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Kyrgyzstan: a Deceptive Calm Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°79 Bishkek/Brussels, 14 August 2008 Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm I. OVERVIEW The changes seem less a revolution than an intensified version of policies pursued by Bakiyev’s predecessor, Askar Akayev. The Akayev administration also con- Long viewed as a relatively liberal aberration in centrated power in family members and close support- Central Asia’s authoritarian landscape, Kyrgyzstan ers, played opposition factions off against each other, has since the autumn of 2007 transformed its politi- but was eventually overthrown in 2005 by the dis- cal system into a functional one-party state ruled by gruntled political and business elite, led by Bakiyev, a small elite, with President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s in the grandiloquently named Tulip Revolution. Instead family at its core. The key change came in December of opening up politics, however, Bakiyev, too, is creat- when, after an electoral campaign widely criticised ing a system whose hallmarks are overweening con- for blatant bias in favour of the ruling party, a new trol by the ruling family, widespread corruption and, parliament was returned that is dominated by Ak most significantly, a monopoly over economic and Zhol, President Bakiyev’s newly-created political ma- political patronage. Critics allege that the newly chine, with decorative roles assigned to two parties strengthened political dispensation will simply trans- that were apportioned seats in contravention to the fer key national assets to the president’s relatives and electoral code. The opposition, sidelined by events, has close supporters. lapsed into apathy, and a superficial calm has over- There is concern also that Bakiyev’s “national agenda” taken the usually boisterous political scene. This calm is in fact a collection of personal, short-term priori- may, however, prove deceptive, given worsening cor- ties, and that major issues in need of attention – among ruption, increasing disillusionment with politics and them grinding poverty, HIV/AIDS and narcotics – a series of major economic crises that could strike will be ignored. Given the opposition’s disarray, there before year’s end. is little likelihood that Bakiyev’s plans will face any serious political challenge in the short run. He seems Thus far the changes have achieved one result: par- determined to stay in office until 2015 and then hand liamentary democracy in Kyrgyzstan has been hob- over to a successor who can be trusted to defend his bled. The task of the new legislature, presidential family interests. aides say bluntly, is to implement the president’s will with minimal discussion and zero dissent. Though the First, however, the Bakiyev administration has to innovations bear strong resemblances to both the survive the next winter. The success of the election Kazakh and Russian political systems, they were not operation infused the president’s team with a sense of introduced because of outside pressure. They are a infallibity that borders on hubris. The challenges it is good example of how the Vladimir Putin model of facing now, however, are infinitely more complex governance is being copied in Central Asia for per- than choreographing an election. sonal interest rather than ideological affinity. Inflation is developing disconcerting momentum. Food The president’s team was motivated purely by the desire prices increased in the first six months of the year by to concentrate power in its hands. Bakiyev’s advisers at least 20 per cent. A major energy crisis, triggered claim they want to break out of the political paralysis by domestic factors, not world prices, is looming. and infighting that has marked the time since inde- Government handling of these issues has not been pendence in 1991. The liberal democratic model has impressive. Complacency and vague talk of emer- failed, they say; the Russian model of limited democ- gency plans has given way to appeals for outside aid, racy, a marginalised opposition and strong presidential calls for a 30 per cent cut in winter electricity con- power is far better suited to the country at this stage in sumption and warnings there will be only enough its development. They speak of pushing through over power for light, not heating. Even more disturbing for the next two years a program of radical privatisation, the regime, perhaps, is growing speculation within particularly of energy resources. Though there has society that it is not just mishandling the economy, been little sign of this so far, the ruling elite remains but that corrupt members of the Bakiyev administra- committed to selling off large parts of the country’s tion themselves contributed to the energy crisis. Such energy infrastructure as soon as it can. street talk is often based on little more than gossip but Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°79, 14 August 2008 Page 2 is frequently a sign of eroding confidence in the state. Zhol (Bright Path). The thrust of the strategy was Many observers, including some presidential advisers, clear, the Russian daily Kommersant noted: the creation feel that pent-up popular anger – at spiralling food of “a new system of power in which all key levers and fuel prices, power cuts and drastically declining will be in the hands of the head of state”.3 public services – could well erupt when the weather turns cold. A. REFERENDUM II. BREAKING THE PARADIGM The referendum on 21 October 2007 overwhelmingly endorsed the proposals. Bakiyev immediately dis- solved the legislature – which, he alleged, had come In late 2007 President Bakiyev announced a radical 1 close at times over the previous two years to launch- shift in political strategy. First elected to a five-year ing a “parliamentary coup”4 – and called early elections term in August 2005, after overthrowing Askar for 16 December. The president’s satisfaction not- Akayev in March, Bakiyev had promised a new era withstanding, there were widespread allegations of of democracy and clean government, for a while posi- falsification and the use of “administrative resources” tioning himself as a close ally of the U.S. Quickly, – techniques that included pressuring government however, he became embroiled in tense confronta- employees and demanding that regional and local tions with the opposition – many of them one-time leaders ensure the ruling party’s victory in their area. allies in the anti-Akayev revolt – and a powerful and A Central Election Commission (CEC) department unruly parliament. In April 2007 he was able to split chief stated that the real turnout had been 25 per cent, the opposition by appointing a prominent opponent, an assessment echoed by Western diplomats, not the Almazbek Atambayev, prime minister. Bakiyev fol- 80-plus per cent announced by the government.5 A lowed this up by calling in September for constitutional senior politician who was at the time the governor of changes to be put to a national referendum. These a major southern region, meanwhile, asserted that in included amendments that would inter alia abolish his area no more than 40 per cent had voted.6 constituency elections in favour of a proportional vote based on party lists, as well as a new electoral code. Opposition parties paid scant attention to the referen- dum, preferring instead to prepare for the widely Declaring that reform efforts since the overthrow of anticipated early legislative elections. Asked why the Akayev had reached a “dead end”, Bakiyev outlined opposition had not criticised the draft constitution ambitious changes, including increased executive and electoral code, a prominent opposition activist, powers that brought regional administrators directly 2 Omirbek Babanov, replied: “Why waste time?” He under the president. The same day he announced he was already planning for the parliamentary elections, would set up his own political party, which officially he said, and had no time for the referendum.7 emerged the following month under the name Ak Many observers, including government political con- sultants, described the referendum as a political trap 1 Kurmanbek Bakiyev, “Послание Президента народу for the opposition. And, they noted, the opposition Кыргызской Республики” [“Message to the people of walked right into it. Valentin Bogatyrev, a political Kyrgyzstan by the president of the Kyrgyz Republic”], 19 analyst and consultant to the presidential administra- September 2007. For earlier Crisis Group reporting on Kyr- tion, expressed surprise at its short-sightedness. “Had gyzstan, see Asia Report N°150, Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge I been in their place, I would not have accepted the of Judicial Reform, 10 April 2008; Asia Briefing N°76, Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbeki- stan’s Isolation, 14 February 2008; Asia Briefing N°55, Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, 9 November 2006; Asia Report 3 “Курманбек Бакиев указал Киргизии ‘Светлый путь’” N°118, Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, 16 August [“Kurmanbek Bakiyev directed Kyrghizia to the ‘bright path’”], 2006; Asia Report N°109, Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, 16 Kommersant, 16 October 2007, at www.kommersant.ru/ December 2005; Asia Report N°97, Kyrgyzstan: After the doc.aspx?DocsID=815314. Revolution, 4 May 2005; and Asia Report N°81, Political 4 Text of a statement by President Bakiyev, carried inter alia Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects, 11 Au- at www.24.kg, 22 October 2007. gust 2004. 5 Crisis Group interview, Bishkek, November-December 2007. 2 “Message to the people of Kyrgyzstan”, op. cit. For more 6 Crisis Group interview, Bishkek, November 2007. The of- on the theory of “power vertical”, see section III.A below. In ficial linked his abrupt dismissal with the low turnout in his a speech later in September, Bakiyev justified his decision region. After his dismissal, corruption charges were brought by saying that “our state was on the verge of collapse”, 28 against him – another part of the punishment, he claimed. September 2007, at www.president.kg/press/vistup/2625/.
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