DOCSLIB.ORG

The Hegelian Trichotomy Underlying Panofsky's Perspective As A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Hegelian Trichotomy Underlying Panofsky's Perspective As A Journal of the Oxford University History Society 1 ”Clemena Antonova, 2006 The Hegelian Trichotomy Underlying Panofsky’s Perspective as a Symbolic Form. by CLEMENA ANTONOVA (Somerville College, Oxford) On Panofsky’s Organizing Thesis In 1899 in the second edition of the Classic Art, Heinrich Wölfflin, by way of setting the tasks for future art history, remarked: ‘There is still a great deal of work to be done here. Comprehensive and connected researches must be made into the development of draughtsmanship, the treatment of chiaroscuro, perspective and the representation of space’.1 Ever since many studies have been conducted on these problems, artistic perspective and the representation of space have certainly received much of their due attention. At the same time, it could be noticed that almost all twentieth-century studies on perspective, especially those organized around broader theoretical frameworks, use Erwin Panofsky’s essay Perspective as a Symbolic Form (1924) as a starting ground or at least a point of reference. This fact naturally prompts some intellectual curiosity as to the major ideas that underlie Panofsky’s text. The following text will be concerned with extracting a Hegelian intellectual background from Panofsky’s main thesis, which is largely obscured by the more obvious Kantian and Neo-Kantian allegiances. I will side with Paul Crowther’s view of the ‘objective significance’ of perspective in Panofsky’s essay. I believe that this position is supported by the very structure of the text, which I see as organized around the philosophical-epistemological concept of the subject-object relationship, which unfolds in a typically Hegelian, i.e. dialectical and historically necessary, fashion. More concretely, the historical development of perspective is broken down into three major moments: Antique perspective which provides the thesis, medieval perspective which is the antithesis and Renaissance perspective as the synthesis. The necessary transition to the latter overcomes the imbalance between subject and object in the former two. Subject (in this case, the viewer/artist) and object (the phenomenal world) are thus unified. If this interpretation is accepted the Kantian and Neo-Kantian influence on Panofsky should be radically reconsidered. By proposing that perspective ultimately overcomes the distinction between subject and object and, by implication, that between thought and reality, Panofsky actually strays away from a basic tenet of Kant’s philosophy (i.e. that there is such a distinction) into a pronouncedly Hegelian theme. The title of Panofsky’s essay signals a direct borrowing from Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Doubts have been raised by some of Panofsky’s critics as to the appropriateness of Cassirer’s concept to this kind of discourse on JOUHS, 4 (Michaelmas 2006) Journal of the Oxford University History Society 2 ”Clemena Antonova, 2006 perspective.2 In what is probably the most recent important study on the subject, Crowther convincingly maintains that while Panofsky legitimately employs Cassirer’s term he misunderstood Cassier on one important ground.3 In reference to mathematical perspective Cassirer says that the reality of its elements ‘is exhausted in their reciprocal relation: it is purely functional and not a substantial reality’.4 Panofsky interprets this to mean that mathematical perspective does not correspond to the way we see the world and the objects in it5 and is, therefore, only an abstraction from ‘actual subjective optical impression’.6 Cassirer, however, very clearly speaks of reciprocity and not abstraction and it is the principle of reciprocity which lies at the heart of the definition of ‘symbolic form’. Reciprocity consists in that the individual item manifests the universal while, at the same time, the latter can be grasped only as a function of the former. While misunderstanding Cassirer on this point, Panofsky projected a relativist view of the historical development of perspective. He thus allied himself with influential figures as Alois Riegl (1858–1905) by suggesting that Renaissance perspective is only one among several possible varieties of perspectival systems, each of which was tied to a historical and cultural moment. At the same time, Panofsky is by no means an absolute cultural relativist.7 By bringing Panofsky’s position closer to Cassirer’s philosophy Crowther shows that it can be read as implying an ‘objective significance of perspective’. The philosophical-epistemological problem of subject and object seems to have engaged intensely Panofsky’s attention at the time of writing Perspective as a Symbolic Form. In the same year, he also published his essay “Idea. A Concept in Art Theory” (1924), in which the greatest difference between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance is seen in terms of the subject-object relationship.8 Interestingly, this is exactly the thesis that Cassirer put forward in The Individual and the Cosmos (1927). Significantly, the discussion of the subject-object relationship in Cassirer’s work is couched ‘in the language of spatial vision’. The ‘Hegelian connection’, which Panofsky’s essay makes, is largely obscured by the more obvious Kantian and Neo-Kantian overtones that surface. Cassirer’s concept of ‘symbolic form’, that Panofsky borrows, relies on Kant’s notion of ‘form’.9 Cassirer explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Kant. In fact, Gombrich has been among the few, who mentioned Hegel’s influence on Panofsky, though he does not refer specifically to Perspective as a Symbolic Form.10 The influence of Hegel is evident on many levels. First, there is Panofsky’s claim that there is a deep, inherent connection between the worldview of a culture or society, this culture’s philosophy of space, and the corresponding system of pictorial perspective. The notion of the interconnectedness of cultural phenomena, which ultimately constitute the ‘spirit of the nation’ goes back to Montesquieu (1689–1755), though he uses it in the more narrow context of law and legal systems (hence, the title of his work The Spirit of the Laws, (1749). Herder (1744–1803) talks more generally of forms of the spirit of the nation, where the latter constitutes a self-contained centre. It was Hegel (1770–1831), JOUHS, 4 (Michaelmas 2006) Journal of the Oxford University History Society 3 ”Clemena Antonova, 2006 however, who systematized the notion of Volkgeist, which as the temporary form of Absolute Spirit becomes the touchstone of his philosophy of history. Second, Panofsky’s triad of worldview-philosophical conception of space-pictorial perspective unfolds within a broader Hegelian trichotomy of thesis-antithesis- synthesis. The latter, since Fichte (1762–1814) provides the framework for the dialectical relationship between subject and object. The subject posits the object (thesis), to which it stands as negation (antithesis). The synthesis emerges out of the meeting of thesis and antithesis, whence the opposition between subject and object is overcome. This Fichtean scheme, as well as the overall dialectical method, is borrowed almost directly by Hegel11 and it provides the basic framework of Hegel’s philosophy. With Hegel, however, ‘the dialectical sequence turns out to be the same as the historical sequence’.12 It is this dialectical-historical dimension of Hegel’s thought that, I believe, can be traced in Panofsky’s essay. It is true that in Perspective as a Symbolic Form Panofsky never mentions his indebtedness to Hegel, but in another work he explicitly claims a Hegelian conception for art history: ‘The Hegelian notion that the historical process unfolds in a sequence of thesis, antithesis and synthesis appears equally valid for the development of art’.13 When applied to the evolution of art, the Hegelian trichotomy is taken by Panofsky to correspond to the division of art history into the three periods of classical Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance as the beginning of the modern era.14 Each of these three refers to and expresses – conversely, can be deduced from – the respective conceptions of space and the respective worldviews. Panofsky’s theory of ‘reversals’ at the beginning of Section III, which we will again mention later, should be understood exactly in this context. According to the Hegelian view of history there is a succession of worldviews which is not a simple linear progression in time (what Hegel calls ‘bad infinity’), but rather a cyclic unfolding of the historical process. Historical time takes us full circle to a beginning (the ‘true infinite’, according to Hegel).15 Panofsky is, in fact, suggesting that the evolution of art follows the same course. The influence of Hegel, however, should not be taken too far. There is something deeply un-Hegelian about Panofsky’s procedure of describing various perspectival systems in terms of the paradigm of linear perspective. This approach is also, of course, in obvious contradiction with Panofsky’s professed relativism. Hegel himself never tired of insisting that we should not employ mechanically modern categories in describing phenomena of the past. The point had already been made by Herder in his essay on Winckelmann from 1777, where he discusses the fallacy of judging Egyptian art by Greek standards of excellence.16 In the Aesthetics one of the basic problems is how one describes the art of the past so that it becomes accessible to the present. From this point of view the question could be asked if the term ‘perspective’ is appropriate in any other case but that of mathematically constructed pictorial space, so long as ‘perspective’ means the rational geometry of vision. JOUHS, 4 (Michaelmas 2006) Journal of the Oxford University History Society 4 ”Clemena Antonova, 2006 If, however, we stick to our interpretation of the Hegelian context of Panofsky’s essay, one would logically expect that Panofsky would start his exposition with Antique perspective as the thesis, then proceed to medieval perspective as the antithesis, and the final movement of the synthesis achieved by Renaissance perspective. What happens, however, is that both Antique and medieval perspective are discussed in their relation to linear perspective.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Trichotomy of Processes: a Philosophical Basis for Information Systems
    Association for Information Systems AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) Americas Conference on Information Systems AMCIS 2003 Proceedings (AMCIS) December 2003 The rT ichotomy of Processes: A Philosophical Basis for Information Systems George Widmeyer University of Michigan Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2003 Recommended Citation Widmeyer, George, "The rT ichotomy of Processes: A Philosophical Basis for Information Systems" (2003). AMCIS 2003 Proceedings. 362. http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2003/362 This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in AMCIS 2003 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE TRICHOTOMY OF PROCESSES: A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS George R. Widmeyer University of Michigan [email protected] Abstract The principle of trichotomy from the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce can be used to categorize processes into the triad of transactional, informational, and relational. The usefulness of these categories is explicated by a comparison with structuration theory and control theory, and elaborated with a consideration of democracy in a knowledge economy. These three example applications of the process triad show the generality of the conceptual categories and provide a natural way of bringing ideas from social and ethical theories into information systems design. Modeling the world and understanding business applications through the use of the Trichotomy of Processes should facilitate the development of more valuable information systems. Keywords: Business processes, information systems theory, conceptual modeling, ontology, Peirce, open society Introduction Various frameworks for understanding the business processes of an organization have been proposed.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant on Recognizing Our Duties As God's Commands
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Asbury Theological Seminary Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 17 Issue 4 Article 3 10-1-2000 Kant on Recognizing our Duties as God's Commands John Hare Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Hare, John (2000) "Kant on Recognizing our Duties as God's Commands," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 17 : Iss. 4 , Article 3. Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol17/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. KANT ON RECOGNIZING OUR DUTIES AS GOD'S COMMANDS John E. Hare Kant both says that we should recognize our duties as God's commands, and objects to the theological version of heteronomy, 'which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will'. In this paper I discuss how these two views fit together, and in the process I develop a notion of autonomous submission to divine moral authority. I oppose the 'constitutive' view of autonomy proposed by J. B. Schneewind and Christine Korsgaard. I locate Kant's objection to theological heteronomy against the background of Crusius's divine command theory, and I compare Kant's views about divine authority and human political authority. 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 2020; 1(3): 307–312
    Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 2020; 1(3): 307–312 Book Review Huaping Lu-Adler. Kant and the Science of Logic: A Historical and Philosophical Reconstruction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2018. Reviewed by Stephen Palmquist, Department of Religion & Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon, Hong Kong, E-mail: [email protected] https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2020-0021 Notwithstanding its title, this book is not about the science called “logic”—at least, not insofar as “science of logic” refers to the rules, procedures, and guiding principles that constitute the laws of thought. While Huaping Lu-Adler often refers in passing to logical operations such as syllogisms, she never discusses their rules of operation. She does mention the law/principle of (non)contradiction eight times and that of identity once (p. 14); yet these all appear in quotes or side-comments. (She never mentions the law of excluded middle.) Similarly, she limits her treat- ment of potentially relevant post-Kantian developments in logic to a few brief glosses on Boole and Frege (pp. 3, 195–7), without referring to propositional logic, fuzzy logic, dialetheism, etc. However, this is all by design, so prepared readers need not be surprised by such omissions. Indeed, as the author announces in the Introduction and repeatedly reminds her readers, the book’s focus is on “the philosophy of logic” (pp. 3–4), not on the mechanics of how logical relations as such actually function. The Introduction acknowledges that historians of logic have typically either defined logic narrowly and therefore found nothing new—and thus little worth writing about—in Kant and other Enlightenment philosophers, or else they have followed Kant’s immediate predecessors by defining logic in a broader sense than we do nowadays and have therefore written voluminously on the views of “logic” advanced during this period, but in ways that relate very little to modern con- ceptions of logic.
    [Show full text]
  • Peter Wallensteen Understanding
    Peter Wallensteen UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT F O U R TH RESOLUTION EDITION SAGE was founded in 1965 by Sara Miller McCune to support the dissemination of usable knowledge by publishing innovative and high-quality research and teaching content. Today, we publish more than 750 journals, including those of more than 300 learned societies, more than 800 new books per year, and a growing range of library products including archives, data, case studies, reports, conference highlights, and video. SAGE remains majority-owned by our founder, and after Sara’s lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures our continued independence. Los Angeles | London | Washington DC | New Delhi | Singapore 00_Wallensteen_Prelims.indd 3 3/11/2015 1:02:59 PM 4 ANALYSING CONFLICT RESOLUTION 4.1 Basic and Complex Levels of Analysis In the preceding chapters, we developed a general understanding of the concept of conflict. This is a necessary initial step in conflict analysis. Here, our task is to approach conflicts where arms are used and the role this gives to conflict resolu- tion. Armed conflict is one category of the general phenomenon of social conflict. It has some distinct features. It normally grows out of non-armed conflict, in the sequences illustrated in Figure 3.3, but involves not just a shift in behaviour. It has other aspects associated with the three concepts of parties, incompatibility and action. First, there is a particular role for the state as soon as a conflict becomes armed. The reasons for this are explained in Section 4.2. There are also armed, as well as unarmed, non-state actors in many armed conflicts, and, for a fuller analy- sis, it is necessary to include them.
    [Show full text]
  • A Philosophical Commentary on Cs Peirce's “On a New List
    The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of the Liberal Arts A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON C. S. PEIRCE'S \ON A NEW LIST OF CATEGORIES": EXHIBITING LOGICAL STRUCTURE AND ABIDING RELEVANCE A Dissertation in Philosophy by Masato Ishida °c 2009 Masato Ishida Submitted in Partial Ful¯lment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2009 The dissertation of Masato Ishida was reviewed and approved¤ by the following: Vincent M. Colapietro Professor of Philosophy Dissertation Advisor Chair of Committee Dennis Schmidt Professor of Philosophy Christopher P. Long Associate Professor of Philosophy Director of Graduate Studies for the Department of Philosophy Stephen G. Simpson Professor of Mathematics ¤ Signatures are on ¯le in the Graduate School. ii ABSTRACT This dissertation focuses on C. S. Peirce's relatively early paper \On a New List of Categories"(1867). The entire dissertation is devoted to an extensive and in-depth analysis of this single paper in the form of commentary. All ¯fteen sections of the New List are examined. Rather than considering the textual genesis of the New List, or situating the work narrowly in the early philosophy of Peirce, as previous scholarship has done, this work pursues the genuine philosophical content of the New List, while paying attention to the later philosophy of Peirce as well. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is also taken into serious account, to which Peirce contrasted his new theory of categories. iii Table of Contents List of Figures . ix Acknowledgements . xi General Introduction 1 The Subject of the Dissertation . 1 Features of the Dissertation .
    [Show full text]
  • Title Peirce's General Theory of Signs Author(S)
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Kyoto University Research Information Repository Title Peirce's General Theory of Signs Author(s) Clare Thornbury Finding Meaning, Cultures Across Borders: International Citation Dialogue between Philosophy and Psychology (2011): 49-57 Issue Date 2011-03-31 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/143046 The copyright of papers included in this paper belongs to each Right author. Type Article Textversion publisher Kyoto University 49 Peirce's General Theory of Signs CLARE THORNBURY Institute of Education, University of London Charles. S Peirce was one ofthe founders ofPragmatism, alongside William James and John Dewey. This paper looks at Peirce's later work on his theory of signs, or semiotic. Peirce's semiotic is a broad one, including as signs things that other semioticians may reject. Peirce's semiotic includes a key division ofsigns into the three categories ofIcon, Index and Symbol. This trichotomy and the breadth ofPeirce's semiotic makes it well suited to, for example, a semiology of cinema. The basic structure ofthe sign in Peirce is also triadic, being a relation between sign-object-interpretant, and this brings us to a further appreciation of the sign as sign-action: a move from semiotic to semiosis. Peirce's approach to the philosophy of language goes beyond language to a theory of signs in general, and this 'semiotic' is deeply embedded within his broader systematic philosophical works. To understand it therefore, it is helpful to do two things: 1) to understand the breadth of Peirce's semiotic and 2) to differentiate it from other philosophical theories in the field.
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking the Peircean Trichotomy of Icon, Index, and Symbol
    Semiotica 2016; 213: 165–175 Ersu Ding* Rethinking the Peircean trichotomy of icon, index, and symbol DOI 10.1515/sem-2015-0134 Abstract: Classification of signs into various kinds is a vital enterprise in semio- tic research. As early as over a century ago, the American semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce laid down a solid foundation for this work by proposing his famous trichotomy of signs. Later scholars have been mostly applying Peirce’s theory to their own semiotic studies rather than challenging the inadequacies that exist therein, thus giving rise to a great number of confusions or even contradictions. The present article modifies Peirce’s theory from the perspective of sign emergence and evolution and emphasizes the importance of understanding sign transformations. Keywords: classification of signs, Peircean trichotomy, index, icon, symbol, sign emergence and evolution When scholars discuss the issue of sign classification, they tend to think of the American semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce, who is widely known for his trichotomous division of signs. For whatever reasons, Peirce takes a particular fancy to “3” and applies the number to many of the things he investigates. As can be seen in Figure 1, he breaks the entity of a sign into three essential elements (representamen, object, and interpretant) as opposed to two (signifier and signified), which is the case with Ferdinand de Saussure (1989: 67). The word “sign” at the top of Figure 1 ought to be interpreted in its narrow sense, referring to the form, vehicle or what Peirce himself calls the representa- men of a sign entity. The American then further analyses each of these elements into its own triple subcategories, resulting in his rather complicated if not cumbersome “three trichotomies.” To begin with, Peirce classifies a sign vehicle as qualisign, sinsign,orlegisign in accordance with its distinctive formal feature.
    [Show full text]
  • The Trichotomy of Processes: a Philosophical Basis for Information Systems
    Association for Information Systems AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) Americas Conference on Information Systems AMCIS 2003 Proceedings (AMCIS) 12-31-2003 The rT ichotomy of Processes: A Philosophical Basis for Information Systems George Widmeyer University of Michigan Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2003 Recommended Citation Widmeyer, George, "The rT ichotomy of Processes: A Philosophical Basis for Information Systems" (2003). AMCIS 2003 Proceedings. Paper 362. http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2003/362 This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in AMCIS 2003 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE TRICHOTOMY OF PROCESSES: A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS George R. Widmeyer University of Michigan [email protected] Abstract The principle of trichotomy from the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce can be used to categorize processes into the triad of transactional, informational, and relational. The usefulness of these categories is explicated by a comparison with structuration theory and control theory, and elaborated with a consideration of democracy in a knowledge economy. These three example applications of the process triad show the generality of the conceptual categories and provide a natural way of bringing ideas from social and ethical theories into information systems design. Modeling the world and understanding business applications through the use of the Trichotomy of Processes should facilitate the development of more valuable information systems. Keywords: Business processes, information systems theory, conceptual modeling, ontology, Peirce, open society Introduction Various frameworks for understanding the business processes of an organization have been proposed.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Are There Four Hegelian Judgments
    Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law LARC @ Cardozo Law Articles Faculty 2004 Why are There Four Hegelian Judgments David Gray Carlson Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation David G. Carlson, Why are There Four Hegelian Judgments, 3 Cardozo Public Law, Policy, and Ethics Journal 143 (2004). Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/20 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. WHY ARE THERE FOUR HEGELIAN JUDGMENTS? David Gray Carlson* Hegel is the philosopher of threes. In the Encyclopedia system, there is logic-nature-spirit. Within logic, there is being-essence-notion. Within notion, there is subject-object-idea. Within subjectivity, there is notion-judgment-syllogism. Yet, as everyone notices, when it comes to judgment, the structure is tetrachotomous. Here we find existence-re- flection-necessity-notion. Why should there be four judgments when there are only three of everything else? Why must Shemp intrude upon the sublime perfection of Moe, Larry, and Curly? What need we d'Artagnan when Porthos, Athos, and Aramis seem the perfect three­ some? Three's company. Four's a crowd! In the Science of Logic,' Hegel does not allude very directly to the change, but in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel explains; [T]he different species of judgement derive their features from the universal forms of the logical idea itself.
    [Show full text]
  • The Object of Signs in Charles S. Peirce's Semiotic Theory
    University of Rhode Island DigitalCommons@URI Open Access Master's Theses 1977 The Object of Signs in Charles S. Peirce's Semiotic Theory William W. West University of Rhode Island Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses Recommended Citation West, William W., "The Object of Signs in Charles S. Peirce's Semiotic Theory" (1977). Open Access Master's Theses. Paper 1559. https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/1559 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE OBJECT OF SIGNS IN CHARLESS. PEIRCE'S SEMIOTIC THEORY OF WILLIAMW. WEST THESIS SUBMITTEDIN PARTIAL FULFILLMENTOF THE REQUIREMENTSFOR THE DEGREEOF MASTEROF ARTS IN PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITYOF RHODEISLAND 1977 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page . I INTRODUCTION. • • • • • • • • • • • • . .. • • • 1 Chapter I THE CATEGORIES• . .. •· .... 4 II SIGNS EXPLAINED 8 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • The First Trichotomy: The Sign Itself . ~ • • 15 Qualisign • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • 15 Sinsign • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16 Legisign. • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • 17 The Second Trichotomy: The Sign-Object Relation ••••• . • ....... • • 18 Icon. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19 Index • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 24 Symbol • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 28 The Third Trichotomy: Ho~ the Interpretant Represents th~ Object • • • • • • • • •
    [Show full text]
  • A Biblical Study
    Trickotomy: A Biblical Study. ARTICLE V. TRICHOTOMY: A BIBLICAL STUDY. BY THE REV. S. H. KELLOGG, D. D., TORONTO, CANADA. CONSCIOUSNESS and revelation alike bear witness that, to speak in a general way, man is it being with a dual nature. I have a body; I am also conscious that I have a soul, of which my body is but the instrument. This is the true Ego; an immaterial essence, which thinks and feels and wills; but a material body has been assumed into organic union with it. Thus I am body and soul. In a like general way, in the account of creation as given in the book of Genesis, we read of two different elements as entering into the constitu­ tion of man; the one, material, a body, made "of the dust of the ground," the other, immaterial, the c~~1J ~rf~, "the breath of life (lives)," breathed into man by God, in the day that he created him. On this point, then, consciousness and Script­ ure bear consentient testimony; there is a dichotomy in the nature of man. But this being granted, the question still re­ mains, whether a further analysis is possible. Philosophy, indeed, whether right or wrong, long ago insisted that a further distinction must be made in the immaterial part of man, as containing in the unity of the one person, first, the yvx7f, or "animal soul," and secondly, the JlO~, or "intel­ ligence." Whether these names were well chosen or not, or whether there was any sufficient ground for the distinction, we do not yet inquire.
    [Show full text]
  • C:\Essays Edited for the Riddleblog\Trichotomy.Wpd
    Trichotomy: Beachhead For Gnostic Influences By Kim Riddlebarger Originally published in ModernReformation (July/August 1995) and edited for publication on the Riddleblog ______________________________________________________________ One of the most difficult problems any theological tradition faces is that there are often times fundamental differences at critical points between the “official doctrine” affirmed by the divines and academics of that tradition, and those doctrines actually believed and practiced on a popular level by the rank and file. There is, perhaps, no greater illustration of this than the popular notion of trichotomy. Rejected by virtually all major theologians in all streams of the Christian tradition as a speculative Greek philosophical notion rather than a biblical conception, trichotomy is very likely the reigning notion of human nature in American evangelical circles today. With few exceptions, the Christian church has affirmed, with one voice, that human nature is bipartite. As men and women, we are necessarily a body–the physical aspect of our nature–and we are also a soul-spirit–the immaterial aspect described in the Bible as either soul or spirit. These two are united together as one person in a psychosomatic unity. This is simply known as dichotomy. Trichotomists, however, contend that human nature is tripartite, that is, as men and women we are body, soul and spirit. But while the theologians of evangelicalism, following the historic precedence, overwhelmingly reject the notion of trichotomy, the popular teaching and literature of evangelicalism abounds with trichotomistic views of human nature in one form or another. It is also no accident that the Gnostic impulse, now so rampant in the quest for spirituality, finds a ready-made beachhead into evangelical circles through the trichotomist view of human nature.
    [Show full text]