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Irredentism and the Turks: Movements in Turkey and Eurasia, 1985-1991

Boke, Laurie Kay, M.A.

The American University, 1992

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Aibor, MI 48106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. IRREDENTISM AND THE TURKS: MOVEMENTS IN

TURKEY AND EURASIA, 1985 - 1991

by

Laurie Kay Boke

submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of the American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Affairs

Signatures of Committ^T

Chair: -—

'TV

Lnr> oo G

Date

1992

The American University 75

(THE AMERICAN UNITORS ITY UBRAPV

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To Gulkan Boke

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MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY AND EURASIA, 1985-1991

ABSTRACT

One major problem in the field of international

affairs is the lack of comparative research on irredentism.

The purpose of this study was to examine Turkic groups in

the Republic of Turkey and Eurasia to determine if ethnic

Turkic movements in this region were irredentist. The

methodology included a case study analysis of movements

among Turks in Turkey and Eurasia based on writings which

have appeared in the general news media, newspapers, and

journals which are Pan-Turkist or have a Pan-Turkist slant,

from 1985 - 1991, specifically Yeni Forum. TUrkistan, and

FBIS daily reports from the Soviet Union and Turkey. Based

on these sources it has been concluded that the movements of

the ethnic Turkic groups are not irredentist as they are not

promoting a political unity at this time. The extent of

their cooperations is mainly based on cultural affinities

and economic necessity, fostering a return to a Turkistani

community.

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank §erif Mardin of The American University and Safari Sayari of the National Academy of Sciences, for their insight, support and guidance. Special thanks is also extended to George Smalley of Lawrence University, for his dedication as a professor and friend, his enthusiasm for exposing students to cultures too often ignored, and for leading the path down the highways of worlds once closed.

I would also like to thank Cevdet Seyan of Voice of America for making available on short notice many of the sources necessary for me to conduct my research; and to H.B. Paksoy for granting permission to use the David S. Thomas translation of Yusuf Akgura's, "t)g Tarz-i Siyaset".

iii

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AB S T R A C T ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... vi

Chapter

I. The Study of Irredentism ...... 1

Purpose of Study ...... 1

Terminology ...... 3

Turkic Identity ...... 10

Hypothesis...... 13

Methodology...... 14

II. Historical Overview ...... 15

Early Organizers of Pan-Turkism ...... 16

Early Pan-Turk Organizations and Literature . 20

Pan-Turkism in the Soviet Union ...... 24

The Republic of Turkey and Pan-Turkism 26

III. Movements in Turkey ...... 32

Alparslan Turke? ...... 32

Position of the Turkish Government ...... 34

Emigre Movements in Turkey ...... 42

Intellectual Movement and Language Reform ... 44

Summ a r y...... 48

IV. Azerbaijan...... 51

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Movements in Azerbaijan ...... 51

Relations With Turkey ...... 59

Language Reform ...... 65

S u m m a r y ...... 66

V. Uzbekistan...... 68

Cultural and Language Reform ...... 68

B i r l i k ...... 72

E r k ...... 77

S u m m a r y ...... 79

VI. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan ...... 80

Kazakhstan...... 80

Kyrgyzstan...... 88

Turkmenistan ...... 92

S u m m a r y ...... 94

VII. Conclusion...... 96

v

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Figure Page

1. Map of Tiirkistan 9

vi

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THE STUDY OF IRREDENTISM

The Republic of Turkey, which has often been

described as the "bridge" between Europe and the Middle

East, is now also being referred to as the "door" to the

Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. The majority

of inhabitants living in the southern arc of the former

Soviet Union, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia,

Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, are ethnic Turks who speak

Turkic languages. Turkey is offering support and assistance

to the newly independent republics. And the Republics are

looking to Turkey as an example and are hoping to benefit

from Turkey's experience and expertise in economic,

political, social, and technological fields.

Purpose of Study

Questions have been raised and speculation continues

as to the possibility of a unified Turkic republic.

References to renewed Pan-Turkist interests and ambitions in

both the Republic of Turkey and the predominately Turkish

republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan are increasing.

Can the goals of the Republics be labeled as irredentist,

ones of unification based on Pan-Turkist ideals? Or are the

1

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Republics merely basing their cooperation on fraternal

feelings? After 70 years of Russian domination the

republics may only want to enjoy their new found freedom

with no greater political unification objectives.

The major problem in the field of international

affairs surrounding irredentism is the lack of comparative

analysis on the subject. Jacob M. Landau in Pan-Turkism in

Turkey (1980) has examined irredentism as an extension of

nationalism and the Pan-Turkist movement within Turkey. But

Landau admits that there have been "only few (and hardly

satisfactory) comparative studies of Pan-movements and fewer

of irredentism."1 There is a strong linkage among Turks

built on ethnic, religious, historical, geographic and

language affinity. All of these components affect the

dynamics of irredentism. There has been no major

comprehensive analysis of the Pan-Turkist movement in Turkey

since 1980, when the military seized control of the

government. At that time the Nationalist Action Party, an

organization espousing Pan-Turkist ideals, was dissolved and

its leader, Alpaslan Turke?, was tried on charges of

subversive actions against the government. Even less is

known about the structure of movements within Central Asia,

•Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 176.

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or of movements among emigres from Soviet Turkish republics

living in Turkey, which may be Pan-Turkist in nature.

The objective of this study is to examine ethnic

Turkic movements within Turkey and movements among the

"Outside Turks" rDis Ttirklerl of Central Asia and Azerbaijan

which have been referred to as being Pan-Turkist or

harboring Pan-Turkist interests, to determine if the goals

of the movements correspond, and if the movements are in

fact irredentist. This will be accomplished through

analysis of ethnic organizations, and of the relationships,

if any, between the various Turkic groups.

Terminology

As stated, the purpose of this paper is to analyze

the notion of irredentism in respect to ethnic Turkic

groups. It is important then to first clarify and define

the terminology that will be used throughout this study.

Nations and communities are natural units of

history created around the shared characteristics of group

ties such as a shared language, religion, race, ethnicity,

and territory. These attributes form the foundation of

Anthony D. Smith's definition of ethnicity. According to

Smith, there are six dimensions of ethnicity. These

dimensions include a collective name, a common myth of

descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture,

association with specific territory (which are possible to

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exchange as did Turkish communities who migrated from

Central Asia to Anatolia), and a sense of solidarity.2

Factors which assist in forming and maintaining ethnie and

ethnic identity are sedentarization and nostalgia, organized

religion, and inter-state warfare.3 In the case of Eurasian

Turkic groups there exists a sense of homeland and nostalgia

for a pre-Soviet identity. Also, the Republic of Turkey

provides a sense of homeland for many Turkic groups. Islam

has been and continues to be a unifying force. A current

example of inter-state warfare promoting a Turkic identity

is the continuing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.4 Glasnost

and perestroika contributed significantly to a reassertion

of ethnic identities and can be considered notable factors

in the promotion of a rise in nationalism throughout Central

Asia and Europe and the eventual disintegration of the

Soviet Union. There are several extensive studies devoted

2Anthony D. Smith. The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-30.

3Ibid, 32-40.

4Intellectual elites among the Turkic peoples in Central Asia refer to themselves as Turks and see their Turkic identity as a potential rallying point. That Pan-Turkism has perhaps some appeal for the local population may be inferred from the anti-Armenian slogans that have appeared in some of the Central Asian disturbances for example, in Ashkhabad, and Nebit-Dag in May 1989, and from the general feeling of solidarity with the Azeris in their quarrel with the Armenians. Yaacov Roi, "The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia,” Problems of Communism. 39, no. 4 (July-August 1990): 54.

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to nationalism5, but for the purpose of this paper

nationalism will be defined as:

The spirit of belonging together or the popular will that seeks to preserve the identity of a group by institutionalizing it in the form of a state. Nationalism can be intensified by common racial, linguistic, historical or religious ties. It is usually associated with a particular territory.6

Association with a particular territory does not

necessarily mean association with a nation-state. In an

examination of the ethnic future of nations, Jason W. Clay

has defined nations "as those groups who have exercised

political control over their destinies at some point in the

past and still see such control as a possible future

strategy....They either have conquered other nations or have

been conquered themselves. State boundaries rarely reflect

the areas traditionally occupied by nations."7 Following

this explanation, the republics of Central Asia and

Azerbaijan are nations since up until at least 1917 these

regions enjoyed nominal independence. Also, it was the

important works focusing specifically on nationalism include: Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London, Hutchinson, 3rd ed., 1966); Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Collier Books, 1967); Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1979).

6International Relations Dictionary. 3rd ed., s.v. "Nationalism."

7Jason W. Clay, "The Ethnic Future of Nations," Third World Quarterly 11, no. 4, (October 1989): 223-233.

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strategy of Moscow to divide and conquer the area based on

geopolitical considerations and not along lines of national

consciousness to circumvent mobilization among Pan-Turkic

and Pan-Islamic groups.8 It is even now being admitted that

the demarcation of borders in Central Asia were conscious

violations of historical traditions and existing

ethnodemographic circumstances.9

Irredentism incorporates the concepts just defined:

namely ethnicity and nation. "Any political effort to unite

ethnically, historically, or geographically related segments

of a population in adjacent countries within a common

political framework" is the general definition of

irredentism.10 Naomi Chazan distinguishes between two major

types of irredentist claims. The first consists of a

situation in which an ethnic group may be a majority in one

state making irredentist claims upon a minority in a

neighboring country. The government makes demands to

incorporate its conationalists and the territory they occupy

so that the people can be reunited with their kin across the

8Graham Smith, ed., The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (London: Longman Group, 1990), 197.

9G. Ch. Guseinov, and D.V. Dragunskii, "A New Look at Old Wisdom," trans. Olga Rubenchik, Social Research 57, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 400.

l0Naomi Chazan, ed. Irredentism and International Politics (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1991), 1.

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border. The second irredentist situation "is one in which

the ethnic group is a minority in two or more countries."11

The group may desire union with one of the countries, or it

may desire independent statehood, or it may have irredentist

claims aimed at creating entirely new nation-states.

Jacob M. Landau tentatively defined irredentism as

an ideological or organizational expression of passionate interest in the well-being of an ethnic or cultural minority living outside the boundaries of the states inhabited by the same group. However, moderate expression of interest or defending a group from discrimination or assimilation may not be irredentist phenomena at all; hence a more adequate definition of irredentism may be "extreme expressions, ideological or organizational, aiming at joining or uniting (i.e. annexing) territories that the ethnic or cultural minority group inhabits or has inhabited at some historical date."12

Nationalist ideologies and movements aiming at a

political union and promoting the solidarity of groups in

different states bound by ethnic kindred are also known as

Pan ideologies or movements. "Political Pan-Turkism derives

its character from its irredentist approach."13 It is this

definition of irredentism, as a sub-category of Pan-Turkism,

that will form the backdrop of this analysis.

"Ibid, 2.

"Jacob M. Landau, "The Ups and Downs of Irredentism: The Case of Turkey," in Irredentism and International Politics, ed. Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1991), 81.

13Jacob M. Landau, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes of Pan- Turkism," Central Asian Survey 7, no. 1 (1988): 2.

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The differences between Turkism and Turanism should

also be clarified. According to Ziya Gokalp Turkism means

to exalt the Turkish nation. Ethnic Turkists identify the

nation with the ethnic group, which they define as a group

of cognates descended from a common ancestor. The immediate

objective of Turkism is the dominance of a single cultural

unity.14 Pan-Turkists considered "Turkism as a pillar of

faith in their interpretation of a wider-embracing

nationalist doctrine."15 The long range goal of Turkism is

Turanism. The word Turan is restricted to Greater Turkistan

(see map, Fig. 1), to include all branches of Turks, those

who share the Turkish culture. Gokalp continued to explain

that if there came a time when the various Turkic groups

identified with separate cultures and became separate

nations with their own names, there would be a need for a

common name to unite all the old relatives of the ethnic

community. That common name would be Turan.

In short, the long-range ideal of the Turkists is to unite in language, literature and culture the Oghuz, Tatars, Kirghizes, Uzbeks and Yakuts once they have joined together under the name Turan.16

14Ziya Gokalp, The Principles of Turkism fTurkculiidun esaslari], tran. by Robert Devereux (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), 12-18.

15Landau, Pan-Turkism. 33.

16Gokalp, 19.

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PAKISTANI INDIA

■ KYRGYZSTAN y B ls h t k k KAZAKHSTAN K a b u l TURKISTAN AFGHANISTAN

S a m a rk a r. \ D u s h a n b e m \ \■ lu th a r a UZBEKISTAN U r g e n c b . . TURKMENISTAN /RAN Fig. 1. Map of Turkistan based on illustration in "UmidHope".

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Turkic Identity

The Turks of the Republic of Turkic have a group

identity based on a "combination of language and religion,

the theoretical ethos of the Turkish Republik as established

by Mustafa Kemal, and the reality of a cultural inheritance

from the Ottoman state."17 Since the creation of the

Republic of Turkey in 1923 group identification has been

through language and history rather than through religion

due to Kemal Atatiirk's ideology propagated through education

for the purpose of unifying the population. "The ideology

is at present encapsulated in the widely promulgated

quotation from Mustafa Kemal: "Ne mutlu Turkiim diyene" "How

happy to be able to say - I am a Turk".18

In addition to Turks of the Republic of Turkey,

Turkic groups also include Turkmen, Azerbaijani Turks,

Uygurs, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks. All of these groups

belong to the Altai-Turkic linguistic group.19 Within these

groups, genealogy, language, custom, and history are the

17Peter Alford Andrews, ed., Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (Wiesbaiden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), 55.

18Ibid, 55-56.

19Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union, trans. Pauline M. Tiffen (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 228-235.

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strongest factors contributing to a sense of group

identity.20

Group identity among Turkic peoples has not always

existed. In fact, at times there have often been

overlapping and even contradictory senses of identity.

Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century, especially

amongst the educated Azerbaijanis, a clearly defined basis

for national feeling did begin to develop among Turkic

groups. These Azerbaijanis openly began calling themselves

Turks as "the consciousness of belonging to one Turkic­

speaking group of peoples" gained acceptance.21 The

question remained as to how they would qualify their

Turkishness but a common identity was promoted through

several issues recurrent during this period.

1. A great interest in the remote history of Turkic­ speaking peoples 2. A reevaluation of the essence and role of Islam as well as of pre-Islamic beliefs 3. A concern with the purity and modernization of language and an insistence that Turkic was not inferior to Ottoman, Persian, or Arabic 4. A desire to adopt scientific and technical knowledge from the West in order to bring a better life to Turkic people

20Andrews, 63-84.

2lTadeusz Sweitochowski, "The Politics of a Literary Language and the Rise of National Identity in Russian Azerbaijan Before 1920," Ethnic and Racial Studies 14, no. 1 (1991): 59.

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5. Preoccupation with defining who were Turks and what characteristics or symbols unified them; for some, but certainly not all Turkic nationalists, this meant advocacy of Pan-Turkism22

The population of the Republic of Turkey as of 1985

was 51.4 million, of which 90% are Turks.23 There are also

approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet Central Asian refugees

living in Turkey24, keeping alive pan-Turkic interests.25

Turkic populations in the Eurasian Republics are diversified

due to Soviet policies. In Azerbaijan, the most cohesive

republic, the total population is 7,145,600. Of this, 78%

is Azeri, 8% is Russian, and 8% is Armenian. In Kazakhstan,

total population 16,538,100, Kazakhs are actually a

minority, making up only 36% of the total population. Other

ethnic groups in Kazakhstan include 41% Russians, 6%

Ukrainians, and 2% Tatars. The total population of

Kyrgyzstan is 4,372,000. Here 52% of the population is

Kyrgyz, 22% is Russian, 13% is Uzbek, 2.5% is Ukrainian, and

1.6% is Tatar. Turkmenistan, the smallest of the Turkic

“William Fierman, "Cultural Nationalism in Soviet Uzbekistan: A Case Study of The Immortal Cliffs." Soviet Union 12, no. 1 (1985): 6.

“ "Turkey: A Country Study", Area Handbook Series. United States Government (1988), 99.

“Andrews, 63-84.

“Graham E. Fuller, "The Emergence Of Central Asia," Foreign Policy 78 (Spring 90): 51.

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republics, has a total population of 3,621,700 of which 68%

is Turkmen, 13% is Russian, 9% is Uzbek, and 3% is Kazakh.

The largest Turkic republic in Central Asia, Uzbekistan, is

also the most diverse. Of the 19,906,000 total population,

69% is Uzbek, 11% is Russian, 4% is Tatar, 4% is Kazakh, 4%

is Tajik, and 2% is Kara-Kalpak.26

Hypothesis

In response to alasnost and perestroika, a

reemergence of nationalism, and a reidentification with

other Turkic groups, questions were raised as to whether or

not the ultimate goal of these Turkic groups was one of

Turkish irredentism, and if they would seek a political

union with each other through a revival of pan-Turkism. It

is therefore hypothesized that the ethnic Turkic movements

in Turkey and Eurasia from the period 1985 - 1991 have

renewed interests in historical and cultural affinities and

are pan-Turkist in nature and that the ultimate goal is

irredentist, as there is a desire to politically unite

territories that the ethnic or cultural minority group

26Grace Halsell, "Soviet Muslims Face Uncertain Future," The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs X, no. 4 (October 1991): 16.

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inhabits or has inhabited at some historical date into

greater Turkistan.27

Methodology

This study begins with an historical overview as to

the origins of the Pan-Turkist movement with attention to

the leaders and their contributions. The methodology will

be a case study analysis of ethnic movements among Turks in

Turkey and Eurasia of a Pan-Turkist nature based on writings

which have appeared in the general news media from 1985 to

1991, and newspapers, periodicals, and journals which are

Pan-Turkist or have a Pan-Turkist slant. Primary sources

include Foreign Broadcast Information Service daily reports

from the Soviet Union and West Europe, Yeni Forum and

Turkistan.

27Turkistan is defined as the area of Central Asia where a lot of Turkic tribes— Kazak, Kyrgyz, Ozbek, Turkmen, Uygur, and others— had settled down and continue to live. Baymirza Hayit, ’’Turkistan Nedir?" Turkistan 1, no. 1 (1988): 3.

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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Nationalism, by most historians, is traced back to

the French Revolution. Napoleon's expansion into Europe

prompted national unity with the bonds of a shared community

interest forming the foundation. Simultaneous to this

emergence of nationalism in Europe, and subsequently in

Russia, was the genisis of a national consciousness among

the Tatars of Czarist Russia. The Tatars were the first

Turkic group to associate common historical and linguistic

ties with other Turkic groups, and thereby led the way in

propagating Pan-Turkism. Turkic groups responded to the

ideal of a unified future in response to the Pan-Slavist

movement and the pressures of Russification as well as the

attempted Christianization of the region in the late

nineteenth century.1 Tatars, the group longest under

Russian rule and subject to these pressures, therefore

understandably grasped at Pan-Turkism as an ideological

base. Education, language reform, and journalistic

'Landau, Irredentism. 82.

15

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propaganda provided the basis of Tatar nationalist

activities towards the ultimate union of Turkic groups.2

Immediately following the Young Turk Revolution in

1908, Pan-Turkists began to organize in the Ottoman Empire.

Pan-Turkish currents seized upon the common origin of the

Turkish people in Central Asia and in their cultural

striving the Pan-Turkists grasped what was regarded as a

common cultural heritage. Highly advocated were reforms in

the school systems and the development of a modern Turkish

literary language. And then, "during the First World War

numerous Pan-Turks hoped for a union between the Turks in

Anatolia and the Turkic peoples of Russia."3

Early Organizers of Pan-Turkism

A key figure leading nationalistic activities was a

Crimean Tatar, Ismail Gasprinsky [Gaspirali] (1851-1914).

Most influential to Gasprinsky's development of a national

ideology were Pan-Slavism, the Young Ottoman movement, and

Pan-Islamism.4 Three principles of "unity" guided his work

and thought: "Dilde. fikirde. iste birlik" [unity of

language, thought, and action]. Instrumental in advocating

2Landau, Pan-Turkism. 9.

3Ingvar Svanberg, Kazak Refugees in Turkey: A Study of Cultural Persistence and Social Change (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1989), 79.

4Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 30-32.

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this nationalist idea based on unity was Gaspinsky's journal

Tercuman [Interpreter]. Terctiman supported secular

nationalism while promoting Pan-Turkism through a fostering

of educational, cultural, and social interests5, thus sowing

the seeds for a political Pan-Turkism of an irredentist

character.6

Briefly stated, Gasprinsky's basic approach in advocating Pan-Turkism was to work for a union of all the Turkic groups in Russia, under the spiritual guidance of Turkey, based upon a culture rejuvenated by a common language.7

In 1907 a Caucasus Tatar, Ali Hiiseyinzade (1864-

1941), defined the objectives of Turkish nationalism as

"Turkism, Islamism, and Europeanism" in his journal Fuvuzat

[Enlightenment]. But the birth of Turkism has really been

attributed to another Tatar, Yusuf Akgura (1870-1935), who

early on explicitly proclaimed a deep commitment to the Pan-

Turk cause and can probably be considered the "most

influential ideologue of Pan-Turkism in the Russian Empire."

His most influential work, "Uc tarz-i sivaset" ["Three

Systems of Government"], was printed in the Cairo journal

Turk in 1904. In it he argued that Turkism was the only

viable option for the union of all Turkic groups, with

5Landau, Pan-Turkism. 12.

6Landau, Irredentism. 83.

7Landau, Pan-Turkism. 10.

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Turkey at the center.8 Akgura believed that three distinct

political doctrines had developed in the Ottoman Empire. He

rejected, however, both the political theories of the

creation of an Ottoman state and Pan-Islamism. Instead, he

introduced Turk Millivet-i sivasivesi [Turkish nationalism],

a principle based on ethnic and religious bonds. Thus, for

the first time, "Pan-Turkism was preached as a political

doctrine" and irredentism had entered as a "political

element in the Pan-Turk ideology".9 Akgura explained that

...such a policy would be to unify all the Turks who, being spread over a great portion of Asia and over the Eastern parts of Europe, belong to the same language groups, the same ethnicity and mostly the same religion. Thus there would be created a greater national political unity among the other great nations.10

It is Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924), a Kurd, who can be

credited with systematizing Turkish thinking of Pan-Turkism

among Ottoman Turks. In his writings, Gokalp examined the

meaning and concept of nation." He concluded that "a

nation is not a racial or ethnic or geographic or political

or volitional group but one composed of individuals who

8Ibid, 14.

9Landau, Irredentism. 83.

10Yusuf Akgura, "Ug Tarz-i Siyaset" [Three Policies], trans. David S. Thomas, Central Asian Monuments I (Spring 1992): 160.

“For an examination of Gokalp's writing, see Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Writings of Ziva Gokalp (London: Luzac, 1950); Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziva Gokalp. 1876-1924 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985).

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share a common language, religion, morality, and aesthetics,

that is to say, who have received the same education.1,12

Cultural unity was emphasized as a preliminary to political

unity, and language reform was seen as a main component in

the formulation of cultural unity.13 Gokalp was a member of

Yeni Lisan [New Word], a strongly nationalistic society that

aimed at eliminating all foreign influences and to purify

the Turkic language, ridding it of Persian and Arabic loan

words, hence the organizations name, "New Word".14

Gokalp also concluded that there were three spheres

to the Turkish nation, and consecutive phases of Turkish

nationalism and expansion. The first sphere included the

Turks in the Republic of Turkey. The second sphere included

the Turkmen in Azerbaijan and Iran (Persia). This

southeastern group of Turkic peoples, who shared one common

culture with the Turks of Turkey, would be joined with the

Turkic state. The third sphere included more distant

Turkic-speaking people "who possessed a traditional

linguistic and ethnic unity," but not an identification with

Turkish culture. This phase would create greater Turkistan,

or Turan. A time frame was not included with Gokalp's

l2Gokalp, 15.

l3David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908 (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1977), 100.

14Zenkovsky, 107.

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outline of the phases of Turkish nationalism, only that

Turanism "remained a vision for the distant future."15

Early Pan-Turk Organizations and Literature

The most outspoken and active groups in terms of a

Pan-Turk nationalist and cultural awakening were the Tatars

and the Azeris. The establishment of schools, the founding

of newspapers, and the organization of political parties

along pan-Turkish lines was a growing trend in the early

twentieth century. Pan-Turkish associations in the Ottoman

Empire were scholarly or nationalistic groupings and often

adopted and maintained Pan-Turk policies. The first of

these associations was Turk Dernedi [The Association of

Turks], established in Istanbul in December 1908.

Membership included such committed pan-Turkists as Ismail

Gasprinsky, Ali Hiiseyinzade, and Yusuf Akgura, who presided

over the first meeting. The statutes of the association

were "to study and impart all the written works and

activities, past and present, of the Turkish peoples in

archaeology, history, linguistics, literature, ethnography,

ethnology, sociology, civilisation, and the old and new

geography of Turkish lands."16

15Landau, Pan-Turkism. 37.

16Ibid, 38.

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Another association founded in Istanbul and established

in 1913 was called Turk Yurdu [The homeland of the Turks].

The objectives of this organization were to raise the

cultural levels of Turks and to set up a meeting-ground for

nationalists, i.e. Pan-Turkists, to join forces. Membership

in Turk Yurdu included Yusuf Akgura, Ali Hiiseyinzade, and

Ziya Gokalp.17

Probably the most important and durable of all

organizations in the early 1900s with Pan-Turk inclinations

was Turk Ocadi [Hearth of the Turks]. It was first

established in June 1911 with the stated objectives of

"working for the national education of the Turkish people

and raising its intellectual, social and economic level, for

the perfection of the Turkish language and race."18

In Central Asia, several organizations also began to

emerge just prior to the fateful 1917 Communist Revolution.

In Tashkent in September 1917, with the added participation

of Azerbaijanis, an ubmrella organization called the Turk

adami markazivvat (Turkic Self-Determination Society) came

into being that pulled together various societies and groups

for concerted action. The society was also responsible for

the publication of a short-lived newspaper, Turk eli [The

17Ibid, 40.

18Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Turkic People].19 Other newspapers published during this

period included Turan [Land of the Turk], Turk sozi [The

Turkic Word], and in Russian Turkestanskaia nravda

(Turkistan Truth) .20

Pan-Turk reformers were also active in Kazakhstan.

The Kazakh Pan-Turks showed a political undertone in their

teachings and writings, similar to their Tatar teachers.21

New ideas began to appear in the poems and essays of the

Kazakh religious writers. The writings of Abubakir Kerderi

(1858-1903) exhibited familiarity and sympathy with the Pan-

Turks and new-method reformers of Kazan.22 Kazakh

intellectuals influenced by Pan-Turkic ideas sometimes

contributed to journals like Teriuman. "The intellectuals,

secularists, and Pan-Turks were committed to working

together....They organized newspapers and journals to spread

this message to the literate Kazakhs, who in turn were

charged with spreading these ideas to the illiterate

masses.23

l9Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 169.

2uIbid, 192.

21Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 102.

22Ibid, 108.

23Ibid, 115.

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One important movement strongly influenced by pan-

Turk ideology was the Basmachi movement. It began as a

revolt in 1916 in reaction to the first non-voluntary

recruitment of Central Asians into the Russian army during

World War One, and as a protest to the actual Russian

conquest it continued as a movement for the National

Liberation of Turkistan, whose aim was the establishment of

an independent Turkistan. This movement was not connected

to any other, and membership included public and private

figures from Kazakh, Uzbek, and Bashkurt unions.24 The most

prominent member of the Basmachi movement was Enver Pasha

(1881-1922)25, as he had the most definite ideas favoring

Pan-Turkism as an expansionist policy, and played a critical

role in its adoption as a state policy.26

“H.B. Paksoy, "Basmachi," in Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union. 1992 ed., vol. 4.

25For a detailed account of Enver Pasha, please see Sevket Siireyya Aydemir, Makedonnva'dan Orta Asva'va Enver Pasha. 3 vols. (Istanbul, 19970-72); Glen Swanson, "Enver Pasha, The Formative Year," Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 3 (October 1980); Azade-Ayse Rorlic, "Fellow Travelers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik Government 1918-1920," Journal of the Roval Society for Asian Affiars 13, part 3 (October 1982) .

26Landau, Pan-Turkism. 50.

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Pan-Turkism in the Soviet Union

One of the most detrimental Soviet policies in

Central Asia to ethnic Turkic identity centered around

language reform.

The Soviets, in order to reduce the influence of Turkey and to combat the Pan-Turanist and Pan-Islamic ideologies prevalent there, started several programs (among them, one dealing with languages) that attempted, according to many, to isolate the Central Asians from their traditional sources of culture in Iran, Turkey, and other countries east of the Mediterranean Sea.27

The policy was to change the Arabic script to the Latin

script. Two speculative reasons for this policy exist. One

reason was "ostensibly....to accelerate the rate of literacy

in the region," and the other reason is that the move

toward Latinization of the alphabet was primarily designed

to make separate cultures out of the more or less homogenous

and unified culture of Central Asia.28

The Latin alphabet was substituted for Arabic for

the first time in 1926 in Azerbaijan and later that year in

Turkmenistan, followed by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and

Kazakhstan in 1928. Conversion of printed materials into

the Latin alphabet was not put into effect until the middle

^M. Mobin Shorish, "Planning by Decree: The Soviet Language Policy in Central Asia," Language Problems and Language Planning 8, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 36.

28Shorish, 37.

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of the first five-year plan in 1930.29 This tranformation

to a Latin script led to increased communication between the

Central Asian republics and Turkey, which the Soviet Union

found undesirable,30 and therefore by 1940 the Latin script

had been replaced with Cyrillic in all the republics.

Despite the continuing language policy aimed at

attempting to hinder Turkic identification, Pan-Turk

literature continued to be published after World War I.

Even though pan-Turkish publications were censored, closed

down, or banned in the Republic of Turkey in the 1930s and

Soviet policies were directed against ethnic Turks in

Central Asia, the publications of this literature persevered

in Europe. They were of a political nature, written and

sponsored by the Outside Turks. Prominent publications of

this period included Turan Mecmuasi [The Magazine of Turan],

a Turanian publication issued by Hungarians; Yeni Turan [The

New Turan], published in Finland; Kurtulus [Liberation], an

Azerbaijani monthly in Turkish; Yas Turkistan [Young

Turkistan], an organ of the National Council of Turkistan

issued in Berlin; and Turkestan, a monthly published in

29Shorish, 38-41.

1uSmith, Nationalities Question. 231.

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France in Turkish, which was mainly concerned with Turkistan

and its sufferings under Soviet rule.31

The Republic of Turkey and Pan-Turkism

With the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923

under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, a new form of

nationalism based on the six elements of Kemalism was

advocated. Political pan-Turkism, especially one of an

irredentist nature, was officially discouraged.

Latent pan-Turkism lingered on, however, through the

1930s. Pan-Turkist groups, pamphlets and journals of an

irredentist nature continued in Turkey, albeit short-lived

ones. Mostly these groups and materials focused on the Di^

Tiirkler in their country of origin.

The best-known exemplifier of pan-Turkism in Turkey

during this period was Huseyin Nihal Atsiz (1905-1975).

Together with his brother Nejdet Sangar (1910-1975), he led

the Pan-Turk movement in the Republic and moved it in an

even more irredentist, and eventually militant, direction.

Initially his writings and the journals published under his

direction resembled earlier pan-Turk articles which

commented primarily on the "history, language, literature,

and present circumstances of the Turkic peoples". Later a

31Landau, Pan-Turkism. 78-80.

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new and distinct trait was added to the pan-Turk ideology:

racism. Pan-Turkism of the 1930s in the Repulic of Turkey

emphasized the racial bond of Turks.32

Some of Atsiz's publications included Atsiz Mecmua.

Avlik Fikir Mecmuasi [Atsiz: a Monthly Magazine of Ideas],

which focused on Turkish literature and history and the

Outside Turks; Turkcii Mecmua [Orhan: A Pan-Turk Monthly],

which contained articles on Turkish language, literature,

and history, but also moved toward the militant and

propounded Atsiz's theory of racial unity.33

Other pan-Turkic journals published during the 1930s

in Turkey were Birlik [Unity], the organ of a students'

organization; Cadlavan. Avlik Fikir ve Edebivat Deraisi

[Waterfall: a Monthly of Ideas and Literature]; and Bozkurt

[Wolf of the steppes — a symbol of Turkism and Pan-

Turkism] . Bozkurt. the longest survivor among Pan-Turk

periodicals, maintained a highly aggressive Pan-Turk

character, and "combined support for the Turkish race as a

unifying concept....with an attack on communism." The

editor, Reha 0§uz Tiirkkan (born 1920),

32Landau, Irredentism. 87-88.

33Landau, Pan-Turkism. 85-86.

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strove to redefine pan-Turkism by informing Pan-Turkists what was expected of them: belief in the superiority of the Turkish race and continuous promotion of Pan- Turkism, in every domain. Regarding the latter, he exhorted Pan-Turkists to adhere firmly to the following principles: racism, All-Turk unity, a warlike outlook, morality, proper administration and activism.34

After World War II there was a resurgence of Pan-

Turkism in the Republic of Turkey. This revival was found

mainly in nationalistic circles which shared a common goal

to make Turkey great again and to fight communism. Several

movements were joined into the Turk Millivetciler Dernedi

[Association of Turkish Milliyetgis] in 1951.35 These

movements included Turk Kultiir Ocaai [Hearth of Turkish

Culture], established in 1946 to "spread Turkish culture and

defend it from both internal and external attacks by foreign

ideologies"; Turk Genclik Teskiiati [Organization of Turkish

Youth]; Turk Kiilturu Calismalari Dernedi [Association for

Activities of Turkish Culture]; and Turk Ktilttir Dernedi

[Association for Turkish Culture - Ankara]. The association

was closed down in January 1953.36

In the 1960s Pan-Turk groups remained active. After

the 1960 military takeover many groups reorganized. In

34Ibid, 87-88.

35Svanberg, Kazakh Refugees. 80.

36Landau, Pan-Turkism. 130.

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Istanbul on 16 September 1962 the Tiirkculer Dernefli

[Association of Pan-Turkists] was established. The goals of

this association were:

1. to strengthen Pan-Turk sentiments amongst the Turks 2. to train exemplary Pan-Turkists — loving God, Turkism and the Fatherland, people committed to the history, historic homeland, language, culture, race and sacred values of the Turks 3. to strive for futhering justice, morality, knowledge, freedom and discipline within the Turkish nation 4. to combat ideas harmful to Turkish unity and in opposition to the Fatherland, morals and national traditions 5. to support all nationalist attitudes within the Homeland37

The association's name was changed on 30 August 1964 to

Tiirkive Millivetcelier Birlidi [Union of the Nationalists of

Turkey].

The most outstanding activity of the Pan-Turk groups

was the takeover of the conservative Republican Peasants and

Nation Party (RPNP) in 1965 by several acknowledged Pan-

Turkists, one of whom was Alparslan Tiirke?. Turke? was born

in Cyprus in 1917, moved to Istanbul at age 15 and began a

military career, rising to the rank of colonel. He

participated in Pan-Turk demonstrations in 1944 for which he

was tried, convicted, and later acquitted. In 1963 he

resigned from the military and entered politics. Realizing

37Ibid, 146-147.

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that the Pan-Turks were too few to begin a political party

on their own, Tiirke? led the takeover of the RPNP in 1969

and renamed it the Milli Hareket Partisi [Nationalist Action

Party (NAP)].38

Turke? determined the party format and its basic

ideology. Nationalism, with recurring Pan-Turkist currents,

was its core theme.39 It was strongly anti-communist, anti-

Soviet, extremely nationalistic, and sought to strengthen

ties with Outside Turks.40 Emphasis was on strong personal

leadership, discipline and sacrifices, and the main goal was

defined as "creating a nationalist strong government."41

Participation in elections resulted in receiving several

seats in the Parliament. In 1969 NAP received 3% of the

vote,42 in 1973 it received 3.4% of the vote, and in 1975 it

received 6.4% of the vote.43 The Nationalist Action Party

also joined the majority Jutice Party to form coalition

governments as a junior member under Demirel in 1975 and

1977. The youth group of the party, Boz Kurtlar [Grey

38Landau, Irredentism. 90.

39Ibid, 150.

40Svanberg, Kazakh Refugees. 80.

41Jacob M. Landau, "The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey," Journal of Contemporary History 17 (1982): 600-601.

42Michael P. Hyland, "Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections," Middle East Journal 24, no. 1 (Winter 1970): 1-16.

43Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 119.

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Wolves] actively participated in the youth violence that

engulfed Turkey prior to the 1980 military intervention.

After the military took power in September 1980, Turke? was

imprisoned for subversive action and the party was

forbidden.44

l4Svanberg, Kazakh Refugees. 80.

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MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY

With the restoration of a civilian government in

1982 in the Republic of Turkey, political parties were again

encouraged to form and participate in general elections.

Initially, however, Pan-Turks did not resume a political

orientation and did not achieve even the limited political

impact it had prior to the 1980 military intervention.

Activities of the Pan-Turks consisted mostly of written

propaganda, with a focus on the assimilation campaign

against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria1 and an

identification with the Turks of Cyprus.

Aloarslan Tiirkes

Turke? was eventually released from prison and

returned to political activity as a Yozgat deputy. In the

Fall of 1991 Tiirke? and several candidates of the National

Labor Party (NLP) (formerly the Nationalist Actiona Party)

formed a political alliance with Necmettin Erbakan and the

right-fundamentalist Welfare Party (WP) (formerly the

National Salvation Party), and ran for parliament on the WP

ticket. Due to this alliance, the WP had lost some

landau, "Fortunes": 2.

32

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credibility, especially in the Southeast region, supposedly

because of Tiirke? and his "rascist orientation" of the "pure

Turk".2 Erbakan tried to reassure voters that although it

had entered into "an electoral alliance with the country's

pan-Turkist movement", the Welfare Party did not support

racism nor did he agree with TUrke§' extreme right-wing

views bordering on racism.3 When questioned about being a

racist Tvirke? replied: "There cannot be any change in our

beliefs in....the greatness of the Turkish nation. There

have always been accusations against us....We sincerely

believe in the spirit of Mustafa Hemal's adage 'Fortunate is

the person who says he is a Turk'."4

It was Tiirke? who put forward a motion in Parliament

to discuss the recognition of the Turkic Republics in the

Soviet Union. During a debate on the issue, he argued that

Turkish foreign policy virtually ignored the republics and

that this policy must be changed.5 This raised questions as

2"Contest Goes On Amid Mud-Slinging and Battle for Media", Briefing, no. 857 (7 October 1991): 3.

3"Erbakan's Vision: Islamic Harmony and a Cleansed Society," Briefing, no. 858 (14 October 1991): 6.

4"T(irke? Urges Government to Battle Separatism," (text). Istanbul Cumhurivet in Turkish (25 October 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 11 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-238; p. 55-56).

5"Government Assesses Policy on Soviet Republics," (text). Ankara Turkish Daily News in English (14 December 1991). FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 17 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBSI-WEU- 91-242; p. 53).

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to Tiirke?' real aims. At times it was unclear if he was

leading a party of democratic nationalists, as his outward

role and attitude suggested, or if the party was one with

ultimate totalitarian aims.6 By the end of 1991 Tiirke? had

joined the Nationalist Labor Party and was elected NLP

leader. This was done, he said, to unite two groups who

shared similar views, principles, and ideals under a single

roof.7

It appears on the surface that the aims and

ideologies of Alparslan Tiirke? and his party were no

different than they had been prior to the 1980 military

intervention. He has not denied being racist, and he has

continued to proclaim the greatness of the Turkish nation.

To what extent the new Tiirke? party will advance pan-Turkic

notions remains to be seen.

Position of the Turkish Government

Depending on one's viewpoint, the Turkish government

could have a lot to gain or to lose by advocating the

political creation of Turkistan. In a world of nation­

states, the promotion of expansionist theories is not

6|,Time for the Right to Come Clean on Democracy," Briefing, no. 867 (16 December 1991): 4-5.

7"Tiirke? Elected NLP Leader," (text). Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, 2700 GMT (29 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 31 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-250; p. 16).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35

condoned. The official government position so far as been

to encourage and assist in the development of cultural and

economic relations between Turkey and the other Turkic

republics, but a political union has not been advocated.

In an interview on 14 October 1991 with Turkish

Culture Minister N. Kemal Zeybek, cultural relations with

the Turkic republics were discussed. Zeybak was asked by

Turkistan reporter Serap Ilaslan his opinion on Turkish

policy towards the "Outside Turks" and what action the

Ministry was taking to develop relations with the Turkish

states. He replied that it was the responsibility of the

Ministry to extend Turkish culture and that it would be

mutually beneficial to study the cultures of the various

Turkic states. By studying the various cultures, one area

that could be greatly enhanced is in the arts and

literatures. For example, if there are 1000 folk songs,

lullabyes, and poems in Turkey and 1000 folk songs,

lullabyes, and poems in Central Asia, these can be exchanged

and therefore the cultural richness of the Turkic states

will be magnified. By interacting with all Turkish

cultures, the culture of Turkey will also develop.8 The

best means of continuing to develop cultural programs is

through education. By reading and examining the writings of

8Serap Ilaslan, "Kiiltiir Bakani Namik Kemal Zeybek lie Roportaj," Turkistan 4, no. 14, (1991): 12.

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influential thinkers on Turkish culture (especially Ziya

Gokalp), a culture can be enriched and preserved.9

When asked about Turkey's national dignity on an

international platform, Zeybak explained that Turkey is

gaining prestige throughout the world and will continue to

carry the flag of peace and promote mutual tolerance in the

world, as this is the Turkish culture. He also commented

that it was his hope to get rid of individual flags for the

Turkic nations and to be joined together under one flag as

one culture.10

Delegations from the Turkish government began to

visit the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan after their

proclamations of independence. A delegation headed by

Ambassador Bilal §im?ir toured these republics in September

1991. The Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman drew attention

to the fact that Turkey had been the first country to extend

congratulations by sending delegations to all the Asian

republics. Azerbaijan and Central Asian Turkish republics

want to establish close relations with Turkey. The

spokesman elaborated by stating the republics wanted "to

develop relations with Turkey, to have direct trade,

establish joint ventures, and send students to Turkey. They

9Hasan Oztiirk, "Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Hiikumet Programlarinda Ktiltur," Yeni Forum 9, no. 210 (1-15 Haziran 1988): 44-46.

10Ilhaslan, 13.

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want to train their personnel in Turkey. In short,

Azerbaijan and Central Asian Turkish republics want to get

closer to Turkey."11

Turkey's policy towards the Turks in Central Asian

and the Caucasus was constantly being pulled in different

directions. The Foreign Ministry, the presidential palace,

the National Security Council, and religious and racist

groups all had different views on the situation. Sule

Perincek wrote of the important role Turkey had in

integrating these republics into the world market in an

issue of 2000 Ikibin'e DoSru rTowards 20001 (a radical

Left/Maoist magazine). Perincek reported that the Bush

administration was worried that with the disintegration of

the Soviet Union new problems would be created in the

region. A former CIA official was quoted as saying that

"Turkey should develop good relations with the republics,

but do so in tandem with Moscow."12 The United States even

went so far as to caution the former Mesut Yilmaz government

of Turkey not to take steps that would encourage the

disintegration of the Soviet Union after the ex-cabinet

u"0n Visits to Soviet Republics," (text). Ankara Anatolia in English, 1540 GMT (2 Oct 91). FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 3 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-192; p. 29-30).

12Sule Perincek, "Policy on Soviet Turkic Republics Viewed," (text). 2000 Ikibin'e DoQru in Turkish (19 October 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 29 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU- 91-209; p. 43-45).

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decided to extend full recognition to the Republic of

Azerbaijan on 9 November 1991, after Azerbaijan proclaimed

its independence from the Soviets.13

At the same time, designate Prime Minister Suleyman

Demirel said in principal he supported the idea of

recognizing Azerbaijan but had reservations about the

timing. He indicated that a clearer picture was needed of

the relationship that would result between Azerbaijan and

Moscow as a consequence of its declaration of independence

before Turkey would take the final step of recognizing the

Turkic republics. The Turkish Daily News was told the

coalition government led by Demirel would attach great

importance to substantially improving ties with the Turkic

republics in the Soviet Union.14 Prior to a parliamentary

debate on the recognition of the republics, Deputy Prime

Minister Erdal Inonii stated that the position of the Turkish

government was not to increase the disintegration phase of

the Soviet Union, but rather, he said, "we will maintain and

enhance our ties with the Turkic republics in cultural,

economic and trade fields."15

13Ilnun Cevik, "Demirel Said to Approach Soviet Turks Cautiously," (text). Ankara Turkish Daily News in English (26 November 1991). FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 2 December 1991 (PrEx: FBIS-WEU-91-231; p. 38).

14Ibid.

15"Government Assesses Policy on Soviet Republics." FBSI-WEU- 91-242 (17 December 1991).

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Inonii had previously made comments that he was

against Pan-Turkism. This angered many individuals who felt

he was playing into the hands of the West by denying the

Turks a cultural, historical and political relationship

which other ethnic or geographical groups were free to enjoy

and pursue. Why should Turkic unity be conceived of in a

negative connotation, when Arab unity or Latin unity is

accepted? Turkic unity could be a unity based on the

necessity of resolving continental problems, which would be

no different than a Pan-American conference occuring between

all the American states. Or it could simply be a unity

based on mutual historical, language, and cultural trends.

And since there has been a trend lately in Kazakhstan,

Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkey for individuals to

identify themselves as Turks, for a Turkish leader to say "I

am against Pan-Turkism" made many individuals feel this was

equal to saying he would not recognize other Turks.16

Comments by Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Democratic

Left Party, suggested the need for the creation of an

"External Turkish Ministry." The necessity of the Ministry,

he said, was warrented by the fact there has been a steady

increase in the interest of Turkish governments in the fate

of ethnic Turks beyond Turkey's borders over the decades.

l6"Pan-Tiirkizm ve Pan-Kiirdizm," Yeni Forum 10, no. 247 (16-31 Aralik 1989): 20.

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"An outburst of pan-Turcisin is always possible" and some

believe would not even be discouraged the more the

"Christian West" picks and chooses in its relations with the

ex-Soviet republics.17 Sooner or later, with all the

unleashing of emotions long suppressed by Turkic groups18,

many believe the Republic of Turkey could be led into

Turanist or pan-Turkist commitments.19

Officially, however, the Turkish government has

denied claims of pan-Turkist aspirations. Turkish Foreign

Minister Hikmet Qetin repeatedly assured the Russian

government that Turkey had no ambition to establish a pan-

Turkic sphere of influence in the former USSR. Qetin also

publicly dismissed the "misconceptions" of Turkey's policy

towards the former republics that had begun to float through

news reports and stated the policy was neither

"discriminatory, nor expansionist, nor pan-Turkish." He

explained that it was only normal for Turkey to seek and

forge ties with people whom it shares a common religion,

language, and culture.20

17"Recognition for Baltic States: Eyes Turn to Azerbaijan," Briefing no. 853 (9 September 1991): 3-4.

l8Cengiz (Jandar, "Central Eurasia: New Friends for Turkey," The Turkish Times. 1 February 1992, p. 2.

19"Ankara Shifts Gear in Central Asia Policy..." Briefing no. 868 (23 December 1991): 8-9.

20"getin Assures Russian on Ankara's Policy in the Turkish Republics," The Turkish Times. 1 Feb 1992, 1.

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In December 1991 the Turkish government attempted to

establish a "Turkish League" among the Turkic republics as

one means of forging ties. Protocols were signed with

Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenia covering cooperation in

the fields of culture, education, health services,

transport, politics, science and technology, and commerce.

The republics asked Turkey to help them make the transition

to use of the Latin alphabet and in turn would share their

natural resources with Turkey, such as Kazakh natural gas

and Azerbaijani oil.21

The official position of the Turkish government is

one of promoting peace, development, and exchanges between

Turkey, the Turkic republics of Eurasia, and Azerbaijan. It

is speculated that pan-Turkism could again become a viable

political force. The government strongly denies any pan-

Turkist or expansionist tendencies. An examination of the

cultural similarities and differences will be studied and

expanded on; language reform will continue. Economic

initiatives will be undertaken and each republic will embark

upon joint cooperation projects with Turkey. The position

of the Turkish government has not suggested nor promoted a

political union of the Turkic republics.

21"Turkish League in Works," The Turkish Times. 1 February 1992, 3.

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Emigre Movements in Turkey

A comprehensive overview of current pan-Turkic

movements in the Republic of Turkey can be found in a recent

unpublished study by L.A. Benzanis entitled "Soviet Muslim

Emigres in the Republic of Turkey." Benzanis examines the

activities of several emigre groups, three of which will be

reviewed here.

One group is part of the Azerbavcan Milli Merkezi

(AMM) [National Center of Azerbaijan] based in Ankara. This

group is responsible for the Azeri publishing scene and

controls Azerbavcan Kultiir Dernedi (AKD) [Azerbaijan

Cultural Association], originally established in 1949.

Leaders indicate that 15,000 people in Turkey are committed

to an independent Azerbaijan. The goals of the AMM are to

1. serve as a conduit for information about Azerbaijan 2. promote recognition in the world community for the cause of a free Azerbaijan that should form part of a confederation of Caucasian states 3. provide moral support for groups within Azerbaijan that share such views22

The AKD is responsible for publishing the quarterly organ of

the AKD, Azerbavcan. This publication has a current

circulation of approximately 3000 and often runs more than

200 pages. "As a cultural publication with a strong Azeri

Turk nationalist orientation, it is essentially the torch-

22L.A. Bezanis, "Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey," 25 October 1991, Middle East Section, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 76-77.

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bearer of the Musavat Party in emigration. It is Pan-

Turkist to the extent that the history and problems of the

various Turkic peoples of the USSR and China are as well

within its purview."23

Another Azeri group that has surfaced in Turkey is

the Azerbavian Tiirkleri Kiiltur ve Danisma Dernedi (ATKDD)

[Cultural and Information Association of the Turks of

Azerbaijan]. The ATKDD has been active in co-sponsoring the

First International Congress on Azerbaijan along with the

Turk Diinvasi Arastirmalari Vakfi [Turkish World Research

Foundation]. This congress coincided with the anniversary

of the Republic of Azerbaijan's 1918 declaration of

independence. Extremism is the message of some younger

Azeri members of the organization, and many "are enamored of

the Bozkurt (Grey Wolf) Pan-Turkist symbol". The ATKDD is

responsible for two bi-monthly publications. The newspaper

Hazar [Caspian] devotes its attention to contemporary

affairs and traces "the interaction of activists in Turkey

and Azerbaijan, monitoring the echo of development in the

Caucasus in the nationalist or Pan-Turkist/nationalist press

in Turkey." The second publication is a monthly glossy

journal entitled Azerbavcan Tiirkleri [Turks of

Azerbaijan] .24

“ ibid, 84.

“ ibid, 79.

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In addition to Azeris, many Turkistanis have

organized and begun publications. The Tiirkestanlilar Kultvir

ve Sosval Yardimlasma Dernedi [Turkistani Culture and Social

Aid Association] was formed in Istanbul in 1984 by former

activists connected to the Tiirkistanlilar Yardimlasma

Dernedi (TYD) [Turkistan Aid Association]. In 1988 the

organization began to print a quarterly "scholarly,

economic, and cultural" glossy magazine entitled Turkistan.

This is a resurrection and continuation of the 1920s journal

Yeni Turkistan and the 1930s Turkistan published in France

(see chapter II, p. 24). "Though Turkistan focuses mainly

on Central Asia it is a forum for the cause of various

Turkic peoples in the USSR, China and Afghanistan seeking a

greater independence. To this extent it is Pan-Turkic in

character. Tiirkistan favors a common alphabet for the

Turkic world and encourages Turkey to overcome its fear of

being accused of Pan-Turkism." It is the longest running

and most sophisticated product of the Turkistani community

in Turkey.25

Intellectual Movement and Language Reform

From 27-29 April 1987 Ankara University arranged and

hosted a symposium with the theme "Diinvada Tiirkler" [Turks

of the World]. This syposium offered exhibits reflecting

25Ibid, 122-126.

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regional cultures and displays of publications. On the

first day of the syposium in his opening remarks, Ankara

University President Tarik Somer talked of conditions of the

millions of Turks living throughout the world (China,

Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Bulgaria, Western Thrace and

Yugoslavia) and noted that despite assimilation campaigns

and propaganda against Islam and Turkic peoples, the Turks

of the world have managed to maintain and preserve their

Turkishness and culture.26

The Turk Dunvasi Arastirmalan Vakfi is active in

promoting an understanding of the Turkic peoples throughout

the world. In addition to co-sponsoring the International

Conference on Azerbaijan (see above) the association also is

responsible for publications. Beginning in January 1987 one

magazine that began publication under the direction of the

association was the monthly Turk Dunvasi Tarih Dercrisi [Turk

World History Magazine]. One article explained that the

magazine would be serving reality and not an ideology,

through independent readers ideas, requests, critiques and

criticisms. It would be the responsibility of Turkish

authors to regain a sense of common history.27

“ "Ankara Universitesi'nde 'Diinyada Tiirkler' Sempozyumu," Yeni Forum 8, no. 185 (15 Mayis 1987): 11.

27"Tiirk Diinyasi Dergisi," Forum 8, no. 181 (15 Mart 1987): 48.

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Significant attention has been given to the

development of the Turkish languange and language reform in

general throughout the Turkic regions. The Turcology

Congress published an outline of the historical development

of Turkic languages.28 Articles have also been written

discussing the standardization of the Turkish language29 and

the effects of the Turkish language on maintaining a

cultural identity.30 Dr. Ozgen noted that the most

important way to preserve a nation was to preserve the

cultural customs, habits, and naturally the language of that

nation. Therefore it is imperative to pay attention to the

beauty of the Turkish language and the importance of its

unifying effects. The trend of importing foreign terms into

the Turkish language (examples given were prestii. nostalii.

transformasvon. and perspektif) must be reversed for it is

destroying the Turkish language and it is the responsibility

of writers, politicians, and the press to show an interest

in this topic for the preservation of the language.31 This

is identical to the aims of Yeni Lisan and the preservation

28Hviseyin A§ca, "Tiirk Dilinin Tarihi Geligimi," Yeni Forum 9, no. 219 (16-31 Ekim 1988): 32-34.

29§. Kaya Sefero^lu, "Anadolu Tiirkgesinin Standarizasyonuna Dair Diigunceler," Forum 8, no. 188 (1 Temmuz 1987): 28-31.

30Mahmut Ihsan Ozgen, "Turkge ve Dig etkiler," Yeni Forum. 10, no. 247 (16-31 Aralik 1989): 46-47.

31Ibid.

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of cultural unity as described by Gokalp in the early

twentieth century (see above).

Letters written by individuals from Turkey and

Central Asia to the editors of Yeni Forum reaffirm the

necessity to return to using and respecting the mother

language in order to preserve the cultural heritage of the

people. Especially in Central Asia there are not enough

books available in Turkish or a dialect of Turkish. When

books are located in a Turkish language, the grammer is

often incorrect and of low quality. One women from Alma-Ata

wrote in a letter explaining that it has been very difficult

to preserve the mother language in Kazakhstan, especially in

the cities. Children go to school together and learn

Russian, speak Russian, listen to Russian music, watch

Russian television and read Russian books. Parents work and

are unable to to reinforce Kazakh culture and customs. In

her house, her daughter does not know Kazakh and whenever

Kazakh language shows are on television, she goes to another

room. The children have become disrepectful of village

relatives and ignore traditional customs, culture and

music.32

The Institute of Turkic studies at Marmara

University held a symposium on the contemporary Turkic

32£a§atay Kogar, "Tiirkistand'da Ana Dili Hususunda Son Geligmeler," Yeni Forum 10, no. 231 (16-30 Nisan 1989): 27-29.

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alphabets from 18-20 November 1991 in Istanbul. Delegates

and scholars from universities in Turkey and from the

Central Asian republics participated in sessions to discuss

the steps necessary for transferring to the Latin alphabet

and made suggestions for the alphabet to be used by Turkic

groups.33

Summary

The government of the Republic of Turkey denies any

expansionist ideas of creating a politically united Turkish

state. Culturally, however, it is recognized that the

Turkic peoples of Eurasia are very similar. The Culture

Minister of Turkey, N. Kemal Zeybek, has openly stated that

more emphasis should be placed on these cultural similarites

to strengthen and develop both the culture of Turkey and the

Republics, especially in the arts and literature. He also

commented that it was his desire for the Turkic peoples to

be united under one cultural flag.

Representatives of the government have gone to great

lengths to quell inuendos that Turkey is harboring Pan-

Turkist emotions and tendencies. Mostly these negative

accusations of labelling individuals or organizations Pan-

Turkist stem from other ethnic groups (especially Russians

33Marmara University Institute of Turkic Studies, "Final Circular of the Symposium on the Contemporary Turkic Alphabets", 18-20 November 1991, UmidHope. trans. Orhan Soylemez, Columbia University (Spring 1992): 21.

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and Armenians) who do not want to see one individual Turkic

republic emerge. Turkish Foreign Minister £etin explained

it was only natural for there to be an interest in

developing relations with these republics since they share a

common language and religion, especially after 70 years of

being denied any contact of significance. Prime Minister

Demiral also noted the importance of enhancing ties with the

Turkic republics. Protocols were signed to develop

relations in the areas of communication, technology,

science, economics, transportation and education. Turkey is

also assisting in the transfer of the Cyrillic alphabet to

the Latin alphabet by supplying printing equipment and

typewriters, as well as hosting syposiums to assist in the

development of an alphabet and its eventual implementation.

Studies related to the development of Turkic languages and

the importance of language on the preservation of a nation

are also being conducted.

Emigre groups in the Republic of Turkey have been

active in promoting cultural, and at times political, unity

between the various Turkic peoples. Mostly this occurs

through the publication of journals focusing on the various

causes and events occuring in Central Asia and issues such

as language reform and independence. Organizations such as

Azerbavian Tiirkleri Kiiltur ve Danisma Dernedi have also been

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active in coordinating international conferences to support

the development of ties between Turkic groups.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IV

AZERBAIJAN

For the past five years, Azerbijan has been witness

to extreme ethnic violance over the disputed Nagorno-

Karabakh region with Armenia. This conflict has made the

Azerbaijanis more acutely aware of their own ethnic heritage

and culture and provided a channel for their energies to

achieve political sovereignty. Azerbaijan, the Turkic

republic closest in geographical proximity to Turkey, has

from the beginning of qlasnost looked towards Turkey for

assistance and guidance.

Movements in Azerbaijan

The Popular Front of Azerbaijan, or PFA, (also

referred to in numerous articles as the Azerbaijan People's

Front, or APF), was officially recognized on 5 October 19891

and rapidly gained prestige and influence in the republic.

The programme of the PFA states that its aim is "to support

perestroika as a general social movement aiming to improve

and democratise all spheres of our lives."2 It supports

‘"Popular Front of Azerbaijan Recognized" (text). Moscow World Service in English, 1100 GMT (6 October 1989). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 6 October 1989 (PrEx7.10:FBIS-SOV-89-193; p. 43).

2Smith, Nationalities Question. 172.

51

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non-violence and human rights, with freedom as the highest

universal good.

Almost from its inception, the PFA has been

negatively labeled as being Pan-Turkist and promoting Pan-

Turkism throughout the region by Armenians and Soviet

officials. Armenian radio reported that Azerbaijan was

using perestroika and the period for restructuring to act

out long suppressed emotions of Pan-Turkism, with the

Sumgait genocide as its first opportunity in that direction.

Once the mechanism for Pan-Turkism was in place, Azerbaijan

would then "seek the unification of the people living in

Soviet Azerbaijan and northern Iran with the long-range

intention of forging a policy oriented toward Turkey."3

USSR Peoples' Deputy Sero Khanzadyan reported that

the violence over Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous

Oblast) and what he termed the "policy of genocide aimed at

the extermination of the Armenians" emanated from the "den

of gray wolves" in Ankara. Soviet officials did not

recognize the Sumgait genocide because, according to

Khanzadyn, past and present Aliyevian pan-Turks had

3"Armenian Radio: Azerbaijan Motivated by Pan-Turkism" (text). Yerevan International Service in Armenian, 1900 GMT (9 January 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 10 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-007; p. 70).

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"disgracefully become the masters of Kremlin."4 Soviet

Ambassador to Ankara Albert Chernyshev has also said that

the movements of Pan-Turkism and Turanism must be

eliminated.5

The ideology and initial goals of the People's Front

were outlined in an interview with one of its members, Gamid

Kherischi. This interview was conducted on 20 November 1989

by two reporters from the Lithuanian newspaper Ataimimas.

Kherischi explained that the PFA viewed the Soviet Union as

a dualistic state, divided along Christian-Muslim and

Slavic-Turkic lines. He encouraged the Baltic states to

continue their fight to seceed from the USSR, for this would

mean less Christian peoples in the USSR and give Turkic-

Muslims a greater advantage. Primarily Kherischi espoused

pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic, anti-Russian, anti-Armenian, and

anti-Christian orientations.6

4Khorhvdayn Hayastan, "Article Links 'Genocide' to Turkey, Pan- Turkism" (review). Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian, 0545 GMT (17 January 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 24 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-016; p. 49).

5"Soviet on Multinational Force, Turkic Movements." (text). Ankara Anatolia in Turkish, 1615 GMT (3 August 1991). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 5 August 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-150; p. 44).

6A. Azhubalio and A. Zdanavichyus, "Azerbaijan People's Front on Goals, Ideology" (text). Baku Bakinskiv Rabochiv in Russian (16 December 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 25 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-017; p. 53-54).

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Pan-Turkic orientations were also evident in

statements made by another PFA member, leader of the

Azerbaijan Turkish Youth, Nimet Ahmet Penahli. Penahli

blamed the United States and Soviet Union for collaborating

with Armenia against Azerbaijan and the Turkic world. This

was being done, he said, in an attempt to prevent a union

between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the other Turkic republics.

In addition, he suggested that the United States would

continue supporting Armenia, promote its independence and

expand its territory to prevent a union of the Turkish world

just as it created the state of Israel to combat Arab unity

and Islamic movements. He predicated that in the wake of

the collpase of the Soviet Union, as an inevitable

consequence of historical rules, the 60 million strong

Turkey would unite with Iranian Azerbaijan which would then

join the approximately 60 million Turkic peoples in Central

Asia. This in turn would lead to the formation of a

confederation in the twenty-first century. He explained

that if the liberation movement in Azerbaijan prevails and Azerbaijan frees itself from Russian domination, then it will form a political-economic confederation with Turkey. Other Turkic peoples will follow suit. The creation of a great Turkish federation would transform the Turks into an economic superpower in the world and the West wants to prevent this.7

7Irfan Ulku, "Azerbaijan Youth Leader on Independent Movement" (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (18 October 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 23 October 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU- 90-205; p. 42-43).

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The importance of Turkey's support in Azerbaijan's struggle

for independence was also noted. Unless Turkey was

dedicated to Azerbaijan's independence, Armenia could come

between the two and cause greater problems for both of them.

Later that year another official statement of the

goals was made by several leaders of the Popular Front in an

interview conducted by the Turkish newspaper Millivet.

published in the 16 July 1990 edition. Present at the

interview were Abulfex Aliyev Elcibey, Nedzheb Nedzhebov,

Isa Kamberov, and Tofik Kasumov. These leaders stated that

independence for Azerbaijan was a goal of the organization

and the PFA would continue to work to achieve that final

result. To protect its borders from Armenia, the Georgian

SSR, and the peoples of the Dagestanskaya Autonomous SSR,

who are all demanding land from Azerbaijan, and also to

protect itself from the 140,000 Soviet armed forces in the

vicinity of Azerbaijan supposedly to assist the Armenians

(and not to quell the independence movement of Azerbaijan),

the PFA recognized the urgency to establish an independent

Azerbaijan army. Then, through a referendum, independence

and separation from the USSR would take place.

As for unification with Turkey, the leaders stated

that for the time being it was not an idea they supported.

"However, the idea of establishing a confederal state may be

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discussed after 20 or 30 years." After achieving

independence, the PFA would help the other Central Asian

republics become independent as well, and perhaps establish

a confederal state with them. However, they also noted that

it was premature to discuss that possibility this early in

their own struggle for independence.8

The People's Front also realized the necessity to

work together with the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet

Presidium in attempting to solve some of the problems

relating to the emergency situtation in the republic, the

situation with Armenia, and the mutual relations between

government organs, the PFA and others. A Consultative

Council made up of representatives of the republic

intelligentsia, the PFA, and other public organizations was

therefore established with the main task of uniting their

efforts. The first meeting of the Consultative Council took

place on 17 May 1990. A resolution was adopted for the

preparation of provisions and regulations for the

Consultative Council. Agreement was reached on adopting

joint measures to celebrate the 28 May anniversary of the

8Cenk Baslamis, "Turkish Paper Interviews Popular Front Leaders" (text). Istanbul Millivet in Turkish (16 July 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 20 July 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90- 140; p. 102-103).

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proclamation of Azerbaijan as the first democratic republic

in the East.9

The PFA was very vocal and critical of the way in

which its organization and some of its members had been

treated by the ruling government. Several branches of the

movement had been closed (one example being the Sabirabad

branch of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, whose activities

were halted on 4 April 199010), its newspaper, Azadlva

[Freedom], was under censorship (and eventually closed on 23

August 199111), and members were consistantly being arrested

and detained. The PFA acknowledged that continued actions

of this kind against its members would deter any progress

9"Azerbaijan Party, People's Front Form Council" (text). Baku Bakinskev Rabochiy in Russian (19 May 90). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 20 June 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-119; p. 114-115).

,0"Popular Front Branch Activity in Sabirabed Halted" (text). Baku Domestic Service in Azeri, 0440 GMT (26 July 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 27 July 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90- 145; p. 88).

""Popular Front Rally Comes Under OMON Attack." (excerpt). Moscow Komsomolskava Pravda in Russian (24 August 1991). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 26 August 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV- 91-165; p. 104).

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hoped to be made by the joint efforts of the Consultative

Council.12

The General Congress of the Azerbaijan People's

Front was held 13-16 July 1991 in Baku, with leaders from

all the Turkish ethnic groups having been invited to

attend.13 Elbulfex Aliyev Elcibey, leader of the

Azerbaijani People's Front, reported that efforts towards

independence were doubled after the congress. "The strength

we derived from the general congress has made it possible

for us to make more timely and practical decisions. The

People's Front, which wages the freedom and democratic

struggle for the Azerbaijani Turkism, reinvigorated itself

with the congress it held in Baku.”14 Elcibey also stressed

that he had no connection with the so-called Azerbaijan

National Freedom Front active in the Swedish city of

Uppsala, which has made unseemly territorial claims on

Turkey. He claimed that any groups making territorial

12"Azerbaijan Party, People's Front Form Council.” FBIS-SOV- 90-119, 20 June 1990.

13”Popular Front Leaders on Situation in Azerbaijan" (excerpt). Istanbul Tiirkive in Turkish (10 July 91). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 19 July 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-139; p. 88).

14,,People's Front Leader on Congress, Turkey” (text). Istanbul Turkiye in Turkish (30 July 91). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 6 August 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-151; p. 69-70).

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claims on Turkey were puppet organizations set up by the

Soviet secret service KGB and that the enemies of Turkey

were the PFA's enemies too.15

Another movement established in Azerbaijan was the

Azerbaijan People's Association. Since its inception in

April 1990, 30 branches of the organization were created

throughout Azerbaijan. Its leader, Mamed Kuleyev, said the

aim of the Azerbaijan People's Association was "to insure

the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic

independence of Azerbaijan and the development of democratic

socialism."16 No further information was obtained regarding

this organization.

Relations with Turkey

Official relations between Azerbaijan and the

Republic of Turkey have been increasing in number and

magnitude. Initially, dialogue consisted of ways to

enhance basic cultural and social programs. With Turkey's

recognition of Azerbaijan's independence, dialogue has

15Ibid.

16"New People's Association Formed in Azerbaijan" (text). Moscow World Service in Russian, 0930 GMT (14 April 90). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 16 April 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV- 90-073; p. 134).

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shifted to include economic, technological, and educational

exchanges.

A delegation from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist

Republic [SSR] headed by Ayaz Hutalibov, then chairman of

the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium, visited

Turkey in January 1990 at the invitation of Finance and

Customs Minister Ekram Padkemirli. The visit was seen as a

means of establishing uninterrupted trade, economic,

scientific, and cultural relations between Turkey and the

Azerbaijan SSR, and also a source for broadening and

deepening Turkish-Soviet relations.17 At meetings with

Turkish business representatives, the govenor of Istanbul,

and other officials, Mutalibov urged ways to discover and

implement new forms of cooperation, such as border trade,

joint establishments, and the coordination of projects.

Mutalibov commented upon leaving that the talks were very

fruitful and that it was the first time individuals at the

government level had became acquainted with opportunities in

neighboring Turkey for establishing relations.18

17"Baku Reports Mutalibov's Arrival in Turkey" (text). Baku Domestic Service in Azeri, 0440 GMT (6 January 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 8 January 1990 (PrEx: FBIS-SOV-90-005; p. 62).

18"Azerbaijan Mutalibov Ends Visit to Istanbul" (text). Baku Domestic Service in Azeri, 1700 GMT (8 January 1990). Translation by the Foreign Information Broadcast Service. FBIS Daily Report -

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In October 1990, Azerbaijan First Assistant Premier

Rahim Ali Huseyino$lu said that his government was seeking

improved relations with Turkey in all fields. Language

reform and practical training on transferring to a market

economy were two areas in which Azerbaijan hoped to gain

assistance.19 This sentiment was also promoted by Rakhim

Guseynov, first deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Soviet

Socialist Republic Council of Ministers. In a speech

delivered at a dinner of the Research Foundation for the

Turkic World held in Istanbul in November 1990, Guseynov

also said that Azerbaijan wanted to improve its relations

with Turkey in all fields and that he had "already held

talks on the matter with Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut."20

One area which was to be expanded had to do with

economic cooperations. The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan,

Gasan Gasanov, expressed his wishes to build an economic

bridge between Azerbaijan and Turkey. He encouraged Turkish

businessmen to invest in Azerbaijan on a large scale.

Soviet Union. 9 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-006; p. 103).

•’"Azerbaijan Willing to Develop Relations" (text). Ankara Anatolia in English, 1450 GMT (4 October 1990). FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 5 November 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-90-214; p. 43.

20"Azerbaijan Deputy Premier Hopes For Improved Ties" (text). Istanbul Hiirrivet in Turkish (5 November 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 9 November 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-90-218; p. 29).

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Several projects included the continued building of land and

air links, the creation of sea and rail links, and expanded

communication hook-ups. Gasanov admitted that because of

the "very special" relations that exist between Azerbaijan

and Turkey, it was important for the Azerbaijani's to be

exposed to Turkish life standards. One way to obtain this

exposure could be through watching Turkish television

programming, and he stated that a protocol establishing this

exchange had been signed. He said, "We wish to watch

Turkish television programs....I can watch Turkish

television using a dish antenna on my roof. I go to bed

after watching the Turkish television network end its daily

program with a ceremony at Anit Kabir [Ataturk's Mausoleum],

when the Turkish national anthem is played and the Turkish

flag is hoisted."21

Besides television broadcasts, Azerbaijan also asked

for books in the Latin script to be sent. The public was

especially interested in receiving the Qur'an. Doctors and

computer technicians were also needed to train the Azeris in

21"Prime Minister Message on Azerbaijani Ties" (text). Istanbul Millivet in Turkish (21 November 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 29 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-230; p. 39).

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these fields with the most updated and contemporary

information.22

Efforts to improve the relations between Azerbaijan

and Turkey continued. In September 1991 Ayaz Mutalibov, now

the President of Azerbaijan, received Inal §im$ar, Director

of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry's Political Affairs

Department. This meeting came shortly after the restoration

of Azerbaijan's independence. §im§ar noted that Turkey was

prepared to seek ways to further improve the cooperation

between the two republics.23

With its declaration of independence, Azerbaijani

leaders joined together and pooled their efforts to obtain

recognition from the world community. Etibar Mametov, a

member of the Azerbaijani's People's Front and Azerbaijani

National Security Council, announced that the Azerbaijani

parliament had met on 30 October 1991. In this session it

was decided that the first application for recognition of

independence should be made to the Turkish Republic, "the

22,lAzerbaycan'm Tiirkiye'den beklentileri," Yeni Forum Deraisi 8, no. 248 (Ocak 1990): 19.

“"Turkish Foreign Ministry Official Meets Mutalibov" (text). Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri, 1700 GMT (13 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- SOV-91-181; p. 80).

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greatest independent Turkic state in the world."24

Azerbaijani Turks were extremely pleased with the efforts of

their leaders, and that political differences had been put

aside by the leaders to make independence a reality.

And recognition did come from the Republic of

Turkey. In expressing his pleasure at the news, Prime

Minister Gasan Gasanov admitted that although efforts were

underway, the economic and political relations between the

two republics had not yet reached a satisfactory level;

however, strong moral ties did exist between Turkey and

Azerbaijan. "Turkey is the only country which supports us

and our cause," Gasanov declared. This statement came after

the failure of Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to

immediately recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. When

asked what effect changes in Turkey's government would have

on relations with Azerbaijan, Gasanov replied, "Governments

may change in Turkey, but the fraternal feelings cherished

by that country and its people will not change."25

“"Politicians Unite on Independence" (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (6 November 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 7 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-216; p. 83).

“Ramiz Asker, "Prime Minister Praises Turkish Recognition" (text). Istanbul Hurrivet in Turkish (20 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 4 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV- 91-233; p. 73).

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Language Reform

As noted earlier, language is an essential component

to ethnic identity. Azerbaijan briefly used the Latin

alphabet after it gained independence in 1918. However, it

was forced to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet after Stalin's

coup, which brought Azerbaijan under USSR control, and a

move to Cyrillic was supposedly to increase literacy rates,

but in fact was implemented to decrease communication with

Turkey, and to thwart pan-Turkic movements.

As part of the efforts to improve ties with Turkey,

Azerbaijani's have called for a return to the Latin

alphabet. Rakhim Guseynov announced that because of the

close ethnic ties the Azerbaijanis and Turks shared, it was

essential for "our language to be the same too."26

Work to achieve this goal began in February 1990by

Azerbaijan writers and members of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy

of Sciences who set up committees to assist in completing a

full transfer to Latin by the end of 1990. Abbas

Abdullayev, a member of the working committees, explained

that two main trends of thought existed among the committee

members: "The first trend calls for the adoption of the

alphabet used in Turkey with all its elements. The second

trend, reflecting various 'linguistic concerns,' calls for

26,1 Azerbaijan Deputy Premier Hopes For Improved Ties," FBIS- WEU-90-218, 5 November 1990.

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replacing some letters in the alphabet used in Turkey with

new symbols."27 Abdullayev did not believe the differences

among committee members would hinder the inevitable transfer

to the Latin alphabet.

Full adoption of the Latin alphabet did not occur in

Azerbaijan by the end of 1990. Before a full transfer could

occur, Azerbaijan needed printing equipment so that they

could arrange and print letters in Latin, and they looked to

Turkey to purchase this equipment. Prime Minister Gasanov

reasserted that they wished to adopt the Latin alphabet to

build a cultural unity with Turkey. Gasanov also explained

that a return to the Latin alphabet was critical for

maintaining Azerbaijan's indepence. "A country's

independence depends on conditions, the most important being

to use its own language."28

Summary

The Popular Front of Azerbaijan has been active in

promoting, supporting and creating an independent

Azerbaijan. Pan-Turkism at this point reflects a cultural

^"Azerbaijan Preparing to Adopt Latin Alphabet" (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (14 May 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 24 May 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-101; p. 119).

28"Prime Minister Message on Azerbaijani Ties," FBIS-WEU-91- 230, 21 November 1991.

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association rather than expansionistic political motives.

Leaders of the movement have commented on the possibility of

a union between Turkey and Azerbaijan, most specifically in

economic and cultural fields. Cooperation has been strong

between the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan and new

initiatives have been undertaken. Language reform and a

return to the Latin alphabet is also strong in Azerbaijan

and Turkey is offering assistance in this area. A political

union may become reality in the next 20 to 30 years, but for

now Azerbaijan is just trying to become accustomed to its

newfound independence.

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UZBEKISTAN

Since the late 1980s, Uzbekistan has enjoyed greater

freedom of the press and through the struggles of writers,

academics, painters, and other artistic and cultural groups,

many topics once taboo are now being addressed. There has

been a demand for a reevaluation of the culture and history,

and social and environmental issues are widely discussed.

In determining the path the Uzbek government should

follow, issues of identity are at the forefront. Who are

the Uzbeks and what direction should they take in forming

their political future? Basically there are three choices

with which the Uzbeks are struggling. One is to create a

state based on the Uzbek nationality. The second option is

the creation of an Islamic state. The third alternative is

that since the Uzbeks belong to the larger ethnic group of

Turks, political movements could move in the direction of

the creation of Turkistan or Turan.

Cultural and Language Reform

Language reform began in Uzbekistan in the mid-

1960s. At that time, Uzbek-language writings decreased its

68

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employment of Russian or European words and increased its

Central Asian vocabulary (Turkic and Arabic).1

Today, Uzbek intelligentsia are taking an active

roll in issues such as the revitalization of traditional

Central Asian culture, the rehabilitation of writers who

perished in the Stalinist terror accused of being

nationalist or pan-Turk (Kedderie, Fitrat, Cholpan), or

implementing a return to the native language.2

University students have also been active in

language reform. An unofficial Uzbek language festival was

held on the Tashkent University campus on 3 December 1988.

During the meeting, signatures were collected for a petition

addressed to the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central

Committee demanding that Uzbek be proclaimed the state

language of the Uzbek USSR. Several banners were displayed

at the meeting and one of the more prominent banners showed

the three stages that the Uzbek alphabet has gone through

during the Soviet period — Arabic, Latin, and Cyrillic —

on a background of green.3

^llworth, p. 287.

2William Fierman, "Glasnost' in Practice: The Uzbek Experience," Central Asian Survey 8, no. 2 (1989): 4-13.

3Timur Kocao^lu, "Uzbek Students Call for Uzbek to be Made the Republican State Language," Radio Liberty/Report on the USSR 1, no. 8, (24 February 1989): 21-22.

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The Republic of Turkey was seen as a excellent

source for revitalizing the language and culture in

Uzbekistan. Shukrullah Mirsaidov, deputy prime minister of

Uzbekistan, has asked Turkey to "teach us the Turkish

language and culture." After 70 years of Russian domination

during which the Uzbeks were forced to forget their own

language and were isolated from the Turkic culture and from

Islam they are now looking to Turkey for assistance. Noting

that a federation of Turkic republics could be established

in the future, Mirsaidov asserted that "Turkey should become

the leader of the Turkic peoples in the world".4

Uzbek President Islam Karimov, on visiting Turkey to

revive and strengthen ties between the two republics, noted

that Turkey's progress in recent years in all fields is a

source of pride for the Turks living in Turkistan. If

Turkey is successful then the entire Turkish world is

successful. He explained that his country wants to benefit

from Turkey's experience, especially in political and

economic areas. President Ozal said he wholeheartedly

supported efforts in Uzbekistan to achieve democratization

and a free market economy and added that Turkey was ready to

4Cengiz Toprak, "Uzbek Leader Urges Turks to Lead Turkic Republics," (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (21 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 26 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-187; p. 28).

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provide every kind of assistance to Uzbekistan to achieve

these goals.5

As a result of these meetings, several accords were

signed to begin cooperations in the fields of economics

(banking, passage to free market economy), technology,

culture, and communications (telecommunication links between

the two republics and a cooperation of news agencies).6

Tashkent and Istanbul were named sister cities. Karimov

said that all Turkic peoples should be united around a

single goal and that this was a significant step in the name

of Turkish-Uzbek friendship. Istanbul Governor Hayri

Kozakcio^lu said that "the Turkish people, who live within

the borders established by Atatiirk, have never forgotten

their brethren in Asia."7

Popular movements within Uzbekistan are also active

in cultural and language reform, and will be discussed in

detail below.

5"Uzbek President Arrives on Official Visit," (text). Ankara Tiirkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 1100 GMT (16 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 17 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU- 91-242; p. 54).

6"Accords In Various Fields," (text). Ankara Anatolia in English, 1025 GMT (17 December 1991). FBIS Daily Report - West Europe, 17 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-242; p. 54).

7"Istanbul Meetings," (text). Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, 1800 GMT (18 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 20 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-245; p. 23).

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Birlik

Probably the best known, and most influential of all

Popular Fronts in Central Asia is Uzbekistan's "Birlik"

[Unity] movement. The movement was formed in November 1988

in Tashkent and held its first demonstration on 19 March

1989, in which there were over 12,0008 participants. On 28

May 1989, the first congress of the movement was held and

physicist Abdurrakhim Pulatov was elected chairman.9

For several months after the formation of "Birlik"

public reports mentioning the movement were usually of a

negative nature. Members were described as self-proclaimed

leaders attempting to create extremist groups within the

republic. "Birlik" was also accused of expressing "ideas of

pan-Turkism and separatism".10

The main tasks of the movement were outlined in

"Birlik's" charter. These tasks included establishing the

genuine sovereignty of Uzbekistan, changing the official

language to Uzbek, finding an unbiased and truthful

interpretation of the history of Uzbekistan, and promoting

'Reports from the Press Center of "Birlik" indicate that there may have been as many as 20,000 participants at the demonstration. See Ahat Andican, "'Birlik Halk Hareketi' ve Ozbekistandaki Geli?meler," Turkistan 3, no. 11 (1990): 26.

9Bess Brown, "The Public Role of Perestroika in Central Asia," Central Asian Survey 9, no. 1 (1990): 88-89.

I0William Fierman, "The Communist Party, "Erk", and the Changing Uzbek Political Environment," Central Asian Survey 10, no. 3 (1991): 60.

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developments in the fields of economics, health care,

education, and agriculture (eliminating cotton as the single

crop produced in Uzbekistan). These tasks would be

accomplished through such activities as drafting the masses

to participate in demonstrations, developing draft

resolutions and studies on important issues, and publishing

documents and newsletters on the activities of the

movement.11

A Birlik youth group was also established around the

same time called the "Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan"

(UFYU). The purpose of this youth organization, according

to its leaders A. Abdullayev (chairman), A. Abdumavlyanov,

(UFYU coordinating bureau member), and K. Babadzhanov,

(editor of the UFYU newspaper, ERKIN SUZ [Free World]), is

to engage youth in becoming aware of the ecological

situation in the republic, and to have them become active in

the struggle against the cotton monoculture and the ever

"For a complete printing of the Charter please see "Birlik People's Movement Charter Published," (text). Tashkent Komsomolets Uzbekistan in Russian (30 September 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 26 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-89-206; p. 64-68), and Timur Kocao^lu, "Ozbekistan Tabiati, Manevi Ve Maddi Varliklanni Muhafaza Edi§ 'Birlik' Hareketinin Umumi progami," Tiirkistan 2, no. 7 (1989), 34-38.

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increasing use of chemicals in agriculture. The leaders

denied being anti-Soviet or extreme Uzbek nationalists.12

Although "Birlik" was broadly welcomed by the entire

population, the communist regime tried to block gatherings,

meetings and demonstrations by placing an official ban on

the organization and arresting (and often beating) the

leaders of the movement. The Supreme Soviet also refused to

meet "Birlik" representatives at plenary sessions to discuss

the people's concerns. Despite these obstacles, "Birlik"

continued to hold meetings and demonstrations: on 24

September 1989 the Uzbek youth initiated a 20,000 strong

demontration; on 1 October 1989 Pulatov organized a meeting

of 40,000 people in Tashkent, with guests from Lithuania,

Georgia, and Azerbaijan.13

It was not until November 1991 that "Birlik" was

allowed to register as a formal party in Uzbekistan.

Pulatov viewed the registration as "Uzbekistan's first step

on the road of truly democratic reform."14 With this

12Ye. Lamilchova and T. Tashimov, "Uzbek Birlik Youth Group Leaders on Program," (text). Tashkent Komsomolets Uzbekistanian in Russian (5 October 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Inforamtion Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 26 October 1989 (FBIS-SOV-90-206,* p. 62-64).

13Andican, 59.

14"Birlik Movement Registered in Tashkent," (text). Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1130 GMT (12 November 1991). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 14 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91- 220; p. 83).

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registration, an interview was conducted with M. Inakov,

chairman of the Revision Commission of the Birlik movement

in Uzbekistan, to discuss any changes in the goals of the

movement over the last three years. Inakov explained that

there were three main aims of the movement: "The first is

to arouse the ordinary people from their lethargy and

increase their political activity. The second is to create

democratic institutions in the republics. And the third is

to create a sovereign, independent, law-abiding, and

democratic state." The movement does not reject the Islamic

party, although it is against Islamic fundamentalism, but is

more attracted toward a state structure of the Turkish

type.15

Despite the fact that the Justice Ministry of

Uzbekistan had forbidden Birlik to nominate its candidates

for the presidential post for the scheduled 29 December

presidential elections, the party's Presidium decided to

nominate Dr. Pulatov for the republican president. Pulatov

believed that the decision by the Justice Ministry to deny

its registration was done to prevent opposition forces from

,5M. Ganiyev, "Chairman of Birlik Movement Interviewed," (text). Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian, 1300 GMT (16 November 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 20 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-224; p. 89).

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joining presidential elections and holding a truly

democratic election.16

Central to the "Birlik" agenda were policies calling

for an in-depth analysis of the cultural heritage of the

Uzbeks and an end to the discriminatory policies directed

against the Uzbek language. Some leaders suggested that

stronger links be established with the other Turkic peoples

in Central Asia based on cultural and language similarities.

A call for a united Turkistan has also been publically

advocated by party members. One member, Zahid Haqnazarov,

went so far as to state: "We need a united Turkestan, a

united democratic society, without [division into]

nationalities and without borders."17

The Turkic republics are having a difficult time

shedding the yoke of communism. Although the Soviet Union

no longer exists, party leaders are finding it hard to

change old habits, to mobilize the masses, and to initiate

new reforms. The conference of Turkic republics held in

Moscow in April 1991 aided the leaders in examining the

numerous problems that continue to plague the republics

despite the downfall of communism. Even though "Birlik" is

16|,Ministry Denies Birlik Party Registration," (text). Moscow INTERFAX in English, 2032 GMT (25 November 1991) . FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 26 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91- 228; p. 90).

17Fierman, "Erk", 62.

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the most organized of movements in Central Asia, it cannot

change the attitudes of the people to make significant steps

in the direction of real democracatic reforms.18

Erk

Opposition within the "Birlik" party existed and on

11 November 1989 a faction of the group which supported

compromise with the Soviet authorities split from "Birlik"

and formed a new organization called "Erk" [Freedom].19 At

the inaugural congress of the movement in Tashkent, Muhammed

Salih, a poet and secretary of the Union of Writer's in

Uzbekistan, was elected as its chairman. The program of the

party covers the "struggle for human rights, the national

rebirth of the republic, and economic and political

sovereignty for Uzbekistan within the framework of a renewed

Soviet Federation."20

18Erol Kaymak, "Ozbekistan 'Birlik Halk Hareketi' Ba?kani Abdurrahim Pulotov ve Ahat Andican ile SSCB Iginde TUrk Halklan Uzerine Konu§malar," Tiirkistan 4, no. 15 (1991): 17-21.

19Andican, 27.

20Irina Grebenyuk, "New Democratic Party Founded in Uzbekistan," (text). Moscow Tass International Service in Russian, 1110 GMT (8 May 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 9 May 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-090; p. 103).

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On 5 September 1991 "Erk" officially registered with

the Ministry of Justice,21 and proceded to nominate

candidates for the upcoming presidential elections. Selected

as party leader was Muhammed Salih.22

Leaders of "Erk" have also suggested stronger links

to the other republics of Central Asia based on cultural and

language similarities. The "Erk" bulletin often publishes

translations of Turkish mythology and essays by Ziya

Gokalp.23 Salih believes that a Turkic league or

confederation is a future possibility as one cannot ignore

the awakening of cultural ties and the cultivation of a

Turkic identity. When asked if the restoration of Turkestan

was a viable goal today, Salih responded:

To talk of a united Turkestan today is very idealistic. The peoples of Turkestan are already divided into five republics; and in each, a national identity has been formed....In the future it might be possible to create a Turkestani federation or confederation based on economic ties....And when the mutual advantages of unification become evident to all concerned, we will unite.24

21"New Democratic Political Party Registered," (text). Moscow Tass International Service in Russian, 1335 GMT (5 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 6 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- SOV-91-173; p. 102).

“"Nominations for President Continue," (text). Moscow All- Union Radio Mavak Network in Russian, 1700 GMT (21 November 1991). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report. 22 November 1991 (PrEx: FBIS-SOV-91-226; p. 84 ).

“Fierman, "Erk", 62.

^Donald S. Carlisle, "Uzbekistan for the Uzbeks," Problems of Communism 40 (September/October 1991): 43.

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Summary

The government and the popular front movements of

Uzbekistan are very active in a revitalization of the

Uzbek/Turkic identification. The government has been

working closely with the Republic of Turkey on developing

numerous programs in the fields of economics, culture,

technology, and communications.

Language reform has been a major issue in

Uzbekistan. Both "Birlik" and "Erk" have drafted proposals

to make Uzbek the formal state language. There has also

been a trend towards the purification of the language.

University students have also been active in this area. A

revitalization of native writers purged as being

nationalistic has been undertaken and their writings are

being translated and published in Uzbek journals.

From the inception of the "Birlik" movement it has

been accused of harboring pan-Turkist tendencies and of

promoting the re-creation of Turkistan. Some leaders of

both "Birlik" and "Erk" have publicly stated that there is a

strong possibility for a return to Turkistan, but at this

time it is not a viable option.

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KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TURKMENISTAN

The Turkic republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Turkmenistan have increased relations with the Republic of

Turkey, are active in revitalizing their histories, and are

promoting language reform. Small nationalist movements have

emerged that concentrated mostly on independence and a

cultural revival. There has been discussion of regional

unity, mostly in the economic sphere, and references to a

return to the pre-revolutionary name of Turkistan have also

been mentioned.

Kazakhstan

Nationalist riots occured in Kazakhstan in December

1986. Expressing disapproval of actions taken by the

Communist Party Central Committee, "a group of students,

incited by nationalistic elements" demonstrated in Alma Ata,

and were eventually joined by young workers and others

dissatisfied with Moscow. More than 300,000 people

participated in the anti-Russian demonstration, when slogans

such as "Kazakhstan for the Kazakhs" could be heard.1

•Taras Kuzio, "Nationalist Riots in Kazakhstan," Central Asian Survey 7, no. 4 (1988): 79-82.

80

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Guy Imart writes that the nationalist movement in

Kazakhstan is "deprived of expansionist dreams" and has

focused almost exclusively on cultural autonomy. The trend

has been to rediscover Turkic "roots" and oz ttirk [pure

turkish] values. Recent writings indicate an attempt to

rehabilitate past culture. A set of values is being

reconstructed to form the "base" of nationhood and generate

the superstructure of statehood.2 A monthly journal called

"Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle" is being published in

Kazakhstan and is devoted to giving a detailed account of

the of the rehabilitation activities in these regions.3

There are also indications of a rehabilitation of

the Alash Orda, the Kazakh autonomous government which

existed from 1917-1919.4 Alash advocates Islam as the basis

of the national regeneration of the Kazakhs, and wants

Kazakhstan to be part of an independent Central Asian

confederation. There are branches of the party in all the

principle Kazakh cities but no precise information about its

membership is available.5 In 1990, Alash was one of the

2Guy G. Imart, "Kirgizia-Kazakhstan: A Hinge or a Fault Line?" Problems of Communism 39 (September-October 1990): 3-10.

3"Tataristan ve Kazakistan'da Ozerk Kurumla?malar," Yeni Forum 10, no. 239 (16-31 A^ustos 1989): 13.

4Imart, 9.

5Martha Brill Olcott, "Perestroyka in Kazakhstan," Problems of Communism 39, no. 4 (July-August 1990): 76.

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unregistered parties laying claim to the right to be a

political alternative to the Communist Party. An interview

with Rashid Nutushev, co-chairman of Alash, met with

reporters and discussed the significance of the Alash party.

He explained that Alash does not simply mean Kazakh, but

refers to "a creature of the steppe, with characteristics

similar to those of the wolf, and is strong, bold, free, and

venomous." The wolf is the party symbol, while the moon, a

symbol of Islam, adorns the front page of its independece

party paper. One of the conditions for joining the Alash

party is being a Muslim and attending the mosque, as it is

believed that through religion all Turkic peoples will be

united.6 Ratbek Nysanbayev, mufti of Kazakhstan's Muslims,

expressed concern over the creation of Islamic oriented

parties as he felt they may breach the peace in Kazakhstan.

He also felt "that if an Islamic party were established, the

republics would certainly be swept by pan-Turkic ideas which

could inflame hostility between the adherents of various

religious convictions."7

6"Kazakh 'Alash' Party Affirms Religion, 'Venom'," (excerpt). Alma-Ata Kazakhstanskava Pravda in Russian (14 November 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 27 November 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- S0V-90-228; p. 86-87).

7"Clergyman Rejects Ideas of Islamic Party," (excerpt). Moscow Izvestiva in Russian, Union Edition (14 November 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 15 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-221; p. 88) .

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Another new party that was established was the Kazak

Milli Kurtulus Partisi [Kazakh National Liberation Party].

Sarkitbeg Shora (name as published), a nationalist leader in

Kazakhstan, was elected party leader during the party

congress held in Alma Ata, 14-15 May 1990. The Kazakh

National Liberation Party supports independence and close

relations with Turkey. The basic objectives of the program

are:

1. To move initially to achieve political, economic, and cultural independence from Moscow. This will be followed by a move to achieve full independence. 2. To change the name of the republic from the "Kazakh SSR" to the "Democratic Republic of Kazakhstan". 3. To establish close cooperation with democratic countries both in the Soviet Union and the world at large, including Turkey, and to secure their support.8

A citizen's movement named Azat [Rebirth] was also

organized in Alma Ata in the conference room of the Writers'

Union of Kazakhstan. This new sociopolitical organization

intends to take an active part in implementing political,

economic and social reforms in Kazakhstan, and to campaign

for its real sovereignty.9 In a television interview one

leader of the movement, T. Koyshibekov, explained that Azat

8"New Party Established in Kazakh Republic," (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (18 May 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 29 June 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-S0V-90-126-S; p. 57-58).

9"New Reform Organization formed in Kazakhstan," (text). Alma Ata Kazakhstanskava Pravda in Russian (12 July 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 23 July 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-141; p. 90).

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is an internationalist movement whose main issue is the

attainment of a true state sovereignty for the Kazakh

republic.10 Other issues that Azat addressed were related

to the priority of employment for Kazakhstan residents on

"their own territory", laws on citizenship and restoration

of the legal rights of people deported in the past to return

to their homeland, and ecologicial problems, especially the

Aral Sea region and the territory of the Semipalatinsk

testing grounds.11

The first congress of the Azat party was not held

until October 1991, when Mikhail Isinaliyev was elected

chairman of the movement. The draft declaration adopted by

the movement stated "that its goal is to unite the national-

patriotic forces for creating a democratic and multi-party

society and an independent state - the Republic of

Kazakhstan." The values of Islam provided the guiding

principals of the movement in their struggle for the revival

10A. Nugmanova, "'Unity' Movement Launched in Kazakhstan," (text). Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1430 GMT (19 September 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 20 September 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-S0V-90-183; p. 91-92).

n0. Kryatkovskiy, "Azat Citizens Movement Founded in Kazakhstan," (text). Moscow TRUD in Russian (26 July 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 13 August 1990 (PrEx: FBIS-SOV-90-150; p. 75) .

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of the Kazakh nation and to gain spiritual, political and

economic freedom.12

Shortly after Azat was established, another

interethnic organization Yedinstvo [Unity], was created.

The purpose of this movement, as described by Yedinstvo

member V.I.Kurilov, is the creation of interethnic unity and

the prevention of extremism.13 The main aims and tasks of

the movement are peace, concord, and harmonious interethnic

relations. The first conference of Yedinstvo was held in

October 1990 and was attended by approximately 262 delegates

representing more than 100 labor collectives. The movement

had approximately 30,000 supporters at that time.14

In January 1991 Yedinstvo renunciated political

activity and announced it would devote its energies to

attaining civil peace. On its program were the issues of

language reform, of which both Russian and Kazakh should be

12,1 Azat Movement Holds First Congress," (text). Moscow Interfax in English, 1630 GMT (7 October 1991). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 10 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-197; p. 69).

13,,Unity Movement Chapter Registered in Alma-Ata," (excertp). Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1230 GMT (5 October 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 10 October 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV- 90-196; p. 116).

14Vladimir Ardayev, "Movement Opposes Ethnic Division in Kazakhstan," (text). Moscow Izvestiva in Russian, Morning Edition (14 October 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 17 October 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-201; p. 75).

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given state language status, and the swift transfer to a

market economy.15

Turkey's Prime Minister Turgut Ozal paid a visit to

Kazakhstan in March 1991. This visit, he said, stemmed from

historic ties with the peoples of the republic and noting

that the peoples of Kazakhstan and Turkey have a common

history, culture and language, they should get better

acquainted with one another. Kazakhstan Culture Minister

Ariftambekova invited Turkish artists to visit Kazakhstan.

In a statement to the press Ariftambekova said "we have a

common language, religion, culture and history. We have

been apart for a while, we are now reuniting.1,16

In September 1991 a Kazakh delegation led by

President Nazarbayev visited Turkey to hold discussions on

the development of Soviet-Turkish relations, international

and regional problems. Particular attention was drawn to

the further development of historical, economic and cultural

15Ye. Savicheva, "Kazakh Group Gives Up 'Political' Activity," (text). Moscow Izvestiva in Russian, Union Edition (9 January 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 11 January 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-008; p. 68).

16Selin Caglayan, "Turkey's Ozal Visits Kazakhstan," (text). Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish, 1615 GMT (15 March 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 March 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV- 91-052; p. 74).

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relations between Kazakhstan and the Republic of Turkey,17

specifically flights between Istanbul and Alma Ata and joint

investments toward producing consumer goods, attracting

foreign investments, and training contemporary cadres.18

Responding to a question on the possibility of a

future union of Turkic states, Nazarbayev asserted:

The agreement that was signed by five republics in Alma Ata last year has contributed significantly toward the present concept in the Soviet Union, which is now a union of sovereign states. A number of politicians assessed this agreement as indicative of a separatist approach among the Turkic peoples. In reality, however, the objective was to prevent the collapse of the economic relations amongst the republics and urge them to support each other as neighbors. The present development aims at this unity. No one can tell the other what to do. We are establishing relations with the Central Asian republics, Russia, the Ukraine and White Russia according to this principle. The era of the concept of elder and younger brothers has been left behind. Regarding the Central Asian republics, well, we are like brothers. We have a common future.19

Kvrqystan

Under Gorbachev, Kyrgystan witnessed a new

period of openess and a noticable change in the cultural

17"Nazarbayev Continues Official Visit to Turkey: Discusses Relations with Ozal," (text). Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh, 1500 GMT (26 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 30 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-189; p. 90).

“"Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev on Relations, Central Asia," (text). Istanbul Millivet in Turkish (26 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 3 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-192; p. 30).

“Ibid.

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climate. A re-evaluation of Kyrgyz ethnogenisis was

undertaken, and in June 1987 at the Kyrgyz Writers' Union

plenum, the need for revitalizing the Kyrgyz culture,

specifically language, historical origins, poetry, and

national-religious customs was stressed.20

In January 1990 an association of Soviet Turks was

established in Frunze. Massut Riza was elected president of

the association, and was nominated as a candidate for a

people's deputy from the Kirghiz SSR, to support and satisfy

the demands of the citizens of Turkic nationality.21

Various unregistered groups met in Frunze on 26 May

and created the public organization, the "Kirgistan

Democratic Movement." A charter was adopted outlining the

aims of the association as promoting "the radicalization of

political and economic reform in the republic and to deepen

the democratic and glasnost process."22

Turkey was quick to respond and recognize the

independence of Kyrgyzstan. General Director of Turkey's

20Simon Crisp, "Kirgiz," in The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, ed. Graham Smith (London: Longman Group, 1990), 251.

2l"Association of Soviet Turks Formed in Frunze," (text). Frunze Domestic Service in Kirghiz, 1300 GMT (27 January 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 27 February 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90- 039; p. 118).

“ "Kirghizstan Democratic Movement Formed," (text). Frunze Sovetskava Kirgiziva in Russian (29 May 90). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 11 June 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-112; p. 119).

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Foreign Ministry, Inal §im§ar, while in Bishkek, said that

Turkey is ready to recognize the republic of Kyrgyzstan's

independence, and was ready to give economic aid during the

transitional period. Direct diplomatic relations were to be

established, and there was discussion of opening a republic

office in Bishkek.23

Kyrgyzstan President Akayev was invited to Turkey in

December 1991 to develop relations with Turkey in all fields

based on their deep ties of friendship, brotherhood, and

culture. Akayev said that in its "international relations

Kyrgyzstan gives priority and attaches a special importance

to its relations with Turkey. He also expressed his

satisfactions at the understanding and support Turkey showed

to his country, and he added that his country is in full

agreement on every issue proposed by Turkey." Akayev added

that Kyrgyzstan "wants to benefit from Turkey's expertise

and experience, that it views Turkey as an example, and that

it seeks Turkey's support."24 Turkey's President Ozal noted

his support of Kyrgyzstan and was happy to see the positive

“ "Turkish Foreign Ministry Official on Independence," (text). Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1600 GMT (16 September 1991). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- SOV-91-181; p. 84-85).

“"Official Talks Begin," (text). Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, 1800 GMT (22 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 23 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-246; p. 54.

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steps taken by Kyrgyzstan in its transition to democracy and

a free market economy.25

In an interview conducted by the Turkish newspaper

Cumhurivet Akayev was asked his views on a possible Turkic

commonwealth. He noted that while the number of people

seeking a unification of Turkic-speaking peoples is growing,

this desire is far from the realization of the ideas of pan-

Turkism, and that it will not reach threatening

proportions.26 Akayev continued to explain that economic

unity could be established as long as it did not force any

country to comply with certain conditions, and economic

development could prevent pan-Turkism from gaining

prominence. Akayev stated:

More people are favoring a union of Turkic republics but I do not think this trend is strong enough to lead to a pan-Turkic front. The people want to live well. Many may favor pan-Turkism for this reason. I do not say that this is wrong. If Kyrgyzstan achieves its economic targets then pan-Turkism and Islam will no longer threaten. If we fail to achieve our objectives then these concepts will be a threat.27

“"Kyrgyzstan President Arrives to Meet Ozal," (text). Ankara Turkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 1400 GMT (22 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 23 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU- 91-246; p. 53-54).

26"Akayev Interviewed on Turkish Relations," (text). Moscow Tass in English, 1615 GMT (17 December 1991). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-243; p. 74).

“ "Akayev Interviewed,11 (text). Istanbul Cumhurivet in Turkish (17 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 23 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-246; p. 55).

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Relations between the republics in Central Asia and Turkey

will take priority, particularly in the economic and

cultural fields. Initiatives were taken for Kyrgyzstan to

adopt the Latin alphabet, which would in turn contribute

significantly toward developing all relations.28 Akayev

went on to say that Kyrgyzstan was also "determined to

contribute to the protection of Turkish civilizations in the

world."29 But he did not see a need at this time for a

political union of Turkic states. He emphasized that

because Kyrgyzstan had just recently found freedom and

independence and dismantled an empire it was not necessary

to rush to create a new one on a lesser scale.30

Turkmenistan

Turkmen nationalist activity has grown significantly

since 1987. Most attention has been given to economic

development, ecological and health concerns, restoration of

the Turkmen cultural heritage, and Islam. However, the

abscence of a numerous, active intelligentsia has impeded

28Ibid.

29"Hosts Ozal at Dinner," (text). Ankara Turkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 2100 GMT (23 December 1991) . Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 24 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-247; p. 23.

30"President Akayev Interviewed on Goals," (text). Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1400 GMT (11 November 1991) . FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 13 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91- 219; p. 84).

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the emergence of a strong national movement.31 There has

been no formal registration of political groups, but

political activity remains high. In 1989, 700 registered

candidates of the Communist Party competed for 175 seats.32

One group established in Turkmenia in 1987 was

Adizbirlik. The Adizbirlik society is a kind of embryonic

national-democratic movement.33 Language reform in the

republic is central to their program. The leaders of the

movement looked into the history of Turkmenistan and

consider themselves "the heralds of perestroyka". Members

include artists, writers, poets and cinemotographers.34

Upon gaining independence, Turkmenistan sent a

delegation to Turkey with the main purpose of establishing

relations with Turks and the Turkish state. On the table

for discussion were political, economic and cultural

31 Annette Bohr, "Turkmen," The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, ed. Graham Smith (London: Longman Group, 1990), 228- 240.

32Dmitri Marchenkov, "Turkmenia: The Quiet Republic?" Soviet Life (August 1990): 15.

33"Economic, Political Situation Assessed," (text). Moscow Komsomolskava Pravda in Russian (16 October 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-S0V-91-202; p. 89- 90).

^B. Gavurov, "Turkmen 'Unity' Society Criticized," (text). Ashkhabad Turkmenskav Iskra in Russian (21 January 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 14 February 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV- 90-031; p. 97-98).

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questions. Ways of organizing air transportation between

Turkey and Turkmenistan, setting up telephone, telegram, and

postal communications, organizing motor vehicle

transportation through Iran, and the possibility of sending

Turkmen gas to Turkey were also on the agenda.35 Turkmen

President Saparmurad Niyazov (former First Secretary of the

Communist Party of Turkmenia) announced that Turkmenistan,

which has significant natural resources, wants to open its

doors to Turkish investors.36 As a result of these talks,

three important documents were agreed upon and signed,

namely, an agreement on friendship and cooperation between

Turkmenistan and Turkey, an agreement on economic and trade

cooperation between the two republics, and a protocol on the

agreements. Turkish President Ozal said the documents "laid

the basis and mapped out the goals of mutually beneficial

cooperation between the two republics. They will facilitate

the development and the strengthening of our relations in

all spheres." He said that Turkey also agreed to help

“"Foreign Minister Previews Visit," (text). Ashkhabad Radio Ashkabad Network in Turkman, 1600 GMT (2 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 4 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV- 91-233; p. 87).

“"Turkmen President Arrives on Official Visit," (text). Ankara Tiirkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 1100 GMT (2 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 3 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- WEU-91-232; p. 49).

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Turkmenistan transfer its economy to a free market

economy.37 To meet this need, Turkey will transfer

information to assist Turkmenistan in creating small and

medium-sized businesses, and will provide policies related

to the banking and insurance industries.38

Summary

In the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Turkmenistan, there has not been a lot of activity promoting

a political unity of Turkic peoples. Movements that have

sprung up are mostly democratic movements, interested in a

peaceful transfer from Communist rule to a nationalist led

government with a free market economy. Some discussion of

pan-Turkic tendencies has arisen, mostly in Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan, however the leaders of these republics have

stated that as long as economic development continues and

sustains the needs of the people, forces such as pan-Turkism

and pan-Islamism will not emerge.

Cultural revitalization is a key component of the

new movements in these republics. A return to pure turkish

37"Talks with Turkey Concluded, Documents Signed," (text). Moscow All-Union Radio Mavak Network in Russian, 1630 GMT (4 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 5 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-234; p. 73).

38,,Ozal Hosts Dinner," (text). Ankara Tiirkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 2100 GMT (2 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Center. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe, 3 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-232; p. 49-50).

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values and rediscovering turkic roots is a common theme.

Crucial to a revitalization of culture is language reform.

In Kazakhstan, due to its ethnic diversity, the movement

Yedinstvo encouraged the adoption of a dual state language

proclamation in hopes of preventing ethnic conflict. All

three republics have movements promoting a return to the

Latin alphabet.

These republics have also sought guidance and

assistance from Turkey since their independence. Formal

delegations have been received in Turkey, and protocols were

signed agreeing on joint ventures in numerous areas. There

has been no discussion of a political union between the

republics and Turkey.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Questions asked at the beginning of this study

revolved around the independence of the Turkic republics of

the former Soviet Union and their quest, if any, for a

unified Turkic state. Throughout this study numerous

popular fronts and democratic movements have been examined

which have evolved since 1985 and the appearance of crlasnost

as a new Soviet policy. Comments made by leaders of these

movements, as well as statements issued by government

officials, have been noted in regard to a cultural and/or

political unification of Turks.

The question remains: Can the hypothesis as stated

at the beginning of this study be accepted or refuted? It

was hypothesized that the ethnic Turkic movements in Turkey

and Eurasia from the period 1985 - 1991 have renewed

interests in historical and cultural affinities and are pan-

Turkist in nature and that the ultimate goal is irredentist,

as there is a desire to politically unite territories that

the ethnic or cultural minority group inhabits or has

inhabited at some historical date into a greater Turkistan.

Due to the information gathered for this research study,

this hypothesis is rejected for the following reasons.

96

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Several ethnic movements have emerged throughout the

Republic of Turkey and Eurasia which are calling for a

revitalization of their culture and identity as ethnic

Turks. Reform movements are in progress as specifically

relate to language, historical revisions, and cultural

renewal. The most active of these movements include

"Birlik" and "Erk" in Uzbekistan; however, the Popular Front

of Azerbaijan has also been very successful in gaining

independence for its country and in establishing closer

relations with the Republic of Turkey. Here, also, the

continuing conflict with Armenia has reaffirmed the ethnic

identity of the Azeris and their relationship to other

Turkic groups in the region.

In Kazakhstan the movements have appeared mostly

along nationalistic and religious lines. The three main

movements discussed, Mash, Azat, and Yedinstvo, have been

very active in language reform, a reaffirmation to Islam, a

peaceful transition to democratization, and closer relations

with Turkey. In Kyrgyzstan, an association of Soviet Turks

was established to satisfy the demands of the Turkic

nationalities and to preserve Turkish civilization

throughout the world. Language reform was also important in

this republic. In Turkmenistan attention has been given to

the restoration of the Turkmen cultural heritage and Islam.

The most active organization in Turkmenistan is Adizbirlik

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which considers language reform as central to its program.

Several projects have been established with Turkey in

economic and communications fields.

Within the Republic of Turkey there are several

Soviet emigre groups active in advancing the relationships

of Turkic groups. The associations looked at in this study

were Azerbavcan Milli Merkezi. Azerbavian Tvirkleri Ktiltur ve

Danisma Dernedi. and Turkestanlilar Kultiir ve Sosval

Yardimlasma Dernedi. Each of these organizations is

responsible for cultural publications devoted to examining

the problems and concerns of the Outside Turks and promoting

nationalist orientations.

The government of Turkey, while denying a renewal of

Pan-Turkist, expansionist goals, has been extremely

influential in assisting the Turkic republics in the

transformation to a free market economy and democratic

reforms, and Turkey was also the first in recognizing the

independence of these republics. The Ministry of Culture

has been very active in promoting cultural exchanges between

all the republics to develop and enhance awareness of the

Turkic culture. Numerous protocols have been established

with the Turkic republics, and new initiatives in trade and

communication are underway. Turkey's role in the language

reform project has been cataclysmic in the transfer from the

Cyrillic alphabet back to the Latin alphabet. The Turkic

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Institute at Marmara University has been holding symposiums

on the language issue and a compromise alphabet (one

combining the alphabet used in Turkey with the addition of a

couple new letters representing sounds used by the other

Turkic groups) has been proposed.

On the issue of pan-Turkism having again risen in a

political context, it is yet unclear how far the party of

Alparslan Tiirkef will go now that he holds a seat in

parliament. He has led debates to increase recognition of

the Turkic republics. He still espouses the greatness of

the Turkic state, and is accused of harboring racist

attitudes.

Many leaders of the movements have supported the

possibility of a political union of Turkic states. Several

groups also refer to their republics by the name Turkistan

rather than the individual republic names. Leaders such as

Muhammed Salih of "Erk", who has written poetry proposing

unity and is extremely vocal about a cultural and economic

union of Turkic states, has now taken a more relaxed

approach to the subject and admits that a political union

may not occur for 20, 30, or more years. Not until all the

republics have agreed that there are mutual advantages to an

economic or political union will one occur.

In a recent convention on "Turks around the World"

in New York, Dr. Ahat Andican gave a speech entitled

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"Tiirkistan: Utopia or Reality?" and raised some of the same

questions which have been dealt with in this study. He

noted that without a Tiirkistan union based on an

economically and politically homogenous structure, he

believes it would be impossible to form an effective Turkic

world community based on ethnic identification, religion and

language similarities. The first step in forming a Turkic

world that could have an affect on world politics would be

to establish a "Community of Turkic States" with the

participation of the Tiirkistan community, Azerbaijan, and

Turkey. The means to a unified Turkic world is through

democratization, respect for human rights, the use of

resources for the interests of the people and the

development of a free market economy.1

Besides working specifically with Turkey, the Azeris

and the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz and the

Turkmen have not really established a unified movement to

date. Many wish to retain their national identity and do

not want to be incorporated into a greater Tiirkistan

community. Irredentism is not an ideological objective at

this juncture among the Turks of Turkey and Eurasia.

•a . Ahat Andican, "Turkistan: Utiopia or Reality?", Speech delivered at the Second Annual International Conference on Turks Around the World, 5-7 June 1992, New York Vista Hotel.

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"Azerbaijan Mutalibov Ends Visit to Istanbul" (text). Baku Domestic Service in Azeri, 1700 GMT (8 January 1990). Translation by the Foreign Information Broadcast Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 9 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-006; p. 103).

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"Birlik People's Movement Charter Published," (text). Tashkent Komsomolets Uzbekistan in Russian (30 September 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 26 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-89-206; p. 64- 68) .

Caglayan, Selin. "Turkey's Ozal Visits Kazakhstan," (text). Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish, 1615 GMT (15 March 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 March 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-052; p. 74).

Cevik, Ilnun. "Demirel Said to Approach Soviet Turks Cautiously," (text). Ankara Turkish Daily News in English (26 November 1991). FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 2 December 1991 (PrEx: FBIS-WEU-91-231; p. 38) .

"Clergyman Rejects Ideas of Islamic Party," (excerpt). Moscow Izvestiva in Russian, Union Edition (14 November 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 15 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-221; p. 88).

"Economic, Political Situation Assessed," (text). Moscow Komsomolskava Pravda in Russian (16 October 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-202; p. 89-90).

"Foreign Minister Previews Visit," (text). Ashkhabad Radio Ashkabad Network in Turkman, 1600 GMT (2 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 4 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-233; p. 87).

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Ganiyev, M. "Chairman of Birlik Movement Interviewed," (text). Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian, 1300 GMT (16 November 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 20 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-224; p. 89).

Gavurov, B. "Turkmen 'Unity' Society Criticized," (text). Ashkhabad Turkmenskav Iskra in Russian (21 January 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 14 February 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-031; p. 97-98).

"Government Assesses Policy on Soviet Republics," (text). Ankara Turkish Daily News in English (14 December 1991). FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 17 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBSI-WEU-91-242; p. 53).

Grebenyuk, Irina. "New Democratic Party Founded in Uzbekistan," (text). Moscow Tass International Service in Russian, 1110 GMT (8 May 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 9 May 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- SOV-90-090; p. 103).

Hayastan, Khorhvdayn. "Article Links 'Genocide' to Turkey, Pan-Turkism" (review). Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian, 0545 GMT (17 January 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 24 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-016; p. 49).

"Hosts Ozal at Dinner," (text). Ankara Turkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 2100 GMT (23 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 24 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-247; p. 23.

"Istanbul Meetings," (text). Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, 1800 GMT (18 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 20 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-245; p. 23).

"Kazakh 'Alash' Party Affirms Religion, 'Venom'," (excerpt). Alma-Ata Kazakhstanskava Pravda in Russian (14 November 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 27 November 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-228; p. 86-87).

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"Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev on Relations, Central Asia," (text). Istanbul Millivet in Turkish (26 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 3 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-192; p. 30).

"Kirghizstan Democratic Movement Formed," (text). Frunze Sovetskava Kiraiziva in Russian (29 May 90). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 11 June 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-112; p. 119).

Kryatkovskiy, O. "Azat Citizens Movement Founded in Kazakhstan," (text). Moscow TRUD in Russian (26 July 1990) . Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 13 August 1990 (PrEx: FBIS-SOV-90-150; p. 75).

"Kyrgyzstan President Arrives to Meet Ozal," (text). Ankara Turkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 1400 GMT (22 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 23 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-246; p. 53- 54) .

Lamilchova Ye., and T. Tashimov, "Uzbek Birlik Youth Group Leaders on Program," (text). Tashkent Komsomolets Uzbekistanian in Russian (5 October 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Inforamtion Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 26 October 1989 (FBIS-SOV- 90-206; p. 62-64).

"Ministry Denies Birlik Party Registration," (text). Moscow INTERFAX in English, 2032 GMT (25 November 1991). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 26 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-228; p. 90).

"Nazarbayev Continues Official Visit to Turkey: Discusses Relations with Ozal," (text). Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh, 1500 GMT (26 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 30 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-189; p. 90).

"New Democratic Political Party Registered," (text). Moscow Tass International Service in Russian, 1335 GMT (5 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 6 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-173; p. 102).

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"New Party Established in Kazakh Republic," (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (18 May 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 29 June 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-126-S; p. 57-58).

"New People's Association Formed in Azerbaijan" (text). Moscow World Service in Russian, 0930 GMT (14 April 90). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 16 April 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-073; p. 134).

"New Reform Organization formed in Kazakhstan," (text). Alma Ata Kazakhstanskava Pravda in Russian (12 July 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 23 July 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-141; p. 90).

"Nominations for President Continue," (text). Moscow All- Union Radio Mavak Network in Russian, 1700 GMT (21 November 1991). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report. 22 November 1991 (PrEx: FBIS-SOV-91-226; p. 84 ).

Nugmanova, A. "'Unity' Movement Launched in Kazakhstan," (text). Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1430 GMT (19 September 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 20 September 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV- 90-183; p. 91-92).

"Official Talks Begin," (text). Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, 1800 GMT (22 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 23 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-246; p. 54.

"On Visits to Soviet Republics," (text). Ankara Anatolia in English, 1540 GMT (2 Oct 91). FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 3 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-192; p. 29-30).

"Ozal Hosts Dinner," (text). Ankara Ttirkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 2100 GMT (2 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Center. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 3 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-232; p. 49-50).

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"People's Front Leader on Congress, Turkey" (text). Istanbul Ttirkive in Turkish (30 July 91). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 6 August 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-151; p. 69-70).

Perincek, Sule. "Policy on Soviet Turkic Republics Viewed," (text). 2000 Ikibin'e Dodru in Turkish (19 October 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information. Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 29 October 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-209; p. 43-45).

"Politicians Unite on Independence" (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (6 November 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 7 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-216; p. 83).

"Popular Front Branch Activity in Sabirabed Halted" (text). Baku Domestic Service in Azeri, 0440 GMT (26 July 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 27 July 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-145; p. 88).

"Popular Front Leaders on Situation in Azerbaijan" (excerpt). Istanbul Tttrkiye in Turkish (10 July 91). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 19 July 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-139; p. 88).

"Popular Front of Azerbaijan Recognized" (text). Moscow World Service in English, 1100 GMT (6 October 1989). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 6 October 1989 (PrEx7.10:FBIS-SOV-89-193; p. 43).

"Popular Front Rally Comes Under OMON Attack." (excerpt). Moscow Komsomolskava Pravda in Russian (24 August 1991). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 26 August 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-165; p. 104).

"President Akayev Interviewed on Goals," (text). Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1400 GMT (11 November 1991). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 13 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-219; p. 84).

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"Prime Minister Message on Azerbaijani Ties" (text). Istanbul Millivet in Turkish (21 November 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 29 November 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-230; p. 39).

Savicheva, Ye. "Kazakh Group Gives Up 'Political' Activity," (text). Moscow Izvestiva in Russian, Union Edition (9 January 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 11 January 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-008; p. 68).

"Soviet on Multinational Force, Turkic Movements." (text). Ankara Anatolia in Turkish, 1615 GMT (3 August 1991). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 5 August 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-150; p. 44).

"Talks with Turkey Concluded, Documents Signed," (text). Moscow All-Union Radio Mavak Network in Russian, 1630 GMT (4 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 5 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91- 234; p. 73).

Toprak, Cengiz. "Uzbek Leader Urges Turks to Lead Turkic Republics," (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (21 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 26 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-187; p. 28).

"Turkey Elected NLP Leader," (text). Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, 2700 GMT (29 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 31 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-250; p. 16).

"Turkey Urges Government to Battle Separatism," (text). Istanbul Cumhurivet in Turkish (25 October 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 11 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-238; p. 55-56).

"Turkish Foreign Ministry Official Meets Mutalibov" (text). Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri, 1700 GMT (13 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-181; p. 80).

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"Turkish Foreign Ministry Official on Independence," (text). Moscow INTERFAX in English, 1600 GMT (16 September 1991). FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 18 September 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-91-181; p. 84-85).

"Turkmen President Arrives on Official Visit," (text). Ankara Ttirkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 1100 GMT (2 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 3 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-232; p. 49).

Ulku, Irfan. "Azerbaijan Youth Leader on Independent Movement" (text). Istanbul Tercuman in Turkish (18 October 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 23 October 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-90-205; p. 42- 43) .

"Unity Movement Chapter Registered in Alma-Ata," (excertp). Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1230 GMT (5 October 1990). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Soviet Union. 10 October 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-90-196; p. 116).

"Uzbek President Arrives on Official Visit," (text). Ankara Ttirkive Radvolari Network in Turkish, 1100 GMT (16 December 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - West Europe. 17 December 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-WEU-91-242; p. 54).

Periodicals

Abbasali, Djavid. "Glasnost and Soviet Azerbijan Literature." Central Asian Survey. 9, no. 1 (1990): 97- 103.

A§ca, Hiiseyin. "Turk Dilinin Tarihi Geligimi," Yeni Forum. 9, no. 219 (16-31 Ekim 1988): 32-34.

Ahsan, Syed Aziz-al. "Soviet Nation-building in Central Asia: 1917-1979." Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism. 14, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 317-329.

Akgura, Yusuf, "tig Tarz-i Siyaset." ["Three Policies."] Trans, by David S. Thomas. Central Asian Monuments I (Spring 1992): 157+.

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Alexeyeva, Ludmilla. "In the Age of Glasnost: Nationalist Movements in the USSR." New Politics. 2 no. 2 (Winter 1989: 133-147.

Alstadt, Audrey L. "Azerbaijani Turks' Response to Russian Conquest." Comparative Communism. 19, 3/4 (Autumn/Winter 1986): 267-286.

Andican, A. Ahat, "Turkistan: Utopia or Reality?" Speech delivered at the Second Annual International Conference on Turks Around the World, New York Vista Hotel, New York, 5-7 June 1992.

______. "'Birlik Halk Hareketi' ve Ozbekistandaki Geli§meler," Turkistan.3. no. 11 (1990): 26.

"Ankara Universitesi'nde 'DUnyada Turkler' Sempozyumu," Yeni Forum. 8, no. 185 (15 Mayis 1987): 11.

"Azerbaycan'm TUrkiye'den beklentileri," Yeni Forum Dergisi. 8, no. 248 (Ocak 1990): 19.

Bennigsen, Alexander. "Panturkism and Panislamism in History and Today." Central Asian Survey. 3, no. 3 (1984): 39- 47.

Bezanis, L.A. "Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey." Unpublished Paper, 25 October 1991.

"Birinci Milletler Arasi Buyiik Azerbaycan Kongresi Kayseri'de Yapildi." [First International Great Azeraijan Congress Held in Kayseri] Turk Kttltiirii. 327 (1991): 441-444.

Bohr, Annette. "Turkmen," The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, ed. Graham Smith (London: Longman Group, 1990), 228-245.

Bromley, Julian and Viktor Kozlov. "The Theory of Ethos and Ethnic Processes in Soviet Social Sciences." Comparative Studies in Society and History. 31, no. 3 (July 1989): 425-438.

Brown, Bess. "The Public Role in perestroika in [Soviet] Central Asia." Central Asian Survey. 9, no. 1 (1990): 87-96.

Carlisle, Donald S. "Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks." Problems of Communism. 40 (September/October 1991): 23-44.

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Clay, Jason W. "The Ethnic Future of Nations." Third World Quarterly. 11, no. 4 (October 1989): 223-233.

Connor, Walker. "When is a Nation?" Ethnic and Racial Studies. 13, no. 1 (January 1990): 92-103.

Cosnahan, G. "The Uzbek Population in Istanbul," Tiirkistan. 4, no. 14 (1991): 59-63.

Crisp, Simon. "Kirgiz," in The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, ed. Graham Smith. London: Longman Group, 1990, 246-258.

Dellenbrant, Jan Ake. "The Central Asian Challenge: Soviet Decision-making on regional stability Under Brezhnev and Gorbachev." Journal of Communist Studies. 4, no. 1 (March 1988): 54-77.

Fierman, William. "Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia." Problems of Communism. 38 (July/August 1989): 123-127.

______. "'Glasnost' In Practice: The Uzbek Experience." Central Asian Survey. 8, no. 2 (1989): 1-45.

______. "The Communist Party, "Erk" and the Changing Uzbek Political Environment." Central Asian Survey. 10, no. 3, (1991): 55-72.

______. "Cultural Nationalism in Soviet Uzbekistan." Soviet Union. 12, no. 1 (1985): 1-41.

Fuller, Graham E. "The Emergence Of Central Asia." Foreign Policy. 78 (Spring 90): 49-67.

Gitelman, Zvi. "Are Nations Merging in the USSR?" Problems of Communism. 32, no. 5 (September-October 1983): 35- 47.

Gleason, Gregory. "Nationalist Sentiment and Migration in Soviet Central Asia." Nationalities Papers 15, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 228+.

Goble, Paul. "Ethnic Politics in the USSR." Problems of Communism. 38 (July-August 1989): 1-14.

Guseinov, G. Ch. & D.V. Dragunskii. "A New Look at Old Wisdom." Social Research. 57, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 389- 433.

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Halsell, Grace. "Soviet Muslims Face Uncertain Future." The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. X, no. 4 (October 1991): 16.

Hauner, Milan. "Central Asian Geopolitics in the Last 100 Years: A Critical Survey from Gorchakov to Gorbachev." Central Asian Survey. 8, no. 1 (1989): 1-19.

Hay it, Baymirza. "Tiirkistan Nedir?" Turkistan. 1, no. 1 (1988): 3-11.

Hroch, Miroslav. "How Much Does Nation Formation Depend on Nationalism?" East European Politics and Societies. 4 no. 1 (Winter 1990): 116-133.

Hunter, Shireen T. "Nationalist Movements in Soviet Asia." Current History. 89 (October 1990): 325-328+.

Hyland, Michael P. "Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections," Middle East Journal 24, no. 1 (Winter 1970): 1-16.

Ilaslan, Serap. "Kiiltttr Bakani Namik Kemal Zeybek lie Roportaj," Tiirkistan. 4, no. 14 (1991): 12.

Imart, Guy G. "Kirgizia-Kazakhstan: A Hinge or a Fault Line?" Problems of Communism. 39 (September-October 1990): 1-13.

Kaymak, Erol. "Ozbekistan 'Birlik Halk Hareketi' Bagkani Abdurrahim Pulotov ve Ahat Andican ile SSCB Iginde Tiirk Halklan tizerine Konugmalar," Tiirkistan.4. no. 15 (1991): 17-21.

Kocao^lu, Timur. "Uzbek Students Call for Uzbek to be Made the Republican State Language." Radio Liberty/Report on the USSR, 1, no. 8 (24 February 1989): 21-22.

______. "Ozbekistan Tabiatx, Manevi Ve Maddi Varliklanni Muhafaza Edig 'Birlik' Hareketinin Umumi progami," Tiirkistan. 2, no. 7 (1989), 34-38.

Kocharli, F.K. "The Flourishing of Intellectual Life and Ethnic Culture of the Azerbaijan People." Soviet Anthropology and Archeology. 26 no. 4 (1988): 11-21.

Kogar, Qa§atay. "Tttrkistand'da Ana Dili Hususunda Son Geligmeler," Yeni Forum. 10, no. 231 (16-30 Nisan 1989): 27-29.

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Kusner, David. "Pan-Turkism Today: Contemporary Turkey and the 'Outside Turks'", Asian and African Studies (Haifa), no. 2 (1987): 187-211.

Kuzio, Taras. "Nationalist Riots in Kazakhstan." Central Asian Survey. 7, no. 4 (1988): 79-100.

Landau, Jacob M. "The Fortunes and Misfortunes of Pan- Turkism." Central Asian Society (Oxford). 7, no. 1 (1988): 1-5.

______. "The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey." Journal of Contemporary History. 17 (1982): 587-606.

______. "The Ups and Downs of Irredentism: The Case of Turkey," in Irredentism and International Politics. 81- . ed. Naomi Chazan. Boulder: Lynn Reinner Publishers, 1991, 81-96.

Lubin, Nancy. "Uzbekistan: The Challenges Ahead." Middle East Journal. 43 (Autumn 1989): 619-634.

Marchenkov, Dmitri. "Turkmenia: The Quiet Republic?" Soviet Life. (August 1990): 8-17+.

Marmara University Institute of Turkic Studies, "Final Circular of the Symposium on the Contemporary Turkic Alphabets", 18-20 November 1991, UmidHooe. trans. Orhan Soylemez, Columbia University (Spring 1992): 21.

Matuszerski, Daniel. "The Turkic Past in the Soviet Future." Problems of Communism. 31, no. 4 (July-August) 1982: 76-82.

Meadwell, Hudson. "Cultural and Instrumental Approaches to Ethnic Nationalism." Ethnic and Racial Studies. 12, no. 3 (July 1989): 309-328.

Milivojevig, Marko. "Soviet Central Asia Cuts Loose." Geographical Magazine. 62 (November 1990): 31-31+.

"Nationalist Movements in Soviet Asia." Current History. 89 (October 1990): 325.

Olcott, Martha Brill. "Perestroyka in Kazakhstan." Problems of Communism. 39, no. 4 (July-August 1990): 65-77.

______. "Yuri Andropov and the 'National Question'." Soviet Studies. 37, no. 1 (January 1985): 103-117.

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______. "The Fabrication of Social Past: The Kazakhs of Central Asia." Political Anthropology Yearbook. 1 (1980): 193-213.

Ozgen, Mahmut Ihsan. "Tiirkge ve Di? etkiler," Yeni Forum. 10, no. 247 (16-31 Aralik 1989): 46-47.

Oztiirk, Hasan. "Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Htikiimet Programlarinda KUltiir," Yeni Forum. 9, no. 210 (1-15 Haziran 1988): 44-46.

Paksoy, H.B. "Basmachi," in Modern Encvlopedia of Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union. 1992 ed., vol. 4.

"Pan-Tiirkizm ve Pan-KUrdizm," Yeni Forum. 10, no. 247 (16-31 Aralik 1989): 20.

"Parting of the Ways: Republics Review Options as Union Breaks Up." Far Eastern Economic Review. 154 (10/3/91): 16-18.

Pool, Jonathon. "Developing the Soviet Turkic Tongues: The Language of the Politics of Language." Slavic Review. 35, no. 3 (September 1976): 425-442.

Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa. "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakstan Under Soviet Rule." Central Asian Survey. 2, no. 2 (September 1983): 7-87.

Roi, Yaacov. "The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia." Problems of Communism. 39, no. 4 (July - August 1990): 49-64.

Rywkin, Michael. "Dissent in Soviet Central Asia." Nationalities Papers. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 27-34.

Salamone, S.D. "The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance and State Ideology." East European Quarterly. 23, no. 2 (June 1989): 225-248.

Sefero^lu, §. Kaya. "Anadolu TUrkgesinin Standarizasyonuna Dair DUgUnceler," Forum. 8, no. 188 (1 Temmuz 1987): 28-31.

Shearman, Peter. "Language, Sovietization and Ethnic Integration in the USSR." Journal of Social. Political and Economic Studies. 8, no. 3 (Fall 1983): 227-256.

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Shorish, M. Mobin. "Planning by Decree: The Soviet Language Policy in Central Asia." Language Problems and Language Planning. 8, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 35-49.

Smith, Anthony D. "The Supersession of Nationalism?" International Journal of Comparative Sociology. 31, no. 1-2 (January-April 1990): 1-32.

______. "The Origins Of Nations." Ethnic and Racial Studies. 12, no. 3 (July 1989): 340-367.

Svanberg, Ingvar. "Turkistani Refugees." in Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, ed. Peter Alford Andrews, 591- 601. Wiesbaiden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989.

Swietochowski, Tadeusz. "Soviet Azerbaijan Today: The Problems of Group Identity." Occasional Paper. No. 211. Washington, DC: Kennan Institute, July, 1986.

______. "The Politics of a Literary Language and the Rise of National Identity in Russian Azerbaijan Before 1920," Ethnic and Racial Studies 14, no. 1 (1991): 55- 63.

"Tataristan ve Kazakistan'da Ozerk Kurumla?malar," Yeni Forum. 10, no. 239 (16-31 A^ustos 1989): 13.

"Turk Dttnyasi Dergisi," Yeni Forum. 8, no. 181 (15 Mart 1987): 48.

Zein, Afaf. "Choosing Sides in the Asian Republics." World Press Review. 38 (November 1991): 21.

Newspapers

"Ankara Shifts Gear in Central Asia Policy..." Briefing, no. 868, 23 December 1991: 8-9.

Candar, Cengiz. "Central Eurasia: New Friends for Turkey." Turkish Times. 1 February 1992: 2.

"Cetin Assures Russian on Ankara's Policy in the Turkish Republics." Turkish Times. 1 February 1992: 1.

"Cetin On Landmark Mission to Secure Ties With Moscow." Briefing, no. 872 (20 January 1992): 8-9.

"Contest Goes On Amid Mud-Slinging and Battle for Media." Briefing, no. 857 (7 October 1991): 3-6.

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"Erbakan's Vision: Islamic Harmony and a Cleansed Society." Briefing, no. 858 (14 October 1991): 6.

"News Briefs". Turkish Times. 1 February 1992: 3.

"Recognition for Baltic States: Eyes Turn to Azerbaijan." Briefing. 853 (9 September 1991): 3-4.

"Talks in Moscow Go Smoothly Despite Yeltsin Hitch." Briefing, no. 873 (27 January 1992): 8-9.

"Time for the Right to Come Clean on Democracy." Briefing, no. 867 (16 December 1991): 4-5.

"Turkish League in Works." Turkish Times. 1 February 1992, 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.