Ludwig Wittgenstein Bibliografía
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BWS Newsletter No 18 24/11/2015, 20:45
BWS Newsletter no 18 24/11/2015, 20:45 From: British Wittgenstein Society [[email protected]] Subject: Newsletter no.18 BWS website home August 2013 BWS Newsletter Issue no 18 Contents Nota Bene The Wittgenstein-Skinner Archive Pdf version (216 kb) Nota Bene Arthur Gibson on Wittgenstein’s Conferences rediscovered archive Around the world Wittgenstein postings In early October 1941 German bombers Lecture series attacked Oakington RAF base. Victims Pastures new were rushed to hospital in Cambridge. Housekeeping The only slightly later admission of a Executive Committee polio patient was unnoticed, by-passed, being left untreated for very many hours in a corridor. This is how Wittgenstein’s closest friend Francis Skinner came to die at the age of 29. About BWS Within the week of Skinner’s funeral, in a state of trauma, Ludwig attempted to resign his Philosophy Chair; arranged to leave Cambridge for Guy’s Hospital working to fulfil his, now memorial, plan with Francis; attended Francis’ funeral; reclaimed from Skinner’s family the Wittgenstein- BWS is a British focal point for research and exchange Skinner Archive, and posted them to Skinner’s school of ideas among Wittgenstein scholars and students friend, Reuben Goodstein. Eventually Goodstein gave the throughout the world. Archive to the Mathematical Association. It was a much- appreciated invitation from the Association (and full This Newsletter will be sent exclusively to members of acknowledgement to it in references here), with the the BWS, on a regular basis, in order to draw attention support of Trinity College, for me to research and prepare to updates on the website, or to share as yet unpublished this unpublished Archive for book publication. -
Wittgenstein in Exile
Wittgenstein in Exile “My thoughts are one hundred per cent Hebraic.” -Wittgenstein to Drury, 19491 Wittgenstein was born in 1889 into one of the richest families in Central Europe. He lived and learned at home, in Vienna, until 1903, when he was 14. We have no record of his thoughts about the turn of the last century, but it is unlikely that it seemed very significant to him. The Viennese of the time had little inclination to consider the possibilities of change, and the over-ripe era in which Wittgenstein grew up did not really end until Austria-Hungary’s defeat, in World War I, and subsequent dismantling. But the family in which Wittgenstein grew up apparently felt that European culture had already come to an end in the 1840’s. And Wittgenstein himself felt he belonged to an era that had vanished with the death of the composer Robert Schumann (1810-1856).2 Somewhere in the middle of the Nineteenth Century there was an important change into the contemporary era, of which Wittgenstein did not feel a part. Wittgenstein’s understanding of history, and his consequent self-understanding in relation to his times, was deeply influenced by Oswald Spengler, who in 1918 published The Decline of the West [Der Untergang des Abenlandes]. This book, expanded to a second volume in 1922, and revised in 1923, became a best-seller in post-war Europe. Wittgenstein made numerous references to it in 1930-1931, and acknowledged Spengler as one of his ten noteworthy influences.3 According to Spengler, cultures grow, flower, and deteriorate naturally, according to their own internal form, much as a human being does. -
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</Em>
University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 8-6-2008 Three Wittgensteins: Interpreting the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Thomas J. Brommage Jr. University of South Florida Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the American Studies Commons Scholar Commons Citation Brommage, Thomas J. Jr., "Three Wittgensteins: Interpreting the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (2008). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/149 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Three Wittgensteins: Interpreting the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Thomas J. Brommage, Jr. A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Co-Major Professor: Kwasi Wiredu, B.Phil. Co-Major Professor: Stephen P. Turner, Ph.D. Charles B. Guignon, Ph.D. Richard N. Manning, J. D., Ph.D. Joanne B. Waugh, Ph.D. Date of Approval: August 6, 2008 Keywords: Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, logical empiricism, resolute reading, metaphysics © Copyright 2008 , Thomas J. Brommage, Jr. Acknowledgments There are many people whom have helped me along the way. My most prominent debts include Ray Langely, Billy Joe Lucas, and Mary T. Clark, who trained me in philosophy at Manhattanville College; and also to Joanne Waugh, Stephen Turner, Kwasi Wiredu and Cahrles Guignon, all of whom have nurtured my love for the philosophy of language. -
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951) by Craig Kaczorowski
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951) by Craig Kaczorowski Encyclopedia Copyright © 2015, glbtq, Inc. Entry Copyright © 2004, glbtq, inc. Reprinted from http://www.glbtq.com The Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is considered one of the most significant thinkers of the twentieth century, especially for his valuable contributions within the field of Linguistic Philosophy. His major works on language and linguistics include Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), and Philosophical Investigations (1953), which was published posthumously. Early Life and Education Born Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein in Vienna on April 26, 1889, he was the youngest of eight children raised in a wealthy and cultured Jewish family. Initially educated privately at home, at the age of 14 he began attending a school in Linz, Austria that specialized in mathematics and natural science. In 1906, he went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering and two years later registered at the University of Manchester in England to study for his doctorate in engineering. Over time, however, Wittgenstein developed a greater interest in mathematics and mathematical logic, and he transferred to Trinity College, University of Cambridge, where he took courses from 1912 to 1913 given by the distinguished philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell. In November 1912, on the recommendation of fellow student John Maynard Keynes, Wittgenstein was elected to the elite Cambridge society known as the Apostles, which at that time had an aura of homoeroticism. This homoerotic atmosphere made Wittgenstein uncomfortable, however, and he stopped attending meetings. Finding Cambridge a less than ideal place to work, since he felt that his fellow academics lacked depth, Wittgenstein went to Skjolden in Norway and continued his mathematical and philosophical investigations in seclusion. -
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Development: Phenomenology, Grammar, Method, and the Anthropological View
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2) 2016 INVITED PAPER Juliet Floyd jfloyd @ bu.edu Chains of Life: Turing, Lebensform, and the Emergence of Wittgenstein’s Later Style Abstract This essay accounts for the notion of Lebensform by assigning it a logical role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Wittgenstein’s additions of the notion to his manuscripts of the PI occurred during the initial drafting of the book 1936-7, after he abandoned his effort to revise The Brown Book. It is argued that this constituted a substantive step forward in his attitude toward the notion of simplicity as it figures within the notion of logical analysis. Next, a reconstruction of his later remarks on Lebensformen is offered which factors in his reading of Alan Turing’s “On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem“ (1936/7), as well as his discussions with Turing 1937-1939. An interpretation of the five occurrences of Lebensform in the PI is then given in terms of a logical “regression” to Lebensform as a fundamental notion. This regression characterizes Wittgenstein’s mature answer to the question, “What is the nature of the logical?” 1. Introduction Lebensform is an important gauge of the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. It represents, from a regressive point of view, the place he finally chased down to. In foundational matters such as these, it is often the simplest, naïve perspective that comes last in a thinker’s (or a tradition’s) evolution, the working through 7 Juliet Floyd CC-BY of how to get back home to the primordial basis, the extraction of fundamentals from a jungle of technical accretions. -
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY in the TWENTIETH CENTURY James R
5 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY James R. O’Shea Introduction Any brief portrait of American philosophy in the twentieth century will inevi- tably illustrate at least one fundamental principle of William James’s (1842–1910) psychology and his pragmatist philosophy: namely, the idea that all cognition is selective, for “without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos” (James 1983: I, 402).1 “Hence, even in the !eld of sensation,” wrote James in 1907 in his classic work Pragmatism, our minds exert a certain arbitrary choice. By our inclusions and omissions we trace the !eld’s extent; by our emphasis we mark its foreground and its background; by our order we read it in this direction or in that. We receive in short the block of marble, but we carve the statue ourselves. (James 1978a: 119) It follows according to James’s pragmatic pluralism that there are typically alternative, often con"icting ways of carving up any given object or domain. Each resulting conceptual “statue” may nonetheless be useful (and for the Jamesian pragmatist, so far true) relative to the purposes and constructions of that particular working framework.2 This essay will itself be highly selective, one statue among many others that might have been carved.3 The account that follows will place in the foreground just one central story concerning the relative dominance of analytic philosophy in America in the decades following World War II as this style of philosophizing developed in distinctive ways, with initial stimulation from European sources, out of its earlier roots in American pragmatism, realism, and naturalism.4 There are many other important movements and topics that will not be covered in this selective overview, most of which, however, are addressed under other headings in this volume. -
Philosophy at Cambridge Newsletter of the Faculty of Philosophy Issue 10 May 2013
Philosophy at Cambridge Newsletter of the Faculty of Philosophy Issue 10 May 2013 ISSN 2046-9632 From the Chair Tim Crane is to be able to fully fund all our graduate students, MPhil and PhD. The campaign has been initiated by some very generous donations from our alumni, and a brochure, Thinking Through the 21st Century: The Next Generation of Cambridge Philosophers has been produced by the University’s Development Office. For a copy of this brochure, please contact the Development Office: www.campaign.cam.ac.uk. For other inquiries about this campaign, please feel free to contact me directly. The second exciting recent development—and our major news for this year—is that we have appointed Richard Holton and Rae Langton from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to professorships in the Faculty, starting in September this year. They are both world- leading philosophers who have made substantial contributions to a number of Professors Rae Langton and Richard Holton to join the Faculty different areas of the subject. Richard works especially on the Welcome to the tenth Faculty of Philosophy the researchers of the future, they are the philosophy of mind and its connections Newsletter. Charles de Gaulle is supposed researchers of the present. with psychology and moral philosophy, to have said that if you want things to But it has become increasingly difficult including decision-making, making stay the same, you have to perpetually in recent years for graduate students up your mind, weakness of the will renew them; and in the Faculty of in philosophy to fund their education. -
Moral Theology After Wittgenstein A
MORAL THEOLOGY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Theology at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) For the Degree of Sacred Doctor of Theology by REV. DAVID GOODILL O.P., M.A., M.Phil., S.T.L. Directed by Rev. Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., Ph.D. 2017 To Our Lady Seat of Wisdom ii This thesis has been approved by the Faculty of Theology at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland on 6 June 2017 on the recommendation of: Prof. Michael S. Sherwin, o.p. (1st Reader) Prof. Roger Pouivet (2nd Reader) Prof. Luc Devillers, o.p. (Dean) iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... vii Annotated Bibliography ................................................................................................. viii Note on Referencing ......................................................................................................... xii 1 WHY STUDY WITTGENSTEIN FOR MORAL THEOLOGY? ..................................... 1 1.1 Introductory Remarks: Wittgenstein, Metaphysics and Moral Theology ................... 1 1.2 Wittgenstein and Metaphysics: A Return or a Rejection? .......................................... 4 1.2.1 Does Wittgenstein Trivialize Philosophy? ................................................................ 4 1.2.2 Metaphysics and Grammar ...................................................................................... 13 1.2.3 Metaphysics and Practice ....................................................................................... -
Wittgenstein on Identity
Wittgenstein's Concept of Identity Wittgenstein represented in the early 30s in Cambridge a new perspective on mathematical logic, which should lead to better reliability and applicability of mathematics. Not only the concept of 'grammar' arises for the identity-sign, which triggers the horror of the Trinity Mathematical Society in 1930 and of E. G. Moore 1932. But additionally Wittgenstein does not use formal language to treat problems of mathematical logic. Otherwise, his formal conceivement of the concepts becomes obvious, if the early criticism in the Notebooks of 1914 and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is taken into account. His idea how to modify logical leads to an operational use of identity constants as an assignment operator. This becomes obvious in the thirties. But at that time, he intermingled methodologically formal concepts and rather hermeneutical concepts. Hence, that he speaks about incompleteness in Gödel's sense, and not merely of 'unvollständig' in a very general sense, has to be noticed by awareness for his methodology, to ensemble concepts from different contextual realms together, to create tensions that initialize a comparative understanding and an improved concept formation. Within the 30s, this improvement focused on the use of identity and quantification, which Wittgenstein changed into a sign for coding like an assignment operator in informatics. Special examples he gives for the reduction of logical constants, and the operational and visual criteria he developes for the correct application of a rule show how he provided the foundations for the genuine Turing-machine within mathematics. 1 "Still the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus" Wittgenstein was indulged with acceptance and compliments by the Cambridge mathematicians of the 30s, not although, but because he had already started to think of philosophy in a new manner. -
Metaphilosophy, Once Again
Metaphilosophy, Once Again Chapter 3 Ordinary Language Philosophy Reconsidered How strange if logic were concerned with an ‘ideal’ language and not with ours. For what would this ideal language express? Presumably, what we now express in our ordinary language; in that case, this is the language logic must investigate. – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, ‘proposition’, ‘name’— and they try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: Is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations I Neither ordinary language philosophers (broadly speaking) Moore, Wittgenstein, Austin, Ryle, Grice, Strawson, Bousma, Ambrose, Toulmin, Wisdom or Malcolm nor ideal language philosophers Russell, Carnap, Bergmann, Reichenbach, Schlick, C. I. Lewis or Ayer have much presence anymore. The issues that they engaged in and that divided them may seem passé. By now it might be said both groups are part of the history of philosophy. Well, of course they are and even with their being such near contemporaries, they are for us part of the history of philosophy. We no longer make philosophical music with any of them or with the movements they inspired. I want here, extending what I argued in the previous two chapters and perhaps whipping a dead horse, to ~ 1 ~ make a renewed defense of both common sense and of ordinary language philosophy. (They are not and should not be taken to be the same. -
Kanterian, Edward (2007) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Reaktion Books
CRITICAL NOTICE Ludwig Wittgenstein Edward Kanterian, Reaktion Books, London, 2007, pp. 224, £ 10.95 ISBN: 978 1 86189 320 8 (paperback). Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall Given that this book is part of an ever growing series entitled ‘Critical Lives’, devoted to a wide range of individuals in varying spheres who are classified by the publisher as ‘cultural figures’, the reader should not be surprised to find that the series also includes volumes about James Joyce, Franz Kafka, Frank Lloyd Wright, Noam Chomsky, Pablo Picasso, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Edward Kanterian’s book is for the most part biographical, and he duly acknowledges his debt to the ‘seminal biographies’ of Brian McGuinness and Ray Monk (Introduction, 9), whilst differing from them slightly in stressing certain discontinuities, rather than continuities, between Wittgenstein’s personality and philosophy. It is also part of Kanterian’s aim to correct an imbalance which he detects between the character of Wittgenstein’s actual work and his ‘present-day public persona’ (Ibid., 8). Remarking that Wittgenstein has come to be associated in the public mind with ‘postmodernism, art, poetry, mysticism, ethics, even politics’, he issues a corrective to Terry Eagleton who takes the ‘co-ordinates’ of the Tractatus to be fixed by Joyce, Schonberg and Picasso instead of by Russell and Frege (Ibid., 8 & 74). Eagleton also comes under attack later on for relating Wittgenstein’s ideas to the Marxist aesthetics of Mikhail Bakhtin, on the grounds that Wittgenstein had an affinity with his brother Nikolai Bakhtin, the philologist with whom he happened to re-read the Tractatus during the 1940’s (Ibid., 160). -
`Philosophie' Grammatisch Betrachtet. Wittgensteins Begriff Der
‘Philosophie’ grammatisch betrachtet. Wittgensteins Begriff der Therapie1 Peter Tarras Abstract Expressions belonging to the lexical fields of medicine and psycho- logy recur repeatedly throughout Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings since the 1930s. He uses therapeutic vocabulary mostly in the context of metaphilosophical reflections, i.e. reflections about the activity of philosophizing. But how are we to understand such ex- pressions? Even though some interpreters admit their metapho- rical nature, the methodological background of using figurative language has hitherto been neglected concerning this matter. He- re, I argue that Wittgensteinian therapy is what G. Lakoff and M. Johnson have termed a “structural metaphor”. Thus we do not only obtain a better understanding of Wittgenstein’s metaphilo- sophy, but also of the role metaphor use plays within his metho- dology. I shall try to show that he uses therapeutic metaphors (akin to pictorial elements) as argumentative and epistemological devices and thereby investigates the philosophically problematic expression ‘philosophy’ grammatically. 1 Einleitung Ausdrücke wie ‚Beulen’, ‚Krankheit’, ‚Verwirrung’, ‚Einbildung’, ‚Thera- pie’ und ‚Behandlung’, d.h. Ausdrücke, die den Wortfeldern der Medizin und Psychologie entstammen, finden sich ab den 1930ern vermehrt in den Schriften Ludwig Wittgensteins. Vor allem im Rahmen metaphi- losophischer Reflexionen begegnet uns dieses therapeutische Vokabular. Genauer gesagt: Mit ihm beschreibt Wittgenstein die Tätigkeit des Phi- losophierens: „Der Philosoph behandelt eine Frage; wie eine Krankheit“ (PU 255).2 Mittlerweile ist es zum Gemeinplatz der Sekundärliteratur geworden, diesen oder jenen Aspekt im Denken Wittgensteins als „thera- peutisch“ zu charakterisieren. Die Bemühungen, den Begriff der Thera- pie bei Wittgenstein einer Deutung zu unterziehen, haben dennoch nicht Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy (2014) 28: 75–97.