A Man Born Out of Season:, Eastern Airlines, and the Civil Aeronautics Board

W. David Lewis Auburn University

Five yearsafter aviationexecutive Edward V. ("Eddie") Rickenbacker died in 1973, the Airline DeregulationAct of 1978 becamelaw. As an outspoken advocateof a free marketeconomy, Rickenbacker would have welcomedthe new statute,which was basedon the premisethat governmentregulation had stifledcompetition on the nation'sairways. Most of all, he wouldhave relished the deathsentence that the act imposedon theCivil AeronauticsBoard (CAB), a federalagency with whichhe had repeatedlycrossed swords during his long careeras chief executive of EasternAir Lines.• Rickenbacker'sattitudes reflected the "ruggedindividualism" of the late nineteenthcentury in whichhe wasborn. He believedthat competitionwas the lifebloodof a free marketeconomy. At most,he was willing to concedeonly a severelylimited role for the governmentto play in corporatewarfare, similar to thatof a refereein a prize fight.Such a role, he believed,should stop well short of meddling,especially by favoringone competitor at another'sexpense. Rick- enbacker'sstormy experience with the CAB causedhim to believethat, in the nameof fosteringcompetition, it rewardedhigh-cost, inefficient airlines at the expenseof larger,better-managed ones, and thusviolated the rulesof fair play. His views were intensifiedby his hatredof FranklinD. Rooseveltand the New Deal, which had spawnedthe CAB. Within a few yearsafter the Civil Aero- nauticsAct of 1938 was passed,Rickenbacker had becomeconvinced that the CAB waspart of a hugeconspiracy against free enterprise.Born whenBenjamin Harrisonwas president, he despisedFDR andeverything he stoodfor. Rickenbacker'sstrong commitment to a free marketeconomy was evident early in his life. Born in povertyin October1890 to Swissimmigrant parents in Columbus,, he quickly displayedpronounced entrepreneurial tendencies anda penchantfor risk-taking.As he laterstated, his business career began at the ageof five whenhe collectedrags, bones, and rusty nails and sold them to a junk dealernamed Sam. Findingthat bonesweighed more whensoaked in water,he swishedthem aroundin mud puddlesbefore selling them. Suspecting that Sam

•Fora usefuloverview ofthe nature, background, andeffects of the Airline Deregulation Act, see [ 16]. BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Volume twenty-five,no. 1, Fall 1996. Copyright¸1996 by theBusiness History Conference. ISSN 0849-6825.

154 A Man Born Out of Season: Eddie Rickenbacker/155 had improperlyset his scales,Rickenbacker bought his own to make sure he wouldnot be cheated out of a singlepenny. 2 Rickenbackerwas also deeplycommitted to the work ethic. He got his first job sellingnewspapers when he was ten yearsold. Every day, he got up early in the morningand walkedtwo milesto get copiesof the earliestedition of the ColumbusDispatch so that he couldbeat his competitorsto the punch.Four yearslater, whenhis fatherwas killed by an assailant,he droppedout of school to supporthis mother.He neverforgot the thrill of giving her his first pay envelope,containing $3.50 he hadearned at a factoryby workingtwelve hours a day, six daysa week. His incomerose as he becameincreasingly resourceful. Gettinga job cleaningrailroad passenger for $1 per day, he doubledand tripledhis incomeby findingcoins that had fallen behind the seatcushions. After taking a ride in a Model C Ford, Rickenbackerfell in love with automobilesand thusbegan a long associationwith one of the chief seedbedsof twentiethcentury enterprise. His upwardclimb resembledthe plot of a Horatio Alger story. After taking a janitorial positionat a shop that repairedmotor vehicles,he movedon to the OscarLear Company,a Columbus-basedfirm that actuallymade automobiles. Refusing to giveup whenhis first attemptsto get a job withthe company were rebuffed, he badgeredthe owners into hiring him by grabbinga broom,sweeping the floor, and asking for nothingas an indicationof hiswillingness to work.His diligenceand zeal to learnwere phenomenal. Paying $60 outof meagerwages for a mail-ordercourse in automotivetechnology, he aroseat four o'clockevery morning to studythe lessons. Rickenbacker'szest for achievementcaught the attention of LeeFrayer, a mechanicalengineer for OscarLear who designedracing cars. Under Frayer's guidanceRickenbacker mastered the basicsof mechanicalengineering and showedan instinctive feel for gasolinemotors. When Frayer moved to a manag- erial positionwith a muchbigger manufacturer,the ColumbusBuggy Company,he put his apprentice,now seventeen,in chargeof its testing department,where Rickenbacker supervised a staff of fifteenor twentyworkers. Continuinghis upwardclimb, Rickenbackerbecame a roving trouble- shooterfor theColumbus Buggy Company. At agenineteen he was put in charge of selling its Firestone-Columbuscars in five midwesternstates, with six sales- men workingunder him. Meanwhile,Frayer, who not only designedbut also droveracing cars, chose Rickenbacker to be hisriding mechanic, a demanding job callingfor steadynerves and quickreflexes. Rickenbacker never forgot Frayer'sreaction when, after the latter had spent an entire year building a racing car for the VanderbiltCup Race,the vehicleoverheated and had to leavethe coursein the first eliminationrun. Takingthe setbackcalmly, Frayer turned to Rickenbackerand said, "Try like hell to win,but don't cry if youlose." SoonRickenbacker himself became a racingdriver. Taking death-defying risks that other drivers shunned,he became one of America's foremost racers.

2Biographicalinformation about Rickenbacker provided throughout this essay is taken chieflyfrom [8]. Forfurther information see [11], which is not always accurate, and [2]. W. David Lewis / 156

His first significantvictory came in a 300-milerace at SiouxCity, Iowa in 1914. More championshipsfollowed over the nexttwo years.By 1916, Rickenbacker rankedthird among all racerson theAmerican tour with winningsof $60,000. After the entered World War I in 1917, Rickenbacker enlistedand went to Franceas a driver on GeneralPershing's staff. Impressing suchpowerful persons as air chief Billy Mitchell with his mechanicalability, he schemedhis way into the Army's fledglingair serviceand becamea combat pilot. In this role he againshowed his deepcompetitive instincts and zest for takingdeath-defying risks in aerialdogfights on the WesternFront. By shooting down twenty-six German aircraft, he becameAmerica's "Ace of Aces." His leadershipskills won him commandof the 94th Aero PursuitSquadron, famed for its Hat-in-the-Ringemblem. Cominghome in 1919as a nationalhero, Rickenbacker was adulated by throngsof admirersin New York, ,,and other cities. Soon he launcheda businesscareer. Intending at first to becomean aircraftmanufac- turer,he sawthat the time was not ripe for sucha movebecause postwar markets weresaturated with surplusplanes. Falling back on the autoindustry, he secured fundingfrom Detroitmillionaire Barney Everitt and created a high-speed,low- slungcar, the Rickenbacker,named after himself. Rickenbackerpoured vast amounts of energyinto makinga car that was notablefor technicalinnovations and imaginativestyling. These features, how- ever, were not well conceivedfor the mid-pricedmarket niche he aimedto fill. Salesfell whena recessionstruck in 1925.Rickenbacker borrowed heavily to savethe company, but it wentbankrupt in 1927,leaving him in $250,000debt. Showing unboundedfaith in free enterprise,Rickenbacker plunged immediatelyinto new ventures.He designedand promoteda lightweightfive- cylinderradial engine to powera "flyingflivver" that he conceivedboth as a car and an airplane.After this venturefailed, a bankhelped him buy the IndianapolisSpeedway, which he developedinto a major testingground for automotiveinnovations. Soon thereafterhe borrowed$90,000 to acquirethe Allison EngineeringCompany, which he sold at a substantialprofit to Fisher Brothers.In 1926he andone of hiswartime comrades founded Florida Airways, whichflew air mail betweenAtlanta and Miami. When it went bankrupt,he becamevice presidentof a GM subsidiary,Fokker Aircraft, and negotiateda deal throughwhich GM acquiredthe PioneerInstrument Company - later to become better known as Bendix Aviation. He used his finder's fees to retire his debts,despite the fact thathe wasno longerliable for themas a resultof going throughbankruptcy. The onsetin 1929 of the worstdepression in Americanhistory did nothingto diminishRickenbacker's faith in free enterprise.When GM moved Fokker to Baltimorein 1932, he left a securepost to becomevice presidentof the AviationCorporation (AVCO), a ricketyfirm whoseair routesran mainly from east to west.Although AVCO was near bankruptcy,Rickenbacker fear- lesslyadvocated a mergerwith EasternAir Transport,another ailing company whoseroutes ran mostlynorth and south. Trying to implementthe idea,AVCO's A Man Born Out of Season: Eddie Rickenbacker/157 chief investors,Averell Harrimanand Robert Lehmann,got into a proxy fight with Wall Streetoperator Errett L. Cord.Rickenbacker picked the losingside by backingHarriman and Lehman, and was once more unemployed. As usualhe plungedahead, persuading GM to acquireNorth American Aviation,a bankruptconglomerate that owned a numberof potentiallyvaluable assetsincluding Eastern Air Transport(EAT). When GM reorganizedNorth American,Rickenbacker became general manager of EAT. Its main assetwas a vacation route from New York to Miami, but its fleet was obsolete and its future extremelydim. As he struggledto improveEastern's prospects, Rickenbacker crossed swords with Franklin D. Roosevelt, for whom he had voted in the 1932 election becausehe believedthat FDR wouldcut governmentspending. Rickenbacker, however, soon became disillusioned with FDR and the New Deal. In 1934, respondingto allegedscandals in the awardingof airmail routesunder the Hooveradministration, FDR canceledall airmailcontracts with privately-owned carriersand orderedthe Army Air Corps to fly the mail. Knowing that Army pilotswere poorly trained and unfamiliarwith airmailoperations, Rickenbacker foresaw that crasheswould occur and accusedFDR of plotting "legalized murder."On the last day of regularairmail operations,in a deliberategesture of defianceaimed at FDR, he and TWA presidentJack Frye flew a newly-built DouglasDC-1 acrossthe countrywith a load of mail, settinga transcontinental speedrecord of thirteen hours and two minutes? As Rickenbackerhad predicted, a mountingnumber of disastersoccurred as armypilots crashed and died whileflying the mail. As a result,FDR changed courseand the federal governmentgranted new airmail contractsto private carriersunder a hastily-contrivedlaw aimed at eliminatingexcess profits and discipliningthe industry.Despite the restrictionsimposed by the new law, Rickenbackerturned Eastern around by acquiringup-to-date planes, expanding its routestructure, doubling its work force,attracting passengers, and improving employeemorale with better wagesand fringe benefits.As a result, Eastern becameprofitable. Its new planes,known as the "GreatSilver Fleet," symbolized itscorporate pride. 4 Rickenbacker'ssuccess was all the more impressivebecause conditions in the airline industry generally had deteriorated while Eastern's fortunes improved.In 1938, however,he learnedthat Ernest Breech,North American Aviation'spresident, planned to sellEastern for $3 millionto a groupheaded by car rental magnateJohn Hertz. Rickenbacker,feeling that Easterncould not have beenoffered for sucha price exceptfor the work he had donerebuilding the airline, was enraged.Going over Breech'shead, he securedfrom GM's chief executive,Alfred Sloan,an optionto keep controlof Easternif he couldraise

3 In additionto thebiographical works previously cited, see also [12]. As Sealing states, Rickenbacker"went along for theride" and "hardly touched the controls" during the flight. 4On Eastern's progress inthis period, see [3] and North American Aviation [10]. W. David Lewis / 158

$3.5 million within thirty days. With customarydoggedness, Rickenbacker securedenough backing to implementthe plan from a syndicateincluding LauranceS. Rockefeller,who becamethe chief stockholderin a new corporate entityknown as .In April, 1938,Rickenbacker became its chief executive officer. The takeoverengineered by Rickenbackercoincided with a momentous change in the way the federal governmentregulated commercial aviation. Becausemost airlineswere unprofitable,FDR appointeda committeeto find waysto remedythe situation.The adventof the DouglasDC-3, the first airliner that couldoperate profitably on passengerrevenue alone, particularly disturbed existingcarriers because any groupof investorswho couldafford to buy DC-3s could now invadethe airwaysat will and displaceenterprises that had goneto greatexpense developing the industry. Respondingto this situation,Congress passed the Civil AeronauticsAct of 1938, which went into effect shortlyafter Rickenbackerand his allies took chargeof Eastern.Under thislaw, whichhistorian Henry Ladd Smithcalled "the most importantpiece of air legislationever passed,"a five-memberCivil AeronauticsAuthority (CAA) receivedbroad powersto regulateairfares and airline routes.In exchangefor agreeingto an unprecedenteddegree of federal regulation, existing airlines received permanent rights to their routes and protectionfrom interlopers.From this point on, no airline couldfly a givenroute withoutthe approvalof the Civil AeronauticsBoard (CAB), createdin 1940. Once given the right to fly a route, a carrier could not abandonit withoutthe CAB's permission.No airline mergercould take placewithout CAB approval. The CAB alsohad power to determinefair ratesof compensationfor carrying airmail,and to fix passengerfares. Price competitionwas no longerpossible. The only ways in which airlines could compete were by offering more convenientschedules, better equipment, and superior service? Rickenbackerscored a notabletriumph just beforethe new law wentinto effect. In one of its last actionswhile it was still in controlof awardingairmail contracts,the Post Office Departmentopened bids on a contractfor service between Houston, San Antonio, and Brownsville, . Because the winner of the contractwould be in a good positionto get a route to Mexico City, two carriers,Eastern and Braniff, foughtfuriously to get it. Findingthat Eastern plannedto bid one centper mile, Braniffbid lessthan one mill. Learningabout BranifPs plan, Rickenbackeroffered to carry mail over the new route for nothing,and got the contract. Rickenbackerinitially supported the Civil AeronauticsAct, arguingthat it was neededto preventunfair competitionfrom "wildcat"airlines threatening chaos in the industry.Eastern's annual report for 1938 anticipated"sound regulation" under the new law. Relations with the CAA and CAB were

•For a usefuloverview of the Civil AeronauticsAct of 1938 and the circumstances surroundingits passage, see [15, pp.301-309]. A Man Born Out of Season: Eddie Rickenbacker / 159 temporarilyamicable as Easternwon severalnew routes.St. Louis,added to its systemin 1939,was a particularlywelcome prize [1, 1938,p. 9; 1, 1940,p. 6]. That sameyear, however,the CAB instituteda proceedingto determine whetherthe airmailrates paid to Easternand several other airlines were "fair and reasonable."At the time, Easternreceived $1.20 per ton-mile,the lowestrate earnedby any domesticcarrier. Despite Rickenbacker's protests, however, CAB examiners recommended a 50% reduction in Eastern's mail rates and asked for a recaptureof fees for the previousthree yearsthat would have cost the carrier $2.5 million.Charging that the proposal"failed to recognizethe efficiencyand economyof our Company'soperations," Rickenbacker won a majorconcession whenthe CAB droppedthe recapturedemand, but the agencycut Eastern'smail rate in half [1, 1941,pp. 5-6; 1, 1942,pp. 1-2]. While the rate case was pending,Rickenbacker underwent a terrible ordealwhen a plane on which he was flying into Atlanta crashedin February, 1941,leaving him withmultiple injuries including a crushedhip socket,a broken pelvis,and a fracturedknee. Initially given up for dead,he clungto life andwas walkingagain, with a permanentlimp, by summer.He wasstill recuperatingin December,when the Japaneseattack on PearlHarbor plunged the United States into World War II. Despitehis physicalcondition, he volunteeredfor a seriesof specialmissions for the headof theArmy Air Corps,"Hap" Arnold, starting with an inspectiontour of Americandomestic military bases in Marchand April, 1942. He thenundertook another mission in Septemberto inspectinstallations in England andto reportto Arnoldon ways in whichAmerican planes could be improved. In October,Secretary of War Stimsonasked Rickenbacker to take a secretmessage to General MacArthur, who was stationedin New Guinea. En routefrom Hawaii to a refuelingstop at CantonIsland, a BoeingB-17 on which Rickenbackerwas flying had to be ditchedin the Pacific Oceanbecause of a navigationalerror that led it off courseand caused it to runout of gas.For more than three weeks,Rickenbacker and sevencompanions, one of whom died, drifted throughshark-infested waters and enduredextreme suffering from hunger,thirst, and exposure to the elements.By the time the partywas finally rescued,Rickenbacker had lost fifty-four pounds and was dehydrated. Showing his accustomedresilience, he wentto New Guineaafter being briefly hospital- ized, took Stimson'smessage to MacArthur, and came home to a frenzied welcome in mid-December. After recovering from his ordeal, Rickenbackerwent on two more missionsfor Stimson.One took him to North Africa, Iran, India, China, and the Soviet Union in 1943; the other, to the Aleutian Islandsin 1944. While he was gone,two subordinatesran Eastern.Like otherAmerican carriers, it gaveup mostof its planesto transportmilitary supplies and maintainedits domestic schedules with a reduced fleet and shrunken staff. Returningto take chargeof Easternafter his adventures,Rickenbacker presidedover the nation'smost profitableairline. During the late 1940s, its earningsexceeded those of therest of theindustry combined. But theseeds of its later declinewere already present, and Rickenbackerwas partly responsible. W. David Lewis / 160

Althoughhis phenomenalvitality remainedas strongas ever,his body had been ravagedby the experienceshe hadendured. His interactionswith powerfulworld leadershad alsoinflated an alreadypowerful ego, intensifyinga tendencyto be overbearingand abrasivein his dealingswith others.His temperwas too quick, his judgmentwas too hasty,and he made costlyerrors based on emotionand sentimentrather than sound business judgment. One sucherror was a speechthat he gave at Havanain 1944 afterthe deathof FDR, in whichhe saidthat he was gladRoosevelt had died. Suchindiscretions hurt Eastern's chances in important routecases conducted by the CAB, whosemembers continued to be chosenby a Democraticpresident, Harry S. Truman. Writing about this time in Ricken- backer's life, aviation writer Robert Serling statedthat "Easternentered the postwarera...with a time bomb buriedin the inflexiblepersonality of the man who ruled the Great Silver Fleet" [12, p. 204]. During the war the CAB awarded Eastern a route from St. Louis to Washingtonand extended its Miami-New York routeinto Boston.But the Board also issued Eastern and three other well-established airlines a show-cause order askingwhy their mail ratesshould not be cut from sixtyto thirty-twocents per ton-mile.Infuriated, Rickenbacker charged that the CAB wasignoring Eastern's "superioreconomy and efficiency."The proposednew rate, he stated,would eliminateany incentive for Easternto excel.The CAB settledfor forty-fivecents perton-mile, but he felt aggrieved[1, 1944,pp. 5,10; 1, 1945,p. 5]. Anticipatingdramatic growth in air travel after the war, the CAB had alreadybegun to encouragecompetition on routesthat were formerlylimited to onlyone carrier. In 1944it authorizedNational Airlines to fly fromNew York to Miami, endingEastern's exclusive control of that route. In August, 1945, it terminatedEastern's single-carrier status from Chicago to Miami by givingDelta the right to competein that market.Despite favoring fair competition,Ricken- backer resented the fact that Eastern would now have to share two lucrative vacationroutes with much smaller carriersthat would need large airmail subsidiesto developthem. In 1946 the CAB again hurt Easternby denying it permissionto inauguratea potentiallylucrative vacation route from Florida to Cuba, Jamaica, Colombia,and the Canal Zone [1, 1946,pp. 6-7; 1, 1947,pp. 7-8]. Rickenbacker became increasinglyindignant because of such decisions.At one point he stormedinto the office of CAB chairmanL. Welch Pogueand launched a tirade. PoundingPogue's desk with his fist, he impetuouslyswept a row of booksonto the floor with his otherhand. But he alsowinked at Pogue'ssecretary as he left. At leastin part,he hadbeen putting on an act [5]. But he wasalso seriously upset. As time wenton, othercarriers, including Capital, Colonial, and Chicago andSouthern, were certificated by the CAB to competewith Easternon routesit had oncehad to itself.As Poguelater stated,one of the reasonswhy the CAB authorizedsuch competitionwas a growingnumber of complaintsabout the quality of serviceEastern provided [5]. During the postwarera, Rickenbacker's belief thatEastern owed travelers nothing except moving them dependably from one place to anotheron time won the companythe unenviabledistinction of A Man Born Out of Season: Eddie Rickenbacker / 161 beingthe only carrierin the industrywhose passengers formed an organization to vent their feelingsabout the brusquetreatment they receivedfrom Eastern.It was known as WHEAL, an acronymfor "We Hate EasternAir Lines" [12, p. 277]. After makinganother mistake by allowingDelta andNational to beathim to the punchin usingfour-engine Douglas DC-4s on the New York- Miami and Chicago-Miamiroutes, Rickenbackerdid better in the vital area of aircraft selection,fighting his two rivals on eventerms by pittingLockheed L-649 and L-749 Constellationsand L-1049 Super-Constellationsagainst their Douglas DC-6s and DC-7s. But he madea poordecision in the crucialmatter of aircraft utilization.When the CAA requiredairlines to employa three-mancockpit crew in four-engineaircraft, he compliedby usingtwo pilotsand a flight mechanic, representingtwo differentunions. C. E. Woolman,Delta's CEO, wiselyused a cockpitcrew of threepilots, one of whomwas trained as a flight mechanicbut belongedto the pilots'union. Woolman thus avoided costly jurisdictional strikes thatshut Eastern down while Delta continued tofly.6 Rickenbacker lost another battle when the CAB decided in the late 1940s to sanctionthe creationof "feederlines"to provideair serviceto smallcities. Earlier,Eastern had wonpermission from the CAB to servesuch destinations as Brunswick,Georgia, Muscle Shoals, Alabama, and Spartanburg, South Carolina. Now, it wasobliged to continueserving these small markets while competing with newly-establishedfeederlines that received much larger airmail compensa- tion thanEastern did. The CAB followedthe samestrategy in the 1950swhen it continuedto favor smallertrunklines like Delta and Nationalin key route decisionsand denied most of Eastern'sapplications. The onlyway Rickenbacker could expandEastern's route systemwas by acquiringsmall carrierslike Colonialin mergers.But this solutionwas hazardous.Although Eastern did manageto gaina few largemarkets like Bermudaand Montreal in the Colonial merger,it alsoinherited a hodgepodgeof smalltowns in the Northeast,such as Rutland,Vt. andLancaster, Pa., that could not be effectivelyintegrated with the largercities that the airline served [12, pp. 244-251; 1, 1954,route map]. Havingto competewith smallercarriers that had much higher costs per route-mileand thereforereceived federal subsidies was particularly galling to Rickenbackerbecause Eastern was well knownas the mostfrugal airline in the industry.As Pogueadmitted, "Eastern's costs were simplyon a different plateau"compared with thoseof its competitors[5]. In 1949, Rickenbacker wrotea letterto theSenate Finance Committee offering to operatethe domestic systemsof Delta, National,Chicago and Southern,Capital, and Colonialfor sixty-fivecents per ton-mile instead of the$4.45 they were actually receiving. He estimatedthat Easterncould carry 2.7 million tonsof mail, for whichthese firmshad received $12 millionin 1948,for only$1.6 million,saving taxpayers

6Fora comprehensiveaccount ofthe postwar rivalry between Eastern and Delta, empha- sizingaircraft selection, labor policies, and the resultsof routecases in whichthese two airlinesbecame engaged, see [9, pp. 109-115,120-131,251-261,283-346]. W. David Lewis / 162

$10.4 million.He laterprofessed surprise that the five namedcarriers "did not acceptthis generous offer. "7 As he fumedabout CAB policies,Rickenbacker became more and more vehementin speechesattacking the alleged misdeeds of federalbureaucrats. As a CAB lawyerlater stated, Rickenbacker and his corporate attorneys did not mince words,telling CAB staff membersto their facesthat they were incompetent. Rickenbackerdeclared openly that such personsworked for the government insteadof goinginto private enterprise because they lacked the ability to succeed in business.CAB officials in turn sternlylectured Eastern's representatives, sayingthat the companyshould be morerespectful and wasdamaging its own interestsby alienatingthe CAB's staff [7]. Eastern'sposition in the airline industrycontinued to deteriorate.In 1955,capitalizing on the powerthat southern senators and representatives could bringto bear on the CAB while the Southstill votedsolidly Democratic, Delta won a case giving it the right to competewith Easternin the Atlanta- Washington-Baltimore-Philadelphia-NewYork corridor, which Woolman called America's "Main Street."Another blow came in 1961 in a hotly-contested transcontinentalroute case in whichthe CAB gaveDelta andNational access to SanDiego, Los Angeles,San Francisco, and other western cities while denying Eastern'sapplication to servethese places. Rickenbacker severely damaged Eastern'schances while the casewas in progressby givinga speechin whichhe bitterlyattacked John F. Kennedy,who had just becomepresident. The decision was a major setbackfor Eastern,which could not fly west of Texas and desperatelyneeded long transcontinentalroutes for efficientaircraft utilization [9, pp. 251-261,283-302;12, p. 323]. Rickenbackeralso made serious errors as the airlineindustry entered the jet age.Instead of acquiringjet aircraft,he choseto purchaseLockheed Electra turbopropswhile Delta bought Douglas DC-8 and Convair 880 jetliners. Althoughthe Electra becamean outstandingplane after initial defectswere eliminated,Eastern suffered badly whenElectras owned by Braniff and North- west,due to flawsin their wing structure,crashed soon after entering service. Amidthe resulting public clamor, the FAA placedspeed restrictions on the plane that madeit impossiblefor Easternto competewith Delta'snew jets on long- haul flights.Ironically, Eastern could have had DC-8s like the onesowned by Delta, but Rickenbacker had decided to wait for a later model with more powerfulengines [9, pp.262-282; 12, passim]. In 1953 Eastern'sincreasingly frustrated directors moved Rickenbacker up to chairmanof the boardand named a new presidentand CEO, Malcolm MacIntyre.Rickenbacker, however, could not give up the control he had held for so longand interfered constantly with MacIntyre'sattempts to run the firm. As Easternwent through one debacleafter another,Laurance Rockefeller decided thatthe only way out of itsproblems was a mergerwith one of thecountry's two

7"Commentson Air Mail Subsidyand Competition," dated April 4, 1949,attached to [1, 1949]and [11, p. 402]. A Man Born Out of Season: Eddie Rickenbacker / 163 largestcarriers, . Again, however,the needto secureCAB approval stymiedEastern's hopes. Led by Delta, the rest of the industry vigorouslyattacked the plan. Meanwhile, it becameclear that John F. Kennedy's brother,Robert, would veto the mergeron anti-trustgrounds in his capacityas attorneygeneral, even if the CAB did not. The mergerplan was therefore scuttled[12, pp. 310-347;9, p. 343]. Rockefellerhad hopedthat the attemptedmerger would permit him to replaceRickenbacker and MacIntyrewith American'schief executive,C. R. Smith, whosemanagerial abilities were legendary.When the merger failed, Rockefellerappointed a searchcommittee to find a new leader. After the committeechose Floyd D. Hall, an executiveat TWA, MacIntyrewas fired and Rickenbackerwas summonedto a meetingat which he was asked to retire. Rickenbackertook the news badly, requiringa secondmeeting - this time attendedby Rockefeller- beforethe embattledexecutive agreed to stepdown. Musteringmuch graciousness in relinquishingcommand to Hall, Rickenbacker left his office at RockefellerCenter and neverreturned to it again [12, pp. 383- 385;4; 6]. He spent•he rest of hislife in retirementbefore dying in 1973. It is easyto blameRickenbacker for his own downfall.It is clear that he madea seriesof badjudgments after he cameback from World War II suffering permanentill effectsfrom the Atlantacrash and the 1942raft episode.But thisis not the wholestory. The Americanpolitical and economic system he had known early in his life hadbeen radically transformed by the GreatDepression and the New Deal. Given his deep belief in free enterprise,his strongconviction that Easternwas beingtreated unfairly by the CAB, and his tendencyto speakhis mind,he was in an impossiblesituation. His failuresof judgmentshould be seen in this light. One of his friendscharacterized him as "an outstandingleader of a small to medium-sizedcompany" who was "mentallyunequipped to move into an era when air transportationwas on the verge of becomingmass transporta- tion." Robert Serlingcalled him a "nineteenthcentury American trying hard to copewith the twentiethcentury - a taskin whichhe achievedboth magnificent successand dismal failure" [12, pp. 305,309]. But was Rickenbackersimply an anachronism?Or was he born out of seasonnot only after his time but also beforeit? Had he been able to move boldly into new marketsunder deregulation, his recordmight have been much different. Temperamentallyunable to deal with the imperativesof service competition,he mighthave thrived at the helm of a no-frillsairline after 1978, when his zeal for low costs would have been well suited to bitter fare wars that the CAB would not have allowed. One thing is certain. As an avid foe of liberalismwho lived to see the dawningof resurgentultraconservatism in the 1960s,he wouldbe muchmore at homein the politicaland economicclimate of the 1990s than he was at the time he died. In this perspective,he was both a casualtyof the agein whichhe livedand a forerunnerof an erayet to come.

References

1. EasternAir Lines,Annual Reports, 1938-1949. W. David Lewis / 164

2. Finis Fart, Rickenbacker'sLuck (Boston, 1979). 3. "Historyof EasternAir Lines,"typewritten ms., Rockefeller Archive Center, North Tarrytown, NY, RecordGroup 2. 4. Interviewof FloydD. Hall (ChiefExecutive Officer, Chairman of the Board,Eastern Air Lines,1963-1976), by author. 5. Interviewof L. Welch Pogue(Member 1942, and Chairman,Civil AeronauticsBoard, ! 943-1946), by author. 6. Interviewof LauranceS. Rockefellerby author. 7. Interviewof IrvingRoth (Attorney, Civil AeronauticsBoard), by author. 8. W. David Lewis,"Edward V. Rickenbacker,"in William M. Leafy,ed., The Airline Industry (New York, 1992), 398-415. 9. W. DavidLewis and Wesley Phillips Newton, Delta: The History of An Airline(Athens, Ga., 1979). 10. North AmericanAviation, Inc., Annual Report, 1937. 11. EdwardV. Rickenbacker,Rickenbacker: An Autobiography (Englewood Cliffs, N J, 1967). 12. RobertJ. Sealing,From the Captainto the Colonel:An InformalHistory of EasternAir Lines (New York, 1980). 13. RobertJ. Serling,The Electra Story (Garden City, NY, 1963). 14. RobertJ. Serling,"Unsung Hero: Frye of TWA," Airways,3 (May-June,1996). 15. HenryLadd Smith, Airways: The History of CommercialAviation in the UnitedStates (New York, 1942). 16. DonaldR. Whitnah,"Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,"in Leafy,ed., TheAirline Industry [seeabove], 15-17.