Attacking the Vulnerability of Global Cyber Networks to Create Societal Collapse

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Attacking the Vulnerability of Global Cyber Networks to Create Societal Collapse GLOBAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: ATTACKING THE VULNERABILITY OF GLOBAL CYBER NETWORKS TO CREATE SOCIETAL COLLAPSE. DIANA SANCHEZ CAICEDO JORGE TADEO LOZANO UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2017 - 1 - GLOBAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: ATTACKING THE VULNERABILITY OF GLOBAL CYBER NETWORKS TO CREATE SOCIETAL COLLAPSE. BY DIANA SANCHEZ CAICEDO THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ADVISOR MAURIZIO TINNIRELLO JORGE TADEO LOZANO UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2017 - 2 - CONTENTS INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................ 5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 7 LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................................... 10 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................ 16 1. SOCIAL STABILITY THREATENED BY CYBERATTACKS ...................................... 24 1.1 ENERGY SECTOR .......................................................................................................... 25 1.2 FINANCIAL SECTOR ..................................................................................................... 29 2. GLOBAL CASCADING FAILURE, PROSPECTIVE OF CYBERATTACKS ............. 32 3. IS SOCIETAL COLLAPSE A REALISTIC SCENARIO? ............................................... 39 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 46 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 49 - 3 - ABSTRACT The more interconnected and complex our systems of critical infrastructure become, the more they are vulnerable to states and non-states actions. Cyber capabilities, both offensive and defensive, have become of critical importance to all players in the international system. As a target, these capabilities could be used against social, economic and military stability without employing brute force. Even though the world has not witnessed a direct cyber-war, multiple computer network attacks have taken place affecting locations all around the globe. These events give rise to an important question: how catastrophic could a larger cyberattack be in the age of technological prevalence. Using public domain information, this research will therefore consider Societal Collapse as the most transcendental outcome of a major cyber-attack; considering the higher dependence by financial and energetic sector on the complex cyber-systems. An attack could generate a massive effect of disruption, uncertainty, panic, instability among individuals and organizations inducing global instability. Key words: Cyberattack, Critical Infrastructure, Interconnectivity, Complex Systems, Cascading Failure, Social Collapse. Cuanto más interconectados y complejos se convierten nuestros sistemas de infraestructura crítica, más son vulnerables a los ataques de Estados y organizaciones criminales o terroristas. Las capacidades cibernéticas, tanto ofensivas como defensivas, han pasado a ser de importancia crítica para todos los actores del sistema internacional. Como blanco de ataque, estas capacidades podrían ser usadas contra la estabilidad social, económica y militar sin emplear la fuerza bruta. A pesar de que el mundo no ha sido testigo de una ciber-guerra directa, múltiples ataques de la red de computadoras han tenido ocurrido afectando diferentes lugares alrededor del mundo. Estos acontecimientos dan lugar a una pregunta importante: ¿Cuan catastrófico podría un ataque cibernético mayor en tiempos la tecnología prevalece? Usando información de dominio público, esta investigación considerará el colapso social como el resultado más trascendental de un ataque cibernético importante; Considerando la mayor dependencia del sector financiero y energético en los complejos ciber-sistemas. Un ataque podría generar un efecto masivo de interrupción, incertidumbre, pánico, inestabilidad entre individuos y organizaciones, lo que induciría a la inestabilidad social global. Palabras clave: Ataque cibernetico, Infrastructura Ciritica, Interconectividad, Sistemas complejos, Fallo en cascada, Colapso Social. - 4 - ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Firstly, I would like to express my immense gratitude to my advisor Dr. Maurizio Tinnirello, for his continued support and inspiration in the pursuit of excellence and innovative knowledge throughout my undergraduate studies; and particularly for his dedicated involvement and patience in this research process. Most importantly, none of this could have happened without the permanent backing of my parents throughout my academic career, they have been my moral and spiritual support. A special thanks to my mother, whose immense love and effort have constantly motivated me to overcome difficulties and achieve my goals. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank someone who has offered me their warmth and expertise in their personal and professional support. Kiowa Pratt, whose particular guidance and involvement in this research has been invaluably constructive. Her sudden and fortunate participation in this process has proven to be a cherished contribution and has served to inspire me towards my goal of producing academic work in my second language. Thank you for all of your encouragement. - 5 - INTRODUCTION Every 28th of June, Ukrainian citizens prepare to commemorate the anniversary of the signing of the first constitution as an independent and free nation. The twenty-first celebration was no exception; fireworks and drumming performances were ready to begin the celebration. However, something unusual altered the regular schedule a couple of days before. The Ukrainian Central Bank, government departments, the Boryspil and Kyiv International Airports as well as metro and ATM services in Kiev were temporarily paralyzed. Just a few kilometers from the capital, in Chernobyl, radiation had to be monitored manually like it had been in the 20th century because the software that is responsible for that task stopped working (Perlroth, Scott and Frenkel, 2017). A ransomware1 shut down the systems of several governmental and private institutions in the country before it spread to more than 100 countries, affecting various industries and their engineering abilities, and the encryption of their digital financial data. These circumstances demonstrate how digital data has become the most valuable asset in the modern age and the most vulnerable one (The Economist, 2017). The modern society has evolved alongside an increasing dependence on big data technologies. Basic resources, such as water and electricity, come directly into thousands of households all around the world thanks to an array of engineering systems controlled by computers. Considering this, today, civilization is not prepared to survive if deprived of such cyber- mechanisms. By examining previous real cyber-attacks and reports of prospective outcomes of major attacks this research aims to answer how a cyberattack can disturb global critical infrastructures, what could be the scope of a major cyber disruption, and could its effects generate a social collapse? The hypothetical answer for these research objectives is that in fact, attacking the vulnerabilities of global critical infrastructures through cyberspace can create social collapse. This could validate the premise that cybersecurity must be a priority in the defense systems of all nations, private sectors, and international community. 1 A ransomware is a computer virus that impedes the access to digital data. The virus uses to encrypt or delete the information in exchange for a ransom, which frequently must be paid with digital currencies such as bitcoins. Zetter (2017) explains: “The digital extortion racket is not new—it’s been around since about 2005, but attackers have greatly improved on the scheme with the development of ransom cryptware, which encrypts your files using a private key that only the attacker possesses, instead of simply locking your keyboard or computer.” 1 Justification Many researches have embraced cyber as a critical topic within international and domestic security. It has become an interdisciplinary concern and a priority for governments, and private sectors (Clemente, 2013, p.1). Cyber has evolved rapidly during the last decade, and society has taken incredible benefits for its advances, using it in thousands of goods and services. There has been a big discussion of how the positive aspects of cyber have turned into vulnerabilities: “Humanity has benefited from this evolution, but the current cyber threat-scape has many officials worried about the potential of extremist organizations conducting offensive operations in the cyber domain.” (Sin, Blackerby, Asiamah and Wasburn, 2016, p.82). Tackling this issue from the academic field has become significantly important in universities and think tanks around the world, and is represented by the increase of research papers and journals focused on cyber-themes interrelated with policy and social sciences. Regardless of the emerging popularity of this concern
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