CFA)(CFA) Forregion 23 and Am Am Based at Wangaratta.Wangaratla

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2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION Letters PatentPatent issuedissued 1616 FebruaryFebruary 20092009

WITNESS STATEMENT OF STEWART KRELTSZHEIMKRELTSZHEIM

Date of Document: 20 May 2009 Solicitor's Code: 7977 RledFiled on behalf of:of: The The State of Victoria Telephone: +61 386843 8684 0444 Prepared by: Facsimile: +61 3 8684 0449 Victorian GovernmentGovemment Solicitor's OfficeOffice OXDX 300077 Melbourne Level 25 Ref: PAC 944884 121 Exhibition Street Attention;Attention: John Cain MelbourneMelboume VICViC 30003000

I,I, Stewart DuncanDuncan Kreltszheim,Kreltszheim, OperationsOperations Manager,Manager, Country FireFire Authority, can say asas follows:

PART 1: INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTiON

4th 1. My name isStewart DuncanDuncan KRELTSZHEIMKRELTSZHEIM and my date of birth is the 4th April 1965. 11 am an Operations Manager for the CountryCountry FireFire AuthorityAuthority (CFA)(CFA) forRegion 23 and am am based at Wangaratta.Wangaratla. I have been working forthe CFA CFA since 1993 and commenced my position as Operations Manager in August 2007.

2.I am qualified in various incident management roles having completedcompleted thethe course inin Australian Inter-Service Incident ManagementManagemenl System (AIIMS)(A1IMS) in AprilApril 1998.1998. I have completed training in Wildfire-Firefighter, Low Structure FireFire Fighting, Fighting, StructureStructure Fireflghting,Firefighting, Structure-Wildfire Firefighting, Crew Leader-Wildfire, Strike Team LeaderLeader- wildfire, Sector Command-Wildfire, Logistics Officer, Planning Officer and Operations Officer Level 3.

3. I have worked in a number of Levellevel 3 Incident Control Centres (ICC)(ICC) with respectrespect toto structural, hazard material and wildfire. I waswas the Deputy Operations Officer - Wildfire inin the 2002/03 fires at at Corryong, thethe DeputyDepuly IncidentIncident ControllerController andand OperationOperation OfficerOfficer inin the the 2006/07 fires at Mansfield (Great Divide North Complex). Annually,Annually, I I assumeassume the role role of

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Incident Controller oror supportsupportI / mentormentor IncidentIncident ControllersControllersas as partpart ofof mymy dutiesduties asas a Regional Duty Officer.Officer.

4. In AugustAugust 2006,2006, I waswas nominated by CFA andand sent toto Washington StateState in in the the United United States forfor fivefive weeks as part part ofof thethe Australian/NewAustralian/New ZealandZealand ContingentContingent NumberNumber #2#2 to to assist withwith thethe USA FireFire ServicesServices inin commandcommand andand controlcontrolareas. areas. In 2006/2007 I waswas partpart of aa CFAlDepartmentCFA/Department of SustainabililySustainability andand Environment (DSE) program with respectrespect to accrediting Level 3 IncidentIneldent Controllers and OperationsOperations OfficersOfficers whichwhich involvedinvolved psychometric testing, a mentoring program and scenario assessments.

5.5. On 7 FebruaryFebruary 2009,2009, 1I was the the IncidentIncident ControllerController atat the the KilmoreKilmore ICCICC from from approximatelyapproximately 4.30pm untiluntil approximately 1111pm. pm. GregGreg Murphy was the IncidentIncident ControllerController prior to me and GrahamGraham HealyHealy tooktook overover from me on on thethe nightnight shift.shift. From From approximatelyapproximately 7pm7pm until until 11pm11 pmGraham Graham HealyHealy workedworked closelyclosely withwithme me toto ensureensure an efficientefficient ongoing and sustainable incident management structure. AfterAfter 1111pm, pm, I Iprovidedprovided assistanceassistance to GrahamGraham when he was the the IncidentIncident Controller.Controller.Between Between12am 12amand and 1amlam on Sunday 8 February 2009 I left KilrnoreKilmoreICC ICC and andspent spent approximatelyapproximately anan hourhour makingmaking notesnotes of the day in my log.

66.. I havehave beenbeen asked byby CFA CFA to provide a statement toto the the 20092009 VictorianVictorian BushfiresBushfrres Royal Commission (Royal Commission). InIn a a letterletter dateddated 77 April April 2009, 2009, the the Royal Royal Commission requested thatthat aa statementstatement bebe providedprovided toto addressaddress thethe subjectsubject ofof informationinformation and warnings relating toto the the occurrence,occurrence, location,location, threatthreat oror riskrisk ofof bushfiresbushfires withinwithin Victoria,Victoria, including information about firefire weatherweather disseminated withinwithin VictoriaVictoria duringduring thethe2008 2008 - 2009 fire seasons. This statement will provide information of the warningswarnings disseminateddisseminated on 7 February 2009 by Kilmore ICC and my role as Incident Controller.

1h 7. From 7pm on the 7t',7 , 1I instructedinstructed AnnAnn CartwrightCartwright Finance andand AdministralionAdministration ManagerManager - North EastEast Area to actact as my scribe and prepareprepare aa log log forfor me.me. Ms Ms CartwrightCartwright had arrivedarrived with the night shift Incident ManagementManagement Team.Team. PriorPrior to that time, due toto thethe franticfrantic nature ofof thethe day, day, I I had had not not preparedprepared aa log. log. A Acopy copy of of my my log log fromfrom 7pm7pm toto 11 11pm pm is attached as Annexure 11 to to my my statement.statement.

88.. Other than mymy log,log , my reference to events ofof thethe dayday is is takentaken fromfrom my my recollection.recollection. It is important to note that II acted in various Incident Management rolesroles at at Yea Yea and and AlexandraAlexandra after the 71'7 U1 andand waswas activelyactivelyinvolved involvedwith withthe the firesfires inin the theState Statefor for atat leastleastfour fourweeks. weeks. It is therefore somewhatsomewhat difficultdifficult toto exactly recallrecall thethe 77hlh in isolationisolation fromfrom thethe otherother days,days, notwithstanding the magnitudemagnitude ofof the firefire on the the 7th71h and its impact.

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9. II havehave alsoalso been asked by Victoria Policeto make make a a statement withwith respect to role on 7th. II signedsigned aa statementon 2e24 lhofof April April2009. An An unsignedunsigned copy of my my Victoria Police statement is attached asas AnnexureAnnexure 22 to my my statement.statement.

1010.. My statement is set out as follows: follows:

1. Introduction 2. Background

3. Role as Incident Controller 4. Warnings issuedissued by by KilmoreKUmore 1CC.ICC.

PART 2: BACKGROUND

11. I am one of a number of people in the North East Area that has been signed off byby the Chief Officer of CFA to be a Level 3 Incident Controller at a Level 3 Incidents. Fire incidences areare categorisedcategorised fromfrom LevelLevel 1I to to Level Level 3, Level Level being the least and Level 33 thethe most complex. Level 3 fires are major incidents due to their duration and complexity.

12. In thethe weekweek leading upup to 7 February 2009, it was decided that I I was to be based at Mansfield Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) office on Saturday 7 February 2009 and may be in control of any fires that broke out in the North East Area or another area requiring a Level 3 Incidentincident Controller. This This was was a a jointjoint decisiondecision made made by by the North East AreaArea Operations Managers and the General Manager for the North North East East Area, Alan Davies, in consultation with DSE Fire Management Officers.Officers, I I cannot cannot recall recall . when the decision was made but it is likely it was on Thursday 5 February 2009 as our preplanned Incident Management Team rosters are are usually usually prepared prepared for for ThursdayThursday toto Thursday.

111 13. During the week leading leading up up to to the the 71h7 of ofFebruary Februarywarnings warnings aboutabout thethe highhigh riskrisk for 7 February 2009 issued by CFA were sent to all relevant local print media in my Region by our media teams within the North East Area and Operations StaffStaff werewere contacted contacted periodically by radio and print media farfor comment.

14. Leading up to the 7°i,t", I was involved in a number of teleconferences with Operations Managers and Regional Duty Officers thatwere facilitated by by the the State State Co-ordinator.Co-ordinator. During these teleconferences I was advised of bureau forecasts for the 7m 71hand the days leadingleading up to thethe t"7`".. The Chief Officer was involved in some of the teleconferences.teleconferences. InIn all the teleconferences we were advised that it was forecasted thatthat we we would would experienceexperience unprecedented fire weather conditionsconditions on on the the 7th.7th. I ensured that at a regional level we were planning for the 7th 7th and days days around around the the 7'"i h becausebecause the the North North East East often often

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experiences weather conditions a day after Melbourne due to the effect of the Great Dividing Range.

1h 1515.. II arrivedarrived at Mansfield DSEDSE office office at at approximatelyapprox'mately 1.00pm1.00pm on on the the 71h7 and logged onto onto to to CFA's Incident Management System (IMS) to access information about the fires. IMS is an internal management system, it contains a range range of informationinformation whichwhich includes preliminary incident reports, messages between RegionsRegions and CFA Headquarters, resourceresource availabilityavailability and movements, deploymentdeployment of aircraft and who has been allocated to an IMT. It enables anyone within CFA to assess what is happening in relation to a fire at any given time.

1616.. II knewknew therethere werewere firesfires in the KUmoreKilmore East area because I hadhad been listening listening to to ABC ABC North East radio when I I was driving driving to Mansfield. As a result of the fire thatthat had started in in KilmoreKUmore EastEast priorprior toto noon,noon, I hadhad aa telephone conversationconversation with with Alan Davies regarding the fire developingdeveloping around Kilmore Kilmore and Wallan.Wallan. At approximately 2.30pm, I waswas directed by Alan DaviesDavies toto go to Kilmore CFACFA ICCICC toto taketake overover asas Incident Controller.

17. I left by car for KilmoreKUmore ICCICC at at approximately 2.30pm2.30pm and and on on the way way I I received received calls calls from Alan Davies and Peter Creak who is the Operations ManagerManager of Region Region 12 12 and is responsible forfor the Seymour andand surroundingsurrounding areas.areas. Peter Peter was was based based at the Regional Emergency Coordination Centre (RECC) at Seymour at the time of of the the calls calls and and he he was was updating me on the RECC's knowledge of the the fire in in the the Kilmore KUmoreregion. region. I cannot recall where Alan Davies was located but during the calls I had with him he he advised me generally about what had been and would be set up up at KilmoreKHmore ICC,ICC, the people, the the structures and the plans. At At that that stage, stage, the the fire fire was was predominantlypredominantly Inin Region 12.

18. I also received phone calls and updates from the the Integrated Integrated EmergencyEmergency Co-ordinationCo-ordination Centre (IECe).(IECC). II believebelieve thatthat thethe callscalls werewere fromfrom Steve Warrington, thethe State State Co- Co ordinator and Craig Lapsley, Director, Director. Emergency ManagementManagement Branch,Branch, DHS. DHS. Apparently, there were some some issues with the the recovery recovery people, people, DHS DHS staffstaff andand ambulance ambulance officers integrating atat Kilmore Kilmore ICC ICC and and they they wanted wanted me me to to provide provide supportsupport forfor the the necessary linkages. Ir made several calls back to the RECC at Wangaratta to gather information about the the fires fires in in my my home home area. area. During During those those calls calls I Iobtained obtained situation situation reports from IMS, IMS, weatherweather informationinformation and and resource resource deployment.deployment.

1919.. II arrivedarrived atat KUmoreKilmore ICC ICC at approximately 44.30pm.30pm and conducted a handover with Greg MurphyMurphy..

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20. Although many ICCs are pre-planned, in reality it is often necessary for people to undertake a caretaker role until the people with the appropriate experience and expertise can be located. Kilmore Kilmore ICC ICC was was a a pre-planned pre-planned ICC, ICC, however, however, it it was was not not until until the the fire fire suddenly commenced at KUmoreKilmore that people were called in to the ICC. Greg Murphy waswas initially the Incident Controller and performed a good job,job, however, because the fire spread at such a rapid pace, the fire soon became an enormous firefire and it was evident that further resources and personnel were required for the ICC. ICC.

PART 3: ROLE AS INCIDENT CONTROLLERCONTROLLER

21.21 . The Incident Controller is responsible for amongst other things, sectorising sectorising the incident, ensuring the development and implementation of Incidentincident Action Plans, Plans, selecting geographic locations for staging areas and Sector/Division Control Points, establishing communication plans, managing aircraft arrangements, ensuring adequateadequate resources, resources, ensuring the safety and welfarewelfare ofof allall personnelpersonnel andand managingmanaging thethe media.media. The role of an Incident Controller is very broad.broad. It It is is both both a a directional directional and and instructional instructional role role as as well well as as an overseer and a facilitator.facilitator. The The structurestructure ofof IMT IMT is is derived from the the Australian Incident Inter-serviceInter-service Management System-Incident Control Systems Systems (AJIMS-ICS). (A1IMS-ICS). The structure is thatthat the team is headed by an Incident Controller with the functions of Operations, Operations. Planning and Logistics sitting underneath. There are a variety of roles that sit in each of these functions.

22. On the day, amongst many other tasks I performed the following asas the the Incident Incident Controller at the Kilmore Kllmore ICC: ICC:

22.122.1 II obtainedobtained aa briefingbriefing fromfrom thethe previous Incident Controller, Greg Murphy, so I could try and ascertain as accurate an account of what had happened as

possible. I gave a briefing to my replacement Graham Healy; Healy:

2222.2.2 Ensured that there was an adequate Incident Management Structure in place to manage the current and developing situation, this required ensuring there was enough personnel inin thethe majormajor functionsfunctions ofof logistics,logistics, planningplanning and operations;

22.3 Once I received a situation report and an idea of the structural set up required, required, I I needed to ensure that the links with Victoria Police and the relevant municipalities had been established so that I was sure that all relevant bodies were aware what each other was doing. ThroughoutThroughout thethe day day I I monitored monitored the[he linkslinks to ensure the level ofof communication was acceptable;acceptable;

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22.4 )1 waswas continuallycontinually establishingestablishing priorities priorities for for action action following following communications with with people in Logistics, Logistics, Planning Planning and and Operations; Operations;

22.522.5 I1 ensuredensured that all available crews and strike teams were deployed;

22.622.6 II ensuredensured that that there there were were regular regular briefings, briefings, initially initially hourly hourly with with IMT IMT headsheads only only to try andand obtain situation reportsreports andand to identify whatwhat waswas requiredrequired toto supportsupport thethe relevant functions in the ICC;

22.722.7 I mademade and received calls with the IECC, IECC, the RECC at Seymour and and Alan Alan Davies;

22.8 1I spokespoke withwith thethe mediamedia followingfollowing the necessary arrangements having been been made made by the Media Unit;

22.9 I ensured that resource issues for personnel within the ICC, ICC, namely enough enough "i' phones.phones, computers etc were addressed;

22.10 Checked and signed warning messages;

22.11 ensured that there was a continualfocus on safetyfrom those people on the fire ground;

22.12 I liaised withwith thethe CommunicationsCommunications LeaderLeader toto ensureensure thatthat therethere werewere adequate communications, the Planning Unit Leader to ensure adequate planning and the Logistics Leader to ensure adequate Logistics;

22.13 I directeddirected the preparation ofof Incident Action Plans;

22.14 1I receivedreceived manyquestions from people within the IMT; IMT;

22.15 I receivedreceived calls directly oror informationinformation was was passed passed ontoonto me about missing strike teams, resource resource deployment, deployment, asset asset protection, protection, lost assets, human human losses. Due Due to the enormous enormous amount amount of of informationinformation II was was receiving receiving from from others others I I only only answered my my mobile mobile phone if if I, waswas aware who who the caller was and and itit waswas in in relation toto thethe jobjob atat hand; and

22.16 I ensured that there were sustainable structures and staff staff planning planning in in the the long long term. This This was was particularly particularly importantimportant asas it it was was evident evident that that the the fire would continue beyond beyondthe 7th71n and we needed to ensure people had satisfactory breaks. This This task task was was difficult difficult because I was aware that there were many fires

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across the slate,state, although I was only aware of the details in a peripheral sense, therefore resources that thai I I would would plan plan for for may may be be directed directed elsewhere. elsewhere. I was also advised that DSE staff could work 24 hours straight but would then require a 24 hour break, otherwise once they had a break it had to be at least ten hours. It is my recollection that there werewere DSE day staff handed over at 9pm or 10pm;

22.17 I liaised withwith otherother Regions,Regions, thethe IECC andand DivisionDivision CommandersCommanders inin thethe otherother Regionsto try and gather as much information about the status of the fire as I could and to ensure proper planning was implemented to address the ongoing management of the fire;

2222.18.18 I worked withwith thethe IMT toto developdevelop predictions ofof thethe firefire movement and the towns that may bebe affected by the fire:fire; and

22.19 I worked closely with Graham Healy Healy who who eventually eventually took took over over at at the the Incident Incident Controller and John Kneebone (Deputy Incidentlncldent Controller).Controller).

23. John Kneebone from DSE joined me at Kilmore as Deputy Incident Controller at approximately 5.30pm. At this time my primary function was to bring the Incident IMT together to ensure ensure that we had necessary personnel personnel available or on-route and that people people were clear about their roles. At At that time, there would have been more than forty forty people in the KilmoreKilrnore ICC.ICC.

PART 4: WARNINGS ISSUED BY KILMORE ICC

24. There are four threat message templates that an ICCuses. The threat messages range in severity and are as follows: Awareness Message, Alert Message and Urgent Threat Message. There is also a Downgrade Message. The messages are issued as as Fire Fire Information Releases.The Information InformationUnit of Kilmore ICCICCformulates formulates thethe warnings.warnings. On 7 February 2009, there were a number of personnel working in the Information Unit, Unil, however, I cannot recall who those people were.

25.25. I had no knowledge of what releases had been sent out in relation to to the the Kilmore Kilmore fire fire prior prior to my my commencement as thethe IncidentIncident Controller Controller at at Kilmore Kilmore ICC. ICC.

26.26. The process for transferring the lhe information received fromthe ground into threat messages that are are distributed dIstributed to to the community community as as Fire Fire InformationInfonnation ReleasesReleases is is as as follows. TheThe Operations Unit obtains information via a number of mediums including from radio from crews on the groundground or in the air or from ground observers. The Operations Unit would then feed this into the Situation Unit Unit within thethe Planning Unit Unit and and the the

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InformationInformation Unit,Unit, alsoalso partpart ofof the PlanningPlanning Unit wouldwould sourcesource this information soso thatthat theythey can formulate their Fire Information Releases.

27,27. The Information Unit also uses the weather reports that they receive from the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) to formulate their fire information releases.releases . The ICC canask for spot weathers and there is also the ability to track wind direction on the Remote Automatic Weather System (RAWS).

28. I do not recall the specifics of the flow of information between the various units in the IMT IMT on the day.

29.29. The Information Unit will recommend the level of warning requiredrequired in in a Fire Fire InformationInformation Release based on the informationthey have receivedreceived.. The Information Officer willlhenwill then obtain sign off of the release from the Incident Controller or Deputy Deputy Incident Controller in his absence. In a levelLevel 3 fire, as the Incident Controller, you often do not have the time to scrutinise the information providedprovided to you in great detail but have toto rely on it being the best information available at that point in timetime.. I would have checked the content of any release toto ensure that it was consistent with my knowledge at that point in time. In acting as a high level manager you need to rely on the information fromfrom the the InformationInformation UnitUnit as as being the best intelligence available at that point in time. This certainly applied to me on the 7th due to to the the fact that that we we were were dealing withwith a a levelLevel 3 fire of a large magnitude that was moving rapidly. rapidly.

30. Some of the aircraft which we deployed to fight the fires and provide information about the locationlocation andand predicted movement of the fires could not fly on 7 February 2009 because of the high winds. The lack Jackof of aircraft, aircraft. the the amountamount ofof smokesmoke andand the lhe poor poor visibility visibility meantmeant wewe were struggling to see the fire perimeter. ThisThis meantmeant thatthat intelligenceintelligence fromfrom the the air air was was affected and deprived us of a most most valuable source ofof informationinformation aboutabout the the fire fire frontfront andand its movement. The 7th was extremely busy, we also received very limited intelligence about the fire because it was moving at such a rapid rapid pace pace and and communicationscommunications channels,channels, such as radios, were restricted. I tried to ensure thatthat planning planning was was being being undertaken,undertaken, there was co-ordination between the functions and liaison between all emergency services. I ensured that all the various personnel in the IMT IMT were communicating with each other so that relevant information could be be consideredconsidered and that relevantrelevant FireFire Information Releases could be issued. issued .

31. Whilst atat the ICC ICC I I did did not not listen to any radio stations for information of warnings for the Kilmore East or any other fires. fires.

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32. II waswas thethe IncidentIncident ControllerController at approximatelyapproximately 5.20pm whenwhen UrgentUrgent ThreatThreat MessageMessage FireFire InformationInformation Release (Release(Release NoNo 7)7) waswas prepared. TheThe detailsdetails of thethe release waswas TheThe grass and scrub fire was burning 4 kilometres east of Kilmore, south of of Sunders Rd, it was moving in a southerly directiondirection andand estimatedestimated toto bebe 4,0004,000 hectareshectares II size.size. TheThe communities in the areas of Kinglake to Flowerdale FJowerdale may be directly impacted upon by this firefire.. It also referred to road closures,closures, HumeHume FreewayFreeway O'Grady'sO'Grady's RdRd WandongWandong-KHmore -Kilmore Rd.Rd. Wandong- Epping Rd intersection ofof YealWhittleseaYealWhittlesea Rd. Kinglake/HealesvilleKinglake/Healesvilie Rd at Kinglake West. It stated that the Urgent Urgent Threat MessagesMessages for Wandong,Wandong, HeathcoteHeathcote Junction, Upper Plenty and Hidden Valley.Valley, Clonbinane, Mt Disappointment, Kinglake, Heathcote and Upper Plenty, Humevale, Reedy Creek, Strath Creek remain current. I have no recollection of signing the release on the day but believe that it was me who signed it. A A copy copy of of the release is attached to this statementstatement asas AAnnexure-nnexure 3.3.

33. I was not aware of the source of the information for Release Release No No 7, 7, who who prepared prepared it it or where it was sent.senl I waswas so busy undertaking all my roles that I have no recollection of that release.release .

3434.. Urgent Threat Message Fire Informationlntormatlon Release (Release No 8) timed at 7.50pm was also issuedissued.. TheThe release release stated stated thatthat the communitiescommunities in the area of of Broadford, Broadford East in the area of O'Gradys Road-South Broadford, Broadford-Wandong/Sunday CreekCreek and Pheasant Creek may be directly impacted upon by this fire.It also stated that that the the Urgent Threat Messages for Wandong, HeathcoteHeathcote Junction,Junction, UpperUpper Plenty,Plenty, Hidden Hidden Valley, Valley, Clonbinane, Mt Disappointment, Kinglake, Heathcote and Upper Plenty, Hume Vale, Reedy Creek and Strath Creek remainremain current.current. The release release stated that that there were reports of structure loss but they could not yet confirm if they they were houses. houses. KinglakeKinglake toto Flowerdale may be directly impacted upon by this fire. I have no recollectionrecolleclion of signing the release on the day but believe thatthat itit waswas meme whowho signedsigned it.it. A A copy copy of of the the release release is attached to this statement asas AnnexureAnnexure 4.

35.I was not aware of the source of the informationinformation forfor ReleaseRelease No 8, who prepared it or where it was sent.

36. As soon as I signed the the Fire Fire InformationInformation ReleaseRelease I I believe believe thatthat itit would would have have been been issued issued by the Information UnitUnit by by fax or email or both both and and the the releases releases would would sent sent to to the the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (IECC)(IEee) whowho were then then coordinatingcoordinating publishingpublishing the messages onto the the CFA website and the reading of urgenturgent messagesmessages byby thethe ABC. ABC. However, I have no knowledge of whether this occurred or not. not.

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37.37. I havehave beenbeen shown an Urgent ThreatThreat MessageMessage that was timed atat 1010.15pm.15pm andand is notednoted asas Release NoNo 9. I I am not aware of the preparation of that message andand believebelieve thatthat itit may may have been signed by GrahamGraham Healy.Healy.The Themessage message states'states' TheThe grassgrass andand scrubscrub firefire is now burningburning lessless than 4 kilometres south ofof Broadford. ItIl is burning inin aa NorthNorth EasterlyEasterly direction andand isis estimatedestimated toto bebe 30,000 hectares inin size. The communities in thethe area of Broadford are under direct threat of being impacted upon by this fire. This includes: Broadford, Broadford East in the areaof O'Grady's Road, SouthSouth ofof Broadford,Broadford, Broadford-8roadford WandonglSundayWandong/Sunday Creek Road, ReedyReedy CreekCreek andand Tyaak.Tyaak. FirefightingFirefighting resourcesresources are currentlycurrenUy fullyfullycommitted committedand andresidents residents areare reminded that theythey cannotcannot expectexpect firefightingfirefighting

trucks to be in in attendance ifif thethe fire fire front approaches theirtheir properties.'properties. I AA copycopy ofof thisthis message is attached at Annexure S.5.

38. I believe thatthat warnings were sent asefficiently asaspossible at the time time with the informationinformation known.

39. II did notnot directly receivereceive reportsreports fromfrom thethe ground crews via the radio. It was indicated to me, between 6.27pm6.27pm andand 7.07pm7.07pm thatthat groundground crewscrews hadhad advisedadvised thethe ICC ICC thatthat windwind had changed fromfrom aa northerlynortherly influenceinfluence to a south-westerlysouth-westerly influence influence hadhad arrived,arrived, butbut II am am not not aware when the wind wind change tooktook place. place. I I directed thisthis informationinformation toto be passed onon to to all all fire groundground personnel inin the form form of aa red flag flag warning. This warning only goesgoes to crews and not the public.public. It is a standard procedureprocedure forfor ensuringensuring thatthat informationinformation pertinent to the safety of fire crewscrews Is effectivelyeffectivelypassed passed through thethe ranks. The redred flag flag warning is normally communicated viavia radio. radio.

40. Lyn Brereton was responsible for transferring information from DSEDSE FirewebFireweb intointo IMS.IMS. This created a problemproblem asas some some informationinformation waswas put put directlydirectly intointo thethe DSE DSE systemsystem asas the the personnel crewing the Situation Unit were from DSE. Therefore, CFA personnel had to print off information from the DSE DSE system and re-enter itit intointo IMS. IMS.

41 I do not recall specifically considering any IMS information. IJ am aware thatthat IMSIMS was not not functioning well from KilmoreKilmore ICCICC and and it it was was necessary,necessary, toto enableenable informationinformation toto be be inputted intointo IMS, IMS, about thethe Kilmore Kilmore East Fire,Fire, forfor itit to to be be relayedrelayed toto the the SeymourSeymour RECCRECC for them to undertake thethe tasktask onon ourour behalf.behalf. II was was notnot monitoringmonitoring informationinformation onon [MS. IMS.

42. The perimeter of thethe KilmoreKilmore fire was was underunder mymy controlcontrol fromfrom KilmoreKilmore ICCICC basedbased inin RegionRegion 12. However, sometime before 6.30pm the fire had spread to other regions, namely Regions 1313 and and 14.14. I Ithereforetherefore spokespoke toto Phil Phil Peacock,Peacock, OperationsOperations OfficerOfficer ofof RegionRegion 14,14, who was based atat WhittleseaWhittlesea FootballFootball GroundGround andand JasonJason Lawrence,Lawrence, Operations Officer at the KangarooKangaroo Ground. I advised themthem both thatthat whilst I waswas In control as Incident 173925_1\C173925_11C WIT.3004.001.0042

Controller,Controller. the Divisions of Whittlesea and Kangaroo Ground needed to be supported by their home regions and I I ensured thatthat theythey hadhad capacitycapacity toto plan plan and and logisticallylogistically support field operaoperationslions inin theirtheir defineddefinedarea. area. I understandunderstand that both Whittlesea and KangarooKangaroo Ground were set up up as Division Division Commands but I cannot recall the times. times. My My view was that until we were able to draw clear geographical lines as toto who was responsibleresponsible forfor what part of the fire thatthat itit waswas bestbest that Kangaroo Ground and Whittlesea continued to report and liaiseliaise with me. me.

43.I had communications via telephone withwith KangarooKangaroo Ground through JustinJustin Dally,Dally, Liaison Liaison officer.officer,who was was basedbased at atthe the Kilmore ICC. I understand thatat times itwas difficultdifficult for communications toto taketake placeplace betweenbetween Justin and the locations.

44.1 I decided decidedat at approximatelyapproximately 8pm,8pm, inin consultationconsultation withwith AlanAlan Davies, that the fire needed to be split at some stage and dealt with by two formally activated ICCs,ICCs, one one from from Kilmore Kilmore and one from Kangaroo Ground but did not want to make this split in the middle of the night. It was an extremely complex firefire structure and it was exceedingly difficult to manage. ItIt was was continuallycontinually aa concern that this was a fire that was going to be hard to manage from the ground up. At At one one stage,stage, wewe lookedlooked atat splittingsplitting myselfmyself and John Kneebone and havinghaving one of of us us staystay atat KilmoreKilmore and the the otherother gogo to to KangarooKangaroo Ground.Ground. However, we decideddecided to stay together as aa team and decided that Kangaroo Ground would become anotheranother activatedactivated ICCICC from from approximatelyapproximately 8am, 8February 2009. Ultimately, AlanAlanDavies Davies wouldwouldhave have requiredrequired sign off from thethe State DutyDuty OfficerOfficer from the IECC forfor thisthis decision becausebecause thethe firefire waswas inin differentdifferent Regions.Regions. Kangaroo Ground and Whittlesea were treated asas aa Division,Division, I triedtried toto ensureensure that there were good relationships and that weall actedacled under the same command structure. WhileWhile GrahamGraham HealyHealy and I I were bothboth atat KilmoreKilmore ICCICC we did a lot lot of work on the transitiontransition ofof thethe ICC. ICC. I waswas not an active participant in any communications with RegionRegion 13 oror thethe IECC aboutabout Kangaroo Ground being activated as an ICC.

45. Kilmore ICCICC waswas setset up withwith aa skeletonskeleton staff in thethe event there waswas a a fire fire in in the the Region.Region. What transpired was aa fire fire that that was largerlarger andand movedmoved fasterfaster andand more more ferociouslyferociously thanthan II or anyone with whomwhom I havehave subsequentlysubsequently spoken has experienced.experienced. ItIt became oneone of of Australia's worst disastersdisasters andand we were required toto managemanage thousandsthousands ofof emergencyemergency workers in a veryvery short periodperiod ofof time when intelligence was limited andand resources werewere stretched. WeWe werewere constantlyconstantly receivingreceiving conflictingconflicting informationinformation from variousvarious sources,sources, namely crews, 000000 calls,calls, radiosradios aboutabout thethe location,location, sizesize andand potentialpotential ofof thethe fire.fire. It It was exceedingly difficult to gathergather intelligenceintelligence aboutabout whatwhat thethe fire fire was was doingdoing whichwhich mademade planning and the the disseminationdissemination ofof warningswarnings exceptionallyexceptionally difficult.difficult.

173925_11C173925_1\C WIT.3004.001.0043

4646.. My day as Incident Controller at the Kilmore Kilmore ICC ICC was was like like no no other other I Ihad had experienced experienced before or sincesince.. WhilstWhilst I Idid did everythingevery1hing II possible possible could to control the IMT, the ferocity ofof the firefire and its unprecedented pace meant thatthat we were forcedforced to be reactive rather thanthan proactive. We We were were trying trying as as best best as as we we could, could, with with the the limited limited information information available, available, toto

plan and warn, where possible. What What was was a a thirty thirty minute minute period period seemed seemed like like a a minute. minute. I had many tasks to undertake, none none of of which which was was easy. easy.

DATED:

STEWART KRELTSZHEIM

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ANNEXURE2ANNEXURE 2 WIT.3004.001.0052

Re'ii8eclRevised 0710707/CJ7 VP Fonn287AForm 287A

STATEMENT

Name: Stewart KRELTSZHEIMICRELTSZHEIM

STATES: My namell8II1e is StewartDuncanKRELTSZHEIM andand my my datedate ofof birthbirth isis thethe 4d'4111 April, 1965.1965. I am an Operations ManagerManagerforfor the Country CountryFire Fire Authority Authority(CFA)for (CFA) for Region 2323 whichwhich isis basedbased at Wangaratta.Wangaratta. I have been workingworking for the CFA since 19931993 and commenced my position as Operations Manager in August2007,August 2007. 1 I have additional qualifications to undertake various functional incident managementmanagement rolesroles includingincluding as aa level threethree IncidentIncident Controller.

I havehave been askedasked toto makeamake astatement statementabout about my myoverall averall rolerole and involvementinvolvement in the fires of Saturday the 7a'711 February,February. 2009.2009,and in making this statementstatementI I have answeredansweredthe the questions questionsputtoput to me by VictoriaPolice,Victoria Police.During Duringthe the week leading leadingup up to that Saturday Saturdaythere there was extensive consultation betweenOperations Managers in the north east area andandDepartment Departmentof of SustainabilitySustainability and EnvironmentEnvironment (DSE)Fire(DSE) Fire Management Officers(FMO's)Officers(FMO's) to undertake pre-planningpre-planning activitiesactivities includingincluding preformed incidentincidentmanagement management teams.teams,deployment deploymentof of air-craft, air-craft,availability availability of tirefire ground personnel and o1herother specialistspecialistfunctions.functions, This planningisplanning is part of normal operational preparedness activities that occur duringtheduring the firefire dangerperiod. This planning was intensified duedue to thethe extremeextreme weatherweather conditions thatwere forecast fcrecast for the Saturday.Saturday,

As a result of this planning I was toto positionposition myselfatmyself at MansfieldMansfield DSE office and maymay bebe inin controlcontrol of any fires thatbroke out ininthe the north east regionregion requiring a level three Incide~tIncident Controller. On SaturdaySaturdaythethe 7a' 7th February,200912009 I arrived atat the Mansfield DSEDBE officeoffice atat approximatelyapproximately 1.00p.ml.OOp.m andand liaisedliaisedwith DSE stai'!staff and local CFApersonnel.personnel, 1I was aware ofof aa developingdeveloping incidentincident inin K.ilmoreKilmore East by monitoring the CFA incidentmanagementincident managementsystem system(IMS)and (IMS) andalso alsofrom from ABC ABC radio radio reports. reports. IMSIMS isis a computer programprogram whichwhich provides situationreportssituation reports onon incidentwhichincident which is updated withwith real-timeinformationreal-time information as as information isis received receivedfromfrom the field,field. ThisThis can can bebe accessedaccessed from anywherein thethe state state by by personspersons who have have accessaccessto the CFA internal network.network,

Slatemenlstatementof KRELTSZHElM.Stewartof KRELTSZH EIM, Stewart PagePAge1of5 I of 's WIT.3004.001.0053WIT.3004.001.0053

Revised 07107(11107 VPVPFoJm2B7A Ports 267A

DuringtheDuring the next hourhour I had several conversationsconversations with AlanAlan Davies Davieswho who is is the General Manager of the CFA in the north easteast areaarea regardingregarding the developing developing firefire aroundaround

IGlmoreandKilmore and Wallan. AtAt approximately approximately 2.30p.m2.3Op.m II wasW1lS directeddirected byby MrMr DaviesDaviesto to go go to the Kilmore CFA CFA where thethe IncidentIncident Control Centre Centre(lCC) (ICC) was locatedtolocated to teketake overasover as Incident Controller. II then then drove drove to to Kilmore Kilmore andand alongalongthe the wayway receivedreceived severalseveralphone phone calls from Peter Creek Creekwho who is the Operations OperationsManagerof Manager of Region 12 12 responsible responsiblefor for thethe SeymourandSeymour and surrounding areas.areas. At that stagestage of the afternoon thethe firefire was predominantly in RegionRegion 12,12. I I also received receivedphone phone calls and updates from the IECCatIECC at Nicholson StreetStreet in East Melbourne and made made several callscallsback back to my home homeregionto region to gather information. During thesethese phone calls I tried to obtain situation reports, weather information and andresourcedeployment. resource deployment.

As I beadedheaded towardsKilmoretowards Kilmore I Icould couldsee see the smoke plume in thethe southsouthwest west

of my my locationlocation betweenbe~n Yea and Seymour,Seymour. TheThe smokesmoke plume wasWBS significant andand building which indicatedindicated to me that the fire waslargewas large andgoing. This This is is aa. CFACFA term which indicatesthatindicates that the statusof the fire. Our terms range fromfromsafe; contained; under control; not not yet yet under under control andand going. I arrived in Kilmore atat approximately 4.30p.m andand conducted a handhand over with GregGMg Murphy, who was at that timethetime the Incident Controller. AtAt thatthat timetime I I commencedcommenced takingtaking notesnotes inin my loglog book book andBOd attemptedtoattempted to gather asasmuch much informationinformation asas 1I could in relationrelationto to the the progress progress of thethe fur.,fire. The subsequentfewsubsequent few hourswerevery busy and I have attemptedtoattemptedto note note below, below,to to the best of my recollectionrecollection andand from my my logbook, logbook, some someof of the key matters.

At aroundaround this stage I was toldtold that the fire was moving in aa southerlysoutherly andand

south easterly direction and all attempts attempts to containcontain thethe fire had had been unsuccessful.unsuccessful, ItIt was"NBS nearly impossibleimpossibleto to get a clear picture of the location andand spread ofofthethe firefire duedue to a a number of conflicting reportsreports from from ground ground crews,crews, aircraftaircraft andand the public. We We also also had difficulty asas aircraftaircraft werewere unableunable toto obtainobtain regularregular linescanllnescenimages images of the fire perimeter due to the conditions. As a result it is was not possible to knowmow exactly where wherethe the main fire front was, was, and where or if spotspot fires fires were were arising.arising. My immediateimmediatepriority priority was wasto to establish a structurestructureforthe for the management ofof thethe fire andand to ensure ensure an an effective effective firefire ground operation structurewithstructure with reporting linesinto the incident control centre.centre.

Page 2 ofaf5 5 statorSlalll1ll&nlnt or KRELTSZHEIM, KRELTSZHEIM, Stewart WIT.3004.001.0054W IT.3004.001.0054

Revl5lldRevised 07!0707trJ7 VP Form ZB1A257A

Crews andand resourcesresources had beendeployedbeen deployed initiallyinitially asas perper CFA'sCFA's operationaloperational procedures. BasicallyBasically the procedureprocedure works as follows: the the public publicring ring 000OOQ which in tumturn transfers thethe call to our dispatch dispatchcentre centre in Ballarat,Ballarat. whichwhich is is known as as Vicfire and and is is run bybythe the Emergency Services Telecommunications AuthorityAuthority (ESTA).(ESTA). Vicfire in turn dispatches brigades, usuallyusuallyby by pager, in accordance with with pre-determinedpre-determined operational protocols. TheseThese relaterelate specifically specificallyto to the the number number of of brigades brigades deployed deployedto to an area under predeterminedconditions.predetermined conditions. Simply Simply put, put, the the closest closest available available brigades brigadesare are deployed deployedto to combat an incident. IfIf furtherfurther resourcesresources areare requiredrequired standardstandard procedureprocedureis is to request strike teams from neighbouringneighbouring groups andand regions.regions. InIn thisthis case case the the fire startedstarted on on private land and therefore the CFA was thethe controllingcontrolling agency supportedbysupported by thethe DSE,DSE, pursuant to our joint operational arrangements.arrangements.

Approximately an hour later, John Kneebone from the DSEjoinedDSE joined me at Kilmore as thethe DeputyDeputy IncidentIncident Controller.Controller. We brought 'theincidentmanagementthe incident management teamteam together toto ensure that.that, at this time of the day and given the conditions, conditions,we we hadhad thethe necessary personnel availableavailable oror on-routeandon-route andthat thatthey they werewere clearclearin intheir their roles. roles. AtAt thatthat stage there wouldwould have beenbeen moremore thanthan thirtythirty peoplepeoplein inthe the ICC.ICC. The structure of thethe incidentincidentmanagement management team is derived derived from thethe Australian Incident Inter-service Management System -- Incident ControlControl SysttmsSystems (AllMS-ICS).(AIIMS-ICS). The The structure structure is headed by an Incident Controller with the functions of Operations, Planning and Logistics sitting underneath. There was a variety varietyof of rolesroles thatthat sitsit inin eacheach ofofthese thesefunctions. functions. On the fireground thethe:fire fire can can bebe divideddivided intointo Divisions and Sectors,Sectors, with Divisional Commanders,Commanders,Sector Sector Commanders, Strike Team Leaders and Crew Leaders all having a role in determining operational tactics.tactics. Overall operational strategies are 1hethe responsibility of the Operations Officer Officerin in the ICC.

Through my own observations BOdand by monitoring the weather on the internet and CFA's intranet it was obviousobvious thatthm conditions were extreme. I directed thethe PlanningPlanning Unit to work with Operations Unit andend try and think two to four hours ahead to try and get ahead.

S\alemenlorstatement orKREL KRELTSZHEIM,TSZHEIM, Stewart Stewart Page a3 of5of 5 WIT.3004.001.0055

Revised 07/07 VP Farm287AForm 267A

As the internal internalICC ICC structure waswas confirmedconfirmed II made made contact withwith thethe divisions divisions at Whittleseaand Kangaroo Ground. According According to to my mynotes notes it waswas sometimesometime before before 6.30p.m. At At this this stage stage the the fire had spread to threethree different regions, namely Region 1414 based from Melton, Region 13 basedfrombased from Lilydaleand RegionRegion 12 based at Seymour. Due to the magnitude magnitudeof of the event II asked the divisionsatdivisions at Whittlesea.Whittlesea andand KangarooKangaroo GroundGroundto to obtain supportsupportfrom from their home regionsand ensure ensurethatthat they hadba~ aa capacitycapacity toto plan and logistically support supportfield field operations inin their their defined definedarea. area.

At around aroundthis this time therethem were several unconfirmed reports of fatalities and propertylosses and I tasked PeterPeter Lucas,Lucas, who is a CFA OfficerfromOfficer from DandcnongDandenong deployed to the ICC, to workwithwork with Victoria Police to confirm.confirm thesethese reports,reports.

We were anticipating a windwind change in the late evening however,however, I began receiving reports reports from from ground ground crews via the radioradio betweenbetween 6.:ppm6.27pm and 7.07p.m that the wind had changed from a northerly influence to a south-westerly influence. influence. I directed this information to be passedonpassedon to all fireground personnel inin thethe fonnform of a red flagflag warning. This This is is a a standardstandard procedureprocedure for ensuringensuring that information pertinent to the safety of fire crews is effectivelypassedeffectively passed throughthethrough the ranks.ranks. The red flag warningwarningis is communicated via radio.

Throughout the rest of the evening and andnight night I continuedtocontinued to gather information with aa view of consolidating the1he incidentincidentmanagementteam structure, it'sit's linkageslinkagesto to other emergency emergencyservices services andand municipalitiesmunicipalities.. Constantly throughout throughoutthe the night, the Information InformationUnit Unit working under the Planning Officer were working to ensure that communities were provided with warnings viavia thethe ABC,theABC, the CFA'sCFA's web page and the bushfire busbfire information information line.

I attempted to keep an accurate accuratebut but thisthis waswas difficultdifficult inin thethe firstfast fewfew hours and after my shift I attempted to to recall and record the events of that afternoon andand eveningevening.. AtAt the the first opportunity I I utilised utilised personsperSODS to scribe for for me. me.

Thesepeople were:

• Anne Cartwright of Laceby West

• Jennifer Harrison ofof KilmoreKilmore st.tementStatement 01 orKREL KRELTSZHEIM,TSZHE1M, Stewart Stewart Page 440r5 of 5 WIT.3004.001.0056

RevivedRevised 07197Q7Jr11 VPVPFollTl287A Form 287A

•John Bissett ofKilmoreof Kilmore

•Jennifer Anderson ofofTamwingce Tarrewingee

•Andrea Larsen of Albury

•Helen O'NeillO'Neill ofWangarattaof Wangaratta

StatementstatementorKRELTSZHEIM,StewartorKRELTSZHEIM, Stewart PagePe e5ot55ot5 WITWIT.3004.001.0057.3004.001.0057

ANNEXURE3ANNEXURE 3 WIT.3004.001.0058

I I»: .I Fire Information ReleaseRelease !~

Ple&ge broadcast thisthis emergencyemergency UrgentUrgentThreat Threat MMessageessage message vertl!lllm.verb6tlrn. MessageMeBSage Is to be rendread at 10 rninuteminute Intervalsfor a KilmoreKihnore EastEast Fire ------ppertoderiod of 30 mminutesnuteslfromfrvm receiptg ---(;ncldf1f1t(incident type 8IJdandcommunity or areaaleS name) unlessunle98 otherwise requested.rBtluested. Date: 712/200971212009 Time:Time:_17. 17.2020 Review time: 17:50 Release no. ~77 Incidentiroident InformationInformation The grassgrass andand Scrub_Scrub_ fire,fire, burning _4_ kilometres East of KnmoreKfmore southsouth of Saunders SaundersRd Rd (_Map(___Map referencereference J.), is15 burningburning InIn a southerly southerly directiondirectlon andand isIs estimated8stlr1Jated toto be._4000_ be._4000_ hectares in size. TheThe communities In the area of KinglaKing lakel(El to to FloVierdaFlowerdalole may be directly Impac\edimpacted upon by this fire. • Core AdviceAdVlC8 • Residents in this this area area maymay experienceexperience smokesmoke andand burningburning embersembers reachingraachlng theirtheir properties,proper1ies, and are advised to patrol their houseshousesto to find and put out any burningburnIng embers that may be landing. • Protect yourself horn hom radiant heatheat byby wearing correct correct protective clothingclothing consistingClol'\Slsting ofof long-sleevedlong-sleeved shirts, long pants, sturdysturdybootsand boots and aa broadbroad brimmedhat.brimmed hat. OnOn no no accountaccount shouldshould synthetic materialmaterial be worn. • hiAs the fire front approaches, it will be unsafeunsafeto to be be either on on foot or In a car as as the the heat heat radiatingradiating fromfrom the fire will bebe intense.intense. BuUdingsBuildings wDlwill offer the bestbest protection during the passage of a~ firefire front.front Close all doors and windows and slaystay inside the house while the firetire ppasses.asses. RemainRemain alert, extinguishextinguish any small small fires and and if If necessary,necessary, move outsideoutside toto burnt ground groundoncethe once the fire frre hashas passed. passed. • If youyou are caughtcaught 0'"ohthe theroad, road,don't don't getget out and run. o Pull to the side, preferablyin an area clear ofot tall treestreesandlong and long gra5S.grass. o PutyourPut your hhazardazard lights on andandclose close thelhe windows and vents. o CoveranyCover any exposed areas of skin with a woollen blanketblanketand and get down as lowlow as as possible.possible. oOnly when the fire has passed dodo you get get out out and and move moveto to safety.safety. .. Drink plenty of fluids to aVbidavoid dehydration. .. RasldentsResidents awayfromaway from homeshouldnothome should not try to return to the area as accessaccess isIs limited andan.d thethe roadsTOads maymaynot not be safe.sate, • Continue to listen to ABC or local radio for updates on thisfIre.this fire. . AdditionalAdditionallnformalion Information .. Tourists are advised toto staystay aWBVfromawayfrom the follOWingfollowing areas:Breas: PubficPublic toto staystay awayawayfrom from the area asas muchmuch as possiblepossible

• Road closuresclosures currently Inin place: _HumsHume FreewayFreeway O'CaradvO'Grady's s Rd, Rd,Wandong Wandong- - KllmoreKilmore Rd.Rd. WandongWandong -- EppingEpping RdRd TIntersectionIntersection of,of Yea!YealW W hittieseahittlesea RoadsRoads KinglakeKlnglake- - Healesville'Healesvllle' RoadRoadat at KinglakeK1nglake West

• EmergencyEmergBncy relief centres arellre located at:

• Thr First Ftrst Relief Relief CentreCentre hasnas been set up atat The KlilmoreKllmore Memorial Hall

Other lnfcnnatloninformation TheThe Urgent UrgentThreatThreat Massages ororWandong, Wandong, HeathcoreHeathcoteJunction,Junction, Upper Upper Plenty Plentyand and HiddenHidden Valley, Cionbinane,Clonbinane, MtMt Disappointment,Disappointment, I(Ingiake,KInglake, HeathcoteHealhcote andand Upper UpperPlenty, Plenty, HumeHume Vale,Vale, ReedyReedy Creek,CrEKlk, Strath CreekCreek remain current.current, We have reports of structure losses. But can not yet yet confirm conllnn If If they they are are houses

CFADSECFA DSE informationInformation Unit Coordinators. Version 1.0laet1.0 last Updatedupdated Augus\200B.August 2005. Endorsed byCFAbyCFA. DSEOSI: informationInfonnat1D11 UnitUnit Coordinators.Coon:linatolS .

---- .._------.._-_ .._------WITWIT.3004.001.0059.3004.001.0059

Fire Information ReleaseRelease l ~ ------_---.:----l IAICFA • For InformationInformation onon firesfires in Victoria and general fire sasa,fe ety ty advice, pleasepleasecontact contact thethe VIctorianVictorian BushflreBushfIre InfonnationInformation Line Une (VEIL) (VBIL) on on freecallfreecall 1800 240 667. 661. Callers Callers who are deaf, hard of of hearing,hearing, oror havehave aa speechspeech Icommunication impairmeimpairmentnt may call textphone/ textphonel telewriter (TTY) onan 1800122 969. Information isis alsc avallablaavailable atat www.dse.vic.gwww.dse.vic.cov.aulf'resov.aulfres orwww,cfa.vic.gov,Buorwww,cla.vic.gov.au

Approved by Incident Controller: -Greg_Greg MMurphyurphy_ _ : Signature: _ ~ To: 0 ICC 0 IFACC '- 0 RECCRECC CIECCECC 0 SECC 0 StagIngStaging Area 0VBIL 0 MECC o Local Media 0 Other: _ For furtherfurther Information,Information. contactcontactthe the Information UnitJOfflcer:_LaonieUnit/Officer _Leonie Hunler0400Hunter 0400 994994 884_884_

CFA DSE Information Unit Coordinators. Version 1.01.0 lastlasl updatedupdated August August 2008. 2008. Endorsed by CFA DSE informationInformation UnitUnIt Coordinators,Coordinators. WITWIT.3004.001.0060.3004.001.0060

ANNEXURE 4 WIT.3004.001.0061

,I Fire Information ReleaseRelease rNrl

I Please broadcast this emergency I Urgent ThreatThreat MessageMessageg@ message verbatim.verbatim. MessageMessage is to . be read..atread .at10 10minute minute1neNsis intervals forfor a ! Kilmore EastEast Fire periodperlod of 30 mInutesminutes fromfrcm receiptreceIpt I -(ifl-c"""ldC7"s-nt-'lype()nddent type endsnd communityoommllnity or elVaersa name)nams) ------unless otherwise requested.mauested. Date: 7121200971212009 TIme:Time; 19.5019.50 Reviewtime:Review time:21.50 Release no. _8B I Incincidentident informationinformation Grass ScrubScrub fire fire burningburnIng East of KilmoreKilmoresouth south of Saunders Rd LMap(__,Map referencerefe~nce ), is burningburning InaIn a westerlydirectionwesterly direction andand isis estlm~edestimatedto to be be":3000_ 3000_ hectares In size.s-ize, TheThe communitiescommunities in ththee areaerea of Broadford, Broadford East InIn the areaarea of O'Gradys RoadRoad -- SouthSouth Broadford, Broadford8roadfortl- WondWondong/Sundayo ng /Sun d ~y Creek Road,Rosd, Pheasant Creek, May bebe directlydIrectly impactedimpacted uponupon by this firefire

Core Advice • Residents Inin this area may experience experience smoke and burning embersembers reaching theIrtheir properties, andand are adYI~edadvlaed to patrol their houseshouses to findfind and put out any .burnlngburning embers thatthatmay may bebe landIng.landing. • Protect yourself fromfrom radiantradiant heat by wearing correct protectiveprotectIve clothingclothIng consistingconsIsting atof long-sleevedlong-sleaved shirts, long(ong pants, sturdy sturdyboots boats and a broadbrimmed hat. OnOn no no account account shouldshould synthetic materialmaterIal bebe' worn.wom. •.As the fire frontfront approaches, itit wDIwill be unsafe to be either on foot or in a car as the heat radiatingradiating from the fire will will bebe intense.intense. Buildings willwill offeroffer 1hethe bestbest protectionprotection dUrirYdduringthe thepassage passageof of a a fire fire front.front. Close all doorsdoora and windows and stay insideInside thethe househousewhile while the fire passes.passes, RemainRemain alert, extinguishextingUish any small small fires and If necessary,necessary. move outside to bum(burnt ground once the fire has has passed.pSssed, • If youyou areare caughtcaughtcn on th thee road, road,don't don'tget get outout andand run. o PullPullto to the aide,side, preferably In an area clear of talltaJi trees and and long,grass.Iong,grass. o Put youryour hazardhazard lightslights on and close closethe the wIndowsandwindows and vents. DoCoverCaver any BXpOBadexposed areas of skin with a woollen blanket and and getget down downas as low low as possible.possIble. o Only 'iwt1anwhen thethe firefire has passed do you get out and move toto safety.safety." • Drink plentyplenty ofof f1uid&fluids toto avoidavoid dehydration. • Residents awayfromaway from home should not try toto l'9tumMumto the1he areaarea as as accessaccess is limitedIlmltedand and the roadsroadsmay may not be safe. • Continue to lIstentolisten to ABCABC or local radio for updates on this fire, fire. Additional InformationInformation • Tourists are advised to stay away fromfrom the followIngfollowing areas:areas; PublictoPublic to stayawaystay away fromfrom the area as much as possible

• Road plo9uresclosures currentlycurrently In place: _H____Humeume Freeway Freeway O'Grady's Rd, WandongWBndOng - Kilmore Rd. Wandong-Wandong - EppingEpping Rd IntIntersectionersection of Yea/WhittJeseaYea/ Whittlesea RoadsR.oads KlnglakeKinglake -- Healesvllle RoadR.oad at KinglakeKinglake West

•Emergency reliefrelief centrescentres areare locatedlocated atat

• The First Relief CentreCentre hashas beenbeen ssetup at up at The KlimateKilmore Memorial Hall

Other iinformationnformatiOn The -UrgentUrgerit" ThreatThreat MassagesMassages o;o, Wandorg, W andong ,HeathcoteHeathcote Junction,Junction, UpperUpper PlentyPlenty andand HiddenHidden Valley, Clonbinane, aonbinane, Mt Mt Disappointment, Disappointment, KingiaKe,Klnglake, HeathcoteHeathcoteand and Upper Upper Plenty, Plenty,Hums Hume Vale, Vale. Reedy Creek, Strath Creek remaincurrent. We,have reports of structure losses. But rancan hotnet yet confirm ifIf they ere are 'houses.houses. KingiakeKlnglake to FiowerdaleAowertlale may be directly impactedimpactedupon upon by by this fire.lira,

CFADSECFA DSE Informationinformation Unl1Unit CoordInators.Coordinators. VersionVersion 1.0 lastlast updatedupdated AugustAugust 2008. Endorsed by CFADSECFA DSE Infonnal1onInformation Unit Coordinators.eoonllnalDrs. WITWIT.3004.001.0062.3004.001.0062

ANNEXUREANNEXURE55 WIT.3004.001.0063

r ire-!rk a.rat!on.:Keieas

. .i°PieasHhrgaacastia rr rct,.y.'._:: (,,e - Messagc.verbatim Messageis t4 t L'L c S . bereadat 40minute iriteTVais fOr e' 1LIjn rfir SJ. e period-of 3Dminutesfrom receipt n c i d a n t i y p e and community or -amc; unless otherwisee- late: 7/2/2009--time: 2Y,1 5- Review time: 21.34: Rrtteesenox a ncicientncident Information 1'19-he grassgraBs andand scrubscrilbfirB fire isis nownowbtJrnlr'!9less burning iess.than.than4 4 ldiometrk1lometrassoutltof iiasouth-ofBroadford.Bn:;adford. ItIt isis burningburning in a North :. Eastly~stJy direction and is estimated to be 30 000 hectares inin size. The communities inin thethe areaarea 0o': Broadford are mderorder directdirect threat oflit beingOeing impactedimpeded apDn.upon.by this ffre.fire. This includes:indirdes: BroadforUBroadford,, Broadford EastinEast in thethe areaarea ofof J'GradysO'C3radys Road, South of Broadford, Broadford -- Wondong/SundayWondongiSunday CreekCn:lek Road, Reedy Creek andandTyaakTyaak.

=irefighting=j refighting resourcesresources areare currentlycurrently fullyfully committedcommitted andand residentsresidents areare remindedn,minded thatthat theythey cannotcamet expect :!reflghting-trefighting truckstrud maymaY reachread'l their properties.properties,and areare attMedadvised to patrol their houseshousas toto findfird and1butand;f)ut out any burning embersernbers thatthatmaymay be landing..lanlflllQ, . , ., Protect yourself frothfroljl radiantradiant heatheat byby wearingwearing correctcorrect protectiveprolective clothingciothing consistingconsisting of.iorhg-sieeveCcf.lohg-Sleevac shirts,shh1s. long pants.pants, sturdy bootsboob; andand a broad brimmed hat. On0 ;1 nono aocduntcicco'unt shouldshould syntheticsynthetic materialmaterial bebe worn.worn. • As the fire front approaches, Itit wiwillll be unsafe toto bebe eithereither onon footfoot oror tn'Sins carCSI' aeail the heat.radiatingheatradiating fromfrom thethe firewillfire'wlll beInisnse.be,lntense, BuildingsBuildIngs willINIIl offeroffer thethe bestbest protectionprotection duringdwin~ theth6 passagepassage of a fi~fire fnmffront:.. Close allall dOOnldoors and windows and.staayinsideand .stay.lnaldethe house house we~~· ;tiet4[rir~~sr. s . ~eNemainmai n alert,alert extinguishextingUish any small 1i~fires andand ifif necessary,necessary. movemow outsideoutside to10 burntbumt g:g ~oC? '.d 0 .'~' tl1;f' f a-r~~ messed.~ ' ssec. •if If youyoti areal'B .caught on the road, don'tdon~ get out and . '.'V L' U , . . 0o Pull to the side, preferablypraferably In an aI'B8area clear ofof ttarar treetrees s and and licngong grass.grses. . o Put your hazardhazard lIghtsonlights on andand closedose thethe windowswindows and venm.vents. ... . o Cover any Bxposedexposed,.areas areas ofofskin skinwith with aawaoHan woollenblanket-andblanket'and g¢.det down asasiow.as low.as'posstble.'poss1ble. o OnlyOnly whenwhen thethe firetiro hashas passedpassed dodo you you get get out out andand movemove to safety.safety: . • DrtnkDrink plentY.plenty of fluids toto avoid dehydration.dehydration,· .' Yo Residents awayMay fromfrom homehom" should notarynot'try to rstumreturn to the area asas access is limitedIlml~ and the roads maymay not be safe.safe . .co Continue toto listen toto ABCABC or local radio for updates on this fire.

,,,:"" )Iitionalj .:lltion..l lnfonnatlonInformation . • ..(,;o ". TourtstsareadvvsedT-ourists·are-acMsed to staystay away from.thefrom the following-areas!totlowingareas'- - PPublicublio toto staystay awayiNlay fromfro.m thethe areaarea asas muchlTllJch as possibleposstble

• Road clo6uresclosures currentlycurrently In place: . _ Hume FrFraev,ayeeway O'GradyO'Grady's's Rd, Rd, Wandong ~_ KilmoreKdmore Rd: Rd.·Wandang Wandong --Epping EppingRd Rd rIntersectionIntersection o' DYea/~ Yea Wh'ittiacea! WhittI~ ea RoadsRoads . KingrakeKingtake -- HealesvitleHeal99villa Road at KinglakeKlnglake WastWest

~~• Emergency relIefrelief centrescentres-are"are lOcatedlocated atat • VltallanWallan Community' Community CentrllCentre "~~

Other infinformationormation .. CFACFADSE DSE Informationinformation UnitUnit CoordinattnCoordinator.. VersionVen;lon 1.0 last updated August 2DDB.2008. EndorsedEndofsed by CFA DSEOSEInformationinformation UnitUnit Coordinators.Coonlinators...... - . --_ -- _ -..:_- .-- . - . . ,:. . '. WIT.3004.001.0064WIT.3004.001.0064

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<.,For~or·;nt~rmatici tnfarmafion on~~fi~s·iit fires in Victoria~~~ agdal)~ general~'e~er~ ~.fire-safetyfir~~·&·af ~lY ;adyice,~~Yi ~ l ' ~pleasei~ ~ contact~~.~·tthe~: V1ctoTla'nv; ~~~r~ah .~ Bushfire~~~~rr: ,', · Inf6rmatioinformation'n LineUne'~IL)(VEIL)on freecal;frsecali 18001800.-240.667.:240 .667. CallersCallerswho who ataare deaf; hardhard'Of-of neama,hearng, oror have.:6have. : ~ . -. speecspeechh "communicaIJon!communication impaimpairmentirment maytray callCall textphorie/textphone itelewi1ter.televditer. (TTY-)(Tr.() 0'1on.180.1800 O'i22'122 989.969. Informationinformation is-Is' iiso available at 4se.vic.aav.autfires orwww.cfa.yie.goy.au ~~v.anable at www.dse 'VIC~~O~~::~~res~~~~~~~~~~~~ '-'---rlL~ \~ -i .: ------. . -e . ' . \pprovedtipproved by IncidentIncident Controller:Controller: _ ~ . __ : ~ignature:...... :.p. c...... +---=-. _ ·0: 0 IOCICC 0 IFACCIFACC 0 RECC 0 ECC EJEl SECC D~Sta'ng Area 0 VBILVBll 0 MECC D'' .Codai'Medla"'Coca! 'Me'dla· Cl-0 ClfEia,U!lier;"· ." _...... ":'" '= =or 'furtherfurther informatton,information, contact:tnecontadthe Information UnitiOfficer...Andraw Unit/Ofcer fndrew AmoldArnold 04190419 879174679174 or03or 03578213765762 1376

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CFA DSE Informationinformation UnitUnit Coordinators.Coortllll8tolS, Version t.0 t.O lastlast updatedupclaled AugustAugust200B 2008.. '- . EndorSedEndorsed by CFA DSE Informalloninformation Unit CoordlnalDfQCoordinators.,' .

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