Online Appendices

REMKO VOOGD

RE-ASSESSING THE DISSATISFIEDDISSATISFIED VOLATILE VOTER Political Support as Cause and Consequence of Electoral Volatility Online Appendices

RE-ASSESSING THE DISSATISFIED VOLATILE VOTER

Political Support as Cause and Consequence of Electoral Volatility

Remko Voogd

Content of Appendices

Appendices to Chapter 3 ...... 3 Appendix 3A Full Tables LISS Panel Data ...... 3 Appendix 3B Robustness Checks (LISS Panel Data)...... 8 Appendix 3C Description of 1VOP Data ...... 16 Appendix 3D Tables 1VOP Data ...... 22 Appendices to Chapter 4 ...... 25 Appendix 4A Validity of the reported and recalled vote choice questions (CSES data) ...... 25 Appendix 4B: Elections Included in the Analyses: Voting Patterns (Recall-Current) ...... 28 Appendix 4C Party System Changes (Only elections with actual changes are listed)...... 29 Appendix 4D Parties Classified as Populist Parties (based on Van Kessel 2015) ...... 30 Appendix 4E Full Tables and Figures ...... 33 Appendix 4F Robustness Models: Base variables + Party ID + Employment Status...... 37 Appendix 4G Robustness Models: Models based on 27 elections from 13 countries ...... 4 1 Appendices to Chapter 5 ...... 45 Appendix 5A Descriptives of Voting Patterns and Correlations between the Support Items ...... 45 Appendix 5B Tables & Figures Inter-Election Period ...... 46 Appendix 5C Tables & Figures Campaign Period ...... 54 Appendix 5D Additional Robustness Checks ...... 62 Appendices to Chapter 6 ...... 63 Appendix 6A Countries & Elections ...... 63 Appendix 6B Model checks with time control variables ...... 65 Appendix 6C Data sources and coding decisions when coding ‘seat-share volatility’ ...... 66 Appendix 6D Analyses with Country Fixed Effects. Outcome = ∆ Trust in Parliament ...... 67 Appendix 6E Analyses Excluding Minority Governments. Outcome = ∆ Trust in Parliament ...... 69 Appendix 6F The relation between the pre-electoral shifts in support and electoral volatility ...... 71 Appendix 6G Analyses with subjective economic evaluations. Outcome = ∆Trust Parliament ...... 72 Appendix 6H Analyses with ∆ Trust in Government as Outcome Variable ...... 73 Appendix 6I Analyses with ∆ Trust in Parties as Outcome Variable ...... 78 Appendix 6J Analyses with ∆ Satisfaction with Democracy (SWD) as Outcome Variable ...... 83

Appendices to Chapter 3

Appendix 3A Full Tables LISS Panel Data

Table A1 Overview of wave characteristics (Table 3.1 in Chapter 3) Period: Balkenende IV Government Wave I Wave II Wave III Date of survey wave December 2007 December 2008 December 2009 - Average Trust in Government (0-10) 5.38 5.82 5.45

- Average Trust in Parliament (0-10) 5.38 5.71 5.45

Percentage of the respondents who 25.3% 23.7% 25.2% substantively changed vote intention a

Number of months over which 13b 12 12 volatility is calculated. Period: Rutte II Government Wave I Wave II Wave III Wave IV Date of survey wave December 2012 December 2013 December 2015 December 2016 - Average Trust in Government (0-10) 4.91 4.94 5.21 5.40

- Average Trust in Parliament (0-10) 5.09 5.06 5.29 5.43

Percentage of the respondents who 19.9% 20.1% 24.6% 10% substantively changed vote intention a

Number of months over which 4c 12 24 12 volatility is calculated. a Only respondents with valid answers to the Trust in (Government & Parliament) items. b Switching is calculated using the actual vote at the November 2006 election and the survey wave in December 2007. c Switching is calculated using the actual vote at the Sept2012 election and the survey wave in Dec2012 /Jan2013.

The Tables and Figures presented in the Appendices to chapter 3 are all based upon original analyses by the author(s). The analyses are based on data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS) panel data project (https://www.lissdata.nl/Home) and data from the EenVandaag Opinion Panel (1VOP) (Data not publicly accessible). The Appendices to chapter three are also online accessible as a supplementary file to the published article: Voogd, R., Van der Meer, T.W.G. & Van der Brug, W. (2019). Political Trust as a Determinant of Volatile Vote Intentions: Separating Within- from Between-Persons Effects, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edy029

Table A2 Trust in Parliament & Trust in Government: Direct effects (Table 2 in Chapter 3) Balkenende IV Rutte II (2006-2010) (2012-2017) Model I Model II Model I Model II Trust in Parliament_bw 0.819** 0.911** (0.020)≠ (0.016) ≠ Trust in Parliament_wi 0.957 0.968 (0.027)≠ (0.022) ≠ Trust in Government_bw 0.823** 0.890** (0.019) ≠ (0.015)≠ Trust in Government_wi 0.932** 0.941** (0.026) ≠ (0.020)≠ Vote2006 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 0.712** 0.728** (0.047) (0.049) Vote2012 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 2.167** 2.214** (0.125) (0.128) Months in between volatility waves 1.111 1.078 1.069** 1.069** (0.115) (0.113) (0.004) (0.004) Wave_wi 2.477** 2.413** 0.624** 0.628** (0.649) (0.634) (0.047) (0.047) Gender_bw (1=Male, 2=Female) 0.811** 0.807** 1.014 1.030 (0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.061) Age_bw 1.006 1.006* 1.004 1.004 (0.004)≠ (0.004) ≠ (0.003) (0.003) Age_wi 0.406** 0.409** 0.988 0.985 (0.106)≠ (0.107) ≠ (0.054) (0.053) Marital status (ref: Married) - Divorced_bw 1.096 1.083 1.047 1.050 (0.127) (0.126) (0.101) (0.101) - Divorced_wi 1.060 1.094 0.783 0.784 (0.509) (0.526) (0.252) (0.250) - Widow_bw 0.850 0.828 1.080 1.088 (0.157) (0.153) (0.130) (0.131) - Widow_wi 1.341 1.687 0.894 0.913 (0.887) (1.094) (0.355) (0.363) - Never been Married_bw 1.061 1.051 0.901 0.902 (0.104) (0.103) (0.076) (0.076) - Never been Married_wi 1.678 1.508 1.789* 1.724 (0.697) (0.610) (0.630) (0.604) Daily activity (ref: Employed) - Unemployed_bw 0.913 0.908 1.105 1.087 (0.094) (0.093) (0.102) (0.100) - Unemployed_wi 1.106 1.119 1.388* 1.387* (0.233) (0.234) (0.215) (0.213) - School/Student_bw 0.899 0.890 1.263 1.262 (0.198) (0.196) (0.303) (0.303) - School/Student_wi 0.687 0.714 0.675 0.645 (0.265) (0.274) (0.291) (0.274) - Retired_bw 1.017 1.026 1.219* 1.219* (0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.123) - Retired_wi 1.233 1.236 1.467* 1.469* (0.389) (0.389) (0.281) (0.279) Education (Ref: Middle Vocational (MBO)) - Primary Education_bw 0.875 0.890 0.883 0.871 (0.129) (0.131) (0.119)≠ (0.117)≠

Table A2. Continued - Primary Education_wi 0.578 0.632 3.409* 3.335* (0.288) (0.308) (2.027)≠ (1.980)≠ - Intermediate Secondary (vmbo)_bw 0.946 0.954 1.022 1.028 (0.093) (0.093) (0.087) (0.087) - Intermediate Secondary (vmbo)_wi 0.734 0.667 2.068 1.939 (0.312) (0.282) (0.955) (0.885) - Higher Secondary (Havo/Vwo)_bw 0.990 0.988 0.912 0.915 (0.127) (0.126) (0.102)≠ (0.102)≠ - Higher Secondary (Havo/Vwo)_wi 0.842 0.849 4.896** 4.977** (0.440) (0.442) (2.746)≠ (2.778)≠ - Higher Vocational (HBO)_bw 0.901 0.902 0.918 0.932 (0.086) (0.086) (0.074) (0.075) - Higher Vocational (HBO)_wi 0.679 0.714 1.167 1.117 (0.296) (0.309) (0.537) (0.513) - University_bw 0.808 0.819 0.761** 0.778* (0.109) (0.111) (0.083) (0.084) - University_wi 1.177 1.249 1.542 1.490 (0.910) (0.961) (1.030) (0.993) Interested in Politics_bw 1.444** 1.431** 1.420** 1.406** (0.108)≠ (0.107) ≠ (0.087)≠ (0.085)≠ Interested in Politics_wi 0.954 0.959 1.127 1.125 (0.084)≠ (0.085) ≠ (0.088)≠ (0.088)≠ Party Member_bw (0=No, 1=Yes) 0.179** 0.180** 0.281** 0.280** (0.033)≠ (0.033) ≠ (0.049)≠ (0.049)≠ Party Member_wi (0=No, 1=Yes) 0.648 0.647 0.790 0.790 (0.192)≠ (0.192) ≠ (0.280)≠ (0.280)≠ Constant 0.030** 0.043* 0.144** 0.156** (0.044) (0.064) (0.043) (0.046)

Observations 12,462 12,552 15,956 16,077 Number of Respondents 4,636 4,636 4,775 4,775 Model χ2 269.08, 276.55, 629.81, 653.94 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 Var(Level-1 Error) 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋

3 3 3 3 Var(Level-2 Error) 1.82 1.82 1.10 1.08 (Panel level-variance component) ρ(Level-2 Error / Total Error) .36 .36 .25 .25 LR Test (H0: Level-2 Error=0) χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 452.66, 459.78, 279.93, 279.19, p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 AIC 13138.07 13204.55 14782.59 14884.92 BIC 13405.57 13472.31 15058.98 15161.59 Coefficients are Odds Ratios: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test). When the cluster confounding test indicates that the between-effect of a variable significantly differs from its within-effect (p<0.05; two-tailed test) the standard error is marked with ‘≠’. Abbreviations: bw = between; wi = within.

Table A3 Trust in Parliament & Trust in Government: Conditional effects (Table 3 in Chapter 3) Balkenende IV Rutte II (2006-2010) (2012-2017) Model III Model IV Model III Model IV Trust in Parliament_bw 0.872** 0.977 (0.027) ≠ (0.024) Trust in Parliament_wi 0.985 1.031 (0.037) ≠ (0.034) Trust in Government_bw 0.921** 0.976 (0.027) (0.023) Trust in Government_wi 0.988 1.047 (0.036) (0.034) Vote2006 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 1.650* 3.349** (0.446) (0.887) Vote2012 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 4.670** 5.769** (0.921) (1.065) Trust in Parliament_bw * Vote2006/(2012) 0.861** 0.867** (0.040) (0.030) Trust in Parliament_wi * Vote2006/(2012) 0.935 0.891** (0.053) (0.040) Trust in Government_bw * Vote2006/(2012) 0.764** 0.832** (0.035) (0.027) Trust in Government_wi * Vote2006/(2012) 0.868** 0.824** (0.048) (0.036) Months in between volatility waves 1.113 1.080 1.069** 1.069** (0.115) (0.113) (0.004) (0.004) Wave_wi 2.450** 2.352** 0.625** 0.630** (0.642) (0.617) (0.047) (0.047) Gender_bw (1=Male, 2=Female) 0.812** 0.807** 1.016 1.030 (0.056) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) Age_bw 1.006* 1.007* 1.004 1.004 (0.004) ≠ (0.004) ≠ (0.003) (0.003) Age_wi 0.411** 0.419** 0.986 0.982 (0.107) ≠ (0.109) ≠ (0.054) (0.053) Marital status (ref: Married) - Divorced_bw 1.100 1.082 1.053 1.053 (0.128) (0.125) (0.101) (0.101) - Divorced_wi 1.068 1.107 0.765 0.743 (0.512) (0.531) (0.247) (0.238) - Widow_bw 0.834 0.797 1.071 1.067 (0.154) (0.147) (0.129) (0.128) - Widow_wi 1.325 1.657 0.895 0.909 (0.873) (1.068) (0.355) (0.362) - Never been Married_bw 1.063 1.053 0.902 0.903 (0.104) (0.103) (0.076) (0.076) - Never been Married_wi 1.679 1.507 1.792* 1.732 (0.697) (0.609) (0.632) (0.608) Daily activity (ref: Employed) - Unemployed_bw 0.912 0.907 1.113 1.096 (0.093) (0.093) (0.103) (0.101) - Unemployed_wi 1.104 1.115 1.389* 1.375* (0.232) (0.233) (0.215) (0.212) - School/Student_bw 0.909 0.916 1.228 1.212 (0.200) (0.201) (0.294) (0.290)

Table A3 Continued - School/Student_wi 0.686 0.713 0.679 0.635 (0.264) (0.273) (0.292) (0.268) - Retired_bw 1.019 1.028 1.226* 1.231* (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) - Retired_wi 1.235 1.258 1.466* 1.467* (0.389) (0.396) (0.281) (0.279) Education (Ref: Middle Vocational (MBO)) - Primary Education_bw 0.869 0.877 0.878 0.867 (0.128) (0.129) (0.118) ≠ (0.116) ≠ - Primary Education_wi 0.581 0.655 3.453* 3.370* (0.289) (0.320) (2.057) ≠ (2.005) ≠ - Intermediate Secondary (vmbo)_bw 0.944 0.947 1.023 1.029 (0.092) (0.092) (0.087) (0.087) - Intermediate Secondary (vmbo)_wi 0.731 0.656 2.069 1.945 (0.311) (0.278) (0.959) (0.892) - Higher Secondary (Havo/Vwo)_bw 0.980 0.974 0.901 0.914 (0.125) (0.124) (0.100) ≠ (0.102) ≠ - Higher Secondary (Havo/Vwo)_wi 0.843 0.861 4.945** 5.076** (0.441) (0.449) (2.773) ≠ (2.834) ≠ - Higher Vocational (HBO)_bw 0.900 0.905 0.903 0.918 (0.086) (0.086) (0.072) (0.073) - Higher Vocational (HBO)_wi 0.672 0.713 1.178 1.142 (0.294) (0.308) (0.541) (0.524) - University_bw 0.807 0.818 0.752** 0.770** (0.109) (0.110) (0.081) (0.083) - University_wi 1.174 1.284 1.594 1.569 (0.908) (0.988) (1.060) (1.041) Interested in Politics_bw 1.448** 1.457** 1.426** 1.417** (0.108) ≠ (0.109) ≠ (0.087) ≠ (0.086) ≠ Interested in Politics_wi 0.955 0.962 1.128 1.126 (0.085) ≠ (0.085) ≠ (0.088) ≠ (0.088) ≠ Party Member_bw (0=No, 1=Yes) 0.181** 0.187** 0.277** 0.276** (0.033) ≠ (0.034) ≠ (0.048) ≠ (0.048) ≠ Party Member_wi (0=No, 1=Yes) 0.648 0.650 0.792 0.814 (0.192) ≠ (0.192) ≠ (0.281) ≠ (0.289) ≠ Constant 0.021** 0.023** 0.101** 0.100** (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) Observations 12,462 12,552 15,956 16,077 Number of Respondents 4,636 4,636 4,775 4,775 Model χ2 277.39, 289.38, 651.38 698.76 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 Var(Level-1 Error) 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋

3 3 3 3 Var(Level-2 Error) 1.82 1.82 1.08 1.08 (Panel level-variance component) ρ(Level-2 Error / Total Error) .36 .36 .25 .25 LR Test (H0: Level-2 Error=0) χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 448.33 , 452.98, 274.88, 273.22, p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 AIC 13130.34 13166.04 14762.97 14837.43 BIC 13412.7 13448.67 15054.72 15129.47 Coefficients are Odds Ratios: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test). When the cluster confounding test indicates that the between-effect of a variable significantly differs from its within-effect (p<0.05; two-tailed test) the standard error is marked with ‘≠’. Abbreviations: bw = between; wi = within.

Appendix 3B Robustness Checks (LISS Panel Data)

Table B1 Robustness models with Satisfaction with the Economy: Direct effects Balkenende IV Rutte II (2006-2010) (2012-2017) Model I Model II Model I Model II Trust in Parliament_bw 0.810** 0.923** (0.023) (0.022) Trust in Parliament_wi 0.949* 0.974 (0.028) (0.023) Trust in Government_bw 0.812** 0.879** (0.022) (0.020) Trust in Government_wi 0.926** 0.944** (0.027) (0.022) Satisfaction with the Economy_bw 1.029 1.033 0.980 1.026 (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.029) Satisfaction with the Economy_wi 1.029 1.032 0.982 0.989 (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) Vote2006 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 0.715** 0.735** (0.048) (0.050) Vote2012 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 2.195** 2.234** (0.128) (0.130) Months in between volatility waves 1.082 1.046 1.070** 1.069** (0.119) (0.116) (0.004) (0.004) Wave_wi 2.306** 2.234** 0.628** 0.626** (0.611) (0.594) (0.048) (0.047) Socio-Economic Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes

Constant 0.043* 0.067* 0.144** 0.143** (0.067) (0.105) (0.044) (0.043)

Observations 12,073 12,147 15,525 15,620 Number of respondents 4,621 4,622 4,754 4,754 Model χ2 260.54, 268.26, 622.15 644.65 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 Var(Level-1 Error) 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋

3 3 3 3 Var(Level-2 Error) 1.80 1.80 1.06 1.08 (Panel level-variance component) ρ(Level-2 Error / Total Error) .36 .36 .25 .24 LR Test (H0: Level-2 Error=0) χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 430.88, 438.41, 259.94, 430.88, p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 AIC 12807.05 12855.98 14420.14 14497.52 BIC 13088.2 13137.36 14710.85 14788.46 Coefficients are Odds Ratios: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test). Abbreviations: bw = between; wi = within.

Table B2 Robustness models with Satisfaction with the Economy: Conditional effects Balkenende IV Rutte II (2006-2010) (2012-2017) Model III Model IV Model III Model IV Trust in Parliament_bw 0.853** 0.989 (0.031) (0.034) Trust in Parliament_wi 0.973 1.021 (0.038) (0.037) Trust in Government_bw 0.914** 0.987 (0.032) (0.033) Trust in Government_wi 0.982 1.038 (0.037) (0.036) Satisfaction with the Economy_bw 1.049 1.009 0.984 0.985 (0.044) (0.042) (0.038) (0.039) Satisfaction with the Economy_wi 1.008 1.008 1.019 1.011 (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) Vote2006 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 1.782* 2.558** (0.600) (0.856) Vote2012 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 4.958** 4.855** (1.191) (1.146) Trust in Parliament_bw Vote2006(2012) 0.885* 0.874** (0.051) (0.041) Trust in Parliament_wi Vote2006(2012) 0.942 0.917 (0.055) (0.044) Trust in Government_bw Vote2006(2012) 0.743** 0.803** (0.041) (0.037) Trust in Government_wi Vote2006(2012) 0.866** 0.842** (0.049) (0.040) Satisfaction Economy_bw Vote2006(2012) 0.962 1.077 0.984 1.068 (0.063) (0.070) (0.053) (0.059) Satisfaction Economy_wi Vote2006(2012) 1.048 1.058 0.934 0.959 (0.057) (0.058) (0.044) (0.046) Months in between volatility waves 1.082 1.045 1.070** 1.069** (0.119) (0.116) (0.004) (0.004) Wave_wi 2.284** 2.172** 0.631** 0.629** (0.606) (0.577) (0.048) (0.048) Socio-Economic Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant 0.029* 0.041* 0.100** 0.101** (0.046) (0.065) (0.032) (0.033) Observations 12,073 12,147 15,525 15,620 Number of respondents 4,621 4,622 4,754 4,754 Model χ2 268.41 299.54 645.923 689.13 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 Var(Level-1 Error) 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋

3 3 3 3 Var(Level-2 Error) 1.80 1.81 1.06 1.06 (Panel level-variance component) ρ(Level-2 Error / Total Error) .36 .35 .24 .24 LR Test (H0: Level-2 Error=0) χ2 = 426.67, χ2 = 425.50, χ2 = 254.88, χ2 = 253.81, p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 AIC 12804.1 12822.95 14403.1 14454.97 BIC 13114.85 13133.95 14724.41 14776.53 Coefficients are Odds Ratios: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test). Abbreviations: bw = between; wi = within.

Figure B1 Prediction of Switching over Trust in Parliament (Economy Model III: Balkenende IV)

Figure B2 Prediction of Switching over Trust in Government (Economy Model IV: Balkenende IV)

Figure B3 Prediction of Switching over Trust in Parliament (Economy Model III: Rutte II)

Figure B4 Prediction of Switching over Trust in Government (Economy Model IV: Rutte II)

Table B3 Robustness models with Switching to/from Abstention: Direct effects Balkenende IV Rutte II (2006-2010) (2012-2017) Model I Model II Model I Model II Trust in Parliament_bw 0.764** 0.835** (0.017) (0.014) Trust in Parliament_wi 0.963 0.926** (0.026) (0.019) Trust in Government_bw 0.777** 0.828** (0.017) (0.014) Trust in Government_wi 0.940** 0.900** (0.025) (0.018)

Vote2006 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 0.766** 0.785** 2.269** (0.048) (0.049) (0.125) Vote2012 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 2.208** (0.121) Months in between volatility waves 1.313** 1.281** 1.075** 1.074** (0.129) (0.127) (0.004) (0.004) Wave_wi 2.219** 2.156** 0.571** 0.574** (0.541) (0.526) (0.040) (0.040) Socio-Economic Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes

Constant 0.014** 0.019** 0.644 0.657 (0.020) (0.026) (0.180) (0.182)

Observations 12,462 12,552 15,956 16,077 Number of Respondents 4,636 4,636 4,775 4,775 Model χ2 339.84, 337.48, 860.75, 894.92 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 Var(Level-1 Error) 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋

3 3 3 3 Var(Level-2 Error) 1.27 1.27 1.06 1.06 (Panel level-variance component) ρ(Level-2 Error / Total Error) .33 .33 .25 .25 LR Test (H0: Level-2 Error=0) χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 433.47, 443.19, 358.22, 359.39, p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 AIC 16536.17 14199.39 16536.17 16625.59 BIC 16812.56 14467.15 16812.56 16902.26 Coefficients are Odds Ratios: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test). Abbreviations: bw = between; wi = within.

Table B4 Robustness models with Switching to/from Abstention: Conditional effects Balkenende IV Rutte II (2006-2010) (2012-2017) Model III Model IV Model III Model IV Trust in Parliament_bw 0.818** 0.891** (0.024) (0.021) Trust in Parliament_wi 0.982 0.956 (0.035) (0.029) Trust in Government_bw 0.872** 0.904** (0.024) (0.020) Trust in Government_wi 0.990 0.971 (0.034) (0.028) Vote2006 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 1.884** 3.750** (0.479) (0.936) Vote2012 (0=Opposition,1=Gov. Party) 4.542** 5.880** (0.849) (1.036) Trust in Parliament_bw Vote2006/(2012) 0.852** 0.874** (0.037) (0.029) Trust in Parliament_wi Vote2006/(2012) 0.956 0.939 (0.052) (0.039) Trust in Government_bw Vote2006/(2012) 0.759** 0.833** (0.032) (0.026) Trust in Government_wi Vote2006/(2012) 0.884** 0.863** (0.046) (0.035) Months in between volatility waves 1.314** 1.283** 1.075** 1.074** (0.130) (0.128) (0.004) (0.004) Wave_wi 2.194** 2.103** 0.572** 0.576** (0.535) (0.513) (0.040) (0.041) Socio-Economic Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes

Constant 0.010** 0.010** 0.469** 0.432** (0.014) (0.014) (0.136) (0.124)

Observations 12,462 12,552 15,956 16,077 Number of Respondents 4,636 4,636 4,775 4,775 Model χ2 349.35, 372.46, 877.23, 932.93, p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 Var(Level-1 Error) 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋 𝜋

3 3 3 3 Var(Level-2 Error) 1.27 1.27 1.06 1.06 (Panel level-variance component) ρ(Level-2 Error / Total Error) .33 .33 .25 .25 LR Test (H0: Level-2 Error=0) χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 427.59, 428.03, 352.35, 350.77, p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 p<.000 AIC 14098 14155.55 16521.18 16582.13 BIC 14380.36 14438.18 16812.92 16874.17 Coefficients are Odds Ratios: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test). Abbreviations: bw = between; wi = within.

Figure B5 Prediction of Switching over Trust in Parliament (Abstention Model III: Balkenende IV)

Figure B6 Prediction of Switching over Trust in Gov. (Abstention Model IV: Balkenende IV)

Figure B7 Prediction of Switching over Trust in Parliament (Abstention Model III: Rutte II)

Figure B8 Prediction of Switching over Trust in Government (Economy Model IV: Rutte II)

Appendix 3C Description of 1VOP Data

Introduction As a robustness check on our main analyses with the LISS panel data, we rely on the Dutch EenVandaag Opinion Panel (1VOP) data. 1VOP are a collection of web-based panel data by the public television, daily current affairs program EenVandaag.

Sample Starting with a large pool of respondents who participated in at least one of the 55 survey waves in which data is collected; we first restricted our sample to only contain respondents who were eligible to cast a vote (minimum age of 18 years at the day of survey participation) and participated in a

1 minimum number of three survey waves that were at least 5 waves apart. 0F This leaves us with a total sample of 63,202 respondents who participated on average in 15.6 out of 55 waves between March

2 2007 and April 2012.1F This time period covers two subsequent government periods: Balkenende IV (2006-2010) and Rutte I (2010-2012). The first coalition was led by the Christian-democratic CDA, with the social-democratic PvdA and Christian-orthodox ChristenUnie as junior partners (also discussed in the main paper). The second coalition was led by the VVD with support from junior partner CDA and radical rightwing populist Freedom Party. Both governments ended prematurely, yet we limit our analyses to periods in which a fully authorized government was in office, thus excluding caretaker governments. The internet panel of the 1VOP is composed by means of self-assignment. While the 1VOP contains a broad cross section of Dutch society, neither the composition of the panel as a whole nor the samples per survey wave are randomly selected. However, once party preference at the previous election is taken into account, the distribution of party preferences and the shifts in those preferences obtained from the 1VOP very closely resemble the actual vote shares and percentage of shifters during the actual elections: party vote shares and shifts during Lower House

1 This assures that respondents participated during a substantial number of days. The average time span between 5 survey waves is 99 days. 2 This relatively low figure is largely due to panel entrance and exit; between entrance into and exit from the panel participants participated on average in 59.7% of the waves.

16 elections correlate with 0.98 with party vote shares and shifts as based on the reported votes in the 1VOP, once the data are weighted on the basis of earlier voting behavior (cf. Van der Meer et al. 2012). Because 1) we are interested in effects rather than in absolute percentages, 2) we are able to control for a range of substantive and methodological determinants in our multivariate analysis, and 3) because the panel data allow us to separate within- from between-respondent effects, the self-selection of the sample is unlikely to bias our conclusions. There are two additional threats to the generalizability of our results. The first is a so called ‘panel conditioning effect’, where respondents become less likely to change over time as a result of their continued participation in the survey (e.g., Warren and Halpern-Manners, 2012). To the extent that voters in a panel are less likely to change their vote intentions than they would be if they were not participating in the panel, it would lead to conservative estimates of the effects of changes in political trust. The existence of a ‘positive’ panel conditioning effect in which switching may be overestimated as a result of reporting non-sincere (strategical) vote intentions to give a signal to parties is also highly unlikely. Aggregate vote-share percentages based on the 1VOP are never reported in the television program. A second bias could occur when the respondents in this panel would be more- or less sensitive to changes in political trust than a random sample. The average participant in the 1VOP is likely to be more politically interested than the average citizen. To test whether both biases affect our conclusions we will later on even discuss the findings of some robustness checks within this robustness check.

Trust in government The 1VOP data cover a recurrent item on trust in government, but not parliament. Trust in government is measured using the recurrent item ‘How much trust do you generally have in the Balkenende IV/Rutte I government?’, with response categories ranging from ‘totally no trust at all’ 3 to ‘a lot of trust’ on a four point scale.2F We employ five observations of trust in government at 4 different points in time when the Balkenende IV government was in office3F , and four observations during the Rutte I period.

3 The Dutch conceptualization of ‘the government’ (‘de regering’) refers to the central political executive, not to the broader body of civil servants that take care of implementation and maintenance of public policies. 4 Two additional waves containing the ‘trust in government’ measure were left out, as their inclusion would lead to very short, unbalanced time spans to measure electoral volatility.

Vote intentions Vote intentions were measured in each original 1VOP survey wave using the same standard question (‘If Lower House elections were held today which party would you vote for’) and a standardized list of parties and party splits represented in parliament. The way we coded electoral volatility is identical to the main analyses on the LISS panel data; we thus only investigate party switching in our main models. We end up with 34 measures of potentially changing vote intentions during the Balkenende IV government period and 19 measures during the Rutte I government period. As trust in government was measured less frequently, we created new variables that describe respondents’ volatility between two subsequent waves in which trust in government was measured. During the Balkenende IV (Rutte I) period, we created 5 (4) binary measures of electoral volatility (as dependent variables), indicating whether respondents changed their vote intentions at least once 5 (coded 1) or not (coded 0) in between two ‘trust in government’ waves. 4F Descriptive statistics of the core variables per wave are provided in table C1.

Moderating and control variables Moderating and control variables are generally similar as those in the main analyses. Voting for a subsequent government party at the 2006 and 2010 elections is coded using 1VOP survey waves collected immediately after the elections. Only for respondents who entered the panel later during the electoral cycle, we had to rely on a recall question. But despite bias in vote recall growing stronger with time, it has been shown that this bias remains relatively small and would result in more conservative estimations of volatility, as voters tend to recall in line with their current preferences (van Elsas et al., 2014).

5 We thus measure the independent variable ‘trust in government’ and the dependent variable ‘volatile vote intentions’ simultaneously over the same period of time. Several vote intention waves are already available after the elections in both government periods before the ‘trust in government’ question was asked for the first time. Note that trust in government cannot influence electoral volatility as long as there is not yet a new coalition government. Therefore, in the Balkenende IV period we include vote intention measurements from the first wave after the inauguration of the government onwards. In the Rutte I period, we included measures of vote intention from a few weeks before the inauguration of the government onwards, after it became clear what the composition of the new government would be and trust in (the future) government was included in the survey.

Table C1 Overview of wave characteristics Period: Balkenende IV Government Wave I Wave II Wave III Wave IV Wave V Date of wave (Trust in Government). 29-11-2007 4-09-2008 06-03-2009 03-09-2009 11-02-2010

Average Trust in Government score. 1.99 1.94 2.15 2.05 1.90

Number of original ‘volatility’ waves within this 8 11 6 4 5 period used in the binary measure of volatility

Percent Volatile of respondents who have a valid 38.6% 36.9% 29.7% 20.6% 25.3% response to the Trust in Government question.

Days between ‘Trust in Government’ waves. 280a 280 183 181 161

Days between first and last original ‘volatility’ 267 231 133 170 91 waves in this period. Period: Rutte I Government Wave I Wave II Wave III Wave IV Date of wave (Trust in Government). 15-11-2010 19-4-2011 7-10-2011 24-2-2012 Average Trust in Government score 2.30 2.23 2.19 2.12

Number of original ‘volatility’ waves within this 5 4 5 5 period used in the binary measure of volatility

Percent Volatile of respondents who have a valid 21.9% 24.8% 23.5% 24.7% response to the Trust in Government question.

Days between ‘Trust in Government’ waves. 56b 155 171 140

Days between first and last original ‘volatility’ 56 64 80 123 waves in this period. a Number of days between the inauguration of government and the first trust in government wave. b Number of days between the ‘trust in future government Rutte I’ wave at 20-9-2010 and the wave at 15-11-2010

Support for government covers CDA, PvdA, and CU for the Balkenende IV government period. The Rutte I government formally consisted of VVD, CDA. Yet, as a minority government it received fixed parliamentary support from the populist right-wing Freedom Party (PVV), which co-developed and co-signed the government treaty. While we therefore code the PVV as a government party in our main analyses, a further robustness check that excludes PVV voters from the analysis shows that the substantive conclusions remain the same. The complex design of 1VOP requires several controls for potential panel effects. First, we control for the actual number of waves in which respondents participated in the time period between

6 two ‘trust in government waves’.5F Second, we control for the number of days in between two survey waves in which the ‘trust in government’ question was asked (see table 1). Third, the models include a linear term for the survey wave in which responses where collected (based on the trust in 7 government waves).6F The relevance of including these controls is confirmed by the outcomes of the models we estimated below. Finally, the range of demographic variables for which we control includes level of education, age, income, daily activity, house ownership, gender, religious denomination, household composition, marital status, trade union membership, and party membership, but not political interest (which was not covered consistently by 1VOP).

Main findings with the 1VOP data The full results of the 1VOP replication of our main models are presented in the tables in Appendix D. Generally, the results are remarkably similar to the result found with the LISS panel data. First, the 1VOP models confirm significant between- and within-person effects of trust in government on electoral volatility (supporting hypotheses 1 and 2). Second, these effects are significantly stronger among those who voted for the future government parties than among those who did not (supporting hypotheses 3 and 4a). Yet, again we do not find any support for hypothesis 4b. Third, we find the same type of untheorized effect we had already found in the main analyses: government party voters were less likely to have volatile vote intentions during the Balkenende IV government and more likely during the Rutte I government.

Further robustness checks on the 1VOP data We performed three sets of replication analyses on the 1VOP data. First, we replicated our models including only those respondents who participated in at least 4 out of the 5 trust in government waves during the Balkenende IV period, and at least 3 out of 4 waves during Rutte I. This check provides insight whether possible sample bias due to self-selection might occur as the sample now

6 The inclusion of the relative share of participations compared to the total number of possible participations did not affect outcomes. Trust in government is not substantially different among participants with different participation rates. 7 In our specification of the ‘within-between RE’ model the need for such a term arises from the possibility of simultaneous but unrelated (time) trends in the within indicators of both X and Y (Fairbrother, 2014).

20 consists only of the most motivated panel members who almost always respond to the survey. The findings imply no substantially different conclusions. Second, we replicated our analyses after changes into/from abstention or blank votes were coded as volatile vote intentions as well. These models show very consistent effect sizes. Third, we investigated for the Rutte I period whether the effects hold when the PVV-voters (previously coded as supporting the government party) are excluded from the analysis. Again, outcomes are generally robust: only the significant between-effect of trust in government disappears in the general model.

References used in Appendix C

Fairbrother, M., (2014). Two multilevel modeling techniques for analyzing comparative Longitudinal survey datasets. Political Science Research and Methods, 2, 119–140. van der Meer, T., Lubbe, R., Van Elsas, E., Elff, M., Van der Brug, W., 2012. Bounded volatility in the Dutch electoral battlefield: A panel study on the structure of changing vote intentions in the Netherlands during 2006-2010. Acta politica, 47, 333–355. van Elsas, E.J., Lubbe, R., van der Meer, T.W.G., van der Brug, W., 2014. Vote recall: A panel study on the mechanisms that explain vote recall inconsistency. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 26, 18–40. Warren, J.R., Halpern-Manners, A., 2012. Panel conditioning in longitudinal social science surveys. Sociological Methods & Research, 41, 491–534.

Appendix 3D Tables 1VOP Data

Table D1 Trust in Government: Direct effects Random-Effects Logistic Regression Balkenende IV Government Rutte I Government Between- Within- C.C. Test Between- Within- C.C. Test Variables: Effects Effects Effects Effects - Trust in Government 0.696** 0.888** 0.784** 0.885** 0.787** 1.125** (0.016) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.052) - Opposition vs. Government Vote 1.102** 0.540** (0.035) (0.030) Time Controls: - Number of participations in 1.073** 1.133** 0.946** 0.934** 1.269** 0.736** volatility measurements in this (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) wave (Totalparticipation)

- Days in between Trust in 0.998** 1.003** Government waves (0.000) (0.000)

-Wave Number (linear) 0.774** 0.927** (0.013) (0.016)

- Control variables included Yes Yes Observations N = 29116, T (average = 2.9) N = 24101, T (average = 2.6) Tot. Observations = 84778 Tot. Observations = 61634 -Model χ2 3090.14, 1489.25, p<.000 p<.000 -Var(Level-1 Error) fixed at: fixed at: -Var(Level-2 Error) 2.47 3.88 (Panel level-variance component) - ρ(Level-2 Error / Total Error) 0.43 0.54 2 2 -LR Test (H0: Level-2 Error=0) χ 5991.68, χ5226.51, p=<.000 p=<.000 -AIC 91994.07 59556.26 -BIC 92601.67 60134.11 Coefficients are Odds Ratios: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test). Abbreviations: bw = between; wi = within; C.C.Test = Cluster Confounding Test

Table D2 Extended model of changing vote intention with interaction effects Random-Effects Logistic Regression Balkenende IV Government Rutte I Government Variables: Between- Within- C.C. Between- Within- C.C. Effects Effects Test Effects Effects Test - Trust in government 1.105** 0.985 1.122** 1.339** 0.919** 1.457** (0.033) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.042) (0.088) - Opposition vs. Government vote 9.013** 7.342** (0.872) (1.201)

-Trust in government * 0.363** 0.788** 0.461** 0.344** 0.699** 0.493** Opposition vs. Government vote (0.016) (0.044) (0.033) (0.022) (0.049) (0.046)

Time Controls: - Number of participations in 1.085** 1.138** 0.954** 0.966** 1.277** 0.757** volatility measurement in this wave (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (Totalparticipation)

- Days in between Trust in 0.998** 1.003** Government waves (0.000) (0.000)

-Wave Number (linear) 0.775** 0.919** (0.013) (0.016)

- Control variables included Yes Yes Observations N=29116, T(average = 2.9) N=24101, T(average = 2.6) Tot. Observations = 84778 Tot. Observations = 61634 -Model χ2 3482.69, 1713.62, p<.000 p<.000 -Var(Level-1 Error) fixed at: fixed at: -Var(Level-2 Error) 2.38 3.80 (Panel level-variance component) - ρ(Level-2 Error / Total Error) 0.42 0.54 2 2 -LR Test (H0: Level-2 Error=0) χ 5713.53, χ5069.04, p=<.000 p=<.000 -AIC 91439.42 59246.6 -BIC 92065.73 59842.51 Coefficients are Odds Ratios: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test). Abbreviations: bw = between; wi = within; C.C.Test = Cluster Confounding Test

Figure D1 Marginal Effect Plots of the interaction terms in Table D2 (Balkenende IV period) .25 .25 0 0 -.25 -.25 -.5 -.5 -.75 -.75 Effect of Trust in Government on Government in Trust of Effect -1 -1 Volatile Vote Intentions (Log odds) (Log Intentions Vote Volatile

Opp. Gov. Opp. Gov. Between Effect Within Effect

Figure D2 Marginal Effect Plots of the interaction terms in Table D2 (Rutte I period) .25 .25 0 0 -.25 -.25 -.5 -.5 -.75 -.75 Effect of Trust in Government on Government in Trust of Effect -1 -1 Volatile Vote Intentions (Log odds) (Log Intentions Vote Volatile

Opp. Gov. Opp. Gov. Between Effect Within Effect

Appendices to Chapter 4

Appendix 4A Validity of the reported and recalled vote choice questions (CSES data)

A. Excluded elections due to too large deviations of the recalled vote from the actual results.

Austria 2013 election – Recall of 2008 election Party Sample 2008 Official 2008 Sample 2013 Official 2013 recall result report result - SPO 34.9% 29.3% 29.8% 26.8% - OVP 34.3% 26.0% 26.5% 24.0% - FPO 9.9% 17.5% 12.8% 20.5% - BZO 1.7% 10.7% 2.5% 3.5% - Gruene 17.4% 10.4% 17.4% 12.4% - Liberal Forum 2.1% - Fritz 1.8% 0.4% - Team Stronach 2.8% 5.7% - NEOS 6.9% 5% - Communist Party 0.9% 1% Source: CSES Module 4 – ParlGov database for election results

Canada 2004 election – Recall of 2000 election The Canadian 2004 election is dropped from our sample as only 259 respondents provided a valid recall vote choice (versus 1347 respondents indicating a party vote at the current election).

Ireland 2002 election – Recall of 1997 election Party Sample 1997 Official 1997 Sample 2002 Official 2002 recall result report result - Fianna Fail 57.3% 39.3% 45.8% 41.5% - Fine Gael 25.9% 28.0% 21.7% 22.5% - Green 2.2% 2.8% 4.3% 3.9% - Labour 9.8% 10.4% 9.3% 10.8% - Progressive Democrats 2.0% 4.7% 3.5% 4.0% - Sinn Fein 1.7% 2.6% 4.6% 6.5% Source: CSES Module 2 – ParlGov database for election results

The Tables and Figures presented in the Appendices to chapter 4 are all based upon original analyses by the author(s). The analyses made use of data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES; modules 2-4) (www.cses.org). The Appendices to chapter 4 are also online accessible as a supplementary file to the published article: Voogd, R., & Dassonneville, R. (2018). Are the Supporters of Populist Parties Loyal Voters? Dissatisfaction and Stable Voting for Populist Parties. Government and Opposition, 1–22. Advance online publication. http://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.24

Israel 2003 election – Recall of 1999 election Party Sample 1999 Official 1999 Sample 2003 Official 2003 recall result report result - Likud 30.6% 14.2% 24.9% 29.4% - Labor (One Israel) 29.4% 20.3% 15.0% 14.5% - Shinui 2.9% 5.1% 15.1% 12.3% - Meretz 10.1% 7.7% 9.2% 5.2% - National Union 2.4% 3.0% 6.2% 5.5% - Mafdal (NRP) 3.1% 4.2% 3.8% 4.2% - Yahadut Hatora 4.9% 3.8% 5.6% 4.3% - Shas 4.0% 13.0% 5.9% 8.2% - Israel Baaliya 4.3% 5.2% 1.9% 2.2% - Am Ehad (One Nation) 1.2% 1.9% - Center 1.0% 5.0% - Balad 0.7% 2.0% 2.9% 2.3% - Raam 1.2% 3.5% 1.4% 2.1% - Chadash 3.2% 2.6% 3.6% 3.0% - Israel Beytenu 1.0% 2.6% Source: CSES Module 2 – Electoral Studies election report for election results

Israel 2006 – Recall of 2003 election Party Sample 2003 Official 2003 Sample 2006 Official 2006 recall result report result - Kadima 28.8% 22.0% - Labor (Avoda) 20.4% 14.5% 14.2% 15.1% - Likud 45.6% 29.4% 12.5% 9.0% - Ihud Leumi – Mafdal 6.1% 4.2% 7.2% 7.1% - Shas 2.5% 8.2% 3.4% 9.5% - Yahadut Hatora Vehashabbat 2.0% 4.3% 2.2% 4.7% - Israel Beytenu 5.5% 11.5% 9.0% - Meretz-Yahad 6.5% 5.2% 5.6% 3.8% - Gimlaim 4.1% 5.9% - Hadash 2.2% 3.0% 3.6% 2.7% - Raam-Taal 0.7% 2.1% 1.6% 3.0% - Balad 0.8% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% - Shinuy 8.1% 12.3% - Israel Baalia 2.6% 2.2% - Am Ehad (One Nation) 0.1% 2.8% Source: CSES Module 3 – Electoral Studies election report for election results

Portugal 2015 election – Recall of 2011 election Party Sample 2011 Official 2011 Sample 2015 Official 2015 recall result report result - Socialist Democratic Party 41.7% 40.3% 39% 39.8% (PSD) - Socialist Party (PS) 37.9% 29.2% 36.1% 33.6% - CDS-PP 2.9% 12.2% - CDU 11.5% 8.2% 11.6% 8.6% - Bloc of the Left 4.7% 5.4% 10.5% 10.6% - Communists 1.2% 1.1% 1.2% - PAN 1.1% 1.4% Source: CSES Module 4 – ParlGov database for election results

Norway 2013 election – Recall of 2009 election Party Sample 2009 Official 2009 Sample 2013 Official 2013 recall result report result - Labour Party 40.8% 35.4% 30.4% 30.8% - Progressive Party 11.5% 22.9% 12.2% 16.3% - Conservative Party 21.3% 17.2% 28.3% 25.8% - Socialist Left Party 7.4% 6.2% 4.7% 4.1% - Centre Party 5.7% 6.2% 5.5% 5.5% - Christian Democratic Party 5.8% 5.5% 6% 5.6% - Liberal Party 6.0% 3.9% 7.4% 5.2% - Red 1.2% 1.4% 1.3% 1.1% - Green 3% 2.8% Source: CSES Module 4 – ParlGov database for election results

B. Procedure for excluding election samples from the pool of elections included in the main analyses.

In a first step, we take the information from the CSES recall vote questions and compare the vote share percentages per party in our sample with the actual vote share that each of the parties obtained in that election (see A. Overview of error by election and party). We hence assess how much the recalled vote –when aggregated for the full election sample – differs from the election results in the previous election. In a second step, we used this information to decide on the ‘quality’ of the recall, by only retaining those election samples for which no single party’s vote share differed more than 7.5 percentage point from its actual vote share in the previous election.

We furthermore include those election samples in our analyses for which the recall of at least one party was over 7.5 percentage points off the actual result, but for which an error of this size is in line with a ‘normal’ bias in the reported vote share in the CSES sample at the current election. To this end, we compared the recall error with the error in the vote share of the current election for that same party (if the party ran in the current election as well). If the recall error was reasonably close to the ‘normal’ error (we take 5 percentage points as a cut-off), that election sample was retained for the analyses.

C. Procedure for excluding election samples from the pool of elections included in the robustness check with a more strict defined criteria for the quality of the recalled vote.

As deviations between the vote share percentages per party in our sample and the actual election results from the recalled elections might not only be based on wrongly reported recall votes, (they might also be mere reflections of sampling error) we believe that too strict criteria on the quality of the recalled votes might eliminate too many elections from our sample of elections for reasons other than erroneously reported recall votes. This might instead introduce more bias than our procedure solves. Therefore we initially decided to put the cut-off point on deviations of 7.5 percentage points.

To check whether our results are robust against choosing a more selective cut-off point for elections that potentially run the risk of recall vote bias, we re-estimated our models with only elections in our sample in which the recalled vote was less than 5 percentage points of from the actual results for any of the parties in that election. Putting the cut-off criterion on 5 percentage points excludes 6 more elections from the sample: Great-Britain 2015, Greece 2012, Ireland 2011, Netherlands 2002, Netherlands 2010, and New Zealand 2002. The results of the analyses with this restricted election sample are presented in appendix 3C.

Appendix 4B: Elections Included in the Analyses: Voting Patterns (Recall-Current) Party Party  Abstention Stable Stable Party Switching Abstention  Party Abstaining N Australia 2004 72.93% 23.58% 1.49% 1.68% 0.32% 1,544 Belgium (Flanders) 2003 70.57% 26.25% 1.59% 1.02% 0.57% 880 Belgium (Wallonia) 2003 69.46% 23.86% 3.13% 1.99% 1.56% 704 Switzerland 2003 52.49% 14.65% 8.64% 5.07% 19.15% 1,065 Switzerland 2007 46.36% 12.88% 11.66% 6.98% 22.12% 2,392 Switzerland 2011 41.49% 17.30% 6.21% 14.80% 20.19% 3,398 Germany 2002 66.53% 20.31% 3.69% 5.68% 3.80% 2,659 Germany 2005 58.07% 25.91% 3.77% 9.31% 2.94% 1,698 Germany 2009 54.39% 16.93% 7.75% 7.98% 12.94% 1,754 Germany 2013 60.13% 21.72% 6.82% 4.71% 6.62% 1,570 Denmark 2001 66.50% 26.93% 3.12% 2.44% 1.02% 1,764 Denmark 2007 67.92% 27.92% 2.46% 1.00% 0.69% 1,300 Finland 2003 58.95% 15.01% 7.82% 7.18% 11.04% 933 Finland 2007 60.70% 18.66% 7.29% 4.17% 9.19% 1,056 Finland 2011 52.24% 27.88% 6.85% 6.76% 6.28% 1,051 Finland 2015 55.88% 21.79% 8.09% 5.29% 8.95% 1,285 Great Britain 2015 52.39% 23.87% 7.72% 6.22% 9.79% 1,399 Greece 2009 66.45% 14.74% 8.89% 5.46% 4.45% 787 Greece 2012 36.18% 40.13% 12.36% 6.11% 5.22% 785 Ireland 2007 25.37% 48.34% 9.96% 14.74% 1.59% 753 Ireland 2011 50.04% 33.31% 6.12% 6.85% 3.68% 1,357 Israel 2013 37.74% 35.52% 9.05% 10.45% 7.24% 718 Netherlands 2006 54.03% 32.27% 2.03% 6.88% 4.80% 2,123 Netherlands 2010 48.42% 37.75% 4.01% 5.44% 4.38% 1,894 Norway 2001 54.43% 25.25% 10.89% 5.05% 4.38% 1,782 Norway 2005 55.20% 30.51% 5.47% 5.23% 3.59% 1,701 Norway 2009 62.44% 25.58% 5.70% 3.56% 2.72% 1,544 New Zealand 2002 50.33% 30.39% 11.44% 4.06% 3.79% 1,504 New Zealand 2008 62.63% 27.00% 1.85% 6.06% 2.46% 974 New Zealand 2011 64.22% 24.93% 5.07% 4.20% 1.57% 1,143 New Zealand 2014 69.53% 22.85% 2.25% 4.20% 1.17% 1,024 Sweden 2014 58.95% 34.30% 1.52% 4.13% 1.10% 726 Total 57.79% 24.76% 5.57% 5.72% 6.14% Source: CSES Module 2-4.

Appendix 4C Party System Changes (Only elections with actual changes are listed).

The reference brackets refer to the source(s) where the election report can be found. ES stands for the journal Electoral Studies, EJPR for European Journal of Political Research and WEP for West European Politics.

Belgium_Flanders 2003 (ES: Vol. 23, 3, pp. 566–571) - On the Flemish side, the Flemish nationalist Volksunie (People’s Union) split into two factions: the Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, N-VA), a re-founded Flemish nationalist party, and SPIRIT, a group of progressive Flemish nationalists. Voters coming from Volksunie going either to NV-A or Spirit are not considered switchers. - The Socialist Party (SP) (variable B3018_1; code=23) changes name into Socialist Party Different (SP.A) (variable B3006_1; code=2). Voters coming from SP going to SP.A are considered stable voters.

Belgium Wallonie 2003 (ES: Vol. 23, 3, pp. 566–571) - The Liberal Reformist Party (PRL) (variable B3018_1; code=21), the Francophone Democratic Federalists (FDF) (variable B3018_1; code=15) merge to form the Reformist Movement (MR) (variable B3006_1; code=10). - Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) (variable B3018_1; code=20) changes its name into Humanist Democratic Centre (Centre Democrate Humaniste) (variable B3018_1; code=11).

Denmark 2007 (EJPR: Vol. 47, pp. 952-961) - A new party (New Alliance) was founded by a number of MP’s from existing parties, but since the original parties still run separately we consider this not to be a party connected to the previous ones. People voting for New Alliance are coded as switchers.

Greece 2012 June compared to the 2009 election (ES: Vol. 43, pp. 172-176) - Democratic Left (DIMAR) (variable D3006_LH_PL; code=6) is supposed to be a split off from (Syriza) (variable D3008_LH_PL; code=2).

Switzerland 2011 (ES: Vol 32(1), pp. 197-201) - Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) (variable D3006_LH_PL; code=9) = split off from Swiss People’s Party (SVP-UDC) (variable D3008_LH_PL; code=4) . - Free Democratic Party (LPS) (variable D3008_LH_PL; code=5) merges into the Liberals (FDP) (variable D3006_LH_PL; code=1) .

Appendix 4D Parties Classified as Populist Parties (based on Van Kessel 2015)

A: Overview of Parties Classified as Populist Parties in each election Classified as Populist Party Australia 2004 One Nation Party (ONP) (Note: Party not classified as Parliamentary Party as the Party did not obtain seats in the lower house (It did in the upper house). Only the voters of this party are classified as populist voters in this election). Belgium (Flanders) 2003 Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) Belgium (Wallonia) 2003 National Front (FN) Switzerland 2003 Swiss People’s Party (SVP), League of Ticinesians (LdTi), Swiss Democrats (SD) Switzerland 2007 Swiss People’s Party (SVP), League of Ticinesians (LdTi) Switzerland 2011 Swiss People’s Party (SVP), League of Ticinesians (LdTi), Geneva Citizens’ Movement (MCG) Germany 2002 Party of Democratic Socialism / The Left (PDS/Linke) Germany 2005 The Left (Die Linke) Germany 2009 The Left (Die Linke) Germany 2013 The Left (Die Linke) Denmark 2001 Danish People’s Party (DF) Denmark 2007 Danish People’s Party (DF) Finland 2003 True Finns (PS) Finland 2007 True Finns (PS) Finland 2011 True Finns (PS) Finland 2015 True Finns /Finns Party Great Britain 2015 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) Greece 2009 Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) Greece 2012 Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), Independent Greeks (ANEL). Ireland 2007 Sinn Féin (SF) Ireland 2011 Sinn Féin (SF) Israel 2013 Ysrael Beitanu (YB) // Likud (L) (Shared List); Shas (Shas), Yesh Atid (YA) Netherlands 2006 List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Freedom Party (PVV). Netherlands 2010 Freedom Party (PVV) Norway 2001 Progress Party (FrP) Norway 2005 Progress Party (FrP) Norway 2009 Progress Party (FrP) New Zealand 2002 New Zealand First Party (NZFP) New Zealand 2008 New Zealand First Party (NZFP) New Zealand 2011 New Zealand First Party (NZFP) New Zealand 2014 New Zealand First Party (NZFP) Sweden 2014 Sweden Democrats (SD)

B: Motivations for classification of UKIP as a Populist Party in the UK 2015 election.

At this election, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) for the first time obtained seats in the Lower House. Van Kessel considers UKIP already as a prototypical populist party (2015, 144), but does not list the party because they did never obtain seats before 2010. As other sources also identify UKIP as an anti-establishment party (e.g. Hartleb 2015), we include UKIP as a populist party at the 2015 elections.

C: Motivations for classification of Populist Parties in the Non-European Cases

In Australia the ‘One Nation Party’ is the only party that is considered to be a (right-wing) true populist party (Mughan and Paxton 2006; Haig 2006). However, this party was only of any electoral relevance during the 2004 elections when it got 1.4% of the vote share. This was not enough for a lower house seat, but the party obtained seats in the senate. This makes the ‘One Nation Party’ a bit of a borderline case. We decided to code voters for this party as populist voters, but we do not code the Australian party system as a system containing a populist party in 2004. No genuinely populist parties that ever obtained seats have been identified in Canada at the 2008 and 2011 election. In New Zealand the ‘New Zealand First Party’ is identified as populist party (Haig 2006; Coffé 2013). We list this party as a populist party and its voters as populist voters during the four elections in New Zealand in our sample. During the 2013 election in Israel we list no less than four parties as populist parties. While extreme right parties are omnipresent, they can be distinguished in “old” right-wing parties characterized by hawkish positions on territorial issues while ‘new’ right-wing parties espouse views motivated by nationalism, racism, and anti-democracy (Pedahzur 2001). ‘Shas’ and ‘Yisrael Beitenu’ are considered the cases of the ‘new’ right most outstanding in terms of populism since these parties espouse nondemocratic values and are doing their best to harm the Israeli democratic structure (Pedahzur 2001; Freedman, Kaner, and Kaplan 2014; e.g. Filc 2009). But also the Likud party is by many experts considered to be a populist radical right party, especially during the most recent elections (Filc 2009; Lintl 2016; Weiss Yaniv and Tenenboim-Weinblatt 2017). Finally, the electoral result of the newly established ‘Yesh Atid’ party in 2013 is considered to be the most prominent manifestation of non-right-wing populism in Israel (Weiss Yaniv and Tenenboim-Weinblatt 2017).

Bibliography of Appendices 4A-4D

Coffé, H. 2013. “Gender and Party Choice at the 2011 New Zealand General Election.” Political Science 65 (1): 25–45.

Filc, Dani. 2009. The Political Right in Israel: Different Faces of Jewish Populism. London/New York: Routledge.

Freedman, Michael, Or Kaner, and Irena Kaplan. 2014. “Voting for Extreme Right Parties in Israel: Evidence from the 2009 Elections.” Electoral Studies 34 (June): 68–77.

Haig, G.C. 2006. “Neo-Populist Party Emergence in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.” University of Oklahoma.

Hartleb, Florian. 2015. “Here to Stay: Anti-Establishment Parties in Europe.” European View 14 (1). Springer Berlin Heidelberg: 39–49.

Lintl, Peter. 2016. “The Dynamics of a Right-Wing Coalition: How the Failure of the Peace Process Encourages Domestic Populism in Israel.” Berlin.

Mughan, Anthony, and Pamela Paxton. 2006. “Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, Policy Preferences and Populist Party Voting in Australia.” British Journal of Political Science 36 (2): 341.

Pedahzur, Ami. 2001. “The Transformation of Israel’s Extreme Right.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (1): 25–42. van Kessel, Stijn. 2015. Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? 1st editio. Palgrave Macmillan.

Weiss Yaniv, Naama, and Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt. 2017. “Israel: Right-Wing Populism and Beyond.” In Populist Political Communication in Europe, edited by Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Frank Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck, and Cleas H. de Vreese. New York: Routledge.

Appendix 4E Full Tables and Figures

Table 1E Explaining vote switching among Populist Party voters and Mainstream Party voters (Ref. outcome = Stable Party Vote) Model I Model II Model III Switch=Party Switch Switch Abstention Switch Abstention Switch Abstention Individual-Level Intercept -1.573 -2.996** -1.396 -3.524*** -1.934 -2.700 (1.191) (1.229) (1.260) (1.357) (1.354) (1.653) Populist Voter Previous (No=0, Yes=1) -0.088 -0.457* -0.698*** -1.130*** 0.658* -1.024** (0.244) (0.245) (0.260) (0.333) (0.399) (0.507) Satisfaction with Democracy (SWD) -0.224*** -0.491*** -0.262*** -0.525*** -0.223*** -0.487*** (0.019) (0.034) (0.029) (0.053) (0.019) (0.033) PVP*SWD 0.446*** 0.384*** (0.068) (0.108) Age -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.026*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) Gender (0=Female) -0.011 -0.148*** -0.013 -0.152*** -0.008 -0.146*** (0.024) (0.045) (0.024) (0.046) (0.025) (0.045) University Degree (0=Other) 0.081*** -0.653*** 0.082*** -0.646*** 0.078*** -0.656*** (0.029) (0.060) (0.027) (0.060) (0.029) (0.063) Left-Right Placement (0-10) -0.022*** 0.014 -0.022*** 0.013 -0.021*** 0.015 (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) Election-Level Gallagher Lsq 0.021 0.076 0.033 0.077 0.011 0.110 (0.070) (0.079) (0.050) (0.086) (0.070) (0.081) ENEP 0.196 0.318** 0.123 0.327** 0.218 0.182 (0.139) (0.150) (0.121) (0.144) (0.140) (0.171) Polarization -0.012 -0.078 0.029 0.003 -0.055 0.002 (0.201) (0.194) (0.172) (0.268) (0.210) (0.262) Days between elections 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - Compulsory Voting not enforced 0.605 1.421* 0.577 1.504 1.131 0.835 (0.748) (0.808) (0.785) (0.952) (0.792) (0.966) - Compulsory Voting enforced -0.209 -1.497** -0.387 -1.598** 0.178 -1.663** (0.406) (0.627) (0.450) (0.683) (0.354) (0.657) GDP Growth % 0.046 0.057 0.046 0.019 0.052 0.052 (0.030) (0.039) (0.051) (0.054) (0.045) (0.048) Election Year 0.075 -0.019 0.083 -0.054 0.038 0.023 (0.070) (0.099) (0.071) (0.138) (0.082) (0.088) Election Year Squared -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) Seat Share Populists Previous -0.008 0.019 (0.033) (0.039) Cross-Level Interactions PVP*SSPP -0.073 0.162** (0.058) (0.067) SSPP*SSPP 0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.001) PVP*SSPP*SSPP 0.001 -0.006*** (0.001) (0.002) Variance Components Variance (Country level ) 0.097 0.119 0.041 0.134 0.127 0.070 (0.099) (0.135) (0.054) (0.193) (0.128) (0.111) Variance (Election level) 0.159** 0.318** 0.234** 0.336** 0.180** 0.306** (0.071) (0.140) (0.105) (0.161) (0.080) (0.120) Variance (PVP) 1.380*** 1.502** 1.478*** 1.572** 1.084*** 0.765 (0.471) (0.737) (0.525) (0.772) (0.400) (0.487) Variance (SWD) 0.013* 0.038** (0.007) (0.019)

Table 1E Continued Observations 34893 34893 34893 Elections 32 32 32 Countries 14 14 14 Bayesian DIC 53839.18 53750.33 53839.83 Standard Deviations in Parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PVP=Populist Voter Previous; SWD=Satisfaction with Democracy; SSPP=Seat Share Populists Previous; ENEP=Effective Number of Electoral Parties (seat-share based).

Figure 1E Relative Marginal Effects of SWD over Populist Voter Previous Election (Model II)

Note: The marginal effects are the effects of SWD on the relative probability of choosing Party Switching over a Stable Party Vote.

Figure 2E Relative Probabilities of Vote Switching compared to a Stable Party-Vote (Model II)

Figure 3E Marginal Effects of Previous Seat Share Populists on Vote Switching (Model III)

Note: The marginal effects are the effects of the Previous Seat Share of the Populists on the relative probability of choosing Party Switching over a Stable Party Vote.

Figure 4E Relative Probabilities of Vote Switching compared to a Stable Party Vote (Model III)

Appendix 4F Robustness Models: Base variables + Party ID + Employment Status.

Table 1F Vote switching among Populist Voters and Mainstream Voters (Models I, II + III) (Ref. outcome = Stable Party Vote) Model I Model II Model III Switch=Party Switch Switch Abstention Switch Abstention Switch Abstention Individual-Level Intercept -0.024 -2.759 -0.163 -1.195 -0.045 -0.818 (1.026) (1.978) (1.047) (1.645) (0.881) (1.509) Populist Voter Previous (No=0, Yes=1) -0.060 -0.353 -0.522* -0.992*** 0.720** -0.901* (0.195) (0.231) (0.269) (0.317) (0.298) (0.497) Satisfaction With Democracy (SWD) -0.174*** -0.406*** -0.218*** -0.441*** -0.171*** -0.404*** (0.022) (0.040) (0.031) (0.052) (0.022) (0.040) PVP*SWD 0.390*** 0.397*** (0.077) (0.124) Age -0.014*** -0.030*** -0.014*** -0.030*** -0.014*** -0.030*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) Gender (0=Female) -0.002 -0.107** -0.004 -0.116** -0.000 -0.106* (0.028) (0.051) (0.028) (0.052) (0.029) (0.055) University Degree (0=Other) 0.119*** -0.586*** 0.121*** -0.587*** 0.116*** -0.593*** (0.033) (0.069) (0.033) (0.066) (0.033) (0.069) Left-Right Placement (0-10) -0.019*** 0.011 -0.019*** 0.010 -0.018*** 0.011 (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) Party Identification -0.532*** -0.640*** -0.531*** -0.634*** -0.533*** -0.641*** (0.015) (0.029) (0.016) (0.029) (0.016) (0.029) Employed (base) - Unemployed 0.081* 0.327*** 0.081* 0.325*** 0.079* 0.324*** (0.046) (0.080) (0.047) (0.080) (0.047) (0.082) - School/Student 0.200** 0.233 0.206** 0.240 0.203** 0.232 (0.088) (0.150) (0.088) (0.147) (0.086) (0.149) - Retired 0.012 0.429*** 0.006 0.421*** 0.010 0.431*** (0.049) (0.089) (0.048) (0.088) (0.048) (0.084) Election-Level Gallagher Lsq -0.006 0.082 0.005 0.088 -0.019 0.087 (0.052) (0.089) (0.071) (0.103) (0.058) (0.101) ENEP 0.089 0.417** 0.060 0.288 0.092 0.108 (0.094) (0.212) (0.128) (0.183) (0.115) (0.200) Polarization -0.202 -0.170 -0.130 -0.140 -0.066 -0.113 (0.191) (0.292) (0.173) (0.273) (0.187) (0.306) Days between elections 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - Compulsory Voting not enforced 0.884* 1.820 0.659 0.966 0.938 1.083 (0.526) (1.235) (0.687) (1.063) (0.749) (1.103) - Compulsory Voting enforced -0.174 -1.255 -0.369 -1.948*** -0.300 -1.994*** (0.407) (0.789) (0.406) (0.650) (0.465) (0.613) GDP Growth % 0.063 0.048 0.039 0.029 0.047 0.064 (0.039) (0.055) (0.035) (0.054) (0.042) (0.059) Election Year 0.042 -0.014 0.058 -0.113 -0.004 -0.024 (0.095) (0.130) (0.092) (0.129) (0.095) (0.166) Election Year Squared 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.006 0.004 -0.000 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) Seat Share Populists Previous -0.028 0.008 (0.030) (0.053) Cross-Level Interactions PVP*SSPP -0.077* 0.157** (0.041) (0.066) SSPP*SSPP 0.001 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) PVP*SSPP*SSPP 0.001 -0.005*** (0.001) (0.002)

Table 1F Continued Variance Components Variance (Country level ) 0.022 0.545 0.017 0.165 0.106 0.077 (0.036) (0.467) (0.024) (0.261) (0.201) (0.138) Variance (Election level) 0.205*** 0.281** 0.218*** 0.397* 0.186*** 0.445** (0.075) (0.137) (0.077) (0.208) (0.068) (0.178) Variance (PVP) 1.162*** 1.061 1.268*** 1.124* 0.687** 0.453 (0.441) (0.657) (0.437) (0.651) (0.331) (0.399) Variance (SWD) 0.013 0.024 (0.008) (0.017) Observations 28557 28557 28557 Elections 31 31 31 Countries 14 14 14 Bayesian DIC 41818.03 41771.44 41820.73 Standard Deviations in Parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PVP=Populist Voter Previous; SWD=Satisfaction with Democracy; SSPP=Seat Share Populists Previous; ENEP=Effective Number of Electoral Parties (seat-share based).

Figure 1F Marginal Effects of SWD over Populist Voter Previous Election (Model II)

Note: The marginal effects are the effects of SWD on the relative probability of choosing Party Switching over a Stable Party Vote.

Figure 2F Relative Probabilities of Vote Switching compared to Stable Party-Vote (Model II)

Figure 3F Marginal Effects of Previous Seat Share Populists on Vote Switching (Model III)

Note: The marginal effects are the effects of the Previous Seat Share of the Populists on the relative probability of choosing Party Switching over a Stable Party Vote.

Figure 4F Relative Probabilities of Vote Switching compared to Stable Party-Vote (Model III)

Appendix 4G Robustness Models: Models based on 27 elections from 13 countries

Table 1G Explaining vote switching among Populist Party voters and Mainstream Party voters. (Ref. outcome = Stable Party Vote) Model I Model II Model III Switch=Party Switch Switch Abstention Switch Abstention Switch Abstention Individual-Level Intercept -0.081 -4.500*** -0.412 -3.571** -0.425 -3.155* (0.827) (1.516) (1.110) (1.544) (1.244) (1.900) Populist Voter Previous (No=0, Yes=1) 0.006 -0.335 -0.603** -1.187*** 0.865** -0.822 (0.198) (0.365) (0.304) (0.353) (0.393) (0.617) Satisfaction With Democracy (SWD) -0.214*** -0.510*** -0.255*** -0.573*** -0.211*** -0.508*** (0.020) (0.038) (0.031) (0.055) (0.021) (0.038) PVP*SWD 0.454*** 0.485*** (0.071) (0.117) Age -0.016*** -0.025*** -0.016*** -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.026*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) Gender (0=Female) -0.002 -0.157*** -0.005 -0.164*** -0.002 -0.160*** (0.027) (0.049) (0.026) (0.047) (0.027) (0.052) University Degree (0=other) 0.093*** -0.640*** 0.096*** -0.644*** 0.091*** -0.648*** (0.030) (0.070) (0.030) (0.070) (0.031) (0.068) Left-Right Placement (0-10) -0.016** 0.019 -0.015** 0.018 -0.014** 0.021* (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) Election-Level Gallagher Lsq -0.105 0.193 -0.055 0.117 -0.079 0.139 (0.065) (0.159) (0.084) (0.151) (0.077) (0.153) ENEP 0.028 0.407** 0.001 0.244 0.000 0.229 (0.091) (0.181) (0.120) (0.261) (0.123) (0.208) Polarization -0.356*** -0.053 -0.241 -0.013 -0.242 -0.120 (0.132) (0.269) (0.147) (0.296) (0.164) (0.319) Days between elections 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - Compulsory Voting not enforced 0.181 0.661 -0.149 0.546 0.213 0.503 (0.655) (1.412) (0.725) (1.197) (0.818) (1.291) - Compulsory Voting enforced 0.416 -1.662* -0.002 -1.724** 0.108 -1.693 (0.376) (0.968) (0.487) (0.718) (0.519) (1.107) GDP Growth % 0.052* 0.038 0.028 -0.023 0.047* 0.025 (0.028) (0.044) (0.035) (0.037) (0.029) (0.070) Election Year 0.115** 0.082 0.107** 0.037 0.108* 0.043 (0.058) (0.108) (0.054) (0.129) (0.061) (0.117) Election Year Squared -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) Seat Share Populists Previous 0.004 0.007 (0.023) (0.053) Cross-Level Interactions PVP*SSPP -0.071 0.174* (0.053) (0.091) SSPP*SSPP 0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.001) PVP*SSPP*SSPP 0.000 -0.007** (0.001) (0.003) Variance Components Variance (Country level ) 0.092 0.147 0.053 0.173 0.104 0.338 (0.070) (0.215) (0.057) (0.238) (0.121) (0.537) Variance (Election level) 0.060 0.285* 0.126 0.292 0.080* 0.229* (0.039) (0.155) (0.090) (0.203) (0.044) (0.134) Variance (PVP) 1.589*** 1.847* 1.763*** 1.980* 1.104** 0.856 (0.570) (0.990) (0.650) (1.090) (0.458) (0.672) Variance (SWD) 0.011 0.042 (0.008) (0.026)

Table 1G Continued Observations 29772 29772 29772 Elections 27 27 27 Countries 13 13 13 Bayesian DIC 45079.27 44994.24 45080.69 Standard Deviations in Parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PVP=Populist Voter Previous; SWD=Satisfaction with Democracy; SSPP=Seat Share Populists Previous; ENEP=Effective Number of Electoral Parties (seat-share based).

Figure 1G Relative Marginal Effects of SWD over Populist Voter Previous Election (Model II)

Note: The marginal effects are the effects of SWD on the relative probability of choosing Party Switching over a Stable Party Vote.

Figure 2G Relative Probabilities of Vote Switching compared to a Stable Party-Vote (Model II)

Figure 3G Marginal Effects of Previous Seat Share Populists on Vote Switching (Model III)

Note: The marginal effects are the effects of the Previous Seat Share of the Populists on the relative probability of choosing Party Switching over a Stable Party Vote.

Figure 4G Relative Probabilities of Vote Switching compared to a Stable Party Vote (Model III)

Appendices to Chapter 5

Appendix 5A Descriptives of Voting Patterns and Correlations between the Support Items

Table 1 Voting Patterns Inter election Campaign Period Between Election Volatility Volatility Volatility 1) Loyal Party Vote 40.0% 53.7% 38.2%

2) Party Switching 33.9% 33.5% 38.8%

3) Party Vote  Abstention 3.1% 2.7% 1.9%

4) Stable Abstention 9.0% 5.2% 6.6%

5) Abstention  Party Vote 14.0% 4.9% 14.5%

N 1.749 1.135 1.279

Table 2 Levels of Support and Correlations Pre-Election Wave Post-Election Wave Average Standard Average Standard Support (1-7) Deviation Support (1-7) Deviation Particularized Specific Support 4.62 1.24 5.26 0.96 Generalized Specific Support 3.55 .95 4.02 0.96 Diffuse Regime support 3.70 1.46 4.29 1.47 Correlations Pre-Election Wave Correlations Post-Election Wave Particularized Generalized Diffuse Particularized Generalized Diffuse Specific Specific Regime Specific Specific Regime Support Support Support Support Support Support Particularized Specific Support 1.00 - - 1.00 - - Generalized Specific Support 0.45 1.00 - 0.33 1.00 - Diffuse Regime Support 0.30 0.77 1.00 0.24 0.74 1.00

The Tables and Figures presented in the Appendices to chapter 5 are all based upon original analyses by the author of this dissertation. The analyses make use of a panel dataset collected around the Dutch 2017 parliamentary elections collected by the University of Amsterdam in collaboration with Kantar - TNS NIPO. This data is not (yet) publicly available. More information on the data can be obtained from the project leaders at the UvA; Philip van Praag ([email protected]) and/or Cleas de Vreese ([email protected]).

Appendix 5B Tables & Figures Inter-Election Period

Table 3 Replication models with Generalized Specific Support and Diffuse Regime Support (Inter-Election Period). (baseline outcome) Loyal Party Vote vs. Loyal Party Vote vs Loyal Party Vote vs Loyal Party Vote vs Party Switching Party Vote  Abstention Stable Abstaining Abstention  Party Vote Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Generalized Specific Support -0.272** -0.297** -1.004** -1.387** -0.831** -1.401** -0.165 -0.373* (0.083) (0.126) (0.285) (0.456) (0.198) (0.337) (0.124) (0.196) Diffuse Regime Support -0.125** 0.010 -0.195 0.241 -0.133 0.468* -0.005 0.175 (0.049) (0.080) (0.130) (0.293) (0.102) (0.215) (0.065) (0.126) Government Voter 2012 (No=0) 1.349** 1.365** 1.370** 1.474** 1.038** 1.540** -16.297 -17.578 -16.299 -17.245 -18.422 -17.280 (0.153) (0.142) (0.158) (0.535) (0.381) (0.574) (792.501) (1,108.296) (786.400) (679.507) (982.217) (681.281) Left-Right: Self placement -0.082** -0.092** -0.091** -0.158 -0.115 -0.197 -0.167 -0.192* -0.173 0.110* 0.096* 0.123* (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.135) (0.112) (0.144) (0.105) (0.084) (0.114) (0.054) (0.045) (0.054) Ideology: Middle-Extreme -0.182** -0.156** -0.191** -0.488** -0.543** -0.482** -0.457** -0.411** -0.517** -0.182* -0.217** -0.181* (0.052) (0.047) (0.054) (0.182) (0.147) (0.193) (0.140) (0.108) (0.150) (0.083) (0.067) (0.084) Political Knowledge 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.033 -0.009 0.033 -0.017 -0.013* -0.022 -0.016* -0.015** -0.016 (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.022) (0.010) (0.023) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) Interested in Politics -0.030 -0.028 -0.034 -0.714** -0.679** -0.631** -0.834** -1.077** -0.830** -0.285** -0.296** -0.280** (0.061) (0.055) (0.063) (0.177) (0.134) (0.182) (0.136) (0.116) (0.142) (0.089) (0.072) (0.091) Gender (ref=men) 0.206 0.165 0.280* -0.081 -0.221 -0.183 -0.820* -1.009** -0.723* -0.341 -0.326* -0.276 (0.153) (0.142) (0.157) (0.521) (0.379) (0.557) (0.386) (0.303) (0.404) (0.237) (0.196) (0.240) Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.028* -0.017 -0.013 -0.009 -0.016 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) Level of Education -0.126 -0.072 -0.118 -0.087 -0.010 -0.350 0.067 0.169 0.045 -0.168 -0.187 -0.140 (0.093) (0.086) (0.095) (0.339) (0.235) (0.357) (0.238) (0.185) (0.254) (0.144) (0.122) (0.149) Employed (0=Unemployed) -0.034 0.012 -0.049 -0.224 0.527 -0.065 0.191 0.382 0.254 -0.432 -0.468* -0.474 (0.189) (0.171) (0.193) (0.637) (0.416) (0.649) (0.442) (0.344) (0.451) (0.287) (0.233) (0.292) Religiosity 0.015 0.006 0.006 -0.424* -0.316* -0.472* -0.277* -0.192* -0.258 -0.079 -0.111 -0.052 (0.061) (0.057) (0.063) (0.246) (0.163) (0.266) (0.159) (0.115) (0.163) (0.088) (0.074) (0.089) Social Class -0.072 -0.125 -0.080 -0.034 -0.223 0.015 0.088 0.070 0.128 -0.004 -0.043 -0.019 (0.086) (0.079) (0.088) (0.272) (0.194) (0.282) (0.212) (0.161) (0.223) (0.131) (0.106) (0.134) Constant 0.709 0.838 0.678 2.749 5.094** 4.518* 8.799** 6.716** 9.358** 3.773** 3.677** 3.583** (0.770) (0.590) (0.792) (2.508) (1.417) (2.648) (1.836) (1.124) (1.983) (1.138) (0.761) (1.177)

Pseudo R2 0.19 0.23 0.20 AIC 2127.1 2789.7 2038.441 BIC 2386.3 3060.7 2315.364 Observations 1079 1354 1038 Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure 1 Average Marginal Effects: Generalized & Diffuse Support (Inter-Election Period).

Table 4 Models controlling for Particularized Specific Support (Inter-Election Period). (baseline outcome) Loyal Party Vote vs. Loyal Party Vote vs Party Switching Party Vote  Abstention Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model I Model II Model III Model IV Particularized Specific Support -1.657** -1.927** -1.739** -1.937** -1.927** -2.285** -2.000** -2.192** (0.117) (0.150) (0.127) (0.154) (0.200) (0.324) (0.218) (0.343) Generalized Specific Support 0.655** 0.726** 0.051 -0.143 (0.134) (0.192) (0.404) (0.626) Diffuse Regime Support 0.217** -0.072 0.114 0.025 (0.070) (0.110) (0.156) (0.330) Government Voter 2012 (No=0) 0.761** 0.445* 0.671** 0.472** 0.067 -0.252 -0.130 -0.109 (0.171) (0.197) (0.183) (0.203) (0.402) (0.618) (0.441) (0.666) Left-Right: Self placement -0.061 -0.015 -0.047 -0.036 -0.078 -0.138 -0.080 -0.208 (0.039) (0.046) (0.042) (0.047) (0.112) (0.148) (0.125) (0.157) Ideology: Middle-Extreme -0.014 0.000 -0.041 -0.003 -0.330* -0.190 -0.411** -0.195 (0.064) (0.074) (0.067) (0.075) (0.150) (0.217) (0.164) (0.228) Distance to Previous Party 0.070 0.143 0.116 0.118 0.142 0.021 0.152 -0.029 (0.071) (0.091) (0.081) (0.093) (0.152) (0.253) (0.182) (0.268) Political Knowledge 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.035 -0.009 0.035 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.024) (0.012) (0.026) Interested in Politics 0.107 0.090 0.099 0.087 -0.670** -0.726** -0.542** -0.611** (0.073) (0.084) (0.076) (0.085) (0.154) (0.222) (0.160) (0.229) Gender (ref=men) 0.367* 0.385* 0.434** 0.430* 0.138 0.179 0.174 0.070 (0.178) (0.199) (0.186) (0.204) (0.428) (0.588) (0.453) (0.627) Age 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.023 -0.002 -0.031* -0.017 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) Level of Education -0.039 -0.050 -0.017 -0.043 0.142 0.121 0.069 -0.141 (0.111) (0.126) (0.117) (0.129) (0.260) (0.391) (0.280) (0.410) Employed (0=Unemployed) -0.118 0.034 -0.008 0.030 0.656 0.060 0.684 0.142 (0.215) (0.244) (0.222) (0.249) (0.457) (0.682) (0.479) (0.699) Religiosity 0.121 0.055 0.063 0.034 -0.266 -0.562* -0.323 -0.613* (0.076) (0.086) (0.080) (0.088) (0.182) (0.300) (0.197) (0.318) Social Class 0.007 -0.050 -0.062 -0.063 -0.093 -0.037 -0.185 -0.010 (0.100) (0.113) (0.105) (0.116) (0.217) (0.306) (0.229) (0.322) Constant 6.009** 5.013** 5.916** 5.131** 10.444** 8.855** 11.695** 10.641** (0.889) (1.142) (0.948) (1.170) (1.852) (2.966) (2.042) (3.119)

Pseudo R2 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.36 AIC 1186.916 907.4665 1104.579 871.3695 BIC 1325.296 1049.647 1251.083 1021.911 Observations 1035 845 976 816 Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure 2 Average Marginal Effects: Models with Particularized Support (Inter-Election Period).

Table 5 Models with Populist Party Voting Interactions Part I (Inter-Election Period). (baseline outcome) Loyal Party Vote vs. Loyal Party Vote vs Party Switching Party Vote  Abstention Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Generalized Specific Support -0.424** -0.356** -1.273** -1.490** (0.090) (0.134) (0.300) (0.474) Diffuse Regime Support -0.238** -0.076 -0.359** 0.116 (0.053) (0.086) (0.146) (0.296) Populist Voter (No=0) -5.426** -3.548** -4.916** -19.447 -3.333* -19.307 (1.279) (0.701) (1.315) (1,956.980) (1.531) (1,953.648) Populist Voter * Specific Support 1.449** 0.532 1.794 1.616 (0.399) (0.613) (655.080) (923.580) Populist Voter * Diffuse Support 0.844** 0.785* 0.702 0.325 (0.218) (0.382) (0.518) (533.902) Government Voter 2012 (No=0) 1.208** 1.199** 1.236** 0.904* 0.764* 1.003* (0.161) (0.150) (0.167) (0.536) (0.400) (0.574) Left-Right: Self placement -0.066* -0.074** -0.079** -0.134 -0.067 -0.175 (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.142) (0.117) (0.151) Ideology: Middle-Extreme -0.179** -0.154** -0.191** -0.459* -0.557** -0.467* (0.054) (0.049) (0.056) (0.201) (0.155) (0.210) Political Knowledge 0.008 -0.001 0.009 0.045* -0.007 0.045* (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.023) (0.011) (0.024) Interested in Politics -0.053 -0.036 -0.052 -0.915** -0.724** -0.817** (0.064) (0.057) (0.065) (0.206) (0.142) (0.211) Gender (ref=men) 0.207 0.194 0.298* -0.124 -0.204 -0.213 (0.157) (0.145) (0.162) (0.550) (0.404) (0.581) Age 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.006 -0.033** -0.021 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) Level of Education -0.181* -0.143 -0.181* -0.194 -0.182 -0.441 (0.096) (0.089) (0.099) (0.364) (0.243) (0.383) Employed (0=Unemployed) -0.025 0.011 -0.064 0.160 0.725* 0.278 (0.191) (0.175) (0.197) (0.657) (0.439) (0.668) Religiosity -0.014 -0.021 -0.018 -0.525* -0.338* -0.571* (0.063) (0.058) (0.065) (0.260) (0.165) (0.279) Social Class -0.057 -0.106 -0.058 0.007 -0.123 0.055 (0.088) (0.082) (0.091) (0.287) (0.202) (0.300) Constant 1.639* 1.811** 1.594* 4.314* 6.285** 5.996* (0.818) (0.634) (0.842) (2.582) (1.519) (2.690)

Pseudo R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 AIC 1290.964 1575.912 1232.188 BIC 1435.858 1725.592 1395.013 Observations 925 1,085 888 Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure 3 Average Marginal Effects: Populist Voting Interactions Part I (Inter-Election Period).

Table 6 Models with Populist Party Voting Interactions II (Inter-Election Period). (baseline outcome) Loyal Party Vote vs. Loyal Party Vote vs Party Switching Party Vote  Abstention Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model I Model II Model III Model IV Particularized Specific Support -1.671** -1.860** -1.715** -1.869** -1.918** -2.129** -1.907** -2.035** (0.126) (0.158) (0.135) (0.162) (0.211) (0.343) (0.230) (0.362) Generalized Specific Support 0.499** 0.613** -0.178 -0.340 (0.145) (0.203) (0.429) (0.647) Diffuse Regime Support 0.121 -0.113 -0.012 -0.003 (0.076) (0.113) (0.171) (0.330) Populist Voter (No=0) -0.383 -0.981 -2.209 -0.945 0.770 -24.463 5.626 -24.278 (2.048) (3.150) (2.293) (3.173) (3.629) (3,753.286) (6.438) (4,122.185) Populist Voter * Particularized Support -0.266 -0.589 -0.074 -0.540 -0.843 1.809 -1.708 1.678 (0.446) (0.694) (0.479) (0.710) (0.952) (678.740) (1.389) (742.437) Populist Voter * Specific Support 0.768 0.006 0.727 0.443 (0.578) (0.860) (687.755) (1,144.350) Populist Voter * Diffuse Support 0.413 0.695 -0.654 0.470 (0.276) (0.564) (0.929) (639.895) Government Voter 2012 (No=0) 0.461** 0.314 0.457** 0.343 -0.453 -0.516 -0.530 -0.366 (0.184) (0.205) (0.193) (0.212) (0.437) (0.614) (0.468) (0.658) Left-Right: Self placement 0.005 0.019 -0.006 -0.004 0.020 -0.079 -0.012 -0.144 (0.043) (0.047) (0.044) (0.049) (0.114) (0.148) (0.126) (0.158) Ideology: Middle-Extreme -0.029 -0.016 -0.049 -0.018 -0.351* -0.257 -0.454** -0.266 (0.066) (0.076) (0.068) (0.078) (0.158) (0.229) (0.173) (0.243) Distance to Previous Party 0.175* 0.194* 0.177* 0.171* 0.275 0.161 0.293 0.125 (0.082) (0.095) (0.085) (0.097) (0.176) (0.260) (0.188) (0.278) Political Knowledge 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.008 -0.005 0.036 -0.012 0.036 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013) (0.026) Interested in Politics 0.100 0.075 0.089 0.075 -0.682** -0.754** -0.554** -0.628** (0.075) (0.085) (0.077) (0.086) (0.158) (0.225) (0.164) (0.230) Gender (ref=men) 0.352* 0.374* 0.417* 0.425* 0.166 0.129 0.203 0.040 (0.180) (0.199) (0.186) (0.204) (0.430) (0.587) (0.459) (0.623) Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.025* -0.004 -0.034* -0.019 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) Level of Education -0.098 -0.103 -0.079 -0.102 0.004 0.039 -0.058 -0.226 (0.113) (0.127) (0.118) (0.131) (0.263) (0.393) (0.283) (0.413) Employed (0=Unemployed) -0.084 0.018 -0.037 -0.018 0.662 0.088 0.687 0.153 (0.217) (0.243) (0.224) (0.250) (0.463) (0.691) (0.490) (0.707) Religiosity 0.065 0.027 0.034 0.013 -0.333* -0.562* -0.357* -0.615* (0.078) (0.087) (0.081) (0.090) (0.183) (0.295) (0.197) (0.314) Social Class -0.021 -0.046 -0.064 -0.054 -0.147 -0.076 -0.241 -0.036 (0.101) (0.113) (0.106) (0.117) (0.218) (0.310) (0.231) (0.325) Constant 6.694** 5.548** 6.705** 5.621** 11.591** 9.481** 12.745** 11.141** (0.950) (1.177) (1.002) (1.207) (1.965) (2.942) (2.101) (3.074)

Pseudo R2 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 AIC 1167.615 905.7642 1093.374 872.6304 BIC 1325.764 1076.38 1269.179 1060.807 Observations 1035 845 976 816 Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure 4 Average Marginal Effects: Populist Voting Interactions Part II (Inter-Election Period).

Appendix 5C Tables & Figures Campaign Period

Table 7 Replication models with Generalized Specific Support and Diffuse Regime Support (Campaign period). (baseline outcome) Loyal Party Vote vs. Loyal Party Vote vs Loyal Party Vote vs Loyal Party Vote vs Party Switching Party Vote  Abstention Stable Abstaining Abstention  Party Vote Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Generalized Specific Support 0.244** 0.330** -0.139 -0.188 -0.610* -0.683 0.053 0.471 (0.090) (0.131) (0.282) (0.437) (0.295) (0.472) (0.225) (0.362) Diffuse Regime Support 0.084 -0.071 -0.195 0.027 -0.160 0.050 -0.081 -0.437* (0.052) (0.084) (0.152) (0.296) (0.129) (0.318) (0.112) (0.238) Government Voter Wave 1 (No=0) -0.400* -0.266 -0.426* 0.277 0.938* 0.246 -15.189 -15.321 -15.216 -16.016 -15.901 -16.011 (0.190) (0.175) (0.192) (0.718) (0.517) (0.716) (883.460) (784.1) (891.10) (1,009.5) (849.02) (1,000.1) Left-Right: Self placement -0.032 -0.044 -0.032 -0.190 -0.150 -0.179 0.213 -0.040 0.209 0.015 -0.020 -0.007 (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.132) (0.098) (0.132) (0.197) (0.092) (0.197) (0.097) (0.070) (0.102) Ideology: Middle-Extreme -0.166** -0.134** -0.162** -0.235 -0.179 -0.240 -0.744** -0.262* -0.758** -0.242 -0.143 -0.287* (0.055) (0.049) (0.056) (0.196) (0.142) (0.197) (0.265) (0.131) (0.266) (0.151) (0.106) (0.160) Political Knowledge -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.015 -0.012 -0.018 0.037* -0.011 0.036* -0.027* -0.007 -0.024* (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) Interested in Politics -0.058 -0.038 -0.070 -0.323* -0.512** -0.335* -0.990** -0.977** -1.008** -0.377** -0.534** -0.408** (0.065) (0.058) (0.066) (0.194) (0.152) (0.195) (0.211) (0.151) (0.211) (0.158) (0.121) (0.167) Gender (ref=men) 0.236 0.253* 0.233 -0.386 -0.499 -0.315 -0.833 -0.665* -0.830 0.387 0.195 0.209 (0.156) (0.143) (0.158) (0.565) (0.443) (0.571) (0.588) (0.392) (0.599) (0.442) (0.341) (0.464) Age -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) Level of Education -0.052 -0.063 -0.070 -0.462 -0.201 -0.484 0.472 0.159 0.440 -0.272 -0.094 -0.270 (0.093) (0.084) (0.094) (0.315) (0.244) (0.315) (0.371) (0.225) (0.371) (0.258) (0.198) (0.274) Employed (0=Unemployed) -0.081 -0.265 -0.096 0.002 -0.085 -0.018 -1.068 0.059 -1.115 -0.337 -0.570 -0.615 (0.192) (0.171) (0.194) (0.691) (0.520) (0.700) (0.765) (0.439) (0.771) (0.537) (0.399) (0.579) Religiosity -0.143* -0.111* -0.170** -0.108 0.004 -0.141 0.182 -0.059 0.165 -0.599** -0.393** -0.678** (0.065) (0.059) (0.066) (0.247) (0.180) (0.250) (0.217) (0.148) (0.218) (0.211) (0.150) (0.226) Social Class -0.067 0.004 -0.063 -0.256 -0.250 -0.268 0.505 0.298 0.508 0.172 -0.071 0.283 (0.089) (0.080) (0.090) (0.299) (0.229) (0.297) (0.336) (0.207) (0.337) (0.239) (0.173) (0.253) Constant 0.226 0.159 0.357 4.061* 3.349** 4.357* -1.267 2.946* -0.864 2.760* 2.499* 3.234* (0.689) (0.576) (0.704) (1.954) (1.439) (1.981) (2.442) (1.310) (2.467) (1.628) (1.140) (1.701)

Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 AIC 1565.958 2068.017 1529.643 BIC 1813.439 2326.054 1794.979 Observations 862 1056 844 Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure 5 Average Marginal Effects: Generalized & Diffuse Support (Campaign Period).

Table 8 Models controlling for Particularized Specific Support (Campaign Period). (baseline outcome) Loyal Party Vote vs. Loyal Party Vote vs Party Switching Party Vote  Abstention Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Particularized Specific Support -0.969** -1.212** -1.081** -1.275** -1.693** -2.073** -2.020** -2.038** -2.044** -36.815 (0.115) (0.142) (0.125) (0.148) (0.197) (0.692) (0.814) (0.687) (0.819) (7,902.050) Generalized Specific Support 0.740** 0.973** 1.187** -0.853 -0.721 -14.227 (0.142) (0.193) (0.275) (0.765) (1.179) (10,500.037) Diffuse Regime Support 0.230** -0.184 -0.262* -0.351 -0.102 3.763 (0.080) (0.115) (0.159) (0.464) (0.879) (5,844.349) ∆ Particularized Specific Support 0.642** 17.375 (0.124) (5,150.729) ∆ Generalized Specific Support -0.267 7.265 (0.287) (3,666.680) ∆ Diffuse Regime Support 0.254* 15.896 (0.146) (3,923.325) Government Intention (No=0) 0.110 -0.253 -0.015 -0.265 -0.014 0.042 0.604 0.675 0.591 -3.451 (0.207) (0.225) (0.215) (0.228) (0.260) (1.245) (1.398) (1.389) (1.467) (4,485.088) Left-Right: Self placement -0.087* -0.069 -0.080* -0.078* -0.076 -0.853* -1.012 -0.750 -1.016 -26.647 (0.039) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) (0.050) (0.485) (0.741) (0.471) (0.745) (2,689.506) Ideology: Middle-Extreme -0.182** -0.219** -0.192** -0.208** -0.196* -0.153 -0.485 -0.051 -0.485 -0.993 (0.069) (0.075) (0.071) (0.076) (0.088) (0.729) (0.894) (0.688) (0.919) (3,004.278) Distance to Previous Party -0.065 0.005 -0.055 0.007 -0.064 -0.316 -0.286 -0.346 -0.284 -24.697 (0.078) (0.084) (0.080) (0.085) (0.101) (0.484) (0.580) (0.539) (0.590) (6,426.581) Political Knowledge -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.015 -0.079* -0.118* -0.084* -0.116* -0.878 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.042) (0.053) (0.043) (0.054) (552.885) Interested in Politics -0.039 -0.046 -0.078 -0.046 -0.068 0.256 0.751 0.468 0.750 -14.697 (0.080) (0.087) (0.083) (0.089) (0.103) (0.434) (0.603) (0.529) (0.640) (4,649.588) Gender (ref=men) 0.165 0.139 0.182 0.109 0.130 -15.462 -18.884 -15.467 -17.458 -100.003 (0.192) (0.207) (0.198) (0.210) (0.240) (523.439) (893.78) (524.93) (447.007) (9,888.135) Age -0.001 -0.009 -0.005 -0.010 -0.006 0.019 0.034 0.014 0.034 0.551 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.055) (0.061) (0.052) (0.062) (666.087) Level of Education -0.003 -0.040 -0.023 -0.057 0.041 -0.994 -0.780 -0.973 -0.784 9.296 (0.120) (0.130) (0.124) (0.132) (0.152) (0.760) (0.786) (0.773) (0.872) (3,966.200) Employed (0=Unemployed) -0.432* -0.100 -0.304 -0.143 -0.237 0.931 1.165 0.965 1.121 52.173 (0.237) (0.266) (0.246) (0.272) (0.313) (1.388) (1.529) (1.385) (1.569) (13,110.823) Religiosity 0.050 -0.047 -0.001 -0.079 -0.021 -0.761 -1.002 -0.864 -1.019 3.501 (0.084) (0.092) (0.087) (0.094) (0.108) (0.715) (0.778) (0.735) (0.794) (7,805.272) Social Class 0.021 -0.103 0.031 -0.071 -0.101 -1.241* -1.282 -1.117 -1.259 1.754 (0.108) (0.122) (0.113) (0.125) (0.146) (0.725) (0.837) (0.697) (0.860) (5,710.292) Constant 6.266** 5.314** 6.197** 5.424** 7.140** 36.096 42.869 36.201 41.368 399.801 (1.063) (1.176) (1.098) (1.199) (1.536) (523.519) (893.87) (525.01) (447.194) (28,758.194) Pseudo R2 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.30 AIC 820.4631 722.1253 786.8875 706.3973 562.3915 BIC 946.0329 853.7316 920.6847 846.2889 721.9337 Observations 655 594 639 585 492 Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure 6 Average Marginal Effects: Models with Particularistic Support (Campaign Period).

Table 9 Models with Populist Party Voting Interactions Part I (Campaign Period). (baseline outcome) Loyal Party Vote vs. Loyal Party Vote vs Party Switching Party Vote  Abstention Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Generalized Specific Support -0.009 0.010 -0.336 -0.335 (0.104) (0.151) (0.317) (0.502) Diffuse Regime Support -0.051 -0.021 -0.220 -0.020 (0.063) (0.099) (0.189) (0.351) Populist Voter (No=0) -5.284** -2.180** -5.642** -3.731 -3.582 (1.093) (0.538) (1.158) (2.472) (2.512) Populist Voter * Specific Support 1.477** 1.687** 1.043 -0.702 0.840 (0.294) (0.386) (0.722) (1.221) (1.073) Populist Voter * Diffuse Support 0.473** -0.118 -0.051 0.157 (0.131) (0.217) (0.382) (0.669) Government Intention (No=0) -0.286 -0.303* -0.314 0.298 0.782 0.272 (0.197) (0.183) (0.199) (0.737) (0.537) (0.737) Left-Right: Self placement -0.029 -0.025 -0.027 -0.175 -0.127 -0.170 (0.035) (0.032) (0.035) (0.141) (0.102) (0.143) Ideology: Middle-Extreme -0.195** -0.142** -0.192** -0.259 -0.134 -0.264 (0.058) (0.051) (0.059) (0.202) (0.150) (0.203) Political Knowledge -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) Interested in Politics -0.044 -0.014 -0.058 -0.314 -0.519** -0.320 (0.068) (0.060) (0.069) (0.200) (0.153) (0.202) Gender (ref=men) 0.280* 0.281* 0.282* -0.377 -0.424 -0.301 (0.159) (0.145) (0.162) (0.568) (0.444) (0.575) Age -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) Level of Education -0.082 -0.093 -0.108 -0.457 -0.239 -0.479 (0.095) (0.086) (0.097) (0.312) (0.245) (0.310) Employed (0=Unemployed) -0.086 -0.238 -0.097 0.067 0.058 0.039 (0.195) (0.171) (0.198) (0.693) (0.515) (0.703) Religiosity -0.164** -0.148** -0.195** -0.128 0.014 -0.171 (0.067) (0.061) (0.069) (0.248) (0.191) (0.251) Social Class -0.034 0.013 -0.024 -0.230 -0.238 -0.244 (0.092) (0.081) (0.093) (0.299) (0.233) (0.296) Constant 1.269* 0.916 1.470* 5.052** 4.035** 5.306** (0.755) (0.617) (0.772) (2.125) (1.617) (2.145)

Pseudo R2 0.08 0.06 0.08 AIC 1183.148 1465.387 1164.061 BIC 1324.317 1611.736 1323.381 Observations 817 971 801 Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure 7 Average Marginal Effects: Populist Voting Interactions Part I (Campaign Period).

Table 10 Models with Populist Party Voting Interactions Part II (Campaign Period). (baseline outcome) Loyal Party Vote vs. Loyal Party Vote vs Party Switching Party Vote  Abstention Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model I Model II Model III Model IV Particularized Specific Support -1.207** -1.378** -1.310** -1.430** -2.985** -3.348* -2.823** -4.361* (0.152) (0.182) (0.165) (0.187) (1.027) (1.619) (1.103) (2.266) Generalized Specific Support 0.541** 0.656** -2.133* -2.209 (0.173) (0.226) (1.237) (2.088) Diffuse Regime Support 0.142 -0.101 -1.294* -1.475 (0.098) (0.132) (0.755) (1.867) Populist Voter (No=0) -3.069** -6.707** -4.896** -6.794** -7.603 -16.778* -21.865* -24.552* (1.240) (1.701) (1.425) (1.819) (5.235) (8.226) (11.660) (12.089) Populist Voter * Particularized Support 0.475* 0.611* 0.646** 0.520 1.825 2.319 2.006 2.919 (0.247) (0.302) (0.262) (0.330) (1.188) (1.910) (1.573) (2.225) Populist Voter * Specific Support 1.024** 1.300** 2.649* -2.154 (0.373) (0.498) (1.533) (4.176) Populist Voter * Diffuse Support 0.336* -0.159 3.481* 6.139 (0.190) (0.296) (1.919) (5.730) Government Party Intention (No=0) -0.050 -0.193 -0.074 -0.217 0.142 1.103 1.418 1.965 (0.222) (0.237) (0.229) (0.240) (1.347) (1.707) (1.678) (2.303) Left-Right: Self placement -0.031 -0.048 -0.044 -0.049 -0.902* -1.531 -1.312* -3.204 (0.044) (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.468) (1.004) (0.786) (2.370) Ideology: Middle-Extreme -0.155* -0.232** -0.183** -0.222** 0.356 0.224 -0.413 -0.846 (0.070) (0.078) (0.073) (0.081) (0.717) (1.010) (1.153) (1.990) Distance to Previous Party -0.051 0.033 -0.041 0.040 -0.638 -0.992 -0.471 -1.772 (0.079) (0.086) (0.081) (0.088) (0.557) (1.072) (0.824) (1.974) Political Knowledge -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.004 -0.087* -0.175* -0.117* -0.257 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.048) (0.089) (0.059) (0.164) Interested in Politics -0.022 -0.021 -0.046 -0.028 0.363 0.710 0.061 0.366 (0.081) (0.090) (0.085) (0.093) (0.476) (0.691) (0.655) (0.999) Gender (ref=men) 0.167 0.194 0.223 0.154 -15.897 -18.971 -16.174 -22.363 (0.194) (0.211) (0.201) (0.215) (545.063) (899.376) (412.638) (504.209) Age -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 0.012 0.076 0.082 0.193 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.055) (0.080) (0.080) (0.174) Level of Education -0.026 -0.065 -0.046 -0.090 -1.410 -1.116 -0.705 -0.647 (0.123) (0.134) (0.127) (0.136) (0.924) (1.143) (1.044) (1.314) Employed (0=Unemployed) -0.397* -0.147 -0.309 -0.177 1.051 2.320 1.103 4.695 (0.241) (0.274) (0.251) (0.279) (1.453) (2.316) (1.664) (4.321) Religiosity 0.006 -0.086 -0.046 -0.122 -0.948 -1.603 -1.439 -2.345 (0.086) (0.094) (0.090) (0.096) (0.762) (1.021) (0.921) (1.651) Social Class -0.003 -0.072 0.032 -0.041 -1.034 -1.007 -1.426 -1.478 (0.109) (0.126) (0.114) (0.129) (0.675) (0.863) (0.921) (1.373) Constant 7.529** 6.628** 7.603** 6.893** 41.586 56.500 47.734 78.181 (1.165) (1.285) (1.208) (1.315) (545.174) (899.622) (412.864) (505.763)

Pseudo R2 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.26 AIC 816.7968 710.7297 779.5006 695.5251 BIC 960.3051 868.6574 940.0571 870.3895 Observations 655 594 639 585 Logit Coefficients, Standard Errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure 8 Average Marginal Effects: Populist Voting Interactions Part II (Campaign Period).

Appendix 5D Additional Robustness Checks

Figure 9 Marginal Effects at Representative Values of the Predictors (Model IV:Inter-Election).

Appendices to Chapter 6

Appendix 6A Countries & Elections

Table A1 Overview of the countries and elections with valid observations of ∆ Trust... (%) Country Year ∆ Trust in Parliament ∆ Trust in Government ∆ Trust in Parties ∆ SWD Austria: 1999 . . . 0.29 2006 -4.28 0.27 2.56 . 2008 6.85 8.43 8.55 . 2013 0.40 -0.20 -2.74 1.32 Belgium: 2014 -1.72 -2.54 4.52 -0.91 Bulgaria: 2013 -5.61 -10.02 1.66 -7.38 2014 0.14 1.88 -8.73 -0.27 2017 4.38 6.97 3.90 2.61 Cyprus: 2016 8.65 10.54 -0.56 6.41 Czech Republic: 2006 -2.24 -6.21 -0.09 . 2013 1.58 4.41 2.11 0.94 Denmark: 2011 -3.16 -10.81 . . Estonia: 2007 25.36 16.75 . . 2011 8.61 1.10 . . 2015 -7.84 -16.91 1.42 -0.29 Finland: 2003 9.12 5.72 4.80 2.95 2007 12.48 6.86 . . 2011 13.83 14.14 . . 2015 9.28 21.31 5.48 2.75 Germany: 2002 . . . 1.91 2005 1.50 2.45 0.05 . 2009 -2.67 -7.63 . . 2013 -4.09 -5.95 -4.79 -0.05 Greece: 2000 . . . 2.32 2004 10.83 10.99 8.38 5.03 2007 -0.94 3.53 . . 2009 11.62 16.89 . . 2012A -1.51 -2.61 2.40 -3.74 2015B -8.41 -23.26 -2.30 -2.95 Hungary 2010 30.72 30.71 22.62 9.32 2014 0.39 2.24 -0.86 -2.19

The Tables and Figures presented in the Appendices to chapter 6 are all based upon original analyses by the author of this dissertation. The analyses primarily use data from the Eurobarometer 1999-2017 survey series (https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer) and data sources coded by the author (Described here).

Table A1 continued Iceland: 2013 25.40 19.51 19.16 . Ireland: 2011 32.23 36.74 . . 2016 3.37 2.90 4.68 2.73 Italy: 2006 2.83 1.98 6.43 7.04 2013 1.87 -4.79 0.05 1.34 Latvia: 2006 3.78 4.37 4.88 . 2010 9.67 6.88 1.73 . 2011 4.05 4.38 . . 2014 1.51 1.78 0.07 -0.10 Lithuania: 2008 0.12 1.04 3.83 . 2012 5.59 5.60 5.54 3.81 2016 9.98 4.20 7.04 5.73 Luxembourg: 2013 -1.38 -2.80 -7.58 1.13 Malta: 2008 11.37 8.97 5.19 . 2013 33.46 30.21 28.60 16.14 Netherlands: 2003 -6.24 -16.92 -2.30 2.49 2006 5.52 13.65 13.97 . 2012 4.09 3.75 -5.64 -0.92 2017 3.98 8.36 11.49 4.96 Poland: 2005 5.94 5.16 2.92 . 2011 -0.39 -1.56 . . 2015 2.08 -0.52 0.83 5.03 Portugal: 1999 . . . -1.92 2002 -1.28 -2.59 -0.12 . 2005 -3.53 7.57 2.69 0.92 2009 4.02 -2.76 . . 2015 -4.11 -2.96 0.87 5.09 Romania: 2008 14.22 15.17 . . Slovakia: 2006 16.06 23.69 8.70 . 2012 14.65 23.16 10.66 1.12 2016 4.17 -0.50 0.64 1.46 Slovenia: 2008 4.33 5.70 3.30 . Spain: 2000 . . . 4.80 2008 9.75 9.17 9.84 . Sweden: 2002 . . . 1.78 2006 8.49 14.17 5.27 . 2010 6.52 7.57 -2.29 . 2015 -1.14 -1.20 -7.88 -3.01 United Kingdom: 2005 2.15 2.72 8.41 -2.36 2010 5.18 7.96 8.86 2.11 2015 5.17 8.27 8.50 -0.23 Note: Greece 2012A = 6 May 2012 election. Greece 2015B = 20 September 2015 election.

Appendix 6B Model checks with time control variables

Table B1 Models with time control variables: Dependent variable = ∆ Trust in Parliament

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III

Days between the Pre- and Post-Election EB wave -0.00503 -0.00832 -0.00720 (0.0241) (0.0259) (0.0255) Days between Election and the Post-Election EB wave 0.00674 0.00943 0.00599 (0.0454) (0.0469) (0.0526) Date of the Election (linear) -0.000540 -0.000582 (0.000685) (0.000731) Wave of Democratization (Ref=Wave 1) - Wave 2 Democracies 0.405 (3.611) - Wave 3 Democracies 1.309 (2.625) Constant 6.087 16.63 16.78 (4.909) (14.31) (15.14)

Observations 66 66 66 R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.012 Adjusted R-squared -0.0307 -0.0397 -0.0699 F-test F(2,63) = 0.0297 F(3,62) = 0.214 F(5,60) = 0.169 p=.9708 p=.8862 p=.9730 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Table B2 Main models + Time Controls: Dependent variable = ∆ Trust in Parliament

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Seat Volatility (%) 0.366** (0.121) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.261* (0.140) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0537* (0.0300) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.783** -0.566* -0.365 (0.270) (0.261) (0.320) ENPP -2.962** -2.065* -1.542 (1.139) (1.022) (1.473) GDP Growth 0.118 0.110 0.0266 (0.174) (0.224) (0.200) Days in between the EB waves 0.00787 -0.000361 0.00211 (0.0246) (0.0260) (0.0217) Days in between Election and EB wave -0.0335 -0.0136 -0.00425 (0.0409) (0.0424) (0.0641) Constant 14.70* 14.76* 11.60 (6.911) (7.194) (8.149)

Observations 66 66 49 R-squared 0.192 0.122 0.089 Adjusted R-squared 0.110 0.0322 -0.0408 F-test F(6,59) = 2.217 F(6,59) = 1.147 F(6, 42) = 0.643 p=. 0538 p=. 3471 p=.695 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Appendix 6C Data sources and coding decisions when coding ‘seat-share volatility’

Data Sources:

The main sources for electoral data on seat distributions have been Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook by Nohlen and Stöver (2010), the parliaments and governments database (Döring & Manow, 2017) and other official data provided by electoral authorities for each country available on internet. The approach of cross-checking several data sources helped to find out the correct results for the correct parties in case of disagreement between different sources. Several complications occurred: sometimes seat distributions of party blocs instead of individual parties are reported, different party names for the same party are used by different sources, sources use different party abbreviations, and a few times errors in the reported number of seats could be found. Cross-checking helped to identify those problems and showed which data source could best be used for individual country-election combinations in order to report the most detailed seat distributions of all parties obtaining seats in a single election. The parliaments and governments database additionally provided most information on mergers and split offs. However, looking up additional descriptive sources on party history provided often more extensive information and sometimes gave reason to overrule the coding classification as provided by the parliaments and governments database.

Name changers, Split Offs, Mergers and New Parties:

There are different possibilities to deal with name changers, mergers and split offs (Sikk, 2005). I considered parties continuing under a different name without any further changes in the general structure of the party just as continuations of the previously existing parties. With regard to mergers and split offs, I adopted the conservative approach advocated by Bartolini and Mair (1990) in which the difference between a party’s seat share and the summed seat share of its predecessor parties is calculated for a merger. After a split, the summed total of the successor parties is used. All parties that had no seats in the previous electoral term and obtained at least one seat in the current election are considered to be new parties. Parties re-entering parliament after a period of disappearance are also considered new parties again. Split offs from existing parties are considered to be new parties when individual politicians broke away from a party and started a new party with a different organizational structure and program. Groups of politicians together braking away from a party who form a split off are not considered as a new party (see also Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2017).

Bibliography Bartolini, S. & Mair, P. (1990). Identity, competition, and electoral availability: The stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chiaramonte, A. & Emanuele, V. (2017). Party system volatility, regeneration and de-institutionalization in Western Europe (1945-2015). Party Politics 23(4): 1–13.

Döring, H. & Manow, P. (2017). Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies. Development Version. Retrieved 12 January 2017, from http://parlgov.org

Nohlen, D. & Stöver, P. (2010). Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook. (D. Nohlen & P. Stöver, eds.). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Sikk, A. (2005). How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe. European Journal of Political Research 44(3): 391–412.

Appendix 6D Analyses with Country Fixed Effects. Outcome = ∆ Trust in Parliament

Table D1 The effects of election outcome characteristics on ∆ Trust in Parliament (Fixed Effects)

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model IIIB Seat Volatility (%) 0.500** (0.116) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.218 (0.141) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0759* 0.0648 (0.0372) (0.0471) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -1.384** -0.849* -1.281* 0.469 (0.331) (0.458) (0.716) (1.236) ENPP -4.111* -2.718 -4.382* -3.477 (1.733) (1.749) (2.437) (3.021) GDP Growth -0.0460 -0.233 -0.156 -0.151 (0.378) (0.322) (0.396) (0.434) Constant 20.86** 19.74* 27.72* 13.34 (7.685) (8.222) (12.10) (16.01)

Observations 66 66 49 37 R-squared (Within) 0.335 0.170 0.353 0.295 Number of countries 27 27 23 19 Adjusted R-squared 0.291 0.116 0.295 0.207 F 13.59 1.055 2.289 2.090 rho 0.511 0.458 0.551 0.545 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure D1 Predictions of ‘∆ Trust Parliament’ over Outcome Characteristics (FE Models I-III)

Figure D2 Marginal Effect plots over 3 aspects of the Majoritarian-Consensus Dimension (FE)

Appendix 6E Analyses Excluding Minority Governments. Outcome = ∆ Trust in Parliament

Table E1 The effects of election outcome on ∆ Trust in Parliament (No Minority Governments)

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Seat Volatility (%) 0.410** (0.130) Costs/Benefits of Government (%) -0.416** (0.153) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.114** (0.0355) Disproportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.818** -0.761** -0.545 (0.304) (0.302) (0.350) Effective Number Parliamentary Parties -3.023** -2.364* -1.292 (1.182) (1.064) (1.354) GDP Growth 0.121 0.247 -0.0722 (0.255) (0.369) (0.334) Constant 15.86** 16.32** 10.95 (6.168) (6.139) (7.136)

Observations 51 51 36 R-squared 0.245 0.219 0.268 Adjusted R-squared 0.179 0.151 0.174 F-test 3.305 2.516 3.214 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure E1 Predictions of ‘∆ Trust Parliament’ over Election Outcomes (Models I-III) (No Minority Governments)

Figure E2 Marginal Effect plots over 3 aspects of the Majoritarian-Consensus Dimension (No Minority Governments)

Appendix 6F The relation between the pre-electoral shifts in support and electoral volatility

Appendix 6G Analyses with subjective economic evaluations. Outcome = ∆Trust Parliament

Table G1 The effects of election outcome characteristics on ∆ Trust in Parliament

VARIABLES Model I Model I Model II Model II Model III Model III (Fixed) (Fixed) (Fixed) Seat Volatility (%) 0.380** 0.417** (0.130) (0.0985) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.362** -0.269 (0.136) (0.174) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0668* 0.0482 (0.0366) (0.0410) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.856** -1.054* -0.788* -0.658 -0.554 -1.156 (0.352) (0.486) (0.345) (0.539) (0.363) (0.853) ENPP -3.299* -4.404** -2.689* -3.699* -2.669* -3.731 (1.394) (1.484) (1.222) (1.881) (1.543) (2.717) Subjective Evaluation Economy -0.605 -8.782* -1.164 -9.857* -3.803 -12.39* (2.784) (3.749) (2.659) (4.164) (4.253) (6.020) Country Dummies Included Yes Yes Yes

Constant 17.64* 37.48** 19.26* 42.18** 24.30* 50.67** (8.493) (12.80) (8.190) (10.30) (11.51) (15.05)

Observations 53 53 53 53 41 41 Number of countries 25 25 25 25 22 22 R-squared (Within) 0.245 0.534 0.241 0.423 0.188 0.519 Adjusted R-squared 0.182 0.496 0.178 0.375 0.0980 0.465 F 2.611 11.78 2.236 3.272 1.276 4.881 Rho 0.662 0.606 0.576 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Appendix 6H Analyses with ∆ Trust in Government as Outcome Variable

Table H1 The effects of election outcome characteristics on ∆ Trust in Government

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model III B Seat Volatility (%) 0.404* (0.180) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.345* (0.173) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0760* 0.0715 (0.0369) (0.0457) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.843* -0.723* -0.373 -0.323 (0.413) (0.388) (0.341) (0.386) ENPP -4.102* -2.912* -2.072 -2.728 (1.977) (1.594) (1.400) (1.667) GDP Growth 0.0248 -0.0148 0.0620 0.272 (0.217) (0.251) (0.213) (0.223) Constant 18.82** 17.72** 11.65* 13.03 (7.561) (7.274) (6.471) (8.418)

Observations 49 49 49 37 R-squared 0.168 0.133 0.118 0.148 Adjusted R-squared 0.0920 0.0545 0.0377 0.0411 F-test 1.654 1.376 1.386 1.237 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure H1 Predictions of ‘∆ Trust in Government’ over Election Outcome Characteristics

Table H2 Interactions over the Majoritarian-Consensus dimension (Dependent = ∆Trust in Government) VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX

Seat Volatility (%) 0.481 0.732* 0.507* (0.292) (0.432) (0.252) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.155 -1.304** -0.810** (0.298) (0.392) (0.257) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0643 0.129 0.108* (0.0612) (0.106) (0.0565) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.702 -0.836* -0.807* -0.987* -0.719* -0.700 -0.451 -0.342 -0.286 (0.518) (0.433) (0.439) (0.526) (0.417) (0.427) (0.352) (0.347) (0.359) ENPP -4.160* -2.522 -5.701** -2.999* -0.567 -5.960** -2.042 -1.119 -3.037* (1.990) (2.999) (2.149) (1.583) (1.778) (1.916) (1.391) (1.411) (1.755) Fractionalization of pre-electoral government 15.34 27.04** 12.90* (13.87) (9.347) (6.949) Interaction Terms: Seat Volatility (%) * Proportionality -0.00871 (0.0241) Seat Volatility (%) * ENPP -0.0878 (0.105) Seat Volatility (%) * Gov. Fractionalization -0.349 (0.513) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * Proportionality -0.0246 (0.0384) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * ENPP 0.246** (0.0816) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * Gov. Fractionalization 1.139** (0.455) Government Alteration (%) * Proportionality 0.00157 (0.00708) Government Alteration (%) * ENPP -0.0155 (0.0287) Government Alteration * Gov. Fractionalization -0.113 (0.128) Constant 17.90* 13.29 19.80** 19.64** 8.647 18.11* 12.26* 8.275 10.67 (7.802) (11.54) (7.913) (7.575) (8.240) (7.958) (6.537) (6.444) (6.866)

Observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 R-squared 0.169 0.179 0.189 0.143 0.197 0.250 0.118 0.121 0.142 Adjusted R-squared 0.0939 0.104 0.0950 0.0652 0.124 0.163 0.0377 0.0415 0.0421 F-test 1.578 2.125 1.712 1.444 3.715 2.900 1.419 1.423 1.488 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure H2 Marginal Effect plots over 3 aspects of the Majoritarian-Consensus Dimension (Trust Gov.)

Table H3: The effects of election outcome characteristics on ∆ Trust in Government (Fixed Effects)

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Seat Volatility (%) 0.597** (0.191) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.337 (0.226) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.114** (0.0425) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -1.985 -2.005 -2.070* (1.179) (1.257) (1.107) ENPP -9.464* -9.104* -7.145* (4.965) (5.276) (4.008) GDP Growth 0.185 0.0886 0.0885 (0.672) (0.663) (0.532) Constant 42.38* 49.32* 39.71* (21.01) (22.70) (18.34)

Observations 49 49 49 R-squared (Within) 0.369 0.276 0.428 Number of countries 23 23 23 Adjusted R-squared 0.311 0.211 0.376 F 5.240 1.266 4.265 rho 0.465 0.481 0.603 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure H3: Predictions of ‘∆ Trust in Government’ over Election Outcome Characteristics (FE)

Figure H4 Marginal Effects over 3 aspects of the Majoritarian-Consensus Dimension (Gov.) (FE)

Appendix 6I Analyses with ∆ Trust in Parties as Outcome Variable

Table I1 The effects of election outcome characteristics on ∆ Trust in Parties

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Seat Volatility (%) 0.138 (0.0994) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.183* (0.108) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0265 (0.0257) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.139 -0.156 -0.0520 (0.281) (0.287) (0.319) ENPP -1.429 -1.302 -2.334* (1.214) (1.079) (1.318) GDP Growth 0.0977 0.0771 0.120 (0.117) (0.134) (0.137) Constant 7.667 7.967 11.62* (5.758) (5.663) (6.505)

Observations 53 53 37 R-squared 0.080 0.105 0.180 Adjusted R-squared 0.00285 0.0305 0.0779 F-test 1.049 1.418 2.359 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure I1 Predictions of ‘∆ Trust in Parties’ over Election Outcome Characteristics (Models I-III)

Table I2 Interactions over the Majoritarian-Consensus dimension (Dependent = ∆Trust in Parties). VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX

Seat Volatility (%) 0.154 0.114 0.0657 (0.169) (0.354) (0.202) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.270 -0.326 -0.187 (0.184) (0.380) (0.239) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0213 0.0948 0.0397 (0.0581) (0.0845) (0.0432) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.111 -0.143 -0.189 -0.0508 -0.174 -0.158 -0.0729 0.00691 -0.0111 (0.415) (0.286) (0.297) (0.325) (0.287) (0.288) (0.276) (0.307) (0.320) ENPP -1.410 -1.502 -0.656 -1.312 -0.953 -0.879 -2.239* -1.061 -2.292* (1.164) (1.901) (1.177) (1.075) (1.201) (1.106) (1.286) (1.192) (1.150) Fractionalization of pre-electoral government -10.49 -2.931 3.119 (9.604) (6.455) (5.550) Interaction Terms: Seat Volatility (%) * Proportionality -0.00185 (0.0152) Seat Volatility (%) * ENPP 0.00571 (0.0766) Seat Volatility (%) * Gov. Fractionalization 0.236 (0.394) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * Proportionality 0.0102 (0.0173) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * ENPP 0.0318 (0.0791) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * Gov. Fractionalization 0.0287 (0.455) Government Alteration (%) * Proportionality 0.000532 (0.00582) Government Alteration (%) * ENPP -0.0200 (0.0233) Government Alteration * Gov. Fractionalization -0.0447 (0.0957) Constant 7.547 8.163 8.587 7.411 6.728 7.661 11.76* 6.983 10.48* (6.558) (8.771) (6.044) (5.840) (6.257) (5.725) (5.968) (5.941) (5.596)

Observations 53 53 53 53 53 53 37 37 37 R-squared 0.074 0.074 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.109 0.172 0.192 0.177 Adjusted R-squared -0.00284 -0.00289 0.0125 0.0325 0.0321 0.0147 0.0690 0.0906 0.0445 F-test 0.635 0.741 0.959 1.109 1.122 1.038 1.577 1.811 1.485 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure I2 Marginal Effect plots over 3 aspects of the Majoritarian-Consensus Dimension (Party)

Table I3 The effects of election outcome characteristics on ∆ Trust in Parties (Fixed Effects)

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Seat Volatility (%) 0.405** (0.121) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.363** (0.137) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0689 (0.0454) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.817* -0.626 -0.704 (0.460) (0.473) (0.722) ENPP -2.469 -2.632* -4.100* (1.455) (1.363) (2.065) GDP Growth 0.402** 0.325* 0.203 (0.103) (0.135) (0.224) Constant 10.17 13.82* 20.20 (6.742) (6.321) (12.56)

Observations 53 53 37 Countries 25 25 20 R-squared 0.226 0.202 0.380 Adjusted R-squared 0.161 0.136 0.303 F-test 6.276 2.366 3.657 Rho 0.550 0.504 0.545 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure I3 Predictions of ‘∆ Trust in Parties’ over Election Outcome Characteristics (Models I-III) (FE)

Figure I4 Marginal Effects over 3 aspects of the Majoritarian-Consensus Dimension (Trust Party) (FE)

Appendix 6J Analyses with ∆ Satisfaction with Democracy (SWD) as Outcome Variable

Table J1 The effects of election outcome characteristics on ∆ SWD

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model III B Seat Volatility (%) 0.129** (0.0440) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.167** (0.0617) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.0293 0.0264 (0.0175) (0.0205) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.481** -0.524** -0.296 -0.376 (0.180) (0.197) (0.195) (0.241) ENPP -1.360* -1.441* -1.264 -1.742 (0.668) (0.667) (0.815) (1.274) GDP Growth 0.0202 0.00864 0.0955 0.146 (0.0828) (0.108) (0.0984) (0.0871) Constant 8.137* 9.351** 6.956 8.723 (3.688) (3.746) (4.218) (6.502)

Observations 42 42 32 22 R-squared 0.237 0.282 0.208 0.349 Adjusted R-squared 0.155 0.204 0.0911 0.196 F-test F(4, 37) = F(4, 37) = 2.628 F(4, 27) = 1.062 F(4, 17) = 1.246 3.905 p=.0499 p=.395 p=.329 p=.0096 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure J1 Predictions of ‘∆ SWD’ over Election Outcome Characteristics (Models I-III)

Table J2 Interactions over the Majoritarian-Consensus dimension (Dependent = ∆SWD). VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX

Seat Volatility (%) 0.0354 0.205* 0.134* (0.0796) (0.116) (0.0751) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.159* -0.228* -0.211** (0.0895) (0.129) (0.0764) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.00634 0.105* 0.0710** (0.0352) (0.0435) (0.0204) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.627** -0.483** -0.501** -0.537** -0.529** -0.521** -0.425** -0.219 -0.179 (0.241) (0.181) (0.189) (0.198) (0.191) (0.192) (0.159) (0.186) (0.183) ENPP -1.267* -1.004 -0.903 -1.440* -1.283* -1.077* -1.295 0.289 -0.837 (0.616) (0.979) (0.604) (0.661) (0.725) (0.590) (0.820) (0.887) (0.670) Fractionalization of pre-electoral government -4.172 -1.993 7.484* (5.334) (3.530) (3.865) Interaction Terms: Seat Volatility (%) * Proportionality 0.00912 (0.00779) Seat Volatility (%) * ENPP -0.0193 (0.0291) Seat Volatility (%) * Gov. Fractionalization -0.00659 (0.207) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * Proportionality -0.000982 (0.00843) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * ENPP 0.0144 (0.0291) Cost/Benefit of Gov. * Gov. Fractionalization 0.125 (0.191) Government Alteration (%) * Proportionality 0.00232 (0.00293) Government Alteration (%) * ENPP -0.0244* (0.0121) Government Alteration * Gov. Fractionalization -0.159** (0.0568) Constant 9.226* 6.865 7.997* 9.455** 8.785* 8.704* 8.527* 1.583 3.047 (3.939) (4.856) (4.007) (3.652) (3.892) (3.645) (4.077) (4.299) (3.608)

Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 32 32 32 R-squared 0.253 0.244 0.282 0.282 0.286 0.318 0.213 0.275 0.355 Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.162 0.182 0.204 0.208 0.223 0.0967 0.167 0.230 F-test 3.531 5.071 2.817 2.498 2.820 2.716 3.659 1.907 2.665 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure J2 Marginal Effect plots over 3 aspects of the Majoritarian-Consensus Dimension (SWD)

Table J3 The effects of election outcome characteristics on ∆ SWD (Fixed Effects)

VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Seat Volatility (%) 0.226** (0.0552) Cost/Benefit of Government (%) -0.266** (0.0781) Government Alteration Rate (%) 0.00613 (0.0196) Proportionality (Gallagher L_SQ) -0.950** -0.942** -1.376** (0.0983) (0.0834) (0.235) ENPP -1.452* -1.928** -2.617** (0.729) (0.522) (0.996) GDP Growth 0.276 0.335 -0.233 (0.267) (0.303) (0.246) Constant 9.439* 12.48** 22.04** (4.177) (2.867) (5.511)

Observations 42 42 32 Countries 23 23 19 R-squared 0.653 0.623 0.606 Adjusted R-squared 0.616 0.582 0.548 F-test 44.88 70.78 119.9 Rho 0.768 0.747 0.818 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed test)

Figure J3 Predictions of ‘∆ SWD’ over Election Outcome Characteristics (Models I-III) FE

Figure J4 Marginal Effect plots over 3 aspects of the Majoritarian-Consensus Dimension (SWD) FE

This dissertation investigates the causal relations between electoral volatility and forms of political support. In particular, it identifies and addresses four shortcomings in the literature. First, it is seldom acknowledged nor empirically scrutinized that the effects of support on volatility may have a dynamic component which varies over time. Second, existing studies may have incorrectly assumed that such effects exist coherently among voters for all political parties. Third, the effects of different subtypes of support on vote switching may be less similar than commonly assumed once such effect are simultaneously assessed. And fourth, it has not been considered that volatility may not only result from political support, but may also be one of its causes. This book empirically demonstrates that dynamic drops in support (critical citizens) stimulate vote switching independently from the impact of low base levels of support (dissatisfied citizens). It also demonstrates that political dissatisfaction stabilizes the vote of populist- party voters. Next, the effects of generalized/diffuse types of support on vote switching are shown to shift to positive effects when controlled for specific support. Finally, the book shows that volatile election outcomes have the capacity to increasingly restore political support over the course of elections. Altogether, this book suggests that volatility more positively impacts the well-functioning of democracies than is commonly assumed by democratic pessimists.

Remko Voogd (1984) is a postdoctoral researcher at Wageningen University Research. For this dissertation he worked as a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam.