Pilgrimage, Commodities, and Religious Objectification: the Making of Transnational Shiism Between Iran and Syria

Home , Maqam (shrine), Zawiya (institution)

Pilgrimage, Commodities, and Religious Objectification: The Making of Transnational Shiism between Iran and Syria

Paulo G. Pinto

Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Volume 27, Number 1, 2007, pp. 109-125 (Article)

Published by Duke University Press

For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/215904

Access provided at 18 Jun 2019 19:36 GMT from UFF-Universidade Fed Fluminense Pilgrimage, Commodities, and Religious Objectiﬁ cation: The Making of Transnational Shiism between Iran and Syria

Paulo G. Pinto

ny visitor to the pilgrimage sites of Lourdes in France, Mashhad in Iran, or Varanasi in India is surely impressed by the crowd of pilgrims coming from various places in order to express their devotion and be in close, intimate contact with a source of sacred power. The same visitor is also sure to be overwhelmed by the market activities that take place near or sometimes inside the sacred shrines. Religious commodities of all sorts are sold in shops and bought by the pilgrims, who are usually avid consumers of religious memorabilia. Notwithstanding the fact that the commoditization of the religious tradition periodically attracts the wrath and condemnation of religious reformers, it is a constant feature of the pilgrimage systems that mobilize massive numbers of pilgrims through vast territories. Pil- grimages are a major feature of world religions, for they connect the local and the global—the particular and the universal—in a complex system of practices and beliefs, which allows them to create shared identities in a multiplicity of social and cultural contexts. This article explores the links among pilgrimage, devotional practices, and the consumption of religious commodities in the production and organization of transnational forms of Shi‘i Islam in the pilgrimage shrines in Syria. The general argument is that a connection ex- ists between pilgrimage processes and the emergence of religious markets, meaning arenas of dies of exchange where religious commodities are produced, sold, and consumed. The consumption d of religious commodities structures channels of participation and articulates local identities mparative Stu in the translocal religious community created by pilgrimage.1 Pilgrimage is a central religious practice in the production of “orthodoxy” and “ortho- praxy” in Islam, for it brings together members of different Muslim communities, who might Co be separated by language, culture, political boundaries, and geographic distance, and mo- bilizes them into one large ritual and devotional activity.2 The engagement of each pilgrim South Asia, Africa an in the performance of the collective ritual practices that constitute pilgrimage produces the the Middle East x-2006-047 Vol. 27, No. 1, 2007 ty Press experience of what Victor Turner defi nes as communitas, meaning a diffuse solidarity that 15/1089201 .12 3 10 Universi transcends social and cultural differences. However, beyond the creation of a shared sense of doi uke belonging to the communitas, the gathering of Muslims of different social and cultural back- © 2007 by D grounds in the activities that constitute pilgrimage also reveals the doctrinal or ritual differ-

1. Victor Turner pointed to the links between pilgrimage and 2. The pan-Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) is paralleled by market systems, but he did not develop this idea further. See other pilgrimages with more regional or sectarian character, Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors (Ithaca, NY: Cornell such as the Shi‘i pilgrimages to Karbala, Mashhad, or Damascus. University Press, 1974), 182 – 83, 222 – 23. 3. Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 166 – 71. 109 110 ences that exist throughout the Muslim world. identities in Shi‘i Islam in the Middle East. The The consciousness of the local variation of the experiential character of pilgrimage entices the religious tradition entices among some Muslims demand for objects and images that can embody the need to fi nd the “pure” or “original” form of the memory of the emotions and sensations their religious tradition in order to restore the produced by the physical and symbolic activi- Islamic communitas, the umma. ties connected to pilgrimage, such as traveling, The continuous re-creation of the religious performing rituals, and being in contact with sa- tradition is done through the detachment of sym- cred objects and beings. The production of such bols, practices, and doctrines from their cultural objects and images leads to the commoditization mparative context and their articulation as abstract systems of the religious tradition, enhancing the circu- that can be consciously presented as doctrinal lation and diffusion of the symbols, practices, Coudies of and ritual models. This process was labeled by and even doctrines thus objectifi ed. Particular St uth Asia, Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori as “religious religious symbols and images may be commodi- objectifi cation,” for it allows religion to become fi ed because of their appeal to particular forms So “a self-contained system that its believers can de- of identity, devotion, and taste rather than their Africa and the ddle East scribe, characterize, and distinguish from other conformity to an abstract and coherent organiz- Mi beliefs systems.” 4 Pilgrims are constantly ex- ing principle. For example, the mass production posed to objectifi ed forms of the religious tradi- and consumption of a Shi‘i iconography of Ali tion through sermons, images, and texts, which and Husayn and its adoption among Sunni Sufi s constitute the discursive and iconic universe of in Syria can only be explained by the evocative pilgrimage. They carry these codifi cations of the capacity of these images in conveying the emo- religious tradition back to their communities of tional and existential quality of the devotion to origin as authoritative discourses and practices the family of the Prophet present in both Shi‘i loaded with the holiness of the pilgrimage site. and Sufi piety.5 Also, in the case of the Shi‘i pilgrimage The ethnographic data analyzed in this ar- shrines in Syria, the process of the objectifi ca- ticle were collected during several visits to Shi‘i tion of local religious traditions attracts the at- pilgrimage sites in Syria, such as the shrines of tention of political regimes, in particular those Sayda Zaynab and Sayda Ruqaya, the shrine of that incorporate religion into their system of Husayn’s head in the Umayad Mosque in Da- governance or that have it as a domain to be con- mascus, the Mashhad al-Husayn in Aleppo, and trolled, such as Iran and Syria. The Syrian and the mausoleums of ‘Ammar bin Yasir, Uways al- Iranian states also aim to manipulate the pro- Qarani, and Ubay bin Ka’b in Raqqa. Most of cess of religious objectifi cation linked to mass these visits took place during my fi eldwork in pilgrimage in order to make it a channel for the Syria among the Sufi communities in Damascus diffusion of offi cial constructions of orthodoxy. and Aleppo from 1999 to 2001. Many of these In this sense, the process of religious objectifi ca- visits were made as part of my ethnography of tion unleashed by mass pilgrimage is invested Sufi —Qadiri, Rifa’i, and Shadhili—pilgrimages by secular and religious states in order to create and visitations (ziyarat) to these shrines. In May both the governance of religion and the mecha- 2002 and June 2006, I gathered more ethno- nisms of governance through religion. graphic data about the religious activities at the This analysis of the pilgrimage shrines shrine of Sayda Zaynab. in Syria reveals the complex web of discursive, Whenever I went to these pilgrimage sites iconic, and experiential elements that constitute in Syria, I took part in the rituals and religious transnational forms of religious solidarity and activities in the shrines. I also visited and spent

4. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics 5. For the devotional attachment of Sufi s to the fam- (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 38. ily of the Prophet in contemporary Egypt, see Valerie Hoffman-Ladd, “Devotion to the Prophet and His Family in Egyptian Sufi sm,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992): 615 – 37. For contemporary Syria, see Paulo G. Pinto, “Mystical Bodies: Ritual, Experience, and the Embodiment of Sufi sm in Syria” (PhD diss., Boston University, 2002). time observing the activities that took place in perfect man” (al-insan al-kamil). The members 111 the market institutions, such as the shops, res- of the ahl al-bayt (the family of the Prophet) are taurants, bookstores, hotels, and street stalls also objects of veneration, being considered as that are linked to these holy sites. I also engaged examples of moral values and virtues. Further- in open interviews and informal conversations more, the mystical traditions within the Sunni with religious leaders, pilgrims, regular visitors, community, which are collectively known as local devotees, merchants, travel agents, and Sufi sm, do have many points in common with other social actors linked to the pilgrimage sites. Shiism in their devotion to the Prophet and the My universe of informants was almost entirely ahl al-bayt. The Sufi s consider Muhammad to be constituted by Arabic-speaking pilgrims, visitors, the holder of the divine “light” (nur), which was merchants, or religious authorities, both Sunni passed to his descendants. The Sufi s also con- and Shi‘i. As most of the data analyzed here were sider Ali to be the transmitter of the esoteric Paulo G. Paulo Pinto collected in the context of my fi eldwork among truths that constitute the Sufi path (tariqa).7 the Sufi communities in Syria, the issues raised The episode that symbolically marked the in this article should be seen as exploratory sectarian split between Shi‘is and Sunnis was the ethnographic and theoretical guidelines rather killing of Husayn, son of Ali and grandson of than taken together as a fi nished analysis. Muhammad, and his companions at the battle of Karbala in present-day Iraq.8 The origins of this Devotion to the Prophet and event go back to the troubled caliphate of Ali, His Family in Shi‘i and Sunni Islam which ended in AD 661 with his murder by one The two main religious traditions in Islam, Sunn- of his followers, who felt betrayed by the fact that ism and Shiism, have a long tradition of debate Ali accepted external mediation to his dispute about the spiritual nature of the Prophet and his with Mu’awiya, the rebellious governor of Syria. family (ahl al-bayt). The various doctrinal views Mu’awiya took power, becoming the fi rst caliph Commodities, Objectification Religious Pilgrimage, and and ritual practices organized around this issue of the Umayad dynasty. After the death of the create both boundaries and points of contact caliph, Husayn claimed power against Mu’awiya’s between Shi‘i and Sunni Islam. The dominant son, Yazid. Then Husayn marched to Kufa, in opinion among Shi‘i Muslims considers Prophet Iraq, with his followers and family in order to Muhammad to be more than a simple man, as lead the rebellious troops against Yazid. his prophecy gave him a holy character that was However, at the plains of Karbala, Husayn inherited by his descendants. Shi‘i theology con- and his followers were surrounded by Yazid’s siders Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, forces, which prevented them from reaching to be the holder and transmitter of revealed eso- the waters of the Euphrates river. After ten days teric knowledge. The Shi‘i tradition also claims of siege a battle took place, and Husayn and his that Ali’s role as the source of esoteric knowledge companions were massacred by the forces of and his family ties to the Prophet made him the Yazid. Husayn was decapitated, and his head was only legitimate successor of Muhammad as the taken to Damascus to be shown to Yazid. The leader of the Muslim community.6 women of Husayn’s family, such as his sister Zay- Sunni Muslims also have a special devo- nab and his daughter Ruqaya, were also taken as tion to the Prophet, who they consider to be “the captives to Damascus, where they died.

6. Yann Richard, Shi’ite Islam (Oxford: Blackwell, teric sects, such as the Isma’ilis, the Druzes, and the 1995), 15 – 22. ‘Alawis; and the “Twelvers,” who accept the line of succession until the twelveth imam and have a main 7. Hoffman-Ladd, “Devotion to the Prophet,” 618 – 29; branch, known as Ja’fari, which developed a written Pinto, “Mystical Bodies,” 101 – 9. tradition of theology and jurisprudence. The Ja’faris 8. The battle of Karbala, which happened in AD 680, constitute the majority of the Shi‘is in Iran, Iraq, Leba- is a symbolic marker rather than a historical date of non, and the Indian subcontinent. See Marshall Hodg- the religious divide between Sunni and Shi‘i Islam. son, “How Did the Early Shi’a Become Sectarian?” The Shi‘is fully emerge as a sectarian community Journal of the American Oriental Society 75 (1955): within Islam only in the ninth century and are divided 1 – 13; Richard, Shi’ite Islam, 1 – 14; Michael Fischer, Iran: into two branches: the “Seveners,” who accept the From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Madison: Uni- line of succession of descendants of the Prophet until versity of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 27 – 32. the sixth imam and are separated into several eso- 112 This drama happened in AD 680 during the invasion and continue to plague Iraq. These the fi rst ten days of Muharram, the fi rst month shrines became the target of a joint political, of the Muslim lunar calendar. It was incorpo- economic, and symbolic investment of the Syr- rated as part of the Shi‘i religious calendar with ian and Iranian regimes, which, despite having the name of ‘Ashura. The major rituals of Shi- very different approaches to religious identities ism, such as the ritual lamentations (rauza), fl ag- and practices, had an interest in promoting pil- ellation (latam/tatbir), and passion plays (ta’ziyat), grimage as a religious dimension of their strate- were developed in order to keep alive the mem- gic alliance and their shared hostility toward the ory of this episode, which acquired paradigmatic Baathist regime in Iraq.12 The Iranian govern- mparative dimensions.9 The drama of Karbala and its main ment is a Shi‘i religious government with pan- characters, such as Husayn and Zaynab, conden- Islamic ambitions, while the government of the Coudies of sate and fuse hope and despair, grief and resil- Baath party in Syria created a secular regime St uth Asia, ience, courage and sorrow, struggle and defeat, with socialist overtones, which has its key posi- functioning as dominant symbols in Shi‘i Islam.10 tions controlled by members of the ‘Alawi sect, So The importance of the paradigm of Karbala can who have a strong interest in showing their be- Africa and the 13 ddle East be seen in the central role that the pilgrimage longing to Ja’fari Shiism. Mi to the tombs of its martyrs had for the histori- The importance of pilgrimage as a reli- cal development and organization of Shiism. gious expression of political alliances in the Also, most Shi‘i institutions of religious educa- Middle East was expressed in the aftermath of tion were concentrated in cities with pilgrimage the deposition of the Baathist regime in Iraq by shrines, such as Najaf, Karbala, and Qom.11 the Anglo-American invasion, when millions of Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims fl ooded the holy cit- Shrines, Religious Imagination, and State Policies: ies of Najaf and Karbala during the celebrations The Organization of Shi‘i Pilgrimage in Syria of ‘Ashura, raising the issue of a political and The Shi‘i shrines in Syria became the main des- religious alliance between Iran and the Shi‘i tination for Shi‘i pilgrims outside Iran in the political forces in Iraq. The role of pilgrimage 1980s, as the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala be- as an international political and religious arena came out of limits as a result of the continuing was also expressed in the announcement by confl icts in Iraq, such as the Iran-Iraq war be- the Syrian government in 2004 of a plan called tween 1980 and 1988, the fi rst Gulf war in 1991, Mawqib al-Sabaiya, which aims to build new Shi‘i the international sanctions against Iraq be- shrines in all the places in the Syrian territory tween 1992 and 2003, and the Anglo-American where Husayn’s head was put down or lost some war and occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the blood on its way from Karbala to Damascus.14 upsurge of violence and confl icts that followed This string of shrines is intended to demarcate

9. Richard, Shi’ite Islam, 22 – 48. For the drama of 13. The ‘Alawis are 15 percent of the Syrian popula- pour une histoire du rapprochement (taqrib) des Karbala as a religious and cultural paradigm, see Ka- tion. They constitute a Shi‘i sect that was organized alaouites vers le chiisme” (“Some Guidelines for the mran S. Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi‘i Symbols around an esoteric interpretation of the Islamic doc- History of the Approach (taqrib) between the ‘Alawis and Rituals in Modern Iran (Seattle: University of trines and rituals. Since the early twentieth century, and Shiism”), in Islamstudien ohne Ende, Festschrift Washington Press, 2004), 3 – 14; Fischer, Iran, 3 – 11. members of the ‘Alawi religious elite have sought fur Werner Ende (Islamic Studies without End: Essays the doctrinal incorporation of their community into in Honor of Werner Ende), ed. Rainer Brunner, Monika 10. Victor Turner highlighted three characteristics of mainstream Ja’fari Shiism. This process of doctrinal Gronke, Jens Laut and Ulrich Rebstock (Würzburg: dominant symbols: “(1) condensation; (2) unifi cation rapprochement (taqrib) between the ‘Alawi commu- Ergon Verlag, 2002). of disparate meanings in a single symbolic formation; nity and Ja’fari Shiism was fully achieved, at least on (3) polarization of meaning.” See Turner, The Forest of 14. Myriam Ababsa, “Signifi cations territoriales et the level of public religious discourse, by the end of Symbols (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 30. appropriations confl ictuelles des mausolées chiites the twentieth century. Many Sunni Muslims consider de Raqqa (Syrie)” (“Spatial Meanings and Confl ictu- 11. Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Re- the ‘Alawis to be heretics, a theme that was politi- ous Appropriations of the Shi‘i Mausoleums in Raqqa ligion and Politics in Iran (London: Oneworld, 2000), cized by the religious opposition to the Baathist re- [Syria]”), in Les pèlerinages au Maghreb et au moyen 69 – 109; Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq (Princeton, gime in Syria. The inner core of the regime, includ- orient: Espaces publics, espaces du public (Pilgrimages NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 238 – 68. ing the current president of Syria, Bashar al-Asad, is in the Maghreb and the Middle East: Public Spaces, composed of members of the ‘Alawi sect. See Alain 12. The Baathist regimes of Iraq and Syria were op- Spaces of the Public), ed. Sylvia Chiffoleau and Anna Chouet, “L’espace tribal des alaouites à l’épreuve du ponents in their dispute over regional power. This Madoeuf (Beirut: IFPO, 2005), 116. pouvoir: La désintegration par le politique” (“The political confl ict prompted the Syrian regime to side ‘Alawi Tribes Facing Power: Disintegration through with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, as well as with the Politics”), Monde Arabe: Maghreb-Machrek 147 American-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in (1995): 93 – 119; and Sabrina Mervin, “Quelques jalons the Gulf war in 1991. a new pilgrimage route linking Iran to Syria outskirts of Damascus, where today one fi nds 113 through the holy cities in Iraq, giving a religious a Palestinian refugee camp and a strong pres- imprint to potential political alliances. However, ence of Shi‘i refugees from Iraq. The mosque the continuing violence in Iraq and the political gained silver grilles around the tomb and tile hostility of the United States against Iran and mosaics decorating the minarets, in a process Syria do not create an environment conducive of affi rmation of the Shi‘i identity of the shrine. to the free mobility of large masses of pilgrims This process of giving a clear Shi‘i identity to between these countries through Iraq. holy places connected to the drama of Karbala Despite the importance of Syria as the is linked to efforts made since the nineteenth burial ground for a large number of members century in creating and affi rming a public Shi‘i of the ahl al-bayt, such as the shrine of Husayn’s identity in Syria.16 The dynamics of the objectifi - head in the Umayad Mosque, the mausoleums of cation of Shi‘i identities and religious traditions Paulo G. Paulo Pinto Sayda Zaynab and Sayda Ruqaya, and the tombs in Syria were changed by the intervention of the of Muhammad’s wives and daughters in the cem- Syrian and Iranian states, which amplifi ed the etery of Bab al-Saghir in Damascus, only recently scope and tried to give a political and ideologi- have these holy sites become fully integrated in cal character to this process. a transnational circuit of Shi‘i pilgrimage. These During the 1980s, the strategic alliance burial sites have always attracted popular piety between Syria and Iran gave a political dimen- because of the strong devotion to the family of sion to the creation and/or affi rmation of the the Prophet or their companions in both Sunni Shi‘i identity of holy places in Syria. Therefore, and Shi‘i piety. Since the Mameluk period Shi‘i the Syrian government in partnership with the communities settled in Damascus and Aleppo, Islamic Republic of Iran started to appropriate near the shrines dedicated to the ahl al-bayt or and transform these sites, making them pilgrim- 17 the martyrs of Karbala. Mameluk and Ottoman age shrines with a clear Shi‘i character. The Commodities, Objectification Religious Pilgrimage, and rulers tolerated their presence under the condi- tomb of Sayda Zaynab was the first religious tion that they refrained from expressing their site associated with the Shi‘i sacred history in devotion to the ahl al-bayt through emotional Syria to be appropriated by the state. In 1979, rituals, which were viewed as blamable innova- the shrine of Sayda Zaynab and an area of three tions by the Sunni religious authorities.15 hundred thousand square meters surrounding Therefore, most Shi‘i holy places in Syria it were expropriated by the Syrian state. were, until very recently, places with no clear sec- The Iranian government sponsored the tarian identity, where Shi‘i piety was integrated building of the new mosque-mausoleum com- with or even diluted in Sufi devotional practices. plex, which was placed under the administra- Because of its religious importance, the mauso- tion of a Syrian-Iranian society.18 The mosque- leum of Sayda Zaynab, Husayn’s sister, was re- mausoleum of Sayda Zaynab became part of built by the efforts of the Shi‘i community in a vast religious complex built in Persian neo- Syria in the 1950s. It is located in a village at the Safavid architecture.19 The mosque received a

15. Irene Calzoni, “Shiite Mausoleums in Syria with 17. Myriam Ababsa, “Les mausolées invisibles: Raqqa Reza in Mashhad in Iran. See Fariba Adelkhakh, Being Particular Reference to Sayyida Zaynab’s Mauso- ville de pèlerinage chiite ou pôle étatique en Jazira Modern in Iran (New York: Columbia University Press, leum,” in La Shi’a nell’impero ottomano (The Shi‘is syrienne?” (“The Invisible Mausoleums: Raqqa, Shi‘i 2000), 133 – 34. in the Ottoman Empire), ed. Biancamaria Scarcia Pilgrimage City or State Center in the Syrian Jazira?”), 19. See Sharika al-Sayda Zaynab lil-Siyaha wa al- Amoretti (Rome: Academia Nazionale dei Lincei, Les Annales de Géographie 622 (2001), 647 – 63. Ziyara (The Sayda Zaynab Company for Tourism and 1993), 199 – 201; Eric Geoffroy, Le soufi sme en Égypte 18. Ibid., 650. The creation of a foundation for the Pilgrimage), Mashru’ al-Majma’ al-Funduqi (Project et en Syrie sous les derniers Mamelouks et les premiers administration of the mosque-mausoleum of Sayda for the Hotel Complex) (Damascus: n.p., 1985). Ottomans: Orientations spirituelles et enjeux culturels Zaynab is an innovation in the framework of the re- (Sufi sm in Egypt and Syria under the Late Mameluks ligious policies of the Syrian state, as the mosques and the Early Ottomans: Spiritual Trends and Cultural in Syria are administered by the Ministry of Awqaf Dynamics) (Damascus: IFEAD, 1995), 63 – 66. (pious endowments; sing. waqf). See Annabelle 16. Sabrina Mervin, “Sayyida Zaynab: Bainlieu de Böttcher, “Le ministère des waqfs” (“The Ministry of Damas ou nouvelle ville sainte chiite?” (“Sayyida Za- Waqfs”), Monde Arabe: Maghreb-Machrek 158 (1997): ynab: Suburb of Damascus or New Shi‘i Holy City?”), 18 – 30. This autonomous institution resembles the Cahiers détudes sur la Mediterranée orientale et le Astan-e Qods, the religious foundation that admin- monde turco-iranien 22 (1996): 149 – 62. isters the property and income of the shrine of Imam 114

mparative

Coudies of

St uth Asia,

Africa and the ddle East Mi

Figure 1. Shrine of Sayda Zaynab at the outskirts of Damascus

golden dome, blue and green tile mosaics on mass pilgrimage through offi cial support from the facade, and mirror mosaics covering the both countries, which included state-sponsored inner ceilings. The pointed arches that framed trips for some classes of pilgrims, such as the the courtyard and the fl ower-buttoned dome mothers and widows of those who were “mar- made the shrine an obvious sign of the artistic, tyred” in the Iran-Iraq war; easier visa require- cultural, and religious presence of Iran. ments for pilgrims; and the offi cial production The same effort in linking Iranian cultural of images and discourses that incited and legiti- forms with the religious imaginary of transna- mized the pilgrims’ quest for personal contact tional Shiism could be seen in the shrine of with the sacred power embodied in the martyrs Sayda Ruqaya, Husayn’s daughter, located in the of Karbala.20 old city of Damascus. This shrine was enlarged Besides the Persian architectural ele- and fully rebuilt in Persian style by the Iranian ments in the shrines of Sayda Zaynab and Sayda government in 1991. The architectural reform Ruqaya, which had the clear aim of creating an of these shrines was meant to create an aesthetic identifi cation between Shi‘i Islam and Iranian and symbolic continuity between the Shi‘i holy history and culture, there were other elements places of Iran and Syria, aesthetically demarcat- that showed the desire of fusing Shiism with a ing the sacred geography of transnational Shi- pan-Islamic consciousness. One such element ism. This path was transformed into a route of located in a courtyard of the religious complex

20. The number of Iranian pilgrims in Syria was es- of Iraq, 247 – 68; Mervin, “Sayyida Zaynab,” 154. After timated at almost 200,000 for 1999 and projected the collapse of the Baathist regime in Iraq, Najaf and at 216,000 for 2005. See Ababsa, “Signifi cations ter- Karbala reappeared as major centers for Shi‘i pilgrim- ritoriales,” 113. The rise of the mosque-mausoleum of age and learning, attracting millions of pilgrims and Sayda Zaynab as a center for pilgrimage and religious visitors. However, because of the persistence of vio- learning from 1973 to 2003 paralleled the decline of lence and military confl icts in Iraq, their position as Najaf and Karbala in both domains; see Nakash, Shi‘is transnational pilgrimage centers is not stable yet. of Sayda Zaynab was a fountain for ritual ablu- 115 tions in the shape of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. This fountain was itself a copy of an almost identical “Dome of the Rock” fountain in a courtyard at the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad, Iran. The presence of the Dome of the Rock within these shrine complexes aims to create both a religious link with the third most sacred shrine in Islam and a symbolic connection between an Iranian-styled Shiism and the political struggle of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem. This Paulo G. Paulo Pinto symbolic presence connects visually the under- standing of Islam as both a religious practice and a form of political consciousness, which is fostered by the offi cial ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran.21 It also brings the Palestin- ian cause, which is a key theme in the offi cial rhetoric of the Syrian regime, to the center of the Islamic political discourse. The political aspects of the Dome of the Rock as a symbol of the struggle against imperialism and Israeli military occupation of what is defi ned as Arab/Muslim lands were further Commodities, Objectification Religious Pilgrimage, and emphasized by its visual association with recent Figure 2. Dome of the Rock fountain surrounded by historical and political events. For example, in barbed wire with a Hezbollah fl ag on its top during May 2002 the courtyard where the Dome of the the exhibition “Glory and Martyrdom,” 2002 Rock fountain in the shrine of Sayda Zaynab is located became the stage of an exhibition citizen tomorrow” (Kul dullar ameriki tat’amal bihi called “Glory and Martyrdom” (al-majd wa al- al-yum hwa rasasa fi qalb mwatan ‘arabi ghadan). shahada), about the resistance led by the Hezbol- The stress on the ideological pole of the various lah against the Israeli occupation in southern meanings associated with the Dome of the Rock Lebanon.22 During the exhibition, the fountain as a symbol gave a less sectarian and more mili- was surrounded by barbed wire, establishing a tant character to the religious communitas that symbolic link between the Israeli occupations of was being imagined through it. The constitution East Jerusalem and south Lebanon. A fl ag of the of this symbolic and political framework creates Hezbollah was placed on top of the golden dome channels of identification between the refu- of the fountain, equating Islam with the resis- gee population settled in the village of Sayda tance against Israeli and American imperialism, Zaynab, which is composed of Shi‘i Iraqis and which was expressed in painted slogans such as mainly Sunni Palestinians, and the discourse of “America, America, you are the great Satan” political Shiism.23 (Amerika, Amerika, anti al-shaytan al-akbar) and The presence in a Shi‘i shrine of a symbol in posters stating, “Each American dollar that with clear Sunni connections, such as Dome you use today is a bullet in the heart of an Arab of the Rock, also shows a conscious effort in

21. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the 23. Political uses of religious symbols and spaces Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California also happen in Nabatiyya during the celebration of Press, 1993), 13 – 59. ‘Ashura. See Augustus Richard Norton, “Ritual, Blood, and Shiite Identity: Ashura in Nabatiyya, Lebanon,” 22. Events linking political Shiism and the Palestin- Drama Review 49 (2005): 140 – 55. ian resistance to Israeli occupation also took place in the Shii mausoleums in Raqqa. See Ababsa, “Signiﬁ - cations territoriales,” 125 – 26. 116 building a pan-Islamic imaginary beyond sec- as tools to diffuse state-sponsored constructions tarian differences. However, the expression of of religious orthodoxy. the holiness of this pilgrimage site through the The process of stabilizing the devotional visual language of Persian architecture also focus of pilgrimage was achieved in the case of aims to create an aesthetic continuity among the Syrian shrines by making public the iden- the Shi‘i shrines through their architectural tity of the holy fi gure and/or consecrating the homogenization under the auspices of the chosen location of his or her burial site through Iranian state. The ambitious character of this the construction of a monumental shrine. When policy can be seen in the large scale of the in- such an architectural intervention was not possi- mparative vestments, which reached even places such as ble, written signs were placed at the site in order Raqqa, where the vast mausoleums in Persian to “inform” the pilgrims that they had reached Coudies of style stand as incongruous monuments for the their destiny. For example, in the shrine of the St uth Asia, Syrian-Iranian religious alliance in a city that head of Husayn in the Umayad Mosque in Da- never had a Shi‘i community or any signifi cant mascus is a plaque, written both in Arabic and So fl ux of pilgrims.24 The standardization of the Persian, that reads, Africa and the architectural context of the Shi‘i shrines also ddle East Hada maqam ras al-Husayn bin ‘Ali bin Abi Mi made possible their use as readily identifi able Talib, ‘aleihum al-salam, aldhi hamala ‘ala al- units of a larger pilgrimage route that has its rumh min Karbala’ mururan bil-Kufa wa al- focal point in Iran. Sham ma’ sabaiyan ahl al-bayt. Another important element in the production of mass pilgrimage is the establishment [This is the burial place of the head of Husayn of the “correct” identifi cation of each holy site son of Ali son of Abi Talib, peace be upon them, beyond all ambiguity or contradiction. The cer- which was transported on a spear from Karbala tainty of meeting a source of sacred power and through Kufa and Damascus together with the blessings that is stronger and purer than others imprisoned relatives of the Prophet, peace be upon them.] that might be more readily available is a major drive behind the pilgrim’s quest. Indeed, an ele- The use of words to decorate or mark tombs and ment constant to the process of transformation holy places is nothing new in Islamic religious of holy sites into shrines for mass pilgrimage in architecture. On the one hand, traditional Is- Syria was the establishment of stable and clear lamic inscriptions were written in formulaic or identities for the holy fi gures buried there. In poetic styles that presupposed readers’ previous some cases, when there was an overlapping of knowledge of a written and/or oral tradition. holy fi gures or a multiplicity of burial sites of On the other hand, the direct and descriptive the same fi gure, it was necessary to overcome prose of the plaque in Husayn’s head shrine in- these logical inconsistencies by identifying the tends to create these common understandings “real” burial site. Many texts that are available in pilgrims who might share very little religious to the pilgrims in the form of books, pamphlets, or cultural background, as the bilingual text or even Web pages try to determine the “true” suggests, allowing their incorporation in a re- identity of the holy fi gures and their burial sites ligious communitas. It is interesting to note that in Syria.25 These processes of objectifying the re- until 2002 the shrine dedicated to the head ligious identity of the holy sites linked to the pil- of Yahiya (Saint John the Baptist in the Chris- grimage route are also heavily invested in by the tian tradition) in the main hall of the Umayad Syrian and Iranian states, which try to use them Mosque had no text explaining whose tomb it

24. Ababsa, “Les mausolées invisibles.” site ziaraat.com (accessed 21 January 2007), which is oriented toward the Shi’is in South Asia and in the 25. See the Web sites ziaraat.com/Damascus/Bibi- South Asian diaspora. The texts about the pilgrim- Sakina and ziaraat.com/Damascus/Bab-e-Sagheer/ age shrines and the identity of the holy ﬁ gures asso- Pictures for discussions about the identity and the ciated with them are not signed. They were probably “true” burial place of Sayda Ruqaya. For a similar written by Syed Rizwan R. Rizvi, the Webmaster and discussion about Sayda Zaynab, see ziaraat.com/ owner of the site. Damascus/Zindan-e-Shaam/About and ziaraat.com/ Damascus/BibiZainab. These pages are on the Web was and how it happened to be in such a loca- The Production of Religious Commodities 117 tion, for it was embedded in the devotional prac- and the Objectiﬁ cation of Shiism tices of local religious communities.26 When approaching the shrine of Sayda Zaynab, The establishment of stable identities and one cannot miss the innumerable shops and the production of public discourses about the street stalls packed with all sorts of religiously holy places are also important elements in the inspired merchandise, such as prayer beads, constitution of the universe of exchanges and mud tablets made with the holy soil of Karbala, the value of the commodities marketed in the miniatures of the Koran, black banners with de- pilgrimage shrines.27 The investment of the votional inscriptions, golden miniatures of the sacred places into shrines with unambiguous doors of the Ka’ba, keychains in the shape of the religious identities also allows for the organiza- sword of Ali, and mosque-shaped alarm clocks. tion of transnational mass pilgrimage, which An important part of this market is devoted to Paulo G. Paulo Pinto entices the development of all kinds of market religious texts, such as various editions of the activities around the shrines. Indeed, in areas Koran, collections of hadith, or religious trea- near the pilgrimage shrines in Syria, businesses tises, as would be expected in a pilgrimage cen- such as hotels, restaurants, shops, travel agen- ter with institutions for religious learning. cies, and so on had developed. In the case of Besides the religious texts, an enormous Sayda Zaynab, this urban transformation was variety of objects base their market value on dramatic, for what was a small village at the out- their iconic character, such as posters depicting skirts of Damascus became a commercial hub Husayn. The market value of these commodities with a lively market of goods from Iran, Leba- is linked in their capacity of evoking particular non, Syria, and, of course, China, Taiwan, and religious experiences through the corporeal Korea. The area near the shrine has become a and emotional sensations that they induce in 29 major outpost of Iranian goods, where the mer- the consumers. The Shi‘i veneration of the Commodities, Objectification Religious Pilgrimage, and chants of Damascus go to buy carpets, killims, ahl al-bayt provides symbols and narratives that and pistachios, which are carried and traded by can be elaborated as “scenes,” “gestures,” or, the pilgrims themselves. building on a powerful religious concept, visual The market of religious commodities is in evocations of their “presence” (hadra) in iconic the core of the commercial activity organized objects, in order to give a Shi‘i framework to in Sayda Zaynab and other pilgrimage sites in particular forms of experience. Syria. The objects consumed by the pilgrims The most frequently depicted figure in as religious memorabilia signify and mediate this vast and varied iconographic repertoire is the relation that they establish with the sacred Husayn, which shows the centrality of the para- fi gures and places through pilgrimage.28 The digm of Karbala in the experience of the pil- importance of these elements in the process of grims. Each moment of the battle of Karbala is structuring Shi‘i identities was not overlooked by used as a scenic tool to convey a different aspect the state or the religious establishment in Syria of Husayn’s persona, as well as distinct values or Iran, which try to control the process of reli- and doctrinal elements of Shiism. A sample gious objectifi cation unleashed by the commod- of the multiple forms through which this Shi‘i itization of elements of the religious tradition. commercial iconography can convey values and

26. When I visited the shrine of Yahiya’s head in 27. The importance of the circulation of knowledge 28. Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood show how June 2006, I noticed a plaque that stated, “This is the or, in other terms, the political economy of meaning objects mediate the relations between the individu- shrine of the head of God’s prophet Yahiya, peace be in the production of commodity value in the mar- als and the world and tell something about the so- upon him” (Hada maqam ras nabi Allah Yahiya alaihi ket is analyzed in Clifford Geertz, “Suq: The Bazaar cial bonds that they materialize. See their The World al-salam), which shows how the whole mosque was Economy in Sefrou,” in Meaning and Order in Moroc- of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption gradually reshaped as a pilgrimage sanctuary. This can Society, ed. Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and (New York: Basic Books, 1979). plaque, as well as others placed throughout the Lawrence Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University 29. Christopher Pinney deﬁ ned this embodied form mosque, was accompanied by a dramatic increase in Press, 1979), 197 – 212; and Arjun Appadurai, “Intro- of evaluation of iconic religious commodities as “cor- the number of Shi‘i pilgrims performing their devo- duction: Commodities and the Politics of Value,” in pothetics.” See his “Introduction: Public, Popular, and tional rituals in the Umayad Mosque’s main hall. The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Per- Other Cultures,” in Pleasure and the Nation: The His- spective, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge tory, Politics, and Consumption of Public Culture in University Press, 1986), 3 – 63. India, ed. Rachel Dwyer and Christopher Pinney (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21. 118 consuming publics that compose the religious market. The objectifi cation of the various meanings and values condensed in the dominant symbols of the Shi‘i tradition and their codifi cation in images or objects make these meanings and values more explicit and conscious to the faithful. A Shi‘i shopkeeper who sold religious souve- nirs in Sayda Zaynab told me about the images that he was selling. According to him, a poster mparative with the image of Husayn’s bloody decapitated body laying on the plains of Karbala showed Coudies of the brutality of the “infi dels” (kufar), while the St uth Asia, desolate setting in the sunset evoked the loneli- ness of the faithful and a deep sense of sorrow So about the rule of injustice on earth. Another Africa and the ddle East poster showed Husayn riding his horse while Mi brandishing his double-edged sword, what the storekeeper described as a depiction of his he- roic and brave character. While the objectifi cation of the religious tradition through commoditization makes it more conscious and clearly bounded, it does not follow a linear path. It is the result rather of a gradual and uneven process in which several forces interfere, such as the ideological interests of the state, the imperative of religious ortho- Figure 3. Shop at Sayda Zaynab selling posters of Husayn, Fatimah (as a child), Bashar al-Asad, Sheikh doxy, and the necessity of appealing to the con- Nasrallah, and Sheikh Fadlallah, as well as various suming public. This is clear in the various post- religious memorabilia ers depicting the same theme, whose images vary depending on the emotional experience evoked experiences can be obtained from an analysis and the religious narrative that the artist used as of the religious posters depicting the battle of a source of inspiration. For example, the sorrow Karbala or the members of the ahl al-bayt. The for the death of the martyrs of Karbala is drama- mass production of these posters gives them a tized in posters that depict Husayn holding in practical and decorative character beyond their his arms his dead son transpierced by an arrow. immediate religious meaning, allowing their When the poster is intended to portray martyr- use as pious adornments or devotional objects dom as the tragic end of courage and struggle in both public and private spaces. The process against injustice, Husayn is holding a young of mass production is a central element in the man in his arms in a gesture reminiscent of a “cultural biography” of the Shi‘i religious imag- Christian pietà.31 However, when the emphasis ery, as it objectifi es and homogenizes it as a com- is on the innocence and the victimization of the modity that can be evaluated and exchanged in martyrs, Husayn is holding in his arms a dead the transactions of the market.30 baby with a halo of light around his head.32 The commoditization of the symbolic fi g- One should refrain from seeing in the pro- ures of the drama of Karbala “unpacks” their cess of commoditization of the religious tradi- multiple meanings to create a varied repertoire tion through mass pilgrimage the effects of an of religious images and objects for the various abstract “market rationality” free from other

30. Igor Kopytoff, “The Cultural Biography of Things: 31. It is interesting to note how the dramatic charac- 32. This contrast was called to my attention in a con- Commoditization as Process,” in Appadurai, Social ter of Christian iconography and its well-succeeded versation with a disciple of a Shadhili sheikh from Life of Things, 64 – 91. process of commoditization became a model for the Damascus while he was buying religious posters in a creation of this Shi‘i iconography, with its strong shop near the mausoleum of Sayda Zaynab. emotional and commercial appeal. Figure 4. A poster stall at 119 Sayda Zaynab’s shrine Paulo G. Paulo Pinto Pilgrimage, Commodities, Objectification Religious Pilgrimage, and

political and cultural forces. These posters are aura of sacrality that traditionally defi nes the produced in state graphics in Iran, and their religious objects and incorporates the religious content refl ects particular aspects of the offi cial symbols and messages that they convey as part religious ideology of the Islamic Republic. For of ordinary life.34 example, the posters depicting Ali holding and Indeed, in any shop or street stall near the protecting the weak and the poor, usually repre- shrine of Sayda Zaynab one can fi nd a great va- sented as street children, evoke the concern with riety of commodities that fuse religious imagery the “oppressed” in the Koran, and at the same with ordinary objects of practical or decorative time they echo this theme’s political reinterpre- use, such as keychains in the shape of Ali’s sword tation by Ali Shariati and Khomeini as portray- or with Husayn’s portrait; bumper stickers with ing those who are economically excluded and Koranic verses; stickers with the face of Ali, Hu- socially weak in modern society.33 sayn, or Musa al-Sadr, the founder of the Amal However, the efforts of the Iranian state movement in Lebanon; mosque-shaped alarm in controlling the production of religious com- clocks that play the adhan (call for prayer); cas- modities and using it as a vehicle for its offi cial settes with songs, litanies, or sermons; prayer ideology are mitigated and sometimes contra- beads made with mud from Karbala; miniatures dicted by the necessity of appealing to consum- of the Koran to hang on the car mirror; and ers’ tastes and interests in a heterogeneous green and black velvet banners with images of market. Furthermore, the commoditization of the mosques of Najaf or Karbala accompanied the religious tradition disrupts the ritualized with texts praising Ali and Husayn. All these

33. Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 26 – 28; Aghaie, Mar- 34. Adelkhakh, Being Modern in Iran, 106 – 7; Greg- tyrs of Karbala, 101 – 5; Fischer, Iran, 164 – 70. ory Starrett, “The Political Economy of Religious Commodities in Cairo,” American Anthropologist 97 (1995): 51 – 68. 120 objects bring religious symbols into the ordi- Shi‘i public spaces where the mourning of the nary activities of everyday life, serving not only tragedy of Karbala with passion plays (ta’ziyat) as identity markers or amulets but also as tools and ritual self-fl agellation (latam/tatbir) can be for the establishment of a personal and intimate openly performed. The rituals that mark the relation with the sacred sphere. This process death of Husayn during ‘Ashura are very dra- of individual contextualization shows how the matic, including processions of breast-beating meaning of religious commodities is embedded devotees carrying black banners and huge im- in the practices and discourses that structure ages of Husayn or replicas of his tomb, as well the identities of their consumers. as self-fl agellation with chains and sometimes mparative knives, while the sounds of drums and cymbals mix with the incessant weeping and crying of Coudies of The Consumption of Religious Commodities and the Making of Transnational Shiism the mourning audience. The performance of St uth Asia, The insertion of the shrines in Syria in the route these emotional rituals by Iranian, Iraqi, and of Shi‘i mass pilgrimage has affected the local Lebanese pilgrims during ‘Ashura led to their So religious landscape at various levels. The greater gradual incorporation into the universe of the Africa and the 37 ddle East impact has been on the Syrian Shi‘i communities, religious practices of Syrian Shi‘is. Mi which have been incorporated in the religious This process of “ritual communication,” framework of transnational Shiism through the as Peter Van der Veer defi ned the symbolic and constant fl ux of Shi‘i pilgrims from Iran, Azer- practical exchanges structured by ritual perfor- baijan, Pakistan, and Lebanon. The presence of mances, had its scope and effi cacy enhanced Shi‘i clergymen accompanying these pilgrims by the fact that these rituals were commodifi ed connects the Shi‘i communities in Syria with the and consumed by the mass media as images that major doctrinal and ritual traditions of Shiism. “represent” Shiism.38 During ‘Ashura in Sayda Furthermore, the books sold at the shrines and Zaynab it is common to see Iranian, Syrian, and the preaching activities of Iranian, Iraqi, or Leb- Lebanese television crews as well as professional anese religious authorities during the main reli- and amateur photographers pressing against gious celebrations are also mechanisms of doc- the crowd of pilgrims in order to fi nd the best trinal codifi cation and the discipline of religious angle or the most dramatic image of the ritu- identities.35 For example, during the celebrations als. These images circulate as photos, postcards, of ‘Ashura in 2000 at the Mashhad al-Husayn or television documentaries, creating a well- in Aleppo, Syrian Shi‘is from different villages defi ned international imaginary about Shiism near Aleppo would gather to listen to a sermon as a ritualistic and emotionally intense form of delivered in Arabic by an Iranian preacher on Islam. The ritual performances of the ‘Ashura social justice as the spirit of Husayn’s struggle. are also consumed as forms of cultural entertain- Framing the pulpit was a black banner on which ment by non-Shi‘i or even non-Muslim (Chris- was written the proverb used by Khomeini to tian) Syrians, creating an arena of cultural and mobilize his followers for political action within aesthetic articulation between transnational Shi- a religious framework: “Every day is ‘Ashura and ism and the larger Syrian society. every land is Karbala” (Kul yum ‘Ashura wa kul ard The commoditization of the pilgrimage Karbala). This phrase evoked the political mean- itself creates the need to consume it as a suc- ings attached to the ritual of ‘Ashura during the cession of images—photos or fi lms—that convey Islamic revolution.36 the individual or collective experience of “being Mass pilgrimage also brought a ritual there” in the holy place. The pictorial mementos transformation of the Shi‘i communities in construct in visual terms the idea of pilgrimage Syria. The pilgrimage shrines constitute new as a succession of unique and personal experi-

35. The concepts of discipline and disciplinary prac- 36. Aghaie, Martyrs of Karbala, 131 – 53. tices were taken from Talal Asad, who deﬁ nes them 37. See Mervin, “Sayyida Zaynab.” as the mechanisms through which “religious discourses regulate, inform, and construct religious 38. Peter Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus selves” in his Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of Califor- Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore, nia Press, 1994), 80 – 81. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 125. Figure 5. Pilgrims 121 inside the shrine of Sayda Zaynab hearing a recitation of the drama of Karbala by a Shi‘i mullah Paulo G. Paulo Pinto

ences that work as signs of distinction in relation tonomy from their original doctrinal and ritual to those who did not or could not share them, context, as well as from the religious authority in a way similar to the role of travel albums in of the Shi‘i clergy. Therefore, they can circulate individualizing travel in the context of mass more easily beyond the boundaries of the Shi‘i tourism. The necessity of the pilgrims to record religious community. This process of objectify- all their “meaningful” moments throughout the ing and universalizing religious symbols, prac-

journey often clashes with the rules of privacy tices, and images is a fundamental step in the Commodities, Objectification Religious Pilgrimage, and or the ritual interdictions that structure many integration of the pilgrimage shrines into Syr- forms of social interactions in religious con- ian society, for it allows a greater participation of texts. Therefore, the visual consumption of the Shi‘i and non-Shi‘i Syrians in the consumption personal aspects of pilgrimage creates a strong and resignifi cation of the religious commodities drive for the individualization and fragmenta- offered in their religious markets. tion of the contexts of interpretation and nego- As one would expect, the Shi‘i communi- tiation of moral rules and religious values. ties in Syria and Lebanon have become major For example, inside the mosque of Sayda consumers of the religious commodities of- Zaynab, as women were performing the visita- fered in the religious market of the pilgrimage tion of the tomb ritual, I saw a man fi lming them shrines. Through the consumption and use of by holding his camera on top of the screen that these religious commodities the local Shi‘i com- separates men from women in the shrine. Be- munities connect with the major trends of trans- cause he was using a digital camera, he was able national Shiism. The Syrian Shi‘i community has to see the women on his camera screen while incorporated rituals and doctrines of the larger he was fi lming them, in a clear breach of the Ja’fari community through the consumption of religious rule of sexual segregation that aims to texts, images, and performances offered in the protect women from the male gaze. Standing pilgrimage shrines. This collective pattern of near him was a young Shi‘i clergyman reciting consumption usually goes together with the ac- the drama of Karbala to a group of pilgrims, ceptance of the religious authority of the Shi‘i who did not seem to be bothered by the scene, clergy trained in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Be- which pointed to an implicit or pragmatic ac- sides the reorganization of the collective frame- ceptance by a religious authority of the neces- work of symbols, rituals, and power relations of sities of the individualized consumption of reli- the Shi‘i community, the consumption of religious experiences over the moral imperatives of gious commodities has created new dynamics of proper behavior in a sacred place. identity among the Syrian Shi‘is. The possibility The commoditization of iconic elements of the individual consumption of mass-produced of the Shi‘i tradition gives them a certain au- objects with Shi‘i symbolic and iconic references 122 and their use in practices that are not fully de- modities allows some ‘Alawis to construct per- fi ned by the collective rituals of the community sonal forms of devotion to the holy fi gures of have allowed the emergence of less hierarchical Shiism without fully adopting the beliefs and and more individualized forms of construction behaviors associated with Ja’fari Shiism. This and affi rmation of Shi‘i identities.39 is more evident in the case of ‘Alawi women, An example of how the consumption of who are traditionally excluded from acquiring religious commodities allows the emergence religious knowledge. Some ‘Alawi women fi nd of individualized forms of piety and religious a public religious identity by turning to Ja’fari identity can be seen in the case of the owner Shiism, despite the fact that they do not accept mparative of a barbershop near Bab Tuma, in the old city many of its behavioral and moral rules, such as of Damascus. When entering the shop the visi- veiling. For example, a twenty-seven-year-old Coudies of tor can see several posters depicting Ali and ‘Alawi engineer told me about her visits to Sayda St uth Asia, Husayn, a large silver sticker in the shape of Zaynab: “As a woman the only path open to me Ali’s sword that frames the mirror in front of is to follow the [ Ja’fari] Shi‘i school, but . . . I So the clients’ chairs, a calendar with scenes from just cannot wear the hijab. Why a piece of cloth Africa and the ddle East the battle of Karbala, and black banners em- should be more important than what I have in Mi broidered with golden letters proclaiming “ya my heart? I in my house have pictures of Imam Husayn” and “ya Ali.” An embroidery depicting Ali and Imam Husayn, which I bought at Sayda Ali’s two-edged sword hangs on the wall. The Zaynab, so I can meditate on their example and owner of the shop is a thirty-nine-year-old Leba- connect with their light [nur ].” nese man raised and educated in Damascus in Some non-Shi‘i religious groups, such as a secular Shi‘i family. According to him, these the Sufi communities, also developed signifi cant religious commodities allow him to reclaim and participation in the market of religious commu- affi rm his Shi‘i identity. When asked how, he nities that emerged around the Shi‘i pilgrimage answered: “I used to be quite isolated, to be a shrines in Syria. The Sufis of Damascus and Shi‘i was to cry and mourn during the ‘Ashura Aleppo consume avidly the abundant iconogra- and to follow some marja [Shi‘i higher religious phy depicting Ali and Husayn, both revered as authority], and I did not like either thing. Now the fi rst links in the mystical chain (silsila) in it is different, I can be Shi‘i by showing in my life the transmission of the esoteric knowledge of [pointing to the objects] the love that I have in the Sufi path. It is quite common to see Iranian- my heart to Imam Ali and Imam Husayn.” The made posters with images of Ali and Husayn religious images and objects displayed in this or Ali’s sword or depictions of the drama of shop also serve as identity markers, delimiting a Karbala hanging on the wall of Sufi zawiyas (rit- space endowed with personal symbolism where ual lodges) throughout Syria. The consumption Shi‘i identity can be expressed, affi rmed, and by the Sufi s of the Shi‘i iconography sold at the lived in relation to the larger Syrian society.40 pilgrimage shrines is done within the framework The centers of mass pilgrimage in Syria of their veneration of Ali, Husayn, and other also allowed for the establishment of forms of members of the ahl al-bayt. ritual communication between transnational The use of these images by the Sufis is Shiism and the ‘Alawi community, whose mem- linked to their perception of religious authority bers can be seen visiting the shrine of Sayda Zay- as deriving from the esoteric tradition that they nab. While this ritual communication remains attribute to Ali and Husayn. For example, in within the traditional framework of ‘Alawi tomb Aleppo many Sufi zawiyas linked to the Qadiri- visitation, the consumption of religious com- yya, Rifa’iyya, and Shadhiliyya display on their

39. The objectiﬁ cation of religious symbols in mass- 40. Joann D’Alisera shows in her analysis of Sierra produced images or objects opens the way to indi- Leonean immigrants in the United States how the vidualized forms of sacralization and devotion. See display of religious commodities produces “qualiﬁ ed Woodman Taylor, “Agency and Affectivity of Paint- identifying statements that aim to locate the individ- ings: The Lives of Chitrajis in Hindu Ritual Contexts,” ual in both his community and the larger society.” See Material Religion: The Journal of Objects, Art, and Be- her “I Islam: Popular Religious Commodities, Sites lief 1 (2005): 198 – 227. of Inscription and Transnational Sierra Leonean Iden- tity,” Journal of Material Culture 6 (2001): 91 – 110. walls images of Ali and Husayn together with of the resignifi cation of religious commodities 123 the photos of their deceased sheikhs. These im- by consumption depends on how successful the ages visually re-create the mystical connections process of objectification was in erasing the between the family of the Prophet and the lin- imprint left by the social and cultural context eage of the present sheikh of the zawiya. In a that structured its production, as well as on the similar way, posters depicting the holy mosques degree of consonance that it has with the reli- of Najaf and Karbala adorn the walls of the gious and cultural background of the consumer. tombs of Sufi sheikhs, such as in the zawiya al- For example, non-Sufi Sunni Muslims who visit Badinjkiyya in Aleppo. These images link the Sayda Zaynab tend to remain indifferent to the local Sufi -framed cult of saints with the larger religious iconography sold there because their Shi‘i pilgrimage network of sacred places. Thus religious sensibilities do not engender the neces- the consumption of the religious commodities sity or desire of consuming religious images. Paulo G. Paulo Pinto sold at the pilgrimage shrines form channels of The ritual and doctrinal forms of com- ritual communication between Sufi sm and Shi- munication produced by religious consumption ism, creating a common religious imaginary for have created new possibilities for the local Sufi their shared symbols and sacred narratives. communities in Syria to negotiate their presence There is also a selective consumption of in the Shi‘i pilgrimage shrines. For example, it Shi‘i texts by the Sufi community, which focuses is common to see in Sayda Zaynab groups of on texts dealing with the ahl al-bayt. This doctri- Sufi s doing dhikr (mystical evocations) inside the nal communication between Sufi sm and Shiism courtyard of the shrine or taking part in the cel- is much less dynamic and consistent than the ebration of religious rituals such as the ‘Ashura. ritual communication, as most Shi‘i texts pose This phenomenon depends on the possibilities doctrinal challenges to the Sunni identity of the of articulation between the various Sufi and Shi‘i

Syrian Sufi s. The religious rationale behind the identities and is not homogeneously distributed Commodities, Objectification Religious Pilgrimage, and Sufi consumption of Shi‘i iconography and texts across communities and social groups. For ex- was summarized by a sheikh of the Rifa’i Sufi ample, according to Myriam Ababsa, in Raqqa, order in Aleppo, who in response to my remarks intellectual circles linked to the traditional on the presence of Iranian-made posters depict- urban notable families resent the appropriation ing Ali and Husayn in his zawiya said, of the tomb of Uways al-Qarani, which they see as a lieux de mémoire of Raqqa’s urban identity, by We belong to Sunni Islam [nahna min ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’], but we share with the Shi‘is our de- the state and by a religious community that they votion to Ali, Husayn, and all the family of the view as “foreign” (the Shi‘i). Prophet. These pictures are only representations However, the members of the seminomadic of the external reality [al-haqiqa al-zahiriyya] of Shawaya tribe, in particular those linked to the Imam Ali . . . but they help us to feel his spiritual Sufi order of the Marindiyya, who consider presence with us. In reality the Shi‘is understood themselves to be descendants of Husayn, have an part of the esoteric truth [al-haqiqa al-batiniyya] approving attitude toward the “beautifi cation” of of the mystical path, which is the ultimate reality the mausoleums. They see the new mausoleums of Islam and, beyond the apparent differences as a sign of the recognition of their holy lineage between our religious schools [madhahibu-na], by the Syrian state. Thus the Shawaya signify the we are all Muslims. Shi‘i devotion to Husayn as a form of respect to This symbolic neutrality of religious commodi- their genealogical history, in opposition to the ties was highlighted by Gregory Starrett, who re- contempt that the urban elite of Raqqa have to- marked that “religious commodities are only reli- ward their tribal identity. The Shawaya, as well as gious once they ceased being commodities, once other residents of Raqqa, continue to make their they passed out of the commodity phase to the visitations to the mausoleums within the frame- consumption phase of their social life.” 41 One work of their Sufi practices and beliefs.42 can add to Starrett’s statement that the scope

41. Starrett, “Political Economy,” 59.

42. Ababsa, “Signiﬁ cations territoriales,” 121 – 24. 124 Conclusion gives a high degree of autonomy to each of the This analysis has shown how the constitution of commodifi ed elements of the tradition, under- centers of Shi‘i mass pilgrimage in Syria have mining the ideological work that tries to connect allowed for the emergence of a public sphere them to discursive and practical frameworks structured by the practices involved in the pro- under the control of the state or the religious duction, marketing, and consumption of reli- authorities. gious commodities. The emergence of a market The fragmentation of the religious tradi- of religious commodities is itself a fundamental tion by the process of commoditization is intensi- element in the social and religious effi cacy of fi ed by the fact that religious commodities share mparative pilgrimage as a mechanism of religious disci- instrumental uses with nonreligious commodi- pline and objectifi cation. While the religious ties. Thus, as Gregory Starrett points out, a copy Coudies of markets created by mass pilgrimage in Syria of the Koran and a box of chocolates can both St uth Asia, share many characteristics with capitalist mar- be suitable gifts for a birthday, and only the re- kets in general, this does not mean that they are insertion of a religious commodity into the web So structured by an abstract and universal “mar- of social practices and cultural perceptions of Africa and the ddle East ket rationality” that acts independently of any the consumers can resignify it as a religious ob- Mi social and cultural context. Even markets that ject and distinguish it from other commodities.44 are limited to the economic sphere of social life Therefore the religious market and its effects have cultural values and dispositions inscribed on religious identities, discourses, and practices in their organization and dynamics.43 cannot be thought of without an analysis of the In the case of religious markets, the nor- practices of consumption associated with it. mative character of the symbols and practices Notwithstanding its commonsensical rep- that defi ne their dynamics reinforces their con- resentations, consumption is not an act of “shape- nection to power relations, institutions, and less desire” but rather an arena to express iden- forms of authority. This is clear in the case of tities and social attributes, such as status.45 the market of Shi‘i religious commodities in Therefore consumption must be understood as Syria, which is the target of a heavily ideologi- a creative interaction between the logic of the cal investment by both the Iranian and Syrian production and marketing of commodities and states that aims to control and manipulate it as the identities, the social position, and the cultur- a tool for the implemention of their particular ally shaped desires and perceptions of the con- religious and political agendas. This ideological sumers. The practices of consumption allow the aspect of the Shi‘i religious market is evident in visitors of the pilgrimage shrines to incorporate the processes of the objectifi cation and com- religious commodities as constitutive elements moditization of the religious tradition. Religious of the disciplinary practices of religious refl exiv- and political authorities try to shape religious ity that structure their identities, such as the use commodities as iconic forms of codifi cation and of mass-produced religious images in devotional communication of their particular defi nition of forms of piety. Therefore, the consumption of the Shi‘i tradition. religious commodities links the processes of the However, the mass production of religious construction and fashioning of religious selves commodities temporarily desacralizes the re- to the larger religious system of transnational ligious images, symbols, and messages of the Shiism. Shi‘i tradition by fi xing them in material objects Finally, it can be said that while the spheres whose position vis-à-vis religious practices and of the production and marketing of religious discourses becomes defi ned by their practical commodities in the Shi‘i pilgrimage shrines use. So a poster with the image of Ali can be- in Syria are clearly marked by power relations come a mere marker of identity or a devotional and ideological constraints, the sphere of con- object in various Shi‘i and Sufi contexts. This sumption creates channels of individual and

43. Robert Hefner, “Introduction: Society and Moral- 44. Starrett, “Political Economy,” 58 – 59. ity in the New Asian Capitalisms,” in Market Cultures: 45. Hefner, “Introduction: Society and Morality,” 25. Society and Morality in the New Asian Capitalisms, ed. Robert Hefner (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 3 – 5. collective participation in the production of the 125 objectifi ed religious system that shapes transnational Shiism. The mechanisms of participation created by consumption can also be used by individuals and groups in order to overcome their social or ideological exclusion, as was the case of the Syrian Sufi s who used religious consumption in order to reconnect with the holy sites that had been transformed into Shi‘i pilgrimage shrines. Nevertheless, these channels of participation are not evenly distributed or open to all identities, presenting various possible levels of incor- Paulo G. Paulo Pinto porating and excluding individuals and communities according to their insertion into the web of power relations, practices, and discursive traditions that defi ne the limits of the religious market. Therefore, the analysis of religious consumption in the Shi‘i shrines in Syria shows how commoditized objects, images, and discourses mediate the articulation of local practices, discourses, and identities with the processes that create transnational religious communities. Pilgrimage, Commodities, Objectification Religious Pilgrimage, and