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Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy � Oliver Leaman.Txt Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy Oliver Leaman.txt KEY CONCEPTS IN EASTERN PHILOSOPHY By Oliver Leaman INTRODUCTION There are many problems in knowing how to discuss the key concepts of Eastern philosophy. The first is in deciding what Eastern philosophy actually is, that is, what counts as the East. There are no problems in including East Asian thought, especially that of India, China andjapan, and the related civilizations in that part of the world. I have included Islamic and Zoroastrian philosophy since so much of it took place within Persia and then went further East, but it should be pointed out that some of its main thinkers were very much part of what is generally called the Western world, even living as far West as what is today Spain. On the other hand, many important East Asian thinkers have also spent at least some time in the West, and it seemed to me appropriate to include Islamic philosophy within the description of Eastern. I was influenced in this by the discussion within Islamic philosophy itself as to how Eastern or otherwise it was. The second problem is in differentiating between philosophy and religion. It is often held that there are several basic distinctions between Eastern and Western philosophy. Eastern philosophy is sometimes taken to be more holistic, and has sought as its end some form of enlightenment, while Western philosophy is more concerned with truth, logic, reason and individualism. This is not the place to debate the differences, if any, between these two forms of thought, since such a debate would be far beyond the scope of this book, and certainly of this introduction. I do not think that these generalizations about Eastern and Western philosophy really lead us anywhere, although I realize that with that statement I have just produced a generalization of my own. One of the things that strike many of those who are predominantly trained within the Western tradition when they approach Eastern philosophy is both how similar it is, and how different. It is true that more of the problems that arise within the Eastern traditions are clothed within the language of a particular religion than is the case any more in the West, but this clothing often appears to be quite superficial. The logic of the controversies which lies beneath the appearance is much the same as in the West, or even exactly the same. It would be rash to insist that the arguments are always the same, of course, since every significant thinker puts his or her own style of expression on the problems they consider. Many of the arguments produced in Eastern philosophy are very different from anything that exists in the West, and often there appears to be an entirely different way of looking at the notion of being and change. In any case, saying anything sensible about vast collections of philosophical traditions stretching over thousands of years and even more square miles is even less likely to be sensible. I have attempted to express the ideas of these philosophical traditions in clear and accessible language, and with no direct reference to Western philosophy. If there is comparative philosophy in this book, it is between the different Eastern philosophical traditions, which are often genuinely linked both historically and culturally. Yet it has to be acknowledged that there is much in Eastern philosophy that will strike those unfamiliar with this tradition as very different from what might be called Western philosophy, in the sense that it has at its basis a culture and view of the world that frequently appears to be very distinct from those prevailing elsewhere. There is no assumption in this book that Eastern and Western philosophy follow a similar approach. It would be highly misleading to adopt such a strategy, since there are huge differences in some of the working practices and techniques of many of the traditions within the East and the West, if we can use these terms usefully. The premise on which I am working here is that Eastern philosophy is philosophy, and not something special and esoteric which we need special non-ph'osophical tools to operate. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Eastern philosophy is closely connected with the religions of the East, and it is impossible to understand that philosophy unless one also understands something of the religions. I have tried to explain enough about the relevant religion or culture to make the Page 1 Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy Oliver Leaman.txt context of the philosophy comprehensible. For this reason I have included some material that is far more relevant to religion than to philosophy. It is always difficult to know if one has gone into enough depth, and if one has spent too much time on the religion and not enough on the philosophy. This is a book on philosophy, and not on religion, and a book on religion would include far more discussion of the key religious concepts than I have done. I have tried to write in such a way as to presuppose no knowledge of Eastern religions, nor philosophy itself, and I have tried to explain to the reader how particular theoretical problems arose within a specific cultural context. I should not wish to argue that Eastern religions have acted as parameters within which the philosophy operated, since often the thinkers themselves have stretched the religion within which they are working to such an extent that it is not reasonable to see that religion as constraining the philosophical thought. If it was the case that Eastern philosophers were always faithful to a literal understanding of their religions in their philosophical output then they would be poor philosophers. It is because they felt the need to follow the argument wherever it went that their philosophy is worth the name of philosophy and is not part of the history of ideas or theology. Clearly readers will benefit from following the cross-references and reading about the network of concepts that relate to a particular topic. One might try to force readers to do this by not saying anything about a term that is explained elsewhere in the book. While I hope readers will explore the whole gamut of concepts in this book, I have tried to make the content of each section work fairly independently of everything else. As a result, there is some repetition, since a term that I suspect readers may not know will often, but not always, be explained briefly whenever it comes up, and readers will not always be obliged to go to the section dealing with that term alone. I chose this approach as a result of talking to a variety of people about how they like entries to be written. The general view was that if one was reading something in which a new philosophical concept figured what one wanted was a quick answer to the question as to what it means. Later on one could browse through the volume to deepen one's grasp both of that term and of the terms to which it is linked. In the interests of brevity, though, I have not always explained each technical term in each section, and it will be easy for readers to go to the appropriate section if they find any terms with which they are not familiar. Every foreign term is provided either with its own entry or with a definition of its meaning together with a reference to an entry that has discussion of it. Where there is no definition of its meaning, it should be assumed that it means exactly the term that is referred to as being the relevant entry. So, for example, the term bheda is represented as 'bheda, difference, see Dvalta', where a discussion of this Sanskrit term may be found within a context in which it plays a part in a theory. There is a particular problem in writing this sort of book about philosophical terms, and that lies in the essentially argumentative nature of philosophy. Every time I write something making a claim about a particular philosophical position, a voice in my head says 'But this is only one view, and there are others who take a different view.' In an article or a book on a particular topic or thinker one has the space to look at a whole range of interpretations, and one can then argue in favour of what one takes to be the correct interpretation. I am constantly aware here that I have not had the opportunity to do that, and readers should be warned that the content here is entirely dependent on my view. I have tried to present what I take to be the most generally accepted view, since in a book of this kind it is not appropriate to do anything else. On the other hand, there is no doubt that I have presented my own line of interpretation on a whole range of issues, and readers will no doubt appreciate that this is just one person's understanding of the issue. If they follow up the references to relevant books, they will find a wide variety of both supporting and critical arguments on all these concepts. Another aspect of presenting such a book on philosophical concepts is that I have tried to display something of the ways in which the concepts are used in arguments, which is after all the main activity of philosophy. Rather than say that A believed p and B suggested that not-p I have tried to point out where different thinkers challenged each other and what the main points of their arguments were.
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