Improving the Accountability and Stability of Israel's Political System
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KOHELET POLICY FORUM The Kohelet Policy Forum in Jerusalem strives to secure the future of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish People, to strengthen Israeli democracy, expand Improving the individual liberty, and deepen free market principles in Israel. The Forum is a Accountability and non-partisan entity. It relies on private donations and does not accept, Stability of Israel’s directly or indirectly, public funds from any government, domestic Political System: or foreign. The Forum’s legislative research, policy papers, and other A Detailed Proposal research-based products are offered to Israeli decision-makers and to the public for a Feasible free of charge. Electoral Reform Abraham Diskin Emmanuel Navon KOHELET POLICY FORUM Am V’Olamo 8 Jerusalem 9546306 Tel. 02-6312720 Fax 02-6312724 [email protected] www.kohelet.org.il Tevet 5777 – January 2017 Policy Paper no. 30 Abraham Diskin Emmanuel Navon Senior Fellow at the Kohelet Policy Forum Senior Fellow at the Kohelet Policy Forum Abraham Diskin is a professor (emeritus) of the Emmanuel Navon lectures at Tel-Aviv University’s Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a faculty member School of Political Science, Government and of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and head International Relations, and at the Herzliya of the School for Interdisciplinary Studies in Interdisciplinary Center’s Lauder School of Administration, Government and Law at Sha’arei Government, Diplomacy and Strategy. He Mishpat College. He was the Chair of the Political graduated from Sciences-Po Paris and earned his Science Department of the Hebrew University and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Hebrew the Chair of the Israel Political Science Association. University of Jerusalem. Improving the Accountability and Stability of Israel’s Political System: A Detailed Proposal for a Feasible Electoral Reform Abraham Diskin Emmanuel Navon Tevet 5777 – January 2017 Policy Paper no. 30 Improving the Accountability and Stability of Israel’s Political System: A Detailed Proposal for a Feasible Electoral Reform Abraham Diskin & Emmanuel Navon Printed in Israel, Tevet 5777 – January 2017 ISBN 978-965-7674-35-2 Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 1 Part 1: Purpose and Goals of Electoral Reform ..................................................................3 Part 2: Mechanism for the Implementation of the Proposed Reforms ................................................................................................................................5 Part 3: Means for Achieving the Goals of Electoral Reform ............................... 7 Appendix 1: History of Israel’s Voting System and Electoral Reforms ................................................................................................................................................11 Appendix 2: Example of Voting Ballot for Election-day Primaries ..................................14 Appendix 3: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems ................................................................16 Appendix 4: Regional Elections ........................................................................................................................19 Appendix 5: Mechanisms for Appointing a Government ........................................................24 Appendix 6: Duration of Israeli Governments ...................................................................................26 Appendix 7: Correlation Between the Number of Parties and Political Stability ............................................................................................................................. 32 Appendix 8: Results of Knesset Elections, 1949-2015 ...................................................................34 Appendix 9: Opinion Poll on the Proposed Reforms .................................................................. 44 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................................. 47 Endnotes ...........................................................................................................................................................................49 TABLE OF CONTENTS iii Executive Summary This paper is a detailed proposal for the reform of In order to achieve the above two goals and to gather Israel’s electoral system. The changes proposed the support of a majority of MKs, we recommend here are the result of years of research, data analysis the following: and comparative studies. We believe that the a. Enabling voters to select candidates on the lists reforms outlined in this paper would be beneficial, submitted by parties for Knesset elections. that they would have a realistic chance of being implemented, and that they would strike a delicate b. Establishing a mechanism for the formation of balance between conflicting agendas. multi-party alliances (hereafter: “multi-party alliance/s” or “alliance/s”); The proposed reform is aimed at achieving the following overall goals: These two reforms should not be made mandatory, in order not to deter the current parties from a. To make Members of Knesset (MKs) more supporting the reforms. Parties will be free to opt accountable and answerable to their voters; out. The parties will also have an incentive not to b. To improve government stability. opt out, because many voters are more likely to vote for a party that enables “election-day primaries” (i.e. When addressing electoral reform, equally laudable the selection of candidates by voters on the party goals are often incompatible with one another. list for which they vote). For example, reforms aimed at guaranteeing government stability may distort or even disregard This paper consists of three parts and nine the will of voters. Moreover, the purpose of electoral appendixes. Part one details the main goals of reform must not only look good on paper but must electoral reform. Part two outlines the mechanism also be feasible to implement. Our proposal takes for achieving these goals. Part three explains in into account Israel’s political reality – the interests more detail the means by which these reforms will and considerations of the parties and the likelihood achieve their goals. of their supporting these reforms. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 The appendixes provide facts, data and explanations concerning the proposed reform. Appendix 1 explains the origins of Israel’s electoral system and reviews previous reform attempts; Appendix 2 presents a sample of a voting ballot for “election-day primaries”; Appendix 3 provides a comparative analysis of voting systems around the world; Appendix 4 explains the pitfalls of regional elections; Appendix 5 explains alternative mechanisms for the formation of a new government after elections; Appendix 6 provides important insights into the alleged instability of Israeli governments; Appendix 7 explains the connection between political stability, the number of parties and the electoral system; Appendix 8 reviews and analyzes the results of legislative elections since 1949; Appendix 9 presents the results of a public opinion poll on the reforms proposed in this paper. 2 IMPROVING THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND STABILITY OF ISRAEL’S POLITICAL SYSTEM Part 1: Purpose and Goals of Electoral Reform In the decades since Israel’s independence, there The following goals are attainable via the reforms have been many proposals for the reform of the proposed in this paper: country’s political system. Those reforms that 1. To grant voters the option of personally were implemented generally proved counter- choosing their representatives, increase the productive. “Solutions” to Israel’s political ills have accountability of elected officials towards their often produced the opposite of their intended voters, and strengthen the link between voters results, not least because they were implemented and elected officials;2 without taking into account empirical evidence (See Appendix 1). Moreover, there are often 2. To reduce the negative side-effects of the contradictions between the different reform goals. current selection process of the parties’ This paper strikes a balance between the conflicts candidates for the Knesset (such as the that inevitably emerge from various electoral registration blitzes for new party members in reforms. Electoral reform in Israel should focus on the lead-up to primary elections); accomplishing the following two primary goals: 3. To encourage the formation of large parties a. Members of Knesset (MKs) should represent and/or electoral alliances;3 their voters and be answerable to them;1 4. To encourage parties to declare before elections b. Governments should be stable and be able which coalition they will join after the elections; to govern, and their formation should be less cumbersome. 5. To encourage the parties’ commitment to the coalition they joined, and to limit their extortion capabilities; 6. To reduce the risk of distorted election results (such as a parliamentary majority produced by a minority of voters); 7. To reduce the risk of excluding minorities from parliamentary representation; 8. To determine who will be the Prime Minister immediately after the elections;4 PART 1: PURPOSE AND GOALS OF ELECTORAL REFORM 3 9. To increase the government’s stability, its ability to govern, and its longevity.5 Contradictions may arise between