying that the American people will continué to elect, to be willing, to do what the government asks them to do. And I think that that is the answer. We must go on with this for a year, a decade, however long it is necessary. And I am sure that we will.

QUESTION: Is the Soviet Union interested in the underdeveloped areas in order to deny materia Is and markets to the United States? What is the interest of the United States in this policy?

PROF. SHULMAN: The implication of the question seems to me correct-that the main emphasis in Soviet policy in the present period toward the underdeveloped countries is one of denial. The Soviet Union does not need raw materials or, at the present stage of its development, additional untrained populations who will need to be fed and trained. Its policy is not in the first instance an acquisitive one in regard to the underdeveloped areas but, in the present period, short term, a policy of denying these areas to the West, both the United States and Western Europe, in the expectation that by blocking these channels the Soviet Union will help weaken the advanced industrial countries. In the Soviet outlook in the short term, the priority target is the orientation of the advanced industrial countries. For instance, if West Germany, which is now oriented on Western Europe, be- gins to look toward the East for its markets, in the short term its politics can decisively affect the balance of power in a way that Africa and Asia cannot. Over a longer period, of course, a different perspective holds, but for the present it does seem to me that this is a policy of denial. It is achieved largely through cooperation with the national bourgeois, for example, giving Sukarno support, and not primarily encouraging revolution in these areas through massive aid to the local Communists. When one considers what implication this has for the United States, it seems to me we should not consider the problem in the same terms in which the Soviets look at it. Our problem is not so much the question of assuring our raw materials sources, although that is an important factor. I think

71 American ¡nterests can be defined as being furthered by the continued independence of these countries. I think our economy can survive even if it should happen that both markets and raw materials were cut off in these areas. The effect would be serious, but not be fatal. Our interests really do require that these areas in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America develop orderly and effective governments in their own terms, following their own cultural patterns, their own adaptations, whatever seems to suit their own situation according to the judgment of their own leaders. Our interests are to assist them in this process of orderly development, political as well as economic, with the primary aim of assisting them to remain independent. If they can do that, I think that we shall have sufficient access to raw materials and markets for our purposes. Above all, I think we shall assist in developing a world environment which will refute Soviet anticipations and which will, in the long run, oblige the Soviets to give up their expectations of the spread of their system and their control pattern to these areas.

QUESTION: In view of Mr. Harvey's statement that in the past fifteen years we have not done so badly, could we have done worse in the light of losses in the Baltic countries, in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, in Korea, and, recently, in Cuba?

MR. HARVEY: That is not an unexpected question. I think that we have to break it down a little as we look at those fifteen years, and let us begin with the beginning. At the conclusión of the war, we as a people expected a certa in sort of world. We were perhaps somewhat naive. We had policies accordingly. A great deal happened to us and happened very rapidly. Of the areas that you ticked off, if you recall, the Balkans, East Germany, the Baltic countries, the East European countries generally, or even the conquest of China, all of those things were really aftermaths of the war. They resulted from the Soviets taking an advantage of the forces they had bu¡ It up and of the common victory, and they got away with very much very quickly. We were rather slow to react. We refused to believe for a good long time that what was happening was actually happening. We refused as a people to face up to something that was very, very difficult for us to face up to. I recall that when Sir Winston Churchill made his speech at Fulton, Missouri, and emphasized what was taking place in the world, the general reaction in this country was one of disbelief and even one of, say, irritation at Mr. Churchill for having said these unpleasant things. Actually, I guess you can date our reaction, and I shall use that term, to this new threat from President Truman's statement to Congress in March of 1947 when he launched what has come to be called the Truman

72 Doctrine. From then on we were alert to the problem, and we did try to deal with it. Since that time there have been losses, certainly. In the case of Korea, we saved South Korea. Of course, we could not save North Korea because it was, as a result of the war, militarily under Soviet control. The only way that we could get it was through war. In the case of Vietnam, we faced a situation where there was a war that had begun even as the war against Japan ended, that looked as if it was going to result in the loss of all of Vietnam and after that all of Southeast Asia; and the general feeling was, on the part of a great many people, that there was no power on earth through which we could save Southeast Asia without a great war with the Soviet Union. But we did save much. We saved much of Vietnam, and we saved Southeast Asia as a whole. I shall not try to dodge the seriousness of Cuba, but that is something which, I have absolute faith, will be taken care of in the course of time, but nevertheless it has been a loss. If, however, you look at what the Soviets have tried to do and the Soviets in conjunction with the Chinese, I think that you can feel that we have really held the line and held it effectively; we have avoided much that it once seemed we would be unable to avoid: a sweep of Soviet power over Western Europe which was devasted by the war, over the Middle East which was itself powerless to stand against the Soviet power; and we have saved those places. Then, and while we have done that, I believe that we have put the Soviets in a position where they cannot any longer really hope to effect their aims. And here I am taking advantage of a question to make a tiny, little bit of a speech, and it is connected with Marshall Shulman. Marshall said that when I finished he felt optimistic and then, after John Scott's statement, not so optimistic. Well, actually after John Scott and Marshall finished, I felt more optimistic than I did when I finished and in spite of some of the points Marshall was trying to make. Now, let me recall ¡ust one thing: What is our object? What is it that we want? And I think I can answer that question. We want the Russians, we want those people who are controlled by the Russians, and we want the Chinese, although that is not as important right at the moment, to become normal people. Now we should like for them to change completely, to become ¡ust exactly like us, but that is not really the object. Our object is not to destroy the Soviet Union or to conquer it or put it under control of Americans or Germans or anyone else; it is that they simply give up this unnatural war that they have declared against us. If they are willing, as Marshall Shulman states, to adjust themselves, to adjust their sights, to adapt and adapt and adapt—and if you stop to remember how he said they adapted, in every case along the lines which at least encourage us to believe that they may become normal people-then I think that we can feel that our job is being done very well.

73 The Secretary of State in a speech at Davidson, North Carolina, said something like this: "Now, let us think what it is here that we have. The Russians talk about peace. Well, what have they done? They have declared war. At any moment, if they will cali off that war, we shall have peace, and that is what we are seeking to achieve." Now, if within the Soviet Union the second generation of Soviet people or the third generation turn out to be like we are, concerned with our own problems, well and good. If they produce 100 mi Ilion tons of steel, well, I think it might hurt our pride a little bit if we produce only 90 mi Ilion tons, but how is that going to destroy us or even hurt us? We at one time produced 120 million tons of steel when they produced 9, and it did not bring disaster to them. Now, if they shift their sights with regard to the underdeveloped countries, if they begin to have policies with regard to them which will make it possible for them to tolerate leaders who are interested in developing those countries, leaders who are interested in keeping those countries independent, I think we can be satisfied. Actually I do not think, to be perfectly frank, that the changes have been as great as Marshall Shulman suggests, and I am not as completely confident that the third generation will devour the revolution as John Scott is, but I am encouraged by their saying it. I do firmly believe that over a period of time, and I do not think it has to be too great a time, either because of the impossibility of the Soviet- offensive against the rest of the world achieving its purposes outside, the great cost of it, or because of the problems that John Scott pointed out so well that are arising inside the country, these people will find this particular game an impossible game, will be brought to be a normal people, and will bring to an end this unnatural war. And it is on that surmise that my whole thesis is based and not that the Soviet system will collapse.

QUESTION: We frequently complain of the ¡ntransigence at the conference table of the Soviets. Is ¡t possible that they view us in the same way? And as an illustration, what would be the harm in going along with their proposition concerning a limitation in the test-ban contacts, of going along with their view of limiting the inspection?

MR. SCOTT: I lack the expertise to go into detail on the question of the test-ban discussions, but the number of seismic experiences in the Soviet Union in a given year is in the hundreds. It was a great concession on our part to agree to the limitation of on-site inspections to 20 or 18 and now down to maybe 8 We have already gone Very far. Now, if you want to go further and say, "Well, if we've gone that far, why not agree to three?"

74 We could, and I suppose we might. lt would leave the test ban pretty much uncontrolled, but maybe this would be a good thing, too. I feel, however, that it would not be. lt would be more than a concession. lt would be a capitulation, and it would probably be diplomatically undesirable. There is one other point that I think is germane, and that is that at the present time the economy of the United States and of the West is functioning substantially better than the economy of the Soviet Union. We can afford economic effort directed to space research and to armaments better than they. This is an area, therefore, of pressure. Thus, for us to agree to any substantial disarmament on, to us, unfavorably discriminatory terms would be to sacrifice a position in our conflict with the Soviet Union which I think should only be done if there are very compelling reasons to do so, and I do not know of any such compelling reasons.

QUESTION: Our attention has been focused on Cuba for many months. Tbe manner ¡n which we responded to the Soviet challenge there has caused great partisan debate. There are many views. lt is very difficult for a citizen to get the facts, both with respect to "the air-cover debate" and "did we wait too long?" Did we handle it ¡ust right? Is there still a problem there? Should we be doing things now that have not been done? Are there things we should do in the future? Touching upon other aspects of the subject, such as commentators' reports that we handled it with ¡ust the proper delicacy, that we did not rub Khrushchev's nose in Cuba and that if we had, it might have toppled him in the Kremlin and brought to power oíd Stalinists who are more warlike and aggressive, with the result that we could have had a worse problem, where do we stand on Cuba today? Should we do something more? If so, what?

MR. HARVEY: I think that I could safely say, since the Secretary of State said it three or four days ago, that a Communist regime in Cuba is clearly incompatible with the interests of this nation and other nations of this hemisphere and that it is a matter of paramount importance that the regime that is there now be eliminated in the course of time. We cannot afford to be complacent about this, and we must do the things that are possible within the framework of the way we operate to get rid of Castro and Soviet presence in this hemisphere. We have, I think, greater unanimity between ourselves and the other American republics over this than we have over almost any question. I think that this is a serious matter now and will be a serious matter as long as the Communist regime endures, and I would think that as a nation we would certainly have to deal with it.

75 PROF. SHULMAN: There are so many different aspects of this problem that I want to select just two. Cuba has a dual character as an international problem: (1) its intrinsic importance, its location, and the particular circumstances of Cuba and (2) the Cuban episode as an instance in the political conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the first character, it seemed to me vitally ¡mportant that the United States make clear that ¡t would not accept the ¡mposition of Soviet missiles there. I suggested in the main part of my talk that from the Soviet point of view the goal of that operation was to use its medium-range missile capability (which ¡t had in great abundance, in contrast, apparently, to its stockpile in the intercontinental category) to affect American attitudes and American political behaviour. The anticipation was that if the movement were successful and brought about a weak, dilatory, or uncertain reaction from the United States, this then would have an effect on a number of other problems, particularly in Berlín. It seemed to me essential that the United States respond firmly, as it did do, in making clear that it would not accept such missiles in that area. Unfortunately, as a country we are not very practiced in living through crises like this, and the moment the crisis was over, we began to talk about it a lot and say we really did not mean what we meant; we began to explain who did what during the 24-hour period, who slept where, who was for what, and who was against what, which I think has been disastrous. I think that it has been shameful. It is part of our innocence as a country and perhaps part of the immaturity of the administration. It weakens the effect of our earlier resolution at the time of the crisis itself. The worst thing that we could do if we really believe that Khrushchev was in difficulty is make it clear that he had backed down unnecessarily, that we were not resolute, and that we did not know whether we were going to invade after all or not. I do not think that the picture of Khrushchev with his back to the wall under pressure of the militant faction is supported by any evidence,whatsoever. It seems to me that this was clearly a probé from Khrushchev's point of view. It was based on his estímate that we would not react, or would not react effectively, and he was in a position to dis- engage when it became clear that this was necessary. In general, the lesson that I draw from this is applicable to other issues, that it is not always the immediate locus of the problem that is ¡mportant. For example, if Berlín is not most significantly regarded ¡n its local context, the particular circumstances of access to Berlín could be resolved by some sort of a formula. What makes it signifícant is the way that ¡t ¡s posed, as ¡n November, 1958, for example, and as ¡t has been posed ¡ntermittently since then. It constítutes a challenge of political will, as part of a general political offensive, and the way we respond to ¡t

76 has an effect on our entire political alliance. It affects all the people whose necks are on the block, whose fate depends upon our capability and our will and our resolve to act. The prime significance, I think, of the Berlin issue has been as a test of our understanding of the character of the political conflict in which we are engaged, and not simply the local problem. This became evident to us in Korea. Our decisión be- forehand had been that Korea was not worth defending in a general war. As it developed, the circumstances and the way in which the issue was posed became the predominant question, and our response grew out of the character of the challenge rather than any strategic significance of the area involved. This is the lesson I would emphasize as an ¡mportant aspect of the Cuban episode.

MR. SCOTT: I shall start by saying that I take for granted the seriousness of the military danger which Soviet presence constitutes for the security of the United States. I do not know enough about it to have any opinion as to how we should best elimínate it. I do, however, want to say something about another aspect of the Cuban challenge and in the same context make a comment on the subject of this whole discussion today, namely the Soviet challenge. When we undertook the Monroe Doctrine as the responsibility of keeping other people out of Latin America, the converse side of this, that we should assume certain responsibilities in Latin America, has not always been carried out as well as it might have been—and in Cuba particularly. Since 1898, we have had very specific responsibilities in Cuba, and we have fulfilled them miserably. The economy of the country was a one-crop economy. Half or so of the working forcé was unemployed half of the time. Living standards were very low. The corruption and dishonesty among a series of leaders in Cuba were such that the ordinary Cuban got very little out of the bounty of Cuba in the form of both sugar and tobacco, for the production of which Cuba was very well equipped. These circumstances led to a sociological problem and crisis in Cuba, which, if the Soviet Union had never existed, would almost certainly have resulted in some kind of revolutionary situation. And if we think we are having trouble now with Cuba, if the same thing happens next year in Brazil, which is not at all impossible, multiply the Cuban trouble by twenty- or thirtyfold, and you will get an idea of how that is going to look. We have south of us a whole continent with nearly 200 million people, whose population increase has been running probably ahead of the gross national product increase, meaning that the average Latin American has been getting poorer every year than he was the year before.

77 This, in the presence of an American economy where we spend 9 bi11ion dollars a year to limit our own agricultural production, where we limp along with a 2.6 or a 2.8 per cent growth rate, where we failed to utilize last year and the year before nearly half of our steel capacity, is on our part a dereliction which is, I think, as important a challenge as the Soviet challenge. I think that we cannot afford to discuss the Soviet challenge without at the same time thinking of what a Marxist would cali the subjective factors which have at least as great a bearing on policies and on the future of our policies.

PROF. NEAL: I do not like a Communist regime in Cuba, but I do not think that this is of the essence. What I think is of the essence is the military presence of the Soviet Union in Cuba, and I think, even if the Soviet Union does not have offensive weapons there, this is very disturbing. I do not think that you can really discuss this, however, without thinking about American bases elsewhere. It would be very nice if the United States could just go ahead and have bases wherever it wanted and nobody else would be allowed to have bases near us and that would be the situation. But it is not the situation any more. Two can play at that game like everything else in international relations. The time is past unfortunately when we can do it and say that other people cannot do it. I find the Soviet military presence in Cuba very disturbing, and it seems to me that we should bend all of our efforts to trying to get them out of there, and one of these things involves, I think, the whole reconsideration of foreign bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

PROF. MOSELY: These issues have been covered very eloquently by my colleagues, and I have only one point to add. The issue of Cuba is not a completely black-and-white one, and it is a great disservice to our unity of action when American opinion takes sides sharply on whether we should or should not invade Cuba tomorrow. We face a very serious problem with respect to Cuba and Soviet policy there. It can still lead to a nuclear war. We also need to consider whether we really benefit by rehashing all of the individual steps that were or were not taken during a crisis of vast danger last October. Sometimes, when we beat our breasts and rehearse all the things we should or might have done differently, I get the feeling that many Ameri- cans suffer from delusions of omnipotence and that we are supposed to feel responsible for anything, anywhere, that does not turn out just as we should like it to. We have great resources, but we are far from omnipotent. Be- cause our resources are limited, and our ability to shape events is also

78 limited, we have to consider how to use our resources in the most effective way ¡n order to move toward our major goals. One of the most important resources of a great power is the confidence of other nations in its basic purposes, as well as ¡n its strength. By our heated discussions about what we did last October, in the confrontaron with Soviet power over the missiles in Cuba, we run the risk of dissi- pating a large part of the political and moral capital our country won by its courageous and moderate stand. As things stand in the contest of today for shaping the world of tomorrow, we cannot afford to throw away any of our resources. We must learn not to be extravagant with our political and moral capital, to which so many nations look for wise leadership and firmness of will.

79 RESOURCE MATERIALS

Prepared by Reference Department The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Library

American Association for the Advancement of Science. Soviet Science; a Symposium. Washington: American Association for the Advance- ment of Science, 1952. 108 pages.

Barghoorn, Frederic C. The Soviet Cultural Offensive; the Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960. 353 pages.

Barnett, A. Doak. Communist China and Asia; Challenge to American Policy. New York: Harper, 1960. 575 pages.

Bauer, Raymond A., and others. How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes. Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1956. 274 pages.

Berliner, Joseph S. Soviet Economic Aid: the New Aid and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries. New York: Praeger, 1958. 232 pages.

Boorman, Howard L., and others. Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains. New York: Harper, 1957. 227 pages. Bowers, Faubion. Broadway, U.S.S.R.; Ballet, Theatre, and Entertain- ment in Russia Today. New York: T. Nelson, 1959. 227 pages. Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. The Permanent Purge; Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. 256 pages. The Soviet Bloc-Unity and Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. 470 pages.

Counts, George S. The Challenge of Soviet Education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957. 330 pages.

80 Crankshaw, Edward. Khrushchev's Russia. Rev. ed. New York: Penguin, 1962. 183 pages.

Cressey, George B. Soviet Potentials; a Geographic Appraisal. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962. 232 pages.

DeWitt, Nicholas. Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R. Washington: National Science Foundation, 1961. 856 pages. Fainsod, Merle. How Russia Is Ruled. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 684 pages.

Field, Mark G. Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. 266 pages.

Gaitskell, Hugh. The Challenge of Co-existence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. 114 pages.

Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. New York: Praeger, 1958. 283 pages.

Granick, David. The Red Executive; a Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry. New York: Doubleday, 1960. 334 pages.

Gunther, John. Inside Russia Today. Rev. ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. 604 pages.

Hazard, John N. The Soviet System of Government. Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. 262 pages.

Hunt, Robert N. The Theory and Practice of Communism, an Introduction. 5th rev. ed. New York: Macmillan, 1957. 286 pages.

Kertesz, Istvan, ed. The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956. 463 pages.

Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Speaks; Selected Speeches, Articles and Press Conferences, 1949-1961; edited with commentary by Thomas P. Whitney. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963. 466 pages.

Kolarz, Walter. Religión in the Soviet Union. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961. 518 pages. Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza. The New Soviet Society; Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. With annotations and an introduction by Herbert Ritvo. New York: The New Leader, 1962. 251 pages.

Leyda, Jay. Kino, a History of the Russian and Soviet Film. New York: Macmillan, 1960. 493 pages.

81 Lippmann, Walter. The Communist World and Ours. Boston: Little, Brown, 1959. 56 pages.

Mayo, Henry B. Democracy and Marxism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 364 pages.

Mehnert, Klaus. Soviet Man and His World. New York: Praeger, 1961. 310 pages.

Miller, Wright W. Russians as People. New York: Dutton, 1961. 205 pages.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. Terror and Progress, U.S.S.R.: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. 261 pages.

Mosely, Philip E. The Kremlin and World Politics. New York: Vintage Books, paperback, 1960. 557 pages.

The Soviet Union, 1922-1962: A FOREIGN AFFAIRS Reader. New York: Praeger, 1963. 497 pages.

Neal, Fred Warner. U. S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union. Santa Barbara, California: Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961. 60 pages.

Olkhovsky, Andrei V. Music under the Soviets; the Agony of an Art. New York: Praeger, 1955. 427 pages.

Roberts, Henry L. Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects. New York: Harper, 1956. 251 pages.

Schapiro, Leonard B. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York: Random House, 1960. 631 pages.

Schuman, Frederick L. Russia Since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics. New York: Knopf, 1957. 508 pages. Schwartz, Harry. Russia's Soviet Economy. 2nd ed. 'New York: Prentice- Hall, 1954. 682 pages. Scott, John. Behind the Urals, An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942. 279 pages.

Crisis in Communist China; a Report on Red China and Her Neighbors to the Publisher of TIME, The Weekly News- magazine. New York: TIME, 1963. 152 pages.

Shulman, Marshall D. Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 320 pages.

82 , and others. U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe; a Study Prepared at the Request of U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960. 80 pages.

Strausz-Hupe, Robert, and others. A Forward Strategy for America. New York: Harper, 1961. 451 pages. Protracted Conflict. New York: Harper, 1959. 203 pages.

Struve, Gleb. Soviet Russian Literature 1917-50. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951. 413 pages.

United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies. 3 parts. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959. 616 pages.

Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, Hearings Together with Compilation of Studies, 87th Congress, 2nd session, December 10 and 11, 1962. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962. 744 pages.

Vernadsky, George. A History of Russia. 4th ed. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1954 . 499 pages.

Walsh, Warren B. Russia and the Soviet Union, a Modern History. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. 640 pages.