THE FALL OF CRETE 1941: WAS FREYBERG CULPABLE? A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History by JAMES C. BLISS, MAJ, NEW ZEALAND ARMY BAL, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia, 2002 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2006 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: MAJ James C. Bliss Thesis Title: The Fall of Crete 1941: Was Freyberg Culpable? Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair Mr. Wilburn E. Meador, M.A. , Member Christopher R. Gabel, Ph.D. , Member Lieutenant Colonel Andrew F. Mahoney, M.S. Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ii ABSTRACT THE FALL OF CRETE 1941: WAS FREYBERG CULPABLE? by MAJ James Bliss, 159 pages. On 20 May 1941, Generaloberst Kurt Student’s Luftwaffe XI Fliegerkorps conducted the first operational airborne invasion in history to seize Crete. Major-General Bernard Cyril Freyberg VC, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, commanded the British forces defending the island. Freyberg, forewarned of the details of the invasion, possessed numerical superiority over the enemy, but was defeated within twelve days. Freyberg, later blamed for the defeat due to his perceived faulty defensive dispositions, was dealt a losing hand from the start. His troops consisted of those that could be rescued from the failed Greek Campaign and lacked sufficient weapons, communications, and transport to conduct the defense. Despite the best efforts of the Royal Navy, overwhelming Luftwaffe air superiority in the absence of the Royal Air Force isolated Crete and the relentless drive of the attacking German forces captured it. Poor tactical leadership by Freyberg’s subordinate commanders and their failure to prosecute his operational plan led to defeat by the barest margin. While a tactical loss, Freyberg’s destruction of the 7th Flieger Division resulted in Hitler never considering an operational airborne assault again. Freyberg, although accepting responsibility for the defeat, should not be held entirely culpable for the loss of Crete. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............. ii ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iii ACRONYMS.......................................................................................................................v CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1 CHAPTER 2. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT............................................................9 CHAPTER 3. OPERATION MERKUR............................................................................34 CHAPTER 4. FREYBERG’S OPERATIONAL PLAN ...................................................59 CHAPTER 5. THE BATTLE ............................................................................................89 CHAPTER 6. AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION .....................................................127 APPENDIX A. MAP OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN..................................139 APPENDIX B. MAP OF CRETE....................................................................................140 APPENDIX C. GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE (OPERATION MERKUR) .............141 APPENDIX D. OPERATION MERKUR PLAN............................................................143 APPENDIX E. ULTRA SIGNALS .................................................................................144 APPENDIX F. CREFORCE OPERATION ORDER......................................................148 APPENDIX G. CREFORCE ORDER OF BATTLE ......................................................151 APPENDIX H. CREFORCE OPERATIONAL PLAN...................................................153 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................154 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ....................................................................................157 CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT ...............................158 iv ACRONYMS AA Anti Aircraft ANZAC Australia New Zealand Army Corps Aust Australia/Australian CinC Commander in Chief CREFORCE Crete Forces BEF British Expeditionary Force DSO Distinguished Service Order GOC General Officer in Charge HQ Headquarters LAYFORCE Laycock Force MC Military Cross MG Machine Gun MNBDO Mobile Naval Base Defense Organisation NZ New Zealand NZEF New Zealand Expeditionary Force OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German High Command of the Armed Forces) RAF Royal Air Force RE Royal Engineers RN Royal Navy UK United Kingdom VC Victoria Cross W FORCE Wilson Force v CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In May 1941, British Middle East Command faced considerable threats to the Mediterranean and North Africa regions. British Forces had achieved decisive victories against the numerically superior Italian Army in Ethiopia and Somaliland in late 1940 and early 1941, and were poised to take Libya. However, in January 1941 Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel and his Deutsches Afrika Korps intervened to support the Italian forces in North Africa. By the end of March 1941, Rommel had forced the withdrawal of British forces from most of Libya. When Adolph Hitler attacked into Greece and Yugoslavia in April 1941 to secure his southeastern flank for his upcoming operations against the Soviet Union, the British government directed Commander-in- Chief (CinC), Middle East Command General Sir Archibald Percival Wavell1 to commit troops in support of the Greek mainland. The Battle of Greece was a decisive defeat for the British and Greek forces. In little over three weeks, the Germans attacked through Bulgaria into Yugoslavia and Greece, and forced the withdrawal of approximately 57,000 Allied troops. Of these, some redeployed to North Africa with the remainder to the garrison on the Greek island of Crete. Crete occupied a strategic position within the Mediterranean. British possession of Crete provided protected naval harbors and threatened the German held Romanian oilfields. For the Germans, Crete allowed air operations to be conducted against British forces in North Africa and secured the southern flank for the invasion of the Soviet Union.2 For the British, the defeat in Greece and the overall Mediterranean strategic setting shaped the operational environment for the Battle of Crete. 1 In April 1941, Wavell appointed Major-General Bernard Cyril Freyberg VC (1889 – 1963), to command all British3 troops defending Crete. Freyberg was born in the United Kingdom, but raised in Wellington, New Zealand, becoming a dentist before World War I. Freyberg was gazetted as a second lieutenant with the 6th Hauraki Regiment in 1911, but could not secure a commission with the New Zealand Staff Corps. Freyberg was traveling overseas in 1914 when war was declared. At the time, Freyberg was in Mexico, reportedly fighting for “Pancho” Villa in the Civil War,4 at which time he made his way to London to offer his services to England. Freyberg’s World War I record is impressive: Freyberg secured a commission in the newly formed Royal Naval Division’s Hood Battalion. He was gazetted as a temporary lieutenant in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and given command of a company. Relishing the opportunity presented by the war (‘I am in this with all my heart’), he took part in the brief, unsuccessful attempt to defend Antwerp in October 1914. Early in the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, he won a DSO for swimming ashore and setting diversionary flares at Bulair (Bolayir). He was wounded at Helles, returning in June to become commander of the Hood Battalion. He was badly wounded again in July, and eventually left the peninsula when the division was evacuated in January 1916. Transferring to the British Army, Freyberg was posted to the Queen’s Royal West Surrey Regiment, but remained seconded to the Royal Naval Division, with which he proceeded to France in May 1916. During the final stages of the first battle of the Somme, he so distinguished himself in the capture of Beaucourt village that he was awarded a VC; he was again severely wounded in this action and evacuated to Britain. Returning to the front in February 1917, he was two months later appointed to command a territorial brigade in the 58th Division – reputedly becoming the youngest general in the British Army. In September a shell exploding at his feet inflicted the worst of his many wounds. When he resumed duty in January 1918 he again commanded a brigade (in 29th Division), performing with distinction during the German offensive of March– April 1918. He won a bar to his DSO in September that year. Freyberg ended the war by leading a squadron to seize a bridge at Lessines, which was achieved one minute before the armistice came into effect and which earned him another DSO. He had been made a CMG in 1917, and was mentioned in dispatches no fewer than five times during the war.5 2 Between the wars, Freyberg held a number of staff and command appointments in the British Army and was promoted to major-general