Lessons from the Flint Water Crisis Mindy Myers Wayne State University

Wayne State University Wayne State University Dissertations 1-1-2018 Democratic Communication: Lessons From The Flint Water Crisis Mindy Myers Wayne State University, Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations Part of the Other Communication Commons, and the Rhetoric Commons Recommended Citation Myers, Mindy, "Democratic Communication: Lessons From The Flint Water Crisis" (2018). Wayne State University Dissertations. 2120. https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/2120 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Wayne State University Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState. DEMOCRATIC COMMUNICATION: LESSONS FROM THE FLINT WATER CRISIS by MINDY MYERS DISSERTATION Submitted to the Graduate School of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 2018 MAJOR: ENGLISH Approved By: _____________________________________________ Advisor Date _____________________________________________ _____________________________________________ _____________________________________________ ©COPYRIGHT BY MINDY MYERS 2018 All Rights Reserved DEDICATION To my Mom and Dad for being the kids’ granny nanny and Uber driver, so I could get work done. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my dissertation advisor, Richard Marback, for his vision, guidance and support. Without your help this project would never have been possible. I am grateful as well to Jeff Pruchnic, Donnie Sackey, and Marc Kruman for their insight and expertise. I would also like to thank Caroline Maun. Your kindness and support have meant more to me than you know. I would like to thank my husband, Jeremiah, a true partner who has always considered my career as important as his own. And, finally, my sons, Linus and Satchel, who were no help writing this dissertation but who I love with all my heart anyway. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... iii Chapter 1: The Flint Water Crisis: A Failure of Democracy ................................................... 1 Chapter 2: Emergency Management: The Framework for the Flint Water Crisis ................................................................................................................................ 21 Chapter 3: Looking to See Where the Shoe Pinches: The Democratizing Potential of Citizen/Expert Relationships .................................................................................... 44 Chapter 4: Citizen Participation and Reports for Decision Making: A Formal Analysis of The Flint Water Advisory Task Force Final Report ................................................ 65 Chapter 5: Lessons from the Flint Water Crisis ....................................................................... 88 Works Cited .............................................................................................................................. 105 Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 114 Autobiographical Statement .................................................................................................... 115 iv 1 CHAPTER 1: “THE FLINT WATER CRISIS: A FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY” The Flint water crisis occurred when the city switched from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department to the Flint River. Upon the switch, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality—the state entity responsible for overseeing water quality and safety in the State of Michigan—erroneously informed the city they did not have to add corrosion control treatment to the water. With no corrosion control in place, the corrosive river water leeched lead from the aging pipes resulting in widespread levels of lead in the city’s drinking supply. It took the state nineteen months to acknowledge that corrosion control had not been in place and to issue an alert to citizens to not drink the water. During this time, the citizens of Flint were exposed to lead well above the EPAs action level. The repercussions of this tragedy for the citizens of Flint cannot be understated. The miscarriage rate in Flint increased precipitously and it is estimated that among the babies conceived from November 2013 through March 2015 “between 189 and 276 more children would have been born had Flint not enacted the switch in water” (Grossman and Slusky 32). Exposure to lead is particularly devastating for children and those exposed will struggle with reduced IQ, behavior problems, lack of impulse control, a reduced attention span, and reduced educational attainment. The lack of corrosion control not only increased levels of lead in the city’s drinking water, but also made chlorinating the system difficult. This led to a spike in Legionnaire’s disease during the switch that sickened an estimated 79 individuals and killed at least 12. In addition to the aforementioned health effects, the water crisis had a detrimental economic impact as well. Home values decreased, and the corrosive river water damaged not only the city’s water infrastructure, but also many residents’ plumbing, water heaters, washing machines, and dishwashers. 2 The initial failure to add corrosion control to the city’s water was a mistake made by officials at the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, but the removal of democratic citizen participation provided the underlying framework that allowed this initial mistake to go unnoticed for so long. It was a failure of democracy that led to the tragic consequences of the Flint water crisis. The City of Flint had been getting its water from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department for decades, but, throughout 2012 and 2013, two subsequent emergency managers who had been appointed by the state to direct the financially distressed city decided to build a pipeline from Lake Huron to Flint to save money and use the nearby Flint River, which had been used as a back-up source for decades, as a temporary water source. Many of the citizens were not comfortable using the Flint River, but the emergency managers projected that doing so would save the struggling city $5 million dollars over the two years it would take to complete the pipeline. They were confident that the city’s water treatment facility would be able to do what was necessary to provide the citizens with safe drinking water. Mike Glasgow, Flint’s Laboratory and Water Quality Supervisor, however, was skeptical from the beginning about the city’s ability to maintain a safe drinking water supply. Emails show that he attempted to persuade the Department of Environmental Equality away from using the Flint River as a water source because he did not feel the water treatment plant was prepared to provide safe water to the city. He explained that, though he had people above him planning to distribute water “ASAP,” he needed more time to train staff and update monitoring. He said that he “was reluctant before, but after looking at the monitoring schedule and our current staffing I do not anticipate giving the OK to begin sending water out anytime soon. If water is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it will be against my direction” (Emails Released by Gov. Rick Snyder). Glasgow doubted he would be listened to but concluded that he would “reiterate this to management above me, but they seem to have their 3 own agenda.” Glasgow was right. Just eight days after sending this message, the City of Flint switched from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department to the Flint River. In the months after the switch, the State of Michigan ignored growing evidence that something was wrong with the water. Residents complained of discolored water that smelled bad and tasted worse. They claimed the water was causing a range of health problems such as hair loss, stomach ailments, rashes, and pet deaths. The city’s water treatment facility issued two boil-water alerts, one for e. coli and another for coliform, and a Water Warning for high levels of trihalomethane, a disinfectant byproduct that can cause liver and kidney damage. The Flint General Motors plant switched from the City of Flint water to Flint Township water citing the fact that the city’s water was corroding their auto parts. An outbreak of legionella--a bacteria carried in water- -occurred the year after the switch sickening 97 and killing 9. A local pediatrician, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, identified an uptick in blood lead levels of Flint children that coincided with the water switch. Walters’ home tested extremely high for lead and an EPA employee who was working on the case was so concerned about what he suspected was a danger to public health that he leaked a memo outlining the city’s failure to implement corrosion control treatment and the potential devastating effects. There were numerous signs that something was wrong with the water. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, state officials, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Health and Human Services continued to assure the citizens of Flint that their water was safe to drink. With no locally elected

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