Chapter 3* Expansion of Maratha Power (1720—1740) Shahu
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CHAPTER 3* EXPANSION OF MARATHA POWER (1720—1740) SHAHU. Pesva Baji Rav I. BALAJIS ELDEST SON BAJI RAV SUCCEEDED HIM in the Pesvaship on 17th April 1720. The training and experience gained under his father’s tutelage and the responsibility of office early matured the Pesva’s character and gave him a poise and ample grasp of affairs. A much more vigorous personality, he quickened the pace of events. The energies of his people that were being wasted in petty disputes and Civil War he directed into fresh channels and carried Maratha arms into Hindustan. With a statesmanship of high order he combined military leadership suited to the genius of his people and under him the Marathas made rapid progress. During his father’s life time he had seen enough of the Moghal Darbar to convince him of its weakness. The parties anxious to dominate at the court were bidding against each other for Maratha co-operation and the new Pesva was too shrewd not to perceive the advantage such a situation gave him. He realised early, as few of his contemporaries appear to have done, that the Moghal empire was rushing to its doom and that it was time for his people to march into Hindustan and seize supreme power instead of remaining confined to the narrow limits of their Deccan homeland. His early victories secured his position at home, increased his resources and confidence and in 1728 his armies burst into Central India. With Rajput help he secured a safe base in Malva for his plan of Hindu-pad-Padsahi which became the watch-word of Maratha policy and animated all Maratha activities in the years to follow. Problems nearer home demanded the Pesva’s first attention. He could not look northward before setting his own house in order. The great feudatories of the Maratha State owed but nominal allegiance to the sovereign, and enjoyed freedom of action that was undesirable. It was necessary that the Royal authority, if it was to be effective, should be strong enough to override that of its feudatories and bend them to its will. The security of the Maratha State was closely bound with its supremacy in the Deccan wrested from the Moghals after a bitter struggle of a quarter century. This had been unwillingly conceded in the treaty of March 1719 * This Chapter is contributed by Dr. V. G. Dighe. 50 MAHARASHTRA STATE GAZETTEER concluded by the Sayyads and its preservation called for constant vigilance. The Sayyads had been driven from power and the very extensive Deccan Province encircling Maratha homeland on all sides except the west had been seized by Nizam-ul-mulk, the ablest among the Moghal chiefs and the most consistent opponent of the Maratha State. The Nizam was not likely to respect an agreement which cut at the root of his authority. A part of the Svaraj territory was yet in the hands of Moghal officials and foreign powers like the Siddi of Janjira. and Portuguese of Bassein and had to be wrested from them. The Civil War with the Kolhapur party was only in abeyance, the faction of Sambhaji refusing to accept a subordinate position. The situation was thus bristling with difficulties. Contest with Nizam-ul-mulk. The safety of the Maratha homeland was the key to the situation. This was always in peril till a satisfactory settlement was made with the Deccan subhedar. The Nizam had arrived in the Deccan in 1724 after his failure as Vazir at Delhi and meant to stay. Within a year he beat down all local opposition, obtained formal recognition of his titles and was free to oppose Maratha claims. But he knew that the Marathas were too strong to be attacked in their homeland and had not forgotten the lesson of Aurangzeb’s fruitless campaigning against them. He proceeded very warily in his plans. He removed his capital from Aurangabad to Hyderabad, a place distant from Maratha territory and occupying a more convenient position for his province. By offering a jagir in Berar he persuaded Raja Sahu to exempt his new capital from Couth. The Pesva protested in vain against the exchange as he saw that this was the thin end of the wedge to eliminate Maratha influence in the Hyderabad quarter. His protest was overruled by the Raja in the hope of establishing cordial relations with the Deccan Subhedar. Sambhaji of Kolhapur now played into the hands of the Nizam. The Kolhapur Prince had refused to be reconciled to Sahu’s superior authority and was now roused into hostility by the Nizam’s blandish ments and by activities of Sahu’s armies in Karnatak. Two Maratha armies under Sahu’s chiefs had swept southward as far as Srirangapatam in 1725 and 1726 and on this Sambhaji looked as encroachment on his rights. He made common cause with the Nizam on the promise that the latter would support his claims against Sahu Anxious to embroil the Marathas in a civil war such a promise was readily forthcoming from the Navab. The Nizam now affected ignorance of the respective claims of Sahu and Sambhaji, withheld payment of Cauth by dismissing Sahu’s agents from his dominions and asked Sahu to submit hill claims to be arbitrated. The proposed arbitration was a mere HISTORY – MARATHA PERIOD 51 cloak to conceal his design of reviving the old controversy over succession and once more embroiling the Marathas in their domestic dispute. Sahu was dumb-founded at the Nizam’s proposal. He had always been anxious to live in amity with the Moghal Subhedar and his friendly overtures had been rewarded with the challenge to his authority. The Pratinidhi’s timid advice of accepting the proposal of arbitration was stoutly opposed by the Pesva and war was declared on the Nizam in August 1727. Sambhaji of Kolhapur joined the Nizam and this the Subhedar felt would be the sign for the civil war to flare up. In a letter to Savai Jai Singh he unfolded his scheme. “With a view to carrying out the Emperor’s order I have with God’s help, called to my side Raja Sambhaji who is Sahu’s rival, conciliated him and engaged in punishing and exterminating Sahu…………… I am hopeful that other partisans of Sahu would desert him for my side and his party would cease to exist — according to our hearts’ desire.”1 But the Pesva’s genius and strategy defeated the Nizam’s design. Orders for general mobilization were given on 1st August 1727. Forts were warned to be on the defensive and before the rains had stopped a large Maratha army consisting mainly of light cavalry took the field under command of the Pesva and entered the Aurangabad district. As the Maratha army was plundering Jalna the Nizam taking Sambhaji with him set out to punish the Marathas. On 6th November 1727 a skirmish took place and the Pesva avoiding a contest turned in the direction of Burhanpur. To save the wealthy city the Nizam hurried towards Burhanpur but failed to come up with the Marathas owing to his baggage and equipment. In the meanwhile the Pesva had entered Gujarat clearly with the intention of drawing the Nizam into the hilly country. His plan was to exhaust the enemy before attacking him in the field. The Nizam turning from the pursuit set his face towards Poona to destroy the place of the Pesva’s abode. Taleganv, Narayanganv, Baramati all surrendered and the main army advanced as far as Poona. Learning that the Pesva had re-entered Vaijapur district along the Godavari the Nizam retraced his steps to cover his country. His army had been tired out by marching and countermarching and the Maratha allies on whom he had placed great reliance proved utterly worthless and lacking in daring. In the mountainous country near Palkhed in which he was marching, grain and forage could not be procured. The Moghal army was completely surrounded, attacked on 25th February and forced to seek terms. On 6th March 1728 was concluded the treaty of Mungi-Sevganv. The Navab granted recognition of Sahu as the sole king of the Marathas and promised to abandon the cause of Sambhaji. He also agreed not to oppose Sahu’s claims of Cauth and Sardesmukhi 1 Mss. letter, Sir Jadunath Sarkar’s Collection. 52 MAHARASHTRA STATE GAZETTEER over the six Subhas of the Decean. The Nizam’s attempt to sow dissensions and involve the Maratha State in a Civil War was decisively defeated by the Pesva and Maratha supremacy over the Decean was firmly established 1. Abandoned by the Nizam it was easy to bring to book Sambhaji of Kolhapur. Incited secretly by the Navab’s agents and Udaji Cavan he again declared war on Sahu in January 1730. He was surprised in his camp on the Varna and his camp equippage and his family fell into Sahu’s hands. Sambhaji threw himself on the mercy of his cousin. Sahu anxious to wipe out bitter feelings invited Sambhaji to a personal meeting, and after much feasting and amidst scenes of splendour was concluded in April 1731 the treaty of Varna which defined the relations of the Kolhapur Prince with the Maratha State. Sambhaji was confirmed in the sovereignty of the territory held by him, he was also to occupy forts and posts upto Tungabhadra and his position was recognised as that of a subordinate ally of the Satara Raja. The agreement put an end to a long standing feud 2. Defeat of Senapati Dabhade. Another domestic dispute convulsed the young Maratha State at this period.