ISS PAPER 262 | AUGUST 2014

Crime networks and governance in The quest for enlightened responses

Charles Goredema and Khalil Goga

Summary The state cannot exercise its authority in many areas of Cape Town where organised crime wields significant power, has capitalised on economic opportunities, and can manipulate and corrupt the state. Solutions to eradicate organised criminal networks generally do not acknowledge the underlying context that sustains them and also stress stronger policing and repression, while paying insufficient attention to deficiencies in other state capacities. State interventions need to be more holistic, more carefully considered and should acknowledge that much organised crime reflects a dysfunctional society in Cape Town. Without an overarching strategy of reform, organised crime will continue to plague affected communities.

THE INABILITY OF THE STATE to Governance implications to them rather than formal structures. exercise its authority is noticeable Furthermore, polarisation in the political Organised crime wields significant power in many areas of Cape Town. landscape means that political allegiance and, without necessarily becoming part These areas are often concentrated influences loyalty and a distrust of the of the formal structures, criminals have in non-white areas, with nightlife state at various levels. capitalised on economic opportunities entertainment being a noticeable to manipulate and corrupt the state. If Enlightened responses exception. However, those that are the state is ‘replaced’ or exists parallel Solutions to eradicate organised criminal most vulnerable include businesses to informal authority, an opposition to networks do not take into account the run by foreign nationals, who democratic governance is created. underlying context that empowers and are unlikely to ask the state for The growth of criminal governance sustains them. These solutions are protection and often instead turn to is worsened by low employment and distinguishable by their preoccupation powerful people (including criminals) lack of opportunity for much of the with stronger policing and repression, for this purpose. Yet even those who population. Increases in migration and while paying insufficient attention to are less vulnerable are more likely to rapid urbanisation have strained the deficiencies in other state capacities. turn to private security companies ability of the state to provide broad Because criminal networks are than the police, illustrating a opportunities for participation in the successful in challenging state authority weakness in capacity, inefficiency economy. Growing informal centres of in grey areas of the economy, there is a and a distrust of state authority. power attract some residents to look need to identify these areas. Studying PAPER

the needs of the youth in particular will system and economy than is often indicate where vacuums are to be found. assumed. Policies to address organised crime should therefore be grounded in Crime is dependent on labour and an understanding of both how criminal markets. The state and business should networks are organised and the basis cooperate to identify the markets for their resilience within the given that serve and sustain crime, with the socioeconomic fabric. purpose of influencing these markets. Youth should be provided with pre- The phases of Cape Town’s evolution emptive state interventions before they include colonial conquest and turn to criminality, including active steps administration, slavery, and - INEQUALITY IN CAPE TOWN to prepare them to participate in the era segregation. The baggage inherited economy. by the city is typified by the glaring Many of the problems that plague Cape Town are particular to previously disadvantaged areas. During the Commision, startling It is important for the state to realise that much statistics were released: organised crime is a symptom of a dysfunctional ONLY society in Cape Town 23,46% State interventions also need to be disparities among its inhabitants in terms more carefully considered. Repressive of income, living conditions and access OF CASES REPORTED TO THE policing often marginalises people further to services, which in turn influence the HARARE POLICE STATION IN and criminal activity is therefore more way in which the formal systems of KHAYELITSHA GO TO COURT accepted. While certain issues such as governance in the city are perceived. abalone and rock lobster quotas are These disparities continue to follow the highly politicised and difficult to manage, centuries-old racial cleavages, with the 3,38% it is evident that the state has suffered majority of the population subsisting in OF THOSE CASES RESULTED from numerous high-profile failures in poverty. While poverty does not always IN A CONVICTION this regard. State interventions need lead to criminality, in Cape Town poor to involve a number of government neighbourhoods are exposed to the AT SAPS HARARE, 66 departments and increasing public creep of informal systems and structures DETECTIVES OFTEN CARRY participation. of governance. To the extent that such OVER AS MANY AS systems and structures are established It is also important for the state to realise by or depend on criminal networks, they that much organised crime is a symptom may be termed criminal governance. 2 300 of a dysfunctional society in Cape Town. UNRESOLVED CASES High levels of drug abuse, broken family Criminal governance can be defined as parallel sources of authority managed units and low employment are the THE POLICE STATION IN by criminal networks. This does not root cause of the continuing presence HARARE HAS A DETECTIVE- necessarily mean that criminal networks of the criminal economy. Without an TO-CITIZEN RATIO OF seek to supplant the state, but rather overarching strategy of reform, organised to exist alongside state structures, crime will continue to plague affected providing some goods and services communities. 1:2 626 (including illegal or illicit ones) that the This paper seeks to explain the enduring state does not provide – including AN AFFLUENT COMMUNITY nature of organised crime in Cape Town employment. Concurrently, core actors SUCH AS HAS and explore the impact of crime networks in crime networks become alternative A RATIO OF on systems and formal structures of sources of authority that provide (and governance. It confirms the findings of are even asked to provide) dispute 1:435 earlier research that crime networks may resolution mechanisms and protection. be more integrated into the sociopolitical The capacity of crime networks to use

2 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES violence increases their social control networks, and the impact of their actions drug markets and/or continued weak or and legitimacy.1 Crime networks, on governance. Failure to do so leads to inefficient state interventions. which are encountered in Cape Town incomplete solutions. Assessing criminal networks mostly in the form of gangs, do not Research suggests that there is a and criminal entrepreneurs exist for the benefit of the community. multitude of various criminal networks This paper argues that such networks Using social network analysis (SNA), and criminals that are tightly or loosely cannot, however, be removed from one can analyse intersections between structured and can vary in the crimes the communities in which they exist by professional criminals and part-time they commit and in terms of their criminal justice measures alone. collaborators working outside core political and social influence. Taming criminal markets. It is possible to illustrate The paper engages with the concept of organised crime requires a concomitant how what is often referred to in the ‘criminal governance’ as a theoretical variety of methods. media as the ‘underworld’ intersects with and descriptive tool. It describes and Rather than providing a snapshot picture what could be called the ‘upper world’. contextualises the impact of organised of criminal networks, it is important Furthermore: criminality on governance in Cape Town to draw on historical information on using case studies drawn from drug • SNA illustrates interactions among the growth of organised crime. Links trafficking, the trade in illegal abalone various actors in a criminal network, and connections among criminals and and rock lobster, the rise of taxi violence, apart from illustrating who is core to between the state and gangs were and protection racketeering. The paper the network. established during a period of over 40 also discusses the utility of social years. Links and markets were forged • It can also identify how the network network analysis to determine the reach in the apartheid period. Apartheid extends into legitimate political and of crime networks. spatial planning and the conflicts of the economic realms. The Jackie Selebi Definitions and concepts liberation struggle presented criminal corruption case is a prime example of gangs with opportunities to secure how a criminal broker like Glenn Agliotti Contending that organised crime should strategic positions in certain locations could position himself to facilitate not simply be regarded as ‘parasitic’, and businesses in Cape Town. Important the connections linking criminals, the paper uses Standing’s conception connections between criminals and the businesspeople and high-level officials. of ‘criminal governance’ to explain state, on the one hand, and criminals why organised crime has become • SNA can also help in describing and anti-apartheid activists, on the other, embedded in the socioeconomic different networks and their changing were forged and activated. environment.2 Moving away from the nature. traditional Weberian perspective, it is Commodity smuggling routes became • Networks may be directed or important to realise that, over time, integral to various stakeholders. transactional; in other words, they can the capacity and authority of the state Many such connections and routes be sustained over a long period of to provide public commodities and have persisted to this day, as has the time or can be constituted quickly and services have been eroded, as has entrenchment of criminal gangs on the dissolved quickly. its monopoly on the use force or the . The chaos that characterised right to tax citizens. Particularly in political transition opened up vacuums Explanation of concepts urban environments, a growing private that were exploited by criminals networks This paper is based on an analysis security industry – part of which is to increase their power and influence as of the impact of serious criminal unregulated – shares security functions new markets opened up in the country activity occurring in Cape Town on with the state. In , this and beyond its borders. The capacity of broader governance, socioeconomic industry has become larger than the the state to counter new threats was low development and nation-building. state security machinery. In addition, for at least a decade. Without suggesting that the city’s informal networks that include criminal Foreign criminals also recognised the experience is representative of other groups have come into existence. opportunities presented by South Africa coastal cities in either South Africa or When engaging with state-building and and soon forged links with local criminals Africa, Cape Town’s crime trends provide the bridging of economic gaps, attention to establish themselves in the country. important indicators of what may be must be paid to these alternative formal Criminal markets have adapted and been encountered elsewhere – particularly and informal, regulated and unregulated sustained by the development of new in cities caught up in transitioning

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environments. The paper is informed by relentless pressure to design tougher structures of governance to consolidate a study of the apparent gaps in state strategies against crime. its resilience to anti-crime initiatives. Such authority – in terms of actual or perceived Numerous official and unofficial strategies structures are part of and exist within presence or the delivery of services – that and measures to tame criminality in Cape state institutions, legitimate business and organised criminal networks have been Town have been adopted, especially civil society. Consequently, if the various able to exploit and look likely to continue since the late 1990s. Government has stakeholders are to be more effective in to exploit to advance their interests. been involved at three levels – national, confronting organised crime, they have Except where necessary, the paper provincial and local. Business has been to better understand both the essence of does not extensively dwell on the factors active, primarily, but not solely, through criminal networking and the concept of causing weak state capacity. Some of Business Against Crime, while civil criminal governance. The study on which these factors are historical, while others are rooted in the geopolitical positioning of Cape Town within criminal markets. ‘Criminal governance’ describes the existence Whatever the case, the projected of pluralistic systems of authority that sustain trajectory of socio-demographic changes themselves through the proceeds of crime that lie ahead indicates that organised crime is likely to become a more formidable challenge for Cape Town in society engaged in various kinds of anti- the paper is based combines analytical, the future. crime initiatives, typified in the late 1990s narrative and empirical methodologies in by the highly publicised People Against exploring potentially destructive linkages The Western Cape region, of which Drugs and Crime (PAGAD) organisation. in which criminal networks thrive. In order Cape Town in the largest city, has been More recently community improvement to determine their role and the optimal identified in earlier studies as one of districts have been established in various options available, stakeholders need to two sub-regions in sub-Saharan Africa, suburbs. Beyond these initiatives – and know the nature of crime networks and together with south-eastern Nigeria, occasionally co-existing uneasily with the factors that sustain them and support affected relatively earlier than others by state institutions – are private security their resilience. the advent of ‘hard’ drugs during the formations that range from registered 1970s.3 The subsequent decades have The incidence, scale and impact of crime companies to disparate ‘informal’ been blighted by recurrent outbreaks of are issues of common concern to many security; the latter can result in the violence directly linked to drug trafficking stakeholders. Included among them are: formation of vigilante groups. in Cape Town and neighbouring areas. In • Government at various levels between these episodes have occurred The former have taken over the • Affected communities and specific some highly publicised targeted killings dominant role of providing security in victims of individuals alleged to be part of the wealthier residential and business areas. • Law enforcement agencies ‘underworld’ that has subsisted for at Informal security and vigilantism are • Civil society in general least that entire period of time. encountered in various forms in densely • Business – both as an organised populated, low-income neighbourhoods. structure and as individual entities Apart from the drug trade, but While raising the level of interest in intricately connected to it, is the trade In the paper we analyse the sub-sectors combating crime, this upsurge of in endangered resources – derived from implicated in the most significant interest has massively politicised this the adjacent oceans and from areas criminal markets. Using selected case sphere. Whether the success achieved further afield – and the business of studies, we describe the strategic to date is proportional to the rhetoric protection racketeering, described by positioning of some of the sub-sectors used and resources expended is, Skaperdas as the ‘defining activity of of existing crime networks and whether however, questionable. This observation organised crime’.4 As crime analysts, this functions in opposition to or in particularly applies to organised crime. law enforcement practitioners, public collusion with established authority. In regulatory authorities and politicians try This paper stems from the conviction consequence, we assess the extent to construct a comprehensive picture that reducing crime in Cape Town could to which the participation of selected from the reservoir of information on crime be better informed by establishing sub-sectors and individuals within them trends in the city and to distil from it the whether organised crime benefits from impacts on structures and systems factors driving crime, they do so under the nature or conduct of existing formal of governance. We conclude with

4 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES suggestions for isolating crime networks and economic territory in which the linkage. As governance systems switch from the structures of mainstream crime that affects its residents occurs. from authoritarian regimes to liberal urban governance. The most recent analysis of organised dispensations, it is contended that they crime in Cape Town was conducted by are extremely susceptible to ‘infiltration’ This paper raises the spectre of systems Standing, who found the dominant view by crime networks. Part of the reason of authority that seek to exist parallel to to be characterised by the following is that they are preoccupied with legitimate systems. To the extent that perceptions: national (re)construction, state-building such systems derive their origin and and bridging economic gaps to such power from criminality and occasionally • That criminals and the structures in an extent as to devote no or sufficient use crime to assert themselves, we refer which they operated existed beyond attention to ‘the nascent role of criminal to them as criminal governance. ‘Criminal mainstream society. actors and the impact of their actions governance’ describes the existence • That they created the illicit markets on broader governance, the rule of law of pluralistic systems of authority that to which they supplied commodities and development’.14 Without informed, sustain themselves through the proceeds and services. comprehensive assessments of the of crime, deploy armed violence to impact of the activities of networked secure their economic advantages, and • That criminals thrived on exploiting crime, neither the public authorities nor enjoy deep and lasting links to the state.5 opportunities that were inadvertently potential victims can formulate effective This paper explores how such systems created by various government responses, and proposed solutions tend embody distinct forms of authority that, initiatives – notably the racial to be disproportionately biased towards on the one hand, flourish in spaces of segregation policies of apartheid. strengthening criminal justice institutions weak or ineffective governance but, on • That criminals corrupted public officials and structures, and building capacity to the other hand, are still connected to and and business entrepreneurs to facilitate disrupt crime through asset seizures. depend on state structures. their activities. Cape Town faces a number of challenges The term ‘criminal governance’ appears • That they also contaminated ethical emanating from organised crime. In to have been coined by Standing6 and business practices by using existing selecting the challenges on which to has subsequently been used by several financial intermediaries or setting focus, one option is to be guided by other authors.7 However, no academic up their own in order to launder the the prioritisation adopted by the police. consensus has emerged about its proceeds of crime.10 Serious organised crime, which the precise use or meaning, and a plethora Standing referred to this as the ‘parasitic’ police’s Directorate of Priority Crimes of other terms have been used to refer view of the interaction among organised Investigation is mandated to tackle, to the same general idea. These include criminals, society, the state and business. includes drug trafficking, vehicle-related ‘parallel power’, ‘twilight institutions’, He found it to be a useful, but incomplete crimes, the theft of precious metals, ‘private indirect government’, and even analysis of how criminals related to their illicit dealings in non-ferrous metals, ‘feudal systems of government’.8 environment.11 Indeed, the history of trafficking in wildlife, dealing in counterfeit Criminal networks are ‘sets of actors that the evolution of both market-dependent commodities and credit card fraud. are connected by ties which in some and predatory forms of organised crime The drug-trafficking process is on the Cape Flats in the 1980s and way or other support the commission of constructed around the three nodal 1990s demonstrates the shortcomings illegal acts’. They are the ‘least common points of production, transportation of the parasitic model.12 For example, denominator of organised crime and and distribution. With the exception of in contemporary contraband cigarette should therefore be taken as the key mandrax and crystal methamphetamine trafficking, crime intelligence analyst Van empirical referent of the concept of (which is often referred to as tik), Cape 9 Dijck has pointed out that ‘the social and organised crime’. Town encounters narcotic drugs mainly commercial platform of an illegal market in the transit or distribution phases. Cape Town in its stands on fiscal poles’.13 Yet the drug trade in Cape Town and environment Connecting fluctuations in the incidence the adjacent Western Cape region has Several themes are important to the and types of organised crime to political become high profile and dangerous, discussion here. The first relates to the transitions has become conventional. spawning a large number of drug addicts contextual background of crime. Cape Some researchers claim that its evolution and numerous, colourfully named gangs. Town is part of a larger geographic in African countries substantiates the Perceptions of police ineptitude or

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complicity precipitated the vigilantism all. As will be noted later, chaotic that attracted public attention in the late migratory urbanisation has occurred 1990s with the advent of the PAGAD at various junctures during Cape organisation, which engaged in violent Town’s existence. The segregationist confrontations with alleged drug dealers. classifications imposed by apartheid laid The enduring perception is that no the foundations for the development of other illicit activity feeds organised crime organised crime networks in the city. networks in Cape Town in the same way Their most dramatic effects became as drug trafficking. visible as the (1950)

Instead of seeing criminal gangs as separate entities, they should be considered as part of criminal networks

Gastrow differentiates between ‘street took effect. Rejecting cross-racial gangs’ and organised crime groups, intermingling, the apartheid state networks or syndicates based on the reserved a number of areas around Cape level of formality and the extent of the Town for whites and forcibly removed crime. Often, gangs were seen as the less all other races to the outskirts of the sophisticated counterparts to organised city, mostly into the region that became crime syndicates and their members known as the Cape Flats. were often youths.15 Gangs seemed The removals, which in many cases to be conceived as more territorially precipitated the breaking up of extended inclined compared to organised crime family units, soon yielded an exponential groups, which were seen to be more growth of gangs. Lambrechts argues sophisticated than gangs. that the ‘conditions on the Cape Flats This understanding seems to have encouraged the formation and activities influenced policy and law enforcement of loosely structured gangs as they efforts during the early 1990s, but by provided structure, a sense of belonging the latter part of the decade had been and identity and a way to pass the replaced by a focus on so-called ‘high time’.19 She agrees with Leggett that the flyers’, described loosely as the top norms of the gang became the norms rung of members of organised criminal of individuals as the family unit made groups. However, Standing convincingly way for the gang as a surrogate family.20 argues that both approaches stemmed This drift intensified due to increasing from a misconception of the nature of drug and liquor abuse in the 1970s and active crime networks16 – relying on what 1980s, which Standing argues was in Five cents Smith refers to as the ‘Mafia mystique’.17 turn due in part to poorly conceived liquor control measures.21 THE PRICE OF A MANDRAX Research suggests that instead of TABLET IN 1977 conceiving criminal gangs as separate Among other developments, these entities, they should be considered as measures led to a criminalised market part of criminal networks.18 This shift for the supply of liquor in the form of appears to be more consistent with shebeens. Later, they fed the trade in a historical analysis of their genesis mandrax as a recreational drug, often in in Cape Town, which demonstrates a combination with liquor. When mandrax THE PRICE OF A MANDRAX close connection with rapid migration was banned in 1977, an illicit market for TABLET IN 2006 and urbanisation that were either its supply connected Cape Town (and poorly planned or not planned at other South African cities) to sources

6 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES in Asia. Coupled with demand, illegality firearms and drugs. Former serious The connections between criminal actors pushed the cost of the product from five crime investigator Hannes van Vuren and occasional beneficiaries of illicit cents a tablet in 1977 (at pharmacies believes that a symbiotic relationship activity were not confined to the liberation when it was legal) to the 2006 price developed on the basis of reciprocal movement. Apart from creating the of R50 a tablet.22 It also attracted requirements.25 Liberation fighters conditions that escalated gang formation criminal entrepreneurs to manufacture needed funds, safe houses and on the Cape Flats, the state played an some mandrax in South Africa, thereby information. Organised criminals, some active role in the growth of the drug minimising the cost of procurement and of whom were establishing themselves trade. Ellis states ‘from about 1986, there the risk of interception by the police. but knew the terrain well, required a was a marked increase in the importance steady supply of drugs, firearms and The related trades in illicit liquor and drugs of this sector as both the state and the had a significant impact on the rate of assistance with moving contraband (such ANC launched initiatives that aimed incarceration and were reflected in growing as stolen motor vehicles) out of South to make greater use of the criminal prison populations and the worsening Africa. Stolen motor vehicles could be milieu in order to attain their strategic 29 of conditions in prisons. As some of the and were regularly exchanged for drugs objectives’. obtained from Botswana, Zambia or the regular inmates tended to be recidivist, The TRC hearings heard and accepted Democratic Republic of the Congo (then violent drug traffickers, this eventually testimony that South Africa’s apartheid known as Zaire). led to prison gangs growing in size and government experimented with the use influence. The largest gangs known are According to Van Vuren, the late Ronny of drugs, including mandrax and ecstasy, the ‘numbers’ gangs – the best known of Johnny Smith, a multi-millionaire and for crowd control purposes.30 The head 23 which are the 26s, 27s and 28s. Prison politically connected drug trafficker,26 of the government’s chemical and gangs rapidly spread throughout the boasted that a second Truth and biological weapons programme known country and firmly entrenched themselves Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as Project Coast, Dr Wouter Basson, was in prisons in the Western Cape. They would be required if he were ever put tried for attempting to sell large amounts have since proved to be a resilient and on trial because he had committed so of illegal drugs. The smuggling of high- unavoidable part of prison life, extending many illegal acts on behalf of highly value goods such as drugs, currency, their influence beyond prisons as gang placed figures during the struggle years. diamonds and cars ‘became the medium members are released at the end of their Ellis confirms these views, relying on wherein professional criminals, sleazy terms of imprisonment. government documentation which politicians, corrupt guerrilla leaders The political conflict in which South showed that some activists were and policemen and those who gave Africa was enmeshed in the period involved in motor car theft and mandrax strategic direction to the armed struggle prior to 1994 affected the gangs that smuggling.27 and counter-insurgency all developed 31 grew on the Cape Flats differently to The African National Congress (ANC) common interests’. youth in other urban localities. Desai set up Operation Vula inside South In an interview on illegal trade routes, a contends that even though politicised Africa to establish, manage and police detective is recorded by Ellis to mass youth movements grew in other coordinate self-defence units for political have said that: parts of the country, the movement was purposes. A second project known We all used the same routes, relatively small on the Cape Flats – at as Operation Bible sought to recruit the smugglers, the South African least up to the formation of the United and coordinate informants in the state 24 intelligence services all of them Democratic Front in the mid-1980s. security apparatus. Cyril Beeka, who The influence and attraction of youth together and the ANC. They used subsequently acquired a reputation as a gangs remained more powerful, to the to smuggle their weapons on those high flyer, had simultaneous friendships extent that liberation fighters sometimes routes, your smugglers would with police officers and ANC political had to negotiate for safe passage with obviously bring in the drugs and activists.28 Beeka’s criminal career neighbourhood gangs. stolen vehicles.32 continued long after the demise of It is not clear whether – as part of the apartheid, as did some of the alliances The apartheid state also used gangs as deals struck with gangs or as a result that he had established. In his case, lines an institution to supress political dissent. of their own initiative – some liberation separating criminal activity, the political Gangs, which had already developed units developed and serviced smuggling establishment and policing were either considerable strength, were used in a routes to facilitate the movement of blurred or non-existent. variety of ways. They were used to inform

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on political activities and to threaten who came to Africa from countries such politically active residents. In exchange as France, Portugal, Britain, Greece, for turning a blind eye to their activities, Lebanon, India, Israel and occasionally the state used local gangs to target anti- from some parts of Central Europe.35 apartheid activists for assassination.33 They set up small trading or import and The symbiotic relationship between the export businesses that often served as gangs used in this way and the state fronts for illegal businesses. In a relatively drastically increased their power and short time these entrepreneurs were influence on the Cape Flats. Consequetly, acquiring various illegal goods from supply lines proliferated and drug indigenous operators. Gastrow states: dependence in communities escalated. The indigenous operators were the The dawn of democratisation in South suppliers of the goods for which Africa coincided with what Shaw and the foreigners could pay and then Reitano describe as the second phase in smuggle to the ‘rich’ markets of the evolution of organised crime in South South Africa and abroad. The Africa,34 in which the country’s borders relatively tightly controlled South ‘opened up’ to the speedier movement of African borders and airports and the commodities and people and the country harsh discriminatory laws in place in was exposed to global market forces. South Africa at the time, made it very South Africa’s relative exclusion from the risky for Africans from countries to world economy during the apartheid era the north to enter the country in order – which may have isolated the country to dispose of their goods or to make from hard drugs such as cocaine and contact with local criminal groups. For heroin – ended, allowing these ‘new’ white foreigners from Zaïre or Zambia, drugs and some of their merchants or for Portuguese nationals living in in. South Africa was regarded as an Angola or Mozambique, it was less untapped drug market. The increase in difficult to visit South Africa for the gang activity to take advantage of the same purpose.36 influx of these drugs in carving out new Similarly, Asian organised crime markets or consolidating existing ones networks, especially those from China, prompted the formation of PAGAD. collectively (but occasionally misleadingly) The patterns of the trade have become referred to as the ‘Triads’,37 had already well established over the last two set up poaching and drug-trafficking decades, with cocaine originating networks during the 1980s. They began from the Andean region in South to develop at a greater rate during the America and heroin emanating from next few decades, spurred on by the Asia – predominantly Afghanistan and growing demand for wildlife and marine surrounding countries. Traffic routes that products in Asia, and for mandrax in directly connect South Africa to these South Africa. Later, the demand for regions carry signficant quantities of mandrax would be surpassed by that drugs to Cape Town, but it is evident that for tik.38 THE CASE OF JACKIE LONTE supplies are supplemented by imports The Europeans and Chinese were entering by land through Angola and Co-operation between the apartheid subsequently joined by some networks state and the gangs on the Cape Flats Namibia (cocaine) and Mozambique and can be illustrated by the case of the from West Africa, which were expanding Madagascar (heroin). notorious Jackie Lonte, who was able beyond their sub-region partly because to develop drug connections through 39 the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB). The sources of supply of cocaine and of declining economies. West In turn, Lonte was expected to heroin to South Africa were initially African or ‘Nigerian’ organised crime ‘deal’ with supporters of the United 40 Democratic Front (UDF). dominated by what Gastrow refers to networks dominated this sector. Their as ‘adventurers and fortune hunters’ comparative advantages could be

8 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES attributed to their flexibility, access to in Cape Town. They introduced a hitherto are in vulnerable employment, where resources and connection to a broader uncommon level of professionalism occasional lay-offs are common.46 ethnically based network that spanned and sophistication, but also became The outcome of a combination of the associated with protection racketeering,43 the globe. They had become noticeable developments outlined above was to human trafficking and sexual exploitation. as successful ‘middlemen’ in the drug position Cape Town as a repository of 41 trade by the late 1980s in South Africa. The protection racketeering business drugs emanating from the east (mandrax West African criminals often became in Cape Town developed in the 1990s and heroin), and west and north specialised in procuring cocaine for and involved a large number of former (mandrax and cocaine). At the same South African markets. When it came police or security officers. With more time, marine resources and wildlife were to distribution, however, the West than 300 nightclubs operating in the despatched to other places from the city. Africans faced competition from local city, significant scope exists for running networks, particularly in Cape Town. lucrative protection rackets. Protection Strategic linkages among They also could not establish a foothold fees reportedly range between R250 and crime networks The brief historical overview above shows The dawn of democratisation in South Africa the limitations of the parasitic view of the coincided with the second phase in the evolution linkages between organised criminals and their environment. In the environment of organised crime in the country so afflicted by crime – centred on drug trafficking – power took various forms, in the heroin trade on account of stiff R30 000 per month. From its inception, and could be exercised by various state competition from the Asian, Indian and protection racketeering has been linked and non-state actors, or through licit and Pakistani groups that had set up stall to drug trafficking, because the power illicit enterprises and formal and informal in the heyday of the mandrax trade. As to control entry into premises comes institutions. Occasionally these wielders with the Nigerians, the Asians could rely with the power to determine whether of power – where they were operating in on a huge global diaspora. In addition, drugs are sold there, and if so, who can the same space – could collude, overlap 44 they could camouflage illicit activities do so. In order to prevent the trade and share power. by using well-established legitimate from being disrupted by the police and In the context of this discussion, it should trading pursuits. ensure that illicit transactions are secure, the protection service provider has to be pointed out that ‘governance’ is not Pakistani and Indian criminals often know and may have to ‘take care’ of state centred or the permanent preserve worked in conjunction with locals. Often any police operatives. The drugs sold of a fixed entity. Instead, its exercise is disregarded as a significant factor, they on the premises could be supplied by conditional on the location of power. The frequently possessed significant supply the racketeer or be from an independent state is, at least partly, a concrete legal chain networks to provide illegal goods source, in which case the supplier has reality, constituted by a set of institutions and services. Like many foreign criminal to strike a deal with the racketeer to with control over a set territory and groups, they were noticeable in the do business. population. The exercise of governance, 1990s, but tended to maintain a lower however, like the exercise of one of its Almost without exception, every major profile later.42 attributes – sovereignty – is a dynamic crime network that established itself in and constructed practice, a claimed The end of the cold war led many South Africa made use of some local status, based on the performance of criminals from Central and Eastern participants, not least because labour certain functions. Europe to venture southwards to find and knowledge of local markets and risk new areas to settle and work in. Cape profiles were required.45 Involving locals This section analyses some networks Town was no exception. Criminals from also pre-empts unnecessary rivalry and that have emerged as a result of the Eastern Europe became noticeable in competition, which could be exploited various formations discussed above. Cape Town virtually from 1994 onwards. by the police. Locals to deploy as foot The analysis broadly profiles the social While not necessarily linked directly soldiers or take on as partners are in networks within which criminal networks to the drug trade, prominent Eastern abundance in Cape Town, because exist. This approach, referred to as social European crime figures have been levels of unemployment are high. A large network analysis (SNA), is constructed implicated in active criminal networks proportion of those who are employed on the premise that contemporary

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organised crime networks are embedded of relationships, (iii) flows, directions in rather than parasitic on mainstream and levels of information, (iv) quality of society. As Standing insists, the parasitic brokerage capital and (v) central agents model only partly explains the evolution within the network’.53 This requires the of such networks.47 SNA uses data gathering and interpretation of data on interactions among various actors, and relationships in a more subtle way. some of whom might only be connected Therefore, one can identify those in indirectly, to chart links between and power and ‘attribute them to specific among them. It does not demarcate individual traits or to structural roles that separate realms for licit and illicit these individuals fulfill’.54 This in turn can relationships or draw a division between draw attention to specific actors who the ‘upper world’ and ‘underworld’. may go unnoticed, but who often show Within networks it eschews the up at the right time to become bridge classification of actors into ‘blue collar’ builders or brokers. SNA has been gangsters and ‘white collar’ kingpins, at tested and used in mapping networks least initially. implicated in the drug trade in Colombia, 55 Research has shown that most organised Mexico and Guatemala. crime in South Africa is committed by Just as they differ in size, crime individuals who comprise networks,48 and networks have different structures. While that there is a definite link between the some have existed for a long time, not ‘shadow’ and mainstream economies. all networks are as enduring – in fact, It has also demonstrated the existence they are often in continual flux. Crime of regular interactions with some analyst Phil Williams broadly divides 49 government circles. criminal networks into ‘directed’ and The networks revealed by SNA assist in ‘transactional’ networks. The former identifying key participants (referred to are ‘directed’ by core strategists, who as nodes), regardless of their status in use them for specific purposes, such a criminal organisation, and can extend as to traffic cocaine from sources to the network from the core criminal actors destinations.56 The traffickers have to ‘legitimate’ political and economic a stable central leadership and are realms. This can assist in determining consistent in the crimes they commit. the brokers that link the core criminal Although multiple structures and nodes actors with actors in the mainstream exist, there is an identifiable centrality economy or in government circles.50 An and a business-like, sustainable example would be drug trafficker Glenn approach is taken. Agliotti, who was found to have played a A transactional network, however, prominent role in the corruption saga that emerges ‘spontaneously as a mechanism led to the conviction of the commissioner to add efficiency’ to a project.57 of the South Africa Police Service, Jackie Transaction networks often rely on a Selebi. The court found that Agliotti number of brokers to facilitate deals. was the intermediary between the BY THE LATE For instance, some Nigerian criminals commissioner and the criminal networks make up loose and often temporary that provided the bribes. Agliotti alliances around ‘projects’. The resulting occasionally withheld some of the bribe networks are adaptable and flexible. 1990s funds he received to pass on to Selebi.51 Often ‘members’ of the network join on ABALONE POACHING a temporary basis, bringing particular HAD BECOME A MORE However, in order for SNA to be useful to ORGANISED AND HIGHLY crime investigators and analysts, it needs skill sets, connections or financial 52 LUCRATIVE BUSINESS to move beyond simply linking actors, power. Thus, the typical ‘drug baron’ and identify ‘(i) types of agents, (ii) types with both finances and connections

10 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES in drug-producing countries will hire Cape Town. was chosen as development (starting in the 1970s a ‘striker’ or a number of ‘strikers’. A a location that is renowned for major and intensifying in the 1990s). In the striker can be defined as a type of ‘fixer’ organised poaching activity. It typifies 1960s over 2 800 tons of abalone were who has access to various networks the trade across the Western Cape. harvested annually, while the 1970s saw and is able to recruit. Strikers often Alongside the picturesque tourist a boom period for the trade. Shortly have the contacts and connections to attractions and residential areas of Hout afterwards declining stocks (due to over- produce items such as documentation Bay lie a sizeable commercial harbour fishing and environmental reasons) forced (probably fake documentation) required and fishing industry. The fishing industry seasonal quotas. in the area is a source of livelihood for a for specific transactions. Strikers may In the late 1980s and early 1990s an number of communities and businesses. also recruit one or more drug mules. increasing number of foreign organised A number of large commercial fisheries These individuals collaborate in order to criminals entered South Africa, including command a significant portion of conduct specific transactions and are Chinese and Asian criminals who began the income generated in the region, ‘demobilised’ once these transactions developing smuggling and trafficking alongside smaller commercial fisheries are completed. Due to their fluid routes. At the same time there was also and numerous rights-based holders. The personnel structure, Ellis uses the term an increase in legitimate trade between fishing business is regulated via quotas ‘adhocracy’ to describe the small groups South Africa and the rest of the world, and permits issued by the state. that often make up such criminal drug including Asian countries, which made networks.58 In Hout Bay lies the township of the tracking of illegal exports and imports However, despite the often ad hoc Hangberg. Predominately occupied by increasingly difficult. coloured residents, Hangberg has over nature of a criminal network, networks In 1994, in what was termed the ‘abalone the years provided labour to the fishing as envisaged by Williams nonetheless war’, violent confrontations occurred industry. The relationship between have ‘cores’ and ‘peripheries’ that between poachers, police, community the residents of Hangberg and the reflect power and influence.59 Those members and commercial divers as the state typifies the difficult and strained at the core of a directed network are resource became increasingly scarce relationship between many coastal often its originators and have the ability and changing quotas left many feeling communities and the state.60 It is an to control or influence it in a particular marginalised and unhappy.63 occasionally tempestuous relationship, way. Power and influence go hand in marked by violent outbursts in 2010 By the late 1990s abalone poaching hand with access to and control over and 2012. In 2012 the residents took had become a more organised and the flow of information relevant to the to protecting poachers from what they highly lucrative business. It involved success of the various missions. Those deemed excessive force by the police, ‘street gangs’, local criminals and on the periphery have access to far and parts of Hangberg are labelled poachers on the shoreline, and less information, which is considered ‘no-go’ areas for both the police and transnational criminals (often the important for the security of the network. Department of Agriculture, Forestry and same Chinese/Asian gangs who had At the same time their services are critical Fisheries (DAFF) officials.61 established themselves during the fall to the geographic and social expansion of apartheid) who controlled the trade The development of the illegal abalone of the network. The greater the distance routes to Asia. The weakening of the trade has gained increasing attention due between core and peripheral actors, the rand against the US dollar buoyed this to the precariously low levels of stocks greater the prospects that the latter will trade because illegal abalone could be believed to be left in the water.62 Together work with multiple networks. purchased at a lower price.64 The state, with the trade in crayfish, abalone although slow to react, began focusing Case study: the abalone and trafficking is significant to the economy law enforcement on illegal poaching crayfish trade of fishing villages on the southern coast with Operation Neptune in 1998. of the Western Cape and the Eastern In searching for an illustrative case This did not fully reverse the wave of Cape. In the same way as with the illegal study of both the networks involved in poaching, and by 2002 more abalone abalone trade, the poaching of crayfish organised criminality and the spheres was confiscated than that harvested by is also an important source of income for of influence that an organised criminal commercial fisheries. Continual declines organised criminals. network may have, we were led to in stocks resulted in Operation Trident the illegal abalone (perlemoen) and The criminalisation of abalone and being implemented, with environmental crayfish (rock lobster) trade in Hout Bay, crayfish fishing is a fairly recent courts being set up in 2003 to help

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combat the inefficiencies in magistrates and much of it concerned the illegal and regional courts who were unfamiliar procurement of abalone.71 with environmental law. Abalone trafficking rivals motor vehicle Despite their relative success, the theft in terms of its connection to a environmental courts were closed down vast range of collateral crimes and in 2005, as was Operation Trident. From transnational networks. Abalone can 2007 to 2010 abalone was listed on the be exchanged for chemicals used in 65 CITES index, but this was rescinded the manufacture of mandrax or crystal due to implementation problems. methamphitamine. It is also exchanged During this period other significant for drugs from Asia. China is the largest developments were occurring on a global market for South African abalone.

The demand for South African abalone remains unabated, because it is regarded as superior

scale. The rise of Asian purchasing Chinese-dominated networks continue power and, in turn, demand for abalone to be active in abalone trafficking.72 – which is a luxury delicacy in China, Gathering intelligence on network Hong Kong and Taiwan – changed the activities requires intensive surveillance markets substantially.66 This is reflected in and espionage, and the extensive use the increases in abalone export prices in of informers for prolonged periods of South Africa, which went up from R26,69 time. Some of the operatives who have per kg in 1990 (with the rand trading at acquired specialisation in detecting these R2,58 to the dollar) to R389,52 per kg by activities have unfortunately become 2007 (with the rand trading at R7,06 to compromised by the crime networks. the dollar). This price escalation provided A pending case revolves around the incentives for poaching.67 According to activities of a network that sucked in DAFF officials, in 2013 frozen abalone a number of current and former police traded at around R1 000 per kg, while operatives. In the following summary of processed (dried)68 abalone traded at the case, initials have been substituted R3 000 per kg. Prices in 2013 suggested for real names, because the case is still that dried abalone can fetch anything pending. The network was allegedly between R6 000 and R12 000 per kg managed by a Chinese national, RW, once it reached Asia.69 who spent part of the time in China, but regularly visited the Western Cape. Although production of abalone in China has been increasing since the late Locally, much of the syndicate was run 2000s,70 the demand for South African by one FB and his associates, including abalone remains unabated, because his wife, bookkeeper and lawyer. The it is regarded as superior. Against this respective roles played by the police background, it is in the interest of operatives are summarised in Figure 1. R6 000– criminals to corrupt law enforcement The police personnel played a primarily agents to ignore illicit activities. This facilitative role, protecting the trafficking R12 000 corruption is not only limited to police network from interception. A former police enforcement, but extends to other operative, JJ, was present at the bottom

THE PRICE PER KILOGRAM government institutions, notably the of the chain, protecting the poachers and OF DRIED ABALONE IN ASIA DAFF. In 2012 the minister acknowledged ensuring that they would not defraud the that corruption was rife in her department criminal network by retaining some of the

12 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES harvest for themselves. Thereafter, serving and business is a matter of enduring and unaccountable alternative – police personnel would be involved concern. Firstly, while they lack the which the authority of a crime network in ensuring the safe transportation of legitimacy generally derived from a invariably is – amounts to exposing a abalone to the premises in the small formal mandate, organised criminals community to ‘self-appointed providers Karoo town of Touws River where it would wield considerable power. Secondly, of arbitrary and illicit forms of justice be dried. It is conceivable – although no and as a result of such power, criminal and security’,74 apart from being such evidence will be led on this in the networks can corrupt or manipulate the inimical to constitutional democracy. court case – that the police could have state without necessarily taking it over. Yet this is precisely what can occur contacts in the customs department to As Torkelson observes: if the demands of urban governance turn a blind eye to the contraband while remain unsatisfied. As with the rest The inability of the state to exercise it was being exported. of South Africa, in Cape Town such authority over all physical and social demands distinctly emanate from black Governance implications territory has created power vacuums (including coloured) youth. It is in this that are easily seized by those profiting sector that crime networks have tended Criminal networks constitute a visible off illegal economies. Criminal über- to find markets and foot soldiers to and influential authority in certain entrepreneurs have embraced these perform various tasks. The most urgent contexts. Sometimes this is because of informal spaces to capitalise on demands are for access to employment the absence of formal state presence the economic opportunities of illicit or business opportunities75 and to and authority. These networks therefore enterprise. Densely populated areas formal low-cost housing.76 expose limitations to the extent and provide ready markets for the sale depth of state authority. This does not, At the end of 2012 Cape Town was of illegal goods (drugs, counterfeit however, give such networks a political populated by approximately 3,5 million commodities, prostitution) as well as character or necessarily make them people.77 It continues to experience enticing opportunities for plunder (theft, overtly inimical to the state. There are gradual growth. According to official hijacking, fraud).73 at least two reasons why the existence statistics, more than 90 per cent of of criminal networks in an informal, Allowing state authority to be displaced households in Cape Town survive on inarticulate triangle that includes the state or replaced by an unelected, informal less than R6 400 ($640 as of 13 June

Figure 1: The role of police operatives in the abalone-smuggling network

In charge of poachers: CC organised vehicles, DD transported abalone KC & an ex-policeman JJ drivers and rubber ducks and payment money

Ran drying facility in Chinese citizen RW Touws River: WD HS, GW and CK funded the syndicate Packers: AM and transported abalone run locally by FB SB (also a poacher)

Two farms in the North West Spotters looking out for Province rented to store authorities: policemen JB, abalone: GH in charge of DO, FM, BB, PB and storage facilities four others

Source: adapted from Cape Times, 26 July 2011

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2013) per month.78 At least 50 per cent and networks of social and economic of its residents live in the Cape Flats production and reproduction’.81 area, which lies south-east of the city. At the same time, political allegiance also While policing crime is not within the influences loyalty. Supporters of the two competence of the city authorities, their major parties that contest political power commitment to work with the national police to reduce the incidence of in Cape Town – the Democratic Alliance substance abuse and other forms of illicit (DA) and the ANC – occupy distant activity is unquestionable, as is that of camps. The DA currently dominates the provincial government.79 Whether this government at both the city and commitment can minimise the creep of provincial levels, while the ANC – which criminal networks depends on the extent forms the current national government – to which the city is able to convince is determined to constantly discredit the

The taxi associations set up ostensibly to bring order to the taxi industry ‘operated like the Mafia, with the power to extort money and murder their opponents’

vulnerable communities and sub-sectors DA. This polarisation, which is evident to rely on state institutions, of which at the national level, where it is reflected the city is the one closest to them as a in acrimonious exchanges in parliament source of political support or social and (which is in Cape Town), plays itself out at economic claim-making, rather than turn other levels. ANC supporters perceive the to alternative ‘institutions’. city authorities as being only one part of the state, the others being the provincial Several factors impact on the prospects government and national government. of the city authorities achieving this. While they contest political power at the The first stems from Cape Town’s local and provincial levels, they distrust history. Apart from the racially inspired the authorities at these levels. social engineering epitomised by the implementation of apartheid legislation, In a survey of responses to criminality Cape Town has regularly had to contend faced by spaza (informal grocery) with rural-to-urban migration. By former shopkeepers in the Delft township to mayor Dan Plato’s reckoning, this the east of Cape Town, three ethnic accounts for an annual growth of up to groups gave different views of whom 50 000 new residents,80 who include they would turn to in response to crime South Africans from outside Cape Town or the threat of crime. Most of the and non-South African nationals. Somalis coloured shopkeepers said they would and Zimbabweans probably comprise report crime to their neighbours or to the largest of the latter communities. the community policing forum (which is 90% The second factor is related to the city’s linked to the police), while black South cosmopolitan character. Cape Town Africa shopkeepers would report to street THE PROPORTION OF CAPE TOWN HOUSEHOLDS THAT hosts multiple informal communities, and committee leaders. Somali shopkeepers, SURVIVE ON LESS THAN some residents look up to structures in on the other hand, responded that they such communities rather than to formally would turn to their landlords. When mandated structures. The communities probed further, some of the latter pointed R6 400 are based either on ‘essentialist identities out that they would feel more secure with PER MONTH like ethnicity, race or religion or on landlords who were also drug ‘barons’, spatially-circumscribed allegiances because these tended to be feared and

14 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES respected in the community. Those that spawned an arms race in the industry also been involved in the entertainment could not rely on such powerful landlords and cost many lives over the years in ‘taxi industry. The adult entertainment sector, were vulnerable to being preyed on by wars’. In a chilling account, the Ntsebeza in the form of nightclubs and outlets local gangs that demanded ‘protection’ inquiry observed that ‘The older, for marketing pornography, appears payments, in the form of cash or more experienced owners are usually to present lucrative opportunities and cigarettes, in order to ‘keep an eye’ on responsible for selecting the targets, avenues for laundering the proceeds the shop. planning the logistics, recruitment of the of other forms of crime. Property development has long been attractive to The state is perceived to either lack hit men and collecting monies to pay for 85 high-net-worth individuals, regardless of the capacity or to be too ineffective to the services of the hit men’. their sources of income. In the case of discharge its responsibility to ensure In 2001 Dugard found that there was crime networks, property can be used safety from crime. The credibility of state not a single urban area in South Africa to conduct illicit transactions discreetly, institutions mandated to protect residents that had not experienced a taxi war in conceal contraband and provide from crime is low, partly because the recent years.86 In the case of Cape Town, justification for depositing large sums criminal justice system that they serve is the taxi industry is connected to the of money. Residential and commercial poorly understood, and partly because trafficking of drugs and abalone. of perceived inefficiency.82 In the face of property is acquired openly through serious criminal threats, crime victims are Criminal entrepreneurship numerous auctions and subsequently likely to turn to non-state structures, such rented out or sold. The business protection regime that as street committees, vigilantes, taxi By constructing property portfolios, took shape in Cape Town during the drivers or even ‘hit-men’. In the sphere core actors in crime networks in Cape 1990s eventually spread to areas of employment, the state is perceived Town consolidate territorial power. In beyond the central business district. as being incapable of stemming the localities in which their property is This development seemed to coincide unemployment. concentrated some have established with the roll-out of the closed-circuit alternative services, which come to The conflicts in the commuter taxi television camera network in the central the fore in the settling of disputes by a industry, which flared up in the late 1990s business district and the spread of spaza combination of both legal and extra- and lasted until around 2005/2006, shops. Robberies of such businesses, legal methods, including assassination. demonstrated the extent of police particularly those run largely by Somali A survey of responses by suspected marginalisation in terms of major traders, has escalated to a point where criminal leaders in Cape Town to attacks crime-related conflict. Testimony to the by the end of the first quarter of 2012 on their properties indicates a preference subsequent Ntsebeza Commission police confirmed that 67 per cent of for private investigation as opposed to reflected police frustration with a culture business robbery victims in the Western leaving it to the police.88 of silence that complicated the task Cape province were foreign nationals.87 of obtaining information to prosecute The densely populated residential areas In response, business owners turned suspects. Witnesses refused to come of the city provide ready markets for the to criminal entrepreneurs of various forward, which ensured impunity for sale of illegal goods (drugs, counterfeit descriptions, including gang leaders. most of the assassins hired to carry out commodities, prostitution) and enticing As the responses by Somali spaza atrocities, making them available for opportunities for plunder (theft, hijacking, shopkeepers discussed above show, future assignments. The commission fraud). The increase in cyber fraud criminal leaders are often perceived to found that there was a strong link around the world has a local twist in ‘between taxis, drugs and organized be able to maintain order and deliver Cape Town, which is influenced as much crime’. The taxi associations set up justice more effectively than the state. by tourism as it is by the construction of ostensibly to bring order to the taxi The resulting protection arrangements low-income residential property. Tourists industry (of which there were no less than are outside the ambit of the law, because and other visitors to Cape Town present 150 country wide by that time) operated those offering protection are not licensed. a pool of potential victims of cyber like the Mafia, with the power to extort It is evident that in some cases Somali fraud, especially fraud committed using money and murder their opponents.83 business operators have resorted to ‘cloned’ credit cards. At the centre of this arming themselves. The use of hit squads to control routes process is the theft of identity particulars is an intermittent practice in the taxi It is clear that, apart from running at any of numerous points at which industry.84 The resulting violence has protection rackets, crime networks have services are paid for, such as restaurants.

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Crime networks active in cyber fraud into account the underlying context that take advantage of a large community empowers and sustains them; such of relatively under-paid waiters and solutions are distinguishable by their waitresses, many of whom are employed preoccupation with stronger policing on a casual basis, to recruit ‘foot soldiers’ and repression, while paying insufficient to capture information from credit cards. attention to deficiencies in other state The most basic tool used is a skimming capacities. device designed to emulate the genuine Because criminal networks would appear device, which can capture details once to be most successful in challenging the a credit card is swiped through it. These authority of state institutions in informal details are subsequently copied onto or ‘grey’ areas of the social economy,92 a computer and transferred to a fake the initial task should be to identify the card to be used in financial transactions. most significant of such areas. They Using such cloned credit cards, crime will probably be areas that have been networks, among other things, procure glaringly abandoned by the state and building materials that are sold to the business, making it possible – if not small-scale construction sector at inevitable – for criminal entrepreneurs to competitive prices.89 take control. A study of the contemporary needs of the youth will also indicate where Finding enlightened the vacuums are. Many young people in responses Cape Town who find no viable economic This discussion may have created options available through formal channels the impression that historical roots are inculcated into the gang lifestyle at and subsequent developments have an early age. The ostentatious lifestyles bequeathed an intractable challenge to of some criminal actors are a persuasive Cape Town. At the same time, however, recruitment technique. Crime bosses and the commitment of ordinary residents, high flyers are seemingly untouchable and administrators and political leadership to difficult to prosecute because there are whittle down the influence of criminality literally thousands of people protecting is overwhelming. Consensus on how them, while people are unwilling or afraid to achieve this remains elusive, partly to come forward and testify against them because of differences in the interpretation in court. of Cape Town’s historical baggage and its Developing effective responses to the relationship to current criminality. creep of criminal governance will depend As Samara argues, it is delusional to ultimately on the ability of the state to take the city simply as a creation of outdo criminal networks in providing 1994, ignoring that ‘Cape Town was opportunities to participate in the once a colonial city, then it became an legitimate economy. In addition, steps to apartheid city. After 1994, the hope was reduce criminalisation among juveniles that it would become a liberated city ... instead of increasing imprisonment [which] appears as a receding horizon’.90 have not been implemented. According The urban renewal project in Cape Town to Pinnock, it is cheaper to manage has only been partially successful: it is interventions before criminality occurs 67% well coordinated and supported in the (rather than later) by providing youth with central business district and southern an alternative social support system.93 THE PERCENTAGE OF suburbs, but underfunded, piecemeal Thus, programmes such as Pinnock’s BUSINESS ROBBERY VICTIMS 94 IN THE WESTERN CAPE WHO and caught up in political polarisation Usiko programme should be included 91 WERE FOREIGN NATIONALS everywhere else. Solutions to eradicate as viable and important interventions in organised criminal networks do not take limiting organised crime.

16 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES An approach that rejects the parasitic reason for low investment and continued Assessing the nature of criminal view of crime networks also accepts socioeconomic issues in Cape Town, networks in South Africa and particular sub-sectors of that the profile and influence of the core these gangs often reflect poor policies criminal networks illustrates how actors at the centre of such networks and state interventions that are not collusion with state authorities is should not be exaggerated. This pertains working and a state that is lacking in established and sustained. Other in particular to crime networks that thrive social control. People turn to gangs important factors include: on market-determined crimes, typically where the state cannot provide, be it in • Historical policies have contributed commodity trafficking. These crimes terms of the illegal economy, the lack of significantly to the socioeconomic problems that precipitated Cape depend on the existence of labour and policing, or high levels of corruption in Town’s enduring drug problems. markets. The state and business have the police force. However, it should also • Poorly informed political a convergent interest in this regard and be noted that gangs can make it more interventions benefitted the criminal are well positioned to identify the labour difficult to get to the root cause of the industry, which gained new markets and markets that serve and sustain problem and develop the social systems and a larger pool from which to recruit foot soldiers. crime. The purpose of acquiring this and good governance required for a • Foreign criminals are part of knowledge is to influence the size of more effective social system. networks that almost always include local actors, with no groups The densely populated residential areas of the city having a monopoly over any part of the drug trade. provide ready markets for the sale of illegal goods • Criminal networks involved in and enticing opportunities for plunder protection rackets are often linked to drug-trading networks. • Similarly, the trafficking of illegal each of these components. While the Finally, state interventions need to be abalone (perlemoen) is linked to the ability of the state to create employment thought out better and in a more holistic drug trade, with abalone being used is limited, there is much that it can do way.96 For example, it has been shown as currency in exchange for drugs. to prepare the youth to enter the job that liquor laws, apartheid and continued • Historically, the evolution of market. A good example is the initiative neoliberal policies combined with the abalone trade has its roots of relatively recent origin in Cape Town criminalisation are at the heart of the in the markets of Asia and the development of Asian criminality that seeks to provide an intermediary growth of gangs in the area. in South Africa. While factors such service to enhance the prospects of Yet the failure of the state to find as the fluctuating rand have had a unemployed people to find work or alternative approaches to liquor licensing noticeable effect on the trade, the opportunities to earn an income. Created combination of the state’s inability has resulted in many businesspeople by the Computer Science Department to intervene in the trade, high levels being forced to operate illegal shebeens. of corruption and an antagonistic at the , it goes Furthermore, the heavy-handed relationship with the community has under the name Ummeli (an Nguni word approach taken by the state in dealing led to its continuation. for intermediary/representative) and is with many communities marginalises • The failure of the state to regulate intended to assist young people with little them further. Tactics by the police and the fishing industry has also or no formal work experience to market resulted in a defiant reaction to the high-level corruption in areas such as themselves to potential employers. authorities among communities. Hangberg and the Cape Flats have led Ummeli takes advantage of the • Criminal networks adapt to their the community to distrust the police widespread use of mobile phones among environment. A boom in tourism and make it easier for criminal networks and information technology has the youth to provide a freely accessible of poachers to survive. In addition, attracted criminals to opportunities website that assists youths to prepare mass imprisonment for drug crimes has for fraud facilitated by Internet and disseminate their curricula vitae to connectivity and credit card also led to the development of larger prospective employers.95 fraud. Tourists and new entrants prison gangs who have developed to the world of plastic money are Gangs and organised crime should links with the outside world, as well as vulnerable to crime networks be seen as a symptom rather than the the marginalisation of large numbers in Cape Town. The proceeds of credit card fraud are often used root cause of a dysfunctional social of predominately male adults from to buy building materials that management system. While gangs finding suitable employment due to their are subsequently sold to poor and violence are often portrayed as a criminal past. communities.

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Notes 14 M Shaw and T Reitano, The evolution of 24 A Desai, The Cape of good dope? A post- organised crime in Africa: towards a new apartheid story of gangs and vigilantes, 1 D Lambrechts, The impact of organised crime response, ISS Paper 244, Pretoria: ISS, Globalisation, Marginalisation and New on state social control: organised criminal 2013, 2, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ Social Movements in post-Apartheid South groups and local governance on the Cape Paper244.pdf. Africa project, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Flats, Cape Town, South Africa, Journal 15 P Gastrow, Organised crime in South Africa: 2004, http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Desai%20 of Southern African Studies 38(4) (2012), Pagad%20Research%20Report.pdf. 787–807. an assessment of its nature and origins, ISS Monograph 28, Pretoria: ISS, 1998, http:// 25 Author interview with Hannes van Vuren, 2 A Standing, Organised crime: a study from www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono28.pdf, March 2013. the Cape Flats, Pretoria: ISS, 2006. 1998. The differences between gangs and 26 Ibid. 3 Ibid; I Kinnes, From urban street gangs organised crime in South Africa are also 27 S Ellis, West Africa’s international drug trade, to criminal empires: the changing face of discussed in M Shaw, Organised crime in African Affairs 108(431) (2009), 171–196. gangs in the Western Cape, ISS Monograph post apartheid South Africa, Occasional 48, Pretoria: ISS, 2000; P Gastrow, Triad Paper 28, Pretoria: ISS, 1998 http://www. 28 Among his friends were the Shaik brothers, societies and Chinese organised crime in issafrica.org/publications/papers/organised- Mo and Schabir. South Africa, ISS Paper 48, Pretoria: ISS, crime-in-post-apartheid-south-africa and 29 S Ellis, Politics and crime: reviewing the 2001, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/ Kinnes, From urban street gangs to criminal ANC’s exile history, South African Historical bitstream/123456789/31288/1/paper48. empires, and in great detail in A Standing, Journal 64(3) (2012), 622–636, 630. pdf?1; P Gastrow, M Shaw and T Reitano, The social contradictions of organised crime 30 C Gould, Chandré South Africa’s chemical The evolution of organised crime in Africa, on the Cape Flats, ISS Paper 74, Pretoria: and biological warfare programme 1981– ISS, 2003. ISS Paper 244, Pretoria: ISS, 2013. 1995, PhD thesis, Rhodes University, 2006. 16 Standing, The social contradictions of 4 S Skaperdas, The political economy of 31 Ellis, Politics and crime, 630. organized crime: providing protection when organised crime on the Cape Flats. 32 Ibid. the state does not, Economics of Governance 17 D Smith, The Mafia mystique, Lanham: 2 (2001), 173–202, 174. University Press of America, 1990. For 33 Shaw, Organised crime in post apartheid 5 R Jaffe, Between the street and the state: example, in a Cape Times interview with South Africa. crime and citizenship in urban Jamaica, Houssain Ait Taleb, a notorious enforcer 34 Shaw and Reitano, The evolution of organised unpublished paper, Leiden University, 2009, and protection racketeer who was stated crime in Africa. http://www.irmgard-coninx-stiftung.de/ to be the leader of the ‘Moroccans’ in the 35 P Gastrow, Organised crime in the SADC fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/urbanplanet/ 1990s. He stated that at the time everyone region: police perceptions, ISS Monograph collective_identities/Jaffe_Essay.pdf; I became known as a Moroccan, including 60, Pretoria: ISS, 2000, http://www.issafrica. Briscoe, The proliferation of the ‘parallel the coloured Cyril Beeka (C Dolley, Band org/uploads/Mono60.pdf. state’, Working Paper 71, Fundacion par of brothers who patrol club scene, IOL, 36 Ibid. las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo 30 January 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/news/ Exterior, Madrid/Brussels: FRIDE, 2008. south-africa/western-cape/band-of-brothers- 37 This is the incorrect term, and often organised who-patrol-club-scene-1.1223533?ot=inmsa. criminals are not related to Triad groups in 6 Standing, Organised crime. ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot). Thus, the fear of Asia, although they may interact with them. 7 E D Arias, The trouble with social capital: the unknown ‘other’ or foreigner became a Often the network is built around a limited networks and criminality in Rio de Janeiro, driving factor rather than the truth. number of criminal entrepreneurs that presentation at the Annual Meeting of the included Asian or Chinese nationals. 18 For example, see P Williams, Transnational American Political Science Association, 2002; criminal networks, in J Arquilla and D Ronfeldt 38 Gastrow, Triad societies and Chinese P C P Fraga, Urban Brazil: drug trafficking (eds), Networks and netwars: the future of organised crime in South Africa. and violence, Drugs and Conflict 11 (2004), terror, crime and militancy, Rand Corporation, 22–29, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/ 39 M Shaw, Crime, police and public in ch 3, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ archives/crime-docs/RioDC11.pdf; Jaffe, transitional societies, Transformation: pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382. Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 49 Between the street and the state. ch3.pdf; A Standing Rival views of organised (2002), 1–24, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ 8 C Lund, Twilight institutions: an introduction, crime, ISS Monograph 77, Pretoria: ISS, transformation/v049/49.1shaw.pdf. Development and Change 37(4) (2006), 2003, http://www.issafrica.org/publications/ 40 Ellis (West Africa’s international drug trade), 673–684; A Mbembe, On the postcolony, monographs/monograph-77-rival-views-of- provides one the richest accounts of the Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of organised-crime-andre-standing. growth of West African organised crime California Press, 2001; A Gupta, Blurred 19 D Lambrechts, The impact of organised crime networks. boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the on social control by the state: a study of culture of politics and the imagined state, 41 Shaw, Crime, police and public in transitional in Cape Town, South Africa, DPhil American Enthnologist 22 (1995), 375–402. societies. thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2013, 119. 9 K von Lampe and P O Johansen, Criminal 42 J Irish and K Qhobosheabe, South Africa, 20 T Legget, Rainbow vice: the drugs and sex networks and trust, paper presented at the in P Gastrow (ed), Penetrating state and industries in the New South Africa, Cape Third Annual Meeting of the European Society business: organised crime in Southern Africa, Town: New Africa Books, 2003. of Criminology, Helsinki, Finland, 29 August ISS Monograph 89, ch 3, Pretoria: ISS, 2004. 2003, http://www.organized-crime.de/ 21 Standing, The social contradictions of 43 For instance, Yuri ‘the Russian’ Yulianitski criminalnetworkstrust.htm. organised crime on the Cape Flats. A number is known to have managed an extortion of gendered and racial stereotypes that 10 Standing, Organised crime. network that ‘provided’ protection services reduced coloured men to a few negative traits to nightclubs in the central business district 11 Ibid. animated these policies, positing coloured of Cape Town in the late 1990s. He was 12 Kinnes, From urban street gangs to criminal men as prone to crime and drink, unreliable, gunned down at a traffic intersection in the empires. weak, irresponsible, and happy-go-lucky. city in 2007. 13 M van Dijck, Cigarette shuffle: organizing 22 Standing, Organised crime. 44 See C McKune, Battle for control of the tobacco tax evasion in the Netherlands, in 23 G Kynoch, From the Ninevites to the Hard doors and ‘drugs’, Mail & Guardian, P C van Duyne et al (eds), Crime business Livings gang: township gangsters and urban 3 February 2012, http://amabhungane.co.za/ and crime money in Europe, Nijmeger: Wolf, violence in twentieth‐century South Africa, article/2012-02-03-battle-for-control-of- 2006, 157–193, 165. African Studies 58(1) (1999), 55–85. the-doors-and-drugs, based on interviews

18 CRIME NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE IN CAPE TOWN: THE QUEST FOR ENLIGHTENED RESPONSES with prominent but rival nightclub protection on lobsters, Mail & Guardian, 18 February 81 D Davis, Non-state armed actors, new bosses Igor Russol and Andre Naude. 2011, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-18- imagined communities and shifting frontiers 45 See Kinnes, From urban street gangs to fishing-experts-put-red-alert-on-lobsters/). of sovereignty in the modern world, criminal empires. 63 S Raemakers et al, Review of the causes of Contemporary Security Policy 30(2) (2009), 221–245, 228. 46 T Samara, Cape Town after apartheid: the rise of the illegal South African abalone crime and governance in the divided city, fishery and consequent closure of the 82 See the judgment by J Yekiso in Minister of Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, rights-based fisheries,Ocean and Coastal Police and Others v Premier of the Western 2011. Management 54(6) (2011), 433–445. Cape and Others, 21600/12 for a detailed discussion of the factors cited by Western 47 Standing, Organised crime. 64 J Steinberg, The illicit abalone trade in South Africa, ISS Paper 105, Pretoria: ISS, 2005. Cape premier . 48 A Hübschle, Organised crime in Southern 83 Dumisa Ntsebeza, Committee of Inquiry Africa: a first annual review, ISS Monograph, 65 Convention on International Trade in into the Underlying Causes of Instability Pretoria: ISS, 2010, http://www.issafrica.org/ Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and Conflict in the Mini Taxi Industry in the uploads/OrgCrimeReviewDec2010.pdf. 1973. Cape Town Metropolitan Area, report to Steinberg, The illicit abalone trade in South 49 C Goredema, unpublished policy brief. 66 the premier, 31 August 2005, 112. The Africa. 50 P Klerks, The network paradigm applied to Ntsebeza Commission of Inquiry was set criminal organisations: theoretical nitpicking 67 Raemakers et al, Review of the causes of the up by then-premier of the Western Cape or a relevant doctrine for investigators? rise of the illegal South African abalone fishery. Ebrahim Rasool. Recent developments in the Netherlands, 68 Abalone can be dried using a variety of 84 J Dugard, From low intensity war to Connections 24(3) (2001), 53–65, 60. techniques, including sun drying or using mafia war: taxi violence in South Africa, 51 For detailed coverage and discussion of machinery. The dried abalone is of greater 1987–2000, Violence & Transition Series the case, Adriaan Basson’s Finish & Klaar value and is more compressed and easier no. 4, Centre for the Study of Violence and is recommended reading. A short review is to smuggle. Reconciliation, 2001. available at http://www.argief.litnet.co.za/ 69 Statements made by DAFF official Bernand 85 Ntsebeza, Committee of Inquiry, 90. cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_ Liberman. 86 Dugard, From low intensity war to mafia war. item&cause_id=1270&news_id=101312. 70 P Cook and R Gordan, World abalone supply 87 This information was given to parliament 52 A Kriegler, unpublished policy brief. markets and pricing, Journal of Shellfish by the head of the police in the province in 53 L J Garay-Salmanca, E Salcedo-Albarán Research 29(3) (2010), 569–571, http://www. February 2012. fishtech.com/ThailandSymposium1.pdf. and I de Leoón-Beltran, Illicit networks 88 When the residence of Jerome Booysen, reconfiguring states: social network analysis 71 T J Petersen, Fight against poaching and who is alleged to lead the Sexy Boys gang, of Colombian and Mexican cases, Bogotá: corruption will continue at whatever cost, was attacked in March 2013, he declined Metodo Foundation, 25. 2012, http://www.info.gov.za/speech/Dynami to cooperate with the police investigation to 54 Klerks, The network paradigm applied to cAction?pageid=461&sid=29527&tid=78449. determine the culprits, opting to use his own criminal organisations, 53. 72 See A W L To, B C H Hau and S K H Lee, resources instead. 55 Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albaran A study on the trade in dried abalone in Hong 89 A discussion with social activist Nkwame and De Leoón-Beltran, Illicit networks Kong, TRAFFIC Bulletin 21(1) (2006), 25–34. Ncedile first revealed this trade, which was reconfiguring states. 73 E Torkelson, unpublished background paper subsequently confirmed in follow-up field 56 Williams, Transnational criminal networks. in support of the present study, 2011. research in Khayelitsha township. 57 Ibid, 69. 74 Transnational Institute, Gangs and 90 Samara, Cape Town after apartheid, 180. governance: failed governance in Ellis, West Africa’s international drug trade. 91 Ibid. 58 marginalised urban areas, 18 May 2006, 59 Williams, Transnational criminal networks, 72. http://www.tni.org/article/gangs-and- 92 M Davis, Planet of the slums, London: Verso, 2006; Arias, The trouble with social capital; 60 Hangberg has increasingly been in the news governance. Fraga, Urban Brazil. as the community has clashed with the state 75 The city’s changing profile from a over perceived injustices regarding land manufacturing hub to one focused on 93 D Pinnock, Gangs: fighting fire with fire, n.d., allocation, which came to a head with the information technology, tourism and financial http://tigger.uic.edu/~huk/Gang%20History/ so called ‘Battle of Hangberg’ in 2010 when services compounds the challenges of fightingfire.html. police and the community clashed. The city unemployment. The new services are not 94 http://www.usiko.org.za. believed that the dwellings in the area were sufficiently labour intensive to make up for 95 It is hosted by mobile phone service provider illegal and unoccupied and that there was the opportunities lost with the demise of Vodacom and can be accessed at http:// rampant criminality, whereas the Hangberg manufacturing. www.ummeli.com/learn-more.html. community believed that the police and state 76 Interview with several respondents in did not have jurisdiction over the area and 96 An interesting case is that of the proposed township, March 2013. that they were trying to remove residents to Wescape development on the outskirts of gain access to the valuable land. Violence 77 This is according to the , Cape Town, which is seen by the city as also erupted in 2012, when police pursued a Integrated Development Plan 2007–2012, a grand plan to provide suitable housing number of poaching suspects into the area http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/IDP/ and employment, yet has come under fire and were met by stiff resistance from the Documents/IDP%202010%20-%202011/ from academics for being poorly conceived community, who believed that the police were IDP201011ReviewMay2010.pdf. (eg Z Nicholson, R140bn Wescape project using excessive force. 78 Ibid. ‘doomed’, IOL News, 5 June 2013, http:// www.iol.co.za/news/politics/r140bn- 61 Interview with Shaheen Moolla, director 79 Interview with provincial member of the wescape-project-doomed-1.1527764) of Feike Management Consultants and Executive Council Dan Plato, who was and by civil society as a continuation of former head of the Marine and Coastal responsible for the community safety portfolio apartheid-style separation (eg R Davis, Is Management Department. in December 2012. Plato is a former mayor the future of Cape Town 25km from Cape 62 Crayfish stocks are currently at 3 per of Cape Town and is familiar with the crime Town?, Daily Maverick, 16 May 2013, http:// cent of pristine levels, while at the end of trends in the city. www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-05- 2011 abalone stocks were at 8 per cent 80 Cited in City of Cape Town, Integrated 17-is-the-future-of-cape-town-25km-from- (F Macleod, Fishing experts put red alert Development Plan 2007–2012. cape-town/).

ISS PAPER 262 • AUGUST 2014 19 PAPER

About the authors ISS Pretoria Charles Goredema is a senior research consultant with more than 20 Block C, Brooklyn Court, 361 Veale Street years’ experience of criminal justice systems in Southern Africa. A lawyer New Muckleneuk, by training, he has conducted and published detailed research work into Pretoria, South Africa organised crime and money laundering in Southern and East Africa with Tel: +27 12 346 9500 the ISS for over 14 years. Fax: +27 12 460 0998 Khalil Goga is a research consultant with the ISS, with which he has been [email protected] affiliated since 2012. He has been researching organised crime in Africa ISS Addis Ababa since 2009. He previously lectured at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, 5th Floor, Get House from where he received both his undergraduate and master’s degrees. Building, Africa Avenue, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Tel: +251 11 515 6320 Fax: +251 11 515 6449 About the ISS [email protected] The Institute for Security Studies is an African organisation that aims to enhance human security on the continent. It does independent and ISS Dakar authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and 4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum Route de Ouakam, delivers practical training and technical assistance. Dakar, Senegal Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42 Fax: +221 33 860 3343 Acknowledgements [email protected] ISS Nairobi Braeside Gardens, off Muthangari Road Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya Tel: +254 20 266 7208 This paper was made possible with support from the International Fax: +254 20 266 7198 Development Research Centre. The ISS is grateful for support from [email protected] the following members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the USA. www.issafrica.org

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