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Jorge PONCE January 2018 Professional Financial Stability Dept. Phone +598 2 1967 1576 Address Central Bank of Uruguay Fax +598 2 1967 1509 777 JP Fabini E-mail [email protected] 11100 Montevideo Uruguay Education PhD in Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, France, 2009 Diplôme Européen d’Economie Quantitave Approfondie, University of Toulouse, France, 2007 Master DEA in Financial Markets and Intermediaries, University of Toulouse, France, 2006 Master in International Economics, Universidad de la República, Uruguay, 2004 Economist, Universidad de la República, Uruguay, 2001 Current positions Head of the Financial Stability Dept., Banco Central del Uruguay, 2012 – present Research Fellow, Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación, 2010 – present Professor of Economics, Universidad de la República, 2004 – present Former positions Research Economist, Banco Central del Uruguay, 2002 – 2012 Professor of Finance and Economics, Universidad de Montevideo, 2010 – 2016 Research Assistant, Toulouse School of Economics, 2007 – 2009 Teacher Assistant of Corporate Finance, Toulouse School of Economics, 2008 – 2009 Teacher Assistant of Mathematics for Finance, Universidad de la República, 1999 – 2004 Credit Analyst, Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay, 1992 – 2002 Other professional activities Referee for: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Theoretical Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Financial Stability, Economic Systems, Monetaria, Revue Française d’Economie, International Research Journal of Management and Business Studies, Economic Notes, Revista de Economía de la Universidad del Rosario, Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación, Banco Central del Uruguay. Organization Committee Member: RIDGE-BCU 2014-2017 Workshop on Financial Stability, XXV and XXVI Jornadas Anuales de Economía (Banco Central del Uruguay), Seminar Series at Cen- tral Bank of Uruguay, EARIE 2008 (University of Toulouse), Macroprudential policies to achieve financial stability 2011 (IMF and Banco Central del Uruguay). 1 Awards, honors and grants Third Prize, Central Bank Economics and Finance Award, Brazil, 2017 First Prize, Premio Nacional de Economía Profesor Raúl Trajtenberg, Uruguay, 2008 Third Prize, Premio Dr. Manuel Noriega Morales, Guatemala, 2005 European Economic Association Travel Award, 2008 and 2009 Jean-Jacques Laffont Foundation – Toulouse School of Economics Scholarship, 2007 – 2009 University of Toulouse Research Scholarship, 2006 – 2007 Published articles, books and book chapters 1. “Flexible and Mandatory Banking Supervision.” (With Alessandro De Chiara and Luca Livio) Journal of Financial Stability, 34, 86 - 104, 2017. 2. “Comités de Estabilidad Financiera: Conceptos y Experiencias.” Economía Coyuntural, 1(2), 2016. 3. Regulación económica para economías en desarrollo. Edited with Rosario Domingo and Leandro Zipitría, 2016. 4. “Instituciones regulatorias para economías en desarrollo.” Chapter 4 in Regulación económica para economías en desarrollo, 2016. 5. Domestic assets prices, global fundamentals and financial stability. Edited with Gerardo Licandro, 2015. 6. “Precio de viviendas: una metodología para evaluar desvíos respecto a sus fundamentos.” (With Fernando Borráz and Gerardo Licandro) In Domestic assets prices, global fundamentals and financial stability, 2015. 7. “Requerimiento de capital contra-cíclico: el caso uruguayo.” (With Cecilia Dassatti, Alejandro Pena and Magdalena Tubio) Monetaria, 2, 2015. 8. “Precio de fundamentos para las viviendas en Uruguay.” Monetaria, 2, 2015. 9. “Systemic banks and the lender of last resort.” (With Marc Rennert) Journal of Banking and Finance, 50, 286-297, 2015. 10. “Financial Stability Committees: An Institutional Response to New Challenges” (With Mario Bergara and Gerardo Licandro) Chapter 10 in Challenges to Financial Stability Perspective, Models and Policies Volume II: Towards the Financial Stability Macroprudential Policy and Perspective, 2014. 11. “Bank competition and loan quality.” (With Fabiana Gómez) Journal of Financial Services Re- search, 46(3), 215-233, 2014. 12. “Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform.” (With Pierre Boyer) Journal of Financial Stability, 8(3), 206 - 217, 2012. 2 13. “The quality of credit ratings: A two-sided market perspective.” Economic Systems, 36(2), 294 - 306, 2012. 14. “Red de estabilidad financiera: complementando y reforzando las perspectivas micro- y macro- prudenciales.” Revista de Economía, 19 (2), 91 - 109, 2012. 15. “Central Banks and Banking Supervision Reforms.” (With Pierre Boyer) Chapter 6 in Mas- ciandaro and Eijffinger (Eds.) Handbook Of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision. London: Edward Elgar, 2011. 16. “Institutions and soft budget constraints.” (With Mario Bergara and Leandro Zipitría) Interna- tional Review of Accounting, Banking and Finance, 3 (2), 41 - 66, 2011. 17. “Lender of Last Resort Policy: What Reforms are Necessary?” Journal of Financial Intermedia- tion, 19 (2), 188 - 206, 2010 18. “A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Account- ability.” Money Affairs XXIII (2), 2010 19. “Depositors’ Discipline in Uruguayan Banks.” (With Virginia Goday and Bertrand Gruss), Revista de Economía, 12 (2), 2005 20. “¿Quién debe actuar como prestamista de última instancia? El caso bimonetario.” Revista de Economía, 12 (1), 2005 21. “Una nota sobre empalme y conciliación de series de Cuentas Nacionales.” Revista de Economía, 11 (2), 2004 22. “Estrategia, estructura y rentabilidad de la banca privada uruguaya: 1992 - 1999.” Revista de Economía, 8 (2), 2001 23. “Una nueva estimación de la eficiencia técnica en el sistema bancario privado de Uruguay: 1992-1999.” (With Ruben Tansini), Working Papers Serie of the Economics Department, 2001 Working papers 1. “Countercyclical prudential tools in an estimated DSGE model.” (With Serafín Frache and Javier García-Cicco), Working paper of the Central Bank of Uruguay 2. “How disruptive are Fintechs.” (With Mario Bergara), Working paper of the Central Bank of Uruguay 3. “A DSGE model for financial stability.” (With Serafín Frache and Javier García-Cicco), Working paper of the Central Bank of Uruguay 4. “Regulation and bankers’ incentives.” (With Fabiana Gómez) Working paper of the University of Bristol 3 5. “The determinants of Uruguayan households indebtedness.” (With Miguel Mello) Working paper of the Central Bank of Uruguay 6. “Precios de inmuebles: aproximaciones metodológicas y aplicación empírica.” (With Mag- dalena Tubio) Working paper of the Central Bank of Uruguay 7. “Precios de viviendas: una metodología para evaluar desvíos respecto a sus fundamentos.” Working paper of the Central Bank of Uruguay. 8. “Financial stability nets: Complementing and reinforcing micro and macro perspectives.” (With Mario Bergara and Gerardo Licandro) Working paper 2.2012 of the Central Bank of Uruguay 9. “Situación y perspectivas del mercado de seguros en Uruguay” (With Verónica Rodríguez) Working paper 3.2012 of the Central Bank of Uruguay 10. “Estabilidad financiera: conceptos básicos.” (With Magdalena Tubio) Working paper 4.2010 of the Central Bank of Uruguay 11. “Bank competition, screening and loan quality.” (With Fabiana Gómez) Working paper 5.2010 of the Central Bank of Uruguay 12. “Intercambio de información en mercados de crédito: una revisión de la literatura.” Working paper 6.2010 of the Central Bank of Uruguay 13. “Una propuesta de informe de estabilidad financiera para Uruguay.” (With Gerardo Licandro) Working paper of the Central Bank of Uruguay 14. “Budgetary Institutions for Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Versus Latin American Countries.” (With Pierre Boyer, Teresa Curristine and Laura Recuero) Working paper of Toulouse School of Economics 15. “Banking Safety Nets: Information Issues.” Working paper 3.2006 of the Central Bank of Uruguay 16. “Banking Safety Nets for Latin American Countries.” Working paper of Toulouse School of Economics 17. “Avances y agenda pendiente de la desdolarización en el Uruguay.” (With Gerardo Licandro), Working Paper of the Central Bank of Uruguay 18. “Primas ajustadas al riesgo: Propuestas para el Seguro de Depósitos en Uruguay.” (With José Antonio Licandro and Rosario Soares Netto), Working Paper of the Superintendencia de Protección del Ahorro Bancario Press articles 1. Who should decide on emergency liquidity assistance? VoxEU (http://www.voxeu.org/index. php?q=node/4494) 4 2. La supervisión financiera debe ser independiente. Diario El País (http://www.elpais.com.uy/ Suple/EconomiaYMercado/10/05/17/ecoymer−488760.asp) Recent Participation to Seminars and Conferences Speaker at First Financial Stability Conference 2017, Madrid. - Speaker at New Challenges in Cen- tral Banking: Monetary Policy Governance and Macroprudential Issues 2017, Milan. - Speaker at LACEA 2017, Argentina. - Speaker at XXII Annual Seminar on Risk, Financial Stability and Banking 2017, Brazil. - Speaker at Financial Cycles and Policy Response in Latin America 2016, Argentina. - Speaker at RIDGE-BCU Workshop 2015, Montevideo. - Speaker at LACEA 2015, Bolivia. - Speaker at X Annual Seminar on Risk, Financial Stability and Banking, Sao Pablo, Brasil. - Speaker at LACEA 2013, Mexico. - Speaker at VIII Annual Seminar on Risk, Financial Stability and Banking, Sao Pablo, Brasil. - Speaker at LACEA 2012, Lima, Peru. - Participant to Debt and credit, growth and crises, Banco de España and the World Bank, Madrid, 2012. - Participant to Macroprudential Policies to Achieve Financial Stability, International Monetary Fund and
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