Did Hunger Defeat the Confederacy?
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Andrew F. Smith DID HUNGER DEFEAT THE CONFEDERACY? etters, diaries, newspapers, and Southern Scarcity governmental communiques Prior to the Civil War, the prairies of the written in the South during the Midwest were opened for settlement, and L Americans began to convert vast new areas into Civil War increasingly mention food agricultural land. At the same time, the Mississippi shortages, hunger, and fears of famine River system provided Midwesterners with an easy as the war progressed. Reminiscences route over which to send their agricultural goods written after the war concur with to the South. As a result, it became less costly these contemporary accounts. As Basil and more efficient for the plantation owners to Gildersleeve, a Confederate officer and purchase food from Midwestern farmers than to grow it themselves.2 During the two decades later a classics professor at Johns Hopkins before the war, the Midwest thus supplied SOWING AND University, wrote retrospectively: “Hunger considerable food to the South. REAPING. Left: “Southern was the dominant note of life in the When the war began, the Federal women hound their men Confederacy, civil as well as military.”1 government imposed a blockade on the on to rebellion.” Right: Confederacy to stop the export of cotton and “Southern women feeling Why did the South—the preeminent the effects of rebellion and agricultural region of the nation—suffer the import of military equipment and supplies into states that had seceded. The blockade had creating bread riots.” from hunger, and what effect did this have (Frank Leslie’s Newspaper, a crucial unintended consequence: it greatly May 23, 1863) on the outcome of the Civil War? reduced the amount of foodstuffs going into the 40 NORTH & SOUTH MAY 2011・VOL.13・NUMBER 1 DID HUNGER DEFEAT Confederacy. policies also contributed to decreased food Confederate leaders were well aware of the production. Impressment (confiscating South’s reliance on imported food, and from agricultural goods to feed the troops), for THE CONFEDERACY? the beginning of the war, they encouraged instance, discouraged Southern farmers from Southerners to increase the production of growing surplus food. Meanwhile, Southern Former Confederate staples. Plantations, powered by slaves, answered economic policies produced hyperinflation, officer Basil Lanneau the call by decreasing cotton production which made food hoarding and speculation Gildersleeve wrote after the and increasing food crops. As a result, food inevitable. The most rational economic behavior war that “Hunger was the dominant note of life in the production on southern plantations soared was to buy and store commodities, whose values Confederacy, civil as well as during the first year of the conflict. It was a at least kept pace with inflation. Financially, it well as military.” different story on smaller farms, however. With was in the best interest of those with Confederate a large percentage of southern men under arms, currency to exchange it as quickly as possible for there were far fewer farm laborers to work the commodities, which could be stored and sold at land. As agricultural historian Charles Ramsdell a later time for more money. wrote of Southern agriculture, “There were large Because the Union blockade prevented coastal sections of the country—the small farm sections, shipping and Union gunboats patrolled rivers, primarily—almost bare of agricultural labor. railroads took on a crucial role for transporting The result was a marked decline in production.”3 goods, troops and military equipment. Before Moreover, as Federal armies steadily gained the war, the South had imported virtually all of control of Confederate territory, many food its railroad equipment. When the war began the producing areas were cut off, contributing to an Confederacy thus had few factories that could even greater decline in total food production. build train engines, rolling stock, rail track or The war also devastated agricultural areas still the machinery and equipment needed to sustain within the Confederacy—such as northern the region’s transportation needs. Moreover, Virginia, much of Louisiana, and northern the Confederate government made no effort to Mississippi— and this too reduced Southern launch such efforts nor did it encourage private food production. To avoid the fighting, enterprise to do so. Early in the conflict the plantation owners near Union lines moved their South also failed to centralize its railroads so that households and slaves further into the interior, they might run more efficiently, and it did not which removed yet more productive agricultural encourage blockade runners to bring in heavy land from cultivation and also brought equipment for railroads, when doing so might more hungry mouths deeper into the South. have made a difference. Meanwhile, slaves who remained on plantations The Confederacy did appoint a railroad czar became less willing to work, especially if who had little authority or power. In December plantation owners and their overseers were away 1861 he requested that the Confederate fighting the war. Other slaves headed for Union government exempt skilled railroad men lines, seeking whatever opportunities were from conscription, and supply much needed available. By the war’s end, the total number of equipment to repair the railroads. If this were former slaves behind Union lines numbered one not done, he warned, “the railroads will very million, many of whom joined the Union army soon be quite unable to meet requirements of or worked on Union-controlled plantations.4 Government.” More than a year later, in April Beginning in the second year of the war, the loss of agricultural areas and the loss of farm laborers began to affect agricultural production. Bad weather added to the Confederacy’s subsistence problems by significantly decreasing grain production in the South. Less grain meant Cotton production on less feed for animals, which caused a decrease in plantations was curbed, and meat production. the production of staples expanded. But no means Weather, refugees and loss of agricultural was found to get the excess land weren’t the only reasons for the food to the areas that Confederacy’s growing food crisis. Confederate needed it. VOL.13・NUMBER 1・MAY 2011 NORTH & SOUTH 41 On November 17, 1862, Confederate Secretary of War George W. Randolph resigned, after less than eight months in office, as a result of Jefferson Davis’s refusal to countenance trading with the enemy in order to subsist the army. 1863, the Richmond Sentinel provisions. This idea had been raised early in the conflict, but pointed to transportation as Confederate President Jefferson Davis opposed it, believing the bottleneck in the supply it would demoralize civilians as well as the army. On October system, and recommended that 30, 1862, the Confederate Secretary of War, George W. the Southern railways be coordinated by a “master mind” in Randolph, sent a letter to Jefferson Davis stating that “the order to transport provisions from where they were grown Army cannot be subsisted without permitting trade to some to where they were needed.5 But these suggestions, which extent with Confederate ports in the possession of the enemy. had been made by others, fell flat because of the laissez faire The alternative is thus presented of violating our established economic policies of the Confederate government. policy of withholding cotton from the enemy or of risking As a result, southern railroads slowly deteriorated, making the starvation of our armies.”9 Davis refused to sanction the food distribution increasingly difficult. When the main trade, and Randolph resigned. railroad lines began to give out, Southerners cannibalized On January 3, 1863, the new Secretary of War, James smaller trunk lines, decreasing the total number of miles A. Seddon, diplomatically told President Davis that “The served by the railroads, thus weakening the overall system. harvests of the past season have not generally proved Even when not interdicted by Union soldiers, the railroads propitious, and notwithstanding the much larger breadth of could not transport enough food to feed civilians, the land devoted to the culture of cereals and forage the product military, cavalry horses, and draft animals. Moreover, when in many extensive districts of the Confederacy is below food was available, inefficiencies in transportation prevented the average, and in some threatens scarcity.” Davis paid no adequate distribution. Civil War railroad historian George attention. Shortly after, in February 1863, the editor of the Edgar Turner concluded that “Tons of bacon, rice, sugar and Daily Southern Crisis, a newspaper published in Jackson, other perishable foods spoiled in accumulated masses while Mississippi, put it less diplomatically: “There is more to fear soldiers in near-by Virginia famished for want of them.” from a dearth of food than from all the Federal armies in Historian Charles W. Ramsdell pointed out that Lee’s army existence.” He then asked, “Who can fight starvation with starved, “not because there was no food in the Confederacy, hope of success?”10 for it was plentiful in many portions of Georgia, Alabama, The failure to solve the Confederate food problems led and Florida, but because the railroads simply could not carry to a series of bread riots that shook much of the eastern enough of it.” When Petersburg and Richmond were cut off, Confederacy beginning in 1863. With the exception of such and “the remnant of the feeble roads wrecked by Sherman’s events in Richmond and Mobile, the Southern bread riots destructive march through Georgia and the Carolinas,” were relatively small affairs, and authorities dealt with them Ramsdell continued, “the stoppage of all supplies followed, easily and with no deaths and few injuries. Nevertheless, and the long struggle was over.”6 the riots reflected real problems in the South and provided The South also had problems with its roads and wagon additional wake-up calls for Confederate leaders to address transportation. Southern roads were mainly unimproved, crucial problems with the Southern food system.