Africa Yearbook

Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2018

Volume 15

Edited by Victor Adetula Benedikt Kamski Andreas Mehler Henning Melber

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Preface xi List of Abbreviations xiii Factual Overview (as of 31 December 2018) xv List of Authors xix

Part 1

Sub-Saharan Africa 3 Victor Adetula, Benedikt Kamski, Andreas Mehler and Henning Melber

Part 2

African-European Relations 19 Christine Hackenesch and Niels Keijzer

Part 3

West Africa 35 Victor Adetula

Benin 46 Alexander Stroh

Burkina Faso 54 Daniel Eizenga

Cabo Verde 63 Gerhard Seibert

Côte d’Ivoire 69 Jesper Bjarnesen

The Gambia 78 Alice Bellagamba

Ghana 84 Jennifer Boylan

Guinea 97 Anita Schroven

Guinea-Bissau 105 Christoph Kohl

Liberia 112 Franzisca Zanker

Mali 121 Bruce Whitehouse

Mauritania 127 Helena Olsson and Claes Olsson

Niger 134 Klaas van Walraven

Nigeria 143 Heinrich Bergstresser

Senegal 161 Mamadou Bodian

Sierra Leone 172 Krijn Peters

Togo 179 Dirk Kohnert

Part 4

Central Africa 189 Andreas Mehler

Cameroon 199 Fanny Pigeaud

Central African Republic 209 Andreas Mehler

Chad 218 Ketil Fred Hansen

Congo 227 Brett L. Carter

Democratic Republic of the Congo 234 Janosch Kullenberg

Equatorial Guinea 251 Joseph N. Mangarella

Gabon 257 Douglas Yates

São Tomé and Príncipe 264 Gerhard Seibert

Part 5

Eastern Africa 273 Benedikt Kamski

Burundi 285 Tomas van Acker

Comoros 296 Simon Massey

Djibouti 303 Nicole Hirt

Eritrea 309 Nicole Hirt

Ethiopia 317 Jon Abbink

Kenya 330 Nanjala Nyabola

Rwanda 342 Margot Leegwater

Seychelles 352 Anthoni van Nieuwkerk

Somalia 359 Jon Abbink

South Sudan 369 Daniel Large

Sudan 378 Jean-Nicolas Bach and Clément Deshayes

Tanzania 388 Kurt Hirschler and Rolf Hofmeier

Uganda 402 Anna Reuss

Part 6

Southern Africa 415 Henning Melber

Angola 424 Jon Schubert

Botswana 436 David Sebudubudu

Eswatini 445 Marisha Ramdeen

Lesotho 450 Roger Southall

Madagascar 456 Richard R. Marcus

Malawi 463 George Dzimbiri and Lewis Dzimbiri

Mauritius 471 Sheila Bunwaree

Mozambique 477 Joseph Hanlon

Namibia 487 Henning Melber

South Africa 496 Sanusha Naidu

Zambia 512 Edalina Rodrigues Sanches

Zimbabwe 520 Amin Y. Kamete

Edalina Rodrigues Sanches

Edgar Lungu’s presidency faced significant political and economic challenges in a year that marked the fifty-fourth anniversary of Zambia’s independence. Several critics of the regime faced legal action, repression, and intimidation. There were repeated attacks on media freedom. The opposition filed an impeachment motion against Lungu, but a legal challenge prevented it being tabled until the end of the year. The Constitutional Court ruled that Lungu was eligible to run in 2021. Lungu became chairperson of the SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation. Important bilateral agreements were established. China continued to be a strategic trade and investment partner. Chinese investments triggered protests and fuelled interparty conflict over the lack of transparency in the government’s dealings. The government increased the minimum wages for various categories of workers. Despite growth in the economy, major challenges remained.

Domestic Politics

In March, the main opposition party, the United Party for National Development (UPND) filed an impeachment motion against Lungu, alleging various constitutional

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004417663_055 For use by the Author only | © 2019 Koninklijke Brill NV Zambia 513 breaches, namely the president’s failure to hand over power to the speaker of the National Assembly when the UPND had challenged his election in the High Court; the contracting of unsustainably high public debt; interference in the operations of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Investments Holdings (ZCCM-IH), when he had directed the company to discontinue proceedings it had commenced for the recovery of debt from the Canadian-based mining and metals company First Quantum Minerals, to the detriment of the people of Zambia; and acts of corruption given the unprecedented procurement of personal wealth and assets in his short time as president. Other charges included the disposal of Natural Resources Development College (NRDC) land, the transfer of proceeds from the sale of mu- kula (rosewood) logs to Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries Corporation Limited (ZAFFICO) rather than the Consolidated Fund as required by law, and wasting state resources through the acquisition of fire department tenders (42 fire trucks were bought at $ 1 m a piece). The UPND-led motion obtained the signatures of one- third of the 167-member parliament, which was enough to get it tabled before the parliament. However, it needed at least 111 of the legislators to vote in favour to be approved, which meant the motion was doomed to fail as the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) held more than 50% of the seats in parliament. Outside of the parliament, Chishimba Kambwili, leader of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and for- mer PF cabinet minister, also seconded the motion. On 22 March, a day before the motion was proposed, he was arrested and charged with 37 counts of ‘being in possession of properties suspected to be proceeds of crime’ and two counts of ‘ob- taining pecuniary advantage’. A day later, more NDC members – general secretary Mwenya Musenge, national mobilisation chairman Christopher Mutale, and national elections chairperson Ackson Simwezya – were arrested in Luapula Province while conducting interviews for prospective candidates ahead of the 27 March local government by-elections in that area. In the National Assembly, deputy speaker Catherine Namugala recognised that the motion met all formal requirements, but she declined to table it in parliament, saying that the “Constitution does not give a timeframe within which an impeachment motion must be tabled”. In April, the speaker of the National Assembly, Patrick Matibini, declared he had not yet decided whether to allow the process to begin. Although discussion on the motion was expected in June, PF activists instituted legal proceedings to stop the impeachment motion. In November, and with no resolution on the motion, UPND presidential advisor Douglas Syakalima stated that his party planned to move another motion of impeachment against the president, but eventually gave up due to the time parliament took to approve the 2019 national budget. As in previous years, a number of by-elections took place following the resigna- tion of local and national representatives. Local government by-elections were held on 24 April across 16 wards. The ruling PF won all the seats in Eastern, Copperbelt, Muchinga, Luapula, and Lusaka Provinces, while the main opposition UPND se- cured victories in the remaining four wards spread across Northwestern, Southern,

For use by the Author only | © 2019 Koninklijke Brill NV 514 Rodrigues Sanches and Western Provinces. More by-elections followed on 6 September to elect representatives for parliament (in Kasenengwa) and in five council wards. The PF won the Kasenengwa parliamentary seat and four wards; the remaining ward was won by the UPND. A final round of by-elections took place on 20 November. The PF won the parliamentary seat of Lupososhi and Mangango and elected councils for the Chisanga and Nkhanka wards, while the UPND elected councils for the Lusinde, Tumvwanganai, and Sipuma wards. The results of the year’s by-elections were used by the ruling party to argue that they still enjoyed the support of voters, while opposition parties claimed that intimidation and vote buying had played a major role in determining the results. The PF held intraparty elections in all the provinces for the ward, constituency, and district committees between 1 September and 8 November. This was in line with provisions of the constitution, which requires political parties to hold free and regular elections and to function in accordance with democratic principles. Some of the elections were far from consensual. There was confusion in the 11 October elections in the Copperbelt, after the ‘original’ PF officials were blocked from fill- ing in the nomination forms for the Butungwa ward. The 20 October elections in Matero also were controversial – two PF members took their party’s secretary general, Davies Mwila, to court seeking an order declaring the intraparty elections held null and void, due to a number of irregularities. In December, the Constitutional Court ruled that President Lungu was eligible to run for president in 2021. This was after much speculation on whether Lungu’s first period in office – between 2015 and 2016, following the death of Michael Sata – counted as a ‘term’ even though it had lasted only 18 months. His second period in office started in 2016 following his victory in the presidential elections held in August of that year. Whereas the opposition contended that his first period in office counted as a term, and that he therefore had already reached the two-term constitutional limit, Lungu’s supporters argued that, under the constitution, a president has only served a term if in office for at least three years of the full five-year term. The court’s unanimous ruling raised criticism from the opposition parties. Hakainde Hichelema considered that the ruling effectively opened the way to a third term for Lungu, and Elias Chipimo, leader of the smaller National Restoration Party, claimed the ruling undermined confidence in the judiciary. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Zambia reported several episodes in which media freedom came under attack. Examples of censorship included when an official from Zambia Information Communication and Technology Authority stated that WhatsApp group administrators would be required to register with the Authority, and when the government announced that roughly 200 Facebook pages had been blocked. Other incidents included the harassment of media practitioners and media houses by police officers, and attacks from political party cadres and state agents. Dora Siliya, the minister of justice, transport and communication, and

For use by the Author only | © 2019 Koninklijke Brill NV Zambia 515 information and broadcasting services, stressed the need for the government to enact cyber laws to reduce fake news and misinformation, but this was perceived by media practitioners as another way to hinder freedom of expression and access to the internet.

Foreign Policy

Zambia strived to attract foreign investment, boost bilateral cooperation, and strengthen its position in the region. On 21–22 February, Lungu visited Rwanda to meet Rwandan president Paul Kagame. During the visit, the two countries signed four bilateral cooperation agreements, more specifically on political consultation; science, technology, and innovation cooperation; trade and investment; and cooperation between the Rwanda Private Federation and the Zambia Chamber of Commerce. On 3–4 May, Zambia participated in the first Japan-Africa Public-Private Economic Forum held in South Africa (Johannesburg). On the margins of that forum, an MoU was signed between the Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation and the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development to provide for the development of minerals, technology transfer, and joint research, especially in copper and cobalt mining. In the following months, Lungu attended the inauguration ceremo- nies of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan (9 July) and of Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa (26 August). President Lungu, elected chairperson of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation for one year, promised to help ensure durable peace and stabil- ity in the region. He assumed the post at the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, Windhoek, Namibia (17–18 August). On 31 August, Lungu arrived in China for bilateral meetings with Chinese president Xi Jinping and Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang. He also attended the third summit of the FOCAC, participated in the Zambia – China Business Forum, and visited Jiangxi province to witness the twinning of that province with Zambia’s Muchinga Province. Following Lungu’s visit to China, Zambia started benefiting from $ 60 bn funding support to finance the Jiangxi Multi-Facility Economic Zone (a consortium of Chinese firms) in Chibombo, a project that was expected to create 5,000 jobs for Zambians. Lungu attended the Seventy-Third UNGA, New York (18 September–5 October). In his address, he stated that he regretted that Africa had no permanent member on the UNSC, and that no progress had been made since reforming the UNSC had been put on the agenda some forty years earlier. He added that Africa should have two permanent members on the UNSC and five non-permanent seats, and that this was a matter of correcting an historical injustice, “a question of restoring the dignity of Africa”.

On 17–20 December, Lungu paid an official visit to Japan. During his stay, he attended a summit meeting with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, also meeting top business leaders to strengthen economic relations between the two countries. A joint statement at the end of the visit summarised the major points of a new phase in bilateral relations. Both leaders committed to increasing trade flows and ensur- ing favourable business environments in the two countries. The Japanese leader also announced the intention to provide technical support in public financial man- agement to help improve Zambia’s debt sustainability. A week after Lungu’s visit to Japan, the Zambian government received K (kwacha) 7.4 m fund for the imple- mentation of the National Agriculture Extension Services Support Strategy project. There were several high-level visits to Zambia during the year. In March, Lungu welcomed the Israeli minister of defence, Avigdor Lieberman, at State House to dis- cuss how Zambia and Israel could boost their economies through agriculture. On 10–12 April, Ram Nath Kovind, president of the Republic of India, undertook a state visit to Zambia. In a joint statement, the two leaders “acknowledged the longstand- ing excellent relations between Zambia and India and reaffirmed the mutual desire to further strengthen economic, commercial, technical, educational and cultural cooperation”. President Kovind announced the Indian government’s intention to support Zambia’s hospitality industry and conference tourism by constructing the Mahatma Gandhi Convention Centre, and to support the health and education sectors through the provision of medicines and medical equipment worth $ 3 m, as well as $ 100,000 to renovate the Mahatma Gandhi Primary School. On 2–3 May, the president of Angola, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, discussed joint projects and bilateral agreements in various sectors of economic and social development. Regional issues were also on the agenda ahead of Zambia’s chairing of the SADC Organ. On 28–29 July, Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the first Turkish president to visit a southern African country. His visit resulted in 12 agreements, including on agriculture, stockbreeding, fishery, and tourism, as well as on investment, sports, and diplomacy. On 9 August, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa held a consulta- tive meeting with Lungu in Lusaka. This was part of a long-standing tradition in the SADC region whereby newly elected heads of state pay courtesy calls on leaders of neighbouring countries. During the visit, Ramaphosa and Lungu discussed bilateral cooperation, political and security developments in the region and continent, and global issues of mutual concern. On 1 October, Lungu received at State House a Swiss business delegation led by Switzerland’s ambassador to Zambia. President Lungu praised Switzerland’s mining investment, saying it was necessary to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries. On October 23, Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa attended Zambia’s fifty-fourth independence anniversary celebrations. Four agreements were signed on the margins of this event, on cooperation to establish a one-stop border post at Victoria Falls, on cooperation in

For use by the Author only | © 2019 Koninklijke Brill NV Zambia 517 managing Zimbabwe liberation war grave sites, on cultural exchange, and on gen- der equity and equality and women’s empowerment. On 1–3 November, Jeanne Hauch, the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) vice president, general counsel, and corporate secretary, visited Lusaka to recognise the accomplishments of the MCC Zambia Compact, notably regarding improved drainage infrastructure, increased access to water supply and sanitation (due to better water and sanitation infrastructure), and improvements in the provision of services from the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company and the Lusaka City Council.

Socioeconomic Developments

Economic growth was an estimated 4% (compared to 4.1% in 2017). According to the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development, copper production increased from 799,329 tonnes in 2017 to 861,946 tonnes in 2018, underpinned by a rapid rise in production at Kalumbila copper mine; improved plant availability and utilisation at the Nchanga Tailings Leach Plant (TLP) (owned and operated by Konkola Copper Mines), coupled with higher grades; and the commissioning of a synclinorium shaft at Mopani in Kitwe, which increased the volume of ore being hoisted (project de- veloped by Mopani Copper Mines). Construction, manufacturing, and a stable supply of electricity also contributed to growth. On the negative side, maize production dropped by 33.6%, and the production of other key crops – such as sorghum, mil- let, soya beans, Irish potatoes, sunflower, and wheat – also decreased, according to Crop Forecast Survey estimates. According to a report from the AfDB, Zambia became self-sufficient in energy in the first quarter for the first time in its history, “thanks to a robust hydraulic and solar power generation industry in recent years”. Important developments in the sector included new hydropower stations at the Musonda, Lusawaki, and Kafue Gorge dams and the inauguration of a 50 MW power plant at a cost of $ 60 m. Another major project was the construction of mini solar plants with an eventual overall capacity of 600 MW at an estimated cost of $ 1.2 bn. Bilateral cooperation was also key to success. Neighbouring Zimbabwe continued to work with Zambia on a major energy project on the Zambezi River, which is expected to generate at least 2,400 MW at a cost of $ 3 bn. The deficit missed its target of 6.1% of GDP, due mainly to high capital spending and rising debt. Domestic debt hovered around 20% of GDP, while external debt, including government guarantees, stood at an estimated 39.2% of GDP. In an overview of the country’s economic year, the minister of finance, Margaret D. Mwanakatwe, noted that debt had increased when compared to 2017. In October, external debt

For use by the Author only | © 2019 Koninklijke Brill NV 518 Rodrigues Sanches reached $ 9.5 bn from $ 8.7 bn at end December 2017. High public and publicly guar- anteed debt led to Zambia being classified as at high risk of debt distress; this resulted in the IMF rejecting in February Zambia’s borrowing plans for the second time. (The first time had been in August 2017.) In October, Zambia and the IMF agreed to plan a new path towards debt sustainability, but a much-needed $ 1.3 bn loan from the IMF remained on hold until the government curbed its borrowing. Zambia’s rising external debt and economic relations with China came under greater scrutiny. A decade after benefiting from debt relief from the IMF, Zambia faced a severe debt crisis as a result of over-borrowing, notably from China. Initially, the government was reluctant to confirm the debt figures, and it was speculated that China alone held a quarter to a third of Zambia’s external debt. UPND’s leader, Hakainde Hichilema, stated that the amount of the debt was shocking and that while China’s financial assistance to Zambia was welcome, it could only be sustained if Zambia did not drift into debt stress and bankruptcy. The leader of Zambia’s Republican Progressive Party, James Lukuku, urged “every Zambian to rise and stop the influence of China” and accused the ruling party of selling the nation to the Chinese. In September, civil society organisations released a press statement asking Lungu to make full disclosure of the true extent of Zambia’s debt burden to China along with the terms attached. The lack of transparency in Zambia’s business with China and China’s increasing presence in the country triggered protests and riots. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, by October there had been 26 riots and protests – up from 21 in the same period in 2017. One of the significant riots took place on 5 November, when hundreds of residents of Kitwe, a city in the mineral- rich Copperbelt, protested following rumours that the government intended to sell the state-owned timber company ZAFICCO to the Chinese. The police arrested over 100 people after clashes with the protesters/rioters. On 15 December, and after much speculation, Zambia’s presidential spokesman Amos Chanda revealed that Zambia’s total external debt was $ 9.7 bn, including $ 3.1 bn owed to China, correcting US national security advisor John Bolton’s assertion that “China was poised to take over Zambia’s utility company Zesco to collect the debt”, which was estimated at $ 6–10 bn. In an attempt to offset some of these criticisms, President Lungu stated, “This cry about Chinese, Chinese, it’s not going to help us … Chinese are cockroaches, they survive everywhere…. Let’s just work with them”. Although the comparison was unflattering, Lungu explained that his comments were not meant to cause offence and suggested that Zambians should learn to be as resilient as the Chinese. Between January and November, the trade deficit rose to K 11.3 m (compared to K 6.3 m in the same period in 2017). However, in nominal terms, total exports of goods in the same period increased by 24.5%, while imports of goods went up by 28.8%. Zambia’s top six main export partners were Switzerland, China, DRC, Singapore,

South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Switzerland accounted for over 40% of total Zambian exports, and China for 14.7%. The largest trade deficits were with South Africa ($ 2.3 bn), DRC ($ 538.9 m), Kuwait ($ 441.3 m), the UAE ($ 359.5 m), India ($ 257.1 m), and Mauritius ($ 204.1 m). Inflation increased to an estimated 7.6%, from 6.6% in 2017. By October, the kwacha had depreciated 20%, a drop matched only by the currencies of Turkey, Angola, and Argentina. From January to November, the kwacha traded at an average of K 10.33 per $ (compared to an average of K 9.49 per $ in the same period in 2017). The cost of living for an average Zambian family of five in Lusaka, as measured by the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection Basic Needs Basket, reached a record high of K 5,324.4. Oil prices rose between February and October as a result of the kwacha’s depreciation and because of international oil price volatility – the price of petrol increased from K 13.75 to K 16.06 per litre, kerosene from K 8.85 to K 11.34 per litre, and the price of diesel was adjusted upward by K 2.64 to K 14.65 per litre. In late September, Britain announced that it had frozen aid to Zambia, along with Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and UNICEF, because of the reported misappropriation of $ 4 m in funds destined for social cash transfers. The move followed allegations of embezzlement and corruption within President Lungu’s administration. Allegedly, the government had plundered social spending to meet debt service payments. According to Africa Confidential, current account expenditure, including ministe- rial trips, was funded partly by the government pension scheme. This caused delays to pensions contributions and payments to pensioners. The same source notes that “civil service salaries were not paid on time in August, in part because a debt repay- ment had to be made on 3 September”. Lungu took steps to clean up the social cash transfer scandal with the ministry of community development. Within 24 hours of the scandal becoming public, he fired minister Emerine Kabanshi, alleging misuse of funds; Kabanshi had been in charge of a social payments programme Britain said had been misused. The government increased the minimum wage for domestic, shop, and general workers, taking effect on 10 September. The gross salary for domestic workers rose from K 522.4 to K 993.6, while the minimum wage for grade-1 shop workers and general workers increased from K 1,132 to K 1,698.6. The minister of labour and social security, Joyce Simukoko, said the new wage structure followed extensive consulta- tions and consensus with stakeholders.