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The Battle of Stalingrad the Early Triumph of the Nazi Military and the Hubris That Led to Its Fall

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The Battle of Stalingrad the Early Triumph of the Nazi Military and the Hubris That Led to Its Fall The Battle of Stalingrad The Early Triumph of the Nazi Military and the Hubris That Led to Its Fall Zachary Duffy Individual Junior Paper 1 Anyone familiar with World War II history can probably think of countless examples of triumph and tragedy experienced by those that fought and died in the war. But the battle of Stalingrad is a particularly stunning example because it was German triumphs that made Hitler overconfident and ultimately led to the downfall of his military in Stalingrad, and the Russians’ tragic suffering that helped them find the strength to triumph over Germany in the battle. The year was 1939 and the Nazi war machine was blazing through Europe in record time, sweeping through France and pushing eastward towards the Volga River and Moscow and setting the stage for World War II as the Germans continued pushing eastward. These great triumphs inspired the German people, and one in particular thought that the Germans could not be defeated. It was because Adolf Hitler’s hubris that the German war machine fell after the battle of Stalingrad, from which the German army would never recover. The German invasions started when Germany, under the new Nazi control, decided to invade Poland in a temporary alliance with Russia. This caused the Allies to declare war on Germany.. Even though the Allies declared the war, it was only because they were forced to. The Allies never wanted a war with Germany after the first World War, and so maintained defensive positions, not venturing out and attacking exposed German movements, not launching artillery strikes against the Axis, not firing at scouts. For this reason, the allies were not ready for it, even if they had predicted it, when the Germans launched an invasion of Belgium. When the allies had been preparing for war with Germany, they had built a line of defenses along their German border, called the Maginot line, to deter the Germans from invading. They didn’t, however, extend the Maginot line to their border with Belgium, with 2 whom they were friendly, but would not let them build defenses or place troops inside of Belgium. The lack of defense of Belgium was why nobody was surprised when the Germans invaded Belgium to get around the French defenses. For this reason, the French were somewhat ready to move troops into Belgium, and rushed in at full speed. What the French were not expecting, however, was the invasion that came next. When the French troops had rushed into Belgium at full speed, they had left a few places under-defended. They thought that the natural protection would be strong enough to deter the German troops. One such area was the Ardennes, a very woody and hilly area, and it was here that the Germans forced 50 Wehrmacht divisions through and penetrated the French line of defense. The French and British tried to retreat, but they were encircled by the German forces. The best of the French armies were wiped out as the Germans crushed in from all sides, and the British only avoided capture because of the desperate last-minute escape at Dunkirk. This rescue was executed with the help of many brave British civilians, who miraculously crossed the extremely dangerous waters of the English Channel to bring home the young men to British soil. Meanwhile, in Russia, the Nazis were using the same Blitzkrieg tactics as they used in France, engineered by the greatest military strategists of the day. Blitzkrieg was a form of warfare defined by quick strikes by motorized and armoured vehicles or infantry, followed by close air support in order to break the lines of the enemy and encircle them. The poorly trained Russian troops were captured in huge numbers as Germans encircled retreating armies and cities that the Russians were camping out in. Upwards of 1,000,000 troops were captured at once, and Russian soldiers were shipped off to work in concentration camps. 3 In the push eastward is where most of the shocking atrocities of Hitler's reign occurred. Jewish people all over were prosecuted and either enslaved or killed. The killing of Jews was considered by many Nazi leaders to be a source of entertainment, and people were often encouraged to watch as people were dragged screaming from their homes. Anyone who would try to stand up to their occupiers would be dragged with the rest of the Jews to concentration camps, where people would often starve to death, or were gassed before they died from malnutrition. Stories began popping up everywhere of terrible acts committed against Jewish people, such as 90 Jewish children that were locked in a cellar without food or water.1 It was these kinds of abuses that gave the Germans confidence and made them feel in power. At this point in the war most of Europe was under the control of Hitler and the Nazis, and the quick fall of France and the lack of resistance from Russia gave the Germans a lot of confidence in their push eastward. They felt as though they could not be beaten, that their tactics were impossible to counter, and that there was no possible way that they could lose. Hitler had started to take control of the day to day operations of his army now, making strategic decisions on his own without the help of his officers or strategists. These were the same people that historians regard as the most brilliant military minds of the day, having invented and used the Blitzkrieg. Hitler’s overconfidence turned out to be a grave mistake as the German army was quickly running out of supplies. Men were spread wide on the Eastern Front, and almost all of Hitler’s junior officers were telling him to slow down and to wait for reinforcements and 1 “Season 1, Episode 4 - The Battle of Stalingrad.” Battlefield . Public Broadcasting System. 1994. Accessed Jan. 18, 2019. 4 supplies. The pleas for help were ignored, and when one of his officers said “there would be a disaster”2 if reinforcements were not sent, Hitler accused him of not having “national socialist ardour,” and admonished him, “clearly I cannot expect this of you (Halder).”3 Hitler had set his sights upon Russia and was not to be stopped from advancing. At this point, the German army was very poorly supplied as they advanced into Stalingrad in early fall. They expected to have another quick victory like the ones in the earlier parts of the war, but was met by a surprising amount of resistance. This resistance was put up by the Russian people, who were desperate to stop the march of the German army into their territory. The battle of Stalingrad was now started, with both sides fighting ferociously. Even though cattle and grain were shipped out of the city, no civilians left. Civilians stayed to help in combat, and inspired soldiers by reminding them who they were defending. Despite all of this though, the Russians were getting pushed back further and further into the city, and the Luftwaffe (German air divisions) were starting to take over the skies. The Volga river behind the Russians became useless between the Luftwaffe and the onshore fighting. The Germans were starting to make real progress in capturing civilians and Russian troops, more of them being shipped off to work in concentration camps. Russian forces were down to fewer than 20,0004 troops and were stuck on the brink of the Volga. Morale among the soldiers was low. It looked like a German victory was imminent, 2 ”World War II.” Jewish Virtual Library, w ww.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-battle-of-stalingrad. Accessed Feb. 3, 2019. 3 ”World War II.” Jewish Virtual Library, w ww.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-battle-of-stalingrad. 4 Editors, History.com. “Battle of Stalingrad.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 9 Nov. 2009, www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/battle-of-stalingrad . Accessed source Jan. 25, 2019 5 leaving them the gateway into the main Caucesses, a land rich in food and oil, two essential supplies to an army. In addition to this, the Volga River was a huge commercial pathway, leaving a large portion of the Russian economy crippled. Yet all hope was not yet lost, as the Russians had not yet surrendered, and they were still fighting hard, with reinforcements coming from further east. Stalin then issued Order 227, which states that it is time to stop retreating, and just because we have a lot of land does not mean we should fight on it. This order ends with the now famous phrase “Not one step back!”5 Stalingrad was now under renewed fighting, as the Russian people were inspired. The general mood around the war was shifting from one of despair and constant retreat to one of strength and moving as one to repel the Nazis and reclaim what was theirs. The problem of Stalingrad needed to be taken care of, and a renewed hope around the war was further boosted by the newly arrived reinforcements around the city of Stalingrad. These reinforcements arrived mid-winter, gathering in the surrounding mountains and encircling the German army in a move much resembling their own Blitzkrieg. This shocked the German forces, as they were so close to winning the city of Stalingrad, and had not expected the Soviet Union to have any more strength. The German forces were now surrounded, and stuck in the city of Stalingrad, as the Russians pelted them with artillery shells, pushed in from all sides, and fired on their troop movements in the rough terrain of the destroyed city.
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