Library of the Australian Defence Force Academy
University College The University of New South Wales Donor: H.J. ZWILLENBERd UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Project Report Sheet Surname or Family name: ZVJ|LLLNB£.RGr OlhernameA: SbA^M.l.lid Abbreviation fordegreeasgiveninthe University calendar:., School: ^^ Titk: XBS...... y5.&.\ST! CS
Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)
The history of the logistic infrastructure of the Australian army during the Second World War has not received the attention from historians which it deserves. In 1939 the infrastructure was minuscule and depended on Great Britain for most of its logistic support except for rations and small arms. By 1945 it had achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency, except for some large or specialised items of equipment. It is the aim of this work to trace this development and examine its attendant major problems.
Primary sources were perused at the Australian Archives in Canberra, Victoria, South Australia and at the Australian War Memorial. In addition, this writer had private access to he records of the late Major General L.E. Beavis by courtesy of his family.
The development of the Australian army's logistic system had not been smooth. The education and training of senior regular officers was deficient in vital areas. Civil and military administrations in 1939 were old-fashioned and badly in need of revision. Responses to the changing circumstances of the military effort were overly bureaucratic and complex. Nonetheless, by the end of the war an effective even if cumbersome logistic system had evolved, due mainly to the influence of some outstanding senior officers, both regular and CMF.
Although some senior army resource managers had realised that the education of regular officers was lacking in breadth and depth there is little evidence that the lessons of 1939-1945 have been learned. The experience of recent wars showed the need for reliance on allied forces. This meant that senior regular officers still had not been exposed to the education required for developing an independent, efficient and effective logistic infrastructure.
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P.26, fn. 65. Delete Nau and insert Wau.
P.44, table. Kemsley. Delete advisory and insert adviser.
P.54, para 2. Amend the first sentence to read: The Chiefs of Staff Committee had subordinate committees and sub-committees.
P. 59, fn. 33. Add: The function of the LGA is amplified on page 79.
P. 62, para 3. Delete H.C. and insert P.C. before Spender.
P. 75, para 1. Delete the first sentence and insert: From its creation in 1901 the Australian army always faced three major problems:
P. 78, para 2, line 7. After Mackay, delete C in C and insert GOC-in-C.
P. 79, para 3, third last line. Insert after function: in respect of administrative matters.
P. 81, para 3, line 1. Insert after logistics: supporting the field force.
P. 92. Delete the last two words and insert Chapter 4.
P. 141, last para and p. 142 first para, line 4. Add: This had been the situation early in the war. ABSTRACT
The history of the logistic infrastructure of the Australian army during the Second
World War has not received the attention from historians which it deserves. In
1939 the infrastructure was minuscule and depended on Great Britain for most of its logistic support except for rations and small arms. By 1945 it had achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency, except for some large or specialised items of equipment. It is the aim of this work to trace this development and examine its attendant major problems.
Primary sources were perused at the Australian Archives in Canberra, Victoria,
South Australia and at the Australian War Memorial. In addition this writer had private access to the records of the late Major General L.E. Beavis by courtesy of his family.
The development of the Australian army's logistic system had not been smooth.
The education and training of senior regular officers was deficient in vital areas.
Civil and military administrations in 1939 were old-fashioned and badly in need of revision. Responses to the changing circumstances of the military effort were overly bureaucratic and complex. Nonetheless, by the end of the war an effective even if cumbersome logistic system had evolved, due mainly to the influence of some outstanding senior officers, both regular and CMF.
Although some senior army resource managers had realised that the education of regular officers was lacking in breadth and depth there is little evidence that the lessons of 1939-1945 had been learned. The experience of recent wars showed the need for reliance on allied forces. This meant that senior regular officers still had not been exposed to the education required for developing an independent, efficient and effective logistic infrastructure. I I
rt-H ? in LTU
(c} 1] 11D41
by
H.J. Zwillenberg
A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts (Hons)
University College
The University of New South Wales
Australian Defence Force Academy
284729 11
CERTIFICATE QFQRIQINAUTY
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis.
(Signed) J CONTENTS
Abstract i Title Page i i Certificate of Originality iii Contents iv Acknowledgements viii Abbreviations ' x
1 INTRODUCTION 1
2 BACKGROUND TO THE LOGISTICS EFFORT AND ITS
SCOPE 1 0
The Strategic Scenario 1 0
Perceived Japanese Strategy and War Plans 2 1
3 THE OFFICER CORPS 2 7
Background 2 7
Composition of the Australian Officer Corps 3 1
Education of Regular Officers 3 3
CMF Officers 3 9
Summary 4 6
4 GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION OF LOGISTICS 4 9
Background 4 9
5 2 Policy Advice and Direction
Army Business Instrumentalities 6 2 Comparisons with Canada 6 9
5 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE AUSTRALIAN
ARMY LOGISTICS 7 4
Introduction 7 4
Financial Delegations 7 5
Ordering Procedures and the Problems of Wastage 7 8
Lend/Lease 8 9
Summary 9 5
6 THE LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S BRANCH 9 7
Background 9 7
Provision of Food 9 9
Ration Storage Facilities 100
Rationing and Catering 103
Ration Scales 108
Drawing of Rations 111
Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (POL) 1 1 2
Horsed and Mechanised Transport 1 1 6
Rail, Road and Maritime Transport Facilities 120
Railway Transport 121
Road and Maritime Transport 128 Drill Halls and Campsites 135
Summary 139
7 LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MASTER GENERAL OF ORDNANCE BRANCH. THE
TECHNOLOGY DIVISIONS 141
Introduction 141
Problems of the MGO Branch 1 4 4
Development of Ordnance Services 14 6
The Chief Military Adviser 149
The 1942/43 Reorganisation of the MGO Branch
and the Influence of Maj Gen L E Beavis 154
Equipment Division 154
Design Division 155
Inspection Division 157
Research and Development (R&D) 16 4
Operations Research 16 8
Summary 17 1 8 THE LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MGO
BRANCH. THE MAINTENANCE DIVISION 173
Background 173
The Ordnance Services 1 7 4 V I I
The Engineering Services 184
Services of the Central Provision Office 194
Controlled Stores - The Provision of Ammunition 196
Non-controlled Stores - The Provision of
Shirts and Trousers 20 6
Summary 211
9 LOGISTICS AND PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS 21 3
Manufacture of Overseas Designs 215
Development of Munitions of Australian Design 222
Production of Uniforms 231
Basic Production Problems 23 4
Summary 23 6
10 CONCLUSION 23 7
BIBLIOGRAPHY 24 5
MAPS
Army Farms 109A
Railway Systems of Australia 123A V I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The writer is indebted to Dr. Robert A. Hall, for helpful assistance and wise counsel and general supervision of the work, the final stages of research and duhng the writing of the thesis. A harmonious relationship was established early on and continued for the duration of the project. Discussions with Dr A.T. Ross, Department of Defence, successfully complemented the writer's understanding of the industrial, technological and, in part, political aspects of the logistic problems in the Australian army in the Second World War.
A number of serving army officers were interviewed. They included Major General Ronald L Hughes, AO, DSO, Major General James C. Hughes, AO, DSO, MC, Major General Barry N. Nunn, AO, RFD, ED, and Lieutenant Colonel Gratton Wheaton, RFD, ED. Some of the problems thrown up by this thesis were discussed with army officers, both regular and reserve now no longer on the active list. Particularly helpful were Major General Kevin G. Cooke, AO, RFD, ED, Brigadier James Stewart of the Australian War Memorial, Brigadier Ronald L Johnson, DSO, ED, Brigadier Stuart Kendall, Colonel Bruce Stark, Lieutenant Colonel J.O. Geddes, MBE, ED, Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon, MC, ED, Lieutenant Colonel T.C. Sargent and Major W.V. Raggatt.
The writer's thanks go to the staff of the Australian Archives in Canberra, Melbourne and Adelaide and to the staff of the Australian War Memorial for their untiring assistance in providing the primary source material. For the physical production of this thesis the writer is indebted to Mary Vanzella, Janny Poate, Ruth White and Dr. Elizabeth Morrison. I X
Irrespective of the opinions expressed by the interviewees, the final responsibility for the contents of the work is that of the writer alone. ABBREVIATIONS
AACC Australian Army Catering Corps AAOC Australian Army Ordnance Corps AAOD Australian Army Ordnance Department AASC Australian Army Service Corps ADOS Assistant Director of Supply AEME Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers AG Adjutant General AMF Australian Military Forces (Prior to 1942/43 meaning all army forces other than AIF, after that time the abbreviation applied to both the CMF and AIF) ANU Australian National University AOD Advanced Ordnance Depot AWM Australian War Memorial Bde Brigade BGS Brigadier General Staff BOD Brigade Ordnance Depot Brig Brigadier C in C Commander-in-Chief CD Council of Defence CE Armd Corps Chief Engineer, Armoured Corps CGS Chief of the General Staff CMA Chief Military Adviser Cmd Command, Commander CMF Citizen Military Forces CO Commanding Officer COD Central Ordnance Depot Col Colonel CPO Chief Provision Officer CRA Commander Royal Artillery CRE Commander Road Engineers DAA Deputy Assistant Adjutant DCGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff DMOl Director Military Operations and Intelligence DMT Director of Military Training X I
DOMF Darwin Overland Maintenance Force DOS Director Supply DST Director (or Directorate) of Stores and Transport EinC Engineer in Chief GRO General Routine Orders GOC General Officer Commanding OS General Staff GSO General Staff Officer HE High Explosive HQ Headquarters Inf Infantry LAD Light Aid Detachment LGA Lieutenant General Administration Lot C Lines of Communication LH Light Horse LHQ Land Headquarters LtCol Lieutenant Colonel LtGen Lieutenant General Maj Gen Major General M/BdProc. Military Board Proceedings MD Military District MGO Master General of Ordnance MSB Munitions Supply Board MT Motor Transport NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NEI Netherlands East Indies OC Officer Commanding OR Other Rank ORBAT Order of Battle Pdr Pounder PMF Pemanent Military Forces POL Petrol, Oil and Lubricants QMG Quarter Master General RAAOC Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps RAE Royal Australian Engineer Regt Regiment R&D Research and Development RMC Royal Military College X I I
SWPA South West Pacific Area SAP Small Arms Factory SMG Sub-machine Gun Tk Tank USAFIA United States Army Forces in Australia WC War Cabinet WE War Establishment WUR War Usage Rates CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The historiography of Australian military history has dealt largely with three aspects:
defence and political strategy; field operations; and biographical works. The logistic
infrastructure of the Australian army, over a period of maximum expansion, warlike
activities and maximum self-reliance, has been subject only to a few largely
descriptive treatments such as those of Fairclough and Tillbrook."'
Logistics receive only a passing reference in most works on strategy and defence
policy. For example, the seven army volumes of the official history covering the
period 1939-1945 and the more recent treatments of defence policy and strategy in
an Imperial and Australian context, such as the books by Grey, Horner, McCarthy
and Day fall into this category.2
Field operations are covered by the official histories but more particularly by such
works as Horner's Crisis of Command, ^ and by a plethora of campaign and unit
histories as, for instance, the histories of the 39 th or 2/27 battalions.'^
1H. Fairclough, Equal to the Task-Par Oneri. The History of the Royal Australian Army Service Corp, Cheshire (Melbourne) 1962; J. Tillbrook, To the Warrior His Arms. A History of the Ordnance Service of the Australian Army, Royal Australian Army Ordnance Committee (Canberra) 1989. 2Gavin Long and others, Australia in the War 1939-1945 Series 1 (Army), Australian War Memorial (Canberra), 1951; Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge) 1990, D.M. Horner, High Command. Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, Australian War Memorial (Canberra)1982; John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-1939. University of Queensland Press (St.Lucia)1976, David Day, The Great Betrayal. Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, Angus and Robertson (U.K.)1988. 3d.M. Horner, Crisis of Command. Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat 1941-1943, ANU Press (Canberra) 1978. ^Victor Austin, To Kokoda and Beyond. The Story of the 39th Battalion 1941-1943, Melbourne University Press (Melbourne)1988; John Burns, The Brown and Blue Diamond at War The Story of the 2/27 Battalion A.I.F, 2/27 Battalion Ex-Servicemen's Association (Adelaide)1960... Finally, there are many biographies and autobiographies supplementing the works on operational strategy and field operations such as the books by Hetherington,
Lodge and Horner, and again the problem of logistics is often overlooked.^
Yet Wrigley,® quoting Michael Howard, points out the importance of logistics.
... the inadequacy of this concept [of operational strategy] was made clear by the course of the American Civil War. The masters of operational strategy were found among the leaders of the defeated South. The victory of the North was not due to the operational capabilities of its generals but to its capacity to mobilise industrial strength and manpower: the logistical dimension . ... Victory can be expected to go not to the side with the most skilful generals ... but to that best able to utilise the wherewithall to expand their ranks, their fire power and sustain them materially...^
The term logistics was adopted by the Australian army from postwar Amehcan military nomenclature and covers the material infrastructure supporting military activities in both in peace and war. In this paper the term is extended to include the role of the senior executive management of this infrastructure. As Downes has stressed :
... a great deal of what happens on the battlefield hinges on the effective or otherwise management of defence resources and assets, to recruit, train, equip, arm and support military forces on the battle field. Therefore, the roles of senior officers in [executive] defence management while perhaps not as distinctive and
Sjohn Hetherington, Blarney-Controversial Soldier 2nd Ed, AWM (Canberra)1973; A.B.Lodge, The Fall of General Gordon Bennett, Allen & Unwin (Sydney)1986; D.M. Horner, The Commanders. Australia's Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century, George Unwin (Sydney) 1984. ®Alan K. Wrigley, a deputy secretary of the Australian Department of Defence was charged by the Minister in 1990 to prepare a review of defence issues as seen through the eyes of now defence experts. ^Alan K. Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community. A Partnership in Australia's Defence, Report to the Minister of Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service (Canberra) 1990, pp1-2. potentially as illustrious as that of operational command are none the less influential and indispensable.8
In the Australian army, as in most other modern armies, problems of logistics were shared between the major staff branches and in both World Wars the Australian logistic organisation was largely based on the British model.^
The major part of the material infrastructure was provided by the QMG and the MGO branches. Traditionally the former was responsible for the physical distribution of supplies such as (food, medical supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants. It did so through a series of military agencies and units specifically raised for this purpose.
The MGO branch was responsible for the actual provision of war materials other than supplies, from their sources (manufacturers and importers) to central and base depots for eventual distribution by the QMG agencies to the combatant units and formations. It also employed specialist corps and manpower.
All of these services constituted the logistic 'tail' without which a conventional army could not fight. In addition, the efficiency of the logistic organisation supporting them determined to a large extent whether advances in pursuit of an enemy could maintain their momentum, or, conversely, whether troops in a defensive situation could continue to hold out.
In the First World War the Australian armed forces formed part of the large Imperial army organisation which meant that very little support other than pay and
SCathy Downes, Senior Officer Professional Development in the Australian Defence Force. Constant Study to Prepare, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, AND. (Canberra) 1983, p.26. 'Senior Officers' in this study include commissioned ranks from colonel upwards. 9War Office (UK) Field Service Regulations 1939, vol.1. "•OThe QMG branch was also responsible for ancillary services such as the provision of camp sites including drill halls and canteen services and aspects of transport and movement. allowances, clothing and a few small arms was provided from Australian sources.
Thus, the appropriate senior Australian staff officers had gained little experience in dealing with logistic problems other than those encountered at brigade and divisional levels.
The value of these experiences at formation level should have been recognised by the army during the inter-war years, but inexplicably seem to have been forgotten.
Nor was the necessity for proper education in the management of resources appreciated.''Consequently, when war broke out in 1939 the army had to fall back on non-military expertise both in the provision and distribution of material
resources.
At the beginning of the Second World War Australia raised forces for Empire and
home defence. Initially, some of the basic logistics, such as personal equipment,2
was provided from Australian resources, but not modern munitions such as Bren
guns and 25 pdr artillery. This was not a problem for the Australian divisions in the
Middle East which once again became part of the large Imperial supply
organisation. Upon their return to Australia the situation changed - the Australian
Force became totally dependent on Australian resources except for items such as
motor transport and tanks that could not be produced efficiently in Australia.
The American supply organisations in Australia were no substitute for the British
logistic organisation in the Middle East because the Australian forces were unable
to integrate into the US logistic infrastructure. One of the reasons was that the
Australian supply system was modelled on the British system which was
centralised to ensure standardisation of procedures, economy and overhead cost
llA-1194(Dept. of Defence-Library)Accession no. 29618/24.14. The History of the MGO Branch of the Staff, LHQ, 1939-1945, MS, 24 December, 1946. l2ciothing, webbing, eating utensils, and small arms. burdens and also to achieve unified control of logistic support for a large number of formations and units deployed in relatively restricted areas. The American forces operated under a decentralised system in which, to ensure flexibility and self- containment in design and production, each arm maintained its own provision system. Stores common to all, such as clothing, camp and general transport equipment were procured, distributed and maintained by a special organisation within the Quarter Master Corps of the US Army.^^
The logistics of the Australian army were the responsibility of a large bureaucratic apparatus partly uniformed and partly public service. Details of the cumbersome nature of the system will be described in Chapters 4 and 5. Early in the war the logistics system had caused some disquiet in the press. For instance, The Age said in mid 1940:
To competent observers it was clear that traditional official routine was frustrating men eager to get things done. The factor euphemistically called 'red tape' was having its customary retardative [sic] effect
The appointment of an all-powerful civilian Director-General of Munitions Supply had shown the way the services should go, so the same newspaper contended :
The other sphere to which it could now be made applicable would be that of the services themselves. These, however, have come to be considered closed corporations by reason of the specialised training required in them and the fundamental importance of the responsibilities assigned to them.''5
The Sydney Morning Herald had something similar to say when it reported that the Prime Minister was to be asked in Parliament:
^^Headquarters, Australian Military Forces, MGO Branch. Equipment Memorandum no.14, 1944, p.13. I4r/7e Age, 5 July 1940. I5|bid. ... to set up a special committee to investigate the possibility of eliminating red tape and bottlenecks [in the] administration of the Defence Departments ...i®
With the entry of Japan into the war and the perceived threat to Australia's security, the demands for an effective command system and thus an improved logistic system became louder. The Daily Telegraph commented:
If an Army cannot organise a system to get small things done [training of a regiment in modern weaponry] what hope has it got of doing big jobs the modern scale involves? ...
and: Perhaps it is not fair to blame higher commanders for not being Napoleons. Remember that for the 15 years before this war started they did an unfashionable job afraid to spend a penny for a new nib for fear of the parliamentary censure that was sure to follow..
The Sydney Morning Herald has this to say:
Now it is not good enough to change old leaders for new, younger, more alert and more imaginative men. You must also change the system which the older men ... have allowed to develop around them.I®
The same issue reported a speech by W.C. Wentworth, subsequently Member for McKellar in the Commonwealth Parliament, to the Housewives Association of NSW in October 1942 in which he alleged that the army administration and procedures were too rigid, suggesting that
the administrative doctrine of rigidity of over-systematising, over-
^^Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 1940. ^'^The Daily Telegraph, 22 December 1941, p.4. ^^Sydney Morning Herald, 10 October 1942, p.6. 7
centralisation and over-standardisation should be replaced by a doctrine of flexibility which would permit of the exercise of initiative and give all praise to the man on the spot...
and that
There was a clique in the Army which was aping the public service mind and in so doing had become more public service minded than the public service itself ...i^
Wentworth's comments bore directly on the management competence of senior officers as resource managers. He did not single out the regular military. That was left to A.S. Wilson, a regular Brigadier who suggested that even after four or five years of war the attitude of regular officers to administrative problems had changed little. In an administrative position paper written in 1946 Wilson maintained that
(a) In peace professional soldiers [could not] be trained and practised in modern administration.
(b) In war this efficiency [could] be remedied by filling key appointments in HQ-AMF with non- permanent officers with previous experience [and that]
(c) An overall supervision [was] required by a civil secretariat [or similar bodies].2o
According to him, professional soldiers could not be expected to function as senior resource managers. This view was not shared by Maj Gen L.E. Beavis, MGO from
1942 onwards and responsible for the total reorganisation of the munitions supply to the army in 1942. Beavis believed that had there been any documentation of
First World War experience, there would have been a solid base for logistics planning.
i9|bid. 20A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1945 Vol.8) File M303. A Study of Structural Innovation in relation to Army Administration by Brig. A.S. Wilson, 1946 p.32. 8
Perhaps, if there had been a history of the administration by Australian and British authorities of the first A.I.F., at the outset of the War of 1939-1945 we would not have been without the organisation to provide the material requirements of a force in the field based on Australia. Such a history might have helped the military authorities between the wars to avoid their failure to obtain in peacetime an organisation which could have expanded when war came. As it was, the organisation to look after the arms, ammunition and equipment of the field force based on Australia had to be created at the same time as it was required to function, and it was largely a case of ' the blind leading the blind' until with some experience and training an efficient organisation came into being.21
This thesis is not intended to present a comparative study of the various Allied logistic systems although some are mentioned to illustrate particular points. Nor is the thesis intended to deal with logistic support of the army below divisional level, but rather with resource management by the senior officers in the context of strategic considerations and the external threat to Australia perceived or real. The work also examines the Government instrumentalities and bureaucratic procedures which underpinned the Australian army logistics and which were the responsibilities of the QMG and MGO branches of the General Staff.
The efficiency of any army's logistic system can be assessed by establishing whether it acted as a brake on the commanders' operational plans, or led to intermittent logistic over-supply beyond their needs. The thesis endeavours to show that, by this measure, the Australian army's logistic system was initially not efficient. The cause lay primarily with the inadequate preparedness of senior managers for the task of resource management. A lesser cause was administrative, through the adoption by the army of public service procedures and the plethora of government instnjmentalities with their clumsy system of checks and balances.
21LE. Beavis, Review of Gavin Long's The Final Campaigns published in Stand To Jan-Feb 1964, p.22. Quoted by E.W.O. Perry. The late Major-General LE. Beavis-an Appreciation, Australian Army Journal no.322, March 1976. p.27. Over time these initial inefficiencies were overcome, operations were rarely if ever handicapped by malfunctions of the system, and large surpluses of supplies and munitions did not build up. A degree of efficiency in the Australian army logistics support was achieved. 10
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND TO THE LOGISTIC EFFORT
The Strategic Scenario - The Blue Water Strategy
That Japan was a potential enemy of Australia had been recognised from the defeat of Russia in 1905. What was not universally agreed, was the form and direction Japanese aggression might take, whether minor coastal raids or invasion, or what the defensive strategy should be - dependence on British naval power or self-reliance on Australia's home defence. One of the first prophets of a possible
Japanese invasion was C.H. Kirmesswho in 1909 envisaged a Japanese occupation of some of Australia's northern coastal districts.'' In the same year the
Japanese scare was taken up by Sir Joseph Cook, the Minister for Defence, who pointed to the naval inferiority of Britain vis-a-vis Japan.2 However, apart from introducing a form of conscription for military service, Australians thought no more about the potential threat from the north.
When war clouds began to gather in Europe in 1914, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was relied on to guarantee peace in the Pacific. However, this alliance was terminated in 1921 and the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 between Britain,
USA, Japan and France virtually took its place. This treaty limited the naval forces of the first three powers in the ratio of 5:5:3. The consequence of this limitation was that British naval power in the Pacific, and thus the security of Australia, was disadvantaged. Senior military officers in Australia had appreciated since the end of the First World War that the balance of naval power could change in the Pacific, and had adopted the view that, in the event of a threat to Australia, British or other
^C.H. Kirmess (Pseud.), The Australian Crisis, G. Robertson & Co. (Sydney) 1909. 2Neville Meany, The Search for Security in the Pacific 1901-1914, Sydney University Press (Sydney) 1976, p.188. 11
assistance could be delayed considerably. Consequently, they recommended a seven-division military force, self-contained in terms of supplies and equipment.^
The British, on the other hand, contended that an invasion of Australia was most unlikely because of the long sea communication faced by any potential invader.
The time taken by an aggressor to reach Australian shores would be sufficient for a
British fleet to come to Australia's assistance. All that Australia would have to contend with would be sporadic raids on vulnerable Eastern seaboard localities."^
Britain 'could prepare Singapore as a major naval base so that the main fleet from
Britain could be supported in the Far East at short notice'.^
This Blue Water strategy, the concept of Empire defence based on superior naval power, pertained through the twenties and thirties. Its logic rendered major military anti-invasion preparedness unnecessary because 'an enemy which gained control of Australian communications with Britain had no need to invade the continent'.®
The Australian Government subscribed to this defence philosophy and saw its substantial annual navy allocations as the major contribution to Imperial and thus
Australian defence.^
The importance of Singapore as a key to this defence strategy was underlined when in 1928 the Australian Government asked its defence advisers for an
3nLA MS 1827(Pearce Papers) S 1, vol.2 pp.5-10. Report on the Military Defence of Australia, 1921. Extracts in A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 905 Council of Defence Agenda ... Part A. 4A-981(Dept.of Foreign Affairs)File 350 Part 1. Empire Naval Policy 1921. 5|bid. 6A T. Ross. The Arming of Australia. The Politics and Administration of Australia's Self- Containment Strategy for Munitions Supply 1901-1945. Ph.D. Thesis University College of the University of New South Wales, 1986, p.69. ^Parliament of Australia. Budget Papers 1934-1946. Quoted by A.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia , The Politics and Administration of Australia's Self-Containment Strategy for Munitions Supply 1901-1945. Ph.D. Thesis. University College of the University of New South Wales, 1986, p.69A. In 1933/34 the navy allocation was 40 per cent of the total defence expenditure. 12
appreciation of the strategic situation and, in particular, of the likelihood of an attack on Australia.® The appreciation took into consideration that the
Washington treaty had decreased the offensive and defensive power of the British in Eastern waters'^ and that
The safety of Australia [depended] on the Naval assistance and security preparations of the mother country in the Far East... [Because of continually changing factors it was] therefore reasonable to assume that full British naval strength [would] not be found East of Suez at the out-break of hostilities ... The Singapore Naval Base [played] a vital part in any consideration of possible war in the Pacific. Until Singapore [was] an established place complete with full docking and repair facilities the British Battle Fleet [could] not meet the Japanese on equal terms.""o
Therefore the existence of Singapore as a strong naval base was an indispensable condition for an effective naval defence against Japanese aggressive aspirations. The base had to be militarily secure and had to serve as support element in maintaining a British battle fleet which would otherwise have
no support between Durban and Esquimalt.i^ Should Singapore fall, the British
battle fleet would still be there to assist in safeguarding against raids. The final conclusion of the Australian chiefs of staff was that
[i]nvasion of Australia but only on a limited scale [was] within the bounds of possibility and not so impossible as to allow of being
definitely ruled out."'^
The Australian navy, while endorsing the appreciation generally, added a rider:
8A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 1768. War in the Pacific. Appreciation 9 August 1929 and Addendum 11 April 1930. 9|bid. Appreciation p.1. I0|bid. Appreciation p.2. 11 Ibid. I2|bid. Addendum 11 April, 1930. 13
The Chief of the Naval Staff... [was] strongly of the opinion that the Naval strength of the Empire [was] sufficient insurance against invasion.IS
But the CGS, Sir Henry G. Chauvel, disagreed :
He [was] of the view that, invasion being the only means by which an enemy could obtain a decisive result, it was a vital danger which should be further provided against by land forces and a shore-based airforce.'"'^
A difference in the strategic basis of opinion had developed. The Australian navy
relied for all protection on the existence of Singapore to support a viable naval force, a view reiterated time and again by most of the Imperial strategists. One such strategist was Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial
Defence, who declared in 1935 that
[p]rovided the British Fleet arrived in time and [found] a properly equipped base at Singapore [Australia] had nothing to fear but sporadic raids.
The Australian CGS in the early thirties, Maj Gen Sir Julius Bruche,^® thought
Hankey's view untenable because Japan might only attack when Britain was
already involved in a European conflict. Thus a British Fleet would be late in
arriving if it arrived at all. Secondly, the proviso of a properly equipped and
defended base at Singapore was not guaranteed and British success in a naval
I3|bid. I4|bid. Sir Henry George Chauvel became a regular officer in 1896. He saw service in the Boer War and was GOG Desert Mounted Corps in 1917. He was CGS from 1923 till 1930 and died in 1945. 15A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 909. Sir Maurice Hankey's Report. Australian Army Reorganisation. Appendix A. Memorandum by CGS, 5 March 1935. l6Maj Gen Sir Julius Bruche was born in Victoria 1873 and trained first as a solicitor. He beqan his career as a military officer in 1891 and became a regular officer in 1898. He saw service in South Africa and in World War 1 mainly as a staff officer. He was appointed CGS in 1931 and was succeeded by Col J.D. Lavarack in 1935. He died in Meiboume in 1961 For further details of his career see E.W.O. Perry, Major General Sir Julius Bruche. Sabretache vol. 15, March 1973, pp.84-89. 14 encounter with Japan was by no means certain. Australia should therefore make adequate preparations for defending its territory against attack and should aim at the greatest degree of self-reliance in home defence just as Britain had done during the First World War when her battle fleets were concentrated in European waters. "I ^
The CGS designate, Col J.D. Lavarack,""® was even more outspoken. He questioned the effectiveness of British sea power, which had declined considerably over recent decades, arguing that Hankey's views were already out of date. He emphasised that the Imperial Conference of 1923 had accepted that the concept of local defence was the first responsibility of each individual part of the Empire.9 He, like Bruche, contended that a British Fleet would not reach the Far East in time and that it could well be defeated after arrival. In fact, Lavarack doubted whether a fleet would be sent in any case, thus making Australia's naval contribution a waste of time and of resources.^o
The fundamental difference of opinions in defence matters between the Australian navy and army was of some concern to the political administrators. The Secretary, Department of Defence, commented to his Minister:
The papers from the services unfortunately illustrate the conflict of
17A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 909. Army Reorganisation. Sir Maurice Hankey's Report. Appendix A. Comments by the CGS, April 1935. ^8Col (later Lt Gen Sir) John Dudley Lavarack was born in Brisbane in December 1885 and joined the Australian regular army in 1905. He attended Staff College, Camberiey, in 1912. Till 1916 he worked for the British Army as a staff officer. He transferred to the A I.F. at that time and reverted to the Australian regular army in 1919. In 1925 he became DMT and in April 1935 CGS. In 1939 he was GOC Eastern Command and in 1940 GOC 7 Division. In 1942 he was appointed GOC First Australian Army which did not see active service until 1944. Shortly afterwards Lavarack became head of the Australian Military Mission in Washington and Governor of Queensland in 1946. He died in December 1957. For further details see E.W.O. Perry, Lieutenant-General Sir John Dudley Lavarack. Victorian Historical Journal vol. 46, May 1975, pp.364-407. ''9A-5954 (Shedden Papers)Box 909. Army Reorganisation. Sir Maurice Hankey's Report. Appendix C, Imperial Conference 1923. Resolution relating to Local Defence. 20|bid. Appendix B. Views of Col J.D. Lavarack, 4 March 1935. 1 5
opinion that has existed for long among the technical advisers on whom the Government and the Minister rely for advice on the basis of the defence policy 21 in July and August 1935 Lt Col Henry Douglas Wynter22 addressed the United Services Institution (USI) of Victoha and of New South Wales where he said :
Considerations of all factors provide overwhelming arguments for preparation against major attack. The idea that we should merely think of minor raids and that we should do so at the behest of people located on the other side of the world is to me completely incomprehensible.23
The Minister did not rebut Wynter till a few months later when he reiterated in December 1935 the official Government defence policy :
Any dangers that threaten the Commonwealth are ... overseas [sic] and her first lines of defence are on or over the sea. British naval strength is Australia's initial safeguard, but her location is in the Antipodes, 10,000 miles away from the main concentration of the British Fleet. The organisation of her local capacity for defence both as a deterrent to aggression and a means of holding out until support is forthcoming is essential for the security of the Commonwealth.24
21 Ibid. Letter Secretary, Department of Defence to Minister for Defence (Parkhill) 10 April 1935. 22Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Henry Douglas Wynter was born in 1886 near Gin Gin, Queensland. He joined the militia in 1907 and in 1911 the permanent military forces. After several staff and instructional appointments Wynter was seconded to the AIF as a brigade major. In the early '20s he attended the Staff College at Camberley and after several staff appointments to Australia returned to England where he attended the Imperial Defence College course in London. In 1926 he was banished to Queensland. He returned to Randwick in 1938 to become the first Commandant of the Australian Command and Staff School. In 1939 he became GOC Northern Command and in 1940 DAA and QMG 1 Aust Corps. In 1942 he was appointed Lieutenant General in charge of Administration and Allied Land Headquarters. He died in February 1945 aged 58. 23A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 365. The Wynter Case. Memorandum Secretary, Dept. of Defence to Minister for Defence (Parkhill) 24 November 1936. Lecture notes for July 1935 lecture to USI of Victoria, p.9. 24A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 910. File 6/1936 Statement of Government Policy regarding the Defence of Australia. Mosman, 2 December 1935, p.9. 1 6
While the Government acknowledged that there would have to be a local defence capability, it clearly looked to Britain for the major effort to stave off invasion.
The divergence between Government policy and the defence concepts of the army flared into the public domain in1936 and developed into what became known as the Wynter affair. Wynter's United Service Institution lecture notes, subsequently found to contain verbatim passages from his memorandum to Maj Gen Sir Julius Bruche compiled on 5 March, 1935 as the official army comment on the Hankey report, were reflected in a newspaper article in April 1936 25. The source was in all probability Wynter's son, a reporter on the Daily Telegraph. While the Government took no notice of this newspaper article, it reacted sharply six months later, when the leader of the Opposition used Wynter's lecture notes to criticise the official Blue Water policy during the 1936 budget debates.26 The Government disciplined Wynter (who had made the notes available to a member of Pariiament) by transferring him to a less prestigious and less remunerative post in Brisbane. He had committed two military offences: one, the disclosure of classified information; the other, public criticism of official government defence policy.
The Wynter United Service Institution lecture notes were extremely useful to the Opposition. The Blue Water strategy had been accepted reluctantly, by the Labor Party, which would have preferred a more independent Australian defence policy.28 Horner suggests that 'defence now took a more partisan aspect'29 and the Government took the view that John Curtin used the expert opinion of senior army officers as the basis for questioning the defence appropriations which
^^Daily Telegraph 3 April, 1936. ^^The Age 6 November, 1936. 27A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 910. File 6/1936. Statement of Government Policy regarding the Defence of Australia. Mosman, 2 December 1935, p.9. 28J.M. McCarthy, The A.L.P. and the Armed Sen/ices, Theory and Practice, Labor History, November 1973, pp.58-67. 29o.M.\^orner, High Command, p.11. 1 7
favoured the navy. All this forced Parkhill, the Minister for Defence, into having to
support the Imperial defence policy more strongly,which meant, of course, the
Singapore strategy. On 6 November, the day after Curtin's attack on the
Government's defence policy, Parkhill made an impassioned plea for unity in
defence matters and stressed that while bipartisanship already existed in
questions of home defence he:
[appealed] for consideration of the complementary aspect of Empire defence ... He had not examined the question so as to make political capital... but in the earnest desire to establish common ground on every aspect of a national policy for the maximum security of the Commonwealth.3i
Shedden,32 at the time First Assistant Secretary, Department of Defence, was very
critical of the army's , and particularly Wynter's, role in the whole affair. In his
view, the army's criticism of the Hankey Report had been unfair, because:
Hankey had urged not so much a strict adherence to Impenal defence, but that Australian defence should be planned in co- operation with Great Britain and not in isolation through self- reliance on local defence.33
Shedden's influence in this matter has yet to be assessed, but the tone of this
passage quoted by Horner seems to indicate a compromise solution. However,
the Government was under constant pressure from British authorities who assured
Australia that it had nothing to fear: British assistance would be speedily
30|bid. 31D.M. Horner, High Command, p.12. 32Frederick Geoffrey (later Sir Frederick) Shedden was born at Kyneton, Victoria in 1893 and educated at Melbourne and London Universities. He served in the 1st AIF as a lieutenant. He was Secretary of the Department of Defence from 1937-1956. He served as Secretary, Advisory War Council, and Chairman of the Defence Committee, with a constant attendance at Imperial Defence meetings. He died in 1971. For details of his career see E.W.O. Perry, Sir Frederick Shedden, An Appreciation Victorian l-listorical Magazine 42(3) August 1971, pp.632-637. ^^D.M. Horner. High Command, p.12. 1 8
forthcoming if a danger to Australia arose. Shedden, The Secretary, Department of
Defence, reported that about twenty-five such assurances had been given between early 1938 and the outbreak of the Pacific war 34 So it was not surprising that the navy continued to receive the major share of the Australian defence appropriations, which in 1937/38 amounted to 43.1 per cent, with the remainder of the defence budget distributed over the army, the airforce and the Department of
Defence non-service instrumentalities.^^
The senior army officers were not deterred by the difficulties they had in getting their opinions widely accepted. In a statement addressed to an army audience, the atittude of the army's senior officers was summarised as follows:
In case of simultaneous war in Europe and in the Far East the United Kingdom would not be able to send or render significant assistance for a long time.
Existence of Singapore would not assist in the defence of Australia.
Australia could not build a battle Fleet compared to that of the Japanese. Therefore Japan would maintain sea control for a long time and would use invasion methods in addition to economic pressures in form of blockade.
Primary role of field army was to defend the vital areas of Newcastle, Sydney and Melbourne. This would mean a well- equipped and trained force with a high degree of strategic mobility for a large portion of the field force in close cooperation with the Air Force.
34A5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 648. File 7 March 1938-26 March 1946. For a detailed history of Anglo-Australian defence relations prior to 1941 see David Day, The Great Betrayal, Angus & Robertson (UK) London, 1988, Chapters 1-3 and the more balanced account in John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-1939 University of Queensland Press 1976, Chapters 3 and 6. 35at. Ross. The Arming of Australia, p.69A. Quoting Govemment of Australia. Budget Papers, 1934-1946. 36MP-826/1 (Dept. of the Army-Defence Schemes) Item 14 Common Doctrine and the Employment and Organisation of a [future] AIF. December 1937. 1 9
Had this concept been accepted as official Government defence policy, it would
have had far-reaching effects for logistics and the resource managers. The
consequences would have been a complete reorientation of equipment and
ordnance procurement policies, transport facilities and reserves of warlike stores
appropriate to the geographic and climatic conditions of an environment that was
quite different from anything the Army had experienced so far. The consequences
would have been beneficial for the Australian army.
Keogh raises another issue in relation to the acceptance of the Blue Water
Strategy. He questions, without providing an answer, why Australian politicians,
senior service officers and senior public servants had not foreseen that Japan
would look to sources in the Netherlands East Indies and in certain parts of
Australia to meet its basic commodity needs, such as oil, tin, rubber, lead, zinc
and copper,37 particularly since Japanese activities and preparations for a move
southwards had been noted and discussed from 1931 onwards.^^ There are
possible answers to that question. One was the strong Empire-mindedness of the
Australian politicians on both sides of the political spectrum and the unshakeable
belief in the might of the Royal Navy.39 Another was the disbelief in the feasibility of
mounting an invasion of Australia, a view postulated by an appreciation of senior
Australian public servants compiled in 1929. The essence of this paper was based
on a Japanese line of communication of about 4,500 miles. The size of an
invasion force was estimated at a minimum of two Japanese divisions totalling
about 40,900 men and 4,800 horses. This would require about 17,000 tonnes of
shipping space distributed over 27 ships, which was almost one-half of the total
shipping available in Japanese ports on any one day. Additional tonnage would
Keogh, South West Pacific 1941-1945, Grayflowers Production (Melbourne) 1965, pp.52-54. 38A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 916. Defence Committee Agendum 13/1931. Japanese Activities in Pacific Islands. (Gilbert & Ellis). 39David Day, The Great Betrayal, pp.3-5. 20 be required to ship stores and aircraft, which would have brought the convoy up to 44 ships with an aggregate load carrying capacity of about 265,000 tonnes.
In 1939 the Government's anti-raid policy still prevailed in line with the traditional Blue Water/Singapore strategy. The home army was organised to beat off raids on vulnerable localities. This organisation was based on the Squires command structure of 1938"^^ and a possible expeditionary force that was envisaged to fight within the framework of an allied power.
The fall of France and subsequent reverses in the Mediterranean unhinged the perceived power balance. As Day points out : 'Britain chose to take risks with the security of her possessions in the Far East including Australia in order to protect her interests in the Middle East'.Thus, almost from the beginning of the war, the prospects of a British fleet arriving in time to safeguard Australia became increasingly unlikely.-phe loss of British naval superiority in the Mediterranean was advanced as a plausible excuse for what had been a political reality for a number of years.
The Singapore strategy was publicly adjudged a failure in December 1941 :
Our thinking about it [Singapore] was governed by the obsolete conception of seapower... No thought was given to land defences of outlying airfields in the Malayan Peninsula ... It is still permissible to hope that Singapore can hold out as an
^ONLA-PRO 6320 (Sir Maurice Hankey's Paper) Item 72. Letter Shedden to M. Hankey 3 July 1934, pp.38-41. 41A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence-Classified Correspondence) File 51/306/6. The Squires Report, 16 December 1938. The report recommended inter alia, the establishment of a command structure instead of several military districts and all formations individually responsible to the Military Board. The author of this report, Lt Gen E.K. Squires, an English officer, had been appointed by the Government in mid-1938 to the position of Inspector-General of the Australian Army. He made a number of recommendations which the Government took a long time to implement. He died in 1940. 42David Day, The Great Betrayal, p.347. 43|bid. 21
isolated fortress. In the meantime its significance in our strategical plan has largely disappeared. It can no longer keep open the short sea route to India and Burma by which Australian and American supplies could travel
The failure of the Blue Water/Singapore strategy, the real possibility of an invasion and the uncertainty of assistance from non-Australian sources had a major impact on the logistic demands of the Australian war effort. During a period in which hostilities were thought likely in the areas of the eastern and western sea boards, the emphasis of logistics would have been on heavy ordnance (artillery and tanks), high ammunition usage and the need for a high degree of strategic mobility. In the event, these requirements did not have to be met to anywhere near the expected extent when hostilities were eventually conducted in a jungle environment. At the same time, geographic and climatic conditions imposed protective measures on the storage and movement of supplies and munitions not anticipated in peace time.
Perceived Japanese Strategy and War Plans
The Australian DCGS, Maj Gen S.F. Rowell, was aware in 1941 that the Japanese had plans for a three-stage aggressive strategy comprising
1. [An] Attack on Malaya with the object of seizing Singapore 2. [An] Attack on the Netherlands East Indies and British Borneo
3. [An] Invasion of Australia or New Zealand.
The prerequisite for the success of this plan was the destruction of US naval power and the occupation of the Philippines, Guam and Wake. Overall, the establishment
^^Daily Telegraph (Sydney) 26 December 1941, p.3. 45DM Horner, Australian Estimates of the Japanese Threat 1905-1941. In: Philip Towie {e6) Estimating Foreign Military Power, Groom (Helm) London 1982, Chapter 5, p.162. 22
of a defensive perimeter was envisaged from Hong Kong to the west of Thailand,
then south of New Guinea, then east of Wake Island to the Kuriles.^e After the
occupation of Rabaul the Japanese realised they could not stop there. There was
a need to control the Solomons, north-east of New Guinea, and even Port
Moresby. The Japanese navy argued for the occupation of Australia or a least a
large part of it to prevent the build-up of an allied counter-offensive and to interrupt
US communications with the Far East. But the Japanese army disagreed. It would
take at least twelve divisions, a force just not available to Japan after other
requirements with higher priority were met.47 On the other hand, so Moreton
contends, the Japanese army did not object to the occupation of the islands'
perimeter. Thus the Japanese high command issued orders on 29 January, 1942
for the occupation of Lae and the Solomon Islands with the view to moving on to
Port Moresby."^®
Whatever the Japanese high command may have wished in regard to Australia, they did not have the resources at their disposal to invade significant portions of the continent. Keogh came to similar conclusions in 1965 which differed from
Moreton's only in minor detail.'^Q
These scenarios were constructed with hindsight. But what were the Australian perceptions of a potential Japanese threat to her security at the outbreak of the
Second World War? While there was no hard evidence available about actual
Japanese military plans, there was plenty of information about Japanese aggressive intentions.^o One of the issues raised by the evidence was that Japan
L. Moreton, Strategy in Command. The First 2 Years. United States in World War II. The War in the Pacific. Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington, 1962, p.58, pp.95-96, pp.107-109. 47|bid. p.214. 48|bjd. 49e.G. Keogh, South West Pacific 1921-1945, pp.134-145. SORobert Walton. Japanese Espionage in Australia 1888-1931. Journal of the Australian War Memorial no.11, October 1987, pp.37-46. Wayne Gobert, Assignment Asia. 23
might well patch up its differences with Russia when Britain and its allies were engaged elsewhere.
The request in 1939 for a copy of the Australian Warbook by the Japanese consul- general should have alerted Australia to possible hostile Japanese intentions52as should have the military intelligence gathering activities of the Japanese Major
Hashida early in 1941.53 Other Japanese unfriendly activities in the islands to the north have been referred to in some detail by Horner.
The foregoing comments have shown that Australia had been aware of potentially aggressive intentions on the part of Japan and over the years had taken some counter measures. Apart from repeated appeals to Britain to put teeth into the
Singapore strategy, successive Australian governments had actively supported a policy of self-containment, particularly in respect of munitions production.This policy resulted in a logistic capability which by the end of 1942 assured Australian army officers of equipment that was superior to that of the Japanese both quantitatively and qualitatively.Other measures included the raising of the
Darwin Mobile Force^^ and the strengthening of some of the island defences.ss
Canberra Times Sunday, 3 March 1990, Magazine p.1; The Evolution of Service Strategic Intelligence 1901-1941, Australian Defence Force Journal no.92, January/February 1992. pp.56-64. ^V-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 434. 20 September 1939-21 November 1939. Plans of Japanese Prior to 1939, WC Agendum Defence 15/1939. 24 September 1939. 52A-461 (Prime Minister's Department) File B 337/1/10. Government Printer to the Dept. of Defence. Item 581/401/521 of 29 September 1939. The Warbook consisted of a series of instructions to all Commonwealth instrumentalities as to the actions that should be taken in case of danger of war and the actual outbreak of hostilities. 53A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence-General Correspondence) File 19/304/276. The Case of Major Hashida, February 1941. File on Japanese Military Attitudes, March 1941. 54D.M. Horner, Australian Estimates of the Japanese Threat 1905-1941. In: Philip Towie (ed) Estimating Foreign Military Power, pp.150-152, 155. 55see Chapters 8-10 of this thesis.
56A.T. ROSS, Awakening the Apocalypse: Technology, Industry and War in Australia 1918- 1945, Draft MS Chapter 12, pp.13-27. 57Alan Powell, The Shadows Edge. Australia's Northern War, Melbourne University Press (Melbourne) 1988, pp.16-17. 58Robert A. Hall, The Black Diggers, Allen & Unwin (Sydney) 1989, pp.34-35. 24
When Japan entered the war several options for attack by the Japanese were envisaged: one, southwards from their mandated territory towards Port Moresby, New Caledonia and the Torres Strait and from there across onto the Australian mainland; another, an attack on North Queensland from the Solomon Islands and from the New Hebrides; or a move southwards from NEI onto Western Australia. Whereas the first option would have required considerable naval and air support, options two and three would have been mainly the task of army forces. The logistic requirements by the Australian army implicit in meeting any one of these three options were the means of moving military resources such as personnel, supplies, munitions and related equipment rapidly and efficiently to localities where they were needed. However, these factors were not addressed until later in the year when the needs became apparent from reports of the fighting forces.
The appreciations made at the beginning of the Pacific war were based on general knowledge and perceived Japanese characteristics rather than on up-to-date actual tactical knowledge and combat experience available at the time. In marked contrast were the 1942 appreciations of Col K.A. Wills,59 whose deductions were made on the basis of the most recent Japanese movements. In February 1942 Wills contended that the return of the 6th and 7th AIF Divisions was too late to save Sumatra and once bottled up in the NEI the divisions would not be available to assist in safeguarding Australia.^o In July 1942 he forecast the Japanese overland thrust at Port Moresby, based on his observations that the Japanese usually resorted to land warfare once a naval thrust had been unsuccessful.^^ This forecast was very much at variance with the American view which discounted the overland threat to Port Moresby. In December 1942 Wills deduced from their
59col (later Brig Sir) Kenneth Agnew Wills was born in Adelaide in 1896, educated in London and served in World War 1 with the British Army. He was a director of his family company in Adelaide and a keen militia soldier. His service during 1939-1945 was in staff positions, mainly in intelligence and 2nd AIF formations. He died in 1977. 60AWM-3DRL (Papers of Brig K.A. Wills) - 34/36. 61 Ibid. Also D.M. Horner, Crisis in Command, p.104 and Appendix 12. 25
known movements mainly within the NEI area that the Japanese had three options, namely an attack on North West Australia and Dan^/in, a strong defensive stance based on Timor and an attack on Port Moresby from the west. In the event none took place.62 it could be said that if the Wills' appreciations had been accepted, particularly the one in July 1942, the Australian reverses of that year might have been avoided. However, this was doubtful. Appropriate logistic support may not have been forthcoming, bearing in mind the virtual total absence of strategic mobility in Australia's north.
Public opinion about the likelihood of land attack against the mainland was divided. Some Australian politicians believed invasion of Australia would be less hazardous for the Japanese than an invasion of Great Britain by the
Germans.^^These people believed that the enemy would consider the occupation of some parts of the Australian mainland as a means of preventing an Allied counter offensive against the Japanese island perimeter. Others discounted the possibility of invasion.^^ The-man-in-the-street' may have feared invasion to a much greater extent than the senior military commanders. By and large one is drawn to the conclusion that early 1942 fears of an invasion were genuine, but were not based on hard evidence.
When the confrontation between Australia and Japan occurred, planning in preparation for the conflict was mainly within the framework of the official defence policy and based on the Blue Water/Singapore strategy. Despite what was then known about Japanese war plans, the army's response was directed by political pressure and by the limited resources available, a situation made worse by the size of the country. According to official defence plans, a system of priorities was
62|bid. ^^ Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1942. 64|bid. 12 March 1942. 65|bid. 19 May 1942. 26
adopted in which a very large amount of manpower and material resources was allocated to the defence of the eastern seaboard.
The defensive effort was managed by a military officer corps both regular and part- time under conditions not very different from those pertaining in the First World War and in the Middle East in the Second World War. The difficulties that did confront the Australian military officer corps in the Pacific War will be examined in the next chapter. 27
CHAPTER 3
THE OFFICER CORPS
Background
This chapter aims to show that the senior officers were ill-prepared to handle the logistic problems which the need for national self-sufficiency had placed upon them. This was at least partly due to the deficiencies in their education and training. The first of these lay in the limited, purely military nature of their training, which failed to provide the non-military basis needed to cope with the new logistic role of self-sufficiency. The second was the narrowness of the training, which did not foster a truly professional approach. Even when the logistic requirements were recognised, no attempt was made to provide additional education in resource management although the knowledge was available in Australia. As it turned out, it was the non-regular officers and one or two atypical staff officers who proved to be the competent resource managers of the logistic support for the Australian army in the Second World War.
Officers as a sociological group have been the subject of numerous studies.The foremost non-Australian writers are Janowitz, Downey, Huntington, Hackett and
^For example: M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait, Free Press. Inc. (New York), 1960; J.C.P. Downey, Management of the Armed Forces, McGraw Hill (London), 1977; 8.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard University Press (Cambridge Mass.), 1957; J.W. Hackett, The Profession of Arms, Sidgwick (London), 1983; N. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Johnathon Cape (London), 1976; 8. Encel, The 8tudy of Militarism in Australia, In: J.van Doom, (Ed.) Armed Forces and Society - Sociological Essays. (Hague), 1968 and his Equality and Authority - a Study of Class, Status and Power in Australia, Cheshire (Melbourne), 1970; W.J. Finlayson, Professionalism. Australian Army Journal no. 205, June 1966, pp.44- 49- G P. Hogan, The Profession of Arms and Officer Career Development. Australian okence Force Journal no. 69, March/April 1988, pp.44-48; D.M. Homer, Staff Corps vs Militia. Australian Defence Force Journal no.26, January/February 1981, pp. 13-25; H. Smith, The Decline of the Military Profession in Australia. Australian Defence Force Journal no.74, January/ February 1989, pp.5-13; A.J. Molan. No Room for Complacency. Defence Force Journal no.65. September/October 1987 pp.3-13. 28
Dixon. Australian writers who have examined the sociology of the military officers include Encel, Finlayson, Hogan, Horner, Smith and Molan. All of the aforementioned writers have studied the functions of the officer corps and what constitutes the professionalism of its calling, defined by Hackett as the 'ordered application of force in the resolution of a social or political problem'.2
There are two basic views of the status of the professional military in society. The
Huntington model sees the military as a state within the state which, while apart from society, nevertheless performs a service which is 'essential to the functioning of society'. Its members 'share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from the laymen'.3
The Janowitz model sees the military as a community that is integrated into the society from which it has adopted many of its administrative methods in order to manage violence in the interest of that society. The Janowitz model has developed because :
The new tasks of the military require that the professional officer develops more and more of the skills and orientations common to the civilian administrators and civilian leaders.^
Janowitz furthermore says :
The history of the modern military establishment can be described as a struggle between heroic leaders who embody traditionalism and glory and military 'managers' who are concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war. This distinction is fundamental.5
2j.W. Hackett, The Profession of Arms, p.3. 3$.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp.8-10. ^M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p.9. 5|bid. p.21. 29
Most recent writers on the subject tend to see the officer corps moving in the direction of the Janowitz model. For instance, Finlayson contends that the modern army reflects all aspects of the wider community in that modern warfare is no longer the prerogative of the services. A modern officer must be aware of the functions of the instmmentalities that make up the total war effort.
Perhaps more importantly, Finlayson differentiates between training and education, training being the acquisition of skills required for the management of violence, and education the capacity to create, understand and progressively improve procedures and standards demanded by the skills for which the officer had trained.®
An illustration of the confusion between education and training and of their respective merits was the decision in 1937 to discontinue Japanese language studies at RMC. A part-time lecturer in Japanese was also adjutant and quartermaster of the Sydney University Regiment. Pressure was brought to bear on the Military Board^ to free this officer from his language teaching position to better attend to regimental administrative duties. The CGS agreed. His justification was that 'this language [was] of little cultural value and the time spent on it at the college [was] practically wasted'.^ The minister at the time (Parkhill) was not sure that the nght decision had been made particularly as the level of Japanese language capability in Australia was apparently not very high. Education had to give way to administrative training requirements at unit level.
6W.J. Finlayson, Professionalism, pp.44-49. ^The Military Board was created in 1904 and vested with the corporate military control of the armed forces, but from 1911 onwards was only concemed with the army. It consisted of three military officers and one civilian public sen/ant as finance mef^iber^ The chairman was the Minister for Defence. The work was carried out in the GS, AG and QMG branches. A fourth branch, that of the MGO was added in 1939. 8A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1937 Vol.2) File 118/37. Language Training. December 1937. 30
Equally important is the perception of the military officer as a 'professional', a term, according to Molan, not synonymous with 'competent'.^ in the words of Huntington, the role of the military manager is characterised by the development of military staffs which are:
Professional institutions [collecting] technical knowledge [applying it] practically to the management of violenceJo
However, such statements are fairly meaningless unless the terms 'profession' and ' professionalism' are defined. Downey suggests three criteria for defining these terms in a military context.First, in a professional military system there must be some permanence, that is, there must be a sizeable full-time nucleus, irrespective of whether a national warlike emergency exists. Second, the permanent nucleus must set its sights on technical proficiency which is attained by study and practical application both in peace and war and, thirdly, the system must be a service that is under the supervision of some political authority. Three further criteria should be added. Professionalism implies the application of first principles, the principles of war, to the solution of military problems. Second, there must be an ethical condition of providing service on the basis of realistic requirements rather than of wants expressed or pressures exerted by politicians or pressure groups, such as the RSL. The third, and perhaps the most important of all criteria, a profession must be able to advance its own frontiers of knowledge and to build up a substantial corpus of theoretical knowledge and doctrine.
The regular officers saw themselves as professionals but because they had been trained in a narrow fashion rather than educated for a broader way of thinking they could not really be classed as professionals. The non-regular officers might have
9A.J. Molan, No Room for Complacency, p.4. 10S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p.4. 11J.C.P. Downey, Management of the Armed Forces, p.8. 31
brought their own civilian background to their military service, but because they lacked the military administrative training they could not be classed as military professionals either. The idea of developing a true military professional was first exposed in the Vasey and Rowell reports on the Royal Military College, Duntroon and implemented in the sixties and seventies.
The extent to which these criteria applied to the Australian officer corps will be examined in the next section.
Composition of the Australian Officer Corps
The effectiveness of any sociological group depends on the composition, education and training of its senior members.'is The regular officers consisted of staff corps, mainly RMC graduates and others, but the bulk of Australian army officers came from the CMF, the part-time militia force. Among these officers there were distinctions. For instance, AIF officers thought of themselves as the elite because they had been selected for overseas service in the Middle East. Then there were the AIF officers with service only in the islands or in the north of Australia and there were AIF officers with no active service in either the Middle East or the islands.
Finally, there were the CMF officers, some of whom had seen active service in the north of Australia and in the islands and others who had not.
Relationships between all of those groups at times exhibited some friction. Horner has shown that the initial occasional tension between staff corps and militia officers gave way to a conflict between the volunteer AIF and the partially conscripted
^2c.P. Coulthard - Clark, Duntroon, The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-1986. Allen & Unwin (Sydney), 1986. Discussion of Vasey and Rowell Reports, pp.161-165, 169-1 70. i^Cathy Downes, Senior Officer Professional Development, p.11. 32 militia.In the context of this work other writers have come to a similar conclusion.5
Some of the senior regular army officers were critical of the administrative knowledge and capability of some of their CMF counterparts, but this was not universal.''® An AIF officer clearly stated he never experienced any conflict with regulars, that there was more likelihood of tensions between staff corps officers themselves and that these RMC trained regular officers were indispensable to the administration of the army at unit and lower formation level.
Others also minimised the differences. The late Maj Gen R.N.L. Hopkins, a senior regular army officer, admitted that there were jealousies and sometimes rivalries between all these groups but probably nothing widespread or much of importance came of it.""® Similarly, Brig R.L Johnson, CMF, said he never had any difficulties with regular army officers either junior or senior to him.'' ^
I'^D.M. Horner, Staff Corps vs Militia, pp.13-25. ''Sjohn Barrett, IVe Were There ... Penguin (Melbourne)1987 Chapters 3 & 4; A.B. Lodge, Geese and Swans, Australian War Memorial History Conference 1983 and J.H. Moore, The Australian Militia in New Guinea 1940-1945. MA Thesis Macquarie University 1979 (MS). 16B.A. Travers, The Staff Corps - CMF conflict as seen by a young AIF officer 1940-1942. Paper presented to Australian War Memorial Military History Conferency 6-10 July 1987. D.M. Horner, General Vasey's War, Melbourne University Press (Melbourne) 1992, pp.2,58,69,84,186,228,259,286,290,31 6. l^Lt Col A. Fleming. Communication 14 February 1990. Lt Col. A. Fleming, a Queenslander, enlisted in the AIF in 1939 as a private. He saw service in the Western Desert and in Greece as an infantry officer and later became associated with the army/air co-operation unit. He was the last CO of that unit. After the war he was the first director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation. Later he served in senior ranks of the Australian Public Service and ended his career as Director-General, National Library of Australia. i^Maj Gen R N.L Hopkins. Communications 2 February 1988. Maj Gen Ronald Nicholas Lamond Hopkins PMF was bom on 28 May 1897, educated in Melbourne and joined RMC, Duntroon. He served in the 6th LHR, AIF. He attended staff college at Quetta in 1928, was Commanding Officer of 7 Div. Cav. in 1940. He served on the general staff in New Guinea in 1942 and in 1944 and then commanded the Australian Staff College. From there he moved as Commander of the Australian component BCOF in Japan. He concluded his military career as commandant RMC in 1954 and died in 1990. ^®Brig R.L. Johnson. Communication 10 February 1988. Brig R.L. Johnson was bom in 1916 and educated at Geelong Grammar School and at St Marks College, Adelaide. He is a senior partner in an Adelaide law firm and saw service in the Middle East and in the New 33
On the evidence it would be difficult to infer that any shortcomings in the Australian
army logistic system were due to a lack of harmony in the officer corps.
Education of Regular Officers.
During the interwar years and early in the war the ethos of the regular Australian
officer corps was firmly embedded in the Huntington model. The officer saw
himself as the 'heroic leader' and both his early education and training were
directed towards attaining the 'warrior cult' , that is proficiency in the combatant
roles of the military profession with the almost total neglect of its logistic aspects.
The RMC curriculum from 1920 to 1930, that is the graduation period of officers with
reasonable prospects to reach middle or senior ranks by 1939/40, shows that of
the total study and tutorial periods only about 2.45 per cent had been earmarked for
administration and accountancy. It was only from 1931 to 1939 that this average
increased to 5.37 per cent .20 What was understood to constitute the subjects of
administration and accountancy is illustrated by the following extract from the
1926/7 annual report of the commandant, RMC :
Administration
The hours allotted were 76 for lecturers and 40 for studies.
The instruction is limited to Cadets of the 1st Class and deals with the organisation and administration of the forces in peace and war.
The subject has been treated under the following headings:-
Composition and organisation of a division; chain of command and channels for correspondence.
Guinea area. After the war he was CO of various CMF units and ended his military service as commander 9 Inf Bde in Adelaide. 20The percentages have been calculated from the data in Appendix D of each of the Annual Report(s) on the Royal Military College of Australia by the Commandant. 1920-1939. 34
Composition and organisation of the Australian Military Forces in detail, including Staff Corps, Australian Instructional Corps, Permanent Forces, Citizen Forces, and Senior Cadets.
The organisation of an office under peace conditions and in the field; correspondence and records; principles of banking and bookkeeping.
Pay and allowances; provisions of Financial and Allowance Regulations and Military Ordnance organisation in peace and war; the methods of requisitioning for stores and clothing and the issue and accountancy of the same.
Mobilisation. - General principles and regulations.
Cryptography.
Throughout the year Cadets are familiarized with conditions in the service outside Duntroon, by the systematic study of Australian Army Orders and Military Board lnstructions.21
If the tuition in administration and accountancy at RMC was designed to be the basis of resource management knowledge, then it failed. Designating the RMC students as staff cadets in terms of logistics was a misnomer. RMC, in practice, trained rather than educated officers capable of assisting in the training of the CMF at unit and sub-unit level. In this they were supported by the non-commissioned officers of the regular Army Instructional Corps.22 This point is made quite strongly by Clark who asserts that 'cadets were trained as war technicians'23 rather than given an education designed 'to stimulate original thought ...'24 in a broadly educated officer.
Thus, apart from its specialist officers (medical practitioners, dentists, veterinarians, lawyers and ministers of religion), the regular Australian army officers were trained
^^ Annual Report on the Royal Military College of Australia by the Commandant. 1926/7 p.30. Extract. 22A.J.C. Newton. The Australian Instructional Corps. Australian Army Journal no.267 August, 1971, pp.29-52. 23s.B. Clark. The Development of the Curriculum of the Royal Military College of Australia in its Progress to University Status ... M.Ed.Thesis, University of Sydney, 1968 (MS), p.73. 24|bid., p.70. 35 rather than educated. It was only as late as 1945 that the army instructed Maj Gen Vasey to head a committee charged with an enquiry into the RMC syllabus.25 The committee pointed out that RMC had done little more than to provide officers for manning CMF cadres. This was no longer adequate, if indeed it ever had been, because Australia had changed from being one of minor units of the British Empire to a relatively significant middle power with its own international commitments and influences. The Vasey committee recommended that, similar to the West Point system, the RMC syllabus should consist of a four year in-depth course balanced half and half between military and high level academic studies. The military part of the curriculum should train the prospective officer in a sound knowledge of all arms rather than aim at competence training in their use.26
In 1946 a committee headed by Lt Gen Rowell produced a further report recommending that all RMC cadets should attain first degree academic status.27 it endorsed the recommendation made by the commandant the year previously:
Events have proved that in modern war the regular officer is faced with problems which demand of him not merely a sound military education but also a high standard of technical and general knowledge ... [The] time has arrived that the curriculum of the
^^Report on the Royal Military College of Australia. 30 November,1944 cited in S.B. Clark, The Development of the Curriculum, Chapter 3. Maj Gen George Alan Vasey (1895- 1945) graduated from RMC in 1915. He sen/ed in France and by 1917 was brigade major. During the inter-war years he had several postings to India and attended the staff college at Quetta in 1928 and 1929. After more postings in India he was appointed in the late thirties as GSO 1 Training at AHQ, Melbourne. In 1939 he became DAA &QMG 6 Division and in 1941 commanded the 19 Brigade. In 1942 he was GOC 7 Division and in 1945 GOC 6 Division. He was killed in an aircrash just outside Cairns in March, 1945. 26|bid. S.B. Clark, pp.72-73. Report of the Education of Staff Cadets at the Royal Military College Duntroon (November 1946) (Rowell Report) Canberra. Army Office Secretariat. Quoted in S.B. Clark, Chapter 3 and in C V. Coulthard - Clarke, Duntroon. The Royal Military College of Australia, 1911- 1986 pp 169-171. Lt Gen Sir Sydney F. Rowell (1894-1970) graduated from RMC in 1914' He had some junior command experience in Gallipoli and Palestine but was invalided back to Australia. During the inten/var years he attended Camberley Staff College and the Imperial Defence College. In 1939 he was appointed GSO 6 Australian Division and in 1941 he became BGS 1 Austr. Corps. He participated in the Greek and Syrian campaigns. Recalled to Australia he became DCGS and in 1942 GOC in C of 1 Australian Corps in New Guinea only to be dismissed in September 1942. After General Blamey's retirement he became DCGS in 1945 and CGS in 1949. 36
college should be reviewed with the object of raising the academic standard so that graduation from Duntroon carries university recognition.28
The Roweil Committee's report illustrates the shift in emphasis on the function of the officer corps. It virtually anticipated the enunciation of the Janowitz model by about fifteen years:
The Committee recognised that the character of modern warfare and the integration of the Australian army with the whole community increased the need for a more liberal education for the military leaders.29
Overall, these committees had no immediate effect on either education or training of the regular officer. They did not raise any doubts in the minds of the regulars that they were professional in the accepted sense of what constituted a profession.
This opinion had not necessarily been shared by their counterparts in the higher echelons of the public service. The administrative shortcomings of the senior military resource managers has been highlighted by Hasluck, albeit in a different context:
The papers they [the public servants] prepared and the supporting documents they furnished were far superior in range and exactness of information, in analysis and in argument to anything that came from the Chiefs of Staff. This overwhelming expertness was one of the earliest demonstrations of the inevitability of bureaurocracy when governments are called at short notice to deal with a multiplicity of complex detail.^o
Obviously, the senior resource managers of the services were not held in very high regard by the senior public servants. What should have been done to correct this ?
28S.B. Clark, Recommendations of the Commandant, p.65. 29|bid. p.81. 30p. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, Australia in the War 1939- 1945, Series A (Civil)Vol. iv, AWM (Canberra)1970. p.436. 37
Hackett suggests, with hindsight, that after the initial education qualifying him for his first appointment, the young officer should undergo a massive postgraduate education taking up as much as 20 to 25 per cent of his time.^^ If such a postgraduate education had been available to Australian resource managers in their formative years it would have enabled them, according to R.A. Clarke :
(a) To develop the ability to understand the employment of new and complex equipment and techniques.
(b) To improve the system of procurement of new equipment for the Army.
(c) To maintain the professional status of officers in the public eye.
(d) To further develop the qualities of leadership by improving the general level of education of officers.32
The first two aspects have a direct bearing on resource management. The management of resources is a distinct administrative science. The basic processes of administration had been recognised by military leaders through the ages.However, the scientific value of these processes lies in their systematic treatment as an integrated whole. The administration processes involve planning, organisation, assembly of resources, supervision and control. All these subjects are equally applicable to the civilian and the military spheres. They encompass the corpus of knowledge which includes organisation theory, operations research, work study, supply mechanisms, financial management and the understanding of the particular political scenarios prevailing at the time, to mention but a few of the manifestations of resource management.34
SI J. Hackett, The Profession at Arms, pp.197-199. 32R.A. Clarke. Science and the Officer. Australian Army Journal no. 149, April 1964, p.35. 33Richard Glover, Peninsula Preparations. The Reforms of the British Army 1795 - 1809. Cambridge University Press 1963 Appendix A and B. S.G.F. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters. His Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula 1809-1814, Oxford University Press (London) 1957, Chapters 1, 2 and 3. 34w.M. Neumann, Administrative Action. The Techniques of Organisation and Management, Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons (London) 1950, pp.3 and 9. 38
During the interwar years several new management techniques had been developed which were adopted by Australian industry and commerce. They were also known to British military logistic planners, though there is no evidence that the senior Australian military resource managers were aware of them. Operations research was one.^s The army could have studied this technique in preparation for the scheduling of indents and inventories on a large scale, and the forecasting of supply, equipment and ammunition requirements.^®
Similarly, the principles of work study were quite well known before the war. Its pioneers were Robert Allan and Charles Babbage in Britain and Frederick F. Taylor in the United States of America. It was the latter who formulated the classical question 'which is the best way to do a job?'^^ Taylor's work on method study aimed at improving methods of production and particularly services, a technique which results in a more effective use of materials, plant, equipment and manpower.38 Complementary to method study is a technique known as work measurement aimed at assessing human effectiveness leading to an improved planning and control mechanism.The application of these techniques to supply and ordnance stores and to the operation of transportation facilities might well have avoided bottlenecks and other problems in the management of logistic resources.As reported by Fairclough^i and Thierauf,^^ some of these techniques were known to the US and British armies well before the Second World
War Many of the advanced management techniques known at the beginning of the
35m. Beer, Design and Control... Operations Research and Management. Cybernetics, John Wiley and Sons (London) 1966, Part 3 36see Chapter 8, 37R.M. Currie. Work Study , Pitman Paperback (London) 1959, p.3. 38F.W. Taylor, Scientific Management, Harper and Rowe (New York) 1911. 39R.M. Currie, Worl< Study, p.9. 40see Chapter 6. H. Fairclough, Equal to the Task, p.58. 42RJ. Thierauf, Decision Making through Operations Research, John Wiley & Son (New York) 1970, p.103. 39
war could have been studied quite easily in Australia ^^ The problem was not the availability of the appropriate literature but rather the lack of appreciation, 'the forgotten dimensions of strategy', that is the logistic and social dimensions in other words, a manifestation of the Janowitz model. An understanding of the
political scenarios in Australia and in the Pacific theatre of war generally would
have been invaluable to senior Australian officers, at a time when the army served two masters, one the Australian Government, the other the Allied Supreme
Commander. It is only quite recently that appropriate suggestions for the
education of senior officers in resource management have been put forward.^^^
CMF Officers
Pre-requisite for appointment to commissioned rank in the CMF were: adequate
and appropriate service in the ranks, existence of a vacancy, fitness in the eyes of
the commanding officer and a pass in the prescribed examinations. The last may
not have been taken too seriously in some units, so much so that the CGS
complained to the Military Board:
Candidates appeared to regard the passing of examinations as a mere formality which must be complied with for promotion and not as test or capacity for greater responsibility. The promotion
43The following titles have been selected in chronologically ascending order to illustrate the availability in Australia of theoretical knowledge relating to industrial management. The information is taken from the 1940/1941 Australian Institute of Management library accession lists. D.H. Robertson, The Control of Industry. Cambridge University Press (London) 1928. J.W. Hallock, Productive Planning - Its .Engineering Elements. Ronald Press (London) 1 929. E. A. Allen, Principles of Industrial Management, Sir Isaac Pitman (London) 1937. J.J. Gillespie, The Principles of Rational Industrial Management, Sir Isaac Pitman (London) 1938. ^ . J 0 Scot, Budgetary Control and Standard Costs, Sir Isaac Pitman (London) 1939. G.I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, Han/ard University Press (New York) 1940. 44Allan K. Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community. A Partnership in Australia's Defence, p.2. 45Cathy Downes. Senior Officer Professional Development in the Australian Defence Force , p.89. 40
of citizen officers [was] generally rather more rapid than [was] bound by their experience.
The corollary to the CGS's view was that the militia officers may not have been adjudged by the standard and objective benchmarks normally applied to their
RMC-trained counterparts. But then again, CMF officers never claimed to be military professionals. For them soldiering was a hobby, in most instances fostered by an acute sense of patriotism and very often by family tradition. When war came, being an officer and all it entailed was a job that had to be done, but the passing of examinations was seen by many officers as a formality imposed by Section 21A of the Defence Act. However, this attitude was not universal. In some CMF units a considerable effort was expended on coaching for promotion examinations. A pre- war CMF officer said that:
The COs I served under would not promote anybody unless the requirements of DA 21 had been met.^^
CMF officers by and large, were militarily not as well educated as their regular RMC counterparts and with a few exceptions this applied both to junior and senior CMF
ranks. It would have been surprising if it had been otherwise. The regular officer
had to concentrate on only one career, whereas the CMF officers had to make their
way both in their civilian and their military callings.'^s
46A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1935 Vol.2) File 114/35. Officers First Appointment and Promotion examinations. Memorandum by CGS to the Minister of Defence. 20 November 1935. 47Lt Col J.O. Geddes. Communication 24 November 1987. Lt Col J.O. Geddes, an accountant and director of a large hardware firm, joined the Light Horse in South Australia before World War II He served as troop commander in 9 Div Cav. and then as staff captain and brigade major 26th Brigade AIF. After World War II he was a company commander in various South Australian CMF units. 48Maj Gen James C. Hughes. Views expressed on 13 February 1990. Hughes was bom in Adelaide and educated at St. Peters College. After graduating from RMC served in Korea 1951/2. Other active service assignment included Malaysia and Vietnam. Attended staff college and was instructor at Sandhurst. 41
An examination of the 1946 Gradation Lists and the corresponding l/l//70's Who in
Australia provides an interesting comparison of the educational backgrounds of the regular army officers and the educational opportunities for additional training and experience which should have deepened their understanding of logistics.
These include postings overseas, attendance at staff college courses in
Camberley, Quetta, the Imperial Defence College, and at the Military College of
Science at Shrivenham, as well as courses at universities and technical colleges.
On the average, regular officers in the interwar years had the opportunity to devote
9.72 per cent of their total service time to some aspect of resource management.
Twenty-eight of the officers, or 62.2 per cent, spent less than 10 per cent of their service time in postings that could have been, conceivably, of benefit to them in terms of resource management. Between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the service time of 11 officers was in postings of this nature and only 6 had an exposure to logistics that occupied in excess of 20 per cent.
The careers of 22 senior CMF officers on the active list and of 42 on the reserve were examined in comparison with regulars using the same sources. The following pattern presented itself:
Active RofO ST* Combined Lo g" Officers Active/R of 0* NoGrads % No Grads % No % No Grad s % No %
Regular 45 3 6.6 3 6.6
39 60.9 21 32.8 CMF 22 15 68.2 42 24 57.1 24 37.5 64
Science and Technology Officers with experience qualifying for logistic appointments.
49Australian Military Forces. Gradation Lists 1946, Vols.1&2, and mo's Who in Australia. Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (Melboume)Vol XII, 1944 and Vol XIII, 1947. 42
That there is a high occurrence of graduates particularly in science and technology and consequently fitness for logistic postings among CMF officers is borne out by the evidence in the last columns. These figures are in fairly good agreement with those produced by Encel.so
The fairly high incidence of tertiary education among the CMF officers produced a more flexible mental attitude than was evident in many of the senior regular officers who were often thought by their CMF peers to be lacking in common sense.
Familiarity with resource management was part of life of many CMF officers.
Horner says :
Most [successful militia commanders] had served as young officers in World World War 1 and they had developed their organisational and leadership skills between the wars in industry and commerce.
A former senior regular army officer suggested that during the inter-war years many newly RMC-trained officers developed 'tunnel vision' compared with the CMF officers who were not preoccupied with 'counting the boot laces in the Q-store'.^^
The regular army officer had little opportunity for gaining experience in man- management because there were only very few regular army units and the commands of most if not all militia units were reserved for CMF officers. While the regular officer had a much wider knowledge of all arms than the militia officer, very often he could not muster the same expertise and competence, specialty for
50s. Encel. Equality and Authority, p.460. 51 Lt Col J.O. Geddes. Interview cited. 52d. M. Horner. Staff Corps v Militia, p.183. 53Maj Gen R. L. Hughes - Personal communication 20 October 1987. Maj General Hughes was born in South Australia, educated at St Peters College and graduated from RMC in 1939. He saw service in Dan/vin and the Islands. After the war he had various staff positions and was commander of the First Australian Task Force in Vietnam. 43
specialty, that the militia officer was able to acquire over the years of his service in one unit.54
As shown above, a large number of senior CMF officers were university graduates.
Before the war many of them had come from the social elite where a good education was usually synonymous with a well-to-do background's derived from commerce and industry. One of Australia's most senior CMF officers, Maj Gen
H.G. Bennett, suggested quite openly that 'it would be better to select officers according to their personality, character and position and then train them for their task'.se
While the CMF officer was not as well trained militarily as his counterpart in the regular army, he had by virtue of his civilian background a much better understanding of resource management. For instance, it is no coincidence that the
C in C selected Captain E.W. Hayward, managing director of the Adelaide firm
John Martin & Co. Ltd., to play a leading role in the Australian Army Canteen
Service rather than let him serve as a relatively junior regimental officer in the 2/43
Battalion.The appointment of Maj Gen J.H. Cannan as QMG is another example.As an insurance executive he would have acquired the administrative
54Lt Col Mark Hulse. Personal communication 2 December 1987. Lt. Col. Mark Hulse held various regimental and staff positions in the post World War II regular army and is now a company secretary. 55 c. Neumann, Australia's Citizen Soldiers, pp.182-183. 56|bid. p.181. Lt Gen Henry Gordon Bennett was born in 1887 at Balwyn, Victoria and joined the Australian Militia in 1908. He joined the AIF and at the end of World War I was the youngest general officer in any British army. Between the wars he was a manufacturer, company director and accountant and rose to GOG 2 Division. He became known for his public utterances on military matters and his recurring theme was the unfitness of senior regular army officers for senior positions. In 1941 he became GOG 8 Div. and escaped from Singapore in 1942. He served as GOG 3 Australian Corps and died in 1962. 57MP-1535 (Dept of Army - General Correspondence) File 924/31/85. 58 Maj Gen J.H. Cannan was born in 1882 in Townsville Queensland and served in the first AIF of 1914 - 1919. During the interwar years he worked as an insurance executive and filled a number of militia commands. In 1939 he was Inspector-General (Administration) Department of Defence Go-ordination and became GOG 2 Division in 1940. After transfer to the AIF he served as QMG at LHQ from 1940 to 1945. After the war he was active in charitable organisations and died in 1978. 44 and management skills necessary to fulfill the requirements of a senior management position.
To illustrate this further, a few examples of senior CMF officers concerned with logistics are cited below : Rank Name Military Posting Civilian Experience LtGen Morshead, L Army Commander Shipping Executive LtGen Savige, SG Army Commander Company Director Brig O'Brien, JWG DMGO Engineering Executive Brig Drake-Brockman,EA EinC Engineering Maj Gen Steele, C.S. EinC Engineering Executive Brig Veale, WCD CRE Local Government Engineer Brig Torr, AG CE Arnx)ured Corps Engineer-Industry Col Kemsley, AN Business Advisory Army BHP- Publ. Relations Brig Kingham, HS DOS Engineer Col Bazely, E Th ADOS Company Director Brig Chapman, WD Consultant to MGO Engineering Executive Brig Stinson, CA ADOS.DDOS Design Branch Engineering Brig Loutit, NM DOMF, DQMG Yellow Cab Company The CMF officers did not have the opportunities for training overseas^^ available to the regular officers. Not only could they not spare the time but also they would not have been accepted by the appropriate British institutions. Most of the CMF officers at unit and formation level had experience in the First World War as commanding officers or formation commanders and that was one of the accepted qualifications for unit and formation command level in the inter-war years although not invariably so. On the other hand they received little or no training in advances in warfare since the First World War. Tactics was the main topic of exercises; logistics problems of training and resource management were practically unheard of. Neither shortcoming made itself felt at unit level as quartermasters still looked after their units in the manner learned in the First World War. At higher formation levels no relevant education was available for resource managers. Exercises with troops
59Australian regular officers were accepted at the rate of 3-5 per annum on exchange with the military forces in India and the staff college at Quetta and Camberley (UK). In addition Australian senior officers participated in the Imperial Defence College courses usually at the rate of one every two years. 45
were impractical because hardly any of the militia units had progressed beyond elementary training at section and platoon level. Also, the militia units were brought together as a brigade formation for only two or at most three days a year for training which made it almost impossible to carry out exercises involving logistic problems at that level and in any case logistics would have received only very scant attention.
Tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) at formation level were quite rare.
Except for those few examples mentioned by Neumann^o there was only one
TEWT at corps and divisional level between 1919 and 1939.^1 The only other exercises were the practical promotion examinations mandatory under Section
21A of the Defence Act and two senior officer exercises in 1935. None of these exercises paid any attention to logistic problems.
The problem of training CMF commanders and staff had been the concern of the senior (regular) military from 1935 onwards. The CGS said at that time that
... while some CMF officers had shown an encouraging capacity for the tactical handling of units ... on the whole it must be confessed that the majority were quite unfitted for the immediate exercise of command of the higher units in war and to undertake the training of their officers in peace.
He might have sought to prepare the political climate for filling divisional commands with staff corps officers, using as the reason the apparent inadequacy of CMF officers. This was telling comment and explains the critical attitude already mentioned of some senior regular officers towards their CMF peers during the initial
Middle East campaigns in 1941 and also later on.63
60c. Neumann, Australia's Citizen Soldiers 1919-1939, pp.204-207. 61AWM - S54 (training) File 943/1/33. Corps Exercise 15-18 September 1925. . 62A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1935 Vol.1) File 88/35. Memorandum from CGS to Military Board 23 September 1935. 63b.A. Travers. The Staff Corps - CMF Conflict. AustralianWar Memorial Military History Conference,1988; D.M. Horner, General Vasey's War, pp.2,58,69,84,186. 46
The crux of the problem was the lack in Australia of a command and staff school.
The CGS had submitted a proposal for the establishment of such a school to the
Military Board in 1937 and ministerial approval was obtained a year later. What may have accelerated approval for an institution tasked to educate, initially, 1600 officers of field rank and above was the CGS's lobbying with the Secretary of
Defence.The lack of such an educational facility for senior CMF officers had been one of Major General Bennett's contentions in his endeavours to influence the efficiency of the army to the better.
Summary
The Australian officer corps was made up of those whose career aims were to become proficient in the management of violence and those who for various reasons embarked part-time on a soldier's calling.
The former believed they were professionals in the profession of arms. This profession in the Australian context addressed itself almost exclusively to aspects of command, military organisation and training, rarely exceeding unit level in terms of logistics. These objectives were taught and practised in the context of British
military tradition and were based largely on experience gained in the First World
War and in the first two years of the Second World War in the Mediterranean theatre. Looking at the education of the Australian army officers, both regular and
militia, one must ask if there was in fact an Australian military profession. In terms of operational combat proficiency the answer is yes. In terms of logistics, most
64A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1937 Vol. 1) File 101/37. Command and Staff School Memorandum CGS to Military Board 17 November 1937. 65A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1938 Vol. 1) File 23/38. Training of Officers on unattached and reserve of officer lists. 9 March 1938. Note: None of the syllabi of the command staff school for 1938-1946 are in existence. 47 aspects of resource management were missing from the education of the regular officers. After only brief training, militia officers were found to be sufficiently competent to carry out functions normally the province of staff corps officers, that is, the people who claimed to be military professionals. What then was the professional element in the education of a regular officer with three or four years full-time training, if a CMF officer could learn very quickly and actually perform on the job as soon as he was in an appropriate posting? Because the regular army officer had been trained rather than educated, a professional element was barely in existence. It must be conceded that the RMC non-military syllabus prior to and early in the war had very little to fire the graduate's imagination. There was little to motivate him to further inquiry or to apply what non-military knowledge and disciplines he had added to his military calling. There was little to encourage him to use the professional's approach of experiment, analysis and deduction.
In terms of resource management, the Australian army had to rely on 'civilians' with military experience acquired in the First World War. These 'civilians' usually had a good education and were able to apply this education to their military task, complemented by their experience in commerce and industry. Thus, except for one or two atypical staff corps officers these officers were the real resource managers.®® On the other hand, the senior militia officers were deficient in all- round military knowledge compared with their counterparts in the regular army. It is therefore a misnomer to speak in general terms of an Australian military profession during the period under discussion.
A disadvantage which the Australian officer corps both regular and CMF suffered was the dearth of facilities for further military education. Attendance at command and staff schools overseas was open to the Australian staff corps officers but not to
66A.P. Lodge, The Fall of General Gordon Bennett, p.13. 48 their CMF peers. The opening of the Australian Command and Staff School at Randwick, NSW came too late to affect the performance of the resource managers except at unit or lower formation level.
The regular army accepted their CMF counterparts in good grace but endeavoured to ensure that the top positions were filled by regulars. Horner thinks they were at that time '.. virtually the only officers with the training and experience to handle high level staff appointments'.®^ Horner's statement would be justified if 'training' was not taken as synonymous with 'education' and if the quotation applied, basically, only to the command, military organisation and training infrastructures. When it came to the management of resources and the smooth provision of logistic support, most of the senior regular army officers did not have the managerial background demonstrated by their counterparts in the CMF.
The logistic support of the Australian army was the concern of a series of government instrumentalities, both civil and military. The next chapter will examine some of these.
67d.M.Horner, Staff Corps versus f^ilitia, p.22. 49
CHAPTER 4
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION OF LOGISTICS
Background
The aim of this chapter is to show that the wartime logistic and administrative apparatus as it affected the Australian army was based on an excessively cumbersome organisational structure which reflected, to a large extent, the complexity of the Australian Government bureaucracy as a whole. The chapter will illustrate the unwieldy nature of the administrative apparatus, which consisted of policy advice and directing bodies, such as the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the army business instrumentalities derived from the policy bodies. The chapter concludes with brief comparisons between Australian, Canadian and New
Zealand practices.
Administration, both civil and military, was badly in need of a re-examination before
1939. Hasluck maintains that changes in functions and responsibilities of the
Commonwealth and the States had called for:
... a new and more highly technical competence among its professional administrators; but the recruitment and organisation of the public service followed the old pattern. War or no war, Australian administration was in need of overhaul and adjustment in 1939.1
Likewise the army: the post First World-War administration of the Australian army was still based on the British Field Service Regulations and the ramifications of the
Defence Act 1903-1939. In 1938 army administrative shortcomings were perceived by the newly appointed Inspector General, Lt Gen E.K. Squires, an
English officer. He recommended far-reaching changes including a system of iPaul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.416. 50
military commands to facilitate local defence against raids and invasion. This system reduced the existing military districts to performing a ' housekeeping ' or administrative role and freed them from operational functions.2
Changes to the political status of Australia within the Empire were reflected in the administration and organisation of the Australian army. In describing the army's adoption of these changes, Hasluck notes :
On the one hand Australia accepted the device of membership of the British War Cabinet. On the other she took at times a highly independent line of her own.^
For example, in 1942 the influence of new warfare scenarios brought about a
modification from the standard British divisional organisation to the Australian jungle division, with all its attendant logistic consequences, such as very much
reduced transport, artillery and mechanised reconnaissance component.When the 9th Division first went to New Guinea, each of its brigade HQs was equipped
with only six jeeps and trailers.^ A 1945 tabulation illustrates the difference in vehicle requirements for 1 Australian Corps less Base Sub-Area. The tropical
organisation had 6,965 vehicles on its WE compared with 15,034 on the normal
(British) WE, a difference of 8,069.® As soon as the units returned to the mainland
and became part of standard formations their WE reverted to the standard British
pattern.7 This resulted in a 5 per cent increase in rations alone for a corps of two
divisions, not counting the increased transport and fuel requirements.^
2A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence) File 51/306/6. The Squires Report 16 December 1938. 3paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.417. 4A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol. 1) File M 16/43. Jungle Division. 19 January 1943. ^Interview Lt Col J.C. Geddes 10 March 1989. 6A-2653 (M/Bd.Proc. 1945, Vol.3) File M 80/45. Conversion from tropical to normal establishment. CGS Minute, 1 March 1945, App.B 7MP-729/6 (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence) File 37/401/1640 Reversion of Jungle Division, May 1943. The reversion to a divisional organisation basically designed for open warfare may have been prompted by the desire to provide an expeditionary 51
Hasluck believes the senior administrators did not always appreciate that '... the task of administration varied with the nature of the war effort'.^Thus when changes occurred rapidly, agencies were hastily set up without clear definition of their functions and were often motivated by self-interested senior bureaucrats.
The army reflected the public service tendency in the progressive instituting of inordinately complex committee structures and monitoring agencies outside the operational requirements. The best examples of these were the Business Adviser,
Department of the Army, Chief Inspector, Army, and the War Establishments
Committee and its derived sub-committees. ^^
In the civilian sphere, the organisation of logistics supporting the three services was characterised by a cumbersome system of checks and balances. Two sets of logistic checks and balances existed: those set up to meet the civilian public service audit requirements, and those created for the benefit of the C in C and his principal staff officers, with the former mainly designed to ensure compliance auditing. The army business instrumentalities, on the other hand, constituted a form of efficiency auditing.They were established to keep an internal eye on the procedural processes of an institution whose senior managers had had no or only very limited training in administering the very large and complex organisation the
force for implementing the defeat -Germany - first strategy, but this was remote in the extreme, and in any case would have only affected the AIF divisions. The only other explanation would be an anticipated Australian participation together with U.K. forces in campaigns aimed at recovering colonial possessions now in Japanese hands. Extensive planning towards that end had, in fact, taken place. The simplest answer might well be that a standard division in training on the mainland was, apart from increased costs, perhaps easier to administer than one with only a few jeeps at its disposal. 8A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1945, Vol.5) File M 148/45. CGS Minute 2115 (7 July 1945) and 2132 (21 July 1945). 9paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.417. ••OSee below. Chapter 4. Incompliance auditing is the checking of transactions in the light of established procedures. Efficiency auditing examines whether the transactions have been carried out efficiently in the light of what they were meant to achieve. 52
army had become by 1942. Efficiency auditing was adopted by the Australian Public Service over 25 years later.
Another reason for establishing business agencies was that the practical experience of the resource managers had not gone beyond that of unit quartermasters or at best brigade staff captains. In the First World War the
Australian army logistics system worked within the framework of the large military organisation of the British army, of which the Australians were but a relatively small element. The same can be said of the Mediterranean theatre in 1940-1942. In the
Pacific War the Australian logistic system worked beside a large and complex
American supply system which was based on an entirely different management philosophy, namely the decentralisation of resources.Thus, in the absence of the necessary expertise in the Australian senior regular army supply management, the army had to have recourse to people with appropriate experience in civilian life.
Policy Advice and Direction
Apart from the service boards, the oldest of the policy bodies was the Council of
Defence, dating back to 1909. It was created under section 28 of the Defence Act
1903-1939 to advise on defence policy and on questions of defence organisation referred to it by Cabinet or ministers.For instance, at its meeting of 14th June
1935 the Council of Defence reaffirmed the efficacy of the divisional army organisation and endorsed the army's recommendation for a three year rearmament programme preparing for defence against raids and invasion. The
Council also reaffirmed government policy that the army should concentrate on
••^MGO Branch, Equipment Memoranda, no. 14, 1945 p.15. 13A-2657 (M/Bd.Proc. Historical Records 1936 Vol. 2) File 2 Nov. 1904. Statement by Minister on Council of Defence. 53
strengthening fixed defences and 'strengthening the material [resources] of fortifications allotted to the support of fixed defences'.In 1936 the membership comprised the Prime Minister, the Treasurer, various ministers and the three service Chiefs of Staff.
During the first week of the war the Council of Defence turned itself into the War
Cabinet which became the executive sub-committee of the full Cabinet. This was a wartime measure terminated in December 1945 when the old Council of Defence was reconstituted.''5
Since the War Cabinet did not have an inbuilt service component, a Chiefs of Staff
Committee was established in September 1939. This Committee had no responsibilities for operations, concerning itself only with policy matters affecting the individual services. Its major role was the preparation of military appreciations for all three services.Because early in the Pacific war the US forces relied heavily on Australian resources for supplies other than munitions, the Committee was augmented in 1942 by a United States army representative so that priorities could be set both for US requirements alone and in competition with Australian service demands. The Chiefs of Staff Committee developed into a very complicated organisation, as illustrated by the following chart.^^
l'^A-5954 (Shedden Papers)Box 910 File Divisional Organisation, 19 June 1935. 15A-2653 (M/Bd.Proceedings 1946 Vol.6)File M294/45. Abolition of War Cabinet, 5 February 1946. l6Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.440. 17A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence-Classified Correspondence) File 31/301/373. (1/2, 2/2, 2/3)Administrative Planning Committee Final Report 1942. 54
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
r Joint Priorities Administrative Pfanning Committee Sub-Committee Planning Committee
Works Medical Movement Services Supply Quartering Sub-C'tee Sub-C'tee Sub-C'tee Sub-C'tee Sub-C'tee
Petroleum Section
The Services Supply Sub-Committee and the Petroleum Section were assisted by representatives of the Department of Supply and Shipping, which also looked after the supply of rations. While the Chiefs of Staff Committee was meant to be a services organisation, it could not function without civilian input into the two most important sub-committees, one to do with rations and the other with petrol. This point will be further examined in Chapter 6.
The underlying philosophy of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was that in principle new projects had to originate from the Chiefs of Staff Committee on which all representatives had the same status as the Australian deputy chiefs of staff. The
Joint Planning Committee considered projects from the operational point of view and made recommendations to the full Chiefs of Staff Committee regarding operational requirements. When the Joint Planning Committee's recommendation received the approval of the Chiefs of Staff Committee it became policy. The policy was then submitted to the Administrative Planning Committee^s which included a
United States representative of the same status as that of the Australian QMG. This sub-committee considered the means by which the operational policies could be implemented. The conclusions of the Administrative Planning Committee then became administrative plans for ordinary departmental action. For instance, the
l8The Administrative Planning Committee was established by WC decision on 5 January 1942, (WC minute 1693 agendum 6/1942)mainly because no machinery appeared to have existed for determining priorities between United States and Australian requirements. 55
Department of the Interior implemented works and Allied Works Council
requirements, the Department of Supply became responsible for materials, and the appropriate army, navy and airforce directorates looked after the requirements
of the services.
The Administrative Planning Committee co-ordinated the implementation of
decisions made under the authority of the Chiefs of Staff and could lay claim to a
number of achievements. The ongoing major functions of the Administrative
Planning Committee were :
(i) the obtaining through the Department concerned of financial provision of works which had been allotted priorities by the priorities work sub-committee
(ii) the responsibility for keeping the Allied Works Council informed of new projects and of the provisions funds for their implementation.
The functions included responsibility for some of the joint US- Australian defence
works, amounting to about thirty million pounds. The Committee organised the
cargo handling of more than 100 vessels, to satisfy US ration and other
requirements. But there were problems which led to its disbanding in May 1942.
For one thing, the U.S. army in Australia was not satisfied with the progress which the Committee fostered in the various service directorates. It seemed to have been
incapable of seeing to the implementing of works projects. It could not speed up
labour supply or satisfactorily resolve ration problems. Also, there were shortcomings in the co-ordination of priorities between solely Australian and joint
Australian/American projects once they had been determined and authorised by the Chiefs of Staff. The effort was just too big for the resources of the
Committee.2o
l^A-Sie/l (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence) File 31/301/373. (1/2, 2/2, 4/21). Administrative Planning Committee, 16 March 1943. 20|bid. 56
If the Administrative Planning Committee's functions had been more clearly defined and rationalised there would probably have been no need for the other six sub-committees. This is even truer after its successor committee, the Allied
Supply Council was established in May 1942.21 This instrumentality will be discussed shortly.
The focal point of the Australian war effort was the Department of Defence. Initially it consisted of four arms: the policy branch (Council of Defence), an administrative branch (the naval, military and air boards), the executive state commands and the military and naval inspection branches.22 From these relatively simple beginnings it developed into a large and sophisticated organisation.
It was decided in November 1939 to optimise the organisation of the Department of
Defence by creating separate service departments for the navy, army and airforce under their own ministers and to transform the secretariat of the Department of
Defence into the Department of Defence Co-ordination, a designation it retained till the advent of the Curtin government, when it reverted to its old name. This
Department also provided the secretariat for the War Cabinet.23
There were two divisions in the departmental organisation.24 One was what might be termed the departmental bureaucracy. This division dealt with general administrative policy matters, the Manpower Committee, the National Register, the
21 Ibid. Report to Minister for Defence 6 March 1942. Note: One of the organisational flaws of this sub-committee's functions was that it was also directly responsible to the Defence Committee. (See page 64 of this thesis). 22A-2657 (M/Bd. Proc. Historical Records 1936 Vol. 2) Statement of Minister for Defence, 2 November 1904. 23A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence) File 30/302/30 Australian War Effort 1939-1940. Note : to avoid confusion, the designation Department of Defence will be used throughout this work. 24A-1194 (Dept. of Defence Library) Accession no. 22609/20.23. Department of Defence Co-ordination 23 December 1939. 57
War Book branch25 and, finally, the finance and military liaison officer branches.
The other division consisted of the Defence Committee, the Chiefs of Staff
Committee and the Board of Business Administration. To enable the Minister and
his Secretary to concentrate on defence policy and joint service matters, the War
Cabinet decided to transfer the finance function of the Department and the Board
of Business Administration to the Treasury, together with all attendant staff.26
Though not stated explicitly, this move, given the widening of the financial powers
of the service departments, meant that the Treasurer would have much closer
contact with the areas where the money was spent.^^
The apparatus of the service departments' liaison officers had its roots in the
Council of Defence regulation of 1923 by which ' the Minister for Defence may
appoint assistant secretaries representing the ... services who will be responsible
to the secretary of the council.'28 The Secretary of the Department of Defence
arranged that the liaison officers should be available to the Defence Committee as
a standing sub-committee to the Chiefs of Staff, for work of a joint nature and a
host of other activities. It speaks for the foresight of the defence planners in this
instance that the liaison officer arrangement was in place before war broke out and
that the incumbents had been nominated by September 1939.29
The liaison staff arrangement was a very useful mechanism for rapid contact with
the appropriate service area. Yet some of the services were not altogether
convinced. The navy had misgivings as to the disproportionate weight these
liaison officers might carry and, by corollary, about the effectiveness of the advice
25The War Book was a general planning document covering all service and civilian government agencies in respect of actions to be taken in a war-like national emergency. 26A-2673 (War Cabinet minutes)1564 of 11 December 1941. 27A-5954 (Shedden Papers)Box 1597 Changes in Defence Organisation. File 23 December 1941. Appointment of Services Liaison Officers. File date 1938/39. 28|bid. 29|bid. 58
they could render if they had not commensurate authority; however, it was always very clearly stated that the liaison officers' function was consultative only.^o
Nevertheless, the liaison officer machinery was maintained and even strengthened by giving this task priority status over and above other duties the liaison officers had to perform 31
The important division of the Department of Defence was the one dealing with the operations of the services. This function was centred on the Defence Committee, which acted as the higher co-ordinator of the war effort. It did so through the Chiefs of Staff Committee, as advisers to War Cabinet and to the Advisory War Council, and, through the Board of Business Administration, providing advice to ministers and service boards on supply and business matters. The Defence Committee had been established by ministerial direction in May 1926 and formally constituted in
March 1929 by the promulgation of the Defence Committee regulation.32 its functions included advising the Minister for Defence on defence policy as a whole, coordinating administrative aspects of the three service boards, coordinating financial implications of defence policy, recommending allocation of funds and preparing matters to go before War Cabinet.
The Defence Committee functioned right through the war. It consisted of the three
Chiefs of Staff, representatives from the Secretariat of the Department of Defence and experts, such as the Director-General of Munitions or one or more of the principal supply officers co-opted from time to time.33
30|bid. pp.2-3. 31 Ibid. p.7. 32paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1942, p.439. See also Statutory Rules 1929 no.26 and Statutory Rules 1938 no.81. 33Examples of projects carried out by the Defence Committee (DC). cooperation of joint service defence plans {A-2673 (WO minutes) 1136 of 10 June 1941). recommendation for US to provide some of their own supply services (A-2673 (WO minutes) 2969 of 30 July 1943) 59
All matters to be dealt with by the Defence Committee had to be submitted in the
first place to the Department of Defence. The army's LGA office prepared the
submissions to the Defence Committee without going through the Department of
Army This by-passing of the Department could conceivably have led to conflicts
between the Department of the Army and the military, but there is no evidence of this - the service liaison officer apparatus was doing its job effectively.
By and large, when conflicts between the military and the civilians occurred, they
centred around the personalities of the C in C and his Minister. The former always
reacted sharply to any criticism of the army when he felt he was being bypassed in
his capacity of chief military adviser to the Government. An early example of this
was Thomas Arthur Blamey's^^ reaction to Michael Francis Forde's^e report on his
ministerial visit to Port Moresby and Milne Bay in October 1942. The C in C was quite aggressive in his attitude to his political master:
I regret exceedingly that neither myself nor my staff were consulted
. preparation of manpower review data (A-2673 (WC minutes) 2065, 1 March 1 943) . organisation for managing the joint USA-Australian war effort (A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 1598 machinery file 17 March 1942 - 1 May 1945).
The following diagram illustrates the Defence Committee's sub-committee structure.
DEFENCE COMMITTEE 1 1 1 OPERATIONS WORKS SUPPLY ADMINISTRATION MUNITIONS I Chiefs of Staff Allied Allied Administrative PSO Committee Works Supply Planning Committee Committee Council Council Committee incl. U.S. Representative
Staff Planning Work Priorities Committee Committee
34A-2653 (M/Bd. Proceedings 1943 Vol.3) File Ml44/43, 4 August 1943. Defence Committee. 35Gen Thomas Arthur Blamey was appointed C in C, Australian Army, in March 1942. 36Michael Francis Forde was Minister for the Army from 1941 to 1946. 60
in any way in the preparation of the report
And in a subsequent paragraph:
...and I regret... that in the view of the inadequate knowledge it was possible for you to obtain in the time available you found it necessary to pass stricture upon the army Authorities [sic] which a more complete examination of the facts does not justify.38
Another example was when early in 1944 the Government had become somewhat
irritated over the number of higher headquarters both in Queensland and in New
South Wales but the C in C insisted that while the strength of commands might vary, the basic organisational framework would have to be maintained.
The functions of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as an agency of the War Cabinet
have already been mentioned. Because administratively it came under the operational direction of the Department of Defence, the Committee's executive arm, the Joint Planning Committee, will be discussed briefly. Basically this sub- committee was charged with the co-ordination of war plans of the three services, and its reports appeared as Chiefs of Staff documents. With the entry of Japan into the war, the Joint Planning Committee was augmented by United States
representatives. The comments and the diagram earlier in this chapter illustrate the administrative arrangements that would have affected the army's logistic system. In the light of the machinery for directing the combined US - UK war effort, the Australian scenario was quite small compared with what had been created in
Washington yet the indications from Lt Gen J. Lavarack's report are that the
37A5954 (Shedden Papers)Box 535. File range 6 October 1942-20 November 1942. Memorandum from Blamey to Forde, 10 November 1942. A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 1597 Changes in Defence Organisation. File 23 December 1941. Appointment of Services Liaison Officers. File date 1938/39. 38|bid. 39A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 1506. Higher Army Appointments. Letters Blamey to Forde, 14 January 1944 and 12 February 1944. Letter Blamey to Curtin, 11 February 1944! 61
instrumentalities in America contained proportionately more service
representatives than was the case in Australia. Compared with their Australian
counterparts, the US senior army officers were thus in a better position to
safeguard their interests.'^o
The Board of Business Administration is the last of the Department of Defence
subordinate bodies to be mentioned here."^^ Hasluck suggests this instrumentality
was sometimes subject to criticism, particularly from the services which thought it
caused unnecessary delays in the chain of defence material procurement. He
admits there was perhaps some substance in these criticisms, but maintains that
the Board '... added an experience of commercial and industrial worlds that might
not otherwise have been found.
The Board at times attracted criticism. When it sought to appoint a sub-committee
to look into the rationalisation of canteen services, the C in C thought this was
beyond the powers of the Board. Blamey wrote to Shedden :
Sorry to worry you over this matter [of rationalisation of canteen services], but unless it is nipped in the bud it will certainly allow a great deal of wasted labour and a great deal of friction ... I would suggest that the appointment of a committee of this kind is ... beyond the scope and capacity of the Board's functions, and, secondly, it involves considerations of service organisation which are quite beyond the limits ... of the Board and of the proposed committee ... I would suggest that the Board of Business Administration be requested to keep their hands out of this general question
40A-5954 (Shedden Papers)Box 1598 Machinery File, 17 March 1942-1 May 1944. Report by Lt Gen J.D. Lavarack, July 1944. Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1942, pp.443, 445-448. Its eventual transfer to the Department of the Treasury in December 1941 has already been mentioned. Established in December 1939, its creation removed from the service departments the function of review, inspection and endorsement of funds expenditure but did not take over any of the executive responsibilities except that of the financial functions of the service boards. In addition the Board of Business Administration acted as adviser in matters of defence expenditures referred to it by the Govemment or by the service boards. 42|bid. p.448. 43A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1944 Vol. 2) File M 76/44. Letter Blamey to Shedden 17 December 1944. The same file contains a suggestion by Blamey for a far-reaching tri- 62
While Blarney agreed that there was scope for rationalisation, particularly in rear areas, the impetus for such a move should come from the Minister for Defence and should be planned by a tri-service committee rather than by an agency of a public service department, and the report should not be a product of civilians. Blarney
had his way and the project was dropped.^^^
The committee and sub-committee structures of the various instrumentalities at the
policy level persisted right through the war and attempts towards simplifying and streamlining policy co-ordination and advice were not particularly successful
The next section will examine the business instrumentalities at army level, that is, at the level where logistics policy was implemented.
Army Business Instrumentalities
The Department of the Army was created in November 1939. The first Minister was
Brigadier Geoffrey Street.^^ The new Department took over from the Department of Defence the basic administrative and financial functions affecting the army. Most if not all of these functions had to do with the provision of logistic support for the
service rationalisation of convalescent depots, base hospital services, canteen and amenity services, education and postal services. He stipulated that such a development would require all three services to be put under ona commander in chief. This idea was floated in a letter from Blarney to Shedden, dated 4 March 1944. 44|bid. Note to file by Shedden (undated). 45A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence) File 31/301/344. Higher Defence Organisation. Report DC Minute 303/1944 on Agendum 174/1944, 14 October 1944. 46Brigadier Geoffrey Austin Street, politician and pastoralist born in 1895 in Sydney, was educated at Sydney Grammar School and Sydney University. He sen/ed in the first AIF between 1914 and 1919 in various command and staff appointments. After the war he rose to be CO of the Corangamate Light Horse. He entered the House of Representatives in 1934 and became Minister of Defence in 1938. He perished in an air crash near Canberra on 13 August 1940. 63
military forces. It monitored work closely associated with the non-combatant roles of the General Staff.
Perhaps the most important link in the army's administrative chain was the
Business Adviser to the Department of the Army , a position established in October
1940 and eventually filled by Col Alfred M. Kemsley.47 The position was
concerned mainly with financial policy. The C in C objected, unsuccessfully, to
the arrangement but he was able to insist that no consultation with the Business
Adviser be required in cases of strategical or urgent operational matters.'^s
In accordance with AMRO,^^ the functions of the Business Adviser were to advise
the Minister on procurement, inspection, custody and disposal of military stores,
equipment and supplies, workshop and repair establishments, transport and
veterinary services, works and buildings, and any other matters affecting army
administration.
As adviser to the Minister the Business Adviser had unrestricted access to all levels
of the army provided the matters under consideration were non-operational.
The matters he dealt with were limited to submissions in excess of 10,000
pounds. These were also required to go before the Board of Business
Administration, (Department of the Treasury), an example of overlapping
47A-1194 (Dept. of Defence Library) Accession Number 30268/20.15. Record of activity of Business Adviser to the Department of the Army March 1943 - March 1946 pp. 124,143. Col Alfred Newcombe Kemsley was born at Prospect, South Australia, in 1896. He had business training and AIF service 1915 to 1919. In his civilian capacity he had had a number of managerial positions such as Secretary, Melbourne Town Planning Commission and General Manager of commercial broadcasting stations. He was Director of Organisation and Recruiting in the AG Branch, Business Adviser to the Minister for the Army and army representative on the Board of Business Administration. 48A-2653 (M/Bd. Proceedings 1942 Vol.3)File Ml04/42. Business Adviser. 15 June 1942-24 August 1947. Note to file from Secretary, 18 December 1942. 49Australian Military Regulations and Orders Section A36. 64 responsibility. The two functions at times conflicted but on the whole amicable relations seem to have prevailed.
Other instrumentalities created by the Department of the Army included the Finance and Accounting Advisory Panel, the Army Inventions Directorate, the Hirings Committee and the Railways Accounts Section. These instrumentalities are mentioned here to emphasise the complexity of army administration which by 1942 had become a considerable burden to the C and C and his senior resource managers. Army agencies were created that had no precedents in the First World War or in the inter-war years. Thus none of the senior resource managers could claim any familiarity with the functions of such agencies. Consequently, the need for a consultative position to keep the C in C advised of administrative developments in the army or the potential need for them became apparent and the position of Chief Inspector Army was established.^o
Blamey's action indicated his scepticism about the administrative ability of his senior resource managers. The first incumbent of the position was Brigadier E. Gorman.He operated basically as a roving trouble-shooter for the C and C. There was always a danger of cutting across the Business Adviser (Army) and the monitoring inspection directorates established by the Board of Business Administration (Treasury), but in Blamey's words '... Gorman [was] a very clever dick [sic] who co-operate[d] very harmoniously with all directorates'.
50A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 2) File M 57/42. Chief Inspector, Army. 31 July 1942 - 13 October 1942 LHQ Memorandum 103399 8 September 1942. Brigadier Eugene Gorman, barrister and QC, was born 1891 at Goornong, New South Wales. He saw service with the first AIF between 1915 and 1919 and 2nd AIF 1940- 1944. He held various honorary appointments and was director of the Australian Comforts Fund - Middle East. 52|bid. 65
The rapid increase in the strength of the army put a considerable strain on the manpower resources of the nation.53 jhe civilian manpower authorities pressured the army and the other services to reduce their monthly intake. The C in
C responded to the manpower pressure half way through 1942 by disbanding eleven infantry battalions. The ORBAT overall was reduced by one infantry and one armoured division. He assured the War Cabinet that further reductions would take place but the War Cabinet was still not satisfied, asking for all sorts of technical details in order to decree further decreases in army strength.54 The pre- occupation with administrative detail at that level is difficult to appreciate, but the old Labor Party members may have still harboured some ingrained suspicion of their senior military officers,55 and have wanted to investigate the matter for themselves. The real answer to the problem is probably found in the extent of the labour shortage in Australia at that time. Such was the demand for workers that school children were put to work in their holidays. It was also seriously considered that the aboriginal population should be rounded up and sent to work. The national labour situation was so serious that politicians had to assure themselves that the human resources allocated to the army were really needed.
The bureaucratic manpower authorities in 1942 had become increasingly concerned about what appeared to be gross wastages of human resources on the part of the army. The Minister for the Army suggested late in 1942 that there might well be numerous positions, particularly in the L of C areas, which could be filled by non-military personnel.56 The C in C rejected this view out of hand, saying :
53The army had expanded to over 600,000 personnel by the second half of 1942. Gross sen/ice enlistments at their peak totalled over one million or about 13% of the population. 54A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol.1) File M 45/42. Reorganisation of the Army in Australia. WC Minute 2224, Agendum 281/1942. 30 June 1942. 55c. Neumann. Parliamentary Attitudes to Defence and the Armed Forces from 1933-1939. BA (Hons) Thesis. University of New England, 1972. 56A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 3) File M 137/42. Enlisted personnel for clerical and administrative duties. Letter Forde to Blamey, 7 November 1942. 66
I do not agree to the incorporating of civil and therefore unqualified elements [ which could have the task] to make recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief.57
The political pressure on the army led to the creation in mid-1942 of the War
Establishment Committee.58 Its task was to ensure economy in the army's
demands for scarce manpower resources. The Committee had no authority to
decide on the need for a new establishment or the basic organisation of a new unit
or formation, but was to advise on personnel and equipment details once the CGS
had approved such a proposal in principle.
However, there were reasons for misgivings in respect of manpower wastage in
the various senior headquarters of the Australian army such as Land
Headquarters. The wastages manifested themselves in the overmanning of
certain functions with disproportionately high ranks. The CGS commented to
Blamey that a fixed WE was quite unsuitable for Land Headquarters :
What is needed is a WE that can be adjusted quickly and as often as you as C - in - C decide.
What was required, so he contended, was the flexibility to expand or contract the
WE at a moment's notice. Such a facility would counteract the tendency to create
large establishments with their corresponding demands for higher ranks :
...at the moment no branch [would] take the risk for fear of finding it has
57|bid. Letter Blamey to Forde, 14 November 1942. 58A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 3) File M 93/42 War Establishment Committee, 25 May 1942. This committee preceded the much wider and more powerful War Commitments Committee established by War Cabinet in September 1942. The latter had the task of co- ordinating competing manpower demands from the sen/ices and from industry. It had a profound but indirect influence on the logistic support that could be given to the army both in terms of production capacity of the army itself. See also: S.J. Butlin and B.C. Schedvin. War Economy 1942-1945. In: Australia in the War 1939-1945. Australian War Memorial (Canberra) Series 4 (Civil) Vol. 4 pp. 349-351. 59A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1943 Vol.5) File 226/43. Changes in War Establishments. File range 27 April, 1939 - 4 August, 1944. Memo CGS to C in C. 31 October 1942. 67
asked for too little ...[and because LHQ did not] have the power to form quickly such directorates as that of Water Transport (Small Craft) which had become necessary recently.®o
The CGS contended that
... the effect of the civil researches into WEs has been an ever present example of long delay due ... to the task of trying to produce a fixed WE being too great. WEs which are the basis of personnel provision and of War Equipment Tables are really not necessary for LHQ which has no War Equipment Table.
It took the C in C about six months to solve the problem of WEs for LHQ. He did so by creating yet another instrumentality, the LHQ War Establishments Investigating
Committee, with the task of reviewing the internal organisation of LHQ, preventing overlapping or duplicating functions, examining the number of all personnel, militarising the civilian staff, and of examining means of replacing male staff with women wherever possible.
This episode illustrates that even in the eyes of senior military officers the LHQ organisation was more complex than it need have been. This condition was sometimes exacerbated by self interest, a phenomenon which reflects Hasluck's similar criticism of the wartime public service.
The C in C was also pressured by his political masters to reduce other higher headquarters. Early in 1943 the Minister queried the need for the First and Second army headquarters. Blamey explained the origins of these headquarters :
H.Q.s of the First and Second Armies were designed to control operations in the defence of Australia. The fact that such operations have, fortunately, not occurred cannot be used as criticism of the establishment of the Headquarters which were necessary to meet a
60|bid. 61 Ibid. 62|bid. CGS Memorandum SM 4858, 8 March 1943. 63paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.480. 68
contingency. This contingency still exists but... these staffs have been used ... to build up the additional headquarters required for New Guinea ...64
Blarney suggested that the Minister was unaware of the facts :
It is apparent, however, that the nature and scope of the task which has been performed and the effect of controlling the logistic side of the New Guinea campaign has neither been appreciated nor understood. This is unfortunate. It is doubtful if in these changed circumstances any cases can be found where officers are not fully employed and in fact most of them work at high pressure for very long hours.^s
The Minister let the matter rest at that time but took the precaution of arming himself
against criticisms that could be levelled against the army at the Annual Conference
of the ALP later that year.66
After the war, all of the business instrumentalities and investigating committees
disappeared. On the reconstitution of the Military Board late in 1945, attention to
army business matters reverted to the Business Member of the Board who was to
be consulted on financial matters by every army authority except the CGS and the
Adjutant General.^^
All other matters were then dealt with corporately by the Board as a whole. The
Department of the Army was abolished in 1972.^8
64A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.5) File 226/42. Changes in War Establishments. File Range 27 April 1939 - 4 August 1944. Letter C in C to Minister, 29 January 1943. The sizes of these headquarters were 530 and 517 all ranks, respectively, for First and Second Armies 65|bid. 66A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.5) File M 225/43. ALP Conference, Canberra 1943. Briefing notes for Minister. ®V2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1946 Vol. 1 and 4) Files M 14/46 and 117/46 of 11 October 1946 and 18 December 1946- SScommonwealth Gazette no.183, 13 November 1972. It was replaced by a Department of Defence which included a Central Office and an Office for each of the Army, Navy and Air Force. A-2653 (M/Bd. Proceedings 1942 Vol.5) File M226/43. Changes in War Establishments, File range 27 April 1939-4 August 1944. Memo CGS to C in C 31 October 1942. 69
Comparison with Canada
In addition to the multiplicity of business instrumentalities a major problem with
the Australian logistic system was the number of lines of reporting to different
bureaucracies: the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister's Department (Council of
Defence, War Cabinet), the Department of Defence (Defence Committee and sub-
structures), the Department of the Army (Business Adviser sub-committees) and
the army itself (Chief Inspector Army, War Establishment Committee, the financial
member of the Military Board, and principal staff officers (General Staff). When
comparing the Australian situation with corresponding conditions in Canada
striking contrasts become apparent. Organisationally the Canadian army was
always part of the Department of National Defence, that is, no special department
was created as was the case with the Canadian air and naval forces.^Q In this
manner the Canadian planners avoided an additional link between policy and operational levels, whereas in Australia with the intermediary link was the
Department of the Army. A very significant difference from a logistics point of view between Australia and Canada was that Canada created one totally integrated
Department of Munitions and Supply directed by one minister. This department also had the power to restrict production of civilian goods. Bothwell states the main advantage:
This single department under a single minister widely independent of domestic political constraints whether from colleagues or opponents, permitted concentration of effort and alliance of political and economic power
69Robert Bothwell, A Curious Lack of Proportion. Canadian Business and the War. In: Sydney Astor (ed.) The Second World War as a Natiorial Experience., Canadian Committee for the History of the 2nd World War (Ottawa), 1961, pp.24-37. 70|bid. p.35. 70
Unlike Australia, just before or at the outset of the war, Canada, did not possess a
sizeable munitions manufacturing infrastructure. In fact, little confidence was
placed in Canada's industrial potential for munitions manufacture^^ in addition,
Britain's refusal to let Canada supply her own forces directly from indigenous
resources precluded initially the creation of a Canadian war materials industry72
In the early stages of the war Canada looked to Britain rather than the USA for
supplies73 because United States equipment was rarely compatible with British
equipment on which the Canadian army, like all other dominion armies, had
standardized.
The close proximity to the United States of America was of importance to Canada
at a later stage. After the crown companies had been created^^ was possible to
obtain swiftly raw materials and machine tools from an adjacent country. The
assistance this gave to the provision of logistics support is obvious when
comparing it with the long lines of supply Australia had to suffer. These and similar
conditions advanced Canada from a country having very underdeveloped logistic
support to its army to an outstanding industrial complex which towards the end of
the war produced virtually every sinew of war. This industrial progress had an
advantageous effect on the army's logistic ' tail ' overseas. It obviated the need
for an MGO branch in Europe.^^
Whether or not the senior resource managers in the Canadian army were better
prepared for their tasks than their Australian counterparts is difficult to say. The
71W.A.B. Douglas, and B. Greenhouse, Out of the Shadows Oxford University Press (Toronto), 1977, p.30. 72|bid. pp.43-44. 73|bjd. ^"^Ibid. p.27. Crown Companies were industrial enterprises started by Government funding but operated by non-government employees as a private enterprise with restricted profit margins. ^^c.P. Stacey, Six Years of War. The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific, Official History of the Canadian Army in 2nd World War, Dept. of National Defence (Ottawa), 1955, Vol. 1, p.199. 71 answer is probably not, but the proximity of the industrial complex of the USA and the Canadian indigenous industrial management know-how guaranteed the ready availability of civilian resource managers in uniform.
Set in a global context a comparison between the Canadian and Australian logistic systems would not be very helpful. Canada, by and large, fought a European war which required a high degree of mobility, necessitating relatively large numbers of men, vast amounts of munitions and other equipment and which took place in densely populated localities, against a single foe. On the other hand, the Australian logistic system had at times to cope with two entirely different enemies, fighting both in open spaces and in closed country and requiring both considerable quantities of mechanised equipment and a capability for supporting infantry warfare under jungle conditions.
Comparisons with New Zealand are not very fruitful because of the relatively small scale of the New Zealand war effort where each of the divisions of the expeditionary force was an enterprise in itself dovetailing with the external command structure existing at the time at particular locations of deployment. Thus, in the Middle East and in the Pacific New Zealand's position was as an :
Association with [a] powerful ally upon whom we were destined to become dependent for nearly all our means of existence.^^
In other words, compared with Australia there was little if any logistic effort at the policy level. Thus any comparison between Australian and New Zealand army logistic instrumentalities above formation level is largely meaningless.
76r / Zealand. Third Division Histories Committee, Base Wallahs. Story of the Units of the Ne. 3aland Base Organisations in Second NZEF Infantry Divisions, (date?). 72
However, the brief discussion of the Canadian organisation of logistics at the policy level has highlighted the shortcomings of the Australian system. An examination of organisation theory as applied to the military shows there are several means of co-ordination ranging from chief executive action as in Canada to one by committee which was the practice in Australia. This latter was considered by an Australian staff officer (A.S. Wilson) in 1946 as generally quite undesirable:
Wherever an organisation needs continual recourse to special co-ordinating devices such as committees in the discharge of its regular work this is proof that the organisation is bad.^^
The main point made by Wilson in his essay is that the fewer the number of vertical divisions in an organisation the less co-ordination is required.
In Australia the abundance of committees, most of them advisory, had been meant to co-ordinate the different tasks of the vertical divisions of the Australian war machinery, that is, the divisions finally arrived at by three services and five or six separate departments of state.
The plethora of civilian and military instrumentalities underpinning the Australian army logistic system was not conducive to the efficient pursuit of the war. The creation of military counterparts to some of the civilian checks and balances and the staffing of them with ex-soldiers was a move to keep an internal eye on administration. This became particularly necessary when competition for manpower resources became acute.
The organisational complexity of the Australian non-combatant army system was influenced by the British logistic tradition which tended to centralise all and not only
77A-2653 (M/Bd. Proceedings 1945 Vol.8) File M303/45. A Study of Structural Organisation in Relation to Army Administration. Paper by Brigadier A.S. Wilson 1946, p.22. 73
common functions. This administrative philosophy worked in the British system which was accustomed to maintaining comparatively large permanent forces over relatively short distances (not counting the colonial garrisons). However, shortcomings in the Australian system were caused not so much by a potentially unsuitable administrative philosophy but rather by the inexperience of the
Australian resource managers. Evidence of this assertion will be provided from
Chapter 6 onwards.
The next chapter will examine the procedural aspects of logistics in the Australian
army. 74
CHAPTER 5
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY LOGISTICS
Introduction
The logistic instrumentalities established to implement the war effort of the
Australian services were many and varied and their procedures were cumbersome. This chapter will show that the whole of the administrative infrastructure was not only complex but more complex than it need have been.
The exceptions were the emergency projects implemented, after Japan's entry into the war, under the provision of delegated emergency funding arrangements.
The bureaucracy both civilian and military decided whether the appropriate instrumentalities had been consulted, where the funds were to come from and whether the right authorities had sanctioned their spending. In addition, financial and stores accounting aspects had to be considered in respect of ordering procedures (contract actions) as well as financial and stores audit requirements once goods had been received and taken on store charge. During the war these audits were basically of a compliance nature, that is, an examination of the correct application of laid-down procedures. There were no attempts at efficiency auditing, unless one classes the functions of the Board of Business Administration or that of the Chief Inspector, Army as a form of efficiency auditing.
Attempts at assessing comparative effectiveness of the logistic procedures are largely futile because of the absence of bench marks against which Australian logistic procedures could be measured. Comparision between Australian,
Canadian and New Zealand procedures is inappropriate because of the entirely different management philosophies outlined in the previous chapter. 75
Financial Delegation
Authority to spend the taxpayers', money for defence purposes before and during the first two years of the war rested exclusively on the annual budget estimates approved by the Commonwealth Parliament, except for small emergency expenditures. The budget proposals were based on the submissions of the senior service managers; in the case of the army, the branches of the Military Board. The war had been in progress for two years before the Military Board was given authority to fund minor and unforeseen war works out of a standing account of 20,000 pounds to cover all commands and the 7 Military District (Darwin and N.T. areas) in anticipation of Treasury approval. It was not, in the true sense, a financial delegation to the Board because the funds availability was finite. Once the allocation had been spent the commands and districts could no longer authorise even minor war works and a new delegation had to be authorised."'
When the Pacific war broke out in December 1941, War Cabinet authorised service
ministers to incur delegated emergency expenditures not exceeding 20,000
pounds,2 provided they had been endorsed by the respective business managers
or advisers. Hand in hand with this delegation went the discretionary right to
consult the Prime Minister or the Treasurer directly, but the ministers were obliged
to report any such financial transaction immediately to the Department of Defence.^
Because this initial emergency delegation was not sufficiently far-reaching the
delegation was extended a few months later to the C in C, army, corps and L of C
1A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1941 Vol 3) Files 49/41 and 198/41. Funds for Minor War Works. WO Agendum 274 Suppl. 2.30 July 1941. 2A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 277 . Urgent Defence Measures. WC Minute 1574 Agendum 416/41 11 December 1941. 3A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1941 Vol 5) File Ml 26/41. Urgent Defence Measures. WC Minute 1573 Agendum 417/41. 11 December 1941. 76
commanders and to the principal staff officers at LQH. The limits of the army delegations are shown below^
C in C 50,000 pounds (maximum) CGS QMG MGO 2,000 Army commanders 50,000 Corps Commander 20,000 L of C Commanders 15,000
All expenditures incurred in this manner had to be endorsed retrospectively by the
War Cabinet.5
The policy underlying these delegations was, on the face of it, a complete break with the country's traditional practices, namely the system of checks and accountability to Parliament for funds. The C in C was very much aware of this. He endeavoured to make sure that the new system was not abused. He said to his senior resource managers:
These concessions [were] hard won owing to general distrust allowing all commanders control of funds ... careless or negligent implementation or any attempt to avoid the conditions imposed will necessarily affect the confidence of the Government in the chosen leaders of the Army.®
Blamey's warning to his senior army officers implied that he was less than completely confident in their performance, and may have suspected they were not
4A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 281. WC Minute 2144 of 15 May 1942 and 2501 of 30 June 1943. The delegations were covered by the following WC Minutes - Schedule A - WC 1573 - Minister (11 December 1941). Schedule B - WC 2144 - Senior army officers - urgent expenditures (15 May 1942). Schedule C - WC 2601 - Senior army officers - non-urgent expenditures (30 Jan.1943). ^ The delegations of the CGS, QMG and the MGO were low because the emergency expenditures would be incurred at command and L of C levels and not at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. 5A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1943 Vol.1) File M 23/43. WC Minute 3664 of 14 September 1943. Schedule A of Board of Business Administration memorandum SI 259. 6A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1942 Vol.2) File M 75/42 Economy in the Use of MT. Circular C in C to all commanders 27 June 1942. 77
suitably prepared to shoulder this unexpected financial responsibility. The
appointment of Chief Inspector, Army, mentioned in the previous chapter, who had
the role of monitoring the smooth running of the army administration, tends to
confirm this.
In 1944 the national emergency had sufficiently receded for the financial
delegations to be reduced. The C in C saw no further need for them and all
delegations other than to himself and the LGA were cancelled."^
By May/June 1945 delegations in excess of 5,000 pounds were withdrawn and
traditional peacetime budgetary control was resumed.®
In contrast to the peacetime financial control exercised by Parliament up to 11
December 1941, the sudden procedural rearrangement gave rise to a financial
delegation mechanism in which expenditure of funds was authorised by the
spenders of the funds and subsequently endorsed by the providers. War Cabinet,
with Parliament retrospectively approving the transactions after they had been
incurred. The procedural change enabled relatively rapid responses to emergency
situations, which, while partly foreseen - emergency camp accommodation for
American forces was a case in point - nevertheless presented themselves virtually
overnight. It reduced the civilian role of providing funds for defence purposes
considerably and threw the onus of authorising the basic means of defence onto the armed services.
It would be misleading to infer that the Government abdicated its role of ultimate financial control. All that had happened was that in an emergency situation the
^A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1944 Vol.4) File M244/44 Delegation to incur Expenditure WC Minute 3579 Agendum 253/44 of 23 May 1944. LGA memorandum 99407 of 10 July 1944. Submission by Forde to WC February 1945. 8A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 307. WC Minutes 4222 (31 May 1945) and 4238 (5 June 1945). 78
sequence of financial control measures was reversed. This was not unlike the
British wartime procedure implemented at the beginning of the war, when the
normal parliamentary estimates system fell into abeyance. During wartime all army expenditure in common with war expenditure incurred by other instrumentalities was financed by a vote of credit taken by the Treasury. In other words, in 1941/42
Australia adopted a procedure which was in principle quite similar to that
implemented by the U.K. two years earlier. However, the evidence does not
indicate that the Australian Government also adopted the apparently much simpler
British accounting control in which financial control by the Treasury was reduced to a minimum.9
Ordering Procedures and the Problems of Wastage
Once a requirement was authorised and funds approved, the ordering process could be initiated. As in most of its activities, the Australian army followed United
Kingdom tradition and precedence when it came to ordering supplies, works and services. Subsequent to the adoption of the Squires Report referred to in the previous chapter,the Military Board introduced a few changes which, in the words of F.G. Shedden, Secretary, Department of Defence,'... violated the accepted principles of financial control by Parliament, the Government and the
Treasury'^ However he did not insist on changing the system back to conform to peacetime practice.''2
9A-5954 {Shedden Papers) Box 1597 [British] Treasury Control of Army expenditure. War Office memo to Secretary, Dept. of Defence Co-ordination, 4 December 1939. •"OA-Sie/I (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence) File 51/306/5. The Squires Report. 16 December 1938. 11A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 894. Shedden to Minister. 12 September 1939. The major departure from U.K. practice proposed by the Board was that the District Finance Officer (DFO) could not veto expenditure submissions by the GOC, could not report independently to the Chief Accounting Officer and the Dept. of the Army and had no investigation powers or audit control. 79
It was perhaps just as well that Shedden's view did not prevail otherwise the already tardy process of equipping the AIF let alone the expanding home forces would have taken even longer. How much more protracted ordering procedures could have been is illustrated by an example which in May 1940 involved the expenditure of 14,000 pounds for some additional stores facilities at Albury. Initiated by the GOC Eastern Command, the submission for funds approval went to the QMG and then to the Military Board, from there to the MGO and then to the Minister. The approval of the Minister of Defence Co-ordination and the endorsement of the Board of Business Administration had to be obtained before the army could proceed with the implementation of the project. In all, just under two months had elapsed.If Shedden's traditional views had prevailed, the 2 MD District Finance Officer would have been asked for his concurrence before the proposal could have even gone as far as the Military Board. The District Finance Officer would have conducted a thorough investigation and in all probability would have referred the matter to the Chief Accounting Officer at army HQ.
Some of the initial problems encountered in the indent and order trail arose from the sheer administrative ignorance of the militia staff officers at formation and unit levels. Some of the field force formations instituted war administrative courses but commanders did not seem to attach much importance to them. For instance, when Fourth Division ran such a course in the second half of 1940, the course attracted barely seventy officers and then only on a part-time basis.
Another impediment under which the services suffered was the pressure brought to bear on them by the Australian civilian bureaucracy. Long says :
13A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol.1) File 2/41. Military Explosives Stores at Albury. 5 January 1941. 14A-1194 {Dept. of Defence Library) Accession no. 23087/20.01 Fourth Division War Time Administrative Course 1940-1941. 10 July 1940 - 17 November 1940. At that time units of all infantry divisions were undergoing their three months training. The formation cadres were in training full-time. 80
The Treasury officials seemed resolved that the war should not be an excuse for undue extravagance on the part of the services... [the result of this attitude was] that plans for equipping the army ... were allowed to proceed at only cautious space.
As the war progressed, the Government felt the need for further admonishment.
Service departments should:
... satisfy [themselves] at the time of ordering that the quantities proposed to be ordered [were] in fact needed ...""s
notwithstanding any previous approvals that might have been given when the
service programmes were reviewed and endorsed.
Wastage did occur due to careless ordering and faulty utilisation of manpower, so
much so that the C in C felt compelled to issue a special order:
The economy [of Australia] merits the most careful examination of every item of expenditure and meticulous care in the employment of available manpower.^^
He maintained that
Men should not be employed on duties for which women are suitable ... Two men must not be employed on any duty which can be fulfilled by one.^®
iSQavin Long, To Benghazi. In: Australia in the War of 1939-1945., Series 1 (Army) Vol.1, AWM (Canberra) 1952., p.41. 16A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.4) File M 199/43. Definition of Responsibilities ... WC Minutes 3077 and 3119. Agendum 455/1943. Memorandum by Minister for Defence, 30 October 1943. l^General Routine Order. Series 1943. Special Order by Gen Sir Thomas Biamey. LHQ 5 April 1943. I8|bid. 81
Wastage also occurred when there was a demand for stores common to more than one branch. For instance two large orders for rope and galvanised iron were placed in 1944 on behalf of ordnance and engineer stores directorates. The LGA ruled that each branch should indent separately to the Department of Supply and
Shipping but should inquire of each other whether or not surplus stores were available and issue a certificate to that effect.This process alone would have been very time consuming and would have added to the administrative complexity.
There was naturally always quite a delay between the time the Defence Committee endorsed a programme and the time the submission for funds was made, during which interval the actual need might have increased or diminished. The same applied to the period between War Cabinet funds approvals and the actual placing of orders. Thus the provision of funds and the size of the orders would depend on what was actually required at the time of ordering and any excess of requirements had to be immediately notified to the Department of Munitions, or the Department of
Supply and Shipping or the relevant overseas procurement authority.20
The ordering officers were in a dilemma here. The originally estimated requirements of the programmes could be adhered to, more often than not entailing considerable over-expenditure but ensuring uninterrupted production njns both in Australia and overseas. Alternatively, anticipated requirements could be brought into line with actual needs at the time of ordering, thus saving funds but at the same time interrupting production runs causing productivity to deteriorate and unit cost of production to rise sharply. From the point of view of the forces the first alternative was preferable even if inefficient. The second could have impaired their combat efficiency on account of possible delays in supply.
19A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1944 Vol. 1) File M 21/44. Co-ordination of Demands for Stores. 21January 1944 - 12 December 1945. Memorandum Business Adviser to LGA 22 January 1944. 20|bid. p.4. 82
One of the basic administrative problems was the then existing contract procedures and principles which governed the procurement of warlike materials and goods. The scope of warlike materials covered two broad categories, one munitions and the other the whole range of items not so designated. The former included arms, armaments, ammunition, weapons, fighting vehicles and 'things of whatsoever kind as the Minister by order declared to be munitions'.2i The latter, called supplies, included foodstuffs, clothes, webbing equipment, transport vehicles, petrol and oil and such services as transport and camp facilities. Munitions eventually became the responsibility of the Department of Munitions and supplies were administered by the Department of Supply and Shipping.
Service orders were of two kinds, those to be placed with government factories and those to be filled from other sources. Orders in the latter category were handled in two ways. Generally, they were processed by the Contract Board, an agency of the Department of Supply and Shipping, where the principle of competitive tendering was applied. The Contract Board was concerned basically with two types of contracts, fixed-price and cost-plus-profits contracts. In theory, when selecting a contractor:
... price [was] not the only consideration. A low price [might] be due to inexperience or error. Failure or delays in one contract may heavily increase expenditure in other fields. The factors which should influence selection [were]:- (a) Quality of product; (b) Quantity of production; (c) Speed of output; (d) Efficiency of [supplying] organisation.22 In fact, price was generally the major consideration and quality and suitability received a lower priority. Government policy was confused. On one hand the Department of the Treasury made it clear that price was the prime consideration : 21 Dept. of Munitions, Contracts and Contract Procedures, (Melbourne) November 1942, p.2. 22|bid. p.6. 83
The price to be paid will be a question of prime consideration, but in some cases it may be outweighed by further consideration of suitability, quality and ... the time of delivery.23 and that
A service department may indicate the capacity of an individual firm to meet a requirement but that should be used only as a helpful guide and not as any subtraction from the responsibility of the purchasing department to determine the placing of orders.^^
On the other hand it must be stressed that the emphasis on price ran counter to declared Government policy which insisted :
that no controllable factor [would] be permitted to deny to our fighting troops any equipment which service authorities advise is a requirement for operations.25
The principle should be, so the Department of Supply and Shipping maintained, that the service requirement be met, that the apparent rule of 'cheapness first' be discarded and that the service department concerned should be able to nominate a suitable supplier who was then sure to be among the invited tenderers.
Clearly, this sort of debate over purchasing procedures once an expenditure programme had been approved in principle was not conducive to good service morale or to confidence in the military leadership. But the Government was in a dilemma, particularly in the case of large orders. If strict economy was exercised it would assist in the avoidance of underhand practices and wastage but would cause considerable delays and lesser quality; if quick and efficient purchasing of
23A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1945 Vol. 4) File M 102/45. Purchasing Procedures ..., March 1945 - 23 October 1945. Draft letter Minister, Supply and Shipping to Treasurer about 20 June 1945. 24|bid. 25|bid. 84
required goods at the desired quality was allowed it might possibly lead to higher prices and the danger of malpractices.
The extent to which the principle of speedy delivery combined with optimum
quality-at-any-price was applied was questioned time and again. By and large the
Treasury attitude prevailed; as it had in peace, so it did in war: price was the first
consideration. The military consumer had to wait and eventually had to make do
with goods that were not as efficient or suitable as they might have been. The
gaiters produced in Australia for Australian troops were a case in point - there was
no comparison with the gaiters issued to American soldiers. Visual inspection of
the two products makes the superiority of the latter obvious, but also indicates
probably considerably higher manufacturing costs.
The example of the gaiters highlights the fact that the Government was faced with
two conflicting views which clouded the relationship between the services and the
bureaucracy. The services thought it was the duty of the bureaucracy to support
the services' demands at any price. The bureaucracy maintained 'that the
services [went] too far.'27 The bureaucracy generally prevailed. In particular the
all-powerful Treasury Finance Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Walter
Massey-Greene28 kept a tight reign on defence expenditure which had
experienced heavy cuts at the height of the depression in 1930/1931 and in
subsequent years.29 Hence there was little sympathy for the principle of quality-
26The Australian gaiters referred to were still on issue after the war and comparison with the American type available from disposal stores and later on issue is easily made. Similar comments can be made about other items of equipment such as clothing and webbing. 27S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, In: Australia in ttie War 1939-1945. Series 4 {Civil), Vol. iv, AWM (Canberra) 1961, p.298. 28Sir Walter Massey-Greene (1874-1952), businessman and politician came to Australia in 1891. After farming in various localities in Australia he entered Parliament in 1910. He held a number of political positions including ministerial appointments and retired from politics in 1938. He was a director of many large companies. 29A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 971. Report on Budgetary Equilibrium in Australia. 5 June 1931. 85
at-any- price. Australia in the late thirties had not yet fully recovered from the depression, unemployment was still very high and the export prices of the principal commodities had in fact, begun to decline.so All economic signs pointed to an incipient depression and all departments of state were pressured into exercising the strictest economy.3i Thus, in the Australian environment at the beginning of the war the implementation of a principle of quality-at-any price would not have been permitted.
The foregoing comments are indicative of the civil-military relationship in general.
Apart from the economic implications, the 'quality-at-any-price' principle had political ramifications. One was the almost traditional attitude on the part of some members of Parliament on both sides of the political spectrum which begrudged the army almost anything that would have been an additional burden on the taxpayer.32 Any evidence of permitting the services to spend public funds as they saw fit would have been anathema prior to and during the first two years of the war.
But after Japan's entry into the war in 1941, when the Australian army was the guardian of the country's security, no steps to obtain it 'on-the-cheap' should have been tolerated.
Even after December 1941, when the services wielded much greater public influence than before, the principle of 'quality-at-any-price', no matter how desirable it might have been from an operational point of view, was not accepted because it conflicted with what McKernan called 'John Curtin's Recipe'.^^ Curtin
30A-461 (Prime Minister's Unclassified Correspondence). File B 339/2/5. Economic Conditions. Statement by Treasurer, 27 August 1937. 31A.T. ROSS, The Arming of Australia, p.146. 32c. Neumann, Parliamentary Attitudes to Defence and the Australian Armed Forces, BA(Hon) Thesis, University of New England (MS) 1972, pp.70-72, 112 Examples of attitudes by E.J. Ward (ALP) and H. Thorby (UAP). 33Michael McKernan, All In!: Australia during the Second World War., Nelson (Melbourne), 1983, Chapter 6. 86
called for austerity in the civilian sector to free manpower for the services and munition production :
Australia must be perpetually on guard ... against spending money or doing anything that cannot be justified.34
Thus rationing of a wide variety of goods was introduced early in 1942 as the best
and most equitable means of curtailing consumption. Without rationing prices
would have steadily increased which among other consequences would have
been reflected in the cost-plus system of purchases by the services. The Austerity
Loans were similarly designed to soak up surplus spending power in the
community.
The ordering processes, particularly early in the war, were affected by several
other factors. In the first instance, the fulfilling of demands for warlike goods
presupposed a viable indigenous manufacturing capacity or the availability of
appropriate external sources of material. Secondly, there had to be actual demands from the army before manufacture or importation of warlike material could commence. This in turn was determined by the role the army was envisaged to play - defence against raids or invasion ? For example, if it was the former, as the Treasury Finance Committee contended, then there was no need to proceed with the 25 pdr project because the current 18 pdr gun would suffice.^6
Expansion of the ammunition capacity was delayed in 1939 and early 1940 for two reasons. First, the Department of Defence did not foresee the need for any new orders once the current demands had been met and second, the sen/ices hesitated to support manufacturing projects for equipment hitherto not made in Australia for
34john Curtin. The Task Ahead. Melbourne Herald. 27 December 1941. ^^Michael McKernan, All In , Chapter 6. 36A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 496, Report by Massey-Greene. 5 December 1939. In the event the 25 pdr gun project had to proceed, because wastages of 18 pdr World War 1 artillery could only be made good by replacing it with a more modern gun. Ibid. Letter Secretary, Army to Secretary, Defence. 17 January 1940. 87
fear that their own fund allocations might suffer.37 |n fact, early in the war the
Australian munitions manufacturing capacity was sustained not by the demands of
the Australian services^s but by the astuteness of the managers of the Munitions
Supply Board (Department of Supply and Development), who were able to
maintain the impetus in expanding the manufacturing capacity by claiming that it
was needed to fulfil munition orders from overseas, notably Great Britain.39
The cumbersome process of providing munitions for the army is described in some
detail by Ross.^o a major proposal had to wind its way through the Defence
Committee, the Board of Business Administration, the Treasury Finance Committee
and, finally, the War Cabinet. The decision of the last formed the basis for the two
operating departments (Supply and Munitions) to formulate plans for implementing
the service requirements. These plans then followed the same path through the
aforementioned instrumentalities, ending up in approval or disallowance by the
War Cabinet. The Secretary, Department of Supply and Development complained
in 1941 that:
It [the Department] had to refer to too many agencies all of which had the power to veto.^i
At the same time he highlighted the need for the services to say what they required:
My Department can only act upon the demands of the Services. It has no authority to build up stocks, and the demands of the Services have to be approved by various controlling or checking authorities.
37S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, p.257. 38|bid. 39|bid., p. 262. 40AT. ROSS, The Arming of Australia, p.289. Ibid, p.288. 42|bid. p.289. 88
Both the system of checks and balances and the need for the services to specify their requirements closely were sources of difficulties. One result of the protracted system was the inability of the Department of Supply and Development to fulfil service demands in a reasonable time. The delay of over three months in proceeding with the 25 pdr project is a case in point.^s The senior army officers
must have known the reasons for this: difficulties between the Munitions Supply
Board and the Military Board had persisted for a number of years^'^ and must have coloured the military's judgement when it levelled generally unfair criticisms against the Department of Supply and Development.These criticisms eventually led to the formation of yet another department of state, the Department of Munitions, headed by Essington Lewis, then the Managing Director of BHP.
The Department was eventually responsible for supplying the munition
requirements of the army, which amounted to 90 per cent of all demands made on the older Department."^® The creation of a new department did not overcome the major problem: that is, the inability of the army to provide both departments with timely and accurate orders. The army's senior resource managers by and large had not been trained to forecast demands accurately. The experience in the First
World War, where Australian logistic requirements were satisfied through the
British bulk stores at Calais,was restricted to the indenting of stores at unit and lower formation level and had had no influence on their quantity or quality. Thus
Australian officers gained no knowledge of the techniques of forecasting potential stores requirements on a large scale.
Was the government aware of the logistic shortcomings of its senior resource managers in the services? Shedden certainly was, otherwise there would have
43|bid. p.289. 44|bid. p. 291-192. 45A-2671 War Cabinet Agenda File 4. Agendum 127/1940 Deliveries of Ammunition and War Cabinet Minute 174/1940, 27 February 1940. 46A.T. ROSS, The Arming of Australia, p.319. '^^john D. Tillbrook. To the Warrior his Arms, p.80. 89
been no need to construct the elaborate system of co-ordination, checks and balances of which the Secretary, Department of Supply and Development complained so bitterly 48 There was, also, a political aspect to all of this. The system that had been developed by the politicians and the senior public servants made sure that a tight rein was kept on the military services, something that was characteristic of the system for which the war was fought but which rendered the system excessively cumbersome. That a system of final absolute civilian control was necessary there could have been no doubt, if democratic institutions were to survive. But this philosophy was taken too far. The civil servants at senior levels wielded a high degree of authority without direct accountability to the community at large. The senior military officers, on the other hand, were held accountable both by their own superiors and their political masters but did not have commensurate authority.
Lend/Lease
The new radically changed Australian procedures for the rapid provision of funds did not solve the logistic problems facing the services. Although the purchase of equipment and services could be authorised and funded virtually at a moment's notice, this facility was of little use unless the particular equipment item was equally readily available.
It was the problem of non-availability in Australia of a number of logistic support items and the need to obtain them speedily, mainly from the USA, which proved the value of the lend/lease system.
^^A.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia, p.288. 90
The inauguration of the lend/lease system in 1941 in the USA enabled non-dollar countries to obtain war materials without any money passing hands. It enabled the President of the USA to provide warlike goods to Allied governments which in turn could sublease them to their own departments of state and even to private firms 49 One reason why the USA administration could do this easily was their policy of paying at the time of delivery for the capital cost of equipment items in common use by both the British and the USA armies.^o The consequence of this principle was that equipment could be written off as soon as it left the factory. Thus a three-ton truck GS^i was accorded a zero book value, anticipating the day the truck was destroyed by hostile action or accident, or became obsolete.
One of the Australian army's basic deficiencies in 1942 was the lack of fighting and motor vehicles. The lend/lease system was ideally suited to alleviate shortcomings in respect of vehicles because they could be speedily supplied.
There was little store-keeping and auditing effort required which otherwise:
... would have absorbed a great deal of manpower and paper on both
sides of the Pacific and contributed nothing to the war effort.
The basis of the Australian lend/lease arrangements was the Curtin/McArthur/
Wasserman Agreement which stipulated that all requisitions by the Australian armed forces had to conform to plans and priorities laid down by the Commander
-in-Chief, South West Pacific area.^^
49S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin. War Economy 1942-1945, p.126. SOWarren F. Kimball The Most Unsordid Act. Lend-Lease 1939-1941. Johns Hopkins Press (Baltimore), 1969, p.86. Truck GS - general service all purpose vehicle, usually four-wheel drive. 52S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, p.127. 53|bid p.124. William S. Wasserman was an U.S. official attached to the United States delegation in Canberra as Chief of the Lend/Lease Mission to Australia. 91
The instrumentality which implemented the Agreement was the Allied Supply
Council. It was the successor of the Administrative Planning Committee, already
referred to in connection with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Council consisted of a number of departmental representatives with a senior US official as
Deputy Chairman.
War Cabinet determined that the role of the Council was :
...to be primarily [that of a ] co-ordinating, planning and advisory body It [ was ] not in any general sense to be an executive agency. and that
The Council was to focus its attention on smoothing the process of relating the supplies and demands of the two Allies at points where they clearly met...54
The Council's major advisory and co-ordinating function was to determine the extent to which demands could be satisfied from Australian sources based on existing production facilities or import arrangements, and the short-fall to be made up by the lend/lease system. Thus the Council operated at a level above that of the services resource management and the services were, therefore, not directly represented on the Council or its sub-committee, except by invitation.^^
This arrangement caused the C in C some disquiet. He was perturbed about the possibility of army requirements not being adequately represented :
I fear [this would] tend to delay and in some cases render impossible the procurement of army requirements and may even result in the Army being allotted unsuitable types [of vehicles] when standard [commercial] types of vehicles might have been procured.^s
54S.J. Butlin and B.C. Schedvin. War Economy 1942-1945, p.100. 55|bid. pp.98-99. 56A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1942 Vol. 2) File M 54/42. Procurement of Motor Vehicles for Army Requirements. 1 July 1942 - 31 July 1942. Letter Blarney to Curtin (as Minister of Defence, 1 July 1942. Letter Curtin to Blamey, 12 July 1942. 92
The standard type of vehicles Blarney was referring to had been ordered by the Division of Import Procurement of the Department of Trade and Customs. He stressed that
... the Army should have the opportunity to secure vehicles designed for army use and that it would be most unfortunate if the flow of commercial vehicles being imported was so much in excess of requirements that it was necessary to forego this advantage [of ordering vehicles specifically selected for army use].57
The C in C raised the need for army representation at meetings with the
Department of Supply and Shipping at which priorities for the production of non- munition items were allocated. Similarly, because the army had no voice in the
Allied Supply Council the demands of the American forces often took precedence over Australian requirements. Blamey maintained Australian demands should recieve priority, since the American forces found it much easier to import their requirements from USA because by the end of 1943 the shipping situation had sufficiently improved. Blamey's representation was lost in the bureaucratic apparatus of the Department of the Army and the C in C did not feel sufficiently strongly about the matter, so he did not insist on army representation.
Apart from the shortage of fighting and transport vehicles the Australian army had relatively little need for lend/lease material. The following table shows the lend/lease receipts in terms of dollar value percentages up to the end of August
1942 by various Australian agenciesi^s
57|bid. 58A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Supply Policy. Minute from C in C to Minister. Dept. of Defence through Dept. of the Army, 17 November 1943. Army representation at certain meetings and complaint that a previous approach in September 1943 by the LGA regarding the same matter had been left unanswered. 59A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1942 Vol.3) File M 135/42. Glebe Island. Letter A.E. Moore to LGA September 1942. The pound values in the source document have been converted to percentages by this writer. 93
Instrumentality Percentagp Department of Trade and Customs 65.9% Ministry of Munitions 16 9% RAAF 8.3°/C Army 1.70/^ RAN and other miscellaneous users 0.7%
Glebe Island was the major receiving terminal for lend/lease shipments, and to facilitate distribution a Central Cargo Clearance Committee was established. Its role was to intervene once a consignee had failed to clear his goods from the wharf. The LGA was :
... somewhat concerned that there should be yet another authority charged with the responsibility of the discharge of ships. Having that in view my questions relate to the higher authority under which the proposed Committee would work [bearing in mind the existence of ] the Cargo Control Commission and the Stevedoring Commission ...60
The Minister for the Army supported what was on the face of it a well-argued case :
Broadly, the Army's views [were] that the control of shipping and of cargo are technical matters which should be the responsibility of a central authority with the requisite expert knowledge and machinery. The Army's Movement Control Organisation [was] the natural and normal choice to whom such responsibility should be allotted... It had at its call the Army organisation including the Docks Service... It was for this purpose that... these exist within the Army as normal integers of the Army organisation ...
Furthermore, [other] organisations have been established by the Government to co-ordinate in co-operation with Army authorities, these activities and in addition other governmental instrumentalities such as the Maritime Services Board and Harbour Trusts exist to enable other aspects to be carried out. For these reasons it is felt to be undesirable and unnecessary to superimpose still another authority at the port of Sydney to effect a control which is essentially one for the Australian Army authorities.®^
60|bid. Letter LGA to A.E. Moore, Division of Import Procurement, Dept. of Supply and Shipping of 29 September 1942 and Minister for the Army to Minister for Supply and Shipping of 12 September 1942. Ibid. Letter to Minister of Supply and Shipping. (Draft). 94
The army did not win. The Australian philosophy of always ensuring checks and
balances would not permit the centralisation of an activity which affected more than
one party. It was another example of proliferation of effort with consequent
inefficiencies found so frequently in the Australian logistic infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the lend/lease system proved of considerable value to the army in
meeting its needs for motor transport. During its time in the Middle East the AIF
had become in practical terms a fully motohsed force. Most infantry platoons had
their own 3-ton trucks. However, little if any of this transport was brought back to
Australia, hence the immediate need for vehicles. By the second half of 1942 the
army had received under lend/lease about 40,000 vehicles of which 27,665 had
bodies and the remainder not, thus enabling the chassis to be adapted to any
application found necessary.62
The availability of motor transport made possible by the lend/lease mechanism
enabled the army to deploy the forces earmarked for the defence of the mainland
quickly and to operate the extensive L of Cs supporting this defence. Eventually, it
assisted the forces in the island campaigns in solving their transport problems in
New Guinea where large tracts of savannah country were encountered suitable for motor transport. Finally, the adequate availability of motor transport enabled the army to reconvert the jungle divisions to the standard British divisional equipment pattern once they had been withdrawn from the islands.
More significantly, the operation of the lend/lease system was characterised by relatively simple accounting procedures compared with the provision of equipment from non-lend/lease sources. Basically, only the Standing Committee of the Allied
62A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol.3) File M 128/42. Disposal of Lend/Lease Motor Trucks, WC Minute 2452. 28 October 1942. 63MP-729/6 {Dept. of Army Class. General Correspondence) File 37/401/1640. Reorganisation of Infantry Battalions, May 1943. 95
Supply Council was involved. In the case of vehicles its Washington counterpart came into play and, finally, on arrival of the vehicles in Australia, the aforementioned Central Cargo Clearing Committee - three agencies in all. By contrast the delays in the distribution of non-lend/lease goods to the prospective consumer involved five to six different instrumentalities.®^
The provision of goods through the lend/lease system highlights both simplicity and complexity in logistic procedures, the former conducive to efficient logistic support and the latter impeding it.
Summary
It took the immediate threat of invasion to convince the Australian Government that financial procedures developed by the public service in peacetime for the expenditure of defence funds were no longer appropriate. The Government consequently accepted the philosophy that its ministers and senior sen/ice officers could and should be trusted with authorising taxpayers' money effectively and efficiently for immediate defence needs of the country. The result of the changed delegation procedure for authorising defence funds was that the services obtained their logistic support, particularly in an emergency, considerably more quickly than would otherwise have been the case.
While some of these changes were revolutionary and went a long way towards supporting the army in meeting its logistic requirements, the same cannot be said for the ancillary bureaucratic processes. Purchase and contract procedures and methods of stores control continued very much as in peacetime, with all the attendant delays and wastages in manpower.
64A-1194 (Dept. of Defence Library) Accession no. 27126/20.01. The Administration of the MOD Branch and of the MGO Sen/ices. Vol. 1,1944 Appendix J 4. 96
The army, particularly in terms of financial regulations, remained, by and large, a complex civilian (public service) function intertwined with army instrumentalities.
The dichotomy in responsibilities could have been avoided if a significant number of senior regular army officers had been educated in financial resource management.
In contrast was the lend/lease system for obtaining American defence material without having to pay scarce dollars. It was an open-ended and initially unilateral credit facility, remarkably free from procedural complexities.
The procedural aspects of the logistic effort translated themselves into the logistic tasks mainly of the QMG and MGO branches. The next chapter will examine the responsibilities of the former. 97
CHAPTER 6
THE LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S BRANCH
Background
There were undoubtedly shortcomings in the provision of logistic support by the
QMG's Branch. Yet the history of the Branch over the war years shows a successful blend of civilian and regular army skills and initiatives in order to meet the challenges of the period.
The appointment of a prominent businessman as QMG was an essential element in the creation of a smooth-running supply and service operation. Civilian skills were behind the drive to improve the diet of the Australian soldier and the management of the specialised POL area. On the other hand the Army could rely on the experience and training of its regular officers in two important areas: troop movement by rail, and docks services.
Basically, the QMG branch saw to the physical distribution of the sinews of war, provided in most instances by the MGO branch from manufacturing resources at home or abroad. The QMG branch was responsible for the provision of 'supplies' traditionally defined as comphsing :
food, forage, petrol, lubricants ... fuel, light, disinfectants and medical comforts.''
1U.K. War Office. Field Service Regulations, Vol. 1, p.xix. 98
Supplies, with the exception of petrol and petroleum oil products, were normally available from local producers by means of the contract purchasing procedure outlined in Chapter 5. In addition to the traditional supply items, the QMG branch distributed clothing including hospital clothing, general stores and camp equipment, spare parts for motor transport, vehicles other than fighting vehicles, medical and dental equipment and a host of other articles 2
The distribution of these stores was carried out by executive agencies of the QMG branch such as the AASC or the AACC.
Finally, the QMG branch had the task of providing certain services such as general transport of personnel and goods by road, rail, and sea; of supplementing civilian agencies associated with ports and docks operations; and the provision of accommodation such as camp sites.
The demarcation between the QMG and MGO branches was not always clearly defined and at times created problems that could have been avoided. Attempts at rationalisation foundered on the rock of tradition. For example, the Business
Adviser, Army, had suggested in 1943 to the QMG and MGO branches that the returned stores depots and salvage activities be combined into one organisation because many returned stores eventually finished up at salvage depots for disposal.3 The suggestion was not welcomed by either branch as they saw it as an attempt to reduce the scope of their respective activities.^
The QMG branch would have been the logical organisation to carry out this function. It was already engaged in large-scale recycling activities to satisfy the
2A-2653 (M/Bd Proc 1943 Vol. 1 ) File M 52/43. Period of forward Ordering and Planning for Supply Items. File range 17 March. 1943 - 24 June 1944. 3A 2653 (M/Bd Proc 1943 Vol. 4) File M 162/43. Retumed Stores and Salvage. 10 July 1943-14 August 1944. Letter Business Adviser, Army, to MGO of 10 July 1943. 4|bid. 99
requirements of prisoners of war, internees and civil construction workers. Thus the sentencing of surplus stores was merely an extension of the QMG's normal salvage operations. The MGO branch rested its case on the provisions of the Field
Service Regulations^ and on the somewhat spurious assumption that only its executive arm, the AAOC was technically qualified to sentence surplus stores.
In the event the question of amalgamation was never resolved. The instance highlights, however, that the by then commonly accepted notions of rationalisation of procedures and work study already referred to in Chapter 3 had by-passed the senior resource managers of the army. The result was the operation of a disposals procedure that was more cumbersome that it need have been.
Provision of Food
The adequate provision of food is a major requirement for any army. Armies are provisioned either by living off the land or by a supply organisation which makes food in various forms available from bases in the rear of the front line troops. The
Australian army has usually followed the latter practice.
Another requirement is that the food be wholesome, palatable, nutritious and available in sufficient quantities - the process of rationing - and that it be apportioned adequately and supplied to the troops in a well-prepared form - the process of catering.
Rationing and catering in the Australian army between 1939-1945 was beset by four major problems: the lack of sufficient and proper ration storage facilities; the initial absence of proper cooking and catering skills; the variance between several
5u.K. War Office. Field Service Regulations, Vol. 1, Sections 136 and 140. 100
different Australian and US ration scales; and the manner in which the rations were ordered and drawn from the ration stores.
Ration Storage Facilities
The lack of storage facilities was a serious impediment to the provision of reserve rations. War Cabinet had approved in 1940 the funds for 9,674,000 reserve rations, a ration being the daily consumption of food per man or woman in the army. This reserve stock covered a pehod of just under forty days, not allowing for wastages or under-drawals. The funds included the provision of railway sidings and storage depots. About 73 were planned, including a depot at Adelaide River designed to hold 300,000 rations.^ The stock of reserve rations was envisaged to feed an army first line component of about 250,000 personnel should an emergency call up become necessary.
The Adelaide River storage facility would have been able to sustain about 7,800 personnel or two brigade groups for about forty days. In the light of the then existing defence policy, the Adelaide River Storage facility was a far-sighted move on the part of the military planners who in 1940 saw a Japanese threat from the north to be a distinct possibility.
In the event the provision of planned storage facilities lagged behind the procurement of rations, so much so that only 7,500,000 reserve rations were available, or about 77 per cent of what had initially been proposed.^ This meant that either the reserve rationing period had to be reduced to thirty days or that, on
6A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 715. Lines of Communications Organisations. WC 1826 Agendum 183/40. 30 January 1940. 7|bid. 101
the forty day rationing period, only 187,500 troops could have been called up.
This non-availability of ration storage space could have caused food shortages.
There were other problems associated with the storage of supplies. Initially, for strategic reasons depots were sited inland. This made a considerable haulage effort necessary because most of the processing plants were located near the centres of consumption, that is near the eastern seaboard. Since the war was waged outside Australia supplies had to be hauled back to the ports for shipment overseas.8 The result was a change in policy from dispersed inland storage to concentrated seaboard storage. This in turn created materials handling problems in Sydney and in Brisbane where, additionally, large storage facilities for satisfying civilian demands had to be maintained.^ The demands on military storage increased following the rapid expansion of the Australian forces after 1941. The arrival of U.S. troops put further strains on the storage accommodation resources and the problem was exacerbated by the stores brought back by the AIF divisions from the Middle East.''° A range of new supply items, generally referred to as
'expense supplies',"'required specialised attention and, therefore, additional storage resources. Scarcity of refrigerated and cooled cargo space impeded and hampered the DST policy of shipping slaughtered meat. Instead livestock had to be shipped to certain areas in New Guinea and the islands to the north where field butcheries had been established.•• 2
The provision of supplies was also beset by inadequate materials handling facilities. To quote Fairclough:
8h. Fairclough, Equal to the Task, p.56. 9|bid. I0|bid. i^lbid. p.52 'Expense supplies' comprised a range of chemicals required mainly for hygiene purposes in the islands. 12A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol. 3) File M 147/43. The Army's War Effort 19 July 1943. p.138. 102
Supply stores prior to the war had been constructed with no thought of modern materials handling devices. It was not until the operation of US Army warehouse procedures was observed in Australia that the advantages of modern materials handling aids were realisedJ^
This statement by one of the senior officers of the AASC is an indictment of the state of technological awareness of the senior resource managers at the beginning of the war. The aids to materials handling referred to by Fairclough centred around the application of forklift trucks for the moving and stacking of palletised loads, well-known in advanced warehousing operations."'4 While prior to the War
Australia was not as advanced in these practices as Great Britain or the USA, three patent applications in 1939 show that the use of box pallets for the handling of fruit was known and therefore the application of forklift trucks also.is The advantages of this technology was a saving of floor space and an increase in storage capacity.''^ The lack of forethought on the part of the army caused a further problem. When the AASC eventually received forklift trucks, quite a few of the warehouses then available to the army had no concrete flooring and were thus unsuitable for forklift truck operations.
Finally, storage operations were affected by the complexity of the administrative apparatus.
Procurement... was affected by lack of adequate S.T. liaison with the Department of Supply and Shipping ... Army liaison was carried out by the M.G.O. Branch and although those officers did everything they could
Fairclough, Equal to the Task, p.58. 14L.J. Hoefkens, Materials Handling in Works Stores - ttie Forklift Truck and Pallet System., Iliffe and Sons Ltd., {London)1952. iSAustralian Patent Office, Boxes and Cases for Fruit Handling, Patent Applications 884 (28 February 1939), 1848 (26 April 1939), 2851 (23 June 1939). Assignee Greenwood and Batley, Manufacturers of Forklift Trucks. J Hoefkens, Materials Handling, p.25. An example cited by Hoefkens on pages 59-60 indicates a saving of storage floor space of 12 per cent with a corresponding increase in storage capacity of 40 per cent. Fairclough, Equal to the Task, p.58. 103
to assist they were pressed for time and had no specialised A.A.S.C. knowledge of the commodities concerned.8
Two further factors affected supplies. One was the cumbersome liaison apparatus
between the QMG and the MGO branches which was not conducive to a smooth
operation of the storage facilities for supplies. The second was the vastly
increased range and quantities of new supply items (expense supplies) which
rendered storage operations difficult. This was due to inexperience on the part of
the distributing agencies who were used to much smaller quantities and much
shorter provisioning periods.''^
Rationing and Catering
The Australian army ration scales, at the beginning of the war were based on
average energy requirements determined by British scientists before the First
World War. The army diet was rich in carbohydrates, proteins and fats, providing
about 4,000 calories daily.20 During the inter-war years the Australian army had
paid little attention to advances in the knowledge of nutrition, in particular in the
importance of protective foods such as vegetables and fruit rich in vitamins. As
Mellor put it:
... with some notable exceptions army officers were not greatly concerned with nutrition as a means of maintaining stamina and morale.
I8|bid. p.53. S.T. stands for Stores and Transport. 19D L Beattie Materials Handling and Terminal Arrangement and Operation, Journal of the Institution of Engineers, Australia 24 (1952) pp. 111-114. In order to provide an advisory sen/ice on materials handling problems a Materials Handling Branch was set up in the Department of Munitions. This branch designed a standard 46 inch square pallet. 20D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, In: Australia in the War of 1939-1945., Series 4 (Civil) Vol. v., 1958. p.580. 21 Ibid. 104
Furthermore:
That the service rations were similarly deficient was not due to economic factors so much as to a failure on the part of the administrators to appreciate fully the importance of established [sic] principles of nutrition.22
Advice to the Military Board on matters of nutrition was the responsibility of the
Director of Hygiene, Col C.H. Kellaway 23 who had recognised the need for special expertise in nutrition and who was responsible for the transfer of the nutrition function from the Army Medical Services, Adjutant General's branch, to that of the
QMG. At Kellaway's instigation Captain Sir Stanton Hicks24 was given the responsibility of oversighting the Australian army's catering functions. Hicks found that the diet of the Australian army was low in protective foods, a conclusion which only confirmed the findings of a 1936 survey of the diets of 1,800 Australian families.25
There was a further problem with the actual food preparation. Before and early in the war preparation of food was carried out by members of individual units and formations under the direction of their respective HQs, and personnel designated as cooks learned their craft in an ad-hoc fashion on the job. There was no establishment for cookery personnel. The standard of the food varied widely from unit to unit and all meals were prepared by largely unskilled personnel. The army had recognised this and endeavoured to effect some corrective action when it
22|bjd. 23Col later Brig C.H. Kellaway saw service in World War I and was Director of the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Research ... He was Director of Hygiene AHQ 1927-1931, Director of Pathology AHQ 1940-1942. He left the army and became Director of Research, Wellcome Research Laboratories, London 1944-1952 and died that year 24cedric Stanton Hicks was born in 1892 at Mosgiel, Otago, New Zealand and was educated at Otago University. He gained his M.D. at the University of Adelaide where he was professor of Human Physiology and Pharmacology from 1926 to 1958. He had served with the N.Z. Expeditionary Force during World War I. He served in the 2nd AIF from 1940 to 1946 from lieutenant to colonel. He designed the army 1-man ration pack and became famous for his research into nutrition and nutrition related diseases. He died in 1975.. 25D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p.581. 105
introduced into the newly established AASC school some refresher courses for the few catenng and cooking instructors.26
Due mainly to the prompting of Hicks, catering schools were set up in each command headquarters and at Allied Land Headquarters to train instructors in catering and cooking.27 The establishment for cookery personnel was based on a ratio of one cook to every forty men and translated itself in infantry units to a catering establishment of twenty three ranks headed by a warrant officer. The officers in the catering schools were recruited from the civilian catering trade.
Policy formulation, instructor training and advisory activities became the function of the Australian Army Catering Corps which was established late in 1942.28
By 1943 each L of C catering school trained about 600 personnel to meet the initial demand of 5,000 cooks or a catering capacity for 200,000 all ranks.29 This catering capacity was necessary in order to meet the four major feeding requirements that confronted the Australian army:
(i) The feeding of troops not in the 'front-line' in order to preserve health and build up stamina for resistance to fatigue and disease.
(ii) The feeding of troops in the 'front-line' where transport problems limit the supply and number of commodities to make up the ration, and where cooking appliances limit the preparation and cooking.
(iii)The temporary feeding of Mechanised troops where even cooking will be limited to a minimum.
(iv)The emergency rationing of the isolated soldier (particularly under
26A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1939 Vol. 2) File 88/39. Establishment of a Permanent A.A.S.C. School 17 April 1939. 27AP-613/1 (Dept. of the Army. L of C Correspondence, S.A.) File 117/1/7 Cooking Schools. S.A. L of C Memorandum 3125 of 3 April 1942. 28MP-A 826/1 (Dept. of the Army - Defence Schemes) File IT 23. The Army War Effort 1944 p 203. A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 3) File M 118/42. Establishment of the Australian Army Catering Corps. G.R.O. - G.209/4 of 24 February 1943. 29A-2653 (M/Bd.Proc. 1943 Vol.3) File Ml47/43. The Army War Effort 1943. 19 July 1943 pp. 138-139. 106
jungle conditions)
The first of these problems was solved on the basis of civilian advice and the scientific balancing of the mainland ration scales ( to be discussed in the next section). Hicks persuaded the army to include less bulky vitaminised margarine in the soldiers' diet because the standard butter fat rations deteriorated rapidly in the hot climate prevailing in the northern parts of Australia.3i This innovation contributed materially to the palatability of the ration and to saving of weight.
Special mobile cooking appliances were developed. The Wiles trailer-mounted cooker superseded the First World War Soya and Fowler stoves. The Wiles cooker had the added advantage of using steam as distinct from direct heat which meant that the vitamin content and the palatability of the food was preserved. 32
The climate in the islands required diets rich in carbohydrates and vitamins with a total calorific aggregate of 3,500,33 and this need was met by the development of a special ration pack weighing only about one half of a normal daily ration in areas where supply difficulties demanded a minimum of weight and bulk.^^
These examples highlight the effect of a strategic situation on the feeding of the troops, an effect that had not but should have been foreseen by the military
resource managers before and early in the war. But the resource managers were faced with a difficult situation. Troops had to be fed on the mainland where largely
open warfare conditions prevailed. At the same time an entirely new catering
situation had arisen due to jungle conditions in the north. Here, difficult topography
30|bid p.l38. ^ „ ^^ ^ ^ 31A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 2) File M 84/42. Use of Concentrated Butterfat. 14 September 1942. .. ^ , 32A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1941 Vol. 1) File 105/41. Wiles Mobile Field Cooker. Field Trials carried out by 18 LHR (MG) and 9/23 LHR. Report dated 14 May J 941 33A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1943 Vol.3) File M 147/43. The Army War Effort 1943. 19 July 1943 p.140. 34|bid. p. 139. 107
impeding the distribution of supplies, high humidity, difficult hygiene conditions and the prevalence of tropical diseases made catering for troops almost a medical
problem. All of this required an expertise not available to the regular army
resource managers. In the north the intermittent arrival of refrigerated supplies
from the south was insufficient to maintain a services population which in February
1944 peaked at or about 64,000 and a civilian population of several thousand, not
counting Aborigines. To augment the food supplies shipped from the south, a
number of farms were established, mainly in the Northern Territory and operated
by the farm companies of the AASC. The major farms were at Adelaide River,
Alice Springs and Hayes Creek,35 with smaller acreages at Katherine, Mataranka,
Coomallie and later in New Guinea.36 in November 1944 the OC of one of the
farm companies. Captain N.A.M. Kjar, recommended to army HQ an ambitious and
far reaching scheme of privatising the army farms to increase productivity and
release most of the army personnel now employed in the operation of the farms.
This move would have meant a saving of between 9,000 and 10,000 pounds per
annum. Thirty to thirty five selected people were to run the farms, assisted by
Aboriginal labour paid 1 pound 4 shillings and 6 pence per day at 6 days per
week, with some assistance from the taxpayer for the purchase of fertilisers and
farm machinery.^^ In the event the proposal was not adopted.
The army farms were a valuable source of fresh food, so vitally important to the
well-being of service personnel and thus to their efficiency, but while they were
worked quite efficiently the production planning left something to be desired.
Attempts to grow potatoes frequently failed because no soil tests had been carried
out to see whether the micro-organisms were conducive to the success of that
35H. Fairclough, Equal to the Task, p.84-90. 36AP-613/1 (Dept of Defence S.A. Correspondence) File 117/1/7 Army Farms SM 18939 3 October 1942. See page 109A. ^^ . . . ncr 37A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1944 Vol.5) File M 332/44 Farms N.T. Submission to DST of 21 November 1944. 108
particular crop.38 Despite occasional infestation by vegetable pests, the army farms established later in New Guinea were also quite successful, drawing praise from the public service. The Auditor-General commented:
If the annual expenditure were increased to 40,000 from an estimated 22,830 pounds and present production maintained, the venture would still remain economically sound. In my opinion the farms are satisfactorily fulfilling the purpose for which they were established.39
In 1943/44 the New Guinea army farms produced 1,257,662 pounds of vegetables and 83,535 pounds of fruit^o which translated into 718,668 and 1,336,560 daily
rations respectively. This production rate would have sustained a formation of
20,000 personnel for about 36 days in vegetables and 67 days in fruit.
Why was it possible for the army farms to function so efficiently? The answer can,
in all probability, be found in the fact that the farm operations were conducted at a
low level of control by a single arm (AASC) and were not subject to high level
policy deliberations.
Ration Scales
At the outbreak of the Pacific war the Australian army operated four ration scales which, by 1945, had been reduced to three, mainly to simplify the rationing
procedures and to improve the nutritional value of army rations in the north of
Australia.'^i The three scales were : A - Papua and New Guinea; B - Queensland, including the Torres Strait west of 150 degrees longitude. Northern Territory and
38h. Fairclough, Equal to the Task, p.89. 39|bid. 40|bid. Ration equivalents taken from first table next page. 41A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1944. Vol. 5) File M 307/44. Ration Scales QMG Memorandum 3 January 1945. In order to make comparisons the oz fractions in the source document have been converted to decimals. Above the latitude of 26 degrees tropical conditions were deemed to prevail which required variations in the scale from that thought satisfactory for conditions below a latitude of 26 degrees. 109
Western Australia north of 26 degrees latitude, and C - remainder of the mainland.
The following table indicates the differences between the scales.
Commodities Scale A Scale B Scale C oz/day oz/day oz/day per man per man per man Beverages 0.700 0.512 0.250 Cereals 16.000 14.000 12.50 Condiments 0.538 0.538 0.538 Dairy Produce 5.107 1.750 1.750 Meat 16.927 13.000 13.000 Sugars 5.000 3.000 2.500 Fruit 1.000 2.000 1.000 Vegetables 28.000 25.000 15.190
An inspection of the foregoing table shows relatively small differences between the scales, except for the last two items where the A and B scales were significantly higher in their fruit and vegetables content.
The US forces had one standard SWPA ration scale which was applied when the
US forces were rationed apart from Australian troops. The following table shows the differences in 1943 between US and standard Australian scales.42
42A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 2 Brisbane Discussions. McArthur/Shedden. 25 May - 31 May 1943 A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence) File 31/301/373 (5/3) U.S. Ration Scales. The data for the Australian scale are taken from scales issued by 3 MD (Scale C) in January 1942. They were subsequently reduced. 109A
DARWIN
Queensland
Approx.
Note: There was also a farm at Bamaga near the northern most coast of Cape York Peninsula
ARMY FARMS 1942-1945 110
US/oz Austraian Aust/ Aust/ %Diff. Commodity man lOOmerVweek man man/ + Aust. day —lis QZ_ we^ dayo? -Scale Coffee & Others 3 3 48 0.48 0.07 230.0 Fruits (Dried) 2 10 160 1.60 0.23 -88.5 Jam 1 54 864 8.64 1.23 +23.0 Tea 0.06 21 336 3.36 0.48 +70.0 Bacon 1.15 40 640 6.40 0.91 -39.0 Butter 1.75 76 1216 12.16 1.74 0 Milk (Fresh) 2.5 35 560 70.00 10.00 +300.0 Bread 12 448 7168 71.68 10.24 -14.6 Beef 12 314 5024 50.24 7.18 -40.0 Mutton or Lamb 12 390 6242 62.42 8.92 25.6 Flour (Plain) 2 42 672 6.72 0.96 -52.0 Onions 3 33 528 5.28 0.75 -75.0
The data show that by and large the US ration scales were more generous than
the Australian. The result of this discrepancy was dissatisfaction of American
troops when rationed together with Australians and, by corollary, envy among the
Australians of the higher American living standards.
It is not suggested that Australian food supplies compared with those available to
the Americans forces were at starvation level nor that the Americans troops were
overfed. The differences in ration scales highlights the difficulties that can arise
when forces of different backgrounds and standards of living are rationed from one
(lower scale) source.
Australian service ration scales should not be considered in comparison with those
pertaining to the American forces, but rather in the context of the Australian supply situation in 1942, generally. The Prime Minister stressed in December 1941:
That the year 1942 will impose supreme tests. These range from resistance to invasion to deprivation of more and more amenities, not only the amenities of peace but those enjoyed in time of war... every citizen must place himself... his entire mode of living on a war footing
Australians must be perpetually on guard; ... on guard against 111
spending money, or doing anything that cannot be justified.43
This meant that it was necessary for Australians to go without certain things and
this could only be achieved by rationing. Food rationing was a minor intrusion into
people's lives compared with, say, clothes rationing,44 but since the Prime Minister
exhorted Australian citizens to frugality, it would have been politically unwise to
increase the rations for service men, particularly those stationed on the mainland.
The mainland scale (C Scale) for tea, for instance, was already considerably in
excess of the civilian ration.45 Any increase in the rations for army personnel
would have been judged for what it was - a means of keeping in step with the
American troops - and would have been detrimental to the impact 'John Curtin's
Recipe' was meant to make.46
Drawing of Rations
The Australian rations were not always used to the best advantage. Many of the
cooks had not learned how to prepare special dishes from underdrawn rations,
which were rations that were not consumed because of last minute changes in
strength returns. In non-operational areas there was also a significant incidence
of personnel not eating under army conditions, leading to further underdrawing of
rations.47 The Business Adviser, Army, blamed COs for lack of interest in culinary
matters, inadequate training of cooks in cooking schools, wastage, and high turn- over rate of cooks preventing them from obtaining appropriate experience. All these factors worked against the production of appetising army food. The senior army officers, in particular the LGA, did not understand that it was not a question of
43john Curtin. The Task Ahead. Melbourne Herald 27 December, 1941. 44Michael McKernan, All In, p. 157. 45|bid. Early in 1942, the civilian tea ration was 1.6 oz per person per week compared with 2.8 oz per soldier per week. 46|bid. 47A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol. 3) File M 165/43. Underdrawn rations. Business Adviser to Secretary, 20 July 1943. LGA to Secretary, 11 August 1943. 112
too generous a ration scale or one that was not always appropriate, but rather one
that was not correctly applied which resulted in high food wastage.
The LGA's contention that 'underdrawals' were actually savings applied only to
hard rations. He explained the problem in terms of generalities:
Ration indents [were] submitted three days before consumption [thus] fluctuations in strength returns introduce variations in actual requirements. There [was] a long learning curve for cooks and caterers ... till they were efficient in utilising currently underdrawn items.^s
The LGA rejected the Business Adviser's suggestion for an enquiry into the ration scales. They had been drawn up by the leading experts in the country, he emphasised, and therefore the '[proposed] investigation could not be more expert'.49
The Business Adviser,Col Kemsley, a prominent business man with considerable
military experience, had made suggestions for a better utilisation of rations. The
LGA rejected the recommendations, failing to appreciate the ramifications of the
Business Adviser's suggestions. The Business Adviser had not only touched on
the method of forecasting ration demands, but also on the supervisory
responsibilities of COs, the training of cooks both at school and unit level, and,
finally on the policy function of the Australian Army Catering Corps. The LGA did
not appreciate that it was the interaction of all of these aspects which would
influence the use of resources.
Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (POL)
The conversion of the Australian army from a horsed and horse-drawn organisation to one that relied almost exclusively on motorised vehicles imposed a
48|bid. 49|bid. 113
new supply problem on the QMG branch. The problem had been foreseen before the war and the Government was ready as early as September 1938 to set up within the Department of Defence the Oil Fuel Sub-Committee, later to become the
Commonwealth Oil Board as part of the Department of Supply and Development.
The Board's task was the co-ordination of Commonwealth-wide POL requirements.50 Since the army was the largest user of POL, a special Army Oil
Advisory Committee was established in April 1941 under the chairmanship of the
QMG.51
The Committee was faced with two problems. In the first place, an organisation was required which would provide and maintain appropriate reserve stocks of POL so that the defence of Australia against raids and invasion could be sustained.
Secondly, POL stocks were needed to support off-shore commitments to Australian and American forces. In respect of the former, the army's major concerns were maintenance of reserve stocks, movement of POL stocks in case of hostilities, recnjitment of oil company employees to man the command bulk issue depots and the establishment of advisory committees to assist in technical matters. The army had estimated in October 1940 to have 30,000 vehicles on the road, each consuming four gallons a day or 60 million gallons per annum including a wastage, evaporation and sabotage factor of 37 per cent. The consumption was to be backed up by a reserve of 50 per cent or six months consumption's dispersed as follows:
50J.S. Butlin, \Nar Economy 1939-1942, pp. 280-281. 51A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1941 Vol. 3) File 202/41 Army Oil Advisory Committee 6 August 1941. The Committee included representatives from the major Australian oil companies. ^ ^ 52A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1940 Vol. 2) File 194/40. Petrol requirements. QMG to Secretary Army , 21 October 1940. Designated safe areas were Melbourne, Adelaide and Port Pirie. 114
Location/Storage Million Gallons
Safe areas A^s depots 6 Reserve stocks to be held at Glen Davis 5 Safe area A depots (drum storage) 7 Safe area resellers (drum storage) 5 Safe area A depots (bulk storage) 7
In September 1941 the POL reserve requirements were upgraded by 40 per cent mainly because the scale of vehicles on issue had been increased a few months earlier by 48 per cent to 44,244.54 By the end of 1941 the MT estimates were reassessed to be 52,795, using now 5.5 gallons per day for 180 days. Thus the reserve stock requirements had increased by another 8 million gallons. The storage distribution recommended in 1942 was55:
Location/Storage Distribution
Commonwealth owned tanks in safe areas; 25.6% (24.7%) Oil company owned tanks in safe areas; 11.9% (14.1%) 44 gallon dnjms in safe areas; 14.9% (15.9%) Ocean terminal bulk storage in safe areas; 30.7% (22.7%) (A depots) At Glen Davis shale oil refinery; 3.4 % ( 4.0%) In resellers tanks in safe areas. 13.5% (15.9%)
The above table shows that, compared with 1940, the ocean terminal bulk storage, which would have been the cheapest way to handle reserve stocks, was deemed safer early in 1942. The OMG apparently did not rate the probability of an attack on the eastern seaboard very highly. One of the ironies of the saga of POL reserve stocks was that the considerably reduced civilian consumption - due to strict
53'A' depots were oil company storage facilities connected to a shipping terminal. 54A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 3) File 244/41. Army Petrol Reserves, 14 September 1941. 55A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 3) File 18/42. Petrol and Lubricants Resen/es. QMG to Secretary, M/Bd. of 16 January 1942. The figures in brackets indicate the dispersion of petrol reserve stocks 18 months earlier. 115
rationing - impeded the speedy discharge of petrol and petroleum products from tankers because empty storage space was severely restricted.^s
Offshore POL supplies were satisfied by lend/lease allotments and required close collaboration between Australian and USA authorities. The Allied Supply
Counci|57 sponsored the Allied Petroleum Co-ordinating Committee^s which consisted of representatives from the three Australian services, several
Commonwealth departments and representatives of the American forces. The
Committee took over the functions of the Army Oil Advisory Committee and expanded into functions which now also covered civilian and USA requirements, particularly when it came to purchases from the sterling areas. This development was at first rejected by the C in C who preferred to continue the old arrangement of petrol requirements being largely a matter for the army, suggesting that the other services including the U.S. should perhaps set up their own similar bodies. It
required the very firm attitude of the Prime Minister to prevent this from
happening.59
Australian resources were responsible for the construction of ocean terminals at
Port Moresby, Milne Bay and Darwin. The U.S. army built similar facilities at Lae,
Buna, Finchhafen and Hollandia.^o
In summary the provision of POL physically distributed by the petrol companies of the AASC caused few if any problems except on the rare occasions when the oil
industry did not have sufficient capacity to meet heavy temporary demands for POL
56|bid. 57S.J. Butlin and B.C. Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, p.100. 58A-2653 (M/Bd Proc 1942 Vol. 2) File M 77/42 Allied Petroleum Co-ordinating Committee. Blarney to Curtin 24 July 1942, Curtin to Blarney 18 August 1942. For details of the Allied Supply Council see J.S. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, War Economy 1942- 1945, p. 99-105. 59|bjd. 60A-2653 (M/Bd.Proc. 1944 Vol.1) File M 5/44. Conference at LHQ, 17-18 January, 1944. 116 at short notice. To overcome this contingency, Base Installation Petrol and Oil Depots (BIPODs) were required to carry part of their reserve stocks in 44 gallon and 4 gallon containers.®^ The need for supplying POL in large quantities had been foreseen in peace time and adequate preparations had been made for reserve stocks in safe locations. At the outbreak of the war the supply apparatus was in place and BIPODs had been established on the mainland. The personnel for handling POL were largely drawn from the oil industry. The latter participated actively in the administration of POL provision, a generally smooth and efficient operation.
Horsed and Mechanised Transport
Transport of personnel and stores was one of the logistic responsibilities of the OMG branch.62 Until the outbreak of the war army transport was horse-drawn, although some moves towards its mechanisation had been made as early as 1933 when a Director of Mechanisation had been appointed within the OMG branch.
The planners were at first preoccupied with the development of prototype hardware, such as armoured cars, artillery tractors and general transport vehicles.But within a relatively short time a mechanisation policy was formulated. It reflected the general defence policy in force at that time. In order to resist raids and to a lesser extent invasion directed against the eastern seaboard, the army had to be mechanised to allow for rapid concentration and rapid logistic support to assist in improving the hitting power of the First Line Component.
61H. Fairclough, Equal to the Task, p.104. 62u K War Office. Field Service Regulations Vol. 1, Section 30. 63A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1933 Vol. 1) File 42/33. Appointment of Director of Mechanisation. 3 May 1933. 64|bid. 117
Mechanisation would also assist the Australian army to take its place alongside other Empire forces in accordance with Plan 401.65
Overall, the mechanisation of the Australian army was not a long process. It had its opponents and supporters. The former contended that horses were more easily maintained - they could live off the land. Horses were cheaper to purchase, did not need spare parts or highly skilled drivers and mechanics. They had, compared with motor vehicles, a better cross-country performance. It was admitted that in certain parts of Australia horses were subject to virus diseases.^^
The supporters of mechanisation contended that horses were a non-renewable resource and could not be replaced as easily as vehicles. Horse-drawn transport moved at a speed of 2.5 miles per hour, whereas motorised lorries travelled at ten times that speed.One driver was required for every two to three horses. The army estimated that 133 mechanical vehicles had the same capability of moving loads as 2000 drivers of horse-drawn transport®® based on a load carrying equivalent of one lorry to eight waggons.^^ In 1941 the tonnage moved by one horse per day in NSW was of the order of 0.8. Thus the transport potential of a three-ton general service lorry was roughly equivelant to that of four horses and required one driver compared to twice that number for horse-drawn transport.^o
There was another drawback to horse-drawn transportation. At the beginning of the war and well into 1940 a large number of army waggons and carts were
65A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1933 Vol. 1) File 46/33. Mechanised Warfare. 19 May 1933. Plan 401 was the blue print for raising an Australian expeditionary force. For details see MP-826/1 {Dept. of the Army - Defence Schemes) Files IT 53 - 56. 66MP-742/1 (Dept. of the Army - General Correspondence) File 145/1/132 Virus Diseases in Horse Holdings. File range October 1945-June 1946. 67u.K. War Office. Field Service Regulations, Vol.2 pp. 50, 202. 68A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol. 4) File M 203/43. Horse Auxiliary Transport. 30 July 1943 - 7 March 1944. 69MP-742/1 (Dept. of Army - General Correspondence) File 145/2/38. 20 July 1942 - 24 April 1944. Correspondence CGS/Minister August 1943. 70MP-508/1 (Army HQ - General Correspondence) File 325/743/29 Horse transport return 106458, 25 September 1941. 118
unserviceable. This was the result of an expectation by the senior resource nfianagers that they would not be used to any extent. In NSW alone about 40 per cent of all general service waggons were irreparable and for a further 20 per cent the cost of repairs was deemed excessive.^i Since such a large number of horse- drawn vehicles had been left in a bad state of repair, the senior resource managers probably had not wanted to spend funds on facilities they were not anticipating to use.
On the other hand, scarcity of motor vehicles, petrol and rubber prolonged the life of horse-drawn transportation which was used right through the war around camp sites, POW camps and depots.^2
When the war moved to New Guinea the army experienced the need to raise pack-
horse transport companies to operate horse or donkey teams forward of the jeep
heads, a move in some respects preferable to employing native carriers,and aiming thereby to save the latter. Loads of up to 160 pounds were carried per animal and the commonly applied basis for calculating the size of transport trains was 26 animals for every 1,000 pounds of European rations. Added to this were the rations required for the accompanying personnel.^^ small enough a pay load,
indeed, but certainly an improvement on what could be portered by native carriers who had a load limit of 40 pounds and whose administrative maintenance
presented quite a few difficulties.^"^
71MP-508/1 (Army HQ - General Correspondence) File 325/743/27. 13 December 1938 - 26 July 1941. Horsed Transport. Memo 24 May 1940. 72|bid. Memo to all commands. AM5466 of 15 May 1941. 73MP.742/1 (Dept. of Army - General Correspondence) File 145/1/28 Pack Transport Companies. 7 July 1943. 74H. Fairclough, Equal to the Task, pp.214-215. 119
On the mainland, however, the days of animal transport were numbered despite the efforts of the Minister for Transport (Lawson) to perpetuate it. The Minister for the Army (Forde) advised that:
Auxiliary horsed transport units were initially raised to augment the inadequate motor transport then available. At that time personnel resources were adequate and [motorised] equipment in very short supply.
In June 1943 the demand for additional water transport for service in New Guinea and Australia became urgent. Intake of new personnel into the Army being insufficient to meet this and other demands.
In selecting Horsed Transport Units as a source of such personnel the shortage of manpower was considered to outweigh considerations of petrol and rubber economy.^^
In the light of the transport requirements scarcely foreseen at the beginning of the war, the motor lorry triumphed particularly from 1942 onwards leaving the horse- drawn transport in its rightful place - to satisfy local non-combatant camp and barracks requirements.
The transformation from horse-drawn to motorised transport proceeded smoothly.
The proponents of the former claimed avoidance of petrol and rubber costs as the salient advantage of horse-drawn transport. They would have had a point if the senior resource managers had made sure that carts and wagons were in a good state of repair. There is no evidence that considerations of this nature ever crossed the minds of the supporters of horsed transport.
The conversion to full motorisation with a War Establishment of '133 cars, 860 vans sic] 800 lorries and 156 artillery tractors' rendered the Australian infantry division
75MP-742/1 (Dept. of Army-General Correspondence) File 145/2/38 Horsed transport Correspondence Lawson/Forde August 1943. 120
in respect of transport superior to the Japanese infantry division which, like its German counterpart, relied heavily on horsesJ®
Rail, Road and Maritime Transport Facilities
The problems of transport by rail, road and sea were exacerbated by 'distance [as] a characteristic of Australia as mountains are of Switzerland'^^ and the resulting 'tyranny of distance'^Shas, from a military point of view, only been echoed to the same extent in the campaigns in Russia 1941-1945 and North Africa 1940- 1943.
Distance by itself can be of an advantage to the defender. Millar states :
An enemy which made a landing in Western Australia or... [elsewhere; on the north coast... would have [had] an immediate problem of supply on long lines of communications. [But]... the area of Australia that an infantry man would call vital ground which at all costs must be denied to an enemy is ... comparatively small. For the rest it is ... a matter... of concentrating effort so as to move a substantial and locally superior force quickly to any point of danger. The ability to strike quickly depends on mobility - good communication and transport of all kinds.'^^
This need for strategic and tactical mobility, strained Australia's transport resources. The difficulties had been anticipated to some extent by the military planners who in 1934 defined the Newcastle/Sydney and Melbourne areas as
Australia's vital ground.so But by 1941 or 1942 they had to reconcile the needs imposed by the invasion and raids contingencies with those posed by the threat to
76A.T. ROSS, Awaking the Apocalypse - Technology, Industry and War in Australia, Draft, MS, 1990..., Chapter 12, p.8. 77Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance Sun Books (Melbourne), 1965, p.viii. 78|bjd. Title page. 79T.B. Millar, Australia's Defence, Melbourne University Press. 2nd Edition, 1969, p.35. 80A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 909. Standardisation of Railway Gauges, 24 December 1934. 121
Australia's northern shore areas. The repeated bombing of Darwin and Port
Moresby confirmed the view that hostilities might have to be expected in the north.
While a large scale invasion of Australia and New Zealand was considered unlikely, a Japanese lodgement in the north aimed at protecting the southern extremity of the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was thought possible, with a strong likelihood of heavy raids on other areas of Australia. The
Australian Prime Minister Curtin subscribed to this view.®^
In such a scenario there was relatively little need to improve the means of concentrating forces and supplies towards the eastern, and to a lesser extent western, vital grounds. The forces and supplies were already there. An improvement in the transport system would have been concerned mainly with railways, either through the standardisation of three different gauge systems or, failing this, by an improvement in transshipping operations where breaks-of-gauge occurred. However, there was a dire need to improve the means of concentrating forces and supplies for holding the northern vital grounds and that entailed improvements in both the combined rail and road systems and in maritime operations.
Railway Transport
At the outbreak of war in 1939 three problems manifested themselves; the control and management of railway transport; the maintenance of rolling stock and railway tracks; and the difficulties caused by a number of breaks-of-gauge not only between but also within states. (See map page 123A).
81 John Robertson, Australia at War 1939-1945, William Heinemann (Melbourne) 1981, p.103. 122
The Australian army had been concerned with railway transport since about 1910
when, subsequent to recommendations by General Kitchener, a War Railway
Council was formed chaired by the QMG 82 in 1938 the army sought to take over
the management of railway transport for military purposes 83 Twelve months later
the QMG pursued this further, by trying to persuade the Defence Council that the
QMG branch through its Movements Section had the apparatus in place to co-
ordinate rail movements on behalf of all the three services. The army would have
been a major user and :
Instead therefore of the Railway Authorities providing accommodation at their respective administrations for the three branches of the service, one central office should be established at each major terminal. This would function primarily as a clearing house for all service demands, would facilitate central co-ordination and would give the railways one representative authority to refer to if conflicting issues arose.®^
This was not just another example of inter-service power politics but a reasonable
suggestion for simplifying and rationalising procedures which could create
confusion if every service had its own movement agency with the railway
authorities having to decide the priorities.
When the transport facilities were faced with the task of moving U.S. forces, War
Cabinet set up a Department of Transport.®^ It had full powers to control rail and
road transport throughout Australia except in the case of an emergency (hostilities on the mainland) when full control would be vested in the army.®®
82S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, p.398. 83|bjd. S'^A-Sie/I (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence). File 36/301/3. QMG to Secretary, Defence Council 24 August, 1938. Railway Transport Organisation, Defence Committee Minute 66/1939. 85A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol.1) File 6/42. Control of Rail and Road Transportation. 14 January, 1942. N.S. Regulation 278 and 279. ®®lbid. LHQ Memorandum 114187 of 29 September 1942. 123
It was not only the control and co-ordination of rail transport services that caused concern but also the repair of railway facilities including the repair of railway tracks. Here, co-ordination was achieved through the War Railway Committee with its joint Commonwealth/State representations, with the Department of Defence as the final arbiter.
Co-ordination of railway transport was one of the logistic problems for which senior officers were adequately prepared. The Movement Control sections had conducted exercises in transport of troops during the inter-war years and the senior officers had gained plenty of experience in moving troops by railway during the First World War. While the army had no influence on the technical problems of mechanical maintenance which was the province of the state railway authorities, it was vitally affected by the problems brought about by lack of railway gauge standardisation and the consequent inefficient transshipping operation which occurred where there was a break of the railway gauge. In the first instance, the break-of-gauge lowered track capacity quite appreciably. The second aspect of the problem was cargo handling at the break-of-gauge location.
In 1935 the Department of Defence had authorised a study which examined the time taken to move one infantry division from Fremantle to Sydney. In a non- uniform gauge system it would have taken 32 days and six hours to complete the task. Under conditions of uniform railway tracks the division would have been moved in ten days. The corresponding times for moving a division from Melbourne to Sydney would have been 110.5 and 72 hours respectively.^^
Howes points out the strategic seriousness of this situation :
87A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 909. Standardisation of Railway Gauges. Council of Defence Statement 11 January 1935. DARWIN
BRISBANE >
SYDNEY CANBERRA GAUGES
HMLWhY SYSTEl^jS @F ^UST^/^LO^ s.j. 124
... large forces had to be held in Western Australia [during the war] on account of the delay ... in getting them there in the event of an attack.ss
One of the consequences of this situation would have been the army's inability to
utilise the troops stationed in Western Australia in defeating a Japanese attack
south from Port Moresby.s^
In 1941 the CGS recommended to War Cabinet that a 4' 8.5' track be laid
alongside the narrower Broken Hill - Port Pirie track which would have lifted the
capacity of the track from two trains per day to six. In military terms, this increased
track capacity would have reduced the movement of a brigade group from East to
West by 13.5 days. The project was not approved because it would have taken
close to two years to complete and would have diverted scarce steel resources
more urgently needed by the munition programmes.^®
As operational war activities moved north, standardisation proposals for eastern
and south eastern railways took a back seat, but the standardisation proposals for
north Australia were kept alive. For instance, in 1942 a joint Australia/USA project envisaged increasing axle load capacity on the 146 miles stretch from Darwin to
Pine Creek from 8 to 12 tons or an equivalent of 500 tons freight per day. The
project did not proceed because BHP was unable to deliver the rails under 12
months.Another proposal sought to upgrade the general train capacity in northern NSW from 8 to 16 trains per day.92
8®A.R. Howes, Transport-the Defence Dilemma. In: J.O. Langtry, and others (ed's), A Vulnerable Country ANU Press (Canberra),1986 p.325. 89|bid. 90A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 5) File M 123/41. Broken Hill/Port Pirie Railway, 8 January 1942. 9^-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 2) File M 30/42 Increase in Railway capacity. WC Minute 2034 of 14 March 1942. Agendum 158/42. 92A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 2) File M 83/42. Railway Track Capability. WC Minute 23911 of 21 September 1942. Agendum 360/42. 125
The Joint Planning Committee, the working arm of the Defence Committee, was
engaged in examining two complementary proposals - one was linking Bourke
with Townsville via Hughenden and the other Darwin with Hughenden. The
Committee ran into difficulty with the Queensland Government which wanted a
Brisbane- Townsville connection and with the South Australian Government which
wanted to link Alice Springs with Birdum.93
Little thought had been given to the difficulties under which the North Australian
Railways laboured.^^ Because the system was not connected with any other
Australian railway system, the question of standardisation and its corollary, break-
of-gauge did not arise. The operation of the system was restricted by lack of
locomotive and rolling stock, so that initially, (February 1942) the system could only
cope with two or at most three trains daily each way transporting at most 100 tons
of military stores. At the peak of the traffic in 1944 when the availability of rolling
stock had been considerably improved, the capacity of the system had only
doubled, yet the operating expenses had increased nine fold and the staff had
escalated by 450 per cent. The army was in overall control^^ but in the light of the
foregoing data the army resource managers did not do particularly well in running
this railway.
The railway standardisation debate discussed in considerable detail by Butlin and
Schedvin accords relatively little attention to the break-of-gauge problem.
Neither the Defence Council nor the Department of Defence had given any
thought to the problems inherent in the transshipping operations at break-of-gauge
93A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1945 Vol. 6) File M 186/45 Standardisation of Australian Railway Gauges. Part II Recommendation 42. 6 September 1945 - 27 February 1946. 94AWM - S 54 (Training) File 625/7/12 Short History of the North Australian Railway ... Report by L. Grant (undated). 95A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 1) File 6/42 Control of Rail and Road Transportation. 14 January 1942. M.S. Regulation 278 and 279. 96J.S. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, pp. 249-254. 126
locations.97 The problem was not so much that additional manpower was required to unload one train and reload the stores onto the next one. This work was handled by labour companies consisting of personnel who for statutory reasons could not be enlisted in the combatant forces. Rather, it was the differing track capacities on either side of the break-of-gauge and the inefficiencies introduced thereby. For instance, at the break-of-gauge localities between Melbourne and
Sydney the train capacity on the Victorian side was sixteen trains per day and only eight in NSW. Even within each state the daily train capabilities differed. There were 40 trains daily between Melbourne and Seymour and between Cootamundra and Sydney. In other words, the critical path caused 80 per cent of the optimum train capacity to be wasted. The break-of-gauge problem might not have arisen if the military planners had supported the development of mechanical contrivances designed in the early twenties to adapt railway carriage bogeys to varying track gauges.
Right through the period from 1934 to almost the end of the war the services, if not directly opposed to any railway standardisation project, were nevertheless not very supportive. The report of a 1943 sub-committee of the Defence Committee charged with the examination of a submission by the Commissioner of the
Commonwealth Railways for a standardisation of the Broken Hill - Port Pirie railway concluded, inter alia, that :
6. Operational Aspects
(i) No development which can be foreseen is likely to occur in the war with Japan that would justify the project
(ii) Operationally, improvement of the Queensland and Northern Territory railways must have first priority
97A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 909. Standardisation of Railway Gauges. Dept. of Defence Statement 24 December 1934. SSAustralia - Patents Department. Break-of-Gauge Device, by Saunders Engineering Company. Pat.Appl. 10711/23. 127
7. National and Econnmin nonsideratinn.g
There appear ... to be no ... reasons why [earlier conclusions]... should be varied.^^
A considerable number of arguments were advanced against the proposal. It was
too costly in terms of manpower. It was likely to divert resources from projects that
in the eyes of the services had a higher priority. Standardisation would bring no
benefits to Western Australia, it would not assist in the movement of raw materials
(iron ore) and the anticipated increase in the volume of traffic could only be
accommodated at the expense of defence requirements.""oo
The army's attitude was justified in the circumstance then prevailing. A
standardised railway system would not have, initially, contributed to the mainland
defence potential. The eastern seaboard cover forces were concentrated in the
areas where most of the material resources were located and large scale
movement from one covering force to the next would still have been possible,
albeit at a relatively slow rate.
Towards the end of the war the army changed its attitude towards standardisation
proposals. The logistic lessons of the Pacific war were finally learnt: there must be
a facility to shift personnel and supplies from their point of origin - the eastern
seaboard - to their point of deployment and consumption, either in the north or in the northwest of the continent.
99A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence - Classified Correspondence) File 36/301/147. Proposal for the Construction of a 4' 8.5" Gauge ... 24 August 1943. I00|bid. 128
Road and Maritime Transport
Road transportation assumed significance after Japan's entry into the war in
December 1941. It was not of importance along the eastern seaboard, except in case of evacuation of the civilian population,101 but was a major consideration on the country's ability to support northern areas both militarily and in respect of the civilian component residing there. Not counting transport by air, then in its infancy,
Australia had only two options, maritime transport and combined rail/road overland communication. The former was subject to hostile interference and was hampered by lack of shipping space and inefficient stevedoring practices. The latter required the building of an all-weather road from Tennant Creek to Birdum, seen in 1939 as quite a difficult undertaking:
There has been n^uch talk of making a through all-weather road from Alice Springs to Birdum ... but the task is a large one and far beyond what its sponsors realise.
Despite the difficulties, the overland rail/road transport system was the only viable solution to the problem of sustaining the northern areas, provided the existing bush track along the telegraph line could be converted into an all-weather road.
The construction of this road was authorised in August 1940.''03
The proposed road covered a distance of about 315 miles and the work was carried out in sections by the road building instrumentalities of South Australia,
New South Wales and Queensland. The army was responsible for maintaining the road gangs and for this purpose created the Darwin Overland Maintenance
Force (DOMF) under the administrative and command umbrella of the AASC.
101 S.J. Butlin and B.C. Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, p. 248. 102MP.729/6 (Dept. of the Army - Classified General Correspondence) File 24/401/24. Report by Lt Col H.C.H. Robertson to Secretary, Military Board, 17 June 1939. 103A-5954(Shedden Papers) Box 723. WC Minute 452 of 16 August 1940. 129
The road had to be completed within three months from the day WC authorised its construction and was to be capable of carrying three-ton fully loaded lorries. The first supply convoy went through before the end of 1940 and the first troop transport in May 1941.104
It was not only the army which was aware of the need for safe communications between the south and the north of Australia. Some of the citizens of Darwin realised early in December 1941 that supply lines to Darwin were no longer secure.
Darwin would be bombed ... If the sea-lines were cut by the Japanese Navy the town would not survive for more than two weeks. At that time there was no all weather road [sic] to the south and then as now the rail termini were one thousand miles away at Alice Springs and Mount Isa ...105
As if to back up these predictions Lockwood points out that towards the end of
January 1942 food reserves at Darwin were scarce. Low petrol stocks impeded defence building programmes and instances of hoarding were not uncommon.106
Lockwood blames the army for POL shortages. Quite a few of the army storage depots had been located forward of troop dispositions necessitating additional transport to get the rations to the point of consumption, quite apart from the tactical error of locating administrative activities forward of the fighting components."'07
The need for an organisation such as DOMF had not been foreseen by the army either before or at the beginning of the war when the politicians and the senior military - at least officially - did not rate the chances of hostilities in the north of
104c. Sutcliffe. Notes [on the Darwin Overland Maintenance Force] MS 9 May 1985, p.1. lospouglas Lockwood, Australia's Pearl Harbour, Darwin 1942. Rigby Ltd. (Adelaide), 1966 p.15. I06|bid. pp 18,19. I07|bid. p. 150. 130
Australia very highly. It was purely an ad hoc organisation, at first not even responsible to the DST. Most officers had been recruited from civilian transport undertakings. For instance, the first CO had been the manager of the Yellow Cabs taxi company in Adelaide.los
DOMF commenced operations on 8 September 1940, with 150 Chevrolet 3-ton trucks and 800 all ranks personnel organised into three transport companies with
HQ at Alice Springs. It grew to a peak in July 1943, with 3,000 vehicles and 8,000 personnel. By that time the daily tonnage transported had increased from 21 to
564. Seventy five per cent of the total tonnage was delivered at Larrimah as through tonnage for transport beyond the rail head. The total number of troops exclusive of convoy personnel transported in this manner had reached 177,000 by
September 1944.1
The most telling statistic in this context is the increase of tons/mile road capacity from 0.73 in December 1942 to 4.14 in September 1944^10 when the successor of DOMF was disbanded and its function taken over by the standard AASC organisation.I The high tons/mile capacity was achieved after the road had been sealed, a process which was seen as necessary as far back as early in 1941 when an experimental RAAF convoy reported the gravel road still unreliable between November and April."'
It is arguable that the army should have foreseen the need for sealing the Stuart
Highway, that is the Alice Springs - Larrimah and the Barkley Highway, Mt. Isa -
108c. Suttcliffe. Notes, p.5. I09|bid. p.7. llO|bid. iil|bid. p.4. 112A.2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 2) File 91/41. Roadworks 30 April 1941. Sunday News Pictorial 24 April 1941. WO Minutes 656 (10 Decenriber 1940), 803, (14 February 1941), 841 (27 February 1941). 131
Tennant Creek sections. The army should also have foreseen the need for strict driver discipline which was absent under the initial almost non-military management of DOMF and which allowed the first gravel pavement to be corrugated and transformed into 'bulldust' in a very short time.113 But the army was not responsible for supervising the road construction. The technical project manager was the Victorian Country Roads Board and the labour was supplied by the Allied Works Council.j^e Victorian Country Roads Board had the experience in sealing of roads but initially lacked the appropriate equipment which did not become available till lend/lease operations became effective in 1942.''15
The army had contracted out the sealing of the Larrimah-Darwin section of the Stuart Highway. In order to speed up the work it agreed to narrow the width of the road by one third.while it was in effect the technical project authority for the sealing project, the army could not be held responsible for a lack in road- building expertise on the part of the contractor. Nor could it do anything about the provision of specialised road-building plant.Thus the management of the project was not very efficient.
How important were the Stuart Highway and its feeder roads to the provision of strategic mobility?^ According to Powell,not very, even after it had been
^David Lee Bernstein. Those Years at the Alice. The Story of the Stuart Highway MS 1972. pp.44-48. The gravel used for paving the road was very soft, forming corrugations under the heavy and continuous traffic with its full loads distributed over four wheels only rather than over eight which was the norm with very large road trains. The supply of water necessary to bed down the pavements was meagre. Uneven speeds contributed to the deterioration of the road. To relieve the monotony drivers would let the truck in front get ahead and then catch up with high speed. Il4|bid. p.48-50. Il5|bid. p.51-58. 116A.2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1944 Vol. 4) File M 299/44. Sealing of Larrimah - Darwin Section, 1 September 1944 - 9 February 1945.
••iSThe means of moving personnel and goods to localities where such resources have a decisive effect on the outcome of war-like operations. ll9Alan Powell. The Shadows Edge, p.49. 132
upgraded. Yet early in 1942 the then still unsealed highway brought up sorely needed reinforcements for the 23rd Brigade. And at its peak in mid-1943 the road system carried, monthly, over 13,000 tons via Alice Springs and 4,000 through Mt.
Isa. This accounted for 41 per cent of the supplies shipped to Darwin. The remaining 59 per cent had to face the risks of marine transport. McCarthy stressed the hazardous nature of supplying the north by sea.^^o Even when possible, maritime supply was hampered by inefficient docks operations. At the same time, marine transport to New Guinea was of the order of 50,000 tons per month.•'21
However, Powell has a point. From mid-1943 onwards supplies transported to the
Northern Territory by road decreased by 18 per cent.'i^s in addition, the sea routes had become safer as the war moved further away from Australia. Ironically, as the road facilities improved the need for transporting supplies by road decreased.
The maritime alternative to road transport of supplies, stores, munitions, etc was also the responsibility of the QMG branch and concerned the army mainly in the context of stevedoring operations."'23 The work was carried out by the Docks
Operating Companies as a normal RAE function in the context of an expeditionary force. What was not foreseen, and for which no planning had been undertaken either before or early in the war, was the need to augment the civilian stevedoring resources in Australia with military labour. This need arose from two causes. The first was industrial. The two unions mainly concerned were the North Australian
l20Dudley McCarthy. South-West Pacific Area - First Year In : Australia in the War 1939 - 1945. AWM (Canberra) Series 1 (Army), Vol. v., 1959, p.72. 121A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.5) File M 226/43. Changes in the WEs. Letter Blarney to Forde 29 January 1943. 122MP 826/1 (Dept. of Defence - Defence Schemes) File IT 23. The Army War Effort, 29 February, 1944. p.142. 123U.K. War Office. Field Service Regulations, Vol. 1, Section 78. 133
Workers Union (N.A.W.U) and the Waterside Workers Federation of Australia. Powell saw the difficulty with the unions arising from a union view of what the war was all about which differed from that of the army and the administration generally.
The ... army saw it as a national emergency where all else should be subordinated to the struggle for victory; the N.A.W.U. officials saw it as an opportunity to advance the industnal aims of the union movement."'24
As a result, several disputes had broken out at Darwin even before Japan entered the war, necessitating the employment of service personnel in a stevedoring role including the handling of railway cargo.
Industrial disputes on the eastern seaboard led to the establishment of Docks Control Detachments working within the framework of a Directorate of Docks which was a responsibility of the Deputy Quartermaster General (Movements).jhe Directorate was mainly concerned with the technical aspects of docks operation and with the training of officers and NCOs^^z rather than with the actual employment of docks labour, the province of the Stevedoring Commission, a civilian organisation established in April 1942. The army had foreseen as early as mid-1941 the eventual need of systematic training for this type of operation as the result of the increased inflow of goods, mainly from the USA.128
The second cause for the need of military stevedoring labour was the overcrowding of the major civilian ports due to the arrival of a number of 'refugee' ships diverted to Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne from South East Asia after the l24Alan Powell, The Shadows Edge, p.47. 125|bid. p.48-49. 126A.826/1 (Dept. of Defence - Defence Schemes) File IT 23. The Army War Effort, 29 February 1944, pp.157-160. 127A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1942 Vol. 3)File M 113/42 Docks Sen/ice Organisation. 15 October 1942. 128A-1194 (Dept. of Defence Library) Accession no. 27883/11.20. Instruction for Dock Working in War. 1941. 134 entry of Japan into the war. The supply of civilian waterside labour proved quite inadequate, mainly due to its organisation which was based on casual employment arrangements between employers and the members of the Waterside Workers Federation of Australia. The members could choose which cargoes they would handle and which not. Because of the inefficiency of Australian waterfront operations the American forces used their own troops to unload the ships carrying their supplies and stores. It encouraged the Australian army to do the same.
The American forces complained bitterly about the inefficiency of Australian waterside operations. A high level conference in July 1942, chaired by the Australian LGA and attended by the heads of all GS branches, the Australian Stevedoring Commission and the general officers of the American troops, focussed on a number of contentious issues which encapsulated the problems on the Australian waterfront. The report on the conference summarised the salient points:
i. Undue emphasis had been placed on rain as a cause for ceasing work. In May 1942 only 2.25 per cent of man hours were lost due to rain. ii Slow turn-around of ships was due mainly to lack of prior knowledge of the arrival of a ship thus there was often little time to assemble the appropriate unloading equipment. iii Australian waterside workers were generally unwilling to work around the clock, seven days a week. iv Frustration was voiced about the army's tardiness to finalise WEs for dock labour detachments. As a result personnel was drawn from training battalions which were not the best source of dock labour.
The Americans were very bitter about extensive pilfering."129
129A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 3) File M 86/42. Dock Labour Conference at LHQ 15 July 1942. 135
The conclusions of this conference led to the introduction of union-independent military labour on the Australian waterfront.
The operation of the military stevedoring labour was beneficial to the defence of
Australia. It supported wharf operations at Darwin when that port was subject to hostile actions. It resulted in quicker turn around of ships with service cargoes and assisted in the rapid wharf clearance of military stores, enabling quick release of vulnerable shipping from target areas. In some of the Queensland ports such as
Cairns and Townsville military docks labour virtually assured efficient stevedoring operations. On the negative side the lack of a well organised civilian stevedoring industry meant that the equivalent of about two battalions were unavailable for the defence of the mainland.
The army operation was probably superior to an obsolete and inefficient civilian organisation. The senior army resource managers were familiar with docks operations both in the First World War and during 1940 and 1941 in the Middle
East, and possessed the expertise to handle such an essential operation smoothly and expeditiously.
Drill Hails and Campsites
In a country with no standing army the training and administrative infrastructure of the military force is based on drill halls and usually temporary camp sites. Their existence is a major factor in the effectiveness and efficiency of such a force. In
Australia, the acquisition, construction and maintenance of drill halls and campsites was the responsibility of the QMG branch.
130U.K. War Office, Field Service Regulations Vol. 1, , p.61. 136
The Australian rearmament programme of 1938 had increased the AMF from
35,000 in September to 43,000 by the end of that year and a further increase to
70,000 took place by March 1939J31 in addition, the re-introduction of universal service had become a definite possibility. The military planners had made provisions in the estimates for these contingencies^by planning additional accommodation facilities.
However, the implementation of the expansion programme was hampered by the same tardiness that was characteristic of other military preparations for war. The construction of new drill halls was not authorised until early 1939. The drill
halls were usually located on land already owned by the Commonwealth. This was not the case with most of the camp sites, many of which had to be acquired for
military purposes under Section 69 of the Defence Act 1903-1939. The policy
was to purchase, if needs be compulsorily, sites on which hutted facilities were to
be erected. The QMG had a special delegation for acquiring small parcels of land
adjacent to existing sites.
The camps usually consisted of a mixture of huts and tents including marquees. A
regimental group required about 25 huts and between 100 and 125 tents .">36
131 Gavin Long, To Benghazi \n: Australia in the War 1939-1945, pp.22-30. 132A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1938 Vol. 1) File WN/1. Memo Secretary to Secretary, Dept. of Defence, 11 October 1938 Attachment A. 133A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1939 Vols. 1 & 2) Files 4/39. Chatswood, 11 January 1939: 16/39 Radcliffe, 27 January 1939: 33/39 Taralgon, 8 February 1938: 125/39 FranLon 22 June 1939: 85/39 Leeton, 17 August 1939: 56/39 Balmoor. 20 April 1 939 134A.2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1940 Vol. 1) Files 27 & 28/40 Greta 27 If/O: ^fi/40 Mt Martha 1 February 1940: 2/40 Redbank, 13 September 1940: 63/40 PuckapunyaM9 Februar? 193^D: 69/40 South Head 29 Februa., 1940: (M/Bd. Proc. 1940 Vol 2) File 284/40 Tartura and Rushmeth, 1 October 1940. 135a 2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1940 Vol. 1) File 64/40. Land Acquisiton 19 February 1940. 136A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 3) File 249/41 Camp Accommodation for future militia training M/Bd. Memorandum 56902 of 6 August 1941 Schedule A. 137
Most of the larger sites were not acquired till 1941. They included the sites at
Dubbo, Cowra, and Tamworth in New South Wales and Mitcham in South
Australia. The latter was for a 150 - bed military hospital.It was not always easy for the army to find suitable sites. In anticipation of a Pacific war an operational and administrative headquarters had to be found in July 1941 for the Newcastle covering force. Such a site had to be out of hostile target range, as close as possible to coastal defence and naval headquarters and adjacent, if possible, to national emergency services, usually based in the local town hall. It was necessary also that the site could be readily connected to existing communication facilities. The site which eventually met these requirements was located at
Lambton.''38
When universal training was re-introduced early in 1941 the camp accommodation was further stretched beyond the twenty-five or so new camp sites established under the non-compulsory system of call-up. This meant that with units training for
90 days and 90 days stood down, half of the militia formations were under canvass at any one time, not counting cadre staffs and AIF formations under training all the time. Camp accommodation was still further strained when the AIF divisions began returning home, and accommodation had to be found for American forces.
The Government was uneasy about the possible wastage of camp accommodation. The Minister noted:^^^
137A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 1) Files 3/41 Dubbo 15 January 1941: 4/41 Cowra 15 January 1941: 15/41 Mitchum 24 January 1941: 20/41 Tamworth, 29 January 1941. (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 1) File 29/42 New Rifle Range for Cowra Camp, 9 February 1942. 138A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 3) File 197/41. Newcastle Covering Force 30 July 1941. 139A 2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1941 Vol. 3) File 249/41. Camp accommodation and future training facility. M/Bd Memorandum 56902 of August 1941, quoting M/Bd Memorandum 47352 of 19 July 1940 and AHQ Op.lnstr. 12 February 1941. 138
I understood that under the system of training proposed ...by the Military Board ... the total camp accommodation eventually to be provided would largely be unoccupied for a considerable part of the year, the extent of the occupation being ...
Furthermore:
For 6 months of the year 25% occupied For 3 months of the year 75% For 3 months of the year fully
I assume that the Military Board has satisfied itself that no alternative method is available under which the policy regarding Militia Training ... can be satisfactorily implemented; and that the expenditure of approximately 1,500,000 pounds is justified to provide further camp accommodation additional to the heavy expenditure ... for the provision of camp accommodation throughout Australia.
At an average cost of 12,000 to 15,000 pounds per camp quite a sizeable sum of capital was tied up nationally, and less than full occupation most if not all of the time constituted wastage. But intermittent occupation of camp sites was a feature of the system then in existence. On the credit side, the camp expansion programme would ensure that adequate accommodation would be available at all times.
It was inevitable that by 1943 surplus camp accommodation would exist as more and more troops moved to the islands in the north of Australia.
Component Camp Caoadtv Camp Occupancv 1 SNovember 1942
AMF,Field, Force 357,506 156,188 44% AMF, Coastal Defence 45,734 26,052 57% TOTAL 403,240 182,240 45% USAFIA 47,000 26,324 56% TOTAL 450,000 208,564 46% Schools 31,835 18,112 57%
I40|bid. Memo Minister to Secretary, Army, 19 September 1941. 141A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 2) File M 59/42. Camp Accommodation for USAFIA 11 July 1942-6 September 1943. WC Minute 3027 Agendum 477/1942. 139
An inspection of the table above shows that on 15 November 1942 about 50 per cent of Australia's gross camp capacity was not utilised. In New South Wales twelve, in Queensland four, in Victoria thirteen campsites were vacant, and in
Tasmania. Not included in the table were camp facilities only temporarily vacant.
Late in 1943 the army began returning some of the miscellaneous sites such as race courses and show grounds to their owners.
However, the surplus in camp accommodation was not uniform throughout
Australia. For instance, additional funds had to be authorised late in 1942 to accommodate returning AIF troops at Sandy Creek near Adelaide.''
With hindsight it is easy to criticise the senior army resource managers for providing too much camp accommodation and, at times, for not anticipating some requirements. But the provision of camps had to be adequate if it was to contribute positively to the morale and thus the efficiency of the Australian forces.
Had the camp accommodation not been adequate in 1941 and 1942, the training of the home forces would have been severely hampered. It would have taken the
American forces longer to become effective and the returning AIF divisions would not have been able to accustom themselves as quickly as they did to the changed conditions of warfare. Summary
Little criticism can be sustained against the QMG branch. The pre-war education and experience generally fitted the senior officers to be effective managers. The exceptions were their failure to keep abreast of modern developments such as in materials handling technology and nutrition. Where this experience was lacking
142|bid. 143A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 3) File M 112/42. Emergency Camp Accommodation WC Minute 2417 Agendum 362/42. 5 October 1942. 140
the army was able to recruit sufficient civilian expertise with or without military
experience to discharge the functions of the QMG branch expeditiously and
effectively. 141
CHAPTER 7
THE LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MASTER GENERAL OF ORDNANCE BRANCH THE TECHNOLOGY DIVISIONS
Introduction
The logistic organisation in Australia during the second World War was extensive. General Blarney said:
Behind the fighting troops an even larger army will have to be employed continuously serving and supplying the actual fighting menJ
All four GS branches were concerned with logistics but none more so than the
MGO branch. This branch was responsible for the provision of every item other
than the supplies required to sustain the combat soldier in the field.2
The provision of ordnance, in particular of munitionsis essential to the pursuit of
war. If the combat soldier has no ordnance he is unable to fight. If he lacks
'supplies' the effect except in the case of POL is not so immediate.
"•T.A. Blarney, quoted in The Maintenance Division of the MGO Branch. MGO Equipment Memorandum no.14,p.2. ^Supplies were generally food items purchased by contract procedures and certain services, such as camp accommodation. Munitions ' comprised two categories of stores. One was called Ordnance Stores and included personal and unit equipment (armament, small arms, ammunition, explosives, flame throwers, engineer and signal stores, tanks, armoured cars, tractors, carriers, mechanical transport vehicles, clothing and necessities, barracks and camp equipment. The other category was referred to as Engineer Stores and included materials and plant other than unit equipment required for engineer work of all kinds whether carried out by engineers or other arms. A-1194 (Dept. of Defence Library) Accession no. 27125/20.01 The Administration of the MGO Branch of the Staff ... and of MGO Services Vol. 1, 1944 Part I. Definition 50. 142
Ordnance generally was the product of industrial and manufacturing processes based on a set of usually very strict specifications, supplied in the first instance by the British Ordnance Board, but was also the product of Australian designs and inventions. The quality of ordnance is a key aspect in the fighting of a war.
Inferiority of ordnance compared with that available to the enemy will disadvantage an army. The initial inferiority of British anti-tank weapons in the Second World
War is a case in point.
The procurement of munitions was based on importation or on local manufacture.
The army's contribution to the procurement processes, particularly of locally manufactured items, was considerable. Through the MGO branch the army was responsible for preparing the functional specifications for munition items based on the interpretation of user requirements. This was the function of the Equipment
Division. The Design Division prepared the design specifications, oversighted research and development activities and saw to the experimental testing of prototypes. The Inspection Division ensured compliance with approved specifications once munition items were in production. Finally the Maintenance
Division of the MGO branch, to be discussed in Chapter 8, was responsible for
'provision, receipt, storage, issue, recovery and repair
Australia had to depend largely on her own resources for warlike stores. She had been fortunate in that successive governments had created the industrial infrastructure for implementing a policy of self-containment in the availability of munitions and other equipment. The official view was perhaps best expressed in a 1935 letter from the then acting Prime Minister to the High Commissioner in
London:
.. An extension of the activities of the Commonwealth Ammunition
4|bid. Appendix Z. 143
Factory at Maribyrnong to provide for the manufacture of aeroplanes has been undertaken at the direction of the Defence Department. This is in accordance with the proposal of the Federal Government to make Australia independent as far as possible of supplies of war material from overseas.5
These developments have been the subject of an extensive study by A.T. Ross who has shown that as early as 1919 and 1920 the senior Australian army officers were convinced of the need for self-containment in munitions supply. He says :
The common view ... was that Australia might have to survive a period of isolation from British naval support and that a large land force was essential to maintain resistance against... the Japanese ... The Senior Officers ... concluded that self-containment of munitions supply was an essential feature of their strategic view.®
The Australian army maintained this stance right through the inter-war years and successive governments tacitly supported the development of laboratories and manufacturing facilities for certain munitions.
There is an inconsistency between this policy and the the official 'Blue Water Strategy' which placed the emphasis of defence on almost total reliance on the protective shield of the Royal Navy based on Singapore.^ In this scenario the Australian army's contribution was the defence of the continent against raids. As late as 1932, the Government instructed the army to put its efforts into readying the framework of three divisions for defence against raids®, which would have meant a low demand for munitions. Thus under the 'Blue Water Strategy' there was really a reduced requirement for a munitions manufacturing capability but as
^Beavis Papers [Small Box] Letter from Acting Prime Minister to High Commissioner London, 19 August 1935. 6a.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia, p.68. 7A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 39. Outline of the Principles of Imperial Defence. Shedden to Dill, 20 December 1929. 8MP-598 (Jensen Papers) Series 30 Box 9 Cabinet Submission by G.Pearce. 12 February 1932. 144
early as 1922 the 'unofficial' policy of self-containment was regarded as an insurance against failure of the 'Blue Water Strategy'.^
This political ambivalence affected the army quite considerably. It was reflected in the organisational shortcomings of the ordnance function and its unpreparedness when war broke out. More importantly, it was reflected in the lack of educational and training opportunities for senior and junior officers alike to interface with other military and non-military defence activities impinging on the ordnance function.
Problems of the MGO Branch.
The MGO during the major part of the war was Maj Gen L.E. Beavis.'io He recognised the intrinsic shortcomings in the education of senior officers.
Too frequently the lessons of one war are forgotten before the next takes place ... The reason is primarily ... the absence of adequate historical records of administrative developments of major military importance.
The 1939-45 war re-emphasised the importance of intelligent administrative planning ... The necessity for long range ordering on a scientific basis of provision equated to the needs of the forces instead of being tied rigidly to the financial system, the need for operational and administrative planning to be undertaken simultaneously ... may be mentioned as one of the more significant lessons.
9A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 39 Notes on a Memorandum on the Principles of Defence by A.E. Leighton, May 1922, p.1. iOMaj Gen L.E. Beavis whose biographical details have already been referred to was perhaps the most highly educated and qualified senior officer of the Australian regular army He had more experience overseas than any of his contemporaries. For details of his professional attainments see E.Warren 0. Perry. The late Major General LE. Beavis - an Appreciation. Australian Army Journal no.332 March 1976 pp.16-27. For sen/ice details see below. IIA-1194 (Dept. of Defence - Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. The History of the MGO Branch of the Staff, LHQ, 1939-1945 (MS) 24 December 1946. Preface para. 1. ''2|bid. para. 5. 145
Never before had the Australian army found it necessary to develop a technical MGO staff to initiate original equipment projects nor to establish military Ordnance and Electrical and Mechanical Engineering services to serve a large army fighting close to her own shores.
The foregoing quotations encapsulate the problems of the MGO branch, problems which were by no means unique to that particular general staff branch. Because of inadequate documentation , important lessons had been forgotten, the need for scientific forecasting had not been appreciated and equipment problems presented themselves that were quite new to the army.
Beavis elaborated on the points quoted above.
Too little attention has been given to the training of officers in the permanent forces ... partly it had been accepted that Great Britain would provide most of Australia's requirements of technical stores and partly because ... the importance of administration - particularly home administration - had not been appreciated fully.
... the Australian Army was therefore ill trained and unprepared to carry out the technical function of research, design, experiment, inspection provision, receipt, storage, accounting, issue, recovery and repair of Ordnance stores.
These assertions were denied by Jensen,6 one-time head of the Department of
Supply and Development, who thought Beavis' MGO story would not be accepted by the wartime Secretary of Defence :
I doubt whether Sir Frederick Shedden would accept the statements made in the MGO story, because ... he always looked to it that the
•"^ibid. para. 4. I4|bid. p.1 para. 4. •"^ibid. p.2 para. 7. l6Sir John Klunder Jensen was born in Bendigo 1894, joined the Commonwealth Public Service after Federation. He held a number of positions of a clerical and an administrative nature and among other things Secretary, Department of Munitions. He retired in 1949 as Secretary, Department of Supply. He had an illustrious career in the munitions supply branch and its successor war and peacetime organisation. 146
primary responsibility was upon Australia to equip itself and that we should look only to the old country where it was a sheer impossibility.
In respect of the comments made by Beavis regarding ordnance training he remarked :
I venture to say that if little attention was given to the training of the MGO branch, it [was] the fault of the branch itself that the attention was not given; the responsibility was upon themselves to acquire the training.
The provision of ordnance services presented a challenge to the Australian army.
During the First World War the Australian army was only responsible for the establishment of BODs behind the combat formations. A similar situation existed during the Second World War in the Middle East. This meant that up to 1942 the
Australian ordnance activity was quite small compared with the task the MGO
branch had to shoulder after Japan's entry into the war. A switch to reliance on
American equipment would have been difficult because Australian munition
production had standardised on British patterns which often were incompatible
with American equipment.
Development of Ordnance Services
Ordnance services in the Australian army dated back to 1909 when the first
Australian QMG took over the responsibility for supervising ordnance activities. In
the inter-war years little development had taken place, except for the attachment
of some technically trained militia officers to the executive arm of the ordnance
services, the civilian AAOD.^o
17AWM-S74 (Mellor Papers) File 35. Jensen to Mellor. 4 May 1953. I8|bid. I^A.T. ROSS, The Arming of Australia, p.72. 20A-1194 (Dept.of Defence - Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. The History of the MGO Branch, pp. 2-3. 147
Other stages in the development of ordnance services included the authorisation of a Directorate of Mechanisation in 1933 as part of the QMG Branch.21 The
Military Board saw the need for developing armoured fighting vehicles,
mechanised artillery traction and general motorised transport. The Directorate was considered analogous to that of the directorates of remounts and of veterinary
services. Also of importance was the position of the Chief Ordnance Mechanical
Engineer concerned with design and experimentation relating to artillery and
general stores.
In 1936 the Directorate of Ordnance Services, which had been established in the
QMG branch in 1913, became the Directorate of Ordnance Services and Artillery.
At that time (1936) the first tentative steps had been taken to initiate pneumatic
tyres for mechanised field artillery and to upgrade coastal defences with
equipment salvaged from the Navy. Both required a local design and
experimental effort.22
There was little opportunity for the Australian army to gain experience, for
instance, in the maintenance of mechanical equipment, because up to 1939 and
even beyond there was little of it in service. What there was - some gun tractors, a
few light trucks and a few motor cars and trucks - were mostly of First World War
vintage. Training doctrine at the beginning of the war did not encompass the
extensive utilisation of mechanised equipment: infantry attacks were still
preceded by barrages of stationary field artillery (outdated 18 pdrs) and supported
in the final phase by cavalry wielding swords and lances. Hence the major repair
21A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1933 Vol.1) File M 42/33. Appointment of Director of Mechanisation. 3 May 1933. 22A-1194 (Dept. of Defence - Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.3. 148
and maintenance functions concerned themselves with out-dated weapons, saddlety, carriage wheels and the like, requiring few modern repair facilities.
The MGO branch was established on 13 October, 1939 as a GS branch in its own right with the appointment of Colonel T.R. Williams as MGO.23 The MGO was made responsible:
In general for the provision inspection and maintenance of war material and ordnance stores; and in particular for the research and design, experiment, proof and inspection of armaments, ammunition and vehicles, technical stores and instruments; clothing, general stores (except those for which the QMG [was] responsible); scientific development of war material; patterns and war inventions; administration of the ordnance services and inspection branch.24
The foregoing statement indicates the breadth of the MGO branch and its tasks. It
demonstrates the sudden change from peacetime to wartime requirements and the
need for changing the public service mentality of the personnel (attention to
positions prescribed by duty statements) to technically innovative attitudes which
put the appreciation of user requirements first and foremost.
It was not long before an extraordinarily heavy load was thrown on the MGO
branch by the demands of the four AIF divisions and the expanding home forces.
The CGS illustrated the difficulties:
While these conditions apply to all branches [of the General Staff] the greatest load has been experienced in the MGO branch, as it is here that the grave shortage of trained staff of technical
23|bid. p.4. . ^ Col. later Ma] Gen T.R. Williams was a non-RMC staff officer. His first major duty was Director of Mechanisation. On 13 October 1939 he was promoted Maj Gen and became MGO and member of the Military Board. In April 1941 he became CMA to the Department of Munitions. He was chairman of the Army and Munitions Co-ordination Committee. 24|bid. p. 4. 149
personnel has been felt most severely.25
As a result of his representations the Government agreed to the formation of a fifth branch in the General Staff, that of the Chief Military Adviser (CMA) to the
Department of Munitions.
The Chief Military Adviser
The creation of this position in 1940 was brought about not only by the quantity of work thrown on the shoulders of the MGO branch, but more importantly by the technological nature of this work. It was also an indication of the propensity of the
Australian army for administrative complexity.
Up to 1940 the MGO branch was largely concerned with warehousing activities.
The increased work load of providing and maintaining stores for the AIF and the militia was hampered by the absence of trained stores personnel.26 The branch had little experience in coping with the additional problems of design and in interacting with users of new equipment which had to be manufactured in
Australia. The situation was exacerbated when the inspection of munitions made in Australia became in 1939 the responsibility of the MGO branch.27 There was still another aspect to this. During manufacture, modifications were sometimes required which were, in fact, 'concessions' to otherwise strict specifications and such modifications could only be agreed to by the users of the equipment. Thus the inspection function, originally little more than a compliance assurance exercised by largely clerical personnel, assumed a relatively high technical profile within an ordnance organisation, at that time largely non-technical.
25|bid. p. 5, quoting memo from CGS to Minister, dated 13 December 1940. 26There will be further elaboration of this point in the discussion of the Maintenance Division of the MGO Branch. 27A-1194 (Dept. of Defence - Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.4. 150
To meet technical requirements, the CGS decided at the end of 1940 to create the
CMA branch. The branch was to have the technical responsibility for meeting user requirements and their interpretation to the Department of Munitions.
There was, however, more to the CMA position than a mere administrative re- arrangement of ordnance functions. As Jensen pointed out, the main reason for the CMA apparatus was to overcome the wastage of time incurred by the protracted design effort on the part of the army in respect of new munition items or modifications of existing ones.28 it had been realised that developmental and production design had to proceed concurrently and not consecutively, as had been normal peacetime practice.29 This was conceptually quite innovative - today it would be called the fast-track design method. The first CMA was Maj Gen T.R.
Williams who had been the MGO since 1939. His replacement was Maj Gen
E.J. Milford who was recalled from the Middle East where he had been CRA, 6
Australian Division.
The CMA experiment was not very successful. It had to deal with several parties often in conflict with one another, the civilian Department of Munitions, the army design teams and the users of munitions, the soldiers in the field.
The field soldiers were unable to make an impact on the conceptualisation, functional specifications and, indeed, the design specifications of equipment which had to be manufactured locally. The design of the Mark I Australian Cruiser Tank and its successors showed the wide gulf that existed between field experience as a determinant of realistic operational requirements and the design and
28J.K. Jensen, Defence Production in Australia to 1941. The Historical Record. (MS). Office of Defence Production, Australian Defence Industries Limited Canberra Library, Ch. 10, pp. 186-188. 29A.T. ROSS, Arming of Australia, p.334. 151
development activities undertaken by the CMA and the Department of Munitions.
Of the Department Beavis said, with hindsight, in 1946:
...While the responsibility for design was vested with the Department of Munitions the primary consideration was what could be produced and not what was needed to meet operational requirements.^o
Ross maintains that the army was attempting to design tanks with which to fight the
German armour, an attitude which was justifiable in 1940 and 1941 when Australia
had several divisions overseas fighting Germans but was quite irrational from
1942 onwards when the likelihood of sending Australian armoured divisions to
fight the Germans was becoming quite remote. Ross quotes Squires as the only
authority who had ever mentioned the threat of Japanese armour and who had
submitted a functional specification for an Australian-made tank to meet it.^^ But
according to Ross such a specification was not good enough for the senior
Australian military officers. Two attitudes manifested themselves. The
traditional view was :
... the reluctance to believe that any good [technological developments] could come out of Australia or that we should ever be so bold as to depart from British standards ...32
The second was to strive for the best possible design. This led the senior officers
into approving modification after modification for an Australian tank which fast
became unnecessarily sophisticated and over-designed for fighting Japanese
tanks. Ross suggests that the explanation for this attitude was that
... they [the senior Australian army officers] were Empire men who had always expected to fight alongside the British army despite their
30A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library)Accession no.29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.73. 31A.T. ROSS, Awaking the Apocalypse, Chapter 11, p.32. 32AWM S74 (Mellor Papers) File 41. Mobilising Industry for War. Brig J. O'Brien to P.P. Mellor, 27 March 1955. 152
pre-war rhetoric on the defence of Australia 33
The army thought there was no point in having a tank which was unable to survive against German AFVs ...34
Clearly, when looking at the saga of the design and development of the Australian
Cruiser Tank, a project in which the CMA was heavily involved, there is no indication that the potential users of Australian produced armour were consulted about the design.
Divided responsibility between the CMA and the MGO which led to rivalries was
highlighted by the Wynter Committee, appointed late in 1942 at the direction of the
Government to examine the functions of the MGO branch.35 Amongst its findings the Committee emphasised that if there had been appropriately educated army
officers available the reorganisation of the technical ordnance services into CMA
and MGO branches would not have been necessary.
The Wynter Committee found :
(i) The head of the design division should be an engineer of the highest technical qualifications with wide experience in production methods and extensive army experience;
(ii) The users eg. the chiefs of the corps of artillery, engineers, signals and infantry have the right of technical access to their respective design, provision and inspection associates and through them to the production agency
33AT. ROSS, Awaking the Apocalypse, , Chapter 11, p.33. 34|bid. p.29. 35A-1194 (Dept. of Defence - Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, pp. 11-14. Following an adverse report on the manpower situation in the Department of the Army, the Government directed the C in C late in 1942 to appoint a committee to look into the possible wastages of resources in respect of control of design and inspection of army munitions and stores. It was chaired by Lt Gen H.P. Wynter, Officer in Charge of Administration at LHQ, with the engineer in chief, the director of staff duties, and the director of armoured fighting vehicles as members. Significantly, the CMA was not a member. 153
employed; (iii) The users should be free to direct the construction of pilot models and mockups of all descriptions through the design and experimental establishments; (iv) Design should proceed in consultation with the production agency from its inception. Army design must actually be developed with the Ministry of Munitions and/or the contractor. The more the design was broken down into details the greater was the part that could be played with advantage by these organisations.^®
In real life the differences between the CMA and MGO branches became a demarcation dispute between regular army officers with little or no technical and industrial experience on the one hand and industrialists in the Department of Munitions with little or no military (let alone combat) experience on the other. Ross has some telling comments to make in this respect:
Milford [MGO and predecessor to Beavis] did not seem to accept that civilian advice on weapons could ever be technically superior to equivalent advice from the Army's own experts. Willams [CMA] seemed incapable of accepting any criticism of the Army's performance in his area of responsibility.
In summary, the Wynter Committee believed that the first requirement for a competent senior MGO officer in the design field were technical qualifications. Extensive military experience was seen as a lesser priority. Nevertheless, it was deemed indispensable that potential users of new equipment should actively participate in the design discussions because they were soldiers with up-to-date combat experience and often had a technical background. The CMA and the MGO were found wanting on both accounts.
36|bid. p.13. 37A.T. ROSS, Awaking the Apocalypse , Chapter 11, p.45. 154
The Wynter Committee recommended that control and direction of design and inspection revert to the MGO. This reorganisation was implemented on 15
January 1943.3® It did not proceed without some wrangling. The CMA was now virtually redundant but the C in C wanted him employed as an adviser to the MGO and as liaison officer with the Ministry of Munitions and approved firms. The C in C wrote directly to the Minister of Defence, bypassing his own Minister for the Army.
Although the proposal was not recommended by his own Secretary, the Minister did approve with the proviso that no precedent would be created.^Q
The 1942/1943 Reorganisation of the MGO Branch and the Influence of Maj Gen L.E. Beavis
The reorganisation of the MGO branch was completed in 1943. The reorganised
MGO branch consisted of a technology group of divisions and the very large
Maintenance Division. The latter was mainly concerned with the maintenance of army equipment and stock levels in the ordnance stores. Because of its significance to the topic of this work it will form the subject of a separate chapter.
The three divisions of the technology group were the Equipment, Design and
Inspection divisions.
Equipment Division
The Equipment division had several directorates dealing with armaments,
engineer equipment, signal and radio stores, mechanical vehicles and general
stores and clothing.^o The directorates were responsible for identifying user
38MP-392 (Dept.of Munitions) Series 36 Bundle 16 File 241/10/18. Reorganisation of the MGO Branch. 39A-816/1 (Dept.of Defence) File 31/301/314. MGO Branch. Correspondence C in C with Minister. January/February 1943. 40A-1194 (Dept.of Defence-Library) Accession no. 27125/20.01. Administration of the MGO Branch of the Staff, Vol.1, 1944, Pt.lll. 155
requirements and for transforming such requirements into functional specifications.
The director concerned did not have the last say in this task. He had to have recourse to appropriate research and development instrumentalities advising on the feasibility of manufacturing the munitions item under review.
Once a project had been specified from a design point of view the Equipment division had to ensure its compatibility with what the user actually wanted. The appropriate director also had to ascertain from the General Staff that a tactical requirement existed and what the scale of issue would be."^^
The directorates had the additional task of liaison with the Department of Munitions and any other instrumentality concerned with the production of the new equipment.
The division was required to assist in forecasting the scale of requirements, perhaps one of the most onerous tasks of the logistics apparatus of the Australian army. Details will be discussed in Chapter 8 and it is intended to indicate here only the main difficulty, namely the uncertainty of the forecast basis of future requirements. As an example, the question of demands for additional shirt and trouser stocks in BODs and AODs not only involved half-dozen instrumentalities or so,but had to take cognisance of new criteria which governed the effective life of clothing on issue.'^^
Design Division
The division was controlled by a Chief Superintendent of Design and was responsible for the preparation of design specifications. These specifications
41A-1194 (Dept.of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.30. 42A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.5) File M 281/43. Basis for Provision for AMF of Equipment - MGO Branch. File Range 6 October, 1943 to 8 July, 1944. 43|bid. MGO to LAG, 24 April 1944. MGO to Minister, 6 July 1944. 156
formed the basis for the manufacture of the equipment. The division had other responsibilities such as ensuring optimum standardisation, supervision of certain testing and experimental establishments and liaison with non-army laboratories and with contractors.
Through its interaction with the Equipment Division the army's design staff came to the very firm realisation that technically trained fighting soldiers should stipulate what a new piece of equipment should be able to do. In other words the fighting soldiers were to make the major contribution to the specification of a new munitions item. This change in design philosophy had already been anticipated by Spender, who was Minister for the Army in 1941. He had questioned the senior military's insistence on manufacturing exactly to specifications laid down by the UK Ordnance Board. He made the point that if munitions to UK-prescribed specifications could not be produced then a design as nearly as possible approximating what the fighting soldiers considered to be the optimum design should suffice.Jensen, the Secretary of the Department of Supply and Shipping strongly supported Spender in this philosophy and Beavis, the MGO, explained to
Jensen that a reversed flow of equipment design know-how had developed.
... As a result we find that the general tendency now is that instead of depending on Britain and USA for new designs and information on fighting equipment... the flow of information re jungle requirements is largely in the reverse direction
One of the results of the change in design philosophy was that munitions design had become more flexible because the first consideration was the fighting soldier rather than compliance with specifications and production procedures developed
44A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 5)File M 56/41, Deficiencies in Stores and Equipment. 5 May 1941. Spender to Secretary, Military Board. Sir Percy Claude Spender was born in 1895 and studied law. He was a member of the Menzies Government first as Minister without portfolio later as Minister for the Army. After that he was a member of the Advisory War Council. After the war he became Australian Ambassador to the United States. ^5mP-730 (Jensen Papers). Series 11, Box 2. MGO to Jensen, 30 August 1943. 157
in a non-Australian and more particularly non-jungle environment. This development was summed up by Beavis after the war:
When Australia began to expand manufacture of warlike stores in 1940 basic UK designs were adopted. In the main modifications incorporated in Australian-made equipment were necessitated by the limitations of materials, manufacturing capacity and ability. Jungle conditions experienced in the war in the South West Pacific Area made it imperative to develop new designs of personal and other equipment, and while basic designs in the main were preserved, fairly substantial modifications had to be made to standard British warlike stores. This was also the period in which the greatest scientific and engineering development took place in Australia.^e
Inspection Division
The Inspection division consisted of three sections. One dealt with weapons, mechanisation, engineering and signal stores; the second concerned itself with gun and small arms ammunition and the third with the inspection of general stores and clothing.From time to time it was thought advisable to amalgamate the
Inspection division with the two other divisions in the technology group, but Blarney as far back as April 1942 opposed such a move :
I am not in agreement with this proposal and the MGO informs me that there is unanimity between himself and his senior officers ... the responsibilities of each division are clearly defined and were designed to avoid over-lapping ... Any overlapping that does occur is due to the enthusiasm of officers or inexperience ... which occurs in any large organisation - rather than to faulty organisation
The 1944 edition of the MGO Handbook lists definitions and functions quite succinctly, yet it does exhibit grey areas open to diverse interpretation. For
46A-1194 (Dept.of Defence-Library)Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.68. ^^MGO Branch. Equipment Memoranda., no. 13, 1944, p.9. 48^-1194 (Dept.of Defence-Library)Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.28. Beavis quotes from Memorandum B 19442 of 9 April, 1942 written by Biamey to Forde. 158 instance, the 'sealing' of drawings on approval by the director concerned (Responsibility vi ) could have cut across some of the functions laid down for the Design and to a lesser degree Equipment divisions.^^
Because the Division also inspected on behalf of the navy, the air force, the US army and the Postmaster General's Department, the activities of the Inspection Division were in the nature of a 'service', that is, it had to preserve its independence. Also, because the development of new equipment went through three distinct phases,
staff work associated with the interpretation of user requirements and preparation of functional specifications, detailed design development ... preparation of design specifications and inspection of product to ensure compliance with design specifications and adopted standards,^o it was essential for the inspection function to remain separate.
The final shape of the MGO branch owes much to Beavis.^^ He was one of the few Australian general officers with an exceptionally wide professional expehence both as a staff officer and in regimental duties. His association with the Australian army began in 1911 as a school cadet at Bathurst. He had entered RMC, Duntroon in 1913 and graduated in 1915 at the top of his class. After extensive combat and staff experience during the First World War he joined the Ordnance College Woolwich and twelve months later was a student at the Artillery College. Subsequently he was posted as staff officer to the Australian High Commission. After several regimental postings in Australia, he returned to England in 1929 as a student at the Staff College at Camberley and on completion of his course
49A-1194 (Dept. of Defenc-Library)Accession no. 27125/20.01. The Administration of the MGO Branch of the Staff, Vol. 1, Part iv. 50A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library)Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.30. 51E. Warren Perry. The late Major-General LE. Beavis - an appreciation. Australian Army Journal no. 322, March 1976, pp.16-27. 159
remained as exchange officer with the Imperial General Staff at the War Office in the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence. From 1933 to 1936 he was posted again to Australia House as Military Representative and Liaison Officer.
Mellor suggests that Beavis became familiar with the problem of managing resources during his time as Australian representative on the British Principal
Supply Officers Committee which would have enabled him to guide the activities of its fledgling Australian counterpart. On his return to Australia he was made
Chairman of the Defence Resources Board in the Department of Defence. But almost from the beginning Beavis clashed with A.E. Leighton, the powerful
Controller-General of the Munitions Supply Board , who wanted the available
funds spent on bringing the government munition factories to peak efficiency rather than diverting scarce financial resources to industry as Beavis and the army would
have it:52
Major-General Beavis ... has sent to Mr [Gavin] Long several papers about his pre-war efforts to bring about the organisation of civil industry for munition production and his final dismissal in 1937 evidently at the instigation of M.L. Shepherd and Leighton.
Beavis lost the fight. It was during this period that Beavis learnt his trade as
senior resource manager and acquired the art of political in-fighting.^^
It was only after the war that Beavis made plain his view of how resources should
be managed. He said in 1946 in connection with the planning for the post-war
Australian army:
In both wars we created military organisations ab initio and it is feared that because it has happened in the past it will be taken for granted and the shocking inefficiency be overlooked ... When a force is created from
52D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry , , pp.28-29. 53AWM-S.93. File 50/2/23/27. Beavis exchanges with G. Long, Letter. N.Penman to A.S. Fitzpatrick, 29 October, 1945.
54A.T. ROSS, The Arming of Australia, pp.232-236. 160
'scratch' the bulk of the efforts ... are in establishing the organisation as distinct from the executive action ... With a host of inexperienced personnel ... there is little wonder that there should have been chaos ..
Other armies, eg. the German and British Armies in the main built for war on the framework existing in peace - for example in the United Kingdom the Army does not start establishing new systems ... the normal [peacetime] procedure being continued.
His views on inertia in large organisations can be gleaned from an extract from a lecture on central planning in war and peace :
It [the large organisation] begins to view with distrust any suggestions which do not accord with established ideas and methods. It is reluctant to admit the necessity of change ... It takes a major effort to alter the course and the larger and more powerful the office machine the greater often is the effort.56
Beavis' philosophies were like a breath of fresh air in a cumbersome logistic apparatus which in addition to its complexity was beset by ongoing acrimonies between the army and the Department of Munitions, in particular its Ordnance
Production Directorate. Its director was L. Hartnett, in peacetime Managing
Director of General Motors Holden. He complained repeatedly that the army came up with innovations and designs which did not readily lend themselves to easy
manufacture,either because of lack of appropriate machine tools, appropriate
human manufacturing skills or the right materials, and more significantly, because the designs were too sophisticated and the production runs too short. All of this was a major worry to a production engineer. The army on the other hand did not appreciate the concerns of the production engineer, particularly after a
SSBeavis Papers [Small Box] . Notes by MGO on certain Aspects of Future Army Organisation. February 1946. 56|bjd. Extract from Central Planning and Control in War and Peace by Sir Oliver Franks, Provost, Queens College Oxford, Lecture II, [possibly 1935] pp.28-29. 57MP-956(Jensen Papers) Series 2 Box 11. Munition Production Programmes 1941- 1944. Item 62 Hartnett to War Cabinet 24 January 1942. 161
requirement irrespective of its volume had been endorsed by the General Staff on behalf of potential users.
This was the situation when Beavis began to make his presence felt. His major contribution was in the technology areas of the MGO branch, that is in respect of the activities of the Equipment, Design and Inspection divisions. Beavis was inclined:
... to view the problem of munition supply as one which stretched from the frontline to the heart land of Australian industry.sQ
Beavis criticised the shortcomings of the senior resource managers mercilessly :
... it was found early in 1942 that most of the officers in the Directorate of Artillery (now Directorate of Armament) were incompetent and a chaotic situation existed in regard to the development of armament and technical matters relating to its procurement.
He blamed the lack of appropriate peacetime training of the senior resource managers and potential resource managers for what appeared to him 'poor performance of the Army's technical areas'.^®
At the outbreak of the war the Australian Army therefore was ill-trained and unprepared to carry out the technical functions of research, design, experiment, inspection,
When the functions of the CMA reverted to the MGO branch, the army began to work harmoniously within its own sections and with its counterparts in the technical
58A.T. ROSS, Awaking the Apocalypse, ChapterU, p.46. 59|bid. p.47. 60|bid. 61A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.2. 162
bureaucracy in matters affecting user requirements, design and specifications, and inspection of munitions. This, in turn, improved relations between the army and the
Department of Munitions as a whole. Hartnett said early in 1943:
I would like to record ... that co-operation between the Army and the Ordnance Production Directorate today is on the happiest basis and we all find it extremely stimulating to be brought in closely with the army on the common problems of equipmentand its manufacture.
In 1946 Beavis went to considerable length in specifying the qualifications and
attainments he thought were necessary for a satisfactory discharge of the functions
of the MGO branch as it was then constituted. His premise was that:
... prior to the 1939-1945 war too little attention had been given to the need for technical training and the rapid expansion of Australian industry from 1939 found the army critically short of officers with extensive unit experience and advanced technical training to undertake the development of design and to discuss production problems with the production agencies and manufacturers.63
One might judge what Beavis said in 1946 as a view expressed with hindsight,
were it not for a letter written by him to the CGS in September 1943. The occasion
was the downgrading to lieutenant colonel of the rank of the Director of Armament
(formerly Director of Artillery) responsible for artillery equipment, small arms
ammunition, optical instruments and the like, while at the same time the directors of
hirings, education, amenities, canteens and engineer stores were left as full
colonels.
Beavis wrote :
It will be accepted that the efficiency of the fighting armies is greatly
62MP-730 (Jensen Papers) Series 11, Box 1 Hartnett to Lewis, 19 January 1943 (Collection of Correspondence dealing with relations between the Ordnance Production Directorate and the army). 63A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.202. 163
dependent on having the best weapons modern science can produce, and also on the efficiency of functioning of these weapons, ... these things do not flow like water out of a tap... Even with standard designs the Equipment Director concerned requires not only considerable knowledge ... but also considerable knowledge of field requirements ... Even greater qualifications are required in modifying standard designs to meet Australian facilities ... The conclusion to be drawn is clear: that considerable technical training and considerable field experience ... up to senior appointments are the qualifications for equipment director... We fall short of this, due primarily to the non-existence ... of personnel with the qualifications and secondly to the lack of recognition of qualifications needed for such appointments.6^
He also suggested to the Vasey Committee appointed in 1944 to review the RMC curriculum that provision be made for teaching commerce and economics subjects including statistical methods and accounting procedures, industrial organisation, production engineering and materials handling.^^ There is no evidence that this recommendation was taken up.
In his recommendation for the post-war MGO branch, Beavis insisted on tertiary engineering qualifications at a time when degree status for RMC graduates had barely been accepted in principle, let alone implemented. He did envisage that the MGO branch would employ non-RMC trained personnel, but in respect of the
Design division he stipulated an academic status that would be acceptable to the corresponding chartered professional institutions as qualifying for corporate membership.6®
However, while the non-military qualifications were attainable even under wartime conditions, it is questionable whether Beavis was realistic in his stipulated military requirements for MGO officers. The variety of military establishments needed to
64MP-741 (Jensen Papers) Series 1 Item 5/25/286 Beavis to CGS. 29 September 1943. 65A-1194 (Dept.of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the Ordnance Branch, p.203. 66|bid. pp.205-219. 164
provide MGO officers, both potential and actually serving, with an opportunity to gain appropriate military field experience just were not available, either in peace or in war.
Research and Development (R & D)
The need for an army to engage in a high degree of research and development (R
& D) activities both prior and during a war is perhaps best encapsulated in Beavis' words :
Superiority of equipment in modern warfare is of at least equal importance to the superiority of man. No one would dispute the fighting quality of British and Australian soldiers, but duhng the war crises did arise through the quantity or quality of equipment being inadequate.®^
This attitude is not surprising seeing it is expressed by a general officer who was responsible for the efficient functioning of the technology divisions of the MGO branch, the link between the technology needs of the army and the agencies which provided them. The technology divisions (Equipment, Design & Inspection) were in the main responsible for initiating R&D into fields in which an operational
(tactical) requirement had been identified.
Prior to and early in the war two organisations were responsible for carrying out applied R & D in Australia: the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR), mainly through its Secondary Industries Testing and Research (SITR)
Committee; and the Department of Defence, Munitions Supply Board (MSB) laboratories which according to Ross :
... continued to be the largest indigenous scientific influence on
67A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.68. 165
secondary industry until after the Second World War...68
There was at first a noticeable lack of harmony and co-operation between these two instrumentalities, with the CGS (Lavarack) and Beavis very much siding with the SITR committee,69 an attitude explained by the army's animosity to the MSB and in particular to its head, A.E. Leighton.^o
But technical innovation did not necessarily emanate from scientific organisations alone. In 1939 the army had an organisation called the Army Inventions Board which dealt with military inventions submitted by the public at large and members of the armed forces. Its resources were very slender and Beavis suggests that all too often :
an already overburdened officer would be passed an invention idea in cnjde form for comment and advice. In those cases it was only human nature to frequently take the easiest course and ... to declare the proposal to be without merit or value.^^
As might be expected, after the outbreak of war the number of submissions grew beyond the capacity of the Army Inventions Board to handle them. Consequently, the CGS at the time (Sir Brudenell White) recommended the establishment of a
Central Inventions Board responsible to the Department of Defence with representatives from all services, CSIR, MSB and co-opted experts. This organisation was superseded in 1942 by the Army Inventions Directorate, an essentially civilian body.^^
68AT. ROSS. The Politics of Secondary Industry Research in Australia 1926-1939. Historical Records of Australian Science 7(4) June 1989, p.373. 69|bid. p.383. 70A.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia, Chapters 4 and 5. 71A-1194 (Dept. of Defence Library) Accession no.. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.226. 72d.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p.643. 166
Before an invention was adopted operationally and even before it reached the production stage it had to go through a number of phases, mentioned here to illustrate the administrative and technological complexities of the R & D process.
The first was the initial scientific research generally carried out by non-army agencies followed by the experimental and development phases which tested the conclusions reached in the first stage. Some army personnel participated in this work. This was also the stage where specifications were compiled and the drafting of plans was commenced, both with active participation of the MGO branch. The final stage'largely carried out by army personnel was the experimental testing which ensured that design and equipment prototype met requirements.^^
In addition, the technology divisions of the MGO branch had to answer certain questions such as whether the innovation was technologically feasible and sound and whether it was, indeed, a novelty or merely a modification of existing equipment. Finally, the MGO branch had to give an undertaking that there was an operational or tactical requirement for it to be produced.
The answers to these questions were prepared by the New Munitions Committee which in conjunction with the Equipment division of the MGO branch ascertained the approval of potential users and of the General Staff Specifications Committee.
The latter made sure that there was technical compatibility with the endorsed actual requirement.From its inception in March 1942 to 31 August 1945, the
Committee handled 814 submissions which reached it from the Army Invention
73A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.69. 74d.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p.644. 75A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.225-226. 167
Directorate and 187 from other sources usually service personnel. The acceptance rate was of the order of 14 per centJ®
The stages through which an R & D project had to go were accompanied by a number of design meetings which often insisted on provisions for modifications to be inserted during the production stage. This meant that in the final analysis :
... the real determinant of equipment standards would be what Australian industry could make in a reasonable time and not necessarily what the Army [ideally] needed.
The major impediment to military technology innovation was that an invention had to meet an already existing army requirement, that is, anything not already thought of had little chance of implementation. A particular problem was experienced in modifying ordnance specifications. With the exception of typically Australian projects all ordnance specifications originated in the United Kingdom - a sensible arrangement for achieving maximum standardisation throughout the Empire. By the same token this arrangement was the cause of much delay in adopting modifications to ordnance items. In order to overcome this delay the CMA recommended the formation of an Australian Ordnance Board. He wanted this organisation to consider and advise on technical details of arms, armament and all kinds of munition coming up for discussion by the Military Board.^^ jhe proposed organisation, eventually endorsed by the Military Board, was to come under the control of the CMA, much to the chagrin of the MGO who at the time was by-passed. It was just another example of the power struggle within the GS. The envisaged membership of the Australian Ordnance Board was quite select. It
76|bjd. p.226. 77A.T. ROSS. Wartime Munitions Expansion in Australia 1939-1945. Dept. of Defence. Central Studies Establishment Report no.13, June 1978, p.64. 78A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol.1) File 31/42, Australian Ordnance Board. 23 February 1942. 168
included the Director of Artillery, the principal ordnance mechanical engineer, the
Inspector General of Ammunitions and the Superintendent of Design, CMA branch.
The aim was to free the CMA from the external checks and balances imposed by the old arrangement. The proposal had considerable merit but was never implemented.
Operations Research
The failure to understand and utilise the theory and technique of operations research for defence purposes is yet another example of the educational shortcomings of the senior resource managers. They thought, initially, that operations research was a kind of trouble-shooting technique to be applied to radio direction finding installations of the army. The Defence Committee recommended the establishment of an operations research laboratory within the
School of Radio Physics, University of Sydney.^^ It was not realised that operations research, basically a statistical technique, had nothing to do with the technology of the equipment under consideration but rather with optimising its use, for instance, for locating enemy aircraft.
As soon as the establishment of an operations research cell was authorised in
1943 it became subject of a demarcation dispute between the CGS and the MGO.
The former wanted it under his control, thus following the British example, the latter saw operations research as a technology and therefore logically coming within his province. Lack of understanding and faulty drafting of the terms of reference were the cause of it:
It is proposed that the Section should deal with tactical and technical aspects relating to the performance of equipment... and tactical and
79A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence) File 31/301/288. Civilian Operations Research Group. Memorandum Dept. of Army to Dept. of Defence 24 July 1942. 169
technical scientific evidence to assist the guidance of G.S. policy., so
In other words, while the MGO understood that the operations research section had something to do with equipment efficiency, his province, he was not 'clear [of] the extent to which the CGS intended to take on the technical functions'.
Eventually, the LGA ruled that the activity would be controlled by the MGO. The incident shows that the very modern concept of operations research had not even reached one of the most competent and technically most qualified senior general officers.®"'
When eventually the operations research group did some useful work in New
Guinea, reports never reached the eyes for whom it was intended.82
In the context of logistics the operational research group should have concerned itself with mathematical techniques that could have been applied to inventory control and the subsequent decision process relating to the replenishment of stores, a technique known to the British army as far back as 1915.83 The basic function of inventory management is to allow successive stages of the distribution process to operate independently from one another with the aim of minimising the inventory commensurate with the military requirements at the time. The provision of shirts discussed in some detail in Chapter 8 highlights this aspect.
The non-utilisation of the operations research technique was explained apologetically by one of the DMGO's, Brigadier J.W. O'Brien in the 1950s. Failure to use the technique was not because of disinterest or opposition or ignorance on the part of the senior resource managers but because they were under constant
80A-2653(M/Bd Proc. 1943 Vol.4) File M161/43. Respective Responsibilities. General Staff - MGO Branch 26 June 1943 to 10 April 1943. MGO to CGS 13 July 1943. 81 Ibid. 82|bid. 83Robert Thierauf, Decision Making through Operations Research, p.183. 170
high pressure and thus unable to see beyond immediate and short range matters.
Operations research experts had to look for problems to solve rather than have worthwhile long range projects offering for which long term solutions were required.This explanation rings hollow. An inspection of the MGO handbook shows that the functions listed in that source document were more suitable for an experimental testing facility rather than for analysis of repetitive problems such as convoy protection, supply problems, forecasting of stores and ammunition demands and the like.ss Mellor suggests, the campaigns in the jungles and mountains of New Guinea offered little scope for operational research'.86
The Operations Research group was transferred to the Directorate of Research, a directorate within the GS branch, established in 1942. This Directorate had highly qualified academics on its staff with military ranks. It concerned itself with applied research into matters and disciplines not covered by other staff branches. Thus it was basically non-science, not specifically orientated (but rather, dealt with economics, demography, international politics, foreign relations, civil affairs).®^
The Directorate of Research became the subject of a parliamentary question and the reply by the Minister for the Army illustrated the basically non-scientific nature of the research. Out of 23 examples cited no more than two had a scientific content.®® The need for a think-tank had been felt by the senior managers of the
®4AWM-S74 {Mellor Papers) File 41. Letter O'Brien to Mellor. 21 March 1955. Brig John William O'Brien was born in Melbourne in 1909 and qualified as a professional engineer. He held senior engineering positions at the Melbourne Tramway Trust, Howard Australia Ltd and the American Bridge Company. He was CO 2/5 Fd.Regt.AIF, CRA 3 Aust Division, Deputy MGO. He was promoted brigadier at the age of 33. 85A-1194 (Dept. of Defence - Library) Accession no. 27125/20.01. Administration of the MGO Branch of the Staff, LHO. MGO Services, Vol. 1. 1944 Appendix B4. 86D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p.661. S7A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.3) File M 185/43. Research Section at LHQ 18 February 1943 to 28 December 1944. 8®A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1945 Vol.2) File M 56/45. Directorate of Research. Reply by Acting Minister of Army to A.B. Abbott , MP Hansard (Representatives) 7 May 1945 pp 1200-1201. M/BD. File 11 April 1945 - 30 July 1945. 171
army. It [filled] an urgent military need at LHQ level and [would] become a permanent part of the higher military organisation of Australia'.While its existence compensated for the educational shortcomings of senior officers, it also made them independent of non-army sources of information and provided much needed non-military knowledge required for attending to problems not only never experienced in their military careers but also never even envisaged. In some of these matters the army was simply out of its depth.
The difficulties expected to occur when large areas of northern Australia reverted from military back to civilian control were a case in point. This, in turn, led to the establishment in 1944 of the LHQ School of Civil Affairs and the directorate became known as the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs.^o
Summary
The MGO branch was faced with problems not foreseen prior to the outbreak of the war nor even afterwards. As a result, the senior military resource managers little ordnance experience had acquired very particularly concerning technological aspects. During the First World War the Australian army relied for its ordnance requirements largely on British resources. Military activities in the inter-war years were on such a small scale that a separate military ordnance organisation was not warranted. In addition, the official defence policy did not envisage the circumstances under which a major ordnance effort was likely to be required during the Second World War. While the technological capacity for the manufacture of munitions had been adequate, military human capability had not.
89|bid. p.2. 90A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1945 Vol.1) File M 2/45. Civil Affairs Organisation 20 December 1944 - 19 September 1945. 172
Two major consequences must be noted. One, there was no satisfactory opportunity for a militia ordnance corps to acquire appropriate training, a shortcoming which affected particularly the maintenance and stores functions of the army early in Second World War and which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Secondly, due to the strategic and international political situations some munitions had to be manufactured locally. The lack of co-ordination of user demands with corresponding design and inspection requirements for munitions was overcome, in part by a creditable R&D effort.
The army attempted, unsuccessfully, to improve on the organisational and technological shortcomings of the ordnance organisation by creating a basically technological fifth branch within the framework of the GS. The attempt failed, mainly due to the personalities of the CMA and the MGO. At the end of 1942 the CMA branch was abolished and the MGO branch reorganised into four divisions. The reorganised MGO branch was successful even though its organisation was complex and cumbersome. 173
CHAPTER 8
THE LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MGO BRANCH. THE MAINTENANCE DIVISION.
Background
The Maintenance division of the MGO branch was directly responsible for the
maintenance of the Australian army in the field. The words of Winston Churchill
bring this home:
Yet even the military student in his zeal to master the fascinating combinations of the actual conflict often forgets the far more intricate complexities of supply.
The 'supply' referred to above was provided by the three arms of the Maintenance
division. The first was the Ordnance service, with a turnover of millions of pounds
and 200,000 individual items not counting ammunition. Then came the Electrical
and Mechanical Engineering service; and finally the Central Provision service,
responsible for preparing financial estimates, calculating stores requirements,
lodging orders and placing the goods so purchased into Base Ordnance Depots
(B0Ds).2 Administratively, the major problem confronting the Maintenance Division
was the forecasting of potential requirements of munitions and the maintenance of
a continuous flow of orders so that industry could in turn maintain even and
preferably large production runs.
1A-1194 (Dept. of Defence -Library) Accession no.29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.167, quoting an extract from W.S. Churchill. The River War , London 1899.' 2A-1194 (Dept. of Defence -Library) Accession no. 27125/20.01. The Administration of the MGO Branch of the Staff, LHQ, Vol.1, 1944, Part vi. 174
Even this brief overview indicates the complexities of the Maintenance division and the problems with which it was faced. Beavis puts the matter quite succinctly :
The ... war undoubtedly caught Australia unprepared for a vast expansion of the Ordnance Services and for development of provision methods and depot and field organisation.
A series of disasters had so depleted the resources of war equipment of Great Britain that it was soon apparent she would have little to spare for Australia...
Australia from being almost entirely dependent on UK was suddenly faced with the prospect of expanding militia training and at the same time raising and training the AIF.
In short, Australia was now faced with the situation where instead of depending on British sources for the bulk of requirements, she was now called upon to maintain her own forces ... from local manufacture and resources and with her own ordnance organisation. An activity never previously envisaged except to a restricted extent.
The Ordnance Services
The Ordnance services in the Australian army had a chequered development. In a
memorandum to the Minister for the Army Blamey quoted an earlier report saying
their task was 'to undertake the distribution of equipment and clothing for local
Units and for Camps of Training'.^ The major changes which were required
emphasised the need for a high degree of training of the officers responsible for the discharge of ordnance functions under war-time conditions. Blamey said that
3A-1194 (Dept.of Defence - Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, pp.104-105. This writer's italics. ^Dept of Defence. RAAOC Historical Files. Item 251/031/141. Memorandum from C in C to Minister for the Army. Undated but probably about October 1944, dealing with the establishment of a permanent Ordnance Corps. App.A. Extract from the Report upon the Department of Defence from 1 July 1914 until 30 June 1917. 175
The Army must have officers with this training [attendance at the Military College of Science, field experience, co-operation with industry] who are fully conversant with the difficulties of army administration both in the field and on Senior Headquarters.^
At the outbreak of the present war the AMF had insufficient trained personnel to meet the requirements of a military Ordnance Service.^
Blamey went on to illustrate the shortcomings of the Ordnance service in the First World War and concluded that ' the lessons to be learned from history [were] that we learn nothing from history'^ and, consequently, that no improvement in the ordnance situation had occurred during the inter-war years.
Militarily, the Ordnance services were controlled during the inter-war years by the QMG branch but the actual work was carried out and managed by civilians employed under the Public Service Act, an arrangement not favoured by the army and, more significantly, not by the Public Service Board either. As early as 1924 the Public Service Board commented that
... the requirements both in peace and war [would] be most efficiently met by the creation of an Ordnance Corps as part of the Australian Military Forces.®
Yet the Government did not approve any of the many proposals that were submitted over the years except to sanction in or about 1927 the formation of a militia Ordnance Corps (AAOC(M)
5|bid. 6|bid. 7|bid. 8|bid. App.3, p.2. 9|bid. Looseleaf attachment. 176
The problem with the permanent ordnance organisation was the civilian nature of AAOD already referred toJo Staffed largely by ex-First World War ordnance personnel it contained a small permanent army complement, the Inspecting Ordnance Officers' Branch and the Inspector of Ordnance Machinery Branch, responsible for the technical inspection functions. The personnel of the two sections was largely drawn from the permanent artillery and engineers. Successive governments must have found the arrangement satisfactory for servicing a peacetime force but it was not geared to the tasks imposed by a wartime ordnance situation. At the outbreak of the Second World War there was in the AAOD an almost total lack of appropriately trained personnel and a virtual absence of a technically educated management.
It was not surprising therefore that ordnance organisation could not effectively support the army at large, with the many and varied demands for stores and equipment for an expanding home force, the newly created AIF, the garrison troops and the fortress organisations. The relatively few ordnance personnel with First World War experience were soon recruited into the AIF and the availability of technically trained people from outside was severely restricted by the increasing technical manpower demands of an expanding industry.
The AAOD suffered from other disadvantages.Because the Department was staffed and managed under public service conditions and employed largely low level clerical gradings there was little opportunity for the AAOD to attract young and high calibre personnel. Also, because of the regional organisation of AAOD operations there was great reluctance to move stores from one military district to
10A-1194 (Dept. of Defence- Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14, The History of the MGO Branch, pp.2-3. 11A-1194 (Dept. of Defence- Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.187. 177
another. Thus an 'ownership' syndrome had developed which would be a distinct handicap in an emergency.2
The small permanent military component of the AAOD was almost constantly in conflict with the civilian AAOD Backed by their civilian union, the Federated
Storemen and Packers Union, the AAOD resisted strongly any moves towards the militarisation of the ordnance activities. There was tension also between the AAOD and the AAOC (M). The former held on firmly to its powers of executive authority, financial and stores responsibility. The militia ordnance personnel were not permitted into ordnance stores hence received no training in practical stores work and stores accounting. The attitude of the AAOD was that the recording of issues and the correctness of the record was its responsibility. Thus AAOD personnel were not prepared to let untrained militia personnel handle such matters. The
Military Board realised this impasse and recommended in December 1940 that the AAOD be militarised but it took the War Cabinet till May 1941 to reach a decision to that effect.''^ When militarisation did occur on 29 May 1941 the AAOC was unfortunate to have transferred to it at the senior level 'some poor administrators of the former AAOD who seemed to have retained [former] obstructionist attitudes'.
There was yet another problem. The MGO had advocated that the army should hold reserve stocks of hand tools, general hardware items, camp equipment and the like, but this view was not shared by the authorities outside the old MGO section of the QMG branch. The assumption was that stores in general use by the community would always be available, an assumption that proved erroneous.
Even stores used only by the services were in very short supply. For instance the l2john D. Tillbrook, To the Warrior his Arms, p.103. 13A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1940 Vol.1) File 31/40. Militia Ordnance Corps, 31 January 1940. l4john D. Tillbrook, To the Warrior his Arms, p.206. 178
AAOD had only about 2,000 12'x 14' tents and 200 - 300 marquees and store tents. Some of these stores were of First World War vintage. Ironically, in 1940/41
Japan had supplied 1 million yards of tentage material,
In summary, the AAOD was not an efficient organisation, although the Government seemed to think it was. Its shortcomings were due to a number of factors :
Lack of personnel with military background and outlook capable of foreseeing likely wartime requirements and expansion problems.
Lack (for various reasons, some financial) of an adequate nucleus of skilled and active personnel on which expansion could be based.
Impossibility of quickly recruiting additional civilian labour.
Opposition in most quarters of AAOD management, to the acceptance of military assistance or direction.
Low medical standards and high ages of civilian staffs (especially seniors) which hampered transfers of trained men to new depots in outlying districts or to operational areas.
Impossibility, under the existing organisation, of absorbing rapidly and efficiently employing the large untrained staffs upon which an ordnance service must rely in war.
Lack of any real system of staff training in peace.
Break-down, under war pressure, of the peacetime accounting system; stock figures vital for provisioning purposes were unobtainable.
Prevalence of a belief that, in an emergency, the ordnance services would again be operated principally as a responsibility of the British Army.""®
Beavis added to this:
It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the structure and activities of the[Australian army's] Ordnance Department were based on meeting the requirements of peace-time ... Its organisation ... stamped [it] ... an essentially peace-time body.""^ i5|bid. pp.141,202. 16|bjd. pp.205-206. 17A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. The History of the MGO Branch, p.167. 179
and maintained that only very few officers had any conception of how modern
Ordnance services should be operated.
This position ... was largely attributable to the failure on the part of Australia to keep itself informed on the developments ... [in] the British Army ... The lack of training was evident immediately after it was decided to raise the AIF."'®
Ordnance difficulties arose as soon as the forces for the Middle East were to be
raised. There was no appreciation of what the true functions of ordnance services were. Nor was it realised just how large the ordnance effort would have to be,
particularly in terms of clothing, equipment and vehicles. As a result, early in the war the army did not appreciate the need to appoint, quickly, a Deputy Assistant
Director of Ordnance Services as the first and vital step in creating a viable
Ordnance organisation. The functions of the Ordnance service in the First World
War had consisted mainly of routine identification of stores and of checking indents
against approved scales of issues. Since no policy matters were involved no
such high level appointment was needed and there seemed no urgency for such
a senior resource manager fifteen years later.
The changing nature of the maintenance effort was not recognised at first. The
stores used in the First World War were much simpler and bore no comparison
with the sophistication of the Second World War equipment which required a high
level mechanical maintenance capability. The scarcity of some equipment,
particularly after June 1940, introduced further complications. Priority allocation
could only be made by a central authority in full possession of the facts pertaining
to the whole of the supply situation.
i8|bid. p.l68. i9|bid. p.168. 180
With the expansion of the AlF into a corps structure the need for a sound ordnance organisation behind corps HQ became pressing. Again, no firm planning had taken place in this regard during the inter-war years. The plan for an expeditionary force (Plan 401) had envisaged only one division and not four. Beavis is quite critical on this aspect:
The organisation and functions of the Ordnance Corps behind Corps Headquarters had not been defined, in fact there was considerable haziness on the subject.20
However he explained this shortcoming by saying :
When the Ordnance organisations given by the Order of Battle of the AlF was decided the assumption was made that the Australian Corps would be maintained almost entirely (clothing and MT being exceptions) by the British L of C organisation ... [a satisfactory arrangement] had the AlF concentrated with British Forces in France ...21 and :
With the experience subsequently gained in the functioning of an Ordnance Service it would be easy to criticise the early failure to appreciate the importance of developing immediately the AlF was raised an adequate Ordnance Service organisation.22
Beavis referred to other shortcomings in the early ordnance organisation. For instance, he criticised faulty placements of BODs and of workshops and suggested that lines of responsibility were not as clearly defined as they should have been.
All of these aspects assumed considerable urgency and importance when Japan entered the war. There were equipment shortages for the expanding home forces because the army had concentrated on equipping the AlF and maintaining it in the
Middle East. Fortunately the AlF had been completely re-equipped prior to its
20|bid. p.170. 21 Ibid. p.i75. 22|bid. p.176. 181
return from the Middle East, so that war equipment becoming available from internal and external sources at that time could go to the home forces.
The major fault was the lack of forward thinking to ensure the establishment of a sound ordnance organisation. Extensive base installations had to be planned for receiving the accelerated and increased output from local industry and from overseas. Appropriate facilities for bulk issues to the AODs had to be created.
Base workshops had to be established for attending to heavy repairs. As well, additional stores and workshop units had to be raised to cater for the immediate needs of the operational force. Beavis commented :
All the difficulties in the raising and training of the AAOC to serve with the AIF in the Middle East [early in the war] were repeated [eighteen months laterl.23
Most of these difficulties had to do with the state of training of ordnance personnel.
While the rapid expansion of the force caused problems:
... many other problems which arose were clearly related to the inadequate preparation made in peace and the inadequate appreciation within the army...24
For instance, the importance of the BODs was often underrated by those senior resource managers responsible for setting priorities in building construction.
Another avoidable mistake was the limitation of the number of A1 medically classified troops for employment in such depots. Beavis saw these instances as a failure to appreciate the importance of administration for the successful outcome of operations and this lack of appreciation had its roots in senior military attitudes engendered in peacetime. He defended the AAOC against criticisms made of an
23|bid. p.186. 24|bid. p.187. 182
alleged elaborateness of newly constructed ordnance installations^s while at the same time criticising buildings erected for housing Commonwealth peace officers at the Munitions Factory, Salisbury, S.A.26
Despite Beavis' criticism concerning the lack of forward planning, a complex
network system of ordnance depots did emerge by 1942 in the form of CODs, BODs
and AODs, accommodating the stores requirements likely to be encountered.
The system was based on a network of nucleus installations approved in 1940 and to be augmented by additions in case of full mobilisation.
Areas Nucleus Planned
Northern Territory 7 11 Eastern Command 12 14 Southern Command 11 35 Western Command 3 10 Alice Springs 4 37 73
The table above shows that a doubling of ordnance stores facilities in general had
been foreseen and reflects the ideas the army had about priority areas of support -
the Eastern seaboard swallowed up about three quarters of the nucleus and
planned stores facilities.
There was yet another aspect of wartime ordnance services that differed markedly
from peacetime conditions. In peacetime the ordnance services operated in a
25|bid. pp.187-188. Quoting Blarney's rejection of criticisms of waste and extravagance in a letter to the Minister of the Army, 21 November 1942. 26awM (Beavis Papers) Small Box. Letter MGO to Business Manager, 17 October 1942. Comments on extravagance at Salisbury. 27A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol.2) File WN 63/40 Ordnance Depots. 20 September 1940 and file 128/41 of 28 May 1941. 183
highly decentralised fashion on a hand-to-mouth basis controlled by the Military
District where the service was delivered. The stores required were purchased locally or imported directly from Great Britain with the exception of the few items manufactured in Australia.
In wartime an overall national equipment programme had to be developed based on GS branch estimates which, in turn, were meant to determine the pattern of firm orders and delivery dates. Stocks had to be physically distributed by central
initiative so that formations could be equipped and maintained in accordance with their operational roles. This requirement necessitated close collaboration between all four branches of the General Staff which could only be brought about by central control. It was also necessary to ensure a balanced supply of ordnance
manpower and standardised procedures to achieve optimum utilisation of this
manpower.28
It is arguable that the senior resource managers of the Australian army should have taken steps to have a nucleus ordnance system in place at the outbreak of war.
However, given the prevailing defence policy and the country's finances which were only marginally improving after the worst economic depression ever, even a
nucleus ordnance system geared to serve the army under wartime conditions would not have been considered. On the other hand, there had been nothing to
prevent planning for wartime contingencies by the senior resource managers if the
leading personalities had been aware of what wholly maintaining a relatively large army entailed. Such a scenario could have been predicated on the premise that
Australia's supply situation was to be wholly based on self-containment, a situation which some of the Australian Empire-minded senior officers failed to appreciate till
half way through the war.
28A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 27125/20.01. Administration of the MGO Branch 1944, p.192. 184
The Engineering Services
In its 1942 reorganisation the MGO branch followed the British precedent by raising the Corps of AEME with effect from 1 December 1942.29 in peacetime the few repairs that were undertaken by army personnel were carried by small repair sections of the AASC and of the RAE. The new wartime organisation consolidated the several disparate engineering consulting and workshop activities under one umbrella and thus ensured standardisation of repair policies, even distribution of facilities and a relatively high level of technical competence.
The potential repair commitment of the Army could not have been anticipated because the wear and tear of equipment eventually experienced could not have been foreseen. In addition a very high standard of serviceability became necessary in order to keep the calls on industry for replacements and spare parts to a minimum. This, in turn, effected the provision of funds. In short, the overall aim of the engineering directorate was to keep as much equipment in operation and out of workshops as possible.
There was also the important need for the AEME personnel to keep up-to-date with scientific and technological developments generally. Technological developments added to the complexity of tasks and to the need for additional training of personnel. The AEME services had overall responsibility for all repair work other than that carried out by LADs, or by some AASC or RAE elements in respect of first or second echelon repairs.^o
29A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.200. 30The term 'Echelon' is used to denote the degrees of the complexity of repair facilities ranging from the use of hand tools to sophisticated workshop repair capabilities such as engine reconditioning. First and second echelon repairs were those repairs that could be 185
Mechanical and electrical maintenance was mainly concerned with keeping the vastly increased army mechanised equipment functioning and with the tropic proofing of certain other equipment including clothing. By and large motor vehicles, particularly at unit level, were badly maintained. The result was that LADs and 2nd echelon workshops were overworked and that the consumption of spare parts increased considerably. In turn LAD commanders found less and less time to carry out unit inspections. A return from 29 th brigade to 12 AOD showed that 75 per cent of motor cycles and 85 per cent of vehicles were unfit for reissue. The LGA on behalf of the C in C reminded all unit commanders of their responsibility in this respect but First Australian Army objected, believing one of its brigades was unfairly singled out.^^ The formation's argument was that vehicles on issue carried too few tools. Also, there were not enough spares in the LADs to turn vehicles around quickly and as a result units hung onto their vehicles for far too long. Finally the 29th brigade was training in heavily timbered country and wear and tear was heavier than normal. Headquarters Northern Territory Force contended that 25 per cent of the vehicles were three years old, 50 per cent two years old. Some vehicles used on road construction worked two shifts out of three and travelled 1,000 - 1,400 miles per week.32 HQ Queensland L of C advised that the pool of reserve vehicles in 3,12 and 13 AODs would require in all 27 cars, 188 vans, 3 or 4 lorries and 969 motor cycles in order to make a one for one issue every time a vehicle came into the depots for repair.^^
Officers with Middle East background where captured equipment was plentiful gave little attention to maintenance because there had been little need for it in the carried out with the facilities normally available in unit line locations or immediately behind them. 31A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.1) File M39/43. Maintenance of MT 18 February 1943 to 29 March 1943; Memorandum LAG to all formations 18 February 1943. 32|bid. HQ - NT Force to LHQ of 24 February 1943. 33|bid. HQ Queensland L of C to LHQ of 15 March 1943. 186
past. Those with only CMF backgrounds in a basically horsedrawn force had no experience with motor transport . More specifically however, the OCs of LADs were too junior in rank to have much influence on the unit COs.
The maintenance of motor transport was a constant problem to the army right up to the end of the war. To assist COs a campaign to improve unit maintenance was launched late in 1944 after it was found that up to 50 per cent of the workshop repair commitment was due to lack of attention by units to such avoidable causes as inadequate lubrication, lack of cleanliness, loose bolts and screws and minor adjustments. A position of chief inspector of unit maintenance was established in the Maintenance division. This appointment had the task of oversighting activities of unit maintenance inspection sections attached to HQs of formations.34 The campaign resulted in quite spectacular improvements in average driver routine maintenance efficiency.^s
With the complex organisation Beavis created in the Maintenance division it was inevitable that conflicts arose vis-a-vis similar activities of other staff branches.
One example was the demarcation dispute over the functions of the E in C, a Q responsibility, and those of the AEME which were part of the Ordnance organisation. The former was responsible for first and second line echelon repairs, that is repairs which could be carried out at unit level or by the LADs.36 if the task was beyond the resources available at unit level the work was handed onto the
AEMEs 3rd and 4th echelon repair facilities.^^
34A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1945 Vol.1) File M 10/45. Unit Maintenance. 19 November 1944 to 13 January 1945. 35A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 27496/12.56. Review of the seven months activities of the unit maintenance campaign. 30 September 1945. 36|bid 37A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1944 Vol.4) File M 218/44 Relations between RAE and A.E.M.E. 31 January 1944 - 8 May 1945. 187
The echelon demarcation did not work well. Ships did not wait until they had a full backload cargo of vehicles to be repaired in third and fourth echelon areas. As a result vehicles deteriorated in field parks established at embarkation points, mainly due to climatic conditions and to pilferage. Consequently, the backlog of vehicles awaiting repairs grew and a high work load was eventually placed on AEME personnel. The MGO wanted the whole system changed. The first three echelon repairs should be done by the force workshops except for 3rd echelon engine repairs. There should be a continuous evacuation of 50 per cent of all vehicles requiring 4th echelon repairs.38 The commander First Australian Corps sided with the MGO. He wanted the first three echelon repair facilities mounted on trucks and trailers and advanced AEME 4th echelon repair workshops established in the corps theatre area. Advanced LHQ backed the MGO's policy proposal but the C in
C did not.39 He exhibited in this instance his at times well known reluctance to depart from established British practices.
While unit responsibilities in respect of MT vehicles maintenance were well understood even if not always observed, this was not the case in respect of mechanical equipment other than ordnance stores. The MGO branch was not certain if it had any responsibility in this regard. A further complicating factor was that there were quite a few units, such as artillery regiments, transport units and service depots, which used equipment other than ordnance stores but which relied on AEME for first and second echelon as well as for third and fourth echelon repairs. The MGO recommended that his branch should ultimately be responsible for unit maintenance of all mechanical and electrical equipment and the procedures and instructions etc. required to implement it.'^o
38A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1944 Vol.4) File M 202/44 21 January 1944 - 22 August 1944. Maintenance of Mechanical Vehicles in an Overseas Task Force. MGO to LAG 21 June 1944. 39|bid. 1 Aust Corps to LGA of 12 July 1942. MGO to CGS of 22 August 1944. 40A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1945 Vol.5) File M 156/45 7 August 1945. Unit Maintenance MGO to DCGS, B50479 of 13 July 1945. 188
The E in C replied:
MGO letters B24943 ... and B50479 are both endeavours by the MGO branch to usurp certain prescribed functions of the E-in-C office ... It is not known how MGO branch finds time to compile such letters but one might infer that they are written by surplus staff who are seeking more responsibilities to justify their existence.^!
and that both organisations, that is the MGO branch and the E in C office should continue to function as before. He then went over to the attack. The RAE accounted for over 60 per cent of all stores lifted forward in recent operations. To carry out all RAE stores responsibilities 2,268 personnel were required in all of
Australia, whereas the AAOC had a total of 18,519 on strength; the RAE would be pleased to take over provision and distribution of all engineer stores. Finally :
With regard to maintenance it has long been patent that the A.E.M.E. set up under the MGO has been unsatisfactory. It [was] undesirable that there should be two corps of engineers in the army and as mechanical] maintenance [was] essentially a Q function the A.E.M.E. should be transferred to the E in C and made responsible to the QMG. In the British Army the R.E.M.E. (Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers) came under the QMG.
The E in C then requested 'that the MGO refrain from writing lengthy letters containing contentious matters'.He foreshadowed that he would at the appropriate time raise the question of making the user responsible for the provision and maintenance of his technical equipment."^"^ The E in C at that time was MaJ
Gen C.S. Steele,'^^ Q militia officer who in civilian life was a technical director of
Ibid. EinC to CGS. EC374 of 24 July 1945. 42|bid. 43|bjd. "^^ibid. Letter E in C Nr EC 430 to CGS, dated 7 August 1945, 45c S. Steele, MIEA, Consulting Engineer. Born in Melbourne 1892, educated at University of Melbourne. First AIF 1915 to 1917, Second AIF 1939 to 1946. Several CMF commands during the inter-war years. Chief Engineer Second AIF in the Middle East. E in C AMF 189
two major industrial undertakings in Victoria. That there would be some rivalry
between him, a highly qualified engineer with active service experience in the First
World War and subsequent high level civilian engineering management
employment, and the MGO, an almost equally highly qualified regular officer, is not
surprising. The QMG and the MGO organisations were faced with overlapping
functions based on the British tradition. Beavis' contributions to the war effort have
already been mentioned but he was not always able to overcome the public
service-type uniformed and civilian ordnance bureaucracy. In fact he may not
have even wanted to. On the other hand Steele wanted to implement
understandable shortcuts and to eliminate demarcation problems but it is doubtful
whether in the light of tradition the principle of user responsibility for provision and
maintenance of their own technical equipment could have been a practical
proposition.
Another vital area of maintenance was the guarding of stores against deterioration
caused by tropical conditions. Tropic proofing was a major task of the AEME
services. It included rotproofing of boots and tentage, waterproofing of equipment
likely to get wet at beach landings and during the frequent rain storms, proofing of
electrical and optical equipment subject to damage by particular fungi, corrosion
proofing of tin plate used in the manufacture of containers and, of course, the
protection of ammunition. Reports from New Guinea operational areas indicated
that damage to many equipment items was sustained but due to ignorance or
inattention to the problem, no quick solutions were found. The causes of the
damage were few but the total effect was exacerbated by the multitude of
equipment items so affected. In the event it took over twelve months of tropical
warfare for a Mycological Panel to be formed by the Scientific Liaison Bureau.
This panel operated through five inter-service committees dealing with the
1942-1946. Technical Director of Australian Paper Manufacturers Limited and Metropolitan Gaslight Company of Victoria. 190 packaging of equipment, corrosion prevention, fungus damage to electrical equipment, rotting of organic materials and damage done to optical equipment.'^®
At the beginning of operations in the tropics the army appeared at first quite indifferent to the problem of damages caused by tropical conditions despite the fact that the Munition Supply Laboratories at Maribyrnong had been working since early 1941 on rot proofing of canvas and sandbags, applying a copper creosote treatment technique :
... it was almost impossible to get the army to take any interest in our proposals for the treatment of millions of unproofed sandbags that had been imported from lndia.47
Despite the technical instructions prepared by the Laboratories not only for sandbags but also for tentage, the army took little notice until 1942 when troops in New Guinea tried to paint white radar tents with sump oils, a practice which only accelerated the rotting process."^® It took the initiative of the C in C on his return from New Guinea late in 1942 for the problem of tropic proofing of war materials to be addressed seriously.^s
The initial indifference of the senior Australian resource managers to the need for tropic proofing is difficult to understand. Australian forces were deployed under tropical conditions from early in the war in the Northern Territory and from 1941 in Malaya and even if regular officers were ignorant of the problem, there must have been a sufficient number of senior CMF officers with the appropriate education to
Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, pp.62-63, 553. The Scientific Liaison Bureau was established on 9 July, 1942 to ensure that scientific problems arising from war activities be brought quickly to the notice of suitable scientists and scientific institutions so that, if needs be, appropriate scientific work could be carried out. 47|bid. p.567, quoting Munition Supply Laboratories War History, p.51. 48|bid. 49|bid. p.551. 191
appreciate the problem. But it was not until May 1943 that the Scientific Liaison
Bureau decided on a scientific nnission, later referred to as the Chapman Mission, to New Guinea's static and operational areas :
to collect information on the problem of deterioration of stores and equipment and to bring back samples for investigation.so
Thus a project came into being that should have been undertaken in the first half of
1941 at the latest. It was not that the senior military officers had not learnt something from their experiences in the first twelve months in the tropics but that, because of their lack of planning, any remedial action designed to counteract deterioration of stores had to be accorded a lower phority than the demands posed by operational requirements. Fortunately some of the storage facilities, for instance the Armco huts, however unsatisfactory in many respects did provide some cover which otherwise would not have been available.
O'Brien took up these circumstances in 1955 with Mellor. O'Brien endeavoured to correct the impression created by Mellor that until the Chapman Mission the army had done little or nothing in the way of tropic proofing of warlike materials. This might have been the case at the time, but as O'Brien maintains that
However essential Tropic Proofing might be ... it had to take second place to the provision of equipment for immediate combat. Even a high proportion of failures in those days ... a little equipment was far better than no equipment at all
Because of the lack of peacetime preparations and of trained personnel, the officers of the reorganised MGO branch had been 'hurriedly pitched into the job
50c.J. Magee and others, Report on the Condition of Service Material Under Tropical Conditions in New Guinea. 2nd Edition, (Chapman Mission) Scientific Liaison Bureau (Melbourne). 1944,p.4. 51 Ibid, p.3 52aWM - S74 (Mellor Papers) File 41. Letter O'Brien to Mellor 1 March 1955. 192 from March '42 onwards', trying to build up from scratch what should have been in place. Some of the equipment at their disposal was so out-of-date that it went back to the Boer war. O'Brien believed the senior officers were well aware of what was needed. To them the Chapman report was:
[not] that it awakened the Army because the Army was well on the job, at least in the MGO Branch but as a civilian cum-military publication and by reason of the high scientific standing of some of its members it helped to enlist the attention of scientists and manufacturers.
The Mission's report covered investigations carried out at Port Moresby which had a relatively dry climate and at Milne Bay with its high humidity. It stressed some of the consequential results of the deterioration of warlike material:
The economic loss due to tropical effects ... is estimated at one to two million pounds. The loss coupled with two other most important considerations, namely reduced operational efficiency due to unreliable and ... unserviceable equipment and the drain on the manpower involved in frequent reconditioning of equipment, justifies the adoption and implementation of the remedial measures advocated in this report.^"^
The measures the report recommended consisted of vastly improved techniques of packaging and handling and storage, the areas thought to be responsible for 75 per cent of stores deterioration. Equally if not more important was the need for corrosion proofing both prior to dispatch of stores from the mainland and while under storage conditions in the tropics.
The deterioration of equipment was not uniform. The following examples will illustrate the variability of evidence found by the Mission. Eighty per cent of returned small arms were in bad condition a phenomenon which was attributed to
53|bid. 54|bid. 193
inadequate maintenance at unit level.Artillery equipment on the other hand was generally found to be in good order, despite the fact that appropriate corrosion inhibiting preparations were not on unit issue - in other words, suitable substitutes were successfully employed.Ammunition was subject to rapid deterioration once it was stored in an Advanced Army Ammunition Depot, mainly due to the unsuitability of ammunition boxes and containers.^^
Army boots were another problem. At the time the Chapman Mission visited New
Guinea there were 100,000 pairs of boots in AODs and BODs covered in mould and hardened with uppers which resulted in loss of water resistance. It should
have been realised that steel plates and studs formed chemical compounds with
leather resulting in a lowering of the surface tension of the matehal.^® The totally
inadequate corrosion proofing of tin plate used for food containers is another case
in point. They were often subject to rusting and pinhole corrosion admitting contaminents into the containers.^^
In some instances, the army could not be blamed for the shortcomings that were experienced in 1942 and halfway through 1943. But the army should have been aware that Australian packaging technology lagged behind that of other countries.
Senior resource managers could have insisted on sturdier construction of packing cases to prevent pilfering. Proper cushioning material to prevent damage to goods should have been required and waterproof linings insisted upon.
Mellor maintains, furthermore, that the technologists in the army often repeated earlier work and 'wasted a great deal of time rediscovering old knowledge'^o
55|bid. p.29. 56|bid. p.30. 57|bid. p.32. 58|bid. p.71. 59|bid. p.85. 60D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p.571. 194
which was stored in a number of scientific and technological libraries but was not organised for ready access.
Services of the Central Provision Office
Provision is the action taken to maintain stocks of ordnance stores at the level necessary to meet all anticipated requirements. It entails forecasting the situation and estimating requirements to ensure supply yet ensuring that no surplus stocks accumulate.^^
The Central Provision Office was responsible for maintaining the flow of stores into the BODs so that the demands from the AODs could be met. To ensure this flow of stocks, firm orders had to be placed by the client agency sufficiently well in advance to allow for adequate planning and organisation of the appropriate manufacturing capacity. The even flow of orders made even production runs possible, which in turn assisted in maintaining continuous deliveries.
The Provision organisation had certain associated functions, such as arranging for funds to cover the orders, preparation of production and consumption forecasts to cover the orders, close liaison with the production instrumentalities to enable follow-up of orders, determination of priorities and the maintenance of an adequate accounting system.
Finally, the Central Provision Office had the task of preventing the over- accumulation of stocks. The following table gives a crude indication of the balance between receipts and issues for which the Central Provision Office was striving.
61A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 27125/20.01. The Administration of the MGO Branch of the Staff, LHQ and of the MGO Services. Vol.1, 1944. Definition 41 Note: The term 'provision' was quite specific to the definition. The terms 'provisioning' or 'provisions' generally referred to food supplies. 62MGO Equipment Memorandum no.14, 1945, p.7. 195
Ordnance Depots Average Monthly Average Monthly Supplying Receipts in Tons Issues in Tons Dead - Weight Dead - Weight
Mechanical Transport 5,000 4,000 Spare Parts Clothing and Stores 20,000 15,000 Technical Stores 7.000 4,000 Returned Stores 6,000 5,000
There was no central Provision facility in the Australian army prior to the 1939-1945 war. Responsibility for Provision of equipment rested with the Director of Artillery and with the Director of Mechanisation, first located in the QMG branch and subsequently the responsibility of the MGO branch.63 it was realised by 1937 that the existing ordnance apparatus would be inadequate to meet potential large scale wartime requirements and that a Provision organisation would be needed. As soon as 1 Aust Corps was created Beavis had a Provision section established in
October 1940, as part of 1 Aust Corps ordnance services.^^ When it came to setting up an appropriate ordnance apparatus, difficulties arose. Among these was the Government's attitude. Tillbrook maintains that:
Until Japan entered the war... any early attempts ... to develop an adequate system of ordnance depots and a realistic provision programme met with obstructionism and stone-walling by the Treasury and the Australian Govenment at large.
Though not mentioned by Tillbrook, a further problem was the army's inability to forecast its requirements in such a manner as to enable the Provision apparatus to maintain an adequate flow of orders. Jensen complained, albeit with hindsight :
Certainly there were shortages here in 1940 but seeing that the Army did not tell us until 12 June1940 (that was the exact date they told us what they wanted) this suggests that they had fallen down in listing
63john D. Tillbrook, To the Warrior his Arms, pp.220-223. 6'^A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.105. 65john D. Tillbrook, To the Warrior his Arms, p.221. 196
their requirements if they only asked for them nine months after the war started ... I can show that the MGO branch complained about November 1939 that we were making too many machine guns; that does not show very much foresight.®®
The Australian army divided its stores into two broad categories, controlled and non-controlled stores. The former comprised about 800 items, including non- fighting vehicles, complete weapon systems and ammunition. There were about
300,000 other items in the second category, including clothing and MT spare parts.An example from each category has been chosen to illustrate the difficulties : the provision of ammunition and provision of shirts and trousers.
Controlled Stores - The Provision of Ammunition
The problem of the provision of ammunition in general was documented and examined by Shedden®® and examined extensively by Ross.®^ Thus only some of the difficulties faced by the army will be highlighted here.
Prior to the 1937 Imperial Conference the army was required to submit an estimate of what ammunition would be needed in an emergency but this had proved difficult . The Secretary of the Munitions Supply Board indicated to the
Secretary of the Department of Defence that he could not provide this estimate because the services would not state their requirements.^® Nevertheless, some schedules were submitted. There were two programmes: a statement of what was on order, and a supplementary statement of what was wanted over and above the estimates. There was little difference between the programmes and both exhibited gaps indicating where the army had no idea of what might be needed. The
66AWM 874 (Mellor Papers) File 35. Letter Jensen to Mellor 4 May, 1953. 67john D. Tillbrook, To the Warrior his Arms, p.224,231. 68A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 487 Dept. of Munitions, 30 June 1945. (Munitions Digest) 69A.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia, Particularly Chapter 5. 70A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence-Classified Correspondence) Munitions Requirements. File 11/302/2. Secretary, MSB to Secretary, Dept. of Defence, 24 April 1937. 197
supplementary estimates show that, with the exception of 9.2 inch artillery ammunition and certain practice rounds, all requirements were expected to be met from local sources.
One of the large items was small arms ammunition. The needs estimate of .303 inch ball ammunition in 1939 was three times the annual estimate for 1935/36.
There was no attempt to indicate how these estimates were arrived at. It would appear that as the international situation worsened the military resource managers simply doubled the previous year's figures. It would be quite unfair, however, to suggest that planning by the military resource managers was incompetent. The
Government had asked them to prepare certain estimates in the light of an official contingency plan which foresaw that only relatively small Japanese raiding parties were likely to be encountered.
After the Munich crisis of 1938 the Military Board submitted proposals for measures designed to meet sudden major emergencies. One such proposal was to initiate an immediate speeding up of ammunition supplies in accordance with the schedules submitted by Australia to the 1937 Imperial Conference. By early 1939 the army had become concerned that the ammunition supplies were not forthcoming. The CGS complained :
I am however so concerned at the slowness of provision of material requirements for the army particularly locally manufactured ammunition for the weapons we already hold, that I must stress for all natures of local production to be placed on war footing at once. We do not appear to have benefited from the crisis in September last year, for, so far as I am able to judge production is proceeding at a rate very little faster than normal times of peace prior to last September. Little or no attempt appears to have been made to hasten or eliminate the delays of peacetime departmental routine.
71A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence-Classified Correspondence) File 30/301/6. Emergency Actions. Statement CGS to Secretary of Defence, 30 January 1939. 198
However, the army must accept some blame. The order recommended by the
Casey defence review of March/April 1938 had not been placed :
Both Casey and the new Defence Minister, Thorby, accused the Army of putting up buildings and other non-vital works while not concentrating on ordering the vital munitions72
The army countered this accusation by claiming that the delay was caused by its endeavours to align the army's requirements with Australian manufacturing capabilities^^ But this argument was not valid because ammunition manufacturing capacity for standard weapons to standard and approved patterns was in place.
A 1939 tabulation of existing artillery ammunition stocks shows that, with one exception, the ammunition holdings must have been considered satisfactory.
When the then current orders had been delivered the ammunition stocks for the
First Line Component (gun line and unit reserve) would have been:
Weapon Ammunition Holdings
3' Anti-Aircraft 96% for 24 gun units 4.5' 21% • 18 Pdr Field Gun 70%} of First Line 4.5' Howitzer 72%} Holdings at Gun 60 Pdr Gun 74%} positions plus 6' Howitzer 73% } Unit Reserve
72a.T. ROSS, The Arming of Australia, p.126. The 1938 defence review was presented to Parliament in April by the Treasurer, R. Casey. He described the second three-year defence programme which more than doubled the expenditure of the 1934/35 to 1936/37 programme. G. Long, To Benghazi, pp.23,26. 73S.J. B[i{\\n, War Economy, 1939-1941, p.319. 74A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence-Classified Correspondence) File 30/301/6. Emergency Actions Statement A, 17 February 1939. 199
At the same time there were only 110 million rounds of rifle ammunition in stock, a holding considered to be too low, and orders for doubling that amount were given.
Australia was still exporting ammunition and charging her customers (UK and
India) inspection fees at a rate of 17 per cent of the total valuers
The Government had good economic and industrial reasons for encouraging the export of ammunitions. Export boosted the volume of production, and the greater the volume the lower the unit price of the product, thus rendering the whole of the
Australian munitions programme more economical. Secondly, additional revenue was created.
The early estimates of munition requirements were based on the UK War Usage
Rates, (WUR), an empirical measure of ammunition expenditure derived from First
World War experience. Also assumed was a six-months reserve holdings calculated from the date the first shot was fired to the date on which production exceeded war usage and other wastages. Depending on operational circumstances the reserve period was not to be exceeded. In addition, the War
Cabinet ordered the services to prepare estimates of ammunition requirements for
WEs for which orders had not yet been placed.^®
Until well into the Pacific war the army had no means of assessing what its real ammunition requirements were at the time of ordering. This uncertainty had the effect of delaying the placement of orders. As a short-term measure the C in C recommended, successfully, that orders be placed as soon as the Defence
Committee had endorsed the requirement schedules, that is, orders were to be placed before funds authorisation had taken place. Flexibility was to be maintained
75A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1940 Vol.1) File 119/40. Inspection Charges. 11 April 1940. 76A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 4) File M 122/41. Munition Requirements 21 June 1942. WC Minutes 1477, November 1941 and 1904, 18 February 1942, Agendum 358/941. 200 by the provision that quantities could be altered if changes in the ORBAT occurredJ^ But even so, there still remained the need for an assessment of true requirements at unit and formation level, which in turn would affect the reserve stocks held at various L of C levels including the LHQ general reserves. It was these data which would form the real basis of production requirements.
Until well into 1943 the supply of ammunition was determined by the stocks of first line holdings, that is the ammunition available at the gun lines or with the individual weapons plus a unit reserve which could be speedily augmented from a second line of stocks held on wheels. Under European or Middle East conditions the second line could be brought forward virtually at a moment's notice, but this was often quite impossible under tropical conditions. On the other hand, ammunition requirements were less stringent. As General Morshead pointed out: Recent operations [have] shown that the present [War Office] first line scaling of ammunition for units of a jungle division [is] in excess of that which units [could] carry under transport limitations usually applying.
The transport limitation to which he referred was the 15 per cent difference in load carrying MT vehicles of the jungle infantry division as compared with the standard divisional establishment.The excessive scale resulted in rather wasteful practices. Units returned ammunition they did not want or established non-
77A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.5) File M 266/43. Funds for Ammunition Items for Period Ending 31 July 1944, 29 November 1943 - 24 June 1944. 78Lt Gen Sir Lesley James Morshead was born on 18 September 1882 at Ballarat, Victoria. He became a teacher at Armidale and joined the School Cadet Unit. In 1914 he transferred to Melbourne Grammar School and joined the first AIF as a lieutenant. He saw service on Gallipoli and in France and returned as CO of the 33rd Bn. He served in the CMF in the inter-war years whilst being Melbourne Manager of the P & O Shipping Line. He was appointed commander 18 BDE 6 DIV, 2nd AIF in 1939, served at GOC 9 Div. at Tobruk and saw service in Syria. Subsequently he became GOC 2nd Australian Corp and directed operations in New Guinea and in Borneo. He died on 26 September 1959. 79MP-742/1 (Army HQ - General Correspondence 1943-1951) File 11/1/844. Supply of Ammunition in the Field. Memo Lt Gen L.J. Morshead to LHQ, 13 March 1944. 80A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1945- Vol.3) File M 80/45. Conversion of Jungle Division to Normal (Standard) Infantry Division. Appendix B to CGS Minute of 1 March, 1945. 201
standard (unofficial) dumps. Formations established standard (regulation type) dumps in lieu of keeping the second line on wheels and had them leap-frogged by native carriers or small craft around the coast - generally quite an expensive procedure in terms of resources.
The difficulty was that the Australian army had no experience of ammunition usage in the areas in which it was fighting for the most part of the war and had based its estimates on Middle East usage rates which, however, gave a distorted picture. For instance, as shown by Rudland and Ross®^ the ammunition usage in terms of rounds per gun per day (RPGPD) in the case of rifle fire and in divisional operations varied from 0.2 at Balikpapan to 1 in North Africa and in New Guinea, and was double that in the case of battalion operations. The corresponding LMG usage rates in the same areas were 4, 10 and 57 for divisional battles and averaged only 10 in battalion engagements.
Further variations were found when considering the origins of ammunition usage, which included firing at the enemy, training behind the front lines, the result of enemy action or turnover of old and defective stock. Training at battalion level consumed more ammunition in New Guinea than actual operations, mainly because of the need to constantly keep up battle skills. Enemy action amounted to 2 -3 per cent of ammunition usage and turnover of all stock and all defective ammunition was of the same order with the exception of the 10-15 per cent wastage due to climatic influences in New Guinea when little was known about ammunition preservation under jungle conditions.®^
W.W. Rudland, and A.T. Ross. Analysis of War Usage Rates for Ammunition, Dept. of Defence (Army Office), Directorate of Operational Analysis - Army, DOA - Rept. No.7, February 1987, p.7. 82|bid. pp.37-38. 202
Several methods of estimating ammunition requirements were used. For the best part of the war Australia had relied on the UK WURs. These rates were modified by the LHQ War Materials Usage Rates Committee established in 1944 to suit conditions in the Pacific theatre of war 83 WURs for ammunition were expressed as the average rate at which ammunition was expended over a specified period of time. They were determined for the primary purpose of arriving periodically at forecasts of future ammunition expenditure rather than as a yard stick for day to day activities such as the compilation of load tables.
The practice of dumping the second line of ammunition holdings was unsatisfactory from other points of view. It relied on non-jungle scales of issue and had to satisfy unit demands ' in detail' that is in terms of specific items rather than replenishment of all categories of ammunition. Replenishing a division by 'detail' tended to clog up the communication channels. It also tended to put unnecessary demands on carrying resources and jeopardised the concept of automatic resupply of ammunition holdings to units and gun lines.
Headquarters New Guinea Force devised a new approach to satisfying ammunition requirements based on a revised scale of first line ammunition holdings, which, in turn, affected the second line divisional ammunition 'refill'.®"^ A comparison of selected ammunition items between 'refill' scale as suggested by Morshead and the standard scales will illustrate the advantages of departing from the standard
WURs.
83|bid. pp.3-4. 84MP-742/1 (Army HQ-General Correspondence) File 11/1/844. Supply of Ammunition in the Field. Morshead to LHG. Memo G/6797/SD. 13 March 1944 Appendix A. 203
COMPARISON BETWEEN STANDARD DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION SCALES (WURs)
AND THE PROPOSED TROPICAL SCALES
Type of Amn. Standard Scale Suggested Scale Savings Savings RPG Unit Total RPG Unit Total in Rounds in Tons
.303 Band.Inf 50 100 919050 50 50 612700 306350 10.4 6127weap's *
9mm Inf. 200 400 675000 200 400 152800 1125weap's *
2' Mortar 36 60 10368 18 36 5832 4536 7.8 108 weap's
3' Mortar 45 112 56 12264 30 30 4380 7884 56.3 73 weap's
25pdrArty HE 40 100 3360 40 100 3360 24 guns
_* weapons
Based on these data the divisional 'refill' was calculated. In lieu of the former second line holdings either on wheels or in dumps, the refill was based on a daily expenditure at intense rates.For example, at intense rates the divisional ammunition stocks would receive fourteen refills in a fortnightly period. Over larger periods the average daily expenditure was much less and the standard WUR method had to be re-employed.
Comparison between Standard Second Line Ammunition Holdings and the Holdings of a Divisional Refill.
Type No.of Second Line Standi Refill Savings % Weight Weapons Rds/Wp. Total Rds/Weap. Total Total Rds saving Saving Tons
.303 Bdr. 9 358 40 374320 12.5 132 837 241 483 65 -8.2
9mm 2 237 600 1 035 200 50.0 111 850 923 350 89 -27.5
2' Mor 120 60 7 200 6.0 720 6 830 1 -11.7
3' Mor 81 72 5 832 12.0 972 4 860 17 -34.7
25Pdr + 7.9 Arty HE 24 75 1 800 100 2 400 +600 +25
85see following discussion. 86MP-742/1 (Army HQ-General Correspondence) File 11/1/844. Supply of Ammunition in the Field Morshead to LHG. Memo G/6797/SD. 13 March 1944 Appendix B. 204
Morshead's recommendation was implemented in August 1944.8^ Because of the number of field guns per division under the tropical establishment was reduced by two thirds, the remaining one field regiment had to carry a proportionately heavier firing load; to accommodate this increased task, the number of rounds per gun was increased.
From a strategic point of view both the WUR and the divisional refill methods for estimating munition requirements were found to be unsatisfactory and the Australian army made use of a further concept developed in the UK and termed Field Force Composition rates. The Field Force Composition rate was expressed as a percentage of monthly usage in terms of the unit's war establishment holdings. It allowed for three operational states - Intense, Normal and Quiet, later reduced to Intense and Quiet.®®
For instance, the 25 -Pdr HE Field Force Composition rates for the three states of activity were 40,10 and 2 respectively. Therefore, the ammunition forecast for one division at intense rate would have been 40 per cent of the standard field artillery HE ammunition WE based on three field regiments or 72 guns each with 40 rounds per gun first line ammunition. The ammunition production necessary to meet this requirement was estimated on the basis of one division at intense rate, one at normal and the remainder at quiet rates. When the two-state scale (Intense and Quiet) was introduced early in 1944 the C in C advised the Prime Minister that the August 1943 estimate was no longer valid. With the introduction of the two-activity state the army forecast that for the ensuing months 1.5 divisions (tropical scale) including their ancillary troops, one seventh of the total light anti-aircraft artillery, one ninth of the total heavy anti-aircraft artillery and 0.17 (about one troop) of an
S^ibld. Memorandum SM 7544 of 12 July 1944. 88A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence-Classified Correspondence) File 31/301/304. Basis of Ammunition Requirements. Letter C in C to Prime Minister, 25 March 1944. Note to Secretary 2 March 1944 and Appendix B. 205 armoured brigade would be deemed to be on Intensive activity. The remainder of the Australian army would be on Quiet activity. These adjustments were made in addition to the 12.5 per cent overall reduction of unit equipment WEs. Blamey claimed that a firm ORBAT could not be forecast because Australia's strategic commitments for the remainder of the year were not clear and he anticipated that this 12.5 per cent unit equipment reduction right across the board would assist in preventing over-Provision should the Provision of ammunition based on Field Force Composition rates still prove excessive.89
To summarise, even as late in the war as mid-1944 there was not just one but several methods of arriving at ammunition requirements for the army. There were the standard first and second line ammunition holdings for a division which had been formulated in the First World War and had been perfected in the Middle East in the early forties. This tactical ammunition replenishment was considerably modified by Morshead who had realised that entirely different circumstances of topography and tactics had affected the usage of ammunitions. Overall, jungle operations were not nearly as expensive in terms of ammunition usage as the desert operations in the Middle East. There was now much greater emphasis on the use of small arms ammunition expended in unit and sub-unit operations than in all other encounters. This has been shown by Rudland and Ross, even though there are some reservations in respect of some of their findings.®®
By the middle of 1944 the system of Provision of ammunition on the basis of Intense or Quiet activities had been firmly established. The system aimed at avoiding over-Provision of ammunition in the light of the changed strategical
89|bid. 90W.W. Rudland and A.T. Ross, Analysis of War Usage Rates of Ammunition, pp.7,9. The reservations are concerned with the attempt to place battalion sized operations in juxtapositions with divisional and brigade operations in different areas, and against different enemies. 206
circumstances of the Australian army. This is not to say that changes in the
Provision process for ammunition based on experience in New Guinea had to wait tili 1943 or 1944. Periodically, shortages were experienced late in 1940 and throughout 1941, but these were not due to lack of foresight on the part of the senior resource managers or to a lack in manufacturing capacity, but rather to
Government policy which sought to assist Great Britain and the whole of the AIF
rather than support exclusively the home defence of Australia.^^ In fact, rapid
improvements had been made in 1942, as has been illustrated by Ross.92 By
mid-1942 the whole of the WE complement of munitions including ammunition had
been in place for a seven-division (standard) home defence force organised into three corps, except for the full complement of 25-Pdr field artillery. The tabulation on which Ross' statement is based does not include the ammunition brought back
by the AIF or the stocks diverted to Australia in refugee ships.
Non-Controlled Stores - The Provision of Shirts and Trousers
The supply of shirts and trousers is a good example of the complexity of the
Provision apparatus^^ as it affected the availability of non-controlled stores.
The physical circumstances underlying the high wastage rates of these stores have been mentioned in the previous chapter. This sub-section aims at explaining the problems with which the Provision system was faced.
91AWM S 54 (Training) File 327/1/11. Arms and Ammunition for a Division. Doc. 422/78, 14 August 1940. 92a.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia, Annex Tables K-2 and K4. 93Refugee ships were cargo carriers diverted to Australia from destinations overrun by Japanese forces. 94A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.5) File M 281/43. Basis of Provision for AMF of Equipment- MGO Branch File Range 6 October 1943 - 8 July 1944. 95A-1194 (Dept.of Defence-Library) Accession no. 27125/20.01. The Administration of the MGO Branch ... Vol.1. Definition 16: Controlled Stores. High value stores both operational and monetary. Release was subject to LHQ approval and issue was directly controlled by the DOS. Non-controlled stores included clothing items, spare parts, raw materials. Issues were authorised at a relatively low level. 207
In addition to the initial unit issue, a six months reserve based on WURs were to be held in CODs, BODs and AODs, giving a reserve holding of a total of eighteen months. As soon as Japan entered the war the Provision basis was considered to be inadequate because no allowance had been made for maintenance periods^^ and the creation of a GS reserve of selected items.^^ The depots considered vital were the BODs and the AODs and for these two types of depots alone a nine month reserve was considered necessary.
The inadequacy of stores holdings as they existed early in 1943 are compared with British practice in the following table.
UK Stocks Aust Reserves Australian Reserves As in 1943. in nxjnths As in 1943. in months Proposed, in months
War Office Reserve. 1 Stores Margins at Depots. 6 1 4 Interim Periods 6 5 5 Maintenance ^ J5. £ 25 21 24
The British reserves were 16 per cent larger than the Australian despite the greater wear and tear in the tropical areas.
96|bjd. Definition 31: Maintenance Period. Normal time elapsed between placing an order and arrival of goods in the respective depot. Normally six months for a Central Provision Store and one month for an ordnance depot. 97|bjd. Definition 28: GS Reserve. An operational reserve held in specified areas to counter the effects of severance of communications with the main sources of supply and unexpected operational requirements. Expressed in a number of months at a given degree of activity. 208
The proposal for revised stores holdings was accepted by the War Cabinet.it meant lengthening of maintenance periods and thus cushioning of sudden runs on stocks was achieved. This in turn compensated for excessive variation in usage, variations in size ranges of clothing, unforeseen troop movements, disturbances in the flow of goods between factories and the CODs, loss and damage in transit and
for unforeseen changes in ORBAT.^s In terms of reserve holdings, the total taxpayer's investment in non-controlled stores increased from 21 to 24 months, or
nearly 15 per cent.
Ensuring adequate maintenance periods caused difficulties for the army vis-a-vis
the politicians and public servants because the senior resource managers failed to
demonstrate the rationale of their requirements. Thus the further away from the
frontline responsible authorities were, the more confused they became in the face
of large army orders. The provision of about 4.5 million shirts and trousers
indented by the MGO in 1944 is a case in point. He had omitted to explain in detail
to the civilian authorities what the basis of the projected requirements was. The
Minister for the Army Francis M Forde asked the CGS, in his capacity as the MGO's
direct superior, whether the high wastage rates in shirts and trousers were
expected to continue :
... while it [was] frankly admitted that we [were] amazed at the apparently high issue of shirts of seven per year for every member of the Australian Military Forces we have no doubt as to the integrity of the directing staff responsible for the calculations.''oo
The Minister for Supply and Shipping pointed out to Forde that an indent of such a
magnitude entailed procuring 16 million yards of material. In addition, the
98A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1943-Vol 5) File M 281/43. Basis of Provision for AMF of Equipment- MGO Branch. File Range 8 October 1943-8 July 1944. WC Minute 3270. 99|bid. Agendum 17/1944. I00|bid. Letter Forde to CGS of 29 March 1944. 209
manufacturing capacity would have to be stepped up by 360 per cent for trousers
and 220 per cent for shirts. This could not be done with Australian resources and
import procurement would have to be resorted to. The Minister for Supply and
Shipping also queried the implied degree of wastage, particularly since American
military authorities had not experienced a similarly high level of wastage in New
Guinea.lo^
The Minister for the Army was critical of the demand by the MGO for the
aforementioned Provision of 4,449,014 shirts of which 755,000 represented three
months holdings in the BODs, and pointed out that:
the implementation of the principle approved in [WC] Minute 3270 [involved] considerable extra demands on our manpower, materials and financial resources-'io^
The Minister insisted that the MGO's demand be reduced by the BOD holdings, that
is, overall by 17 per cent and that AOD holdings be reduced to an absolute
minimum. He also wanted the method of computations to be revised in order to
establish a better basis for estimating real requirements. He gave the CGS an
opportunity to save face. Perhaps complaints from the front were in part due to
uneven distribution of stocks, perhaps the production capacity was somewhat
inadequate, perhaps an enquiry should be conducted?^What he did not say,
but what might well have been in his mind, was that the fewer stores were in the
AODs the fewer issues would be made.
The MGO interpreted the Minister's directive for an enquiry as an expression of no confidence in him :
101 Ibid. Letter Minister for Supply and Shipping to Forde, of 14 March 1944. American uniform material was of better quality and therefore lasted longer. I02|bid. Letter Forde to CGS of 29 March 1944. 103|bid. 210
... it is manifestly impossible for me to continue holding the appointment of the Master General of the Ordnance.""
Nonetheless the MGO still wanted an enquiry in the form of a Royal Commission.
In his reply to criticism the MGO blamed the neglect in the inter-war years for shortcomings in 1944, but he did not do it very convincingly :
The difficulties which have confronted the MGO Branch in suddenly expanding to deal with expenditures to the order of 100,000,000 pounds a year in Arms, Armament and Equipment votes have been immense.los
This argument was somewhat fatuous. The war had been in progress for over four years and he was still trying to put the blame for shortcomings on the administration of the pre-war era. The need for jungle green shirts could not have been anticipated at that time in those years of financial stringency. Nor could something tangible have been done about it. The excuse for his seemingly excessive demands was that the Business Adviser of the Army and the Board of
Business Administration had endorsed his proposal."'o®
What he should have done six months earlier was to explain to the politicians in
Melbourne that the basis of his indent was 7.5 shirts per man per annum^o^ and lO'^lbid. Letter MGO to LGA of 12 April 1944. 105|bid. 106|bid. "•o^lbid. Letter MGO to Minister for the Army of 6 July, 1944. Calculation of Minimum Maintence Figure (MMF).
Assumptions: Average Strength of AMP 461,000 Average Monthly Issues and dues out from 1 April, 1943 - 1 December, 1943 289,000 Estimated Army Strength for 12 Months of 1944 404,000
MMF= PftQOQO X 404.000 =253,000 461,000 21 1
explain why shirts in New Guinea did not last as long as on the mainland and why
American experience was different.
Summary
The Maintenance division of the MGO branch had the hardest task of all of the army's logistic support services. It was a large and complex organisation combining technical, service, accounting and stores control elements under the umbrella of a brigadier's command, directly answerable to the MGO.
The MGO's major contribution to the Division's efficiency was in the field of
Provision. He was able to clear up the problem of ordering, so much so that the manufacturing agencies could embark on long range production planning and the army on a long range stocking policy. Ross maintains that this stage had been reached by mid-1943.
Up till that time ordering and stocking policies:
... did not provide for adequate maintenance stocks to be held in Ordnance Depots and was unsatisfactory from the point of view of the Production Departments who would be unable to deliver the goods fast enough once the Army's inadequate maintenance stocks were exhausted.
One consequence of ordering and indenting procedures revised on the basis of jungle warfare experience was that the magnitude of some orders was such that
Average no. of Shirts per Man per Year = MMF x 12 = 253,QQQ 12 = 7.5 No. of Troops 404,000
^OSA.T. ROSS, Awakenng the Apocalypse, Chapter 11, Tentative p.47. 109A-1194 (Dept.of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. History of the MGO Branch, p.120. 212
the political and public service authorities refused to endorse them no matter how soundly they appear to have been based. 213
CHAPTER 9
LOGISTICS AND PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS
Of necessity the war years saw a vast growth in both the range and the quantity of munitions manufactured in Australia.
From about 1912 onwards successive Australian governments had deliberately encouraged the development of munitions production capability in Australia because they distrusted the validity of the official Empire doctrine of reliance on
Great Britain for protection of the dominions, particularly those in the Pacific region.
Beginning with the Colonial Ammunition Factory, Footscray, Victoria and the Small
Arms Factory (SAF) at Lithgow, NSW, subsequent installations had added to the
Australian capability for self-reliance in the supply of munitions including clothing and saddlery. Other government factories were later established, for instance at
Maribyrnong and Bendigo, Victoria, St.Mary's in New South Wales and Salisbury in South Australia. During the war numerous munition annexes large and small were attached to private industry. Australia's industrial pre-war facilities were also seen as a venue for reconditioning existing First World War munition surpluses. Equipment deficiencies had began to worry the army's political masters much earlier, often at the prodding of adverse criticisms in the press.
P.C. Spender, when Minister for the Army, in 1941, complained bitterly about equipment deficiencies generally. He alleged :
That deficiencies of stores and equipment for the AMF [were] so serious that it [was] extremely doubtful whether one division could be moved into action even ... on the scale required during the war 1914-
1A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941. Vol. 5) File M 6/41 Equipment Deficiencies-AIF 22 January 1941 - 14 February 1941. 214
1918 and even if full allowance [was] made for the drain upon supplies for equipment for the AIF, the fact that such a position [existed] after twenty one months of war... [indicated] very strongly that the present supply system [was] not meeting the urgent circumstances of today.2
He blamed the slow production and cumbersome ordering procedures and proposed that the not inconsiderable First World War stocks of munitions be brought into a serviceable condition. He singled out 18 - pdr artillery pieces, 4.5 inch Howitzers and Vickers and Lewis machine guns which could be quickly reconditioned in potentially suitable workshops pinpointed by the local manufacturing knowledge of the New South Wales factory inspectors.
The major logistics problem encountered was the lead time required to define
requirements and to design and manufacture ordnance, a problem not always foreseen by senior army managers. There were numerous other problems including strategic considerations, the usually high development costs involved, the lack of appropriate manufacturing skills, the insecurity of supply lines for component parts from overseas and the lack of sufficient large scale manufacturing facilities. Manufacture was made no easier by the inability of the Australian services, and of the army in particular, to forecast with any degree of accuracy the likely demand for munitions under any given set of circumstances.
The production of munitions in Australia fell into two categories. The first was the manufacture of munitions based on designs and specifications supplied mainly by
Great Britain, the second, those produced from Australian designs and specifications laid down by the appropriate Australian authorities. The main difficulty in the first category was one of production engineering. Here, it was necessary to ensure the continuity of large-sized orders which would ensure smooth production runs and relatively low unit costs. The same problem
2A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol.5) File M 56/41. Deficiencies in Stores and Equipment. 5 May 1941. 215
bedevilled the second type of munitions manufacture, but here a further difficulty was the reluctance of the army to accept Australian designs.
Examples of munition production based on overseas design and specifications - the manufacture of the .303 Mk 3 Lee-Enfield rifle, the production of various machine guns and some artillery and mortar equipment - will be discussed in the next section. Subsequent sections will examine the manufacture of some
Australian-designed munitions and the problems encountered in the production of uniforms.
Manufacture of Overseas Designs
Due to the foresight of the Government between the wars, at the beginning of the
Second World War there was ample capacity to produce all of Australia's estimated requirements of .303 Lee-Enfield rifles. Several factors may have affected the ability of the SAF at Lithgow to meet sudden surges of demand. One was the low base production rate and low stock levels just prior to the war. This is best illustrated by the following incident. In 1936 the NSW police force endeavoured to obtain 1,200 to 1,300 Mark I .303 Lee-Enfield rifles. At that time the prescribed war reserve was 300,000, earmarked for equipping two cavalry and two infantry divisions for home defence, one expeditionary division and the requisite number of L of C and other troops, plus an anticipated first year's wastage of 34,000. The production rate at the SAF, Lithgow at that time was of the order of 1,000 rifles per annum. The Military Board recommended that the rifles be loaned rather than sold and that they be subject to recall if needed.^ The inference is that the prescribed war reserve was not in stock otherwise selling the equipment would have been preferable to lending it.
3A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1936 Vol. 1) File 3/36 Loan of Rifles to NSW Police Force, 7 February 1936. 216
A second factor may have been the decision to turn over some of the rifle production capacity to Bren gun manufacture. While in 1936 rifle stocks were considered inadequate, one year later the Military Board was recommending that because the light machine gun (Bren) would to a large extent replace the rifle, production of the latter at SAF, Lithgow should be reduced from 50,000 to 30,000 per annum.4 However, the Board did not appreciate the lead-time required for new equipment manufacture to reach anticipated production volumes. In fact, the lead-time for the Bren gun was 5.5 years from the formulation of the service requirements for this weapon in 1935 to the anticipated quantity production stage in May 1941.5
A third factor affecting rifle production was a basic miscalculation in what the army's stocks of rifles should be. The basis of the estimate was the number of rifles required per unit during the First World War and the wastage rates experienced in the Palestine campaigns rather than those that occurred in the western front where the wastage rates were much higher. In June 1940 the flaw in the calculation of wastage rates was realised and a drastic revision of stock requirements had to be made. The re-estimated annual production rate was 100,000 rifles per annum, only to be doubled twelve months later.®
In 1940 the rifle situation was quite critical, exacerbated by the transfer of about
30,000 rifles to Great Britain in the second half of 1940.^ While there had been sufficient rifles in 1939 and early 1940 to equip the first two AIF divisions, there were not enough for the expanding home forces, and impressment of .303 Lee-
4A.T. ROSS, Awakening the Apocalypse ..., Op.cit., p.309 A Table 6. 5A.T. ROSS, Wartime Munitions Expansion in Australia 1939-1945, Op.cit., p.27 Table 8. 6A.T. ROSS, The Arming of Australia, p.309 A Table 6. 7D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p.35 217
Enfield rifles was authorised to meet the deficiency estimated in June 1941 to be 70,000 weapons.®
The impressment yielded a large quantity of rifles, many of them fitted with aperture sights which were not part of the initial costing of four pounds per rifle so that an additional impressment order had to be raised.^ ironically, six months later the MGO reported that most of the rifles were no longer needed and were of little military use. Consequently 51,000 rifles were returned to their original owners.Nevertheless the impressment of rifles had served a useful purpose because it partially made good the deficency experienced earlier in the war. By the end of 1942 the annual production rate had climbed to 209,462 and towards the end of the war reached 240,000 whereupon it was halved by the War Cabinet.
The manufacture of machine guns was also a matter of concern. Two machine guns were manufactured in Australia, the Vickers and the Bren. The Vickers machine gun was manufactured also for 'export' in addition to Australian army requirements and this was a cause of difficulty for the army. In 1940 the production rate of Vickers machine guns was about 20 per week, which did not alleviate the stock depletion due to meeting AIF requirements and supplying regular shipments to India. The War Cabinet did not accept a commitment existed for deliveries to India while local requirements were not met and ordered the weekly production to be stepped up by 50 per cent. By early 1941, production had risen to 50 per
8A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941. Voi.5) File M 86/41. 20 June 1941. Impressment of Rifles. WC Minute 1317, Agendum 261/1941. Memorandum SM 12747 of 29 September 1941. 9|bid. Memorandum SM 16410, 13 December 1941. I0|bid. Report by MGO, 2 June 1942. 11A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1945 Vol.4) File M 18/45 Production of Small Arms WC Minute 4298. Agendum 243/45. 11 July 1945. 218 month, but this was still inadequate to meet AIF needs and outstanding overseas orders which were well in excess of the annual production rate. In addition to the Indian order of 1,004 guns, New Zealand had ordered 160 (subsequently increased to 218), and Fiji 10.12 Strangely, despite the War Cabinet's ruling, production allocation to India remained at 1,004. The New Zealand and Fiji orders for 218 and 10 were still to be met. The Dutch East Indies stepped up their original orders with a further 1,000 in April 1941."'3 The Australian Army received only 129.
The Defence Committee became somewhat alarmed about the high rate of 'exports' and recommended that no more than 50 per cent of the whole production be allocated to overseas customers.""^ By July of 1941 orders for Vickers machine guns were placed on a monthly quota system: India 100, Dutch East Indies 25, Army 50, 30 of which were allocated a month later by the Department of Defence to the air force.
At this stage the CGS was in a dilemma. His preference was for the Bren machine gun but its production rate was low at that time. Yet he still needed Vickers machine guns. Consequently he persuaded the War Cabinet to order an increase of the original production rate of 200 per month and a reduction of the Indian quota from 100 per month to 75.''® By the time Japan entered the war the Australian army was still over 3,000 Vickers' machine guns short, despite a production rate which by then had reached 280 per month and which would rise to over 360 by July 1942. Army stocks of spare parts for Vickers machine guns were also
12A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence-Classified Correspondence) File 23/301/71 Vickers' Machine Guns for India WC Minute 297, 17 June 1940 and Memorandum Ministry of Munitions to Minister of Defence 12 February 1941. I3|bid. I4|bid. Defence Committee Note 39/1941. 24 April 1941. I5|bid. Defence Committee Note 77/1941. 1 July 1941. I6|bid. WC Minute 1557. 8 August 1941. 219
considerably short of requirements and orders for large quantities of various items were outstanding from the Department of Munitions.""^
Despite their tactical effectiveness (range, rate of fire), Vickers' machine guns were not as versatile as light machine guns. The Australian army had decided in
1935 that the light machine gun of the future would be the Bren, a development of
Czechoslovakian origin intended to replace the Lewis and Hotchkiss guns. In
1937 the Military Board had estimated that on the basis of an anti-raids policy, the number of Bren guns required complete with spare barrels each would be as follows:"'®
PurpQ§9 No
To equip First Line Component 3,600 First quarter war wastage 720 Total required on mobilisation 4,320 Estimated annual war wastage 1,800 Total number of spare barrels required on mobilisation 7,960 Estimated war wastage of spare barrels 1,900
The Board concluded that a Bren gun factory was required and thought its capacity should be such as to meet the estimated annual wastage rate of 1,800 in an anti- raid scenario.in the event, no new factory was built. The SAF at Lithgow already had the major production facilities for manufacturing Bren guns in place, though the factory floor space had to be substantially increased. Once the
production stage had been reached (1941), the factory was able to cope with the
17A.T. Ross maintains that very late orders were responsible for this deficiency. Personal communication. ^ . 18A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence) File 23/301/2. Bren Gun Factory. M/BD. Memorandum to Secretary, Dept. of Defence 13 April 1937. I9|bid. 220
demand and to increase its production rate quite substantially over the years, so much so that towards the end of the war some of the production capacity was changed into repair work and spare parts manufacture.20 Once SAF Lithgow was tooled up, the provision of Bren guns presented few if any problems. It was the standard light machine gun of the Empire forces. The only impact on its availability were at times tardy deliveries caused by the failure to maintain realistic ordering schedules.
The provision of artillery equipment told a different story. The first artillery equipment to be discussed here is the 40mm quick-firing Bofors anti-aircraft gun which was very effective against low-flying aircraft and dive bombers. The senior resource managers had not appreciated the need for such equipment.
Inexplicably the experience of Japanese warfare in China had passed them by, and even the European experience in 1939 and 1940 did nothing to speed them in making up their mind that such equipment was needed in the Australian army.
Eventually an order was placed with the Department of Munitions for 43 units in
January 1941.21 Towards the end of 1941 the army increased its order to 500 and after Japan's entry into the war the army more than doubled its requirements when the lesson of Pearl Harbour and Darwin had been driven home.
The erratic ordering of a gun whose effectiveness should have been obvious since
June 1940, at the latest, threw the production instrumentalities into chaos. It is inexplicable that the CGS, for instance, should not have realised its importance.
The availability of Bofors guns at Darwin and in New Guinea would have made a major difference in efforts to resist the Japanese. The only explanation is that the senior Australian army managers just had not appreciated the effectiveness of
20A-2653 (M/BD. Proc. 1945 Vol. 4) File M 118/45. WC Minute 4298 Agendum 243/45. Production of Small Arms. 11 July,1945. 21 A.T. Ross, Awaking the Apocalypse, Chapter 11, p.5. 221
Japanese aircraft, hence the tardiness in providing for appropriate anti-aircraft defences.
Fortunately, the case of the 25-pdr field gun was a happier story. During the interwar years the standard field artillery gun was the 18-pdr gun (low trajectory) and the 4.5 inch howitzer (high trajectory), both 'survivors from the war 1914-
1918'.22 By the middle thirties a new field artillery piece had reached production
in Great Britain, namely the 25-pdr field gun, meant to fulfil the roles of both its
predecessors. The Australian army and the Munitions Supply Board both
enthusiastically supported the notion of local manufacture of the new gun.23
There was a serious initial delay in commencing production - drawings did not
materialise from England - so Australian production commenced on the basis of
Canadian designs. The first 25-pdr gun wholly constructed in Australia became
available in October 1941.24
A shortened version for employment under jungle and mountainous conditions
and capable of being dropped by air reached the production stage in 1943.
While the users were unanimous in their praise of the standard version, opinions
were divided in respect of the shortened model. Mellor suggests this was due to
artillery men having expectations of it which its designers had not intended.25
The main advantages of the 'short' 25-pdr gun were its portability - the gun could
be broken down into ten pieces - its considerably reduced weight and a relatively
small loss of range, 13 percent, compared with the standard 25-pdr version.26
22D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, p.234. 23|bjd. 24|bid. p.237. 25|bid. pp.238-239. 26lbid. 222
While the Australian infantry division was superior in most respects to its
Japanese counterpart, its medium 3-inch mortars were outranged by the Japanese infantry gun by something like 1,200 yards.27 The counter weapon was the
British-developed 4.2-inch mortar. This weapon outranged the Japanese infantry gun by about 700 yards but was almost three times as heavy as the 3-inch weapon. Nevertheless, it was a weapon suitable for mountain warfare, and more mobile than the Australian 'short' 25-pdr or the wheeled Japanese infantry gun. In addition, it required far less space from which to fire than the other two weapons. It was cheaper and easier to manufacture. Thus War Cabinet had no hesitation in ordering 500 units early in 1942.28
The provision of anti-tank guns was an example of stop/start procedures and unco-ordinated effort only too common during the war. The War Cabinet had realised the inconsistency early in 1941 and established the principle that the production of anti-tank and tank guns should dovetail with the availability of tanks per se.29 The same ruling was to be applied to experimentation with 25-pdr tank guns. The programme for providing 17-pdr and 25-pdr tank gun equipment was cancelled by War Cabinet in 1943 because at that stage the production of tanks in
Australia was very much in doubt.
Development of Munitions of Australian Design
Although by far the majority of munition items manufactured in Australia were of overseas designs, some Australian-designed munitions were developed. Two
27A.T. Ross, Awaking the Apocalypse, Chapter 12, p.7. 28A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 3) File M 120/42. Provision of 4.2 inch Mortar for Australian Requirements. WC Minute 2460 Agendum 436/1942. 29 October,1942. 29A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1942 Vol. 3) File M 96/42. Tank and Anti-tank Guns WC Minute 2570 Agendum 395/1941/suppl. 1. 11 January 1942. 30A-2653 (M/Bd Proc. 1943 Vol. 2) File M 71/43 12 October 1943. Army Requirements in Artillery and Weapons. WC Minute 3081. Agendum 321/43 13 July 1943. 223
examples will be discussed here, one which never reached the production stage - the Cruiser tank - and the other an eminently successful infantry weapon - the
Owen submachine gun.
The manufacture of tanks, as distinct from machine gun carriers, constituted the one major problem Australia was unable to solve, yet the army persisted with it almost against all odds while it resisted for a long time the production of the Owen
SMG. Reasons for the difficulties were many and varied.
Ross maintains that the problem was not:
... the Army's propensity for endless design changes nor DAFVP (Directorate of Armoured Fighting Vehicles Production) failure to follow equipment procedures laid down by the MGO branch. It was a complete lack of any laboratory and engineering capability for the design and manufacture of AFN/s.^""
Ross' view is supported by army sources:
The project [AFV] design [was] the only important Australian munitions activity that did not reach successful production because of manufacturing difficulties.^^
The MGO branch blamed the Department of Munitions and the Directorate of
Armoured Fighting Vehicles Production for this failure.33 Yet despite the alleged and probably real shortcomings of Australian design and manufacturing facilities
Ross commented that the Australian Cruiser tank Mk I (AC1) was superior to the
31A.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia, pp.398-399. 32A-1194 (Dept. of Defence-Library) Accession no. 29618/24.14. The History of the MGO Branch, p.72. 33|t is not intended to discuss the politics underlying the AFV projects because they are fully covered by A.T. Ross in Chapters 6 and 7 of his The Arming of Australia or in the Department of Defence, Central Studies Establishment, Wartime Munitions Expansion in Australia 1939-1945, CSE Rept. 13 June 1978, AR-000-620. 224 tanks the Japanese were able to put against the Australians,and that the Australian tank hulls cast by BHP in one piece had ballistic qualities that were superior to those made anywhere else in the world ^^
One of the difficulties experienced in the tank project was the ambitious nature of the Australian tank requirements, already indicated in Chapter 8. The army was tardy in supplying the specifications for the Australian Cruiser Mark I (AC1). The first finalised specification did not emerge until November 1941. The major technical problem was the provision of suitable tank engines. The Cadillac engines available in Australia in 1941 were not powerful enough and their supply could be interrupted. It was suggested that Pratt and Whitney single row WASP engines might be used in the Australian Cruiser tanks and that the bulk of these engines should be diverted from the air force to the army.^® Curtin did not agree with this suggestion: a decision of this nature could not be implemented without regard to the general defence situation, the production capacity and the cost.^^ The whole project faltered when the Defence Committee pointed out that Government had given priority to aircraft production and that consequently WASP engines would not be available for tank production.
Other technical problems encountered centred on difficulties in gear box design and manufacture and the rolling of the required armour which was too thick for Australian manufacturing capability.The Australian munition production instrumentalities both civilian and military had bitten off more than they could chew.
34a.T. ROSS, The Arming of Australia, p.373. 35|bid. 36A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence) File 45/302/102. Production of Tank Engines. CGS to Minister 28 October 1941. 37|bjd. Curtin to Forde 14 November 1941. 38|bid. Forde to Curtin 28 November 1941. DC Minute 2/1942 of 8 January 1942. 39a.T. Ross, Awakenng the Apocalypse, Chapter 11, p.33. 225
Technological difficulties and the politics of the project impeded co-operation between the army and the Directorate of Fighting Vehicles Production. Matters were made worse by the army, which would not settle for a tank capable of meeting anything the Japanese could put up, yet looked for equipment that was equal or superior to anything the Germans could field against them.
That the Government had lost faith in the Australian tank production effort is clear from an exchange of messages in January 1942 between the Minister for the Army
and Australia House in London. The Minister asked for the dispatch of 775
Cruiser tanks to Australia because local production would take too long.^o The
reply from the High Commissioner (Sir Earl Page) is interesting:
Tanks. Australia [had] asked for a total of 140 Matildas ...775 American Cruiser tanks were requested. 905 had been released. Of the Matildas released 20 were shipped in January, 60 in February, 60 are for shipment in March and 20 for each of the succeeding months. Of Cruiser tanks released 10 were shipped from the United States as far back as August, 20 were shipped from the United Kingdom in January, a further 50 were to have been shipped from the United States in January. So far as I know only 15 have gone due to the American shipping position. The following released for shipment from the United States: 125 February, 150 March, 150 April, 200 May, 200 June.4i
The reply indicates that 160 tanks had been either or were about to be shipped to
Australia, not counting the considerable quantity earmarked for later delivery. On
the face of it there was really no need for Australia to manufacture tanks but the
Army wanted a new design. Blamey suggested in April 1942 that
Although a number of tanks [were] now being delivered ... from overseas [they were] ... rapidly becoming obsolete. The Australian tank on the other hand [was] of advanced design
40A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence) File 45/302/161. Tank Production. Minister to High Connmissioner, 17 January 1942. 41 Ibid. Curtin to Forde 12 March 1942. 42|bid. Blamey to Forde 17 April 1942. 226
He recommended that production of tanks be continued because Australia had no control over deliveries but twelve months later the LGA advised the Minister that:
We now find that there is considerable over-production of tanks for our immediate requirements and we have a reserve of 100 per cent
He recommended discontinuing any work on AC Mk III but continuing with the prototype of AC Mk IV.
The Government drew the only possible conclusion from the sorry history of tank production'^s gnci ordered tank manufacture in Australia to cease.At the same time it approved the purchase of 310 American M4 Shermans, an order that was later upgraded to 510 units. All tanks held in Australia in 1944 were considered unsuitable in the light of heavier anti-tank guns that had developed elsewhere, but of course that did not necessarily affect the conflict with Japan. Also, these tanks had been declared obsolete by the countries of their origin and were nearing the end of their useful life."^^ It was eventually suggested that these tanks should be disposed of for the clearing of ditches and irrigation channels.It would have been a very poor bargain for the prospective users because the tanks would not have been in very good condition and spare parts would have been hard if not impossible to obtain.
43|bid. 44A-2653 ((M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.3) File M 101/43 Procurement of Matilda Close Support Tanks from New Zealand 29 May 1944. 45A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence) File 45/302/161. Notes on the History of Tank Production in Australia 1939 - July 1942 compiled by F.S. Shedden 14 July 1942. 46A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol.3) File M 101/43. Finalisation of Australian Tank Production WC Minute 3300 Agendum 62/1944. 47A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1944 Vol. 4) File M 316/44. Tank Policy. WC Agendum 574/44, 24 November 1944 to 4 January 1945. 48A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1945 Vol. 8) File M 258/45. Unwanted Tanks. 20 November 1942. 227
A contrast to the failure to develop an Australian-designed tank to the production stage was the eventually very successful manufacture of the Owen SMG.
Ross maintains :
Of all the munitions made in Australia during the Second World War the Owen SMG was ... designed and developed wholly in Australia; and it turned out to be the best SMG in the Western Allies arsenal of armaments. However, the weapon would never have emerged if it had been left in the hands of the Army MGO Branch and the Chief Military Adviser's Branch.
The need for such a SMG was taken seriously in Australia only after the British
army had realised its potential. The Australian armed services rigidly adhered to what Ross called the 'uniformity of armaments with Britain (UAB) rule'.so it was
not until after June 1940 that the Australian army followed the British example
and became really interested in sub-machine guns despite the fact that one Evelyn
Owen5i had submitted prototypes as early as 1936 and again in 1939.^2 Even then the resistance of the army to the Owen model was so strong that War Cabinet
had to order the production of 100 experimental Owen guns against the advice of the Military Board.
The question of the calibre of the gun caused some controversy. Essington
Lewis54 agreed to either 0.45 or 0.38 inch calibre, because these calibres were
49A.T. Ross, Awakening the Apocalypse, Chapter 11, p.18. S^A.T. Ross. The Arming of Australia, p.72. Evelyn Ernest Owen, 1915-1949, was an inventor born and educated in Wollongong, New South Wales. He perfected the Owen SMG which was patented in 1941. He enlisted in the AIF during the war but was released to assist in the production of his invention. 52A.T. Ross. The Arming of Australia, p.344-349. 53A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 497 Production of Owen Guns 1941. A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol. 4) File M 50/41. 29 October 1941. Owen SMG. Advice by M/BD. 10 May 1941. Author's italics. 54Born at Burra, S.A. in 1881 and educated at St. Peter's College and S.A. Schools of Mines and Industries, Essington Lewis joined BHP Limited at Broken Hill in 1904 as a miner and rose to Chief General Manager of the Company in the late 1930s. Appointed by the Menzies Government as Director General of Munitions he was thus largely responsible for Australia's industrial war effort. He died on 1 October 1961. 228 already produced in Australians and were also the CGS' choice. There is an apparent discrepancy between Ross' account and what the previously quoted Shedden papers reported. Ross maintains that the army stipulated 0.38 whereas the Shedden papers suggest that 9 mm was the army's preferred calibre. The army had switched belatedly to 9 mm on British advice relating to the Sten gun. If, as Ross implies, the army wanted to torpedo the project, the suggestion of other calibres would have served the purpose: the 0.38 because it was a revolver ammunition and the 9 mm because none was made in Australia at that time and special tooling-up would have been required by the ammunition factories. In the event, the 0.38 inch was the calibre adopted for trial and testing but 9 mm for production purposes.in 1942 a further order was placed for 2,000 Owen SMG. Eventually field trials and reports from New Guinea demonstrated the superiority of the Owen over the Austen and its close relative the Sten SMGs. Yet the army kept on complaining that, compared with the Austen, the Owen was more difficult to manufacture, took longer to produce, and consumed more labour and machine tool resources.^^
The CGS finally conceded that both guns were equally efficient's and the C in C in his correspondence with the Minister in February and July 1943 stated that there was nothing much to choose between the two but he still felt that the Austen was cheaper and on that account would have to be preferred. The Minister made it very clear that not only had the Owen been accepted by the previous Government and endorsed by the present one as the standard Australian SMG equipment, but
55A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 489 Reports by Director General of Munitions. No.15, September 1941. Also WC Minute 1476, 6 November 1941. 56A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 490. Reports by Director General of Munitions, Report Number 17 November 1941. 57A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 490, Reports by Director General of Munitions No.22, April/May 1941. 58|bjd. 229 more importantly it would take a Cabinet submission to reverse the current situation.59
In the event, Australia produced both Owen and Austen SMGs. The unit price for the Owen and the Austen SMGs were 15 pounds and 13 pounds respectively but when tooling-up costs were taken into account, there was little difference in the cost of the two weapons.60 The following forward estimates, however, illustrate the relative popularity of the two SMGs.
Austen Owen Total requirement to 30 June 1946 11,918 54,369 Stock in hand as at 8 March 1945 15,105 39,683 Balance 3,187 14,686 Surplus Deficiency
The table shows that there were over two and a half times as many Owens in the Australian army as Austens.^^
In the beginning of the discussion of the provision of SMGs it was suggested that if the sacrosanct principle 'the army knows best' had been followed, Australian soldiers would have had to wait a long time for a weapon that was more efficient than the one they were eventually given and which they, clearly, preferred. The sources consulted, including the accounts by Ross®^ and Mellor,®^ indicate a stubbornness on the part of the CMA and the then MGO, backed by the C in C
59A-816/1 (Dept. of Defence Classified Correspondence) File 23/301/86. Submachine Gun Requirements. Forde to Blamey 5 March 1943. ®0A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1944 Vol. 3) File M 116/44. Submachine Guns WC Minute 3535. Agendum 219/44 9 May 1944. A.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia, p. 368. 6l|bid. Memorandum Dept. of Army to Dept. of Defence, No. 13 11687 of 6 March 1945. 62A.T. Ross, The Arming of Australia, pp.344-370. 63A.T. Ross, Awakening the Apocalypse, Chapter 11, pp.18-29. 64D.P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, pp.325-332. 230 and the CGS, in their preference for the British product. This attitude caused a reaction in government circles. J.W. O'Brien was to write in 1959:
Japanese initial operations ... had made it obvious that sub-machine guns were essential weapons for Australia and the Pnme Minister himself had personally taken an interest in accelerating output. As a matter of fact it was the delays and other matters on the Owen gun that brought about the removal of the Mastergeneral of the Ordnance (Maj Gen Milford) and my own predecessor (Brig L.E.S. Barker).®^
Upon his return from the Middle East, General Blamey, now appointed C in C, must have sensed that the General Staff by its refusal to accept the Owen gun was not held in great favour by the Government. This may have prompted Blamey to appoint Milford GOC 5 Australian Division in April 1942 and to make Beavis his successor. But this did not make Blamey a supporter of the Australian- designed SMG.66 One explanation has already been put forward, namely the ingrained belief by some senior army officers that Australia was simply incapable of producing efficient munitions.®^ By corollary, most senior resource managers by tradition and experience were 'Empire men', hence inclined to the belief that almost by definition anything developed in the U.K. must be superior.
But this interpretation would be an oversimplification. The adoption of non- standard equipment always carries with it the possibility of failure. It cannot be anticipated how the equipment is going to perform compared with a model already tested in the field and in an advanced state of production development. It was a question of 'safety first', an attitude understandable even if not defensible, bearing in mind Australia's short history in the manufacture of mechanical equipment. Had
®5Letter Brig J.W. O'Brien to Curator of Fire Arms, Museum of Applied Science, Victoria. 26 February 1959. By courtesy of Dr. A.T. Ross. 66A-816/1 (Dept.of Defence-Classified Correspondence) File 23/301/86. Submachine Gun Requirements, Forde to Blamey 5 March,1943. 67AWM S74 (Mellor Papers)Box 3 Bundle 1. Mobilising Industry for War. Letter Brig. J. O'Brien to D.P. Mellor 27 March 1957. 231
the Owen proved unsatisfactory under operational as distinct from test conditions the senior military resource managers would have been blamed and not the manufacturers.
Production of Uniforms
Despite the interest shown between the wars by the militia units in Australia in
distinctive and colourful uniforms, the military resource managers resisted this
tendency except in the case of Highland dress. The public pressure of the
Caledonian societies proved to be too strong.Restrictions of funds and the
endeavour to standardise and thereby simplify the provision of uniforms led to drab
military clothing which in the views of the Military Board was perhaps not even
particularly suitable for Australian conditions. The CGS had laid down some
principles in 1938 which were designed to govern the specifications of Australian
uniforms. The field service dress was to make the soldier feel comfortable when
engaged in training or on operations. The undress uniform was to ensure the
soldier looked neat when in contact with civilians.®^ Other items of dress were
there to fulfil special purposes. For the vast majority of Australian soldiers, the
infantry, there was only one uniform. The aim, understandably, was to reserve all
available funds for the accumulation of war stocks and this did not allow any
divergence from standard patterns in peace time.
A uniform scale had been laid down in 1935^° and although the strength of the
home forces doubled in 1938/39 the scale did not increase correspondingly. For
instance, the then Minister for Defence reported a clothing intake by May 1939 to
68A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1934 -Vol. 2) File 101/34 Scottish Dress, 2 November 1934. 69MP/B 1535 (Army HQ Main Correspondence Series) File 734/1/367. Uniforms. Memorandum QMG to AG of 18 August 1938. 70A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1935 Vol. 1) File 12/35 of Mobilisation Reserves of Clothing 27 February 1935. 232
equip about 15,000 all ranks with their standard issueJ^ Based on a mobilisation period of eight weeks a complete set of personal issue was to be available for
251,000 all ranks on the 56th day of mobilisation72 But, due to the financial climate, the army had not insisted on increased clothing output prior to the war.
Nevertheless there were just sufficient stocks of uniforms available for the
Inspector General to insist that on the day war broke out, that issues should be made to enlistees when they were attested rather than wait until they were called up73
In the light of the temporary shortage of uniforms in 1939, the Contract Board recommended measures to speed up the supply of uniforms by introducing short cuts into the ordering procedure mainly in respect of tendering. Proven suppliers were to be approached on the basis of current prices with speed of delivery as a main criterion,bearing in mind that it took seven hours to make a uniform as compared with 1.6 hrs to produce a ready made civilian suit. But the
Department of the Treasury did not agree to shortened procedures.
Also, the Government had adopted an unusal way of funding the provision of uniforms, one which departed from the usual provision of supplies. A Clothing
Materials Trust Fund Account had been established as early as 1935 but the
repeated attempts of the QMG to increase the purchasing power of this fund to compensate for higher wages and increasing raw material costs were unsuccessful.
As late as 9 November 1941 War Cabinet refused to approve the recommendation of the Minister for Supply and Development that provisioning for uniforms be put on
71MP-B1535 (Army HQ Main Correspondence Series) File 734/3/746. Material for Militia Uniforms. Statement by G.A. Street 24 May 1939. 72A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1935 Vol. 1) File 12/35 of Mobilisation Reserves of Clothing 27 February 1935. 73MP-B1535 (Army HQ-Main Correspondence Series) File 734/3/796, Availability of Uniforms at Outbreak of War. 3 September 1939. 74MP-B1535 (Army HQ-Main Correspondence Series) File 770/1/247. Uniforms. Memorandum Shedden to Secretary, Treasury, 23 November 1938. 233
a twelve months' basis with regular monthly deliveries in order to guarantee smooth continuous contract activity and that in case of an emergency the Department be authorised to act in anticipation of firm demandsJs
In summary, it can be said, however, that the availability of uniforms presented few problems except for the difficulties experienced in forecasting requirements
mentioned in the previous chapter. The Provisioning periods had been 'frozen' and it would have taken a major effort on the part of the resource managers to change this. But where they failed was in not appreciating the climatic and environmental conditions which affected the service life of military clothing in New
Guinea and in the islands. They had not experienced anything like it during the
First World War or in the Mediterranean theatre in the Second World War.
The large wastage rate of shirts, for instance, was due to the heavy usage rate during training, the complete re-equipment of soldiers before going north, wear and tear under jungle conditions and the difficulties experienced in reconditioning of an article with an average service life of 14-21 days.^®
That there were no technical problems in procurement of military clothing is not surprising. Australia was a world producer of wool. Garment manufacture for the services had been carried out in one of the oldest government factories, the
Commonwealth Clothing Factory at Brunswick, Victoria, and even before the war a dozen or so private garment manufacturers were engaged in the production of uniforms.
75A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1941 Vol.4) File M 114/41. Production of War Supplies. WC Minute 1432 Agendum 340/1941 of 22 October 1941. 76A-2653 (M/Bd. Proc. 1943 Vol. 5) File M 281/43. Basis of Provision for AMF of Equipment, MGO to LGA and Minister. 24 April 1944 and 6 July 1944 respectively. 77MP-B1535 (Army HQ-Main Correspondence Series) 734/2/746. Clothing of Militia Forces. Statement by Minister for Defence. 24 May 1939 pp.3-4. 234
Basic Production Problems
Logistics based on indigGnous design and manufacture presented certain far- reaching problems. These problems were examined in depth by the Advisory War
Council which had time to contemplate issues detached from the pressures confronting the War Cabinet.
The basic question raised by the Advisory War Council was whether Australian munition production was perhaps too diversified with the result that certain vital projects were prejudiced and disadvantaged in terms of resources both human and material."^® For a nation with a limited scientific and industrial infrastructure the answer would have been 'yes'. The design and production of the Australian
Cruiser tank was a case in point. As Ross has shown, lack of realistic functional specifications on the part of the army and absence of the appropriate design and manufacturing infrastructure rendered the project abortive/^ and eventually unnecessary since usable tanks had become available from overseas from the middle of 1942 onwards.
Was there a reasonable balance between the manpower demands of the services and those of industry ? The answer was 'no'. The difficulty was exacerbated by inter-service priority problems. The acting Prime Minister, Fadden stated :
There is a competition in the demands for manpower. There is a great danger of attempting too much and not getting the best out of our total resources. We cannot meet unlimited enlistments and unlimited
78A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 490. Reports of Director General of Munitions No. 22, April/May 1942. Advisory War Council Minutes 964 and 987 of 11 June 1942. Agendum 244/1 942. 79A.T. Ross, Awakening the Apocalypse, Chapter 11, pp.29-45. 80A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 490. Reports of Director General of Munitions No. 22, April/May 1942. Advisory War Council Minutes 964 and 987 of 11 June 1942. Agendum 244/1 942. 235
demands for munitions and war supplies.
A few examples will serve to illustrate this point. The short call-up notices brought the production of electrical insulators concentrated in one large firm to a standstill because there was not enough time to train replacements.82 The shortage of labour was conducive to accelerated 'migration' of labour from firm to firm chasing the highest wages and thus slowed down production significantly, as did the high degree of absenteeism.83 The massive call-up early in 1942 negated attempts at further industrial trainings'^ and the army was forced to release skilled tradesmen for work in munitions industries on a basis of leave without pay and subject to instant recall.
Finally, and this is perhaps the crucial question, was the existing and potential
manufacturing capacity likely to outstrip the availability of raw materials or intermediary (starting) products?®® The answer here must be 'no' - the raw materials in question were indigenous to Australia, and the country was a leading world producer in some of the intermediary commodities. The availability of the intermediary products depended on the primary metallurgical production capacity, which in turn relied on an adequate but relatively not very large supply of
manpower.
S^MP-ySOCJensen Papers) S10. Box 2. Consolidation of Munitions Programme. Pearce Committee Report. W.C. Agendum 63/1941. Suppl. 3. Statement by A/Prime Minister. 7 May 1941. 82A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 489. Reports by the Director General of Munitions No. 11, May 1941. ®3A-5954 (Shedden Papers) Box 490. Reports by the Director General of Munitions No.20, February 1942. 84|bid. No. 23, May 1942. 85|bid. No. 24, June 1942. 86|bid. No. 22, April/May 1942. 236
Summary
Early in the war the army was faced with munition shortages of all kinds and, apart from some importation of war material, had to rely on indigenous sources for the provision of military equipment. There were two kinds of manufacture, one that was based almost exclusively on designs and specifications supplied by the
Ordnance Board of Great Britain and the other, the products of local design and manufacture.
Examples of the second category of munitions manufacture included the Owen
SMG and the Australian version of the Cruiser tank. The former was a well conceived and designed weapon. Its production was at first hampered by the intransigence of the army which preferred the British Austen gun. It was due to the insistence of the Australian Government rather than the support of the senior military officers that the project finally came to fruition, after a gestation period of about five years. The second example, the manufacture of the Cruiser tank, did not reach the production stage. There were some technical difficulties but the main problem was the army's continuous upgrading of specifications which, if carried into the production stage, would have produced a tank capable of fighting German armour rather than the much less sophisticated Japanese tanks.
The production of military clothing presented relatively few problems except for the failure in forecasting requirements. One of the reasons for the army's inability to do so was the failure to base calculations of wastage rates on the climatic and environmental conditions prevailing in theatres of the Pacific war. 237
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate that the logistic system of the Australian army during the Second World War, while effective was, initially, inefficient. It was effective in the sense that except for occasional shortages at unit and lower formation levels supplies and warlike materials were available to the combatant forces. It was inefficient because the regular senior resource managers were ill-prepared for the task and because the administrative infrastructure was complex and therefore cumbersome, more so than it need have been. While there were improvements in the effectiveness as the war progressed, the inefficiency of the logistic system remained a continuing battle.
Changes in defence strategies contributed to the logistics problem of the senior officers. The Blue Water defence strategy based on the Singapore naval base and the uncertainty of Japanese intentions caused Australian planners to concentrate their initial efforts on the defence of Australia's industrial heartland. The defence of the north and of New Guinea and its islands was only considered a priority when the threat against these areas crystalised in 1941.
The emerging strategic scenarios tested the competence of senior officers in ways not appreciated in the inter-war years or even early in the Second World War.
Their basic education had left them unprepared for the task of resource management. It had also left them unaware of the need to understand and keep up with the administrative and technological advances in resource management that had occurred world wide in the inter-war years. Such experience as they had gained in the First World War was at too low a level to prepare them for resource management at divisional, corps or army level twenty years later. 238
Psychologically, the senior regular officers were trained to see their profession of arms in the light of the Huntington model, that is, in terms of heroic leadership capability, rather than of the professional attititude later enshrined in the Janowitz school which recognised the need to adopt the administrative and management technologies of the society which they were called upon to defend.
The result of this lack of broad education and training in logistics was inadequate planning, obsolete stores handling technologies, cumbersome ordering procedures and outmoded forecasting techniques.
In addition to these shortcomings, many of the senior regular officers were unable to appreciate wider technological developments which had been occurring in Australia, with the result that Australian expertise in munitions design was treated by the army generally with a degree of scepticism.
Australia was fortunate that these failings on the part of the regular officers could be offset by filling some of the resource management positions with civilian (CMF) officers who had gained their military experience in the First World War but who had then made their mark in industry and commerce during the inter-war years.
Senior resource managers had little influence on the bureaucratic apparatus created to administer the logistic support of the services. The infrastructure ranged from a number of policy advising and directing bodies from War Cabinet level down to specific instrumentalities created by the services themselves. The plethora of agencies together with diverse lines of reporting to alternate civilian authorities led to an overlap of functions. It was of interest to look at the Australian logistic systems in relation to those developed in Canada and New Zealand, though the three systems were, for a variety of reasons, not strictly comparable. The Australian infrastructure was modelled on the existing public service instrumentalities with 239 their ever present philosophy of checks and balances. The Canadians created a single monolithic defence administrative structure with just one apex, covering all logistic functions. The New Zealanders worked within the logistic framework of the nations to which their forces were attached at the time.
The cumbersome structure of procedures flowed directly from the complexity of the logistic infrastructure. This became obvious early in the war and led to a virtual reversal of the funds delegation procedure, a change which was both revolutionary and beneficial. The streamlining of funds authorisation procedures appears to have been an exception in an otherwise cumbersome procedural system, although it could be interpreted simply as a means of anticipating Treasury approvals for funds. No similar change occurred in ancillary processes such as the purchasing and contract procedures, where the unwritten law of accepting the lowest tender, a hallmark of peacetime procurement practice, was still very much in vogue. Even though the economic situation of the country would not have made the opposite approach of quality-at-any-price possible, there was room for a more flexible approach.
Fortunately, the inefficiencies were not uniform across all the branches of the general staff which shared the responsibilities for logistics. The QMG branch was responsible for supplies (food, POL etc) and the management of ancillary services such as transportation and accommodation. The regular resource managers of the branch had been trained as quartermasters and logistic officers of formations in the First World War but had little opportunity during the inter-war years to add to their expertise. Their lack of awareness of advances in materials handling is a case in point. However the army was able to enlist the skills of CMF officers and civilians in appropriate fields to overcome this lack of experience. 240
In some areas the skills of senior regular officers were appropriate. For instance the transition from a horse-drawn to a mechanised army was accomplished by regular officers who were more conversant with the problems likely to be encountered than were their CMF counterparts.
Similarly, the army had no difficulties in operating docks and establishing camp facilities, tasks in which senior regular officers had ample experience.
In other cases, civilian expertise was the key. In the area of catering for instance, the major changes in established army practice were brought about by one of the country's leading civilian nutritional experts.
The management of petroleum products caused little concern, mainly because the resource managers in this field had been recruited from the petroleum distribution industry.
Major logistic tasks were the provision of adequate transport facilities in support of forces covering the vital seaboard localities and, later, the assurance of strategic mobility to the north of Australia. The first task was coped with adequately by the QMG branch, despite two problems which surfaced and which could have been ameliorated by appropriate military pre-war planning had the governments of the day encouraged such moves. One was the lack of a standard rail gauge between the various states. It restricted the strategic mobility of forces considerably. The military planners had taken no action to solve the problem despite the extensive studies which had been done to illustrate the disadvantages. The second problem was the delays caused at break-of-gauge localities. In this case there were technical advances of which the military planners should have been aware. If implemented in peace time at relatively small cost, these advances would have minimised later difficulties considerably. 241
One of the major success stories of the QMG branch was the north-south transportation facility, managed initially by CMF officers with considerable civilian experience in the transport industry.
Overall, little criticism can be sustained against the discharge of logistic
responsibilities of the QMG branch. The combination of the skills of regular officers
and civilians proved adequate for the smooth running of operations. Senior officers
had been appropriately trained and had the requisite amount of practical
experience. Where other experience was needed, civilian expertise with or without
military background was readily available. In these areas the bureaucratic
structure was not so complex as to be excessively cumbersome and inflexible.
The situation in the MGO branch was entirely different. The need for self-reliance
in the provision of ordnance logistics over and above what had already been
recognised as essential and implemented in the interwar years was at first not
appreciated. In the First World War the majority of ordnance logistics were
provided from British sources and issued to the Australian divisional AAOC depots.
Thus experience gained by Australians in ordnance matters was limited. In the
inter-war period a civilian ordnance department discharged the ordnance function,
which meant that neither regular nor CMF officers gained appropriate experience.
There was no opportunity for the creation of an efficient military ordnance
organisation in which the army's requirements, equipment design and inspection
could be integrated. At the same time there was no precedent and no build-up of
experience for the creation of an effective maintenance and stores function.
Shortcomings were caused largely by Government defence and fiscal policies.
Opportunities for appropriate education and training on the part of senior officers
were not available, apart from a few who had relevant overseas postings. It is
because of the handful of people like these that an effective - even if cumbersome - 242
Ordnance organisation was ultimately established. This organisation was able to co-ordinate the technological aspects of the production of warlike materials and to put forecasting and ordering procedures on a sound footing, which in turn enabled the manufacturers of munitions to embark on long range production planning and the army to develop a long range stocking policy.
The experience and education of most Australian senior officers, which led them to denigrate all Australian-designed munitions and only to accept unreservedly munitions manufactured in Australia to British specifications, impeded progress. Likewise, the educational and sometimes intellectual shortcomings of Australian senior officers showed up when flexibility in dealing with realistic user requirements and design specification was required.
The logistic competence of the MGO branch left much to be desired in the first two years of the war but improved considerably from 1943 onwards, when the educational shortcomings of senior resource managers were compensated for by the posting into key positions of senior officers whose intellectual and educational background enabled them to make the complex logistic infrastructure work.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing. Compared with 1939, the army's logistic system was, basically, little different in 1945 because most of the logistic systems had been in place embryonically in some form as functions of the Military Board. The major difference, and one that was more apparent than real, was the funds authorisation procedure which delegated emergency fiscal powers to the senior resource managers. This change in procedures speeded up procurement of warlike material and improved the efficiency of the logistic systems.
The extensive involvement of senior civilian resource managers and specialists in various fields with military experience gained in the First World War and, in the 243 inter-war years, brought to the logistic system a breadth and depth of an educational basis which would have been unattainable if the army had had to rely entirely on their own regular army officers with their restricted educational background.
The two outstanding exceptions among the senior staff officers in terms of educational background were Maj Gen Beavis, the MGO a regular officer, and Brig O'Brien, the Deputy MGO and a CMF officer. These two succeeded in cleaning up erratic ordering procedures and ensuring the influence of fighting soldiers on the design and development of munitions, thereby removing some the major factors contributing to the initial inefficiency of the logistic system.
The lesson for future army resource management was understood by the wartime MGO when he prescribed the qualifications senior resource managers should have. However, Australian post Second World War military history does not appear to show that the lesson had been learned. From the late forties to the late sixties Australia maintained expeditionary forces in Asia under combat conditions. The Australian units were made up of regular soldiers and volunteers for overseas service who in the first instance had been conscripted. This was a framework which provided for training of regular junior officers but did not enhance the education of future senior resource managers.
Logistically, the support of the Australian forces in recent combatant situations has also been quite unsatisfactory. They had received their basic issues from surplus Second Worid War stocks which, by the middle sixties, had become virtually obsolete or unusable. This :
pointed both to the unpreparedness of the army for operations and the lack of priorities accorded the battalion [ 1 RAR ] during the time in which 244
it was prepared for overseas serviced
Initially supplied and maintained from USA resources, it was found in Vietnam that by the time an Australian task force reached brigade strength, the formation of an
Australian Logistic Support Group had become necessary because the American army could not cope with supplying the Australians. According to Tillbrook this organisation did not function particularly well because of shortcomings and general inexperience at the Australian end.2
The Australian military resource managers were either still ill-prepared for their task
- the failure of Australian boots was almost a repeat of the expehence in New
Guinea twenty five years earlier- or were hamstrung by fiscal contingencies or a mixture of both. By the middle sixties a new generation of senior military officers had emerged but their education had varied little from what had been available twenty years earlier. Even more importantly, the army could no longer draw on the civilian expertise in resource management so freely available in the Second World
War.
It is not surprising that the need for a broader and more liberal education of
Australia's regular officers was reflected in the formation of the tri-service Australian
Defence Force Academy offering full academic university educational facilities, to be reinforced, hopefully in the not too distant future, by the establishment of a
National Defence College of Australia.^
1 Jeffrey Grey, >4 Military History of Australia, p.234. 2J.D. Tillbrook, To the Warrior his Arms, pp.511-512. ^Cathy Downes, Senior Officer Professional Development, pp.89-101. 245
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1942/3 M112/42 Emergency camp accommodation, October 1942. 1942/3 Ml 18/42 Establishment of Australian Army Catering Corps, February 1943. 1942/3 Ml 20/42 4.2" mortars, October 1942. 1942/3 Ml 28/42 Disposal of lend/lease motor trucks, 1942. 1942/3 Ml 35/42 Glebe Island, 1942. 1942/3 Ml 37/42 Enlisted personnel for clerical duties, November 1942. 1943/1 M 16/43 Jungle division, January 1943. 1943/1 M 23/43 Board of Business Administration, 1943. 1943/1 M 39/43 Maintenance of motor transport, 1943. 1943/1 M 52/43 Period of forward ordering, 1943- 1944. 1943/2 M 71/43 Army requirements on artillery and weapons, October 1943. 1943/3 Ml 01/43 Matilda tanks from New Zealand, May 1944. 1943/3 Ml 44/43 Defence Committee, 4 August 1943. 1943/3 M147/43 The army's war effort,' 1943. 1943/3 Ml 58/43 Australia1944. n army audit corps, 1942- 1943/4 Ml 61/43 Respective responsibilities GS - MGO branches, 1943-1944. 1943/4 Ml 62/43 Returned stores and salvage, 1943 - 1944. 1943/4 Ml 65/43 Underdrawn rations, 1943. 1943/4 Ml 85/43 Research section at LHQ, 1943 - 1944. 251
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1943/5 M281/43 Equipment of AMF, 1943/1944.
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1945/1 M 2/45 Civil affairs organisation, 1944- 1945. 1945/1 M 10/45 Unit maintenance, 1944-1945. 1945/1 M 18/45 Production of small arms, July 1945. 1945/2 M 56/45 Directorate of Research, 1945. 1945/2 M 98/45 Review of direct war effort, 1945. 1945/3 M 80/45 Conversion of jungle division to standard infantry division, March 1945. 1945/4 Ml 02/45 Purchasing procedures, 1945. 1945/4 Ml 18/45 Production of small arms,July 1945. 1945/5 Ml 48/45 Re-conquest of occupied territories, July 1945. 1945/5 Ml 56/45 Unit maintenance, August 1945. 1945/6 Ml 86/45 Standardisation of Australian railway gauges, September 1945. 1945/8 M257/45 Reconciliation of stores, 1945. 1945/8 M258/45 Unwanted tanks, November 1942. 1945/8 M294/45 Abolition of War Cabinet, February 1946. 1945/8 M302/45 Study of structural organisation (Wilson Study) 1945. 1946/1 M 14/46 Reversion to old Military Board organisation - Appointment of Business Member, October 1946. 1946/4 Ml 17/46 Reversion to old Military Board organisation - Appointment of Business Member, December 1946. A-2657/1 Military Board Proceedings - Historical Records 1936/2 File Defence Organisation, November 1904. 253
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RUDLAND, W.W. Analysis of War Usage Rates for Ammunition and and ROSS, A.T. Review of Australian Activities. Directorate of Operational Analysis-Army. Report 7 February 1987, Report 8 November 1987.
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MCCARTHY, Dudley. South West Pacific Area - First Year. Kokoda to Lae. AWM (Canberra)Series 1 (Army) Vol. iv, 1959.
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HORNER, D.M. Crisis of Command - Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat, 1941-1943. A.N.U. Press (Canberra) 1978.
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E. SERIAL PUBLICATIONS
Australia - Parliament - Hansard (Representatives)
Australian Military Forces - General Routine Orders (since 1942)
Canberra Times
Commonwealth Government Gazette
Daily Telegraph (Sydney)
Melbourne Herald (Melbourne)
Sun (Sydney)
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)